

# THIERRY DE MONTBRIAL

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The time has now come to conclude the work of these two days, which has been very intense – indeed, I am full of admiration for you all, Ladies and Gentlemen, for having been so assiduous, despite of the attractions outside.

I would like to say a few words about some aspects of the idea of world governance. What is the challenge, in the end? It is to ensure that our planet in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is safe, that is to say that we no longer have great world wars, and that this planet is not only more developed and better developed economically, but also fairer, and finally that we have both security and prosperity. Basically, we need to do for the entire planet what we have tried to do for some sixty years with the European Union. And I have to tell you that it is my profound conviction that, in a century, in other words at the beginning of the 22<sup>nd</sup> century, either the whole world will be a vast European Union in terms of organisation, or there will have been tragedies, conflicts and world wars. With the ensuing technological developments and degree of interdependency, one can imagine how devastating a great world war could be. We would be wrong to imagine that a world war has become unthinkable; that is quite simply not true, and the issue for our discussions, the real challenge of this World Policy Conference, is how to help organise the world so that such tragedies can be avoided, so that, conversely, we have the best of interdependency. The experience of the European Union shows that the necessary governance can be established only gradually. Kemal Dervis mentioned a little while ago, and rightly, that it took the Greek crisis – although he did not mention it explicitly – for the European Union, or at least the euro zone, to undertake seriously what it should have been doing from the start, that is, to create additional methods of economic coordination and new mechanisms of solidarity. And we well knew, moreover, from the moment that we set up the single currency, that sooner or later we would have to develop much more rigorous procedures for budgetary and fiscal coordination.

Again on the subject of the challenges of this World Policy Conference, may I remind you of some basic historical facts. We have alluded to the first globalisation; the first globalisation was, in reality, a consequence of the scientific revolution of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. But how did the world organise itself after this first globalisation? It was organised from Europe, through colonisation; European wars became world wars through colonisation. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century the phenomenon of colonisation was considerably reinforced. And what did all that end up in precisely through lack of adequate governance? It ended up in two world wars, and the failure of that first globalisation... a bloody failure indeed. After that, Ladies and Gentlemen, this world that should have been unified, was divided until 1990. And now, with a level of technology infinitely superior, resulting in everything that has happened in the wake of successive waves of scientific and industrial revolution, here we are engaged in building a genuinely global model. We do not yet have suitable instruments of coordination for this venture. Far from it. Although we are taking a long-term view, there, I believe, lies the fundamental challenge. Again, we will not solve this question overnight, but we still need to be aware of the dangers of inaction. There is still in the world many elements of insecurity, or quite simply a lack of experience.

In my introductory remarks I mentioned certain situations – the Middle East, the whole area extending from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the farthest bounds of Afghanistan; I mentioned the conflict in Kashmir. I did not mention, but would like to do so this evening, the rivalry between India and China, about which we have not said much explicitly, but which potentially exists and is already manifest in several upgrades. Then there is the Korean peninsula; we touched

on it briefly. We say it again, sooner or later, the question will arise of the reunification of the Korean peninsula, which is one of the last problems inherited from the Cold War, but not the least. We are not going to be able to put off the process of reunifying the Korean peninsula indefinitely. And several scenarios can be imagined. Some scenarios may be, I dare say, agreeable, and others extremely disagreeable. One can imagine a major regional conflict becoming global from situations of this kind.

I also alluded, in my introductory remarks, to the tensions between Japan and China, which to me are disquieting. Yesterday evening, Madame Fu Ying made a remark that caught everyone's attention, an extremely interesting remark, that China and Japan had never been powerful at the same time. From that, we can clearly see it as rivalry between one rising power and another established power at a certain stage of maturity. Henry Kissinger used to say that, although China – the middle kingdom – has immense experience of internal governance, it has very limited experience in foreign policy. This inexperience may in itself be a source of instability.

As far as Europe is concerned, and I mean continental Europe in the broad sense, that is to say beyond the European Union, we should also remember that some basic questions have yet to be settled. Relations with Russia have still not stabilised, despite some progress, notably around the Ukraine. We still do not have, for Europe as a whole, the equivalent of the Helsinki Accords, which were themselves a kind of remodelled version, at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, of the Concert of Europe after the Congress of Vienna.

I will conclude these remarks by adding that, to my way of thinking, collective security, (in the traditionally accepted meaning of this expression), and the search for a balance of power, are not incompatible objectives. It is not just collective security, nor just a balance of power, it is both. I even think that there cannot really be true collective security without some balance of power, and this also applies inside the European Union. If there were, inside the European Union, major imbalances of power between for example Great Britain, France and Germany, I think that we could be in difficulty again. There must be internal balances. The question of the Ukraine, moreover, taking the Continent in the broad sense, was and still is a major issue in this regard.

I will not prolong these remarks and will not go into many other, equally important questions such as stability on the African Continent, because it is now time for acknowledgements. These acknowledgements, Ladies and Gentlemen, go to everyone, and in particular to those who took part in the two previous conferences. One of our great satisfactions was to see that a small club was beginning to form, and it has been, I believe, considerably enhanced during this third meeting. My thanks to each and every one of you, participants, speakers and moderators. It has been a great pleasure to work with you. I thank IFRI and particularly Song-Nim Kwon. I thank Nicolas de Gernay, who is the managing director of this conference; and the Moroccan team, who have worked hand in hand with us. I thank our sponsors, and first among them, the OCP Group, without whom the marvellous welcome we have received in this magnificent city of Marrakech would obviously not have been possible. And I also thank the interpreters, who have skilfully rendered all of the subtleties of the debates.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I promise you that the fourth edition of the World Policy Conference will be even more successful, thanks to the experience that we have gained from year to year but, mostly, thanks to you.