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Thank you, Jim. It is great to be here today. Thank you all. I am so happy to be on this panel. I am going to make four points connected to your question. One has to do with the structure of the world economy, another with the business cycle as it relates to the emerging markets. For the third, I want to talk a little bit about Europe, but in its connection to the emerging markets, and finally, since we are in France, I want to say something about France, which I feel strongly about.

My first point is about the structure of the world economy. I would like to say that the 20th century ended around 1990, with two transformations - one was the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Empire and the opening that provided to the world, the change in the whole approach, with a global market economy that was much more integrated than before, and the different politics that came with it. I do not want to deal with that.

The second turning point around the 1990s was perhaps less known. It is less of a single year change than it is a process. We have to remember that from 1820 to 1950, if you take the whole emerging and developing world and the rich countries, there was divergence. The rich countries were getting richer, and the poor countries were not catching up and diverging more and more. There was some growth, but it was much, much slower than the growth in the advanced economies. This happened throughout that colonial period and the wars until 1950.

From 1950 until 1990, if you take the whole group - there are exceptions of course, such as Korea, which was a dramatic success story much earlier - there was no convergence. The average per capita income in the developing and emerging market world was not catching up with the average in come in the advanced countries. It was not diverging much further, but it was stuck. The gap was still there and it was huge. Since 1990, on the other hand, the per capita average income of emerging and developing countries is growing three times faster than the per capita income in the advanced world. We cannot be certain of what will happen over the next 10 years, but given the difficulties of debt and stabilisation in the US, Japan and Europe, that ratio may go up to four. We are facing a dramatic change in the structure of the world economy.

Now, I cannot predict 30, 40 years. I think people are carrying out studies and looking at scenarios, but they cannot go beyond scenarios. What will happen beyond 2025, 2030, nobody knows. But, looking at the trends over the next 10 to 15 years, I think this dynamic will continue. There is a debate on that and we can come back to it, but there are enough drivers of this scenario that I think it will continue, at least for the next 10 years. We will face a very different world economy in 2020, with a very, very different role, a much strengthened role of the emerging markets and the developing countries as a whole. As President Ouattara reminded us this morning, for the first time, Africa is actually participating in this process.

The second point, which is very important, is that we should distinguish trends from cycles around the trends. While there is a very significant difference in the trend growth rates between the emerging markets and the advanced countries, and I think that will continue, the cycles around these trends remain highly correlated. According to some work done by the IMF when John was still there, this correlation is actually increasing. When there is a big slowing down in Europe and in the US, it has a huge effect on China, India, Turkey and Latin America, and vice versa. Increasingly, if there were to be a major slowdown in China, it has quite an effect on the world economy as a whole.

While the trends are different, the cycle around the trends are not disconnected. On the contrary, through financial markets, through the increasing share of trade and very much through expectations, the 'animal spirits', as Joan Robinson used to call it, the world is one interdependent whole.

For my third point, I want to bring the discussion to Europe and the emerging markets and this whole dynamic. I do not know whether Christophe de Margerie is here, but I am going to try to follow his advice and say exactly what I think, which I can do now that I am part of a think-tank, rather than part of a government or international organisation. I have a few facts.

The highest current account surplus that China ever reached was 411 billion five years ago. Everybody was beating up on China, saying, 'This is a huge imbalance.' Jim, you referred to huge imbalances. 'You are subtracting demand from the world economy. You have to fix it. You have to let your exchange rate appreciate' and so on. China has now done part of that. Its current account surplus is around USD 200 billion, which is still quite a bit, but it is much less than 411.

The country that has the highest current account surplus in the world in the 12 months to October 2012 is Germany, not China. Moreover, if you aggregate Northern Europe and put in the Scandinavian countries, their current account surplus over the last 12 months has been close to USD 530 billion, more than China ever realised. The Eurozone as a whole has a surplus in the current account that is approaching USD 100 billion. In that context, the emerging markets are being asked via the IMF to help Europe when a geographically quite small and connected region, Northern Europe, has close to a USD 500 billion current account surplus. A geographically quite small and connected region, Northern Europe, the Eurozone as a whole also has a current account surplus. Moreover, the IMF is asked to do this by Europe in the form of supporting a programme that professionally, it does not think is going to work.

We do not have time to go into the details, but that is the fundamental fact. India, China, Turkey and Brazil are asked to finance a programme that the staff of the IMF have grave doubts about. I think this is totally unfair and totally in contradiction with the role the emerging markets should play in the world. I am not saying that the IMF should not cooperate with European institutions on helping Europe. The emergence of Europe from the crisis is very important, not only to Europe, but to the world economy, so do not misunderstand me, but the way the IMF and the emerging markets are being pressured to go along with a programme that they do not believe in is quite unacceptable, in my view.

Now, I want to say one word about the programme. Again, time is too short to go into detail, but maybe we will have some time during the debate. It is true that there has been private debt reduction in Greece and there will probably be a reduction in the interest rates on the public debt, which is now huge. However, I worked for the World Bank for a long time during the 1980s, and during that period in Latin America, or in Africa with HIPC Initiative, which was again mentioned by President Ouattara this morning, as economists and as political scientists, we knew that confidence was very important. Even if you lower the debt service ratio of a country like Greece, whose annual payments go from 7% of GDP to about 5% or 5.5% of GDP after the lowering of interest, this does not change the fundamental confidence factor in the country.

Few are going to invest in Greece unless there is a serious overall debt stock reduction and unless the doubts as to whether or not Greece will exit the Eurozone disappear. Greece is at breaking point, socially, politically and as a society. The suffering of many people has reached dramatic proportions. According to the programme, if you are unemployed, you lose your health insurance after one year. There are now thousands of Greeks with cancer who cannot access medical treatment. Society cannot withstand that. It has to be turned around and we cannot wait. There is nobody in as terrible a situation as Greece, but I think the situation in some other countries is serious, particularly in Spain.

I think the world needs Europe. I think that European values, European democracy, European human rights are too valuable to lose this project. But as Angel Gurría said, we all know it takes time, but frankly I really believe that we are at a moment in time where Europe has to accelerate the solution process. Everybody has to contribute to it. Of course, this includes the southern countries with their reforms, but also very much the northern countries, which are running a large current account surplus. Adjustment requires both surplus and deficit to be reduced. You cannot have a current account surplus with outer space since we do not trade with outer space. If you want to adjust and have a more dynamic equilibrium, Northern Europe has to contribute much more than it has done so far.

I am waiting for the German elections. It is really a problem. I wish they were tomorrow. My last point is about France.

And I will now speak in French.

I think that France has an absolutely crucial role to play. It's true that Germany is the biggest economy, the biggest country. It has extremely sizeable financial resources. It implemented reforms under Gerhard Schröder's Social Democratic government which have greatly helped the German economy to recover, but today, the crisis is hitting everyone. Over the past two days, we have seen that the growth forecasts for Germany have been cut.

But I think that France has an absolutely vital role to play because, if France didn't exist, if we performed an experiment of removing France from the map of Europe, we would have two Europes: Southern Europe and Northern Europe. And the connections, the understanding between the two parts of Europe, would be minimal. There is real danger of a break-up.

Those in the North have an extremely negative view of the South and Southern Europe is starting to have an extremely negative view of Northern Europe too. France is in the middle. It has a privileged relationship with Germany. For many, France is responsible for the construction of the great European project, but it also has Mediterranean sensibilities; it understands the South, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, I would even say Turkey, and better than the North.

A strong and active France, with healthy public finances, playing a full part in Europe, is important, not only for France itself but for the whole construction and the European project of the future.

Thank you very much.