Thank you, Jean-Claude. My remarks will be very much in line with what Jeff has said but they will be much more practical, if I may say. It will be a reflection on the risk assessment of the present day, and I will focus on the outlook of the coming months.

The euro has been at the centre of financial global instability for approximately two years. One year ago, we were probably very close to the abyss. Like Jean-Claude said, that was already the case in autumn 2008 after Lehman Brothers; it turned to be the case again last year, with the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. On its cover, in December 2011, The Economist asked the question, ‘Is this the end?’ Today, it’s good to see that we are navigating much calmer seas. Is this the calm that is a prelude to new tempests? This is what I would like to briefly introduce into the discussion.

It was not the end, the predictions of so many articles in the financial press, the vision given by so many covers of The Economist, proved flatly wrong, it has not been the end and it is a very striking fact. As Jean-Claude proclaimed for months, the fact is that we have never been facing a crisis of the euro: the exchange rate between the euro and the dollar always remained close to, say, 1.30. Given the mood in the financial markets, we should rather have witnessed a period of dramatic decline in the euro. We remember what a period of dramatic decline in the euro, we know that this can happen. In the beginning of its story, in the early part of the decade, the euro fell to 0.88 USD. But that did not happen again. And this means that the attractiveness of the euro remained unchanged, that the demand for the euro, as an international currency, always remained during this period of crisis, as strong as it had been.

The reason of this stability, so different from the idea of a collapsing currency, is that an exchange rate does not only say something about one side of the equation, the euro, but says something about both sides of the equation, the euro and the dollar. Understanding the stability of the exchange rate requires that we look to the euro and the difficult management of the crisis, but we must pay similar attention to the other side of the equation and, consequently, to the management of the US dollar.

What happened in Washington in the same period can reasonably be considered as a dangerous political deadlock by major international investors, at least by those outside London and Wall Street. I will just mention two episodes, the first one being the “countdown to shutdown” of the US government in May 2011. I have always been curious to know how the Chinese ambassador in Washington was writing telegrams to Beijing in Mandarin to explain that the government of the biggest power on earth was materially preparing to shut on Friday night at 12. I do not know the answer, but having written many telegrams in French to my minister, I can imagine the difficulty for the Chinese ambassador to send that to his authorities. After that, we had the even more dramatic episode of the debt ceiling in August 2011 when the biggest financial power on earth was on the edge of default.

Given this background, let me turn to the present situation and explore a few risks for the future. I would first like to add to the comments on the US and the eurozone a few words about Japan. The Japanese situation, in my view, has significantly changed in recent months. Due to its huge saving pool and its huge external surplus, Japan was until now never considered as being exposed to any sort of systemic risk, despite the fact that it is probably the most problematic country regarding the size of its debt; it is the most industrialised country regarding its size. Japan has, for a long time, been defying the laws of gravity. However, this is changing. It is not dramatic, but it is changing and I just want to introduce this as another potential concern that was absent in the past. The management of the financial issues in Japan has recently been made more difficult, due to the risk of reversion of interest rates, more expansive conditions for the Japanese treasury, a strong increase in the exposure of banks to the Japanese sovereign and, consequently, the possibility of disruptions in the inter-banks relations, according to their exposure to the sovereign. I think this is part of the new financial landscape, but, naturally, it is certainly not one of the core problems.
Turning to the eurozone, as I said at the beginning, we are now in calmer seas than before. This is frequently attributed to Mario Draghi's words in July, that he would do "whatever it takes to rescue the euro". This was and remains a very important part of the story; but this bold declaration should not be considered in isolation, there is a constant dialectic relationship between the posture and actions of the European Central Bank on one side and the vision and decisions of governments on the other. The recent commitment by Draghi was made possible only because the governments had themselves previously confirmed their willingness to do whatever is needed to build a more resilient monetary union, to push integration further. I refer here, in particular, to the so called Four Presidents' Report, which has been considered to be rhetoric by many but that is the opposite of rhetoric. For the first time in the management of the crisis, the European governments have anticipated the movements of the market. Until June, the governments always were in a responsive position. In June, for the first time, they were in advance of the line, giving a vision of what a more perfect monetary union could be in a visible framework, say in 10 years, or something like that. This is an extraordinary change, that, in conjunction with the ECB's commitment, explains why we are in calmer seas. Success cannot be considered as already guaranteed; the weaknesses are always there; the danger of fragmentation of the financial European system is always present. There are also national problems and I would not underestimate the role of France in this process. This shows that being in calmer seas, facing very big problems, the major risk regarding Europe and the eurozone now would be complacency.

Finally, turning to the US, the outlook is dominated by the fiscal debate, that is frequently commented on under two headlines. The first is that it is political theatre as usual. The second is that it could be the beginning of a huge catastrophe. To be brief, I will say that I am on neither side. I definitely don't think that it can be properly summarised as political theatre. It is a very big political and social issue for the US to decide the way it will go in the future. The campaign has exemplified this distinction between two opposite visions of America. I think that, like in 2011, with the shutdown of the government and the debt ceiling debate, compromise will be extremely difficult before 31 December. There is a possibility that no compromise being sealed at that date. In that case, we would jump over the fiscal cliff. Would this be a tragedy? No, because on January 2nd, nothing would materially change. Households would not pay more taxes on 2 January. Spending will not be cut significantly on the first day. As such, jumping off the cliff only creates a new context in which, for the first time, the decision of Congress about the major financial issues of the country will be raised in conditions that are positive for Congress, because the decision at that date will no longer be to raise taxes for the rich, but to reduce taxes for 98% of the populace. I think this could be a promising context, better than a new postponement of difficult decisions, in which Washington would finally be able to reduce the large factor of financial instability that we have been living with for so many months.

Finally, my conclusion will, surprisingly, come to something quite similar to Jeff’s conclusion. My approach was very much practical and focused on political determinants of major financial decisions. I think that we have a good chance, contrary to the reckoning of pessimists, to enter calmer seas, as I said, for Europe and for the US, after the trauma that I briefly described, not only for a few weeks, but for a significant period of time. This will allow policy makers to make decisions based on better assessment and compromises than when they have to be made under the pressure of financial stress, as we have seen recently. This is an opportunity, in my view. I hope this opportunity will be seized.

Finally, I see two major risks. One, as I said, is Europe being complacent, because calmer seas can also reduce the pressure to act. The second, which is more in the line with what Marek Belka said, is that finally coming to a better management of public deficits everywhere, would introduce depressing forces in the world economy; as Marek remembered when speaking about Spain, we all know that a weakening growth will make the solution of the financial issues more difficult. This is why I join Jeff in saying that macroeconomic policy coordination in the coming months to avoid this risk of a new downward slope in 2013 could be the present most important issue. Thank you.