Thank you. I have also learned a great deal from you about everything. I have certainly learned a great deal from the conference so far because everything that I have heard is relevant to my current research project on global trends and their implications for China. Many of the things that I have heard have confirmed my basic conclusions in the project, which I will go over briefly.

For instance, I see six imbalances in global trends: demographic, social, ecological, economic and financial, the imbalance between the need and supply of natural resources, and the imbalance of wealth distribution. I then see three uncertainties, not all of which have been fully discussed at the conference. The first uncertainty is technology innovations that will generate new growth points. Unfortunately, these innovations will probably not happen in Asia, but in the United States or Europe. The second uncertainty is the changing balance of power. People talk about the rise of China and India, and whether Russia is rising is debatable internally and elsewhere. However, I see a lot of uncertainties here. Whether the United States is declining or not, what I can see is that Japan is not rising and Europe is in some kind of trouble and is not rising at the moment. Of the others, I do not know a lot. The third uncertainty is the direction of political development in various countries. We do not seem to be moving in the same direction as the years immediately after the end of the Cold War.

I then see three levels of governance problems. Firstly, there is what we talked about yesterday in terms of the level of individual social media, which will make a great impact on world politics and economics. The second level is the community level in terms of ethnic and religious communities and NGOs and so on. The third level is today's subject of global governance.

What, then, are the certainties? I see two dimensions of stability in world politics. The first of these is the relations of the great powers. Relations between the great powers have been stable since the end of the Cold War despite certain disturbances and tensions. The second stability is the stability of global economic and political order. This is quite stable and has been remarkably stable since the end of the Cold War, having weathered all the financial turbulence and political disturbances.

The conclusion of my project is therefore that China can still develop because the United States, China, Japan, Europe and Russia are all faced with similar challenges and problems. Why, then, do we not work together?

The big problem here for me and for some other people in China is that this kind of conclusion is very difficult to sell in China. Most people will say that the major problem that China faces in the world today is of course the US and Japan and the US-Japan alliance. They will ask what the point is of talking about those global trends and will question whether they are relevant to China. To many commentators and listeners, the Diaoyu Islands are a top priority, the South China Sea is a priority and the first aircraft carrier that China is building is another top priority.

I was also very struck by Han Sung-joo's remarks on Northeast Asia. We are probably not living in the same world when we compare Asia with Europe. In Northeast Asia, we are still talking about territorial disputes and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, although North Korea's nuclear weapon is not a very big issue in China's strategic thinking, China has nuclear weapons and North Korea is a small underdeveloped country. Why should we be concerned about that? Iran is far away from China and does not pose a threat, but Japan is very close by and making trouble. That kind of geopolitical reality therefore means something big to most Chinese. China's threat perception is very different from other countries.

I can give three reasons for why we are in this shape rather than in the same kind of moment that we see in Europe and the Middle East. Firstly, we are still modernising. You are post-modern; we are modernising, and there are some pre-modern societies in Africa and Asia. Secondly, taking the example of China, it is huge. It is difficult to tell the
Chinese that they have to be concerned about the Middle East or Europe or the fiscal cliff in the United States because we have so many domestic priorities that we need to solve. We are a continent ourselves. There are of course some problems that we need to deal with, such as Syria and the evacuation of Chinese citizens from some places in the Middle East where things go wrong, but these people are still a very small proportion of society.

The last point I want to make is about China itself. Han Sung-joo talked about China’s politics and I basically agree with what he said. However, in terms of democracy, a lot of people in China today are asking what the point is of establishing your kind of democracy when there are so many problems in these democracies in Europe and the United States, with Occupy Wall Street and the sovereign debt crisis. There is also what is happening in the Middle East, such as in Syria if the ruler was thrown out and in post-war Iraq and currently in Egypt. Do we really want to follow those examples? This is therefore a big question that we are facing today. Some Chinese even proposed the option of going back to the Mao Zedong years where we were so defiant against the whole world and there was a sense of social equality.

This takes me to the last point, which is that we are faced with similar problems in different stages of development and therefore need to seek different solutions to our problems. Thank you.