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Last but not least, we now move to the giant, China, with Professor Zhang Yunling, who is a professor of international economics and an academy member and director of international studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

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I was suddenly picked up to replace my friend, who is a real security specialist, so I will try my best to say something. This session is about Asia; Asia is too big, so let me focus more on East Asia, and we will also take a historical perspective. East Asian security has experienced a Cold War period, as we know, and during the Cold War period we had war, after which we had a readjustment and moved to a relatively stable regional security order. Then we had a post-Cold War period, during which transitional period we had no war. It should have been a very dangerous period, but until now it has not happened.

Looking at the future, we are moving to a new time period. What kind of security might we have in this period? Some have called it the new Cold War or a hot war, and what happens in the future in this regard is a great concern. However, looking at the region now, when we talk about security, we really have a new situation and concept. We are living in a time of globalisation, and the region, whatever differences we have, is highly economically integrated apart from North Korea. All the other members are deeply involved or integrated, which means we have shared common interests together. We have very strong interest group pressures for policymakers to continue such trends.

Talking about security, we have broader dimensions beyond individual countries, apart from issues of national security. We have regional security, global security, non-traditional security, especially now with the new terrorist threat, and so on. That means that we have to think of security in terms of creating new ideas rather than falling into conventional security thinking. The future regional security order will not be dominated by the US; it is expected by the US that the NATO alliance will dominate regional security, but I do not think so. It will not be dominated by China, because it is not able to do that, and it is probable that no other country would welcome that kind of situation in the future.

That means we need something new, a new security order. China calls this cooperative security a new security concept, and under this kind of new framework and architecture, it is not possible for the region to create a totally unilateral security arrangement. Therefore, regional security should be based on multiple institutions, on consultation, on self-restraint, and on more functional institutional arrangements to make the situation stable. Therefore, there will be multiple players rather than one or two key players, so that is probably the new security order for the future in East Asia.

Secondly, let me put this in perspective. The question is asked whether East Asian security can be defended or secured, or whether East Asia will become more dangerous or safer. My perspective, as an economist by training, is that no country in the region wants to have a war. China is a rising power, but I do not think it has the intention to go to war. The ASEAN group does not want to have a war, and though China has disputes with some of the countries, in general both sides try to keep a stable order and relationship.

Regarding China and Japan, this is a question; both countries understand the real danger, so they try to manage the risk. Regarding the Korean Peninsula, it is a big question whether a war will result, whether from a sudden accident or otherwise, but the difference from the past is that there are so many big players that all share a common stand which prevents them from taking any dangerous actions that might result in a war on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, for the first time all the major players are at the same table, so that is another big difference.
Probably the only question left is whether China and the US, the two giants, will have a war; it might happen, but the cost would be too big, and nobody knows where it would end. However, the decision-makers on both sides understand quite well that there would be no winner, so I think they would do their best to prevent that happening.

There are risks in terms of managing terrorist threats as well as the emerging strategic competition between China and the US, so the only thing left is how to manage this. Aside from this strategic issue, there is one matter we have to consider, that is, the difference in philosophy or in thinking between the US and China. China’s traditional culture relies on harmony, cooperation and consultation rather than preparing for confrontation from the start, and that is why China refers to a community of common destiny. That is very traditional, to try to create an environment and architecture which can bring all the parties together although they have their differences. Therefore, China has the culture and philosophy of putting aside differences and looking for opportunities to sit together and try to cooperate.

Therefore, this kind of traditional philosophy could emerge as a strong support for new regional security arrangements and regional relations still requires hard work to realise, because Chinese culture emphasises this process more, whereas the US probably more emphasises the result. The right kind of environment and various kinds of consultation processes are needed to prevent the risks from being realised.

Lastly, about China, there were a lot of discussions in previous sessions about what China intends to do, so the first question is whether China wants to replace the US in the region as the dominant power. I answered this already; I do not think so, because China has many things to do, its situation is different, and it has to manage the very complex transitions in its relations with its 20-plus neighbours, so it is not possible. The region has also changed, because we have so many sub-regional cooperation organisations which China has to deal with bilaterally, along with those sub-regional organisations of which China is a part.

Secondly, regarding the current debate and dispute on the South China Sea, it is a very difficult question, and I need more time to address it. China has no intention to dominate or control the entire South China Sea; we call this a historical right to the nine-dash line, but there is no Chinese law identifying this nine-dash line, so it is only a historical issue left by the Kuomintang Government. Chinese law identifies very clearly the islands that belong to China within the nine dashes, but there is no definition or identification, so there is no problem of freedom of navigation; China has never stopped any ships.

Concerning the reclamation of islands, we have to remember that China has a claim on all the islands, but the real situation is that most of these islands are occupied by other neighbouring countries, so we have a DOC to try to control the situation. However, the other countries have developed the islands for a long time; they have airports and everything there, but China did nothing, and it has just started to do this. The people worried whether China would use these islands as military bases, but it is not possible; they would be too vulnerable as they are too far away. That is why China announced that the islands would be developed as a public good. This is a very important area which could promote China-ASEAN cooperation in the future, in jointly discussing what kind of public good we can use it for in the future.

The US identified the so-called 12 miles of sea territory, because China never announced but rather requested this territory. This is still worrisome for the future, so that is why, when US warships pass through these 12 miles, Chinese officials state very clearly that this is a strategic challenge, a threat to our security, since our interests and people are there.

Therefore, this is a big issue, and the rise in China tends to raise a lot of issues and the worst expectations for the future. The future of the security agenda in the region has two aspects. The first is how to understand, accept and deal with the rise of China. The second is that China will continue to be active in participating in all kinds of initiatives, arrangements and existing sub-regional organisations, and that is the strongest hope for the future.