What Asia can learn from European rearmament

What Asia can learn from European rearmament
Europe’s pivot serves as a warning: US military intervention should no longer be taken for granted

Hiroyuki AKITA, chroniqueur Nikkei
31 mai 2025

TALLINN, Estonia — Europe is undergoing its most dramatic security realignment since the end of the Cold War, a shift with far-reaching implications for the continent and beyond. At the heart of this transformation is a growing determination to strengthen its own defense capabilities while reducing reliance on the U.S. military.

The impetus for this pivot is twofold: the immediate threat posed by an increasingly belligerent Russia, and growing unease over the unpredictability of U.S. military support under President Donald Trump. But this is not solely Europe’s concern. Asia, despite its geographic distance, cannot afford to see these developments as completely irrelevant.

Estonia, a Baltic nation bordering Russia, stands at the forefront of Europe’s rapidly evolving security landscape. When I returned in mid-May after a year away, the country was in a state of heightened, quasi-war tensions, fueled by Moscow’s relentless assault on Ukraine.

On May 13, the day before my arrival, an unflagged tanker — suspected of being part of the so-called shadow fleet, a secretive network of ships transporting Russian oil around the world — appeared off Estonia’s coast. When the Estonian Navy attempted to inspect the vessel, a Russian fighter jet entered Estonian airspace in what appeared to be an effort to disrupt the operation, the first such intervention by Russia.

Russian cyberattacks and acts of sabotage targeting Estonia’s critical infrastructure have also intensified. In response, NATO conducted a large-scale military exercise in May, code-named Hedgehog, simulating an invasion of Estonia, a member of the alliance.

At Amari Air Base in northern Estonia, the roar of British helicopters and Portuguese F-16s filled the skies as they carried out combat drills.

« In my mind, Europe is already [at] war. … We have to end living in a dream, » Major Gen. Andrus Merilo, commander of the Estonian Defence Forces replied when I asked about Russia’s threat.

« Currently the battlefield is in Ukraine, but [the] war will not end in Ukraine. … [Russia’s] aim is to restore the dominance in the region, including Estonia.

« We would like to live in peace. But unfortunately, peace is temporarily over. Now, it’s in our hands to start not only managing escalation but also building whatever [capabilities] we can to control this [situation]. »

Amid rising tensions, ministers, military leaders and policy experts from the U.S., Europe and beyond gathered in Tallinn, Estonia’s capital, from May 16 to 18 for the Lennart Meri Conference, an annual forum on international security and foreign policy.

This year’s gathering differed markedly from previous ones, both in tone and substance. The debates were more urgent, more pointed and more detailed, focusing on Europe’s accelerating shift away from an excessive reliance on a U.S. security umbrella. At the center of the discussions was a pressing question: What must Europe do to build credible defense capabilities? From defense spending and force readiness to the resilience of the arms industry, participants engaged in impassioned exchanges of views.

Europe’s increased sense of vulnerability was most evident in the debate over the continent’s reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Some participants openly questioned whether the U.S. would continue to extend its nuclear deterrent to Europe, prompting discussion over the extent to which France’s nuclear arsenal could serve as a viable alternative.

In addition to the growing threat posed by Russia, urgency was heightened by Trump’s rhetoric and policies, which have raised doubts about the reliability of U.S. commitments to its allies. The Trump administration is now actively weighing a reduction in U.S. troop deployments in Europe.

« It’s more than 30 years of U.S. desire [to reduce troops in Europe], President Trump just said, enough, this is going to happen and it’s going to happen now, this is going to be orderly, but we are not going to have any more patience for foot dragging in this situation, » U.S. Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker said at the conference.

Whitaker indicated that formal negotiations with Europe regarding U.S. troop reductions might commence later this year. While the details remain uncertain, one conclusion was clear: Europe must urgently prepare for a future less reliant on American protection.

The question is how feasible such autonomy truly is. Judging by defense spending alone, Europe’s resolve appears genuine: 22 of NATO’s 30 European members seem to have met the goal of spending 2% of gross domestic product on defense by 2024. Yet the path forward is fraught with challenges, not least because Europe lacks a unified security vision. Perceptions of the Russian threat vary widely, shaped largely by each member state’s geographic proximity to Russia.

According to European security officials, NATO Europe can be broadly divided into three camps. The first mostly consists of northern European countries that view the Russian threat with utmost seriousness — among them the Nordic nations, the Baltic states, the U.K. and Poland.

The second group comprises southern European countries such as Spain, Portugal and Italy. While they acknowledge the threat posed by Russia, their more immediate concerns center on refugees arriving from Africa and other pressing regional issues.

The third group occupies a middle ground, with Germany as a typical example. According to a German ambassador stationed in Europe, Berlin is primarily focused on preventing a war with Russia — a priority that diverges somewhat from the more hardline stance of the Baltic states, among the alliance’s most vocal critics of Moscow.

Ultimately, the future of European defense will likely be shaped by a coalition of willing nations.

« There are differences in position within NATO, making it difficult for all members to act in unison, » said Michael Clarke, an expert on European security and a former director-general of the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based defense think tank. « For example, in the case of the conflict with Russia, it is likely that about a dozen northern European countries, including the U.K., would form a coalition of the willing with NATO’s endorsement and act together. »

Across the Atlantic, Washington now regards China as its foremost threat, while concerns over North Korea continue to intensify. But it would be misguided for countries like Japan and South Korea to assume that Asia will be spared from potential U.S. troop reductions.

Within the Trump administration — particularly among proponents of the « America First » or MAGA (Make America Great Again) policy, such as Vice President JD Vance — there is a belief that responsibility for addressing threats posed by China and North Korea should fall primarily on those most directly affected: Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.

According to U.S. media reports, proposals have already emerged to cut U.S. troop levels in South Korea by around 4,500 personnel, with plans to redeploy them elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. military footprint in Japan may not remain untouched either.

But a former senior U.S. Defense Department official familiar with internal Trump administration deliberations said opinions within the government remain far from unified regarding the future scale of U.S. forces in Asia. While some MAGA-aligned officials question the need to maintain current troop levels, others, particularly within the Pentagon, State Department and military, argue for reinforcing the U.S. presence to better deter China’s growing assertiveness.

The most dangerous near-term scenario would be the simultaneous escalation of crises in Europe and Asia, triggering a scramble for America’s finite military resources. Preventing such a development will require close coordination and strategic alignment among U.S. allies on both sides of the globe.

The need for transatlantic and Indo-Pacific cooperation has never been more urgent.

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How eroding public support could make Trump even more aggressive

How eroding public support could make Trump even more aggressive
Recent China tariff deal shows president holds fewer cards to push his trade agenda

Hiroyuki AKITA, chroniqueur Nikkei
18 mai 2025

TOKYO — In poker, players who believe they hold a strong hand usually stay quiet and play on, aiming to raise the stakes and extract more money from their opponents.

But U.S. President Donald Trump, who often touts his dealmaking prowess and casts himself as a poker expert, has been acting in ways that defy this logic. His impatience for a quick tariff deal with China is a prime example.

On the surface, the deal announced on Monday appears to be a balanced compromise. In reality, it marks a significant climbdown for Trump, involving sharp reductions to previously imposed tariffs. As part of a 90-day truce, both countries agreed to roll back their respective rates by 115 percentage points: The U.S. will cut duties on Chinese imports from 145% to 30%, while China will reduce tariffs on American goods from 125% to 10%.

Trump had long vowed to exert unparalleled pressure on Beijing to dismantle what he called an « unfair » trade regime. Yet he pulled back his most potent card, even though China offered no written commitment to structural reforms. In poker terms, Trump tipped his weak hand.

He might have had little choice, given the mounting headwinds he faces. According to the polling average compiled by U.S. media company RealClearPolitics, his approval rating stood at just 46% at the 100-day mark of his presidency. Over the nearly half-century, he is the only U.S. president to have fallen below the 50% threshold so early in office. While support among Republican voters remains solid, independents are beginning to drift away.

A major source of the turbulence is his underperforming economic agenda. In early April, Trump announced a sweeping set of « reciprocal » tariffs targeting multiple countries. But the move spooked financial markets, prompting the administration to backtrack 13 hours later by offering a 90-day grace period. Key electronic goods, including smartphones, were also temporarily exempted from the tariffs.

In a separate episode, Trump called for the resignation of Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, frustrated by the Fed’s resistance to lowering interest rates as aggressively as he wanted. But facing a sharp decline in stock prices, Trump ultimately backed down from the demand.

In light of these developments, some policymakers in Europe and Japan have begun to express cautious optimism. The weakening economic sentiment in the U.S., combined with sharp price declines and other warning signs from financial markets, might have heightened Trump’s awareness of the risks associated with a prolonged tariff war. Looking ahead, they hope he will be compelled to gradually moderate both his rhetoric and his actions.

The latest U.S.-China tariff agreement is likely to reinforce optimism that Trump may be shifting toward a more pragmatic approach.

However, the belief that mounting political and economic pressure will temper Trump’s combative style could be misguided. His overriding priority remains rallying his core supporters — fervent backers of his « America First » agenda — and securing a decisive victory in next year’s midterm elections.

If he is forced to scale back his signature tariff offensive, he is likely to double down on his hardline stance in other areas. With the stakes high in the midterm elections, alienating his loyal base is a risk he is unwilling to take.

The central question is whether the U.S. can extract enough concessions from China during the next 90 days of negotiations for Trump to claim a « victory. » But the road ahead is anything but smooth. While the tariff war is certain to take a toll on China’s economy, President Xi Jinping and his administration appear confident that the country is better positioned to endure the pain.

Unlike Trump, Xi faces no electoral pressures, and in China, the government, central bank and state-owned enterprises all operate in lockstep with his directives.

« If the situation remains unchanged, Chinese-made household goods, clothing and toys will start to disappear from U.S. store shelves, fueling consumer frustration, » said a Chinese political analyst familiar with Beijing’s U.S. strategy, speaking before the latest U.S.-China tariff deal was announced. « While the tariff war is undoubtedly challenging for China, it poses greater political risks for Trump.

« The Chinese government believes it holds the upper hand in this game of chicken. »

If a compromise is reached and a full-blown tariff war is averted, it would be a welcome development for the global economy. However, such an outcome is unlikely to soften Trump’s confrontational stance. Should he conclude that the China tariffs have failed to achieve his objectives, it becomes more likely that he will escalate bold and potentially disruptive policies in other areas, domestic and international, to keep his base energized.

At home, Trump is already ramping up pressure on groups and institutions he views as ideological adversaries. A notable example is his targeting of elite universities like Harvard and Columbia, which he considers liberal strongholds. Citing what he calls their failure to adequately address « antisemitic activity » on campus, Trump has taken steps to revoke federal research grants and other funding.

In foreign policy, Trump is expected to intensify his pursuit of high-profile achievements. If successful, these efforts could benefit the broader international community. However, if they fail, his impatience and erratic policymaking may become even more pronounced.

Trump’s top diplomatic priority is brokering a ceasefire in Ukraine, but progress remains stalled due to the wide gulf between Russia and Ukraine. If negotiations fail to yield concrete results, he may opt to publicly criticize both sides and withdraw from the mediation process. Such a move could result in the suspension of U.S. military aid to Ukraine, further destabilizing an already volatile situation.

If Trump abandons his ceasefire efforts, he is likely to shift his focus to other high-stakes issues — most notably, the Iran nuclear talks or the North Korea situation. He may attempt to pressure Tehran into dismantling or halting its nuclear program, and if no concessions are made, he could escalate military threats.

People tend to believe in the outcomes they desire. However, assuming that a desperate Trump will soften his position is a risky bet. A wiser strategy would be to brace for the possibility that, when cornered, he may take unpredictable — and potentially destabilizing — actions.

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Joseph Nye: Intellectual giant who saved US-Japan alliance

Joseph Nye: Intellectual giant who saved US-Japan alliance
Foreign policy expert believed Washington’s tilt to isolationism would create instability

Hiroyuki AKITA, chroniqueur Nikkei
9 mai 2025

TOKYO — If forced to name just one of Joseph Nye’s many accomplishments, one would typically choose the concept of « soft power » — that countries can pursue diplomacy through ideas and values and not just through military strength.

But from the perspective of the Asia-Pacific, Nye, a former dean of Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government who died Tuesday, made even more significant contributions.

In the early 1990s, calls to drastically reduce the U.S. troop presence in Asia were gaining traction in Washington. The Cold War was over, and the threat of the Soviet Union had vanished.

As the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Bill Clinton administration, Nye was opposed to this idea. He believed that withdrawing the U.S. military would increase the risk of conflict in the region. Working together with then-Defense Secretary William Perry, he redefined the U.S.-Japan alliance as essential to stability in Asia and pushed to maintain the 100,000 U.S. troops deployed in East Asia.

This policy came to be known as the Nye Initiative. Without his work, the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea alliances could have been greatly weakened, and the Korean peninsula and the seas in Asia made much more dangerous. In this sense, Nye was an intellectual giant who saved the U.S.-Japan alliance.

One of Nye’s most striking qualities was his ability to listen. During interviews, he would listen carefully to the question and ensure that he understood what the interviewer wanted to know. When answering, he would get straight to the essence of the matter in a calm, measured tone. His spoken statements conveyed a sharp logic, as though they were beautifully crafted writing.

As the assistant secretary of defense, Nye also worked to engage with the Chinese military. At the time, I was stationed in Beijing, and I distinctly recall Nye repeatedly emphasizing the importance of military dialogue between the U.S. and China at a press conference during a visit there. In more recent years, he would express his concern that such military-to-military talks were disappearing.

Nye also worked together with the late Richard Armitage, a former deputy secretary of defense, to publish six reports aimed at strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. A leading figure in the liberal theory of international relations, Nye was not originally an expert on Japan.

Nye was driven to champion the U.S.-Japan alliance out of his deep insight into and reflection on history. He knew that if the U.S. turned to isolationism, global instability would follow. He shared this concern during the first Donald Trump administration.

In his view, the U.S. has an instinct to turn inward. Before both the first and second World Wars, the U.S. initially turned inward, recoiling from involvement in Europe and elsewhere. It was only when no other option remained that the U.S. finally took action.

When I met Nye in Tokyo in November last year, I asked him if he thought that America could resist the lure of isolationism. He answered vaguely that the U.S. was at a watershed moment. He too was uncertain of the degree to which Trump 2.0 would damage U.S. foreign policy.

In his later years, Nye warned against underestimating China’s power. In Washington and elsewhere, some observes argue that China had peaked, and that it would enter a period of decline because of a shrinking population and other factors.

Nye believed otherwise. China may be plateauing, he said, but it was premature to say that it would decline. It was the analysis of a great scholar who was deeply versed in the rise and fall of great powers.

So, could it be that U.S. leadership as a superpower is merely plateauing, and the country could soon experience a revival? I would have liked to hear his thoughts on the matter one more time.

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Trump-driven disorder rattles emerging economies

Trump-driven disorder rattles emerging economies
Countries reel from misjudging risks of new US president

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
6 mai 2025

TOKYO — Until late 2024, many major emerging economies viewed Donald Trump’s impending return to the U.S. presidency favorably. They believed that by accepting economic « deals, » they could foster a strong relationship with a second Trump administration — without facing significant pressure on human rights or other sensitive issues.

A November 2024 poll by the European Council on Foreign Relations, conducted after Trump’s election victory, found that emerging countries broadly welcomed his return.

In India, 84% of respondents described Trump’s election as « a good thing, » while 61% shared that view in Saudi Arabia. Likewise, in Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey and Brazil, positive opinions consistently outnumbered negative ones.

A senior Indian official echoed this sentiment in a conversation with Nikkei in New Delhi in December, saying Trump’s return is advantageous for India because the new president is unlikely to interfere in the country’s domestic affairs over human rights and recognizes its strategic importance.

However, that initial optimism is now fading. The disruption Trump is unleashing on the global stage has far exceeded what emerging economies anticipated, with his « America First » diplomacy proving much more assertive than during his first term.

From March 17 to 19, the Raisina Dialogue, an annual forum on international affairs, was held in New Delhi. At a breakout session featuring prominent thinkers from emerging economies across Asia and the Middle East, concerns about Trump’s return to power surfaced repeatedly.

« There’s a new sheriff in town, and the new sheriff in town wants to do things his way, » said Sunjoy Joshi, chairman of India’s Observer Research Foundation think tank. « Well, [Trump is] trying to do a big reset, and a lot of things which are going to be shaken around in the process of this reset. »

Regarding Trump’s reported interest in acquiring Greenland, a territory of Denmark, and even Canada, a former Indonesian official expressed bewilderment, saying the U.S. now appears to harbor « territorial ambition. » The shift, the official noted, « is different from Trump 1.0, and for us, this is quite, quite puzzling. »

The so-called Global South, a diverse group of emerging and developing countries, varies widely in terms of national power and ambitions and is far from a unified bloc. However, major emerging nations within the Group of 20, such as India, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa, Saudi Arabia and Mexico, broadly share a common aspiration.

Their shared goal is to reshape the international order, which has been dominated by the U.S. and Europe since World War II, and to create a system that more fully reflects their voices. In short, they seek to realize a truly multipolar world.

While dissatisfaction among emerging nations with the U.S.- and Europe-centric system is not new, their growing influence has transformed long-standing frustration into outright anger.

One frequent source of frustration is the composition of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Of the five seats, three are held by leading Western powers — the U.S., the U.K. and France. A South African official voiced indignation, remarking that despite the rising influence of the Global South, this is not reflected in the council’s structure, which he deemed unfair.

From this perspective, many emerging countries initially saw Trump’s return as an opportunity. Unlike his predecessor, Joe Biden, who championed summits for democracy and remained firmly committed to a U.S.-led international order, Trump, with his singular focus on national interests, was seen as more likely to facilitate a shift toward a multipolar world.

However, emerging nations miscalculated, underestimating Trump’s threat to their vision. His extreme actions now threaten to plunge them into chaos, rather than paving the way for multipolarity.

Undoubtedly, their gravest misjudgment has been the U.S. imposition of « reciprocal » tariffs. In early February, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Washington and pledged to increase imports of U.S. energy. Despite this, India was hit with a 26% tariff. Similarly, Indonesia and Vietnam faced crippling levies of 32% and 46%, respectively.

That said, Trump may choose to ease tariff pressures, mindful of the potential impact his policy could have on the financial markets. Some countries might even succeed in negotiating exemptions or reductions with Washington.

However, such moves would not provide a fundamental solution. If a tariff war dampens the global economy, it could significantly affect the prospects of emerging economies. On April 22, the International Monetary Fund lowered its global growth forecast for this year by 0.5 percentage points from its January estimate, bringing it down to 2.8%.

Dino Patti Djalal, former Indonesian ambassador to the U.S., emphasized the potentially severe repercussions of Trump’s tariff agenda on the global economy. « For Indonesia, the biggest threat posed by the Trump administration is high tariffs, » he said. « The worst-case scenario for us is that the tariff war between major countries heats up and the global economy cools down. »

In the medium term, Trump’s security policy could also jeopardize the growth of emerging countries. In his eagerness to secure a ceasefire in Ukraine, Trump may pursue an agreement with terms favorable to Russia. Should that occur, the risk of a renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine would remain high. In the worst-case scenario, food and energy crises could flare up once more, severely impacting emerging and developing countries.

In an effort to mitigate these risks, emerging economies are moving swiftly to strengthen ties with China as well as other major countries. Earlier in April, Indonesia held its first-ever « two-plus-two » dialogue with China, bringing together their foreign and defense ministers. Malaysia and Cambodia also plan to establish similar strategic frameworks for talks with Beijing.

Following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, emerging nations seemed poised to establish themselves as a « third pole, » independent of both the West and the China-Russia bloc. However, the unexpected turbulence caused by Trump’s policies has unsettled these prospects, and emerging countries are likely to remain preoccupied with protecting their own interests rather than building their own « pole » for the time being.

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