US must not let Iran distract it from China

TOKYO — The U.S.-Israel war on Iran is poised to have profound and far-reaching consequences worldwide.

As war engulfs the Middle East, the threat of a global energy crisis grows ever more acute. At the same time, there is rising concern that international focus on countering Russia’s aggression in Ukraine may wane.

But looking ahead over the next 10 to 20 years, perhaps the most significant geopolitical risk lies in the potential derailment of U.S. strategy toward China. Should Washington’s attention shift away, Beijing may seize the opportunity to assert itself more boldly, accelerating efforts to reshape the global order in line with its ambitions. Its ongoing campaign to isolate Japan through relentless — and what many see as extraordinary — pressure offers a glimpse of what the future might hold.

The U.S. carries a bitter lesson from its recent past. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the George W. Bush administration launched wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. These conflicts dragged on for roughly two decades, consuming American attention and resources in the global war on terror.

Before those attacks, however, the Bush administration had been formulating a long-term strategy to counter the growing challenge posed by a rapidly rising China.

« A tough new China strategy is finally about to get underway. » That was the refrain I repeatedly heard from U.S. officials during my time as a Nikkei correspondent in Washington.

But the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq dramatically altered the trajectory of Washington’s priorities. The administration started viewing China as a partner in the war on terror, showing a friendliness that diverged sharply from earlier plans.

The war on terror continued under his successor, Barack Obama, while China focused on amassing wealth and expanding its military capabilities, gradually shifting the balance of power in Asia in its favor. In numerous cutting-edge technologies, it has advanced to the point of challenging U.S. supremacy.

The current administration of Donald Trump appears determined to avoid past mistakes, hence its reluctance to commit to a ground war in Iran. Yet a prolonged crisis in the Middle East could increasingly strain U.S. foreign policy.

When the U.S. launched an attack on Iran last June, I happened to be in neighboring Turkey. In a conversation with a Turkish government adviser, he voiced deep concern that if Iran’s current regime were toppled without a viable alternative in place, the result could be catastrophic, plunging the region into chaos and potentially igniting a civil war.

The U.S. military, as currently structured, lacks the capacity to wage two major conflicts simultaneously. Elbridge Colby, undersecretary of war for policy and a key architect of U.S. defense strategy, has argued that effectively countering China requires scaling back commitments in Europe and Ukraine. If that assessment holds, Washington has limited bandwidth for another Middle Eastern war.

From an Asian perspective, the greater worry is that escalating tensions in the Middle East will absorb more of Trump’s focus, diminishing his ability to address pressing security challenges from China and North Korea. Compounding this concern is the approach of the U.S. midterm elections in November, which is likely to demand an increasing share of the president’s attention and political capital.

Even under normal circumstances, Trump’s strategic perspective is relatively narrow. His primary focus has been on Greenland and the Americas, regions he treats as part of the U.S.’s traditional « backyard. » Trump has shown little appetite for deepening military engagement elsewhere to uphold America’s broader sphere of influence.

The U.S. strike on Iran likely sent shock waves through Beijing as well. There is little doubt that Chinese leaders are heavily concerned about potential disruptions to energy supplies and the wider economic repercussions.

Following the crisis in Venezuela, Iran — another key partner in China’s effort to forge an anti-U.S. bloc — has come under American attack. The destabilization of Tehran’s regime represents yet another setback for Beijing. Moreover, Trump’s apparent willingness to use force without hesitation adds a layer of unpredictability that complicates China’s calculus.

At the same time, Beijing may see opportunity in Washington’s deepening entanglements in the Western Hemisphere and the Middle East. If these commitments sap U.S. focus and resources, China could find it easier to expand its influence across Asia. In what appears to be a calculated move, Beijing has intensified efforts to undermine America’s alliance network there.

In this campaign, Japan has emerged as a primary target. China has discouraged its citizens from traveling there, imposed economic sanctions and intensified a sustained campaign of anti-Japanese criticism and pressure.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks on the Taiwan issue in November, which drew an infuriated response from China’s leadership, were merely a catalyst. For China, the « first island chain, » stretching from Okinawa through Taiwan to the Philippines, represents a critical defensive perimeter separating China’s coastal waters from the open Pacific Ocean. Beijing’s long-standing strategy has been to exert pressure on Japan, weaken the U.S.-Japan alliance and push American forces far beyond this strategic boundary.

At the same time, the administration of Chinese President Xi Jinping is actively promoting a global narrative that portrays the Takaichi government as seeking to revive militarism. According to multiple diplomatic sources, China has even encouraged visiting leaders of major nations to bypass Japan during their trips to the region, a calculated effort to diplomatically isolate Tokyo.

French President Emmanuel Macron traveled to China in December, followed by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in January and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in February. All three did so without stopping in Japan. However, Carney’s trip to Japan this month, followed by Macron’s scheduled visit later in March, suggest these developments do not necessarily indicate a deterioration in their countries’ ties with Tokyo.

Even so, China is likely to continue urging visiting foreign leaders to bypass Japan, drawing confidence from a past « success story. »

In 1998, U.S. President Bill Clinton visited China without stopping in Japan, emphasizing U.S.-China cooperation. The episode sparked uproar over what became known as « Japan passing, » leading to a momentary chill in U.S.-Japan relations.

Like Japan, the Philippines, another key U.S. ally on the first island chain, has also become a target of Chinese pressure. During my visit to the country for a conference in late February, tensions over territorial disputes in the South China Sea were clearly escalating.

In December, the China Coast Guard fired high-pressure water cannons at Philippine fishing boats operating in the South China Sea, damaging two vessels. Then in February, amid intensifying rhetoric over the disputes, the Chinese Embassy in Manila warned that further deterioration in relations could cost « millions of jobs » for Filipinos, heightening diplomatic pressure.

Rear Adm. Jay Tarriela of the Philippine Coast Guard has observed that China is escalating its coercive campaign on two fronts. « In an effort to expand its control over the South China Sea, China has been steadily intensifying physical pressure, » Tarriela said. « With the Philippines assuming the ASEAN chairmanship this year, Beijing has also ramped up intimidating messaging in the social media space, further escalating its pressure tactics. »

Even if the U.S. were to prevail in its power struggle with Iran, it could still fall behind in its strategic competition with China. To avoid such an outcome, the role of U.S. allies is crucial. It is therefore imperative for Japan to push back against China’s efforts to isolate it and to work on strengthening solidarity not only with Washington but also with the broader network of U.S. allies.