How China’s Japan-bashing is indirectly targeting Washington

TOKYO — China’s Japan-bashing shows no sign of abating, pressuring the two nations’ relationship in areas such as diplomacy, security and trade.

Since spring, diplomats in the U.S. and Europe have often quietly talked about how Chinese President Xi Jinping behaved during meetings with foreign leaders visiting his country.

According to diplomatic sources, Xi on several occasions abruptly shifted the topic to Japan after otherwise friendly conversations. The sources said the Chinese president sternly accused Tokyo of moving toward rearmament and of undermining regional peace and stability, surprising some leaders.

China’s Japan-bashing began last November after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made a remark on a potential Taiwan contingency.

Takaichi told the Japanese parliament that if China were to take military action against Taiwan and U.S. forces responded to such a conflict, Japan could face what is known under its law as a « survival-threatening situation. »

Under such circumstances, Tokyo could exercise the right to collective self-defense and authorize the deployment of the nation’s Self-Defense Forces. While the Japanese government has explained that the remark does not mean Tokyo has changed its long-held position on Taiwan, Beijing interpreted it as signaling the possibility of Japan’s military involvement in a Taiwan conflict.

Even so, Xi appears to have gone too far. Criticizing Japan in multiple meetings with foreign leaders is definitely unusual.

Beijing has stepped up its anti-Japan diplomatic campaign in meetings with foreign leaders and through state media. It has labelled Tokyo’s defense buildup as « new militarism. »

Moreover, China has urged its citizens to refrain from traveling to Japan and tightened restrictions on exports of dual-use products, including rare earths, to Japan. From June to July, Beijing increased military activity around the Japanese archipelago including joint operations involving Chinese and Russian bombers and naval vessels.

Why has Beijing chosen to intensify pressure on Japan?

There are three factors behind the move, based on analysis by Japanese authorities and experts on China.

The first is that Xi’s hostile reaction to Takaichi’s Taiwan remark has prompted Chinese Communist Party officials and government bureaucrats to take an increasingly tough line toward Japan, partly as a way of demonstrating loyalty to the Chinese leader.

One episode illustrates this point. Earlier this year, when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi dined with a senior Southeast Asian leader, he devoted nearly half of the conversation to Japan, according to diplomatic sources in the region.

The second factor is Beijing’s desire to warn other countries over the Taiwan issue by making an example of Japan.

By targeting Japan, China seeks to send a message that countries that challenge Beijing on Taiwan could face serious consequences.

Such « make-an-example » diplomacy has become a familiar feature of China’s foreign policy. In 2018, after Canada detained a senior executive of China’s Huawei Technologies, Beijing restricted imports of Canadian agricultural products. In 2020, Beijing imposed sweeping economic sanctions on Australia after Canberra called for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19, which was first confirmed in the Chinese city of Wuhan.

Yet these factors alone do not fully explain why Beijing has gone so far as to accuse Japan of pursuing « new militarism. »

That leads to the third factor: China’s long-term strategy to compete with the U.S. over the international order.

Xi’s government has openly criticized the U.S.-led international system and has sought to promote an alternative version of global governance. In recent years, Beijing has promoted a concept of a « community with a shared future for mankind » and the Global Security Initiative framework as part of its effort to expand the China-led international system.

One of the biggest obstacles to that strategy, from Beijing’s perspective, is Japan’s deepening alliance with America.

Japan is located along the so-called First Island Chain, which stretches through the Japanese archipelago, Taiwan and the Philippines. Chinese strategists have long regarded the island chain as a geographic barrier that limits China’s ability to project power into the Pacific. From Beijing’s view, Japan represents a key pillar of the regional security architecture that constrains the expansion of its influence.

Against this backdrop came Takaichi’s remark on Taiwan.

Beijing seized on the remark to reinforce its narrative that Japan is returning to militarism. By doing so, Beijing hopes to undermine support for Japan’s efforts to strengthen its security framework.

In other words, China’s pressure against Japan is not aimed solely at Japan. It is part of a broader strategy to weaken the foundations of the U.S.-led order in Asia.

Analysts say Beijing may also believe that U.S. President Donald Trump places less emphasis on alliances, making it easier for China to take a tougher approach toward Japan.

Ryousei Kokubun, professor emeritus at Keio University, said China’s campaign should be viewed in a broader context.

« China has accused Japan of reviving militarism in the past over historical issues and Taiwan-related matters, » Kokubun said. « This time, however, Beijing’s criticism of what it calls Japan’s ‘new militarism’ is directed not only at Japan itself. It is also aimed at the U.S. behind Japan and at the U.S.-Japan alliance. »

China’s strategy nevertheless has its limits.

No major country in North America, Europe or Asia has echoed Beijing’s accusations that Japan is becoming more militaristic. If China continues its coercive action towards Japan, it could instead fuel greater concern among other countries about China’s own behavior.

Akio Takahara, a distinguished visiting professor at Tokyo Woman’s Christian University, argued that China’s gains from the campaign are likely to be limited.

« There is little benefit China can obtain from attacking Japan to this extent, » Takahara said. « Japanese investment in China could decline even further. Even so, it may be difficult for Beijing to lower a fist that it has already raised. »

Japan’s best response is to avoid being drawn into China’s provocations and to continue calling calmly for dialogue. On its side, China would also want to avoid a higher risk of unintentional military collision in the waters around Japan and elsewhere.

At the same time, Tokyo should coordinate more closely with Washington on China strategy while steadily strengthening its defense capabilities and alliance network. It will also become increasingly important for Japan to explain to the international community how such efforts contribute to regional stability.

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