America’s backyard war: Global lawlessness looms, aiding rival powers

TOKYO — At first, U.S. President Donald Trump seemed genuinely intent on securing a place in history as a formidable peacemaker, remembered for a remarkable record of conflict resolution. Yet his Jan. 3 strike on Venezuela and the ensuing capture of its leader, Nicolas Maduro, leave little doubt that Trump can no longer restrain his contrary impulses and is veering toward a far more radical course.

For years, Maduro has suppressed human rights and dismantled democratic institutions under his authoritarian rule, triggering the exodus of millions of Venezuelans. Even within Western democracies, some voices have expressed tacit support for regime change in the South American nation. Still, it is unclear if Trump has a coherent strategy for how events should unfold in the months ahead.

Last December, I met with U.S. foreign policy and security experts familiar with the inner workings of the Trump administration to inquire about the objectives behind its escalating military pressure on Venezuela. Based on those discussions, Trump’s strategy appears set to unfold in two stages.

The first stage aims to expel « hostile forces, » perceived as threats to the U.S. mainland, from strategic locations such as Venezuela. This vision extends beyond the Maduro regime and criminal networks.

« Trump also sees China’s growing presence in Venezuela, which possesses the world’s largest proven oil reserves, as a serious concern, » said a security expert, speaking on condition of anonymity. China is already Venezuela’s largest purchaser of crude oil.

The second stage, as envisioned by the Trump White House, is to significantly weaken the regime in Cuba, which has long been defiant toward Washington. The administration believes that toppling the Maduro government, which maintains close ties with Havana and supplies it with heavily subsidized oil, would effectively isolate Cuba and erode its resilience.

China’s shadow also looms over Washington’s intensified pressure on Cuba. Intelligence suggests that Beijing has established surveillance facilities on the island, a concern that first gained traction during the previous Joe Biden administration and has since grown more acute.

At the same time, Trump is seeking to curb Chinese influence in other strategic zones, including the Panama Canal and Greenland, as part of a broader effort to assert U.S. dominance across the Western Hemisphere.

These strategic imperatives did not emerge in a vacuum; they were already articulated in the U.S. National Security Strategy released last December. Nevertheless, seizing a sovereign nation’s leader by force, along with the potential installation of a U.S.-backed interim administration, defies the imagination of any reasonable observer.

Trump has justified the operation by citing Maduro’s alleged role in trafficking narcotics into the U.S. But that rationale appears tenuous.

« Venezuela is not a major drug-producing country, and much of the narcotics transiting through its territory are bound for Europe, » said another security expert.

The U.S. intervention in Venezuela carries a profound risk: It may accelerate the erosion of international legal norms and push the world closer to a state of lawlessness. At least two dangers stand out.

First, it lends dangerous momentum to the notion that the world’s great powers are entitled to intervene militarily in other sovereign states. Many observers argue that Trump’s action constitutes a clear violation of international law and the United Nations Charter, which forbids the use of force without Security Council authorization or a legitimate self-defense justification. Though Trump asserts he is acting to avert a third world war, his moves might instead be hastening it.

Of particular concern is how this precedent may shape the behavior of China and Russia, both of which have reacted sharply to the U.S. assault on their ally Venezuela. The overthrow of the Maduro regime would entail significant practical losses for China and Russia, which have security and economic interests in the country. While their outrage seems genuine, it also likely masks a calculated expectation of medium-term strategic benefits.

If the U.S. claims the right to intervene militarily in its « backyard » to defend national interests, then Beijing and Moscow may feel emboldened to assert the same prerogative in their respective spheres of influence. It is not hard to imagine Russian President Vladimir Putin seizing on Washington’s actions as propaganda fodder, justifying the invasion of Ukraine with the same rhetoric of national interest and historical precedent.

Beijing could similarly rely on this logic to justify its aggression. China asserts sweeping claims over the South China Sea and regards the Taiwan Strait as part of its « backyard ». There is growing concern that it could escalate its use of force to obstruct the passage of foreign naval vessels in these contested waters.

The second concern is that the recent strategic tilt toward the Americas could dilute U.S. strategic focus and overstretch its defense commitments in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.

Over the past two decades, the U.S. has failed in its attempts to build pro-American regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq following its invasions. This failure has severely eroded U.S. credibility, leaving both Afghanistan and much of the Middle East mired in instability and conflict.

To avoid this failure, the Trump administration intends not to be directly involved in Venezuela’s national reconstruction, but rather to remotely control it by using the remaining forces. But, key figures in the pro-Maduro government and military remain entrenched, and the country harbors numerous anti-American guerrilla groups. Dismantling the Maduro regime may prove far easier than establishing a stable successor government.

For 20 years, as Washington was absorbed by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it failed to craft a coherent strategy to counter China’s rise. In that vacuum, Beijing accelerated its military modernization, and the strategic balance in Asia has shifted decisively in its favor.

Against this backdrop, Trump condemned the Iraq invasion in February 2016. « Going into Iraq, it may have been the worst decision anybody has made, any president has made, in the history of this country, » said the then-Republican presidential candidate at a CNN town hall event. Although the situation differs from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, if the Trump administration’s security and diplomatic energy is consumed by the Americas, it will be unable to devote sufficient focus to its China strategy, ultimately risking a « new lost era » for that strategy.

How, then, should responsible powers respond to rising geopolitical risks? The most urgent task is for key U.S. allies, including Japan, European partners, South Korea and Australia, to coordinate their efforts to contain the spread of global disorder.

First, these nations must work to prevent emerging and developing countries from drifting en masse toward blocs led by China and Russia, such as BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. To do so, Western democracies must offer compelling alternatives — trade frameworks, technology and climate policy that deliver tangible benefits to the countries of the Global South.

« Japan and other U.S. allies should lessen strategic reliance on Washington by prioritizing intelligence sharing and defense-industrial cooperation, while building stronger regional partnerships and sustaining support for Ukraine, » said Giulio Pugliese, director of the EU-Asia Project at the European University Institute. « Even as these allies shift their strategic focus to their own theaters, coordinated action — including in diplomacy — among like-minded partners will be an important factor to preserving a rules-based order despite U.S. structural power. »

Moreover, to safeguard stability in both the Indo-Pacific and Europe, U.S. allies and like-minded nations must deepen security and economic ties. Expanding joint military exercises and interoperability will be essential to strengthening broad-based cooperation and partnership as well as promoting free trade. Emma Chanlett-Avery, deputy director of the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Washington, D.C. office and the director for political-security affairs told Nikkei, « Japan should deepen bilateral ties with partners like South Korea, Australia and Europe, while taking a more proactive role in multilateral frameworks such as the Quad, G7 and G20. Priorities include advancing security agreements, strengthening defense collaboration, and expanding trade networks through CPTPP and RCEP. »

In the 1930s, the collapse of the rules-based international order had catastrophic consequences, culminating in World War II. We cannot afford to repeat the same mistake.