How a US war in its ‘backyard’ could unsettle Asian security

TOKYO — Rarely do events in the faraway Caribbean send ripples across Asia’s security landscape. Yet beneath those turquoise waters, an unlikely development is unfolding — one that demands serious attention.

Late last month, U.S. President Donald Trump visited Japan and South Korea on an Asian tour, reaffirming the strength of the alliances with the key partners in the region. A sense of relief spread through Tokyo and Seoul, but the future of U.S. military engagement in Asia remains uncertain. Optimism would be premature.

Meanwhile, in what Washington has long regarded as its own « backyard, » the Caribbean — and even parts of the Pacific — the Trump administration is militarizing its counter-narcotics policy like never before. Targeting Latin American drug cartels accused of funneling narcotics into the U.S., it has deployed military assets and conducted more than 10 airstrikes on vessels suspected of trafficking drugs, reportedly killing dozens.

To justify its « war on drugs, » the U.S. government has claimed the targeted vessels were transporting illegal narcotics, yet it has provided no clear evidence to support the allegation. Several American experts in international law have warned that such strikes may violate established legal norms.

Cracking down on drug smuggling is the sovereign right of any nation. What makes Trump’s approach perilous is his shift from law enforcement to a military campaign, one that could escalate into open conflict with Venezuela’s anti-U.S. government under President Nicolas Maduro, all under the pretext of narcotics control.

This may not be mere bluster. According to the Washington think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, by Oct. 27, the U.S. military had moved five surface combat ships, three amphibious assault vessels and one submarine into the Caribbean.

Some analysts estimate that more than 10% of the U.S. Navy’s globally deployed forces are now concentrated in the region. The Trump administration has also announced that the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group will deploy to the Caribbean. The cutting-edge flattop, previously active in the Mediterranean, is expected to arrive off the coasts of Central and South America this month.

Military experts in the U.S. point out Washington has not dispatched such a large force to the area since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the tense 13-day standoff between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. The current buildup even surpasses the U.S. deployment during the 1983 invasion of Grenada.

For U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia, there is growing anxiety that a U.S. military entanglement in a « backyard war » with Venezuela could carry serious security repercussions for Asia.

Even as the world’s preeminent naval power, the U.S. faces clear limits. Of its 11 prized aircraft carriers, roughly two-thirds are typically tied up in training or maintenance, leaving only about three available for deployment at any given time.

The military balance in Asia, meanwhile, is already tilting toward China. The Chinese navy now fields more than 370 surface combatant ships and submarines, outnumbering the U.S. Navy in sheer vessel count.

Elbridge Colby, U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy and one of the principal architects of Washington’s defense strategy, has long contended that countering China’s expanding power will require scaling back America’s military commitments in Europe. If that proves true, Washington would have limited capacity to deepen its engagement in the Caribbean while preserving deterrence against China.

For Japan and South Korea, which are both confronting nuclear threats from China and North Korea, this prospect is nothing short of alarming. During a closed-door Japan-South Korea dialogue held in Seoul on Oct. 22 and 23 by the Japan Institute of International Affairs and a South Korean government-affiliated think tank, participants discussed the risks posed by a diminishing U.S. military presence in Asia.

How far does the Trump administration intend to maintain its defensive line in Asia? And what options would Japan and South Korea have if U.S. forces were to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula? Such questions surfaced during the discussions, even extending to the sensitive issue of whether nuclear options should be considered.

Ultimately, the U.S. and Venezuela may avoid a full-scale war, reaching a settlement in which the Maduro regime pledges to strengthen anti-narcotics measures. Alternatively, a political change in Venezuela that replaces the Maduro administration might help avoid war. Even if that is the case, Trump’s extensive naval deployment to the Caribbean would send a stark warning to U.S. allies: Trump’s fixation on « American First » extends beyond trade to the very core of U.S. military strategy.

In the early 19th century, President James Monroe declared the U.S. would steer clear of global entanglements, focusing on its backyard in the Western Hemisphere. This policy became known as the Monroe Doctrine. Some analysts have described Trump’s approach as a « new Monroeism, » though it remains unclear whether it rests on any coherent strategic framework.

Even so, there is little doubt that Trump’s instincts echo elements of Monroeism. In that sense, Washington’s aggressive posture in the Caribbean is both a source of the problem and, arguably, an inevitable consequence of those very instincts. U.S. allies in Europe and Asia should prepare for the possibility that American military presence in their regions could wane.

According to Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington appears to be pursuing three separate security strategies at once.

« The Trump administration is following three strategies simultaneously: a spheres of influence approach, prioritization of the China challenge, and retrenchment to the Americas, » Cooper said. « These do not meld together easily. »

Cooper observes that reconciling these conflicting directions is inherently difficult and could destabilize U.S. military engagement worldwide.

« As the military balance shifts towards China, the cost of defending Taiwan is rising, » Cooper said. « I worry that some Americans are rethinking whether defending Taiwan is worth the risk, and increasingly considering an offshore balancing strategy. »

Trump’s Asian tour wrapped up without incident. But for U.S. allies, the moment for vigilance is far from over.