What Asia can learn from European rearmament

TALLINN, Estonia — Europe is undergoing its most dramatic security realignment since the end of the Cold War, a shift with far-reaching implications for the continent and beyond. At the heart of this transformation is a growing determination to strengthen its own defense capabilities while reducing reliance on the U.S. military.

The impetus for this pivot is twofold: the immediate threat posed by an increasingly belligerent Russia, and growing unease over the unpredictability of U.S. military support under President Donald Trump. But this is not solely Europe’s concern. Asia, despite its geographic distance, cannot afford to see these developments as completely irrelevant.

Estonia, a Baltic nation bordering Russia, stands at the forefront of Europe’s rapidly evolving security landscape. When I returned in mid-May after a year away, the country was in a state of heightened, quasi-war tensions, fueled by Moscow’s relentless assault on Ukraine.

On May 13, the day before my arrival, an unflagged tanker — suspected of being part of the so-called shadow fleet, a secretive network of ships transporting Russian oil around the world — appeared off Estonia’s coast. When the Estonian Navy attempted to inspect the vessel, a Russian fighter jet entered Estonian airspace in what appeared to be an effort to disrupt the operation, the first such intervention by Russia.

Russian cyberattacks and acts of sabotage targeting Estonia’s critical infrastructure have also intensified. In response, NATO conducted a large-scale military exercise in May, code-named Hedgehog, simulating an invasion of Estonia, a member of the alliance.

At Amari Air Base in northern Estonia, the roar of British helicopters and Portuguese F-16s filled the skies as they carried out combat drills.

« In my mind, Europe is already [at] war. … We have to end living in a dream, » Major Gen. Andrus Merilo, commander of the Estonian Defence Forces replied when I asked about Russia’s threat.

« Currently the battlefield is in Ukraine, but [the] war will not end in Ukraine. … [Russia’s] aim is to restore the dominance in the region, including Estonia.

« We would like to live in peace. But unfortunately, peace is temporarily over. Now, it’s in our hands to start not only managing escalation but also building whatever [capabilities] we can to control this [situation]. »

Amid rising tensions, ministers, military leaders and policy experts from the U.S., Europe and beyond gathered in Tallinn, Estonia’s capital, from May 16 to 18 for the Lennart Meri Conference, an annual forum on international security and foreign policy.

This year’s gathering differed markedly from previous ones, both in tone and substance. The debates were more urgent, more pointed and more detailed, focusing on Europe’s accelerating shift away from an excessive reliance on a U.S. security umbrella. At the center of the discussions was a pressing question: What must Europe do to build credible defense capabilities? From defense spending and force readiness to the resilience of the arms industry, participants engaged in impassioned exchanges of views.

Europe’s increased sense of vulnerability was most evident in the debate over the continent’s reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Some participants openly questioned whether the U.S. would continue to extend its nuclear deterrent to Europe, prompting discussion over the extent to which France’s nuclear arsenal could serve as a viable alternative.

In addition to the growing threat posed by Russia, urgency was heightened by Trump’s rhetoric and policies, which have raised doubts about the reliability of U.S. commitments to its allies. The Trump administration is now actively weighing a reduction in U.S. troop deployments in Europe.

« It’s more than 30 years of U.S. desire [to reduce troops in Europe], President Trump just said, enough, this is going to happen and it’s going to happen now, this is going to be orderly, but we are not going to have any more patience for foot dragging in this situation, » U.S. Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker said at the conference.

Whitaker indicated that formal negotiations with Europe regarding U.S. troop reductions might commence later this year. While the details remain uncertain, one conclusion was clear: Europe must urgently prepare for a future less reliant on American protection.

The question is how feasible such autonomy truly is. Judging by defense spending alone, Europe’s resolve appears genuine: 22 of NATO’s 30 European members seem to have met the goal of spending 2% of gross domestic product on defense by 2024. Yet the path forward is fraught with challenges, not least because Europe lacks a unified security vision. Perceptions of the Russian threat vary widely, shaped largely by each member state’s geographic proximity to Russia.

According to European security officials, NATO Europe can be broadly divided into three camps. The first mostly consists of northern European countries that view the Russian threat with utmost seriousness — among them the Nordic nations, the Baltic states, the U.K. and Poland.

The second group comprises southern European countries such as Spain, Portugal and Italy. While they acknowledge the threat posed by Russia, their more immediate concerns center on refugees arriving from Africa and other pressing regional issues.

The third group occupies a middle ground, with Germany as a typical example. According to a German ambassador stationed in Europe, Berlin is primarily focused on preventing a war with Russia — a priority that diverges somewhat from the more hardline stance of the Baltic states, among the alliance’s most vocal critics of Moscow.

Ultimately, the future of European defense will likely be shaped by a coalition of willing nations.

« There are differences in position within NATO, making it difficult for all members to act in unison, » said Michael Clarke, an expert on European security and a former director-general of the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based defense think tank. « For example, in the case of the conflict with Russia, it is likely that about a dozen northern European countries, including the U.K., would form a coalition of the willing with NATO’s endorsement and act together. »

Across the Atlantic, Washington now regards China as its foremost threat, while concerns over North Korea continue to intensify. But it would be misguided for countries like Japan and South Korea to assume that Asia will be spared from potential U.S. troop reductions.

Within the Trump administration — particularly among proponents of the « America First » or MAGA (Make America Great Again) policy, such as Vice President JD Vance — there is a belief that responsibility for addressing threats posed by China and North Korea should fall primarily on those most directly affected: Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.

According to U.S. media reports, proposals have already emerged to cut U.S. troop levels in South Korea by around 4,500 personnel, with plans to redeploy them elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. military footprint in Japan may not remain untouched either.

But a former senior U.S. Defense Department official familiar with internal Trump administration deliberations said opinions within the government remain far from unified regarding the future scale of U.S. forces in Asia. While some MAGA-aligned officials question the need to maintain current troop levels, others, particularly within the Pentagon, State Department and military, argue for reinforcing the U.S. presence to better deter China’s growing assertiveness.

The most dangerous near-term scenario would be the simultaneous escalation of crises in Europe and Asia, triggering a scramble for America’s finite military resources. Preventing such a development will require close coordination and strategic alignment among U.S. allies on both sides of the globe.

The need for transatlantic and Indo-Pacific cooperation has never been more urgent.