{"id":10237,"date":"2018-05-23T10:24:34","date_gmt":"2018-05-23T09:24:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/?p=10237"},"modified":"2018-07-25T09:11:53","modified_gmt":"2018-07-25T08:11:53","slug":"as-poland-and-hungary-flout-democratic-values-europe-eyes-the-aid-spigot","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/as-poland-and-hungary-flout-democratic-values-europe-eyes-the-aid-spigot\/","title":{"rendered":"As Poland and Hungary Flout Democratic Values, Europe Eyes the Aid Spigot"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><\/p>\n<header>May 1, 2018<\/header>\n<header><\/header>\n<header>Steven Erlanger, The New York Times<\/header>\n<header><\/header>\n<header><\/header>\n<header>\n<div>\n<div>\n<p>BRUSSELS \u2014 The European Union is largely about money \u2014 who gives it, who gets it and why. In the face of a challenge to European democratic values from Poland and Hungary, Brussels is naturally turning to money to get at least some leverage over the popular, populist governments there.<\/p>\n<p>The struggle at the heart of the European Union has infused what would normally be a humdrum moment in the life of its bureaucracy \u2014 the publishing of its proposed long-term budget on Wednesday \u2014 with novel importance.<\/p>\n<p>How the European Union disperses its money will be hashed out over months \u2014 debated, amended and approved by the leaders of the member states and by the European Parliament, too.<\/p>\n<p>But suddenly at stake in the tedium is whether the money that richer states transfer to poorer ones \u2014 long seen as a means of democratizing former dictatorships, like Portugal, Spain or Greece \u2014 is instead enabling new ones, namely in Poland and Hungary, among the top money-getters in the European Union.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<aside><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p>That money is no small change. In Poland, European Union money has represented some 61 percent of\u00a0infrastructure spending; in Hungary, the figure is 55 percent.<\/p>\n<p>But both countries have been criticized for increasing state control over the news media and especially the judiciary, which goes to the heart of European commitments to freedom of the press, the rule of law and democratic transparency.<\/p>\n<div>\n<div>\n<p>The means to influence or punish member states for violations of European principles are very weak, however. Real censure is subject to veto, making it difficult for Brussels to challenge democratically elected leaders, even when their practices in office are suspect.<\/p>\n<p>But the challenge is of fundamental importance, argued Adam LeBor, an analyst of Central Europe. \u201cBeyond Brexit and migration,\u201d\u00a0he wrote\u00a0in The Financial Times, \u201cthe new Kulturkampf over national identity may be the biggest threat to the E.U.\u2019s future unity and stability.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<aside><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p>So the European Commission, the bloc\u2019s bureaucracy, is considering tying new aid to the credibility of the judiciary in member states, on the principle that oversight of European Union spending must depend on the rule of law and independent judges.<\/p>\n<p>Such a change would attempt to skirt contentious judgments about \u201cvalues\u201d and instead shift the debate to sound financial management. Importantly, the finance rules work on a form of majority voting, eliminating the veto.<\/p>\n<p>Fines would be considered approved unless the European Council, made up of the heads of government, votes to repeal them.<\/p>\n<p>And even if those fines and aid reductions are passed, governments that are punished would still be liable to fulfill their budget obligations to fund agricultural and investment subsidies out of their own tax receipts.<\/p>\n<div>\n<div>\n<p>That all may be too clever to survive the long process of approval. And even if successful, it would not take effect until at least 2021. But it is an effort to hit countries that have flouted European values and norms in the pocketbook.<\/p>\n<p>All this is cresting because the European Union is beginning to debate its budget framework for 2021 through 2027, a budget that will have to deal with a significant reduction in funds given Britain\u2019s intention to leave the bloc and stop paying into its budget after a transition period that will end in December 2020. Currently, about 10 percent of the European Union\u2019s budget comes from Britain.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<aside><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<div>\n<p>Compared with the national budgets of its 28 member states,\u00a0the European Union\u00a0budget is small. The last seven-year budget, passed in 2013, amounted to only about one percent of the European Union\u2019s gross national income, about 155 billion euros, or about $186 billion, a year.<\/p>\n<p>But about 9 percent of the European Union budget goes\u00a0to Poland\u00a0alone. Another 2.5 percent goes\u00a0to much smaller Hungary.<\/p>\n<p>That money reflects the bloc\u2019s extraordinary commitment to aiding the development of its newer and poorer members, measured by gross domestic product per capita. It is also important to those countries\u2019 growth and the popularity of their governments.<\/p>\n<p>For instance, Hungary\u2019s healthy growth rate of 3 percent a year would be\u00a0as low as 1 percent\u00a0without those regional support funds, known also as cohesion funds.<\/p>\n<div>\n<div>\n<p>Recipient countries argue that much of that money is spent on buying equipment and services from some net-contributor states, like Germany and France, and returns to them in the form of markets and profits.<\/p>\n<p>The Hungarian government spokesman, Zoltan Kovacs, has called the suggestion to tie political conditions to European Union funds\u00a0\u201cpolitical blackmail.\u201d\u00a0He has pointed out that Hungary opened its markets to the bloc in 2004, when the economy was far from competitive.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<aside><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p>\u201cDon\u2019t try to suggest that the E.U. cohesion fund is a gift for central and eastern member states,\u201d he said here last year.<\/p>\n<p>There are expected to be other contentious proposals, too. The distribution of regional support would be based not just on national income per capita but on other indicators like youth unemployment and migration burdens.<\/p>\n<p>That is a clear effort to help older members like Italy and Greece that have borne the brunt of refugee and migrant flows, and other southern countries like Spain and Portugal, where youth unemployment is high.<\/p>\n<p>Cohesion funds for newer member states could be cut by as much as 6 percent to make room for these other kinds of aid.<\/p>\n<div>\n<div>\n<p>Of course, the talk of cuts also comes in the context of Britain\u2019s exit from the European Union, along with its hefty contributions.<\/p>\n<p>Some countries, like France, Germany, Poland and Hungary, have said that they would increase their future contributions to Brussels to help make up for Britain\u2019s departure.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<aside><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p>Other countries, like the Netherlands, have said that they do not want to contribute more, but that the bloc\u2019s budget should absorb the loss of Britain by shrinking and becoming more efficient.<\/p>\n<p>But the commission itself is expected to propose a larger budget than the current one, and aim for an overall amount of 1.13 to 1.18 percent of the bloc\u2019s gross national income, compared with 1.03 percent when the current framework was approved.<\/p>\n<p>But the prevailing mood, led by the Commission vice president, Frans Timmermans, is that the challenge of Poland and Hungary cannot go unmet, and that other countries flirting with forms of \u201cilliberal democracy,\u201d like Slovakia and the Czech Republic, should see consequences.<\/p>\n<p>In an unusually explicit Twitter thread after the Czech elections last autumn, Juho Romakkaniemi, the former head of the cabinet of another European Commission vice president, Jyrki Katainen, asked: \u201cHow long the other MS [member states] are willing to pay large sums for cohesion if it leads to divergence?\u201d<\/p>\n<div>\n<p>Mr. Romakkaniemi noted that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were among the highest net recipients of European Union funds, while their governments indulge in euroskeptic politics. \u201cMy fear is that the populistic path leads to divergence from the E.U. core values of freedom and Rule of Law \u2014 until a breaking point,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThis would be a very sad and dangerous development,\u201d he added. \u201cBut I can see big risks here. It is not too late to reconsider this path carefully.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<aside><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<figure role=\"group\">\n<div><\/div>\n<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div><\/div>\n<p><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>May 1, 2018 Steven Erlanger, The New York Times BRUSSELS \u2014 The European Union is largely about money \u2014 who gives it, who gets it and why. In the face<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":10238,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[23],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-10237","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news-room"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10237","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10237"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10237\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/10238"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10237"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10237"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10237"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}