![\"Russian](\"https:\/\/cdn.cfr.org\/sites\/default\/files\/styles\/full_width_xl\/public\/image\/2022\/02\/GettyImages-1124904864.jpg\")
<\/p>\nAfter all, the US had just carried out a chaotic and near-unconditional\u00a0withdrawal from Afghanistan. Putin had largely gotten away with annexing Crimea in 2014. And Chinese President Xi Jinping had paid little if any price for rolling back democracy in Hong Kong. From afar, therefore, the US appeared weak, divided, and inward-looking.<\/p>\n
Add to that Putin\u2019s lack of respect for America\u2019s European allies. Germany, having unwisely decided to phase out nuclear power, had allowed itself to become more dependent on Russian gas and, as was often true of West Germany during the Cold War, is uncomfortable confronting the Kremlin. Moreover, Putin began his military buildup as winter was approaching, when low temperatures and high fuel prices would give the Kremlin added leverage. The French were focused on their upcoming presidential election, while the United Kingdom was preoccupied with COVID-19, Brexit, and Prime Minister Boris Johnson\u2019s\u00a0behavior.<\/p>\n
In addition, Putin took steps to reduce Russia\u2019s own vulnerabilities, especially to economic sanctions. The country\u2019s foreign-exchange reserves reached a record\u00a0$630 billion\u00a0in December 2021, while high oil prices have generated significant government revenue. And China, already providing diplomatic backing, could offer financial help if the Kremlin were to need it.<\/p>\n
But while Putin manufactured the Ukraine crisis believing he held a clear advantage vis-\u00e0-vis the West, he committed an error that can prove dangerous even for a skilled martial-arts practitioner: he underestimated his opponent.<\/p>\n
While\u00a0Biden\u00a0and\u00a0NATO\u00a0have said they will not intervene directly on behalf of Ukraine, this is not the same as accepting Russian dominance. In fact, the US has organized a comprehensive response. It has\u00a0sent arms\u00a0to Ukraine to increase the costs to Russia of any invasion and occupation. There are plans to fortify NATO member countries closest to Russia. Substantial economic sanctions are being prepared. And\u00a0rerouting gas to Europe\u00a0would partly offset the possible loss of Russian supplies.<\/p>\n
All of which is to say that Putin\u2019s initial thrust failed to score a decisive blow. Those who say that Russia\u2019s president has the West where he wants it have things backwards. Putin has placed himself in an unenviable position: he must either escalate or find a face-saving way to back down.<\/p>\n
The US has wisely provided Putin with a\u00a0diplomatic off-ramp. This could entail a new structure to help underpin European security, as well as arms-control arrangements that would limit the scale and location of a range of systems. A revitalized and revised Minsk process would seek a political settlement in eastern Ukraine that would allow for considerable autonomy for the region\u2019s inhabitants (many of whom are ethnic Russians) and the replacement of Russian soldiers by international peacekeepers. The US has also\u00a0signaled\u00a0that Ukraine will not enter NATO any time soon, and then some.<\/p>\n
Whether such an outcome will be enough for Putin is uncertain. He is not going to hear what he wants \u2013 that Ukraine will never be able to join NATO, or that NATO forces will pull back to where they were more than two decades ago, before the Alliance expanded into Central and Eastern Europe. But Putin will probably have a few weeks to ponder his next steps. He will soon travel to Beijing for the opening of the\u00a0Winter Olympics\u00a0\u2013 and Xi has likely made it clear that he would not appreciate a war in Ukraine overshadowing the opportunity to showcase China ahead of the Communist Party congress this fall, where he will seek a third term.<\/p>\n
Putin does have another option. He could increase Russia\u2019s military presence in the Western Hemisphere, claiming to be doing to the US what it and NATO had done to Russia. But this would be risky, and would do nothing to deal with his concerns in Europe.<\/p>\n
It is impossible to predict what Putin will do, and it may be that he has yet to decide. He may well opt for a so-called \u201cminor incursion,\u201d or limited intervention, possibly to increase Russia\u2019s military presence in eastern Ukraine.<\/p>\n
Such a course of action would give Putin something to show for his aggressive diplomacy without incurring major penalties, as NATO\u2019s 30 members would be unlikely to reach a consensus on how to respond. It would also be consistent with the martial-arts approach of looking for tactical openings to unbalance one\u2019s opponent.<\/p>\n
But such a scenario highlights the limits of martial arts, which are more about tactics than strategy. This largely manufactured crisis in Ukraine risks leaving Russia worse off: controlling slightly more territory, but facing new sanctions, a stronger NATO, and a neighbor whose people have developed a more separate, anti-Russian identity.<\/p>\n
When he returns to his dacha, therefore, Putin might be well advised to take up another game closely associated with Russia: chess, where the best players think several moves ahead and respect their opponent.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n