{"id":14973,"date":"2022-02-21T12:27:50","date_gmt":"2022-02-21T11:27:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/?p=14973"},"modified":"2022-02-21T12:27:50","modified_gmt":"2022-02-21T11:27:50","slug":"fyodor-lukyanov-putins-ukraine-strategy-mixes-threats-diplomacy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/fyodor-lukyanov-putins-ukraine-strategy-mixes-threats-diplomacy\/","title":{"rendered":"Fyodor Lukyanov: Putin\u2019s Ukraine strategy mixes threats, diplomacy"},"content":{"rendered":"
By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV\u00a0<\/span>February 11, 2022<\/span><\/div>\n
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MOSCOW (AP) \u2014 With Russia carrying out a massive military buildup near Ukraine and the West roundly rejecting Moscow\u2019s security demands, a window for diplomacy in the crisis appears to be closing.<\/p>\n

But even as Moscow continues to bolster its forces and holds sweeping war games, President Vladimir Putin is keeping the window open for more negotiations in a calculated game of brinkmanship intended to persuade Washington and its allies to accept Russia\u2019s demands.<\/p>\n

The West fears that a Russian invasion of Ukraine may be imminent, while Russia maintains it has no plans to do so but wants its security concerns addressed.<\/p>\n

Here is a look at the Kremlin\u2019s strategy in the standoff:<\/p>\n

DEMANDS AND RESPONSES<\/p>\n

Russia wants the U.S. and its allies to keep Ukraine and other former Soviet nations from joining NATO, refrain from putting any weapons near Russia, and roll back alliance forces from Eastern Europe.<\/p>\n

Washington and NATO reject those demands as \u201cnonstarters,\u201d but they also are offering to discuss possible limits on missile deployments, a greater transparency of military drills and other confidence-building measures.<\/p>\n

Putin has yet to deliver Moscow\u2019s formal response to the Western proposals, but he has already described them as secondary and warned that he wouldn\u2019t take \u201cno\u201d for an answer on his main demands. He countered the Western argument about NATO having an open-door policy by arguing that it threatens Russia and violates the principle of the \u201cindivisibility of security\u201d enshrined in international agreements.<\/p>\n

MILITARY MUSCLE-FLEXING<\/p>\n

With the West rejecting its key demands, the Kremlin has raised the stakes by massing over 100,000 troops near Ukraine and carrying out a series of military maneuvers from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea.<\/p>\n

As part of the show of force, Moscow has moved trainloads of troops, tanks and weapons from the Far East and Siberia to Belarus for joint war games, drawing Western concerns that Russia could use them as a cover for an invasion.<\/p>\n

Washington and its allies are raising the prospect of unprecedented sanctions in the event of an invasion, including a possible ban on dollar transactions, draconian restrictions on key technology imports like microchips, and the shutdown of a newly built Russian gas pipeline to Germany.<\/p>\n

President Joe Biden\u2019s administration also has deployed additional U.S. troops to Poland, Romania and Germany in a show of Washington\u2019s commitment to protect NATO\u2019s eastern flank. The U.S. and its allies have delivered planeloads of weapons and munitions to Ukraine.<\/p>\n

CALCULATED ESCALATION<\/p>\n

By concentrating troops that could attack Ukraine from many directions, Putin has demonstrated a readiness to escalate the crisis to achieve his goals.<\/p>\n

\u201cPutin appears overconfident and is exhibiting a high level of risk-tolerance,\u201d said Ben Hodges, who served as commanding general of the U.S. Army Europe and now works at the Center for European Policy Analysis. \u201cHe seems intent on applying maximum pressure on the West in this self-manufactured crisis, in hopes that Ukraine or NATO will eventually make concessions.\u201d<\/p>\n

Some observers expect Putin to further ratchet up tensions by expanding the scope and area of the military drills.<\/p>\n

Fyodor Lukyanov, head of the Moscow-based Council for Foreign and Defense Policies who closely follows the Kremlin\u2019s thinking, predicted a Western refusal to discuss Russia\u2019s main demands would trigger a new round of escalation.<\/p>\n

\u201cLogically, Russia will need to raise the level of tensions,\u201d Lukyanov said. \u201cIf the goals set are not being achieved, then you need to increase pressure — first of all through a demonstration of force.\u201d<\/p>\n

Lukyanov said that while invading Ukraine is not what Putin wants, he may challenge the West by other means.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe whole idea as envisaged by Putin … was not to solve the Ukrainian crisis by means of war, but to bring the West to the negotiations table about principles of European security arrangements,\u201d Lukyanov noted. \u201cThe moment Russia starts a war against Ukraine, the whole previous game will be over and the new game will happen at an absolutely different level of risk. And all we know about Mr. Putin is that he is not a gambler. He is a calculated player.\u201d<\/p>\n

POTENTIAL PATHS FOR COMPROMISE<\/p>\n

While Putin and his officials have insisted they expect the U.S. and NATO to bow to Russia\u2019s demands \u2014 a prospect that looks all but impossible \u2014 some Kremlin-watchers expect Moscow to eventually accept a compromise that would help avoid hostilities and allow all sides to save face.<\/p>\n

Even though Western allies won\u2019t renounce NATO\u2019s open-door policy, they have no intention to embrace Ukraine or any other ex-Soviet nation anytime soon. Some analysts floated an idea of a potential moratorium on expanding the alliance.<\/p>\n

Gwendolyn Sasse, a Carnegie Europe fellow who heads the Centre for East European and International Studies in Berlin, voiced skepticism, saying that \u201cthe worst would be to signal that there are divisions in NATO,\u201d noting that Putin might not be satisfied with it either.<\/p>\n

Another possibility is the \u201cFinlandization\u201d of Ukraine, meaning that the country would acquire a neutral status, the way Finland did after World War II. The policy helped it maintain friendly ties with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War.<\/p>\n

Such a move would represent a sharp revision of Kyiv\u2019s course toward NATO membership and likely fuel strong domestic criticism, but the Ukrainian public could eventually welcome the policy twist as a lesser evil, compared with a Russian invasion.<\/p>\n

Asked about the \u201cFinlandization\u201d idea, French President Emmanuel Macron told reporters Monday that \u201cthis is one of the models on the table,\u201d but he backtracked the next day when he visited Kyiv.<\/p>\n

Another potential compromise would likely include steps to defuse tensions in eastern Ukraine, which has been controlled by Russia-backed separatists since a rebellion flared up there in 2014 shortly after Moscow\u2019s annexation of Ukraine\u2019s Crimean Peninsula.<\/p>\n

Russia has urged the West to press Ukraine to fulfill its obligations under a\u00a02015 peace deal\u00a0<\/a>that was brokered by France and Germany and required Kyiv to offer self-rule to the rebel-held territories. The deal has been seen by Ukrainians as a betrayal of the country\u2019s national interests and its implementation has stalled.<\/p>\n

Macron this week described the agreement as \u201cthe only path allowing to build peace … and find a sustainable political solution.\u201d<\/p>\n

___<\/p>\n

Associated Press writers Lorne Cook in Brussels and Sylvie Corbet in Paris contributed.<\/p>\n

Read the original article on the site of the Associated Press<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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