{"id":15086,"date":"2022-03-16T14:10:04","date_gmt":"2022-03-16T13:10:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/?p=15086"},"modified":"2022-03-16T14:10:04","modified_gmt":"2022-03-16T13:10:04","slug":"germany-awakens","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/germany-awakens\/","title":{"rendered":"Germany Awakens"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"article__byline\"><time class=\"vl-divider\" datetime=\"2022-03-14T10:50Z\">Mar 14, 2022<\/time><\/div>\n<div><\/div>\n<div class=\"article__abs u-mt-se\" dir=\"ltr\">\n<p>By launching its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and threatening the West with nuclear escalation, Russia has shaken the very foundations of the postwar order \u2013 and jolted Germany from its dream of effecting change through trade. But can Germany&rsquo;s resolve withstand the economic pain to come?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article__body article__body--commentary paywall english\" dir=\"ltr\" data-page-area=\"article-body\">\n<p data-line-id=\"c4403ad2ef28478aa41a28d4366c3a0e\">MADRID \u2013 Russian President Vladimir Putin\u2019s barbaric\u00a0war on Ukraine\u00a0seems to have awakened Germany from its post-Cold War slumber, with a dramatic shift in foreign and defense policy indicating a newfound recognition of Russia\u2019s unreliability as a partner and the broader security challenges Europe faces. But can Germany\u2019s tougher approach withstand a painful and protracted crisis, or will accommodationist voices regain traction, urging acceptance of the realities on the ground?<\/p>\n<p data-line-id=\"c4403ad2ef28478aa41a28d4366c3a0e\">There is no doubting the resoluteness of Germany\u2019s response to the Russian invasion. Beyond halting the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has\u00a0announced\u00a0a \u20ac100 billion ($109 billion) increase in defense spending this year and agreed to send weapons \u2013\u00a0not just helmets\u00a0\u2013 to Ukrainian fighters.<\/p>\n<p data-line-id=\"c4403ad2ef28478aa41a28d4366c3a0e\">Moreover, Germany has participated in the imposition of sweeping Western sanctions aimed at isolating Russia and inflicting maximum economic pain. More fundamentally, Germany seems finally to have abandoned its long-held belief that dialogue is the only way to deal with the Kremlin.<\/p>\n<p data-line-id=\"c4403ad2ef28478aa41a28d4366c3a0e\">Germany\u2019s newfound mettle, which has been welcomed across Europe, was by no means guaranteed. For decades, Germany\u2019s approach to geopolitics had emphasized rapprochement and economic engagement, with its Russia policy representing a kind of misguided continuation of the Federal Republic\u2019s Cold War-era\u00a0<em>Ostpolitik<\/em>. This\u00a0persisted\u00a0through Russia\u2019s invasion of Georgia in 2008, its\u00a0downing\u00a0in 2014 of MH-17, a passenger flight passing over eastern Ukraine, and the Kremlin\u2019s poisoning of political opponents like\u00a0Alexei Navalny, who recovered from a\u00a0nerve-agent attack\u00a0in a German hospital.<\/p>\n<p data-line-id=\"c4403ad2ef28478aa41a28d4366c3a0e\">Germany was not alone in taking a soft-handed approach to Russia. The United Kingdom has continually \u2013 and willingly \u2013 attracted Russian oligarchs\u2019 dark money. In this sense, Britain\u2019s\u00a0sanctioning\u00a0of oligarchs like Roman Abramovich also represents a notable shift.<\/p>\n<p data-line-id=\"c4403ad2ef28478aa41a28d4366c3a0e\">But, historically, Germany has been at the center of Europe\u2019s political tangles. This was often for the worse: Germany repeatedly disrupted Europe\u2019s balance of power, leading to conflict and unparalleled bloodshed, culminating in World War II. But with the 1951\u00a0creation\u00a0of the European Coal and Steel Community, which bound together Germany and France, the country\u2019s role was transformed.<\/p>\n<p data-line-id=\"c4403ad2ef28478aa41a28d4366c3a0e\">From Chancellor Konrad Adenauer\u2019s tenure in the 1950s and early 1960s through Chancellor Helmut Kohl\u2019s in the 1980s and 1990s, it was said that Germany would find its interests in the interests of the European project. Integration was the only conceivable path to a sustainable and lasting European peace, and Germany was essential to achieving that goal.<\/p>\n<p data-line-id=\"c4403ad2ef28478aa41a28d4366c3a0e\">After reunification in 1990, Germany leveraged its economic strength and prowess to assume a unique convening power in Europe, which enabled it to define the EU\u2019s agenda \u2013 and, thus, trajectory \u2013 for decades.<\/p>\n<p data-line-id=\"c4403ad2ef28478aa41a28d4366c3a0e\">But Germany\u2019s leadership was always selective. It used its\u00a0influence\u00a0\u2013 enhanced by an EU presidency \u2013 to press for the completion of an EU-China\u00a0investment agreement\u00a0just a month ahead of US President Joe Biden\u2019s inauguration last year. (That deal is now in limbo, unlikely to be ratified by the European Parliament any time soon.) Germany also pushed forward Nord Stream 2, despite its allies\u2019 concerns.<\/p>\n<p data-line-id=\"c4403ad2ef28478aa41a28d4366c3a0e\">However, in areas that drew less German interest, such as banking union, the EU was left largely directionless. This dynamic is what prompted former Polish Foreign Minister\u00a0Rados\u0142aw Sikorski\u00a0to\u00a0declare\u00a0in 2011 that he feared Germany\u2019s power less than its inactivity. In fact, Germany\u2019s selective leadership prevented the EU from forging ahead strategically and left it\u00a0reliant\u00a0on former Chancellor\u00a0Angela Merkel\u2019s personal mediation, which ended when her 16-year tenure did.<\/p>\n<p data-line-id=\"c4403ad2ef28478aa41a28d4366c3a0e\">In this sense, Putin has done the West a favor. By launching a brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and threatening the West with nuclear escalation, he has shaken the very foundations of the postwar order \u2013 and jolted Germany out of its\u00a0dream\u00a0of\u00a0<em>Wandel durch Handel\u00a0<\/em>(change through commerce). If recent policy changes are any indication, a more comprehensive and strategic form of German leadership could emerge.<\/p>\n<p data-line-id=\"c4403ad2ef28478aa41a28d4366c3a0e\">But the Western countries imposing costs on Russia will also face high costs, from low growth to skyrocketing energy bills. The post-pandemic recovery could be all but wiped out in much of Europe. Over time, this \u2013 together with the existential dread generated by Putin\u2019s wanton nuclear threats \u2013 could generate significant pressure on European leaders to pursue normalization of relations with Russia and even greater accommodation of it. Germany\u2019s coalition government will be no exception.<\/p>\n<p data-line-id=\"c4403ad2ef28478aa41a28d4366c3a0e\">Putin would view any such shift as yet another demonstration of Western weakness, all but inviting him to pursue ever-bolder gambits. That is why the West, with Germany as a central player, must stand firm in defending its values and opposing Russia\u2019s illegal aggression, despite the costs. Otherwise, sooner or later, we will find ourselves once again living in a world where, as the Athenian historian Thucydides famously\u00a0put it, \u201cthe strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.\u201d<\/p>\n<p data-line-id=\"c4403ad2ef28478aa41a28d4366c3a0e\">Read the original article on the site of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.project-syndicate.org\/commentary\/german-policy-shift-after-russia-invasion-of-ukraine-by-ana-palacio-2022-03?utm_source=Project%20Syndicate%20Newsletter&amp;utm_campaign=e3dddb6984-covid_newsletter_03_16_2022&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_73bad5b7d8-e3dddb6984-93460205&amp;mc_cid=e3dddb6984&amp;mc_eid=683bdade5b\">Project Syndicate<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Mar 14, 2022 By launching its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and threatening the West with nuclear escalation, Russia has shaken the very foundations of the postwar order \u2013<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":13660,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[23],"tags":[153],"class_list":["post-15086","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news-room","tag-153"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15086","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15086"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15086\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/13660"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15086"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15086"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15086"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}