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SINGAPORE — Few now dispute that the U.S. and China have entered a new cold war. The pressing question is whether these two superpowers, locked in an escalating rivalry, can manage their competition and prevent tensions from spiraling out of control.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n
Recent developments have only heightened these concerns. China is increasingly working to challenge the U.S.-led international order and establish a parallel system more closely aligned with its own interests.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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This troubling trend became evident at this year’s Asia Security Summit, known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, held in Singapore through June 1. Hosted annually by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think tank focused on security policy, the conference brings together defense ministers and senior military officials from the U.S., Europe and Asia.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Since 2019, China has consistently sent its defense minister to this high-profile forum, except in 2020 and 2021 when the event was canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Beijing aims to use the platform to achieve two key objectives: to articulate its stance on contentious issues such as Taiwan and the South China Sea, and to soften its image as a regional and global threat.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Successive U.S. defense chiefs have attended the forum, often using the opportunity to hold sideline talks with their Chinese counterparts. In this way, the Shangri-La Dialogue has served as a fragile but crucial conduit between the military leaderships of two increasingly adversarial nations.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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This year, however, marked a dramatic shift: China did not send its defense minister — or even a top-ranking uniformed official. Instead, it was represented by Rear Adm. Hu Gangfeng, vice president of the People’s Liberation Army National Defense University.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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In effect, Hu lacks the authority to speak on behalf of the Chinese military as a whole, rendering China’s presence largely symbolic. In previous years, Chinese delegations engaged with the media, but such interactions were markedly limited this time.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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According to sources close to the organizers, a program slot was left open until the final moment in the hope that China’s defense minister would attend. Beijing’s decision to forgo participation in the dialogue raised eyebrows and quickly became a dominant topic of conversation during coffee breaks and meals throughout the summit.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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In response to inquiries about the downgraded delegation, Hu stated that China sends representatives of varying ranks depending on the year, describing this year’s participation as part of \u00ab\u00a0normal\u00a0\u00bb arrangements. However, Western participants offered a different interpretation, with analyses generally falling into two main camps.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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One explanation points to China’s complex domestic political landscape. Under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, a sweeping anti-corruption campaign has unsettled the military establishment, leading to the downfall of several senior officers.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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He Weidong — the second-highest-ranking uniformed officer and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission — has not made a public appearance in nearly three months, and his whereabouts remains unknown. In November, Miao Hua, then head of the commission’s Political Work Department, was suspended and placed under investigation for \u00ab\u00a0serious violations of discipline.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Both officials are reportedly under scrutiny for corruption. In this climate, many observers believe that China’s top military leadership is in no position to take part in major international forums.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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The other interpretation emphasizes external factors. The tariff war launched by the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has sparked global backlash and diminished America’s international standing. From this perspective, Beijing may have calculated that China can afford to forgo Western-led forums without risking diplomatic isolation.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Both explanations are certainly relevant, but the latter may offer a more accurate reading of the situation, especially given that Xi’s military purges are not a recent development.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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One notable development reinforces this interpretation: China has moved to establish the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed) in Hong Kong, an international body focused on dispute resolution and clearly positioned as a rival to existing global conflict-settlement mechanisms.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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In a pointed symbolic move, the signing ceremony for the organization’s founding was held in Hong Kong on May 30 — the opening day of the Shangri-La Dialogue. The event was attended by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, a member of the Communist Party’s Politburo, along with representatives from numerous countries. Thirty-two countries, largely from emerging and developing regions, signed the convention that established the organization.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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In a broader perspective, the establishment of the IOMed signals a new phase in China’s diplomatic strategy as a major power on the world stage. Until around the 2010s, China sought to expand its global influence by increasing funding and personnel contributions to United Nations institutions. In a strategy often likened to a hermit crab occupying an empty shell, Beijing attempted to embed itself within the existing international system dominated by the U.S. and its European allies.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Over the same period, however, China began shifting to a second phase: constructing its own parallel economic architecture. This included high-profile initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, a vast infrastructure and development program, and the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Now, with the launch of the IOMed, China appears to be entering a third phase — one focused on establishing its own international institutions not only in the economic sphere but also in the political and diplomatic realms.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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China already engages in regional cooperation through frameworks such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. However, the establishment of the new mediation body represents a shift of different dimension — it positions China not just as a participant, but as a leader in international conflict resolution, signaling a far greater level of ambition.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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If China’s initiative genuinely contributes to reducing global conflicts, it should not be dismissed outright. Yet serious questions remain about the country’s fitness to lead international mediation.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Established institutions such as the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration already serve as forums for resolving inter-state disputes. In 2016, the latter issued a landmark ruling rejecting China’s sweeping territorial claims in the South China Sea. Beijing, however, dismissed the verdict as \u00ab\u00a0nothing but a scrap of paper\u00a0\u00bb and has refused to comply.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Doubts also remain about the suitability of Hong Kong as the headquarters for the IOMed, an institution that must be perceived as impartial to be effective. The \u00ab\u00a0one country, two systems\u00a0\u00bb framework, which once promised autonomy for the territory, has been steadily eroded. Beijing’s tightening control over Hong Kong only deepens skepticism regarding the city’s ability to serve as a neutral and independent host for an international organization.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00ab\u00a0A multipolar world order is already a reality,\u00a0\u00bb said a member of the Chinese delegation to the Shangri-La Dialogue. \u00ab\u00a0The power gap between the U.S. and China is narrowing, and China is poised to play an increasingly prominent role on the global stage.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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In his debut speech at the forum in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth underscored Washington’s resolve to counter what he described as the \u00ab\u00a0real\u00a0\u00bb security threat posed by China in the Indo-Pacific. He emphasized the U.S. commitment to deterring any aggression against its allies and partners in Asia. \u00ab\u00a0But if deterrence fails, and if called upon by my commander in chief, we are prepared to do what the Department of Defense does best — fight and win — decisively,\u00a0\u00bb he said.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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As the contest over the global order intensifies, the risk of economic and military confrontation becoming irreconcilable grows. In 1940, Japan — seeking to challenge the Anglo-American-led international order — put forward the concept of the \u00ab\u00a0Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.\u00a0\u00bb One year later, in December 1941, it launched a war.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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If China’s efforts to build a parallel world order continue to accelerate, global polarization will deepen — and so too will the cold war between the U.S. and China. With that, the risk of a hot war could intensify.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
Lisez l’article sur le site de Nikkei<\/em>.<\/a><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Will China succeed in building a parallel order to US dominance? Beijing steps up their game in bid to secure international mediation body Hiroyuki AKITA, chroniqueur Nikkei 15 juin 2025<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":17730,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[23],"tags":[156],"class_list":["post-17807","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news-room","tag-156"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17807","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=17807"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17807\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/17730"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=17807"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=17807"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.worldpolicyconference.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=17807"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}