My personal experience: a brief flashback on 8 years

Joined the UN just after the nineties, the decade of lost opportunities. Many efforts started, few completed:

° European integration: euro but no integration and real strengthening

° Policy of the West toward Russia: no genuine engagement

° Middle East: the failure of Oslo, the frozen conflict of Iraq

° Fragile States: benign neglect (Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti…) followed the tragedies of the 90’s (Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda)

° No genuine reform of UN, NATO, EU…

Early 2000’, a sense that nevertheless everything is still possible:

° After Kosovo crisis, Security Council re-unites: Kosovo, Timor, Congo

° New burden-sharing of UN funding is agreed, Nobel Peace Prize,

ambitious reform of peacekeeping

° New concepts emerging: responsibility to protect…

8 years later, where are we? I have observed the Security Council, its response to crises (9/11, Iraq, Kosovo, Darfur…), and I have contributed to shaping the response of the International community:

° Peacekeeping enormously overstretched (UN deployments twice the size of NATO, biggest after US, NATO also overstretched and poorly equipped to deal with peacekeeping, not enough resources worldwide)

° International institutions and world leaders overstretched (Iran, Korea, Palestine, Terrorism, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Financial crisis). What time is left for the second-tier crises, which may well be the first-tier crises of tomorrow?

° A deep sense of loss of control, no empowered institutions, no agreed architecture, no dominant models. Crisis-management mode. Loss of control, weakening of “big ideas” not necessarily a bad thing (see damage done by big ideas in 20th century!), but need to have cooperative framework: what is to be done?

• Getting our priorities right: re-building “common ground”

Reversing the deterioration of relations between major powers

° An unprecedented strategic situation in which there is neither a defining conflict nor a defining power. But there are common interests.

° China’s growing stake in stability can be mobilized

° Russia’s interests need to be acknowledged, while Russia needs to commit to a rule-based world. Europe has to develop a genuine Russia policy.
° The US has the greatest challenge: from “leadership” to compromise. Does compromise mean abandoning one’s principles?

° The new South/South connections between major emerging countries (Brazil, South Africa, India) and with China and Russia are an immensely positive factor that should be leveraged to give more fluidity to the International architecture. The Europeans should try to become part of those new networks, instead of being sidelined.

Terrorism not the defining threat of our time, but a symptom of fundamental imbalances that need to be addressed

° Lack of progress in the Middle East peace process destroys credibility among millions of Muslims. Sense of political injustice combined with sense of social injustice, most dangerous combination.

° Terrorism grows when gap opens between political awareness and political empowerment (see late 19th century in Europe and Russia). Asymmetric threats are a rational response to an asymmetric world.

° What is new, and could change the threat is combination of WMD and terrorism.

The proliferation of WMD is a defining threat

° No successful answer without a consensus including China and Russia on the broader political context (security of Israel, role of nuclear deterrence in the Middle East, nuclear deal with India, India-Pakistan relations and Cachemire).

° Re-activate discussions between nuclear power to marginalize role of nuclear weapons, and develop cooperation on decommissioning and nuclear fuel cycle.

Market forces need to be balanced by strong institutions, and independence of nations by solidarity and accountability.

° The concept of responsibility to protect and the progress of international justice are triggering a backlash that, while encouraged by dictators under siege, has a broader appeal. There is a widely shared perception that this is a cover for a colonial agenda dominated by the rich and powerful.

° The deal “development/security” is more and more seen as a sham, as development aid is not lifting the “bottom billion” out of extreme poverty, and the negative impact of the financial crisis trickles down on emerging markets.

° The issue of equity and justice has enormous resonance for billions who see a world of double standards and minimum solidarity. There is a new opportunity to reflect on Institutions that missed the opportunity to reform themselves in the immediate aftermath of the end of the cold war.

• Getting Institutions right

There is no “institutional fix” but institutions matter

° No institutional reform will produce results if it is not based on some common strategic goals. Institutions are not an end in themselves. That is why I address the institutional issues only after discussing the need for common ground, which institutions do not automatically produce.

° But institutions are essential to help forge a consensus for action and build legitimacy at a time when no power is in a position to define a world order, and retrenchment is not an option.

• What we want from international institutions

Legitimacy, representativity, efficiency

° 21st century legitimacy has more than one foundation: values, efficiency, representativity. Trade-off needed in a world as heterogeneous as ours; nice to have an alliance of democracies, easier to agree with like-minded actors, but exclusion of key actors and deepening of divides
° Inclusiveness essential: but including states or people? There is a need to develop open institutions that reach out to civil society and private sector.

° Global institutions will not be supported if they do not deliver results, but all stakeholders must benefit from the results (example of peacekeeping).

° The pursuit of efficiency cannot replace consensus on a political agenda

Why it will be difficult to achieve: the reform of the Security Council

° The Security Council gets weak support because it does not include some key financial (Japan and Germany) and military contributors (India), and its legitimacy is challenged on two counts: it represents the world of 1945, in which Europe is over-represented, and it is not efficient.

° Enlargement of the Council will not automatically address those two issues: smaller countries do not agree that bigger countries will naturally represent their interests. And a larger group of members will not be able to make better decisions. It may actually further dilute responsibilities and reduce common ground.

° Reform of the Council will not happen if there is not an agreement between the US and China not only to accept reform, but to actively lobby for it. And reform may well produce worse decisions, or no decisions, if the Europeans cannot reform their own foreign policy-making process. A smaller representation of Europe will not make the world a better place if the voice of Europe has become inaudible because it is reduced to the lowest common denominator of contradictory policies.