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Mr Advisor, representing His Majesty; Prime Ministers; Presidents; Excellencies; Ladies and Gentlemen.

I am happy to be in this magnificent city of Marrakech and in this magnificent country to open this conference. As his representative, Sir, please extend my appreciation to His Majesty for the very substantial speech you just read.

I would first like to recall that the goal of the *World Policy Conference*, now in its second year, is to help rebuild global governance. This is a goal that is both very specific and very ambitious.

We are talking about “governance” rather than “government” to convey the need for flexible coordination systems at a time when purely hierarchical structures seem unsuited to the challenges facing the world. Global governance essentially involves *coordinating the production of public goods* as they are understood by States, which remain the basic reality of international society. Each country has its own vision of public goods, a vision affected – by not determined – by global debate.

As you said, Sir, what we are seeking to do today – by “we”, I mean the *World Policy Conference*, but also anyone working on the issue of governance – is to achieve a practicable and realistic approximation of the plan for perpetual peace: that old concept that, as you said, is associated with illustrious names. You mentioned Ibn Khaldoun: many Westerners would benefit from reading the works of this great philosopher and historian. Naturally, the writings of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Emmanuel Kant and, more recently, the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas also come to mind.

We want to help develop a concrete and realistic version of this concept. This is a vital challenge because, if we fail to adapt our coordination structures to a world that is changing rapidly, and even too rapidly, we will experience systemic crises the likes of which the recent economic and financial crisis would only be a preview of things to come. We must therefore avoid the risk of a major structural crisis worldwide. That’s the defensive aspect, but it is also important to develop coordination methods that are lasting and universally beneficial .

I personally regret that after the Second World war, the name *League of Nations* was replaced by *United Nations*. That was undoubtedly inevitable because the League of Nations was bankrupt due to events during the interwar period. But I believe that at our current stage of development, the expression “League of Nations” corresponds better to reality than “United Nations”, simply because the nations are not, or not yet, united. The States as a whole constitute a society much more than a community, in the sociological sense of these terms. What we want to construct is a true League of Nations. Any society must be structured to reflect common, overarching interests, those that



transcend the inevitable conflicts between its members. It must be organised in such a way as to prevent or limit the effects of disturbances of all kinds, whether economic or political in nature.

For those familiar with the early works of Henry Kissinger on the Congress of Vienna and the creation of a European entente after the Napoleonic wars, I am thinking in particular of the “revolutionary actor” concept. The revolutionary actor is the one who refuses to obey the established rules for the common good, and who, as a result, imperils society. Every society must take steps to restrict actors who seek to destroy or destabilise it.

These ideas may seem abstract, but in fact they are very concrete. The great French mathematician and physicist Paul Langevin once said, “The concrete is the abstract rendered familiar through use”. These abstract ideas typically take shape in the process of organising international trade. The WTO’s goal is to maintain a basically open economic system because we know that if the system closes up, we will again experience crises comparable to those that occurred in the 1930s, which led to the Second World War, through protectionism, the rise of nationalist movements and the rest. And the issue of fighting troublemakers has now taken a decidedly concrete turn, with international terrorism orchestrated by non-state political actors such as Al-Qaeda.

These issues should be further examined from two perspectives: time and space.

From the perspective of time, we must take care to build a coordination system that is viable both over the medium and long term without, however, neglecting short- and medium-term issues. So we must be prepared to work on two different timescales. With regard to space, we must work at both regional and global level. It is not reasonable to expect us to develop mechanisms for resolving all local problems on a global scale. One of the major shortcomings of governance as it operates today is precisely the poor way it handles regional issues.

I think that at future sessions of the *World Policy Conference* – and this includes our work over the next two days – we should keep this time-space distinction in mind: short/medium and medium/long term on the one hand, regional and global on the other.

I believe that a reformed United Nations – which, I am aware, will certainly never again be called the League of Nations – will have to set itself the objective of ensuring cohesion and the legitimacy of the coordination systems developed for each major problem affecting the world as a whole, at the various levels of time and space.

Allow me to say a few words about events that have occurred since our first meeting a little more than a year ago in Evian. I am thinking in particular about the economic and financial crisis. Those of you who attended the meeting last year remember that the *WPC* coincided with a dramatic worsening of the crisis. Jean-Claude Trichet had taken the time to come despite the enormous tension. Today it is safe to say that the financial crisis is behind us – as long as we do not slacken off and think that because things are going better, we can do without essential systemic reforms.

With regard to the economic situation, the picture is far from clear. Most experts are still floundering when it comes to developing exit strategies. No one knows how many years it will take to put the economic system as a whole back on the rails.



But beyond the economic aspect, I want to emphasise that global governance does not only involve the economy – there is also strong interaction between the economy and politics, security problems and a certain number of more specialised issues, such as energy, climate change, health and the environment. We will address all of these topics during the conference.

I must say – no doubt too abruptly – that the world has seen little progress in these areas over the past year. With respect to energy, for example, since we will be at the Copenhagen Conference in two months, I fear that we are heading toward disappointment because the governance and negotiation systems for issues as complex as the link between energy and climate change are not up to the task. The same holds true for other issues as well, including health care. We therefore have an enormous amount of work ahead of us.

To address these concerns, I would like to make a few comments from the standpoint of methodology. Firstly, I want to underscore the primacy of States. The *World Policy Conference* was conceived in late 2007 and first held in 2008. We were the first to recall the principle of the primacy of States at a time when it was still fashionable to consider them as nothing more than hindrances to the advent of the “best of all worlds”.

Yes, States have primacy because by definition they embody the common good of their people, even though they do so imperfectly, which brings us back to the subject of coordination that I was just discussing.

Naturally, States must also implement domestic reforms and not only in the way they coordinate intergovernmental relations. In order to improve the functioning of systems as complex as finance, energy, health care, etc., they must cooperate with other stakeholders and thus the other active or political units concerned on a case-by-case basis. States must segment and coordinate, which involves the UN objective that I previously referred to. In support, we need a spirit of cooperation that transcends conflicts and differences – lacking which, nothing is possible. And that, most likely, is the major obstacle.

Over the past few years, I have been trying to describe this new world in my writings. Last year in Evian, I used three terms for that purpose: multipolarity, heterogeneity and globality. Allow me to say a few words about each subject.

Multipolarity: The United States, of course, is and will remain the leading world power for the foreseeable future. No one disputes that. But on every governance issue, the United States can no longer claim to hold the only key to the common good. It must reason more in terms of *partnership* than in terms of *leadership*, which is not inherent in its culture. It must learn to work with other players. But the poles corresponding to each of the above-mentioned issues are not necessarily the same. If I may use mathematical language, the intersection of all sets of the poles corresponding to the different issues obviously include the United States. The United States is always among the poles, at least at global level. This is a very important point. For each issue, therefore, we must identify the poles. For example, the creation of the G20 seems like a positive initiative in terms of macroeconomic coordination and global finance. But in terms of major political



concerns, the appropriate G would probably consist of permanent members of a reformed Security Council within the United Nations system. And we must acknowledge that little progress has been made on that front.

What I want to say about the Gs – groups corresponding to the various governance issues – is this. Firstly, selecting members for a G depends on the issue in question, but when a G is formed, a charter must be developed that defines both the rights and responsibilities of each member. The aim is to ensure effective governance in the relevant field, not only for the good of the group's members but also for the good of others. And that raises a challenge we face everywhere: for a group to operate effectively, it must be large enough to include the main players in the relevant field without being too large to function properly. As an example, one of the major problems in the energy and climate negotiations, which we will surely see in Copenhagen, is that there are too many players, at least during the current phase.

Defining an appropriate G – the right size for each problem – is a difficult exercise, but I repeat: each G must have a charter of rights and responsibilities. The responsibilities must include contributions to the common good by providing substantial resources – economic and military, for example.

I cannot emphasise strongly enough the responsibility aspect. It seems to me, ladies and gentlemen, that we have much to do. Unless I am misinformed, I am unaware that any existing Gs are making any effort to precisely describe their duties in writing, not only for the good of their members but for the good of other States as well. In that regard, I think it would be appropriate to revise the entire United Nations Charter. And allow me to add, even if it means putting a cat among the pigeons, that even certain documents approved by the UN General Assembly, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – “universal” because at the last minute René Cassin managed to replace the word “international” with this adjective – would pose a problem. The Declaration of Human Rights is superb, many support it and of course I do myself, unconditionally, but it is not universal: because not all members of the international society participated in drafting it, it is not an integral part of all cultures. So we have important work to do in specifying both the rights and responsibilities of the Gs' members. And this especially pertains to the members of the most recent addition, the G20.

Underlying these issues, however, are problems of effectiveness and legitimacy. Effectiveness demands that a group not have too many members and that, of course, the group itself be properly organised. Legitimacy demands a sufficient number of members and that there be mechanisms for addressing the interests of non-members – and in this area everything, or at least much, remains to be done.

Of course, when we talk about these groups, which have been proliferating over the years, we must also include international organisations in the economic sector, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. For the most part, the issue of linkage and coherence among these institutions remains to be decided and, as I said before, a reformed United Nations could play a major role in this area.

Heterogeneity, my second description for this new global system, refers to a key issue. The ideological factor remains very important in today's world. Ideology simply means that each nation operates according to a "system of ideas" and such systems do not form a coherent whole. Fukuyama's "end of history" equation (democracy + market economy => peace + prosperity) is based on an ideological premise that is particularly open to question because the terms used are not defined with any precision. So it is not operational.

We must therefore recognise that different groups of people, different nations and different political entities have different ideologies and cultures. And the only way to work together is to be tolerant of one another. You yourself, Sir, used this word a few moments ago. Tolerance means respect for others, listening to others, and constructively trying to understand them. We can all agree that this effort has generally been very inadequate. In fact, it is not easy to understand someone else's mindset.

One example is China's foreign policy. China is not well represented at this year's *World Policy Conference*, but I have reason to hope it will be better represented next year. When the Chinese say things that shock us, we should interpret them through the lens of their culture and history. We then realise these are not intended as subterfuges against Western interests, for example. When the Chinese draw attention to the dangers that may result from occupying Iraq or Afghanistan, as they have been doing since the early 1990s, they haven't necessarily been trying to catch Westerners in a trap. These are basically fair arguments and this type of speech can be best understood in reference to a strategic culture in which the absence of war is generally preferable to a state of war. That goes well beyond the Latin adage, *Si vis pacem, para bellum*: "If you want peace, prepare for war". So there are wide gaps in understanding that we must take very seriously.

I will not have enough time to elaborate on another idea that I will have to be content with sketching out. I am talking about the problem of translation. Think about the documents that govern the European Union. Now think about the failed plan for a constitution. The effort to write a text that would work in all EU languages condemns it, by necessity, to a sort of vacuity or at least an extreme linguistic poverty because all languages express a certain mindset. What we should be seeking in a revised and edited Constitution would not be a series of translated texts, but those that are perceived expressing cultural equivalents through the cultures of different nations. That, to my mind, is an avenue worth exploring.

Lastly, my third description is *globality*. Globalisation is the result of the revolution in information and communication technologies. By its very nature, it is an irreversible phenomenon. Not completely, however. Let me explain: it is a phenomenon that perpetuates itself by extension but it can be artificially stopped. Nothing prevents States from re-establishing trade barriers. Nothing prevents them, for example, from using the same technologies to control websites. It bears repeating – it would be disastrous if States were to give in to that, meaning it could lead to a third world conflict. A real one. So we must, at all costs, come together and allow globalisation to continue on its way, but in a more harmonious manner, to use a word essential to Chinese culture.

We must seek ways to govern that will support harmonious globalisation. That, in the final analysis, is the objective of the *World Policy Conference* process. It assumes a certain number of conditions that I earlier tried to delineate, with tolerance a particularly important factor.



Our work follows the general principles that I just outlined.

For this year's conference, called a *Groundwork Meeting*, we have chosen seven major themes with a dozen roundtables.

For each theme, I strongly encourage you to identify the relevant issues and main points that call for improvement. Outline solutions, yes, but as they say, "A problem well-stated is a problem half-solved". Personally, I think that a well-stated problem at this point is already an accomplishment. And that does not mean spreading ourselves too thin. I also urge you to work in a spirit of tolerance and mutual respect. There is no place at the *World Policy Conference* for unilateral statements of an ideological or polemical nature. We are here in search of ways to advance the common good.

From this perspective, I am confident that over the years the *World Policy Conference* will help push things forward a bit. To that end, I wish to recall two of the principles discussed in Evian. Our goal is to bring together committed and often high-level figures active in political life with business leaders and other major representatives of all parties with a stake in globalisation issues, including opinion leaders. We also want to give the floor to States which, in practice, typically have no voice on this matter. It is in this way that we can hope to build a better world, a world that will still be livable in 2100 and 2200. And God knows that it is not easy to imagine what the world will be like in the year 2200.

But there is one thing I do know: if we do not make every effort today to improve global governance over the long term, the world in 2100 or 2200 will be unliveable.

That, ladies and gentlemen, is why we are here. I would again like to thank everyone who worked so hard to make this conference possible. I want to especially acknowledge our Moroccan friends as a sign of my appreciation, particularly those sitting in the first row.