Bogdan KLI CH

I have several remarks and several questions, and I will use them only as a summary. First of all, how can you imagine that you know about the return to the new cooperative model of security between Russia and the West? The current model was blown up during the intervention in Donbass and before that, during the illegal annexation of Crimea. This model was paradoxically introduced into NATO's security concept in 2010, but it was practised for years from the end of the Cold War.

The model was based on an assumption that dialogue is better than confrontation and that it is better to resolve problems together. This was put in place within the institutions that were set up for such a decision, for example, between NATO and Russia and within the NATO-Russia Council. How can you imagine a return to a similar dialogue that was the basis of the cooperative model of security, which does not exist anymore? That is first.

Secondly, one of the speakers, Mr Malgin, said that in 2018, there will be a chance for personal change within the administration and within the Cabinet. That will lead to new political circumstances. Do you think that after such changes, the Russian Federation will change its approach concerning the conflict in Donbass? You still have 30 000 troops, more than 800 armoured vehicles, and around 390 tanks. Donbass and the Eastern part of Ukraine is still surrounded by about 80 000 regular troops of the Russian armed forces. Do you think there will be a withdrawal of those troops, of the shadow army, from Donbass? Do you think there will be changes within this area surrounding Donbass? This is one of the most visible signs of Russia’s assertive position, to use your word.

Thirdly, one of the speakers was talking about the future. You were also speaking about the future of the relationship between the European Union and Russia. In such a context, between 2020 and 2035, we can say everything, because everything can happen. However, there are some crucial differences between the European Union and the Russian Federation concerning the policy and concerning the economic model. There is the reference to international global affairs. There is a huge confrontation right now between the West and the Russian Federation, and the European Union is a part of this West. How do we avoid this confrontation in future and what should be done? I mean, what are the preconditions for such a reduction of tension between the EU and the Russian Federation?

Igor YURGENS

We have three questions on Ukraine and EU-Russia relations.

JU Chul-Ki

I am Chul-Ki JU and I am the former ambassador to France. I was also senior foreign policy advisor to Madam President Park. I am retired now and welcome this opportunity to speak on this issue. Russia is part of Europe and a large chunk of your relations are conducted through your relations with Europe and the United States. However, you are also our neighbour, and we have our initiative and project to link the railway with the Russian Trans-Siberian Railway. This is to shorten the distance regarding logistics and to connect with Europe, including Germany, France, and other countries.

We worked very hard to link the railway, without direct contact with North Korea, and we were finally about to sign a contract in February 2015, after 10 years of waiting patiently. Then in January, North Korea blasted its fifth nuclear bomb test, and it was all off, so we were not able to sign. At that time, I left the government, but it was very unfortunate. Then probably even the UN Security Council opted out with regard to this railway project, but it can still be done potentially. The new government focuses very much on following the same pattern of policy, although they changed the name. They do not call it the Eurasian Initiative, but they set up a Northern cooperation committee, which will be more powerful. I hope they can carry on.
Then we also think that the most backward regions in China are the three Northern provinces. The three Northern provinces in China are the regions that lag behind the most in China now. This is because of this blockade by North Korea. You need to develop the Primorsky area, and we are ready to cooperate. The project was there and nothing practical was done. Now, our people are starting to travel there freely because there is a visa waiver now. This is a big potential change in the area.

One of the conclusions I have personally is that we should change our minds, before something passes through North Korea. Until we find solutions to the North Korean nuclear problem, we cannot do that, but we can link our Busan power to Vladivostok, Harbin, and beyond. We can start the operation of a Trans-Siberian Cooperation. This is the vision, and I hope the new government will carry that on.

My viewpoint is that I do not have feedback. We must find solutions to the North Korean nuclear problem, because that is against humanity. We do not need any more nuclear weapon states. We must absolutely put an end to that, and we need cooperation. You are permanent members of the Security Council, like France, and I think there is good cooperation, but how can we persuade North Korea? For the moment, you are the best ones who can speak to North Koreans, because of these tough relations with China. I hope you will comment on that.

Then I see the drastic change in the Vladivostok area. Vladivostok became a modern and very attractive city in terms of tourism, and it is potentially a logistics destination area. In 10 years’ time, I hope we see a very prosperous area in the Vladivostok area and other regions. That goes in parallel with the development of the three Northern provinces in China and potentially North Korea and the Korean Peninsula. Regarding Japan, you will also find a source of investment there.

Lastly, the Eastern Economic Forum that President Putin launched a few years back will add momentum. One must revisit the documents annually. This should be changed, and I think there will be change. However, without even passing through North Korea, we should do that, but it would be far better if we find a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. We will have a gigantic problem of providing economic help.

We are ready to help massively in the build-up of the North Korean economy, but now, the issue is the nuclear problem. We hope regional powers cooperate and find solutions, but on the other hand, even if we do not have that, we must meet in peace. We do not need to have another war, and we have to start linking your power with our power and start shipment to Europe. European goods can also come to us. That is my contribution and I await your feedback.

From the floor

My first question is to Mr Dynkin and it is about territory. There are many interpretations saying that Russia will divide in future and there are many interpretations that Russia will enlarge. Regarding Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan, there is the question of relations between Russia and Belarus. Which prognosis is closer to the reality in the way the situation is developing? The second question is to Mr Malgin about Siberia, and about the plan for the development of Siberia in the context of the population, for example.

You know the problems very well, and it should be a key element in every prognosis about the future of Russia to consider the Siberian problem. The third question is to Mr Lissovolik. What in your opinion are the main barriers to the growth of the population in Russia? What is the main barrier to the development of the population? The question is in fact about how to stop the depopulation of the Russian Federation.

Igor YURGENS

There are more questions to Artem than to others, so we will probably start with you, Artem, and then Alexander and Yaroslav will answer.
Artem MALGIN

I will discuss Siberia first, because it is easier to answer. I have no recipe, first of all. I have never been in Siberia. The furthest geographic point I was at was in the Urals, and then I was in the very Far East many times, so it is a completely unknown place to me personally. However, what I can say is that Southern Siberia is rather well populated, but there is also the problem of climate. How do we find those who are ready to go to unfriendly climates?

The next thesis is, look at pre-revolutionary Russia. It went much more southwards. The biggest cities were Kiev and Odessa. To some extent, the greatest developments were achieved in Yekaterinodar, which is Krasnodar nowadays. Without the Revolution, it would have had a chance to be as big as Odessa, to some extent. Then, under the Soviets, there was the resource-led economy, and this was probably not because of political will. At that time, there was industrial development. Due to all that, we moved towards the North and Siberia. It is not the best solution to artificially populate this region. That is what I can answer on this question. It could be readdressed to Yaroslav to some extent.

Then, about Ukraine, EU, and Russia relations, I am not going to count figures for the troops, tanks and all that stuff. When we start talking about figures and troops around Ukraine and even Eastern Ukraine, they are absolutely different. However, what I can stress again is regarding appeasement in Ukraine. Stopping the conflict in Eastern Ukraine is a key element in Russia's European policy. It is a key point for better relations with the EU, and it is also one of the key points regarding stable development in Russia itself.

The conflict in Donbass touched strongly the development of the Russian regions which neighbour this part of Eastern Ukraine. Look at the statistics for what is happening in the Rostov region and other regions which neighbour the Ukraine border. They were interlinked to the greatest extent with Ukraine, and with Donbass in particular, when it comes to very Southern parts of the European territory. Here, I see no other way than a resolution of the conflict. It is a mistake to start approaching it by counting troops. You first need to understand that it should be resolved. Then it opens our relationships with the EU. You know that the EU imposes sanctions and continues imposing sanctions every six months. We have a chance and a pretext to remove sanctions when we witness a better situation in Donbass every six months.

Alexander DYNKIN

I have one geographical point, so let me start with geography. Let me remind you that I told you that Russia is not for beginners. Our border with European states is something like 6,500 km. Our border with Muslim countries is twice as big and our border with China is 4,200, and we even have a 17km border with DPRK. This is just so you can imagine where we operate. There is no intention to enlarge this territory, as it is huge. This figure regarding the Baltic is completely political speculation about Belarus and so on and so forth. This is the first part of the answer.

Regarding relationships with Ukraine and the relations with the European Union, our perception in Moscow was that there was a coup d'état in Kiev. France, Germany, and Poland assigned the transition period with opposition. They did not say it worked after this coup d'état happened. President Yanukovych was staying for three more days in Ukraine and nobody supported him. This is about so-called international law.

Our policy towards Ukraine was typically Western policy. It involved a responsibility to protect the Russian-speaking population. We have mirrored your behaviour, but I do not know where. It was everywhere. There are alternative facts about the overestimation of the troops. There were recent military drills in the Western part of Russia and Belarus. We followed the statistics in Poland. The quantity of troops involved in the quality of these drills was overestimated by 10 times. This is not my problem.

Regarding relations with Korea, I do remember this very economically valuable project of the railroad towards Busan, with a connection to Yokohama, which could be the belt to Europe. It never happened, due to the policy of the North Korean regime. I could not understand that. Maybe they had a frightening effect on this railroad, so it never happened. Regarding solving the nuclear problem, a military solution would destroy sales completely. This is my point.
Something like an ERM deal with North Korea is the only one with the recipe for how to manage it, but there are plenty of other options. Regarding Donbass, a few months ago, President Putin suggested using peacekeepers on the dividing line, and in my perception, this is a breakthrough in the resolution of the Donbass issue. Currently, the Russian proposal regarding the UN resolutions being debated at the United Nations in New York. We shall see what the Western response to those ideas will be. This idea is completely workable.

**Yaroslav LISSOVOLIK**

Very briefly, regarding Siberia, if you were to ask me what my top picks are in terms of regional centres and regions that are to grow in the coming decades, I would say the Far East. As was rightly pointed out by the Korean representative here, there is a lot of interest from foreign investors, and we are seeing important developments with regard to building scientific centres etc. Then there is Southern Russia, including the region of Krasnodarsky Kray.

There was the paradigm of regional development that we saw during the whole Soviet period and partly in the post-Soviet period. This pattern prioritized the development of the Hinterland compared to the coastal regions. This is going to be reversed, and Russia is going to be more in line with international practice. It is going to be the coastal regions that are going to be growing much faster. I can tell you, if you look at the share of the budget that is distributed from the federal centre to the regions, the highest shares are the Far East and Southern Russia. In terms of state priorities, these are the two regions.

Siberia will continue to be a repository of national resources to a significant degree. This has been its traditional role, but then another important issue is human capital development. There are parts of Siberia that are very important in this regard, including the Novosibirsk region. To a significant degree, the role that is being played by Siberia will continue, but in terms of growth and in terms of priorities, it is going to be the Far East.

I will speak especially in terms of demographics and the recipes to deal with adverse demographics. It is about targeting human capital development and budget spending that is oriented more towards financing healthcare, as a share of total budget spending. We in Russia had a programme that was very successful, that directed additional monetary transfers to those families that had a second child. That served to boost fertility rates. Then there are discussions around the possibility to expand this programme to families that have a third child.

Then, if you take the past several years, the average life expectancy has increased substantially and is now above 70 years. It is around 71 years. For males, the figure is 67-70 years old. To remind you, the average life expectancy of a Russian male in the 1990s went as low as one point as 54. The developments of the past several decades in that regard are positive, but the main conclusion from our history, especially from the 1990s, in terms of demographics, is this. The best thing, and the most important recipe for these things, is stability, economic stability, and economic growth. The experience in the 1990s was of a tremendous fall in population with regard to fertility and significantly higher mortality. Part of the reason was simply economic instability.

**Peter JANKOWITSCH**

My name is Peter Jankowitsch and I am a former member of the Austrian government and Austrian diplomatic corps. I now work for the Austro-French Centre for Rapprochement in Europe, so this is a very interesting discussion for me. My question relates to a very unstable region of Europe, namely the Western Balkans. President Putin once said that the demise of the Soviet Union was one of the great catastrophes of the 20th century.

I also believe, personally at least, that the dissolution of Yugoslavia is a very similar catastrophe. It meant the disappearance of a country which provided stability and had a very important role in international relations. This created a lot of instability in the region. The only organisation at the moment in Europe which is capable of bringing some degree of stability and continuity into this region is, like it or not, the European Union. Two of these countries have already joined the European Union, Croatia and Slovenia, but there are four more.

I have a little question in my mind about how the Russian Federation sees this process of integration of these countries into the European Union, which is not in any way anti-Russian. Some of these countries, like Serbia, have a very long
and a very close relationship to Russia. All of them are Slavic. However, there were certain overtures made from time to time to the Republic of Srpska in Bosnia by Russia. This raises questions about whether or not Russia is behind this process.

This would be something which would be very stabilising for the region and would certainly also help to improve the relationship between the European Union and the Russian Federation. There is not a shadow of a doubt that we would not exist. There is no opposition to this joining from Russia. On a purely personal point to Mr Panov, I would like to say that I have always defended the idea that Russia is a profoundly European country, and I do not see, from the philosophy of Mr Dostoyevsky that someone mentioned, how you can join with China. That is just my personal remark.

Sean CLEARY

Forgive me for this, but it is a philosophical statement.

Igor YURGENS

FutureWorld Foundation is about philosophy, and you are leading this think tank.

Sean CLEARY

It is related to the topic. It is about Russia in 20 years. When you do any form of scenario work, you usually have two questions that you have to ask right at the beginning. Are you going to look at a set of drivers and a set of uncertainties and then plot the inter-relationships between these? Are you therefore going to take an analytical approach in respect of the development of scenarios? Or are you intending to create normative scenarios in order to justify an outcome that you perceive to be appropriate? Both of these are legitimate uses of scenario method, and both of them, I would suggest, are appropriate ways to tackle the question of Russia in 2020.

I have a question, but if you will allow me, I want to tag a comment onto it. My question is, in approaching this question, how much was normative, and how much was analytical? Michel, yours was normative, but the key question is, what are we trying to do? The second tag comment on it is that quite frankly, we are at probably the most dangerous period of my comparatively short life. Seven decades is not a huge amount of time.

However, we are at a point where the rules of the game are being questioned on almost every front. International law has been questioned, in terms of both its efficacy and its legitimacy. Most geo-strategists, over the last 30 years I suppose, have tended to argue that stable and progressive situations can only be defined if there is a reasonable equilibrium. This is underpinned by a normative regime that enjoys legitimacy and permits efficacy. Arguably, that is not true today.

The problem is, when it is not true, then you get the sort of situations that we have seen too often in the past. We certainly saw it in the years leading up to the First World War. One does not have to buy Christopher Clark’s thesis of sleepwalking into disaster in order to be able to argue this point coherently. It was an absence of an ability to envision better outcomes and a coherent strategic approach of the great powers of the time that led us into an absolute disaster. One could make the same case in respect of the ‘30s, leading up to the Second World War.

We do not want that today, but there is a very great risk. There are those in Moscow who are envisioning Russia in 20 years’ time, and those in Washington, who are characterised by tweeting and indecent behaviour. There are those in Europe who are fractured as a result of uncertainty due to rising populism and the like. There are those in China who are determined, because of a failure of everyone else in the system, to try to bring some order through frames of global governance. They are all acting on independent tracks.

There is a very great risk that a funny little man sitting in Pyongyang, or one of half a dozen other events, could in fact lurch us into something that we will all regret deeply for the rest of our lives. The question is, do you have a vision of where Russia should be in 20 years’ time, and can one start constructing a strategy that will enable one to achieve that
outcome? This is in a manner that is consistent with the positions that other major actors will be adopting over that period.

Igor YURGENS

We have discussed this many times over. We are in the process of building up something like a normative vision of global governance with Sean and with his people. I will dare to try, when I make a conclusion, to answer your question from my personal point of view. I thank you very much for your question. We will have the Consul General of Russia for Casablanca next.

Abdellatif ABID

I am not in the business of entertaining any questions here. It is not my role and purpose. I wanted to refer to an allegation made. We are not talking about numbers of troops. There are no Russian troops in Donbass, period.

Igor YURGENS

The remark has been well dealt with. There were two questions and one declaration. Put it this way. Question number one is on the Western Balkans and what our position is on their integration into the EU.

Artem MALGIN

In Austria, they have really young people at the top. That is providing power attraction to the youth. I said it in my speech, and I always stress it when I am with Western audiences. Russia may want to support being against something like this. Rationally, it must be a really strategic issue, and taken in a short period. Otherwise, I will not use the word divided, but it is diversified. The Balkans, as well as many other international issues, give such a point of discussion. These are not as strong as Ukraine, because when it comes to Ukraine, there are many other points of view. For example, I hold a rather moderate view.

As for the Balkans, there are those who are really involved in the Balkan affairs, those who understand the differences between small states in the Balkans that they could have their interests in. However, strategically, the Balkans are rather far from us. It is clear that throughout these 25-27 years of the post-Soviet period, we have not managed to hold a specific long standing, logical, or strategic line there. The region is very diversified.

Knowing everything, coordinating and putting together all these minor trends are impossible. I participated in a number of recently organised semi-official discussions on the Balkans, but I am not a specialist of the Balkans. The general trend I can talk about is just to leave them on their own. It is clear. We have no immediate interest in letting them into the EU or stopping them from joining it.

It is a general trend in the Balkans, in spite of what our Albanian friend said yesterday. For him, the EU looks like the ill man of Europe. Let him look at his own country, and the EU is much more robust than Albania, I guess. If it is a general line, we will follow the general line. If they are in the EU, we will set another part of our interests in a new framework of the Western Balkans being inside the EU.

Renaud GIRARD

I just have a question on that. The Albanian Prime Minister and also Mr Đukanović, Prime Minister of Montenegro, said that there was a Russian military attempt to overthrow him. Is it true or not? They wanted this.

Igor YURGENS

What Đukanović said was that there were Russian nationalists who are persecuted by Russian authorities. Those two Russian nationalists, tried to do something in Montenegro before Montenegro had elections which would have led joining NATO, which they did. I do not think the Russian authorities have anything to do with the radicals who are now,
today, in Moscow, being locked up in prison for a demonstration which was not allowed by the state. Yaroslav wanted to answer the previous question.

Yaroslav Lissovolik

Serbia is talking about not just a one-way vector in terms of its development of partnerships towards the EU. It is negotiating and discussing the possibility of an FTA, a free trade area, with the Eurasian Economic Union. I would turn the question back to you. Would Europe, would the EU, accept the possibility of an economic alliance between the Eurasian Economic Union and Serbia? By the way, as you probably know, there are no full-fledged relations between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union.

I see some issues in terms of how this process needs to be approached. It should not be approached as a one-way street. This is a country that has substantial support for Russia and a substantial inclination for building economic relations with Russia, and it should be allowed to choose its own path. If it is a two-vector model, with the possibility of alliances both to the West and to the East, let it be so. However, the Serbs are talking about Serbia as a bridge between the Eurasian Union and the European Union. That would be a very good model that could perhaps be replicated for some of the similar cases that are called “in-between countries”. This includes those economies that lie between the European Union and the Eurasian Union.

Igor YURGENS

Before we wrap up and hear short final remarks from all the participants in the panel, can Russians allow me to try to venture to answer Sean Cleary’s question? If so, here are the main outcomes. There probably will be a bipolar world. The United States and the European Union would be on one side, with Japan and other allies. Then China, Russia and probably some other countries would be on the other side. These are the two poles associated along different systems of governance, one democratic and another autocratic.

If this is so, and we are now talking about Russia, there is the analysis given by Alexander Dynkin, which is about the “argentinisation” of Russia. I remind you that Argentina was the fifth largest nation after the Second World War, and now it is on the way down. Russia might be similar to Argentina. It will not develop faster than 2%, probably 3%.

Regarding being second in command to China, I do not think that the Russian character would ever tolerate that. Nobody among my friends knows a single Chinese song or verse, or has even watched a Chinese movie. Everybody knows the Beatles, Frank Sinatra and whoever, Joe Dassin. It will not take one generation to make us Chinese and to say that we will be second in command to China. We did not agree to be second in command to the European Union and the United States. For me, it is very hard to imagine.

What is left? On one pole is China and the autocracies, which we can temporarily join. Another pole is democracy, which will develop with its own difficulties. What is the future for the world? It is becoming larger in terms of population and smaller in terms of resources. I guess the only viable theory is the theory of systemic convergence, an intermixing of opposing social ideas and principles of economics. We read about it in Pitirim Sorokin’s and later Sakharov’s works. We felt this spirit in researches of Galbraith, Rostow, Stiglitz. We can see it in China in reality - the convergence of two models, which Beijing is trying to do at the moment. It is introducing very serious social conditions into its own systems, but is enhancing efficiency of capitalism.

We can have one happy multipolar world, with some drastic cuts on wealth disparity, which you were alluding to. The mathematical models, both in terms of norms and analysis, will bring us together. That is the only way out. It is too difficult now to visualise, but we have to survive, and I do not think we have any other chance to do it. I am being a little bit more hypothetical than some others, but we submitted our views on that to the FutureWorld Foundation. This peaceful convergence of two systems is probably the best chance for the Russian Federation. Otherwise, we will be torn apart by the European Union on the one hand, and Greater Europe, and Asia and China on the other.
Donald JOHNSTON

I have enjoyed listening to the conversation and I am attracted to Sean’s point. What do you envisage for Russia in 20 years? We seemed to have moved away from that, which easily happens, but I see Russia building on its extraordinary comparative advantages, which it still has. These are primarily human capital, supported by enormous resources. We talked about Korea, where I spend much time, and we have our Korean friend here with us. Korea did not have any resources. The only natural resources that Korea had were in their brains, and North Korea actually has more resources than South Korea. Look what South Korea has been able to accomplish.

This takes you to the other part of the model, which is education. For centuries, Koreans have put a very high value on education. When President Putin says he is interested in the Korean model, I hope he is thinking about the education model. I also hope that he is thinking about how important this fact is. With these resources behind it, Russia is well placed to make serious strides ahead.

There is one point I wanted to ask you about, Mr Chair. We never heard about the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) project, which is probably the largest infrastructure project in the history of man. The Chinese have floated this, and I think President Putin went to Beijing for an announcement in that regard. I went there as well, to try to understand more about what this is. It is massive, and it has got to have major implications for you and the Eurasian countries. There are about 97 airports and I do not know how many ports, roads, and pipelines.

We did not hear anything about OBOR today, and I would think that that has got to be part of the glue between the economic interests of China and Russia.

Michel FOUCHER

I have two points on international law. I agree that Western countries broke the law in Iraq, in Libya, and in Kosovo. I was in charge of Kosovo in the French ministry of foreign affairs, and we were not strong enough to oppose the US department and the Pentagon. We were proposing substantial autonomy, but without a US military base near Pristina, because we were not informed of that project, so I fully agree. It is not a reason to put everything out and to rebuild, because I do not want to live under the leadership of the people in Beijing. I am a democrat and I am not sure it is in our interests.

The EU is deeply divided on Ukraine, and the issue started long before the Donbass issue. It started in 2008 with the Bucharest Summit. France and Germany were against accession, but Madame Merkel wrote a sentence on open-door policy during the night. This was interpreted very badly by the president in Moscow. I agree with Artem that deciding how to achieve appeasement is a priority. President Macron is working on that. The Merkel factor does exist. You will find a very nice analysis in the New York Times, which is a comparison between two trajectories, starting in former East Germany. This is the starting point. She is from Dresden and the daughter of a pastor. She has a very moral view on reality. It means that in the Normandy format, it is not always easy to address.

There is a Polish factor and an American one in the Ukrainian crisis. My view is that we share a burden, which is a co-responsibility for the crisis. I always thought that it was unacceptable for Russia to have a scenario in which NATO is in the Ukraine. This is a provocation, and that is why I came back to neutrality. We should have proposed that at the beginning, and when I talked to my colleagues in the ministry of foreign affairs, though I was not there anymore, the answer was yes. We are ready to propose that, but what do we get in exchange from Moscow?

We have to work much more to look for appeasement. In the EU, we have to work on having a common view, because our Polish colleagues are very offensive. They very much disliked Obama’s pivot to Asia. They wanted troops on the ground, boots on the ground, and they got that, but they are very offensive. From Italy to Poland, you have a full spectrum of different positions. It is a priority and we should avoid leaving with a frozen conflict. If we do that, we will fail.
Alexander PANOV

I agree that we are Europeans, but it is interesting that Europeans do not listen to us and do not understand us. In the Eastern countries, there is a better understanding and a better treatment of Russia. I would like to say that we will never be Chinese, as we will never be Germans, but at the same time, at our institute, the biggest group, and there are many groups, are the students who are studying Chinese, not French.

Alexander DYNKIN

Regarding this bipolarity, we produced a joint standard with the Atlantic Council. Their part deals with foresight analysis. They produced global trends in a famous report which was very popular around the globes. We joined our efforts together and we produced five analytical scenarios. These were polycentric, Greater Eurasia and some others, and among them was a new bipolarity. We published it two years ago, both in English and in Russian. It is not my fault that developments in the global order unfortunately moved towards this new bipolarity scenario. This was just one of the possible outcomes after the demise of the Soviet Union.

Regarding this arrogant, funny little man in Pyongyang, he is also learning something. He learned from the case of Colonel Gaddafi, who was given a no-fly zone. Then he was wounded in his two legs and brutally killed. Before that, he got rid of his nuclear programme. This young guy learned his lessons. We found at our institute that he said that North Korea was a nuclear state just 100 days after the death of Gaddafi. For him, this is salvation. We have to look a little bit more closely at the behaviour of those countries which engineered Libya. I am not talking about "argentinisation". I am just mentioning that Brazil and Mexico are our competitors in terms of quality of institutions.

Artem MALGIN

Unfortunately, we have no time to discuss Ukraine, but to my mind, Ukraine is a key point for the next 3-4 years. It should be distributed in a way that means we have 50% of the conflict resolution resources in Moscow and 50% somewhere outside Moscow. This will be further divided into 25% in Kiev and 25% somewhere in the West. At the same time, Ukraine should not overshadow other issues. If we move ahead with other things in our EU-Russia relations, the Ukrainian situation will be resolved in a smoother and faster way.

Yaroslav LISSOVOLOK

There was the question you asked at the very beginning when I was about to speak about whether Russia is to be the master of the Eurasian universe and the Eurasian space. The role of the Eurasian Union will grow, and it is very important that the European Union works together with the Eurasian Union. After all, it is very important for our European friends and colleagues to realise that the Eurasian Union was conceived as one that is based on the values of the European Union. It was inspired to a significant degree by the success of the European Union, so the negation of the Eurasian Union is a bit of a self-negation for the Europeans. Lastly, it is great that we are having this discussion on long-term issues. Parts of our discussions were short-termistic at times, which shows that Russia is very much lacking this long-term focus.

Renaud GIRARD

I just wanted to talk about what Michel said, about the diplomatic conference. We missed a huge opportunity in the February 2014 crisis in Ukraine. On February 19, Hollande and Merkel were in Paris. They went to Kiev with the foreign ministers. They arrived on February 20th in Kiev. They took Sikorski of Poland along the way, and they started negotiating with Yanukovych. The fact that they started negotiating stopped the killing. This is very important. There was no more killing on the afternoon of the 20th in Kiev.

They negotiated all night long. At 7.30, they were tired and they went to sleep. At 1pm, Sikorski went to Maidan and said, ‘You should accept it. You will never have a better deal’. Then at five o’clock in the afternoon, they signed a deal. I was watching BBC news and I saw pro-Russian president Yanukovych shaking hands with Terimbo, Yatsenyuk and
Klitschko. It was a huge diplomatic success. This agreement has three godfathers, France, Germany and Poland. It was a huge success. They shook hands and there was political agreement in Ukraine.

Then we, the Westerners, forgot the lessons of the great Kissinger. When you have such a miracle baby, you babysit him. You do not leave the baby in the snow, but you babysit him. It is a kind of diplomatic miracle, and it will be taught in diplomatic academies. There are MGIMO people here. What would have the basic reflex of good diplomats have been? Fabius was unfortunately a very bad diplomat. He took his mobile phone. He asked to see Putin and asked Putin to also be a godfather of this agreement, telling him, ‘Sebastopol will always be yours. NATO will not take Ukraine, and remember April 2008, Vladimir’. This is interesting, regarding the relations with the West. Here, we missed a great opportunity. That is my point.

Igor YURGENS

Thanks to everyone who participated.