Hervé MARITON

I have one quick question for Michael. You did not talk much about NATO. If there is to be a stronger European position on defence, what does this mean as far as the evolution of NATO goes? That could also be addressed to Bogdan. I have a quick question for Richard and Steven. You are very enthusiastic about Europe. Nonetheless, the British voted for Brexit, and the last popular vote in France, in 2005, was a no vote – I voted yes but the majority voted no. Many in Eastern Europe actually criticise the way Europe goes. Could each of you make one concrete proposal in the way Europe could work?

Dania KHATIB

Ma question est pour Madame Guigou. Vous avez dit que l'Europe doit être plus impliquée dans les affaires du monde, et vous avez parlé de la politique envers l'Afrique. Que pensez-vous que l'Europe doit faire en ce qui concerne la crise au Moyen-Orient, particulièrement envers la Syrie, dans la perspective du flux de réfugiés qui s'abat sur l'Europe?

I also have a small comment for Mr Lothian. You talked about this Shia and Sunni divide, it is something I researched thoroughly. I don't think the West should get involved at all. This is something the Muslim ulama, the centers of Islam, should reconcile among themselves. Thank you.

JU Chul-Ki

We launched the Asia-Europe Summit process in 1995 with the belief that it might contribute to making the world better. It was done through an initiative of President Chirac and Prime minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore. A biannual summit meeting was continuously held, but even though we have this pillar of discussion, I wonder whether this process is properly used in times of crisis like this, when we have to discuss the refugee issue, the North Korean nuclear issue and many others. However, sometimes they are good for meetings of leaders but are a bit lacklustre in terms of producing concrete results and exchange of ideas.

Maybe you can join me in that process. We have India and Pakistan in the ASEAN process, beyond China, Japan and Korea, so we had better valorise and use the existing platforms to discuss common challenges.

Fathallah OUALALOU

J’ai retenu une idée intéressante, c’est que l’Union européenne se définit par rapport à ses frontières. Est-ce que ceci n’a pas amené l’Union européenne, de temps en temps, à tourner le dos à la Méditerranée, et donc aussi à faire perdre à la Méditerranée sa centralité nécessaire ? Certes, il y a eu cette belle conclusion Afrique-Europe, mais est-ce que actuellement, avec le retour de la croissance, les discours de Macron, peut-être les initiatives de Macron, il ne serait pas temps de se réconcilier avec cette frontière ? Car tourner le dos à la Méditerranée, d’après moi, cela a été avant tout aussi au détriment de l’Europe.

Stanislas COZON

I have a question regarding immigration. Richard Burt told us that the EU should define immigration strategy. What is the likelihood that within a year we will meet for the 11th edition of this World Policy Conference and this strategy will have been defined, firstly, and secondly, that its execution will have started effectively.

Daniel DAIANU

I have two questions, the first to Michael Lothian. When you say that the UN should change because there is a legacy problem, what do you have in mind? Secondly, what is the critical mass in terms of vision that should help the Union redeem itself and move forward? They may not be kindred spirits when it comes to very concrete steps;
Richard BURT

I will just make a couple of quick comments. First of all, I detect in many of the questions the kind of persistence of what I call Euro-pessimism. Were we here a year ago, we would all be wringing our hands about the threat of populism, we would be worried about Marine Le Pen in France, we would be worried about what was the AFD in Germany. My colleague, Bill Drozdiak, wrote a book that has just been published, and unfortunately he wrote it six months ago. It is called Fractured Continent. People are not talking anymore about a truly fractured continent – we know about Brexit, we know about Catalonia, but there is a new optimism, and it does go directly to Merkel on the one hand and Macron on the other. There will have to be a grand bargain there.

Emmanuel Macron, as I understand it, is laying out, in a brilliant, exciting way, a kind of Kennedy-esque way, a vision for Europe, and it is a vision based on putting Europe first. It is also a vision based on finding a way to reform and strengthen EU institutions including the EU monetary system. The big question for a long time has been whether the Germans are ready to come in and be brought along, whether they are ready to make the necessary financial concessions to make Europe work. The Germans will never agree on a transfer union, but Merkel in the campaign made some comments and has said that there is a new willingness to think about reforms, particularly of the monetary system, of creating what Europe in my judgement genuinely needs, which is a common fiscal strategy.

Maybe the fact that Wolfgang Schäuble will not be the Finance Minister in the next German government means that there may be some more flexibility there. I am fundamentally optimistic about reinventing this French-German axis within Europe, the motor that is necessary to make Europe work.

Finally, there was the question of coming up with one idea for changing Europe, and I mentioned it. I do think that immigration has already been demonstrated to be a serious danger to European unity, and we saw that in stark terms, in terms of how different nations are, and I have to say that the nations of Central Europe responded to the problem of immigration, and historically it is understandable. These are countries that were not as cosmopolitan, if you will, as Western European countries. They were under Soviet domination, they did not have the experience and the openness that Western European countries had, and they responded in a predictable way.

A European-wide approach, an EU-wide approach, not a national approach, if it can be worked out, is necessary. Another crisis in the Middle East, a crisis in North Africa could re-emerge and create a new set of strains that could be very counterproductive to what I see as the very positive trends that are alive and well in Europe today.

Ali ASLAN

Thank you for your assessment, and interestingly enough pointing out German leadership, Germany's role in moving forward. Not too many panels these days on the future of Europe are without a German on the panel. I know that German leadership is talked about much more outside of Germany than it is within Germany, interestingly enough.

Steven ERLANGER

Let us call it Franco-German leadership.

Ali ASLAN

There you go. I am sure Elisabeth would have corrected me by the time it was her turn. Steve, you may not be German but of course you are a German expert. There were a couple of questions that you wanted to address.

Steven ERLANGER

I will be quick about this. Certainly, the existential panic that led to the Bratislava Summit has calmed down, there is no question, and at least the European Commission is willing to take more political risks. Whether they can come to a common asylum policy I doubt, because it is such a matter of national issues, but I have not just one but three very quick proposals. Firstly, the problem is not immigration qua immigration; the problem is loss of control. The problem is
the sense of uncontrolled immigration, and there is now, more importantly, more order to it, and that issue is calming down, even in Germany.

The problem in Central Europe is being told what to do by Brussels on this issue or other issues. Therefore, firstly, Schengen has to have external frontiers that work, otherwise Schengen does not work. Frontex, which has a new name, which I forget, is getting a lot more money, and it is doing more; that is really important. Secondly, Greek debt has to be forgiven, at least big chunks of it – the Germans are just going to have to swallow that down. It is unsustainable. It is ridiculous. You cannot have a stable Euro otherwise.

Thirdly, I suggest that Council meetings of country leaders should begin with breakfast and not with dinner. It would make a tremendous difference, I think, to the quality of the decision-making.

Regarding Merkel-Macron, I respect Macron’s audacity. I think his speech was very good but a little too early, because the Germans had not yet figured out a government, and he should have done more coordination, not just with Merkel but also with the countries of Central Europe, who rather resented the speech because they felt left out of it.

We will see. I have just looked at a bunch of poll figures done by the Körber Foundation from Germany. We want a lot from Germany, and I am not sure that Germans want to give us what we want. Yes, they like more European defence, but they do not want to spend any money for it. Half of Germans will think they should not come to the aid of a NATO member if it were attacked by Russia – half. That is Article 5, and yet 85% of Germans believe the US will come to their aid if necessary, so there is an ambivalence and a schizophrenia which is historical and lasting and has not yet been resolved.

Ali ASLAN

We will continue to look forward to your astute observations about the current and future state of the EU.

Elisabeth GUIGOU

Merci. Macron et Merkel peuvent donner une nouvelle impulsion. Pourquoi ? Parce que Macron a décidé de faire des réformes, et que l’Allemagne presse la France de faire ces réformes internes depuis longtemps. La deuxième chose est que, pour la première fois, me semble-t-il, depuis la chute du Mur de Berlin, l’Allemagne a besoin de la France. Elle a besoin de la France justement pour ces questions de sécurité, de terrorisme et aussi pour maîtriser ensemble des mouvements de population, Steven a raison. Le problème n’est pas que ça existe, parce qu’on a besoin de l’immigration. L’Allemagne est dans un déclin démographique terrible, bien plus encore que les autres pays européens. Le problème, c’est l’organisation des migrations.

Et vous avez raison, on a le devoir d’accueillir des réfugiés. C’est un devoir, non seulement moral, mais c’est un devoir du droit international. On doit poser cette question entre Européens. Donc ça veut dire qu’il faut que l’Union européenne continue à se renforcer, mais on ne peut pas tout faire au niveau de l’Union européenne. Il y a énormément de choses qui doivent être de la responsabilité des Etats-nations membres de l’Union européenne. Ce que l’Union européenne doit faire, c’est aider les Européens à affronter davantage les défis globaux ; dans un monde global, il y a des défis globaux qui ne peuvent pas être relevés isolément.

A partir de là, la question de la sécurité est évidemment centrale. Nous n’avons pas le temps aujourd’hui, mais il faut approfondir un peu les choses, parce que Trump nous rend service en disant : « prenez vos responsabilités. » C’est vrai, mais ça n’est pas demain matin que l’Union européenne va pouvoir remplacer le parapluie américain et la garantie de l’article 5, c’est complètement irréaliste. Il faut sans doute recentrer l’Alliance atlantique sur sa vocation initiale, qui est de protéger le continent européen et de ne pas s’éparpiller partout. En revanche, comme l’a dit très bien Bogdan, il faut faire en sorte que l’Union européenne puisse mieux assumer la sécurité avec son voisinage.

Nous savons très bien qu’il n’y a jamais de solution militaire, que les interventions extérieures finissent toujours par provoquer des réactions négatives, voire de futurs conflits, on l’a vu avec l’Irak. Ce ne sont pas les Battlegroups qui vont défendre la Pologne contre la Russie. Nous avons donc besoin d’approfondir cette question-là, c’est-à-dire
d'abord entre Européens, d'avoir une vraie industrie d'armement européenne. Si nous n'avons pas d'industrie d'armement, ce n'est même pas la peine d'y penser. Il faut avoir aussi une stratégie commune.

Maintenant, j'en viens à la non-maîtrise de l'immigration, parce que c'est un énorme souci. Pour moi, même dans l'urgence, il faut évidemment renforcer nos frontières. D'ailleurs, c'était prévu dès le départ et on ne l'a pas fait ; comme pour l'euro, il était prévu qu'on fasse une union économique et on ne l'a pas fait. Il faut enfin faire ce qu'on aurait dû faire depuis maintenant une vingtaine d'années, mais ces solutions d'urgence ne répondront pas à tout. Quand des gens risquent leur vie pour traverser la Méditerranée, ils passeront de toute façon, il faut donc du développement. Ce sont des solutions à moyen terme. Je ne vois pas comment nous pouvons résoudre cette question-là, comme le disait très bien Fathallah Oualalou, si nous continuons à considérer que la Méditerranée est une frontière. La Méditerranée doit être un pivot pour organiser une coopération, un partenariat entre l'Europe, l'Afrique et le Moyen-Orient.

Je crois que nous ne nous en sortirons pas autrement. C'est la raison pour laquelle, il me semble que notre principal objectif doit être d'avoir une vision pour l'organisation du continent européen dans ce monde éclaté, qui est devenu encore plus incertain avec Donald Trump. Nous n'avons pas beaucoup parlé de la Russie, mais l'organisation de ce continent doit se tourner davantage vers le Sud. L'Europe a réussi quand elle a trouvé des réponses aux peurs, au lendemain de la guerre ; aujourd'hui, l'Europe doit trouver des réponses aux peurs du moment qui sont liées à la globalisation.

Yukio OKAMOTO

I just have one word before we leave. The EU has always been regarded by Asians, especially by Japan, as an anchor of world conscience and stability, and we are so sorry to see Britain leave.

Michael LOTHIAN

I have three very short answers to three very succinct questions. Firstly, on NATO, I did not talk about it because it dilutes the argument about European security. First of all, if America is not part of NATO, there is no NATO, and so we are looking at a different animal. Secondly, the last time that NATO Article 5 was invoked was in relation to self-defence in relation to 9/11 in Afghanistan, out of area, and we begin to dilute the argument about European security when we bring NATO in.

Secondly, on Shia-Sunni, I agree that it would be much easier not to take sides. However, the Sunni party do have the backing of a majority of the West, and the Shia feel very strongly about that. We have a role in Europe where we could rebalance that slightly and give a certain reassurance, which would be useful.

Thirdly, on the UN, I could write a book about this, but basically we have a system in the UN Security Council where one permanent member can say no, and that becomes the world order. We need to get to a situation where there is a better judgement of what is in the world's interest rather than the interest of one nation, and we need to be able to get there.

Just one final comment – I keep hearing that everybody is reassured this year because, after last year’s concerns about the advance of the far right, it did not happen. I was not here last year and maybe I did not get that feeling, but what I must say is this: from Britain’s perspective, watching 25% of the French voting for Marine Le Pen, watching 20% or whatever it was in Germany voting for the far right, watching this moving across Europe, it is scary enough that these countries are prepared to invest their electoral strength in movements like that. It would be a great mistake if we became complacent about that.

Bogdan KLICH

The question about NATO was very good. We have not forgotten about NATO, and this panel was about the abilities of the EU to react in the sphere of security; that is why we did not talk about NATO. However, I am satisfied with the results of both the Newport and Warsaw Summits concerning reinforcement of the eastern flank of the alliance.
Enhanced forward presence and tailored forward presence were good solutions, and they were and are still, consequently, implemented, so the implementation of those decisions is going in the right direction.

Secondly, there was a crucial decision by the Warsaw Summit in the form of a declaration between the EU and NATO, signed together by the Secretary General of NATO and both Juncker and Tusk on behalf of the EU, on the cooperation between those two entities. It is necessary to enhance cooperation between the EU and NATO in the sphere of security; without that, we cannot speak about a better feeling of security in Europe.

Thirdly, I have a feeling that we should work within NATO on this strategy concerning the southern flank, because the strategy concerning the eastern flank during the Warsaw Summit was presented in a very clear and visible way. However, the protection of the southern border of Europe consisted only of some elements. We should work on a comprehensive strategy within NATO on how to reinforce and protect the southern alliance border.

Ali ASLAN

Ladies and gentlemen, surprisingly we were not able to address and solve all problems of the EU within 90 minutes, but this spectacular panel was able to give you a lot of food for thought, building on what was said yesterday about the future of the US.