

## ARTEM MALGIN

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I would like to talk about nuclear forces as we are in the initial stages. I think it's still a little early to talk about this subject. Thank you, Mr. de Montbrial, thank you Thomas, thank you to my Moroccan colleagues for the invitation.

I had no intention of speaking of the Ukrainian crisis and Russia's foreign policy, because we decided it would be better to cover more peaceful issues. I completely agree with what Mr. Morel said on the Ukrainian crisis, and I want to stress that it should be one of the main issues for Russia's foreign policy in the foreseeable future, because it brought us to this situation with the Western world, ruined the previous record of President Putin, and brought us to Syria without any technical reasons or vision about what is happening in the Middle East. This strategic involvement in the Middle East happened when we had really bad institutional and often political relations with the main players in the Middle East.

This mixture of the crisis, along with bad relations with those previously considered as Russia's main global partners, creates a tremendous problem for Russian foreign policy, but the key issue and the key decision is in the Ukraine, and this crisis should not be underestimated, as sometimes happened. It is not a frozen conflict; unfortunately, it is going on, it is a low-intensity conflict we somehow got used to. Europe and even the Ukraine got used to it, but it should be settled, and this is one of the main tasks for Russian foreign policy.

Returning to what I wanted to say, the whole conference has brought me to the idea that our world nowadays tends to be one without great ideas or trends, like we had in the 1990s, at the end of the 1980s or the beginning of 2000. It is a global world but driven by in-country processes, which somehow overflow national borders into the global scene. Look at Trump, at Brexit, at Saudi Arabia, at very strange developments in Iran, at Russia's and Turkey's foreign policies, which range between autarchy and interventionism. These are purely national phenomena, absolutely, which somehow enter the global scene without being a single global trend. It is not one global tendency, and this should make us more attentive to these countries.

This period should last quite a long time; it is international decadence, if you like, but decadence does not mean something bad. It means that we have a very mosaic, diversified world with small tendencies, and from these tendencies we may grasp a general pattern, but we could live without such a pattern, if we lived as our predecessors did in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the last 25 years of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, or in the 1920s. It was a kind of development or progress, but not as strong, dynamic or homogeneous as we got used to seeing in the 1980s, the 1990s or the post-Second World War period. We should pay more attention to the in-country process.

Economic growth is more of a plateau – it climbs up, reaches a plateau, slides down and then climbs again to a plateau – there is no longer such growth as in the 1990s with the dot-com boom. No longer is the price of oil the main engine for the world economy, and China is no longer growing as strongly as it was 10 years ago. It is not so easy to grasp what is happening in this world, but at the same time there are some multilateral and global challenges. Multilateralism is not finished under contemporary circumstances. We see people who have been brought to the very top of their countries by grassroots tendencies, not personalities – Brexit is not about personalities but about trends from the very bottom which are very unclear, psychological states in British society somehow converted to political will that could destroy your part of Europe or change it considerably. We need multilateralism, because multilateral regulations usually build through great tendencies, great changes, as happened after the end of the Second World War and the Cold War, and has happened at the beginning of this new era of the 1990s. Should multilateralism be ruined, the world would consist of provincialised countries with local, regional conflicts, some becoming trade wars if strong enough, on very specific issues, but these kinds of issues really harm the everyday life of our people.

Returning to my country, this kind of crisis has often brought us to this narrow, provincial vision, fortunately because we are not always alone in this vision, and unfortunately because too many countries nowadays are provincial in a strategically global world.