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Steven ERLANGER

First, we will have Chiyuki Aoi, who is the Professor in International Security at the University of Tokyo. Chiyuki, the floor is yours.

Chiyuki AOI

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for your kind introduction. I am Chiyuki Aoi from the University of Tokyo and I am very happy and honored to be here. I am included in this panel on East Asia, but my academic expertise is international security, therefore I would like to include a more global perspective to discuss East Asian regional issues.

My talk is entitled, Creation of a rules-based order; values in contemporary foreign and security policy. First, I would like to say that all the views expressed here are my own independent academic opinion and do not represent my home institution. Although I held an advisory position for the current Japanese administration in the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, views expressed here are my own.

Today, I would like to stick to the instruction to keep things short at seven or eight minutes, so I will discuss the following three issues. The first issue is that generally I would argue that currently values play a very important role in foreign and defense policy. They always have but I think for a number of reasons it is more important today. Second, I would like to discuss some key features of the current Japanese national defense program guidelines and the relationship between that and Japan’s values-driven strategy. Third, I will discuss some of the challenges facing values-based foreign and defense policy.

Foreign policies have always been explicitly linked to values, so there is nothing new in this. However, interests including national interests have links to values, and these values can be anything. They do not necessarily have to be liberal, although we do wind-up talking about material national interest and liberal values. I think values can be anything and very often foreign and defense policies are deeply entwined with our values. However, as mentioned often during this conference, it is the currents of our time that liberal ideals and values are intensively challenged from within, from forces favoring populism and unilateralism as opposed to multilateralism, and also from without, from entities that challenge fundamentally liberal ways of managing political relations. Hence, it is natural that our defense policies have to come to involve the defense of values. Because so much of our foreign and defense policies have to do with the defense of values there is a need to communicate well what these values are that we are defending, hence the importance of strategic communications. It is particularly important to explain and justify actions, because actions started in particular involve issue linkages, such as the use of geo-economics that go across traditional boundaries of strategy. Whether that is a preference or not, very often communications replace physical force and do so by manipulating or subverting the way physical force is perceived or the way calculations are made regarding escalation in military confrontations, as was seen in Ukraine. Furthermore, democracies are particularly affected by the advent of information and communication technologies. For example, the spread of social media, the availability of cyberspace and globalization.

I think the features I just mentioned provide for very important background to the current Japanese National Defense Program Guidelines. In case you do not know, this document is roughly the equivalent of the Strategic and Defense Security Review in the United Kingdom. This is a doctrine that justifies the use of the defense budget and in the case of Japan, it sits directly below our national security strategy, which was adopted back in 2013. We revised the Guidelines at the end of last year, so I would like to highlight some of the key relevant features.
The NDPG, the national defense program guidelines, adopted a new multidomain strategy that encompasses a new focus on cyber, space and electromagnetics. Of course, these will be game changers in the coming ten or so years, so it is natural that they are included. In my view, it is also important that current program guidelines have redefined Japan’s defense purpose to have specific streamlined links with particular defense activities, which I argue will have implications for Japan’s values-driven strategy. Japan now has three newly reformulated defense purposes. The first purpose is to create a security environment, which is desirable for Japan and for which Japan will use whole of government capabilities. The second goal is to deter threats from reaching Japan and the third is to counter the threat and minimize damage in case determent fails. Needless to say, these purposes are mutually reinforcing and of these, the first purpose, the create category, which may be perceived as akin to Western doctrinal term of ‘shape’, is new. This justifies the meaning for example, of Japanese self-defense force— that is our military— activities in what are essentially defense engagement activities, as well as strategic communications. Normally defense engagement includes capacity building, defense diplomacy, peace operations etc. These are called security cooperation in Japanese and before, surprisingly these activities had no explicit link to Japanese defense purposes and now they have a proper home where they belong. It is important that these create activities can now reinforce Japan’s values-driven strategy to realize its foreign policy and defense goals.

Japan’s values-driven strategies have taken many forms in the last decade and a half, but currently the most important initiative is Free and Open Indo-Pacific, FOIP. Among European powers, France and the UK are major partners in this initiative. In the Asia-Pacific region Japan’s ties with India, Australia as well as the US are firmly established in this context and all these partners are keen to develop mutual relations. I do believe that the new regional Indo-Pacific bloc is firmly on the rise. It should be noted that FOIP was originated by the Japanese and following a decade and a half earlier of values-driven initiatives such as the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity initiative, and so the origin of Japanese values-driven strategy predates the current preoccupation with China. The Japanese- initiated FOIP has different approaches from the more military and alliance-oriented approach taken currently by the United States. Japan’s FOIP comprises the principles of rules-based order, particularly in the maritime domain, sustainability and local ownership in ODA and investment.

I know time is very limited, so let me jump to the discussion of challenges in lieu of conclusions. To create rules-based order, to talk about it is rather abstract, so I think the major question that comes to everybody’s mind is – ‘what rules and what order are we really talking about’? I think that is the purpose of the whole of values-based strategy. Together with like-minded countries and local partners and others, we must define what these rules may entail. For example, there are significant disagreements among great powers in the region regarding what those orders and rules are and in bilateral relations within the region as well, there are significant policy discrepancies. For example, policy towards South-East Asia among Europeans, Japanese, Australians and the US for example always involve tensions between the pressures of values such as human rights and so-called constructive engagement. Specifically, bilateral policies among Western nations historically differ for example, regarding Myanmar.

Secondly, hence there is a challenge of coordinating policy among so-called like-minded countries. Lack of engagement with each other among this grouping and also local partners in carrying out various policies and projects is a continuous concern. In this context, FOIP should be conceived as the main vehicle to get allies and partners on board along a common path. Concrete projects must be jointly managed, relations with key actors in the region must be coordinated and, in this sense, FOIP is very much a shaping activity and by nature, a multilateral activity.

Lastly, I think I am personally concerned about the trend of regional realism, which means that basically we do not have time to deal with issues that are concerns for other regions. For example, in Asia one is talking about North Korea, or the ascent of China as a super power all the time, while neglecting issues and challenges facing Europe and vice versa. I think that is a very dangerous trend. I think we need to talk to each other, share concerns and maybe together, we will be able to develop the notion of a rules-based order. I think that Europe and Japan had better work together to define this notion. Thank you.

Steven ERLANGER

Thanks a lot; very well done. Thank you for that broad view.