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Ladies and Gentlemen, I will summarize workshop 3, which focused on Africa, in three points. First, the sequence of speakers, then the issues debated and lastly the proposals made.

First, the workshop had the honor of welcoming His Excellency Sheikh Shakhbut Bin Nahyan Al Nahyan, the United Arab Emirates' Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, who told us that his country was created in 1971 without spilling a drop of blood and that since then, it has been built on tolerance and neighborly love. Consequently, the United Arab Emirates has taken every opportunity to develop good partnerships and good cooperation with all.

We applauded his words. Then we heard a summary of the workshop chairman's introductory remarks, which is published in the conference brochure, and we heard from Nathalie Delapalme, Cheikh Tidiane Gadio, Élisabeth Guigou, Aminata Touré, Juliette Tuakli, Lionel Zinsou and Nardos Bekele-Thomas. Alain Antil spoke and the debates were opened.

A number of questions were raised.

We started out with the conclusion of our work in 2019 on the African state, which some people said was weak. Personally, I said that south of the Sahara, the state as an institution does not exist. Colonization cobbled together several entities that since independence that have not succeeded in turning the administrative apparatus inherited from colonization into a real state exempt of patrimonialism. Some of them have seen putsches, others none at all, but those have seen other forms of crisis and dysfunction. Putsches and coups have hampered their own development and the development of African integration. A fundamental conclusion, dating back to well before independence, is that the African states whose borders were drawn up at the Berlin Conference could not develop alone. They had to work together.

This instability, which we had already looked at in 2019, leads us to conclude that despite the efforts made since the 1990s and 2000s, the instruments that various international organizations have adopted to outlaw putsches have not prevented them from occurring.

Let us make the distinction a putsch and a coup. A putsch is when military officers take power. The military is not invested with political power, so it eliminates constitutional organs in order to seize it. A coup is when an organ invested with political power eliminates all the other organs in order to take their place. What happened in Mali and Guinea were putsches because the military was trained to fight terrorism, not seize power. What happened in Tunisia was a coup. But in recent years, a new process has emerged, where a freely and fairly

elected head of State “tinkers” with the constitution to give themselves a third term of office. This creates crises. And that crisis blocked the country and still disturbs international organizations.

We have read many things that label this crisis a “constitutional coup”. Some of us take issue with the term. A coup cannot be called constitutional. If there is a constitutional coup, that means it complies with the constitution, so together let us find another expression. We asked the question in the commission, but did not come to a conclusion. We wondered if it should be called “rigging” the constitution. A name must be found for this situation, which causes many problems and confusion.

This was the starting point of our discussions.

Then we turned to Covid-19. Covid-19 aroused much fear, but at the same time we realized that overall, African states pulled through quite well and that Covid-19 created new solidarities. Covid-19 prompted states to ask themselves new questions, especially about pharmaceutical industrialization, because vaccines arrived late in some places. Lack of electrification meant that shipping vaccines within some countries posed problems and they arrived after their expiration date or were so poorly stored they could not be used.

Still, Covid-19 showed that African states could mobilize to correctly manage some situations. It also triggered solidarity, and, consequently, it was an opportunity for Africa to reveal itself.

The second question was climate change. We have always wanted Africa to be able to speak with one voice in international relations. At COP 21, Africa showed it could speak with one voice and be heard. Climate change has brought about a set of new problems with regard to free-range pasturing. The question arose of whether it was better to stabilize livestock breeding because in some parts of Africa, it is done by free-range pasturing: herdsmen take their animals wherever they find pastures.

Covid-19 has led to a qualitative leap in digital technology in Africa. You already pointed this out in your reports, and so did we in ours. Overall, the African states that have borne the brunt of Covid-19—but not only—are the oil producers. Some have managed to maintain a positive growth rate.

The other point about climate change is the growth in urbanization, which boosts economic progress but at the same time increases the budget deficit because it soaks up huge amounts of government spending on investment and, consequently, increases the debt.

We also debated a new phenomenon. First, in recent years Africa has managed to lower the borrowing rate. Second, Africa has succeeded in getting the loan period extended, which is extraordinary and shows it is moving forward. Whatever information saddens us, Africa is moving forward.

To the satisfaction of everyone in the workshop, one talk stressed the need to create engaging narratives. We do not do it enough. States do not spend enough money on it, and what is positive is not known.



Excuse me, journalists, but when a train is on time, nothing happens. Nobody mentions it. When a train derails, it is talked about for months. But there are trains that arrive on time in Africa, and they must be mentioned, too.

Then the discussion turned to terrorism, which is linked to stability from a different angle. Terrorism does not seem to worry some African states as much as it should. Afghanistan has just changed course. We do not know yet if that will result in a surge of terrorism. We noted that the epicenter of terrorism has shifted to Africa. No African state is safe. Some panicked states talk about recruiting, or more exactly, a certain African state, is attributed with the intention to recruit mercenaries.

In our workshop we recalled that there are two conventions. The Organization of African Unity Convention adopted in Libreville on July 4, 1977 prohibits any state and any natural or legal person from recruiting mercenaries. The convention remains in force. It was followed by the International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of mercenaries, which the United Nations General Assembly adopted by resolution A/44/34¹ on December 4, 1989. African states ratified the convention, which remains in force. So how can mercenaries be recruited? Allow me to recall that the 1977 OAU Convention was adopted at the same time that the conference on the Additional Protocols to the 1949 Conventions was coming to an end in Geneva. The 1977 Additional Convention on Humanitarian Law, additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, declared that mercenaries cannot be considered combatants and therefore do not come under humanitarian law. Consequently, it seems to me that the debate should be closed on this point. It is out of the question for a State to recruit mercenaries to fight terrorism.

Another issue came up. We mentioned it but did not find a solution. Why don't African states have the army they need to fight terrorism together? Why do United Nations peacekeepers or, in the case of bilateral cooperation, other armies have to come each time?

In the 1990s, West Africa experimented with ECOMOG, an army of the Economic Community of West African States, which brought some order to Liberia and Sierra Leone. Why wasn't this experience repeated? During the Shaba affair in Zaire (ex-Zaire) in the late 1980s, why did the great powers supply African armies so that they could go to Shaba themselves? Why not do it again? Why hasn't the early warning system set up by international organizations like the African Union and ECOWAS made any progress?

This led us to the instruments the African Union and African regional organizations adopted in 1990-2000 to foster democratic stability within states. Why have they lost their effectiveness? Why not do what the last ECOWAS summit on September 5 in Accra recommended, i.e., review all the instruments and 1) amend the texts and 2) adopt measures to increase efficiency?

We also addressed the issue of African youth. Africa is an extremely young continent and some speakers stressed that this was an opportunity. There is an impression about that youth has been neglected, even betrayed, but today we are seeing that they are actually spearheading progress. It cannot be said that Africa has not made progress. This progress is being made by the new generations, who have relatively few complexes about issues of

colonization or decolonization. They do not worry about it like their elders did. They have put these issues behind them.

Now let us turn to the proposals. We made two sets of proposals.

The first is for the World Policy Conference. Instead of being confined to a workshop, Africa should have a longer, more substantial forum devoted to it. Why? Because Africa is not an isolated continent. What is happening in the Persian Gulf affects Africa. What is happening in Asia affects Africa. Africa is involved. We are completely, totally and absolutely involved. Consequently, we cannot look like a “fly in the ointment”. That is the gist of the proposal submitted to the WPC’s organizers.

We made other, small observations that will be discussed more appropriately, but there are other proposals that must be brought to the most influential states among us, that attended the conference and can lobby for the texts to be revised, respected and accompanied by appropriate measures for internal stability and for the AfCFTA, the African economic zone that has been launched and is a fine example of south-south cooperation, to be effective.

The workshop also discussed the construction of national identity and the role of culture, including the restitution of cultural property to formerly colonized countries.

This sums up our work. Thank you for listening.