

The poster features a central illustration of the Earth from space, surrounded by a thick, orange and yellow ring of fire or smoke. Several drones are flying around the planet. On the left and right sides, there are silhouettes of human heads facing each other, with intricate circuitry patterns overlaid on their faces and necks. The background is a dark, deep blue space.

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WORLD POLICY CONFERENCE

EIGHTEENTH EDITION
APRIL 24-26, 2026
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FRANCE



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Foreword



The eighteenth World Policy Conference (WPC) was held in Chantilly from 24 to 26 April 2026, only the third time France has hosted this event. The 300 or so distinguished guests from all over the world who attended were delighted to come together in such magnificent surroundings, and enjoy the friendly atmosphere that is one of the hall-marks of the WPC, which we all hold very dear. We were aware, however, that we are living in seriously concerning times, and that a new form of global governance needs to be given an opportunity. Otherwise, the likelihood of the international system drifting off course will continue to rise.

When I founded the WPC, which was first held in Evian from 6 to 8 October 2008, at a critical juncture in the major financial crisis of that year, I was not so naïve as to imagine that the best of all possible worlds would emerge spontaneously from a globalisation that was already faltering. I knew that a new world order would not emerge without immense efforts around the admittedly delicate equilibrium that held sway at the end of the Cold War. Geopolitics has always straddled the line between war and peace.

When an event as momentous as the breakup of the USSR upsets the delicate balance in place at the time, it is not immediately clear within which sphere of influence the next order will be found, nor when or how it will come about.

Year after year, the WPC strives to understand the state of the world, so as to better reflect on the search for a form of governance fit to give international law and multilateralism a new lease of life, as both are essential to reduce the risks of local or global crises. During this eighteenth edition, we have endeavoured to clarify the current trends in economics, geopolitics and international politics. There is already ample material to consider there. However, this year we also chose to explore in greater depth the technological aspect of interdependence and the new challenges it poses at the advent of a new international order, at a time when the phenomenal acceleration of innovation is presenting an unprecedented challenge to humanity’s capacity to adapt. This, then, is how the outlook for the path currently taken by generative AI is presented, while the future of agentic AI and humanoid robotics is already becoming clearer. At the same time, the Ukraine war is continuing, and conflict in Iran is generating fresh uncertainty, in which AI, of course, is playing a part. Economics is increasingly involved in the geopolitical sphere (a phenomenon named “geoeconomics”), and states of “neither war nor peace” threaten to spread and degenerate.

This publication, produced by Songnim Kwon and her team, provides an incomparable snapshot of the state of the world in 2026. The WPC intends to continue to move in the same direction as those who, despite all the obstacles, believe in the possibility of building a new world order for everyone’s benefit. Nurturing active hope while remaining clear-headed, and believing that even the humblest contribution to the greater objective sought is important – this could be our motto.

Thierry de Montbrial
Founder and Executive Chairman of Ifri and the WPC
July 20, 2026

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Friday, April 24

08:30 – 09:30
Opening session

G rard Larcher, President of the French Senate

Nial  Kaba, Special Envoy of the President of the Republic of C te d'Ivoire, Minister of State, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of C te d'Ivoire

H.H. Bartholomew Ist, Archbishop of Constantinople - New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch

Thierry de Montbrial, Founder and Executive Chairman of Ifri and the WPC

09:30 – 10:45

Plenary session 1: Power Over Rules: Challenges in International Trade

Chair:

Marcus Noland, Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at the Peterson Institute for International Economics

Speakers:

Bark Tae-Ho, President of the Seoul Forum for International Affairs (SFIA), former President of Lee&Ko Global Commerce Institute, former Minister for Trade of Korea

S bastien Jean, Associate Director of Ifri's Geoeconomics and Geofinance initiative, Member of the French Council of Economic Advisors and former Director of CEPIL

Brian Kingston, President and CEO of Canadian Automobiles Manufacturer's Association

Qiao Yide, Vice Chairman and Secretary General of Shanghai Development Research Foundation

Chair:

Kazuto Suzuki, Director of the Institute of Geoeconomics at International House of Japan, Professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Tokyo, Japan

10:45 – 11:45

Plenary session 2: Digital Finance and International Markets: Alternative Approaches, Differing Opportunities and Potential Risks

Chair:

John Lipsky, Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, former First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF

Speakers:

Jean-Pierre Landau, Associate Professor at the Department of Economics at Sciences Po Paris, former Deputy Governor at the Banque de France, former Executive Director for France at the IMF and the World Bank

Sam Okwulehie, CEO at LATC Group, Senior Advisor at Boston Consulting Group

11:45 – 12:15

Plenary session 3: Conversation with Anwar Gargash, Diplomatic Advisor to the President of the United Arab Emirates

Chair:

Thierry de Montbrial, Founder and Executive Chairman of Ifri and the WPC

12:15 – 14:15

Lunch

14:30 – 15:30

Plenary session 4: Fiscal Firewalls or Fiscal Freefall? Charting a Path to Stability

Chair:

Jeffry Frieden, Professor of International and Public Affairs and Political Science at Columbia University, Professor of Government emeritus at Harvard University

Speakers:

Vincent Koen, Advisor to the OECD, former Deputy Director of Country Studies at the OECD

Nicolas V ron, Senior Fellow at Bruegel and at the Peterson Institute for International Economics

Masood Ahmed, President Emeritus of the Center for Global Development, former Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department of the IMF

Yann Coatanlem, President of Club Praxis and Atlantic Council contributor, former Managing Director and Head of Multi-Assets Quantitative Analysis at Citigroup

15:30 – 16:30

Plenary session 5: Minilateralism Without Treaties: Insights from the G7 and G20

Chair:

Philippe Etienne, *Ambassadeur de France*, Professor of Public and International Affairs at Columbia University, former Diplomatic Advisor to President Macron, also acting as G7 and G20 Sherpa

Speakers:

Lee Hye-Min, former G20 Sherpa of Korea, former Ambassador for International Economic Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Senior Advisor of KIM & CHANG

Gary Litman, Senior Vice President for Global Initiatives at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce

Andreas Schaal, Director of Global Relations and Co-operation at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD Sherpa to G20/G7/APEC

16:30 – 17:30

Plenary session 6: Major Challenges of Asian Geopolitics

Chair:

Douglas Paal, Distinguished Fellow at the Asia Program Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Speakers:

Yuichi Hosoya, Professor of International Politics at Keio University in Tokyo, Director of Research at the Asia-Pacific Initiative

Kim Chang-Beom, Vice Chairman and CEO of the Federation of Korean Industries

Wang Jisi, Founding President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University

17:30 – 18:15

Plenary session 7: Debate with Patrick Pouyann , Chairman and CEO of TotalEnergies, and Dominique Senequier, CEO & Founder of Ardian

Chair:

Terry Martin, Journalist, TV news anchor

18:15 – 19:30

Plenary session 8: When Technology Redefines Modern Warfare

Chair:

Thibaud Frossard, Vice-President of Capgemini Group and Head of Aerospace, Defence and Security at Capgemini

Speakers:

General Wayne Eyre, former Canada's Chief of the Defence Staff, Senior Fellow and Visiting Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa

Am lie F rey, Director of Data Projects and Institutional Relations at the strategic research institute of the French Ministry of Armed Forces (IRSEM)

Thibaud Bezacier, CEO of Alseamar, France

Gauthier Schweitzer, Co-Founder of Sahar, France

19:30

Dinner debate with Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda

Saturday, April 25

09:15 – 09:30

Message from Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic

09:30 – 10:30

Plenary session 9: The Future of the European Union: What Are the Big Questions?

Chair:

Jean-Claude Trichet, former President of the European Central Bank, Honorary Governor of the Banque de France

Speakers:

Gabriel Felbermayr, Director of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), former President of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)

Thierry de Montbrial, Founder and Executive Chairman of Ifri and the WPC

C t lin Predoiu, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs of Romania

Norbert R ttgen, Member and former Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Deutscher Bundestag

10:30 – 11:00

Plenary session 10: Conversation with Aleksandar Vu i , President of the Republic of Serbia

Chair:

Thierry de Montbrial, Founder and Executive Chairman of Ifri and the WPC

11:00 – 12:00

Plenary session 11: Innovative Leaders Session: "Beyond Automation, the Agentic AI Revolution"

Chair:

Etienne Grass, Global Chief AI Officer at Capgemini Invent

Speakers:

Thomas Courbe, Head of the Directorate General for Enterprise (DGE) at the French Ministry of Economics, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty

Moritz Maier, Co-Founder & CEO of Synera, Germany

Victor Gaspar, Chief Sales Officer of Multiverse Computing, Spain

Nicolas Bodin Guittard, Co-founder & CEO of Label4.ai, France

12:00 – 14:00

Lunch / Business Community Lunch

14:15 – 15:15

Plenary session 12: Financing Global Public Goods in a Fragmented World

Chair:

Jean-Michel Severino, President of Investisseurs & Partenaires, former Vice President of the World Bank for Asia, former CEO of France's International Development Agency (AFD)

Speakers:

Masood Ahmed, President Emeritus of the Center for Global Development, former Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department of the IMF

Bertrand Badr , Managing Partner and Founder of Blue like an Orange Sustainable Capital, former Managing Director and Chief Financial Officer of the World Bank Group

Michel Kazatchkine, Special Advisor to the World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe

Mark Malloch-Brown, Board Member of ODI Global, former Head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP)

15:30 – 18:00

Parallel workshops

Workshop 1: Economy and Finance

Chair:

Jean-Claude Trichet, former President of the European Central Bank, Honorary Governor of the Banque de France

Speakers:

John Lipsky, Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, former First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF

Yann Coatanlem, President of Club Praxis and Atlantic Council contributor, former Managing Director and Head of Multi-Assets Quantitative Analysis at Citigroup

Daniel  aianu, Chairman of the Fiscal Council and Advisor to the Governor (Euro Area Affairs), former Board Member of the National Bank of Romania

Jeffry Frieden, Professor of International and Public Affairs and Political Science at Columbia University, Professor of Government emeritus at Harvard University

Akinari Horii, Special Advisor and member of the Board of Directors of the Canon Institute for Global Studies

Jean-Claude Meyer, Vice Chairman International of Rothschild & Cie (H.)

Nicolas V ron, Senior Fellow at Bruegel and at the Peterson Institute for International Economics

Workshop 2: The New Energy Order: Risks and Opportunities

Chair:

Val rie Ducrot, Executive Director of Global Gas Centre

Speakers:

Olivier Appert, Member of the French Academy of Engineering, Scientific Advisor of the Center for Energy and Climate of Ifri, former Chairman of France Brevets, former President of the French Energy Council

Dario Liguti, Director of Sustainable Energy at the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)

Olivier Hahn, Senior Vice President Strategy & Markets at TotalEnergies

Nicolas Piau, Co-Founder & CEO of Tilt Capital

Nicholas Kairis, Chief Legal Officer at Sagint Inc.

Jean Abiteboul, President of GIGNL (International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers), Non-Executive Board member of Tellurian, Inc. (AMEX: TELL), Founder and Chairman of JA Energy Consulting

Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega, Director of the Center for Energy & Climate of Ifri

Christophe Poinssot, Deputy CEO of the *Bureau de recherches g ologiques et mini res* (BRGM), Member of the French Academy of Technology

Workshop 3: AI: Power Struggles and Societal Challenges

Chair:

Patrick Nicolet, Executive Chairman of Linebreak Ltd., former Group Chief Technology Officer of Capgemini

Speakers:

Pauline Thomson, Managing Director for Infrastructure Funds & Head of Data Science at Ardian

Christine Choirat, Head of Data Science and Artificial Intelligence at the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO)

Tobby Simon, Founder and President of Synergia

Fran ois Barrault, Founder and Chairman of FDB Partners, Chairman of IDATE DigiWorld

Daniel Andler, Professor Emeritus at Sorbonne University, member of the *Acad mie des sciences morales et politiques*, philosopher

Arthur Stril, Chief Financial Officer of Collectis

Jay Truesdale, CEO of TD International

19:30

Piano recital

20:00

A Guy Savoy signature Gala dinner

Sunday, April 26

08:30 – 09:45

Plenary session 13: New Challenges for Health in a Changing World

Chair:

Michel Kazatchkine, Special Advisor to the World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe

Speakers:

Andrew Haines, former Director of the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine

Margaret Chan, former Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO)

Christine Choirat, Head of Data Science and Artificial Intelligence at the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO)

Antoine Flahault, Professor of global health at University Paris Cit , H pital Bichat, Inserm (France)

Juliette Tuakli, Mercy Ships International Diplomatic Ambassador for Africa, former Clinical Professor in Pediatrics at Harvard Medical School, Founder and former Medical Director of CHILd Accra in Ghana

09:45 – 10:15

Plenary session 14: Conversation with Nabil Fahmy, designated Secretary General of the Arab League

Chair:

Thierry de Montbrial, Founder and Executive Chairman of Ifri and the WPC

10:15 – 11:15

Plenary session 15: The 2026 Conflagration: Regional Fractures, Global Shockwaves, and the End of the Old Order

Chair:

Marc Hecker, Executive Director of Ifri, Editor-in-Chief of *Politique  trang re*, and Research Fellow at the Security Studies Center, Ifri

Speakers:

Dorothe  Schmid, Head of the Turkey/Middle East program at Ifri

Itamar Rabinovich, Vice Chairman of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv, Distinguished Fellow at the Brookings Institution, President Emeritus and Counselor of the Israel Institute, Professor Emeritus of Middle Eastern History at Tel Aviv University

Renaud Girard, Senior Reporter and International Columnist at *Le Figaro*

Memduh Karakulluk u, Founding Vice-Chair and Founding President of the Global Relations Forum, Founding Partner of Kanunum, Chairman of Kroton Consulting

11:15 – 12:30

Plenary session 16: Designing the Day After: Security Architectures, Economic Reconstruction, and the Quest for a Viable Peace

Chair:

Terry Martin, Journalist, TV news anchor

Speakers:

Jihad Azour, Director of the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and Caucasus Region Department of the IMF

Hubert V drine, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, Founder of Hubert V drine Conseil

Kim Gunn, Member of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, former Ambassador for International Security Affairs

Anne-Claire Legendre, President of the *Institut du monde arabe* (Arab World Institute)

Abdulaziz Othman Sager, Founder and Chairman of the Gulf Research Center, Saudi Arabia

12:30 – 14:30

Lunch

14:45 – 15:45

Plenary session 17: The EU as a Strategic Partner: Perspectives from Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia

Chair:

Thierry de Montbrial, Founder and Executive Chairman of Ifri and the WPC

Speakers:

Lasha Darsalia, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia

Vahan Kostanyan, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia

Dmytro Kuleba, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

Roman Vassilenko, Ambassador of Kazakhstan to the EU, NATO, Belgium and Luxembourg

15:45 – 17:15

Plenary session 18: The United States: Internal and External Perspectives

Chair:

Virginie Robert, Foreign Desk Editor at *Les  chos*, Vice President of the European-American Press Club in Paris

Speakers:

Hiroyuki Akita, Commentator of *Nikkei*, Japan

Jay Truesdale, CEO of TD International

Vuk Jeremi , President of the Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia

Jean-Claude Gruffat, Member of the Board of Directors and Executive Committee of Atlas Network, Managing Director of Weild and Co LLC New York

Thomas Gomart, Director of Ifri, Member of the Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defence's scientific committee (IHEDN)

Wang Jisi, Founding President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University

17:15 – 18:30

Plenary session 19: Final Debate

Chair:

Thierry de Montbrial, Founder and Executive Chairman of Ifri and the WPC

Speakers:

Kamel Abdallah, Managing Director and CEO of Canal Sugar

Jorge Casta eda Gutman, former Foreign Minister of Mexico

Philippe Chalmin, Founder of Cercle Cyclope, Professor Emeritus at Paris-Dauphine University

Ha m Korsia, Chief Rabbi of France

Yim Sung-Joon, Senior Advisor at Lee International IP & Law Group, former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, former National Security Advisor to President Kim Dae-Jung

18:30

Envoi





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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
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Gérard Larcher

President of the French Senate



To our friends in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia: the gradual disappearance of Europe and France is not just about Europe and France. It should be of concern to any country whose ambition is not to be reduced to the status of a relay or satellite power for more powerful countries. Yes, it should concern any country worried about exercising its full sovereignty. However, this disappearance is not inevitable: in a world that is becoming less and less globalized, there are as many signs of the structuring of international issues around superpowers such as China or the United States as there are of centrifugal movements and resistance to these trends, in Europe or elsewhere. Perhaps the time has come for middle and emerging powers. When we speak of "middle powers" we do not mean minor powers, operating in the gaps left free by major powers, but rather an alternative way of asserting sovereignty vis-à-vis block structures or relations of strict subordination. The middle power is one that wants to control its own destiny, without limiting itself to its immediate environment, and refuses to rely on those more powerful than itself. Let us not be afraid to say it: France has all the characteristics of a middle power, even if it finds it difficult to see itself as such. I am convinced that this is not a decline for my country but an opportunity, if it wants to regain a more credible voice and action. When a country speaks, it must have the means to turn its words into deeds: this fundamental rule of diplomacy has too often been forgotten. The European Union is the epitome of an alliance of middle powers. But it struggles to see itself as a major power on the world stage because, for too many years, it has refused to equip itself with certain instruments of power, in the name of unbridled neoliberalism. It has also been paralysed by internal differences. European countries that want to go further should, in my view, form "ad hoc pioneer groupings" within the Union.

*Full version page 134



Nialé Kaba

Special Envoy of the President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire,
Minister of State, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire



We are witnessing a triple fracture: A geopolitical fracture: great power competition has returned to the forefront, undermining decades of multilateral cooperation. Bloc dynamics, once thought obsolete, are re-emerging in new forms. A technological fracture: the digital revolution, instead of being a universal public good, is amplifying inequalities and widening unprecedented gaps between nations. A climate and humanitarian fracture: environmental disruptions threaten to destabilize entire regions, accelerate forced migration, and exacerbate tensions that already fuel conflicts. These fractures deepen economic inequalities, which, far from diminishing, continue to widen between developed and developing countries, eroding the legitimacy of institutions meant to address them. For Africa, this fragmentation is not theoretical — it is lived reality: in regional instability, in the volatility of global financial markets, in the difficulty of financing structural transformation, in migration flows reflecting deep inequalities, and in the persistent marginalization of the continent in global decision-making. [...] In our view, a renewed global governance should rest on several key pillars: First, representativeness. Côte d'Ivoire, in line with the African Union's position, reiterates its call for a deep and inclusive reform of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, including permanent representation of Africa on the UN Security Council. Second, the reform of the international financial architecture, to ensure that developing countries have adequate access to financing for structural transformation and for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. In this regard, developing countries — which contribute only marginally to global greenhouse gas emissions — call for climate transition financing not to weigh on sovereign debt, but to be considered as an investment in global stability. Finally, digital governance. While the digital revolution is a driver of development in Africa, it also brings new challenges: disinformation, cyberattacks on emerging critical infrastructure, and the use of autonomous tools by non-state armed groups. Africa and the Global South can no longer remain passive consumers of these technologies without participating in their regulation.

*Full version page 136



HH Bartholomew Ist

Archbishop of Constantinople - New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch



Peace is not simply another political objective. It is the deepest expression of communion between people. It is also the ultimate condition for preserving creation in the face of the forces of fragmentation that threaten it. Since the very beginning, humanity has been possessed by an irreducible longing for unity. And yet contemporary reality seems contradictory thereof. The world we live in is marked by constant tension between reconciliation and division. On the one hand, technological advances and economic interconnection have brought us closer than ever before. On the other hand, we are witnessing increasing fragmentation, both geopolitical and geoeconomic, explicitly manifested in the increased vulnerability of international trade, market instability and a gradual decline in global prosperity. The international trading system, which could be an instrument of peaceful cooperation, tends to be transformed into a set of regional blocs that are sometimes antagonistic, structured around dominant powers. In this context, universality of law is undermined, and the sense of injustice grows. Yet the experience of history teaches us a fundamental truth: only solid institutional cohesion can contain the forces of disintegration. After decades of global economic integration, often seen as inevitable, we are now entering a phase of uncertainty and reconfiguration. But this crisis goes far beyond the economic and technical dimensions. It reveals a deeper crisis, a spiritual crisis. It highlights our difficulty in recognizing the other – whether an individual or a nation – as our neighbor, a partner in our destiny. From this perspective, global governance cannot be reduced to the management of power relations. It must be understood as a service to humanity.

*Full version page 137



Thierry de Montbrial

Founder and Executive Chairman of Ifri and the WPC



Since the beginning of this decade and the COVID-19 pandemic, it has been as if we have entered a vicious cycle that some interpret as a 'return of the empires', with a non-zero risk of slipping into a third world war. This phenomenon is underpinned by fierce competition for technological, and ultimately monetary and financial, domination, in directions and with consequences that are largely unpredictable. The main challenge is artificial intelligence. It is already permeating all economic activities, starting with warfare. Since the beginning of the 2020s, 'high-intensity wars' have returned, in defiance of international law and multilateralism. [...] The question of the true nature of peace is too serious to be left to experts in economics or politics alone. The return of the spiritual to world affairs should make us question it. In Russia, communism's heir leans on Orthodoxy; in Turkey, Mustapha Kemal Atatürk's successor leans on Islam; in India, Nehru's heir leans on Hinduism; in China, Mao's successor does not disdain Confucius. But those who are driven by the spiritual quest do not solely have reasons to rejoice. Unfortunately, in certain circumstances, nothing is easier than manipulating the masses, especially when spiritual or religious leaders are complicit in authoritarian regimes. In these times of great disarray, the quest for peace requires in-depth reflection on the meaning of this concept, which inevitably has a spiritual dimension.

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Power Over Rules: Challenges in International Trade




CHAIR:
Marcus Noland
Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at the Peterson Institute for International Economics



Bark Tae-Ho
President of the Seoul Forum for International Affairs (SFIA), former President of Lee&Ko Global Commerce Institute, former Minister for Trade of Korea

There are three big drivers that are going to be affecting outcomes moving forward. The first of these is disruption in the economic policy sphere and here Donald Trump is the primary disruptor. Second is disruption in geopolitical relations where Trump is a participant, but he has accomplices. The third is the development of Artificial Intelligence or AI. We will focus on that first driver. I suspect that most of you do not recognise or realise just how extortionate these deals are. [...] In the case of Japan, the magnitude of those transfers is equivalent to what the Germans paid in reparations between 1925 – 1929, so this is victor's justice with an 80-year time lag. The Koreans got a slightly better deal because they have a 10-year horizon and the hope is that whatever new government takes power in the United States in 2029 will simply absolve the Koreans of the obligation. Supposing in 2028 the Democrats win the election and some reasonable Democrat with multilateralist instincts comes into the White House and comes to each of your countries and says, 'It was a nightmare, but the nightmare is over, we want to rebuild cooperative relations'. How does your government react? Credibility once lost is very difficult to reclaim. It is kind of like when your wild, old girlfriend calls you up and part of your mind says "no," but another part says "she was a lot of fun," it is very tempting.

Korea and the United States reached several important agreements during their bilateral summit held on the sidelines of the APEC Leaders' Meeting in Korea last October. Most notably, Korea committed to investing USD 20 billion annually for ten years in US-designated projects, along with an additional USD 150 billion to support the reconstruction of the US shipbuilding industry. The Korean government is working closely with Korean companies to ensure that these investments generate mutual benefits for both countries. However, Korean firms investing in the United States have expressed concerns over high tariffs on intermediate goods imported from Korea and uncertainties surrounding visas for Korean personnel working at US facilities. In particular, recent changes in US trade policy have effectively weakened the benefits of the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, which had made over 98% of bilateral trade tariff-free since 2012. Despite these difficulties, Korea achieved a major milestone in 2025 as exports surpassed USD 700 billion for the first time, driven largely by semiconductor and other intermediate goods exports. More than 70% of Korea's exports now consist of materials, parts, and equipment, many of which are supplied to overseas affiliates of Korean conglomerates. Korea therefore aims to strengthen a strategy linking overseas investment expansion with exports of high-value-added intermediate goods, leveraging its strong manufacturing competitiveness in semiconductors, batteries, robotics, automobiles, shipbuilding, and steel. At the same time, Korea is diversifying supply chains and expanding cooperation on critical minerals to enhance economic security. Korea also believes that the global trade order is unlikely to return to a fully WTO-centered framework in the near future. In this context, regional FTAs such as the CPTPP are expected to play a more important role. Korea is actively pursuing CPTPP accession. Recent US proposals for interim plurilaterals offer an encouraging path toward reform.



Sébastien Jean
Associate Director of Ifri's Geoeconomics and Geofinance initiative, Member of the French Council of Economic Advisors and former Director of CEPII

For the European Union, the international trade landscape is currently defined by two major shocks. The first is the protectionist pivot of the Trump administration, to which the EU responded with the Turnberry agreement—a framework that appears both asymmetrical and fragile. Trust in Washington has been severely eroded, a particularly destabilizing development given that the United States remains Europe's foremost trading partner and the historical architect of multilateralism. The second shock is the Chinese trade surplus in manufactured goods, which has surpassed \$2 trillion, accounting for over 15% of the manufactured imports of all other nations. This surplus largely reflects deliberate policy choices: macroeconomic policies that prioritize supply over demand and sustain persistent underconsumption; a 16% real depreciation of the yuan over four years despite record surpluses; and a targeted, sector-specific industrial policy that forces partners to absorb Chinese strategic priorities. Furthermore, several recent measures amount to the weaponization of dominant market positions for the purpose of political coercion. Confronted with these twin challenges, Europe must act on three fronts: strengthening its internal market and innovation capabilities; actively shielding itself against unfair competition; and forging new partnerships grounded in political trust rather than mere market access. Ultimately, navigating this geopolitical risk will necessitate enhanced cooperation between public and private stakeholders.

Power Over Rules: Challenges in International Trade



Brian Kingston
President and CEO of Canadian Automobiles Manufacturer's Association

I think the Canadian government would overwhelmingly welcome a change and a new stance, particularly on things like Section 232s, where we have industries that are so deeply integrated with the United States that we are not able to diversify; such a shift would be extremely welcome. That said, I think the scars are pretty deep here. I have never seen a fracture in such a close relationship, and I think that even if there is a change in stance from the administration or a new administration, there is now going to be a long-term push in Canada to try to diversify as much as possible. Again, it depends on the sector, but people want to avoid going through this situation again. I think the best example of this is that our government just announced \$81 billion in unprecedented defence spending, and part of that is because of these constant 51st-state annexation threats. I think Canadians will remember that, and there will always be this desire to try to insulate ourselves as much as possible from future protectionist pushes. But at the end of the day, we are so integrated that we have got to get back to a stable trading relationship.



Qiao Yide
Vice Chairman and Secretary General of Shanghai Development Research Foundation

In the first one I want to describe what happened to address unilateral protection measures. Last year, we saw more bilateral agreements reached, and the EU in particular has taken very aggressive initiatives. We also see the presence of regional cooperation and integration. Then we also see middle power alliances being shaped. I guess that is a good start to deal with protectionism. We also see all kinds of international organisations trying to help their members to deal with that. The second point is I try to identify what factors affect the choices of different countries. I guess the first and most important factor is the geopolitical positions of these countries, particularly mainly the relationship with the US. There is also the factor of economic strength. The last point I want to make is recognition and a suggestion for the future. Each country should try to do anything that benefits their interests, but I also want to point out that they should not use their own protectionist measures against existing. I guess the best way to solve disputes among ourselves is to find a way to compromise. First of all, what is the definition of global imbalance? We generally use the term current account balance, which is the best definition. The responsibility is not just on China, the US has a tremendous deficit, and the EU also has a great surplus, so these three major partners should coordinate to solve these problems, not just to only target on China.



Kazuto Suzuki
Director of the Institute of Geoeconomics at International House of Japan, Professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Tokyo, Japan

On the one hand, the free trade regime has not yet been dismissed but there are countries that have certain indispensabilities, which are using them as a weapon or leverage to force other countries to change their policies, behaviour or trade patterns. The United States has used its market indispensability as leverage to make other countries change their behaviour. China is using the indispensability of goods, such as rare earth minerals, as leverage against the others, so these indispensabilities are now forcing other countries to behave differently. The current economic order has on one hand countries like Japan, South Korea and many others, that are trying to maintain the international order based on a free trade agreement forming plurilateral mechanisms such as the CPTPP. Meanwhile, there are countries that go beyond that free trade arrangement and use the economy or indispensability as a tool to negotiate and force other countries to behave. This is what Iran is doing in the Strait of Hormuz: it has closed the strait in order to take the international economy as a hostage and to force other countries to push the United States and Israel to stop fighting against them. China is still the number one trading partner and I think from a Chinese point of view, the trade relationship with Japan is still important. In that context, the Takaichi government in Japan is launching a new growth strategy. I am a member of the Growth Strategy Council, focusing on the 17 different strategic sectors to enhance Japanese capabilities to be more indispensable in the global supply chain and to make sure that we are also resilient in the face of other countries that use leverage against us. In those terms, like South Korea, Japan has concluded memorandums of understanding with the United States to invest USD 550 billion there, which is currently to reduce the tariff they imposed but at the same time, we are trying to build up the joint autonomous capabilities, the economic resilience and economic security capabilities together with the United States.



Digital Finance and International Markets: Alternative Approaches, Differing Opportunities and Potential Risks



CHAIR:
John Lipsky
Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, former First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF



Jean-Pierre Landau
Associate Professor at the Department of Economics at Sciences Po Paris, former Deputy Governor at the Banque de France, former Executive Director for France at the IMF and the World Bank



Sam Okwulehie
CEO at LATC Group, Senior Advisor at Boston Consulting Group

"What exactly is digital finance?" For our purposes today, it is the delivery of financial services — either to conduct economic transactions or to serve as a store of value — via digital channels. The key qualities of digital finance, encompass both new instruments and potentially new institutions that did not exist previously. One key attraction of digital finance are the potential gains in efficiency and reduction in cost in conducting financial transactions. This could increase both the speed and resilience of completing those transactions. One additional benefit of the growth in digital finance is the prospect of enhanced financial inclusion, in that these new can accommodate individuals who currently lack access to traditional financial institutions. In this case, digital finance will help to expand modern financial services to many places where they do not exist currently. Of course, the prospect of expanding digital finance also has raised several issues, including privacy and security. Of course, the prospect of new instruments and new institutions is creating a regulatory challenge. Already, differences are emerging in the development of digital finance between the US, the European Union and China. At this time, they all appear to be on somewhat different paths with respect to the development of digital finance. Therefore, the risk exists that rather than expanding the efficiency of the system through interoperability, that the result will be the opposite, namely an incentive for different authorities to create barriers to the instruments favoured by other jurisdictions.

Right now, it seems to me that the problem is on its way to being solved in the US. Through recent legislation, the GENIUS Act, the US seems to have found a balance between big tech and the banks, who are going to cooperate and may issue new forms of digital money, and the government will ensure that this digital money is supported by the issuance of government public debt. The government will find a new way to issue public debt, big tech and the banks will find new ways to issue digital money, and everybody will find new ways to promote the international use of the dollar as a medium of exchange and a store of value. I think that is the guiding strategic principle behind the GENIUS Act, and that kind of cooperation will allow the US government not to issue its own digital currency because it will ensure that the private digital currencies issued by big tech and the banks are actually almost equivalent to public money. The issue is much more muddled in Europe. You know that the central bank, the ECB, is very keen to promote the digital euro, a very good project that I fully support. However, there is clearly some pushback from the banking system, and the banks are very afraid that if you and I, the ordinary citizens, have access to public money in a digital form on our mobiles, one way or another it will trigger a loss of deposits from the banks, funding difficulties. A last word about the emerging economies: it is very significant that emerging countries are making inroads into making retail digital payments easy for everybody. Brazil has a system, the Pix, which is an enormous success where hundreds of millions of people can easily access retail payments, whether or not they have a bank.

Digital finance is no longer a future concept; it is a present-day reality being adopted at speed by corporate and everyday users. The central tension is that regulators are playing catch-up with what is already happening in the market. Business does not wait for academic clarity, and users are working out for themselves what serves them best. From a user perspective, stablecoins are the most widely adopted form of digital money, precisely because they are backed by an underlying asset. They offer the efficiency of digital technology while retaining the reassurance of conventional value. Crypto, by contrast, is increasingly viewed as a speculative store of wealth, with limited transparency around origins and ownership. The deeper question is what regulators must now do to provide clarity, so that the system does not drift into the kind of self-regulation that preceded the 2008 financial crisis. Digital finance is delivering real benefits - inclusion, efficiency, and speed - but those gains will only be sustainable with clear rules of the game. The Nigerian experience with the eNaira is instructive: the digital currency has been issued, but adoption is minimal because the framework around it lacks clarity. Several other emerging-market central banks face the same challenge. Interoperability is therefore the critical product that must emerge. What happens in Abidjan needs to connect seamlessly with trade flows in London, Johannesburg, and Dubai; without it, the inclusion gains become fragile and reversible. The disruption is real, particularly for banks and central banks, but it also creates opportunities - notably for telcos increasingly functioning as both banks and payment conveyance terminals. The priority is to ensure that this digitalisation is sustainable, interoperable, and not dependent on systems outside our control. Business will continue regardless; the question is whether the framework keeps pace.



Conversation with Anwar Gargash, Diplomatic Advisor to the President of the United Arab Emirates



CHAIR:
Thierry de Montbrial
Founder and Executive
Chairman of Ifri and the
WPC



Anwar Gargash
Diplomatic Advisor to the President of the United Arab Emirates

I think to start with, Iran's strategy was to enlarge the war with very little consideration for its longer-term regional relations, and I think in the long-term this will also affect Iran's position and posture in the region. It has now become very clear to the region, to the United Arab Emirates and other countries, that Iran is a long term threat, and I think you have to differentiate between relations, and trust and confidence. Relations are bound to come back at some stage, but trust and confidence are different, and I think Iran will be seen as basically a strategic threat from the region's perspective for many decades to come. As I said, this is independent of the nature of relations that will have to be rebuilt, whether in the medium or longer term; these are two different things. The attack on Iran was an American-Israeli attack, and Iran chose to enlarge the war and include the region, and the United Arab Emirates was attacked with more missiles and drones than Israel. Clearly, this was a very conscious plan by Iran, not only sending a message or enlarging the crisis, but also sending a message of very little consideration for Iran's Arab relationships, as if Iran was telling the Arab Gulf countries that we do not matter in its calculations, and I think this is going to last for the very long-term. [...] My final point is that we are really looking into a crystal ball, and it means that it depends a lot on what we will see in Iran. I think what we will see in Iran will basically be a different version of the Islamic Republic; it will not be like an Ali Khamenei Islamic Republic, because, as I said, that was very dependent on a certain personality, period, and role. I think the priority now for Iran is to rebuild and re-establish not only regime survival but also economic survival, and I think this will require a lot of rational thinking from Iran beyond all the statements we are hearing right now in the war.



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CHAIR:
Jeffry Frieden
Professor of
International and Public
Affairs and Political
Science at Columbia
University, Professor of
Government emeritus at
Harvard University

Fiscal Firewalls or Fiscal Freefall? Charting a Path to Stability



Vincent Koen
Advisor to the OECD, former Deputy Director of Country Studies
at the OECD

U.S. public debt now exceeds 120% of GDP, mirroring broader global trends. Worldwide, fiscal deficits remain elevated at around 5% of GDP and public debt is projected to approach 100% of GDP by the end of the decade. At the same time, government interest payments are increasing rapidly as interest rates have normalized, while ageing populations and slowing growth make it harder to stabilize debt ratios. Age-related spending pressures are set to intensify. OECD projections suggest increases of 3–6% of GDP in spending on pensions, healthcare, and long-term care by mid-century. This dynamic is already visible in countries such as Japan and Korea and is expected to affect the United States as well. Without policy adjustments, debt trajectories in many countries appear unsustainable. A key lesson from recent OECD and IMF work is the importance of strong fiscal frameworks. Countries such as Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands demonstrate that well-designed fiscal rules supported by credible institutions and domestic political commitment can reduce deficits and volatility. These frameworks are most effective when they are simple, transparent, and broadly accepted as tools for intergenerational fairness. To reconcile sustainability with growth, several policy priorities emerge. First, increasing employment, particularly by extending working lives, can boost growth while improving fiscal balances. Second, improving efficiency in healthcare and long-term care systems offers significant scope to contain spending without reducing quality. Third, tax reform, including broadening tax bases and strengthening environmental and property taxation, can raise revenues more effectively. Finally, rebuilding fiscal buffers is essential. Recent crises have shown that shocks are frequent and costly. Strong fiscal positions enhance resilience, enable timely policy responses, and reduce financial instability risks. Ultimately, fiscal sustainability is not only about debt reduction but also about safeguarding economic stability and fairness across generations.





Fiscal Firewalls or Fiscal Freefall? Charting a Path to Stability



Nicolas Véron
Senior Fellow at Bruegel and at the Peterson Institute for International Economics



Masood Ahmed
President Emeritus of the Center for Global Development, former Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department of the IMF



Yann Coatanlem
President of Club Praxis and Atlantic Council contributor, former Managing Director and Head of Multi-Assets Quantitative Analysis at Citigroup

Fifteen years ago, as the euro area crisis was in a phase of dramatic contagion from Greece to other European countries, the EU was a financial danger to the world, an exporter of financial instability. Now the opposite is true: the EU is broadly stable as it is buffeted by external shocks. Meanwhile, the US used to be the safe haven of global finance, but appears to have been losing at least part of that privileged status in the course of last year. A combination of aggressive deregulation, desupervision, and institutional erosion in the United States represents a risk not just domestically but also for global financial system participants, not least in Europe where exposures to the US financial system are very high. This financial dynamic compounds the longstanding risks that arise from the unsustainable US fiscal trajectory.

Low-income countries (LICs) are facing distinct and significant debt problems. While their total debt stocks remain generally lower than those of advanced economies, LICs' limited access to financial markets means that even debt levels around 50% of GDP can leave them excluded from new borrowing. Many LICs have crossed this threshold in recent years, while the main mechanism for debt relief, the Common Framework, has proven slow, uncertain, and difficult to exit. Even more pressing is the cost of debt service, which has risen to record highs across LICs. In 46 countries representing 3.4 billion people, debt service exceeds government spending on health and education combined. This leaves little room for growth-enhancing investment that could raise future revenues and ease debt burdens over time. Creating space for new spending will require either additional concessional resources or lower debt service costs – both of which present significant political economy challenges in a time of declining aid and international cooperation. Between all of this, it is clear that the existing system is not well equipped to resolve debt problems for the countries most in need. And things may only get worse in the short-term – the Middle East conflict is pushing energy and food prices higher, hitting low-income oil importers especially hard. The priority for the international community must be to identify a set of proposals that are workable amid the constraints while still making a meaningful difference for a group of indebted LICs.

How can governments prioritize returns? Technology is one obvious lever — better data systems, AI-assisted decision-making, smarter targeting of public services. The Trump administration has brought in Palantir to interconnect and rationalize federal systems. How much state intelligence is useful, and how much becomes too much control? But the potential is real. Structural agility is Europe's missing ingredient. The main message from the Draghi report is very clear: most of the economic gap between the US and Europe comes from the tech sector, uniquely volatile and risky. Companies that succeed are the ones that can change direction very fast. That kind of move requires being able to restructure quickly and at a reasonable cost. Europe, for the most part, can't do that. Restructuring is expensive, slow, and legally complex. So companies don't take big bets. And when they do, they can't course-correct fast enough. We should borrow from Denmark: introduce flexicurity — at least for the top earners involved in innovation, the engineers and technical talent at the core of the tech economy. The instinct is always to spend more. Better targeting of public policies can do two things at once: actually, help the people who need it, and free up resources by eliminating programs that aren't working. A few tools are under-used: negative income tax rates can increase labor market participation while reducing net social transfers; lifelong learning tax credits align incentives toward adaptability rather than just income support. Neither requires more spending — they require smarter spending.



Minilateralism Without Treaties: Insights from the G7 and G20



CHAIR:
Philippe Etienne
Ambassadeur de France, Professor of Public and International Affairs at Columbia University, former Diplomatic Advisor to President Macron, also acting as G7 and G20 Sherpa

The G7 may have changed a lot since it was created 50 years ago (first as a G6 in Rambouillet in November 1975), and in particular its relative weight may have fallen but the problems which led to this French initiative are not without sounding familiar for us: an energy crisis started by political and military events in the Middle East. One big change is definitely for us and was already seven years ago (I was the Sherpa in Biarritz in 2019 for our last presidency) the full participation of other democracies (India, Korea, Brazil and Kenya this year) like the participation of many non State actors to build meaningful multi stakeholders coalitions. This year, and together with crisis management, our Presidency has singled out in particular four priorities: how to tackle global imbalances (which includes a thorough dialogue with China in all available fora), the paradigm shift from ODA to international partnerships, the resilience of supply chains for critical materials and the most sensitive aspects in the development of AI following the previous G7 presidencies (Hiroshima principles), in particular the protection of young people and the identification of AI created content.



Minilateralism Without Treaties: Insights from the G7 and G20



Lee Hye-Min
Former G20 Sherpa of Korea, former Ambassador for International Economic Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Senior Advisor of KIM & CHANG



Gary Litman
Senior Vice President for Global Initiatives at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce



Andreas Schaal
Director of Global Relations and Co-operation at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD Sherpa to G20/G7/APEC

We are witnessing this systemic breakdown of international cooperation. The four G20 summits since 2022 demonstrated that the G20 could no longer have meaningful impacts on global issues given the breakdown of the global cooperation mechanisms, mainly caused by intensifying US-China conflict and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Against this backdrop, the G7 has regained its importance by coordinating international sanctions on Russia. However, the role of the G7 is limited as a global governance entity due to its continued lack of representativeness in the global economy, whereby its share in the global GDP has dropped from around 65% when it was created in the mid-70s, to 30% now compared to 85% of the G20. Furthermore, as the conflict in Iran begins to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe, there is an increasing risk that this June's G7 summit meeting will just be a formality, a gathering of the leaders who can no longer agree on the common path forward despite the sincere efforts of France. The respective failure of the WTO ministerial meeting in March and the stalemate within COP climate negotiations, serve as further evidence of this collapse. Without the restoration of global cooperation, meaningful progress on climate change or international trade remains out of reach. I would like to highlight the collapse of the rules-based international trade regime. The US administration has abandoned the principle of MFN, Article 1 of the 1947 GATT, the most important pillar of the modern international trading system. The challenge to MFN did not just begin with the Trump administration, with the declaration of Janet Yellen, then US Treasury Secretary under Biden in April 2022, that the US would prepare free but secure trade with friendshoring, the WTO's fundamental principle of MFN was dead. What is more serious is that it is not just confined to the United States. In January this year the EU Trade Commissioner proposed to weaken the MFN. Under his proposal, lower tariffs would no longer apply automatically but would instead be tied to sales practices and open markets in the partner country. The WTO's dispute settlement mechanism, once hailed as the crown jewel of the Uruguay Round negotiations, remain paralysed.

I want to report to you that, from the point of view of American business and a lot of multinationals based in the United States, multilateralism is still alive and well. American business is not withdrawing from the global markets. We appreciate all the difficulties, and I agree with almost everything that has been said so far about the challenges, but from the private sector point of view, there is no option but to engage with partners around the world, encourage the flows of capital, goods and ideas. That is what we are going to represent and, as has been said, this year we are lucky to host the Business 20, which is the counterpart to the G20. By the end of the year, 9 – 11 November, we will host the largest gathering of business in a generation in Washington. We have no doubt it will be noted by the political authorities, everybody else, including the markets. We are totally committed to working with our partners and making sure that we all contribute to global progress, prosperity and wealth creation. In terms of the G20/G7 global governance, it is absolutely true that they are challenged by the political realities in every member, domestically. I think it is an important conversation for think tanks, academia and strategists to figure out why these institutions and multilateral institutions as a whole are experiencing a loss of confidence and why they suffer from an incompatibility with national domestic politics and aspirations. We need to see what is going to happen in a world that is indeed fragmented. There is no disputing that fragmentation is a fact, and it creates all new boundaries and sharper edges between different markets. At the same time, it creates a diversity of growth paths and solutions, with more opportunities to engage in a variety of debates where you do not rely on some universally accepted truths, same kind of language that has been around for 50 years and has never been challenged. Hopefully, that will lead to a proliferation of opportunities, in fact, that is how the private sector looks at it, at least in the American private sector.

Today's challenges require multilateralism that is effective, delivers lasting solutions and helps improve people's lives in a meaningful way, particularly as geopolitical tensions are rising, consensus is increasingly harder to reach, and the institutions that underpin global co-operation are under growing strain. Global governance fora, including the G7 and G20, play an important role, backed by International Organisations like the OECD that can help ensure continuity, support implementation, and connect back to the wider multilateral system. The G7, as a smaller group of like-minded countries, can move with agility and serve as a policy incubator. The G20, with its broader and more diverse membership, provides the inclusiveness and weight required to deliver truly global solutions. The OECD and G20 have a long track record of co-operation – from promoting strong, balanced, and sustainable growth and ensuring that everyone pays a fair share of taxes, to enhancing agricultural market transparency and advancing innovative and trustworthy AI. Building on this foundation, the OECD is working closely with the US' 2026 G20 Presidency to drive progress on tackling barriers to growth and addressing global imbalances. The OECD is also proud to support France's 2026 G7 Presidency on the road to the Évian Summit, leveraging our data and analysis to underpin work on global imbalances, shape a new narrative for development and strengthen critical mineral supply chains.



Major Challenges of Asian Geopolitics



CHAIR:
Douglas Paal
Distinguished Fellow at the Asia Program Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Four years ago when Russia invaded Ukraine there was a lot of talk, certainly in the US in security circles about whether or not the implications where that the US would be distracted by the fight in Ukraine and would not have the resources to provide adequate protection to maintain the status quo of Taiwan's autonomy in the Western Pacific. We have now gone forward a few more years and the same questions are being asked just in the last few days, with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies publishing a report on the depletion of American arms in attacking in Iran together with Israel in this latest conflagration between Iran and these other countries. The warning is that we are running down our supplies, American ships that are normally in the Pacific have been transferred to the Persian Gulf area and a lot of troops have been moved, and a Marine expeditionary unit has been moved from Japan to the Gulf. Therefore, we have got a lot of change in the region and possible implications for the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and it is in that framing that I would like to invite our speakers to talk.



Major Challenges of Asian Geopolitics



Yuichi Hosoya

Professor of International Politics at Keio University in Tokyo,
Director of Research at the Asia-Pacific Initiative



Kim Chang-Beom

Vice Chairman and CEO of the Federation of Korean
Industries



Wang Jisi

Founding President of the Institute of International and
Strategic Studies at Peking University

It is ironic to mention that at this time Asia is perhaps the most peaceful place in the world. A few years ago many people thought about the possibility of a big war or contingency in the region but having seen the war in Europe and also in the Middle East, we do not have any major war or conflict between leading powers.[...] Japan has maintained its previous position towards China during the administration of Prime Minister Takaichi, which understands China's stance that Taiwan is part of the People's Republic of China. It means that we do not like to see rapid change in the status quo of China, while understanding and respecting China's "One China" policy. We need to think about those things and first, we need to maintain the strategic balance in the region by strengthening Japan's defence capabilities and its alliance relationship with the United States, while creating a much better relationship with the RoK. Second, we also have to understand that it is essential to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, trying to prevent the rapid destruction of the previous status quo in the region. As I mentioned, there are two preconditions. First, maintaining the strategic powers in the region and expanding Japan's defence spending to match the pace of the Chinese military buildup. Second, we need to ensure that the Taiwanese government does not rapidly change the status quo in the region. By maintaining those two preconditions, I think in Asia we can maintain the continuation of peaceful order.

As regional interdependence deepens, developments in Ukraine and the Middle East are increasingly tied to both the current and future prosperity of the Asia-Pacific. While the region continues to enjoy the absence of war and conflict, this peace still contains elements of uncertainty and instability, raising questions about whether the current regional architecture is sufficient to sustain long-term stability. Against this backdrop, the region appears to be witnessing different tactical approaches involving the PRC and its neighbours. Seoul and Beijing are trying to restore momentum in their relationship, with ties warming through an exchange of high-level state visits between President Lee Jae Myung and President Xi Jinping following the Gyeongju APEC Leaders' Meeting. By contrast, relations between Japan and the PRC remain in a diplomatic hiatus, while Tokyo maintains a firm and principled policy toward China under Prime Minister Takaichi. China's approach toward neighbouring countries does not appear to follow a uniform, one-size-fits-all pattern. Beijing seems to have adopted a more pressure-oriented approach toward Japan, including through regulatory controls and other measures, while showing a degree of restraint toward South Korea. Some experts have tried to understand this distinctive approach as possibly seeking to create distance between Seoul and Tokyo and to limit Japan's more assertive posture, particularly if tensions rise in the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, important long-term variables remain. In South Korea, the gap between warmer government-to-government ties and public sentiment appears to be widening, driven by increasingly unfavourable perceptions of China among younger generations. Meanwhile, across Southeast Asia, the United States appears to be losing some ground, as recent surveys show that a slight majority of respondents now favour aligning with China over the US, highlighting the need to consider not only geopolitical and geostrategic issues, but also economic implications and public perceptions.

One thing I should mention is that the Chinese were very worried when they heard Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi say something like the contingency on Taiwan is a contingency about Japan. That offended the Chinese leadership and the bilateral relationship deteriorated rapidly. I hope the situation will improve but I do not expect it to change very rapidly in the near future, not only because of the statement from the Japanese Prime Minister but also because China is worried about Japan's connections to Taiwan, its increased military budget, and its military exercises together with some other countries like the Philippines, that China has pushed back against. [...] I think ASEAN in general is moving in the same direction as before, it does not take sides between the United States and China. On the Taiwan issue, all the ASEAN countries recognise the PRC as the legal government of China but there people in Southeast Asia who regard Taiwan in different ways. For instance, Singapore still has a very strong connection with Taiwan, and they have an unofficial but important military connection with the island. The Philippines also have their own territorial disputes in the South China Sea with China. Their attitude to China is influenced by that in favour of Taiwan. Indonesia and Malaysia are generally in the middle; Thailand also has a military pact with the United States. Therefore, there are very different attitudes to the PRC and Taiwan in Southeast Asia and there will not be any significant change to that in the near future. In the long run, the issue of semiconductor trade with Taiwan, and TSMC is very important in Southeast Asia in connection with the United States. It is a very substantive factor in the region.



Debate with Patrick Pouyanné, Chairman and CEO of TotalEnergies, and Dominique Senequier, CEO & Founder of Ardian



CHAIR:
Terry Martin
Journalist, TV news anchor



Patrick Pouyanné
Chairman and CEO of TotalEnergies



Dominique Senequier
CEO & Founder of Ardian

What is Europe economically? In fact, what is missing is a real single market in Europe. We have taken some steps towards a single market, but we have not built a real one economically because fundamentally, the way we built the European market was by allowing each country to translate the famous directives into its own language. This is a big difference between the US economy and Europe. And for me, the next step, the Investment and Savings Union on finance is fundamental. This would give us the size we need. If you wonder why in a digital world we do not have European giants, it is because we have 27 regulators and 27 small markets. By the way, we built the system with the idea of protecting the European consumers so we have a deliberate policy that has not allowed us to build European champions because they might be dangerous for European consumers. The whole European project was conceived initially to avoid wars between European countries, so we built a project that is the exact opposite of what we require today. I would say it is an anti-power project, Europe has never been conceived as a power, on the contrary, it has been seen as a way to find a consensus so that we can keep the peace between European countries. That is a project that worked very well until 2015 but suddenly, we are entering a new world, a world of power where strength is more important than what happens at the United Nations. We are in a world where you have the US, China, and Russia. Europe, which has never been conceived as a power, must have a complete rethink. My view is that the only way is to have more Europe and more of a single market, but a real one and that assumes, which is not yet the case, that each state would agree to lose a bit of sovereignty. In my field, energy, it is obvious that we should have a common view on investment in Europe. The French like nuclear, so let us invest in nuclear, the Germans like wind, so we can invest in wind, then the important issue is the combination and the grid we need to build between us.

• Stay focused on the long term: Despite geopolitical turmoil, Dominique Senequier argues that markets have historically recovered from major crises. She cites the rebound of the S&P 500 since the 2008 financial crisis as evidence that long-term investors should avoid overreacting to short-term volatility.

• The U.S. remains unavoidable for investors: With around \$90 trillion in market capitalization, the U.S. offers unmatched scale and liquidity, making it difficult for global investors to ignore.

• Europe still offers attractive opportunities: She remains positive on European private equity, particularly mid-sized companies, but stresses that investors must be selective given weaker growth prospects and market fragmentation.

• AI may be entering bubble territory: While acknowledging AI's transformative potential, she warns that investment expectations may be running ahead of proven revenues and draws parallels with previous periods of financial excess.



When Technology Redefines Modern Warfare



CHAIR:
Thibaud Frossard
Vice-President of Capgemini Group and Head of Aerospace, Defence and Security at Capgemini



General Wayne Eyre
Former Canada's Chief of the Defence Staff, Senior Fellow and Visiting Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa

These days, technology in the defence sector is no longer simply a factor that increases military power, it is becoming its core component. Artificial intelligence, drones, cyber, space systems, information warfare, we are seeing a paradigm shift in how conflict is conducted, not only in terms of capabilities but also in the very organization of armed forces. This transformation is occurring against a backdrop of fresh strategic tensions: forms of hybrid warfare are on the rise, the boundary between peace and war is increasingly thin, and the pace of operations is accelerating. In this environment, the advantage no longer lies only in possessing capabilities, but in knowing how to adapt, transform and improve them as quickly as possible. At the same time, the defence industry is also undergoing profound changes. The previous very long development cycles we knew are being replaced by ever-faster innovation cycles, featuring the arrival of new players. Nowadays, the sector's major clients, specialist SMEs, digital firms, and DefTech start-ups must all work together, sometimes with timeframes and risk assessments that are quite different. This shift is a source of both opportunities and tension. Armed forces need greater speed and operational excellence. Manufacturers need to be more agile.

Technology is transforming warfare rapidly, but it does not determine outcomes on its own. War remains fundamentally a human contest of will, shaped by leadership, judgment and adaptation. Both history and current conflicts show us that no single technology wins wars; what matters is the integration of capabilities, doctrine, training and culture. A modern convergence of technologies -persistent surveillance, drones, precision strike, electronic warfare, cyber, space and AI-enabled command and control— is changing the character of war. This combination creates new operational problems, such as how to survive and maneuver when massed forces are easily detected and destroyed. Response to this question would be a better balance between expensive high-end systems and cheaper, attritable systems that can be produced and adapted quickly. Adaptation cycles, once measured in decades, are now measured in weeks, requiring more investment in research and development and more flexible production capacity. Commanders' responsibilities are increasing, not decreasing, as autonomy expands. While autonomous systems can improve speed, precision and awareness, they cannot handle moral ambiguity or bear legal responsibility. Commanders must therefore understand these systems, set clear parameters and apply what he called a "common sense check", especially in environments where data may be poisoned or AI may hallucinate. Finally, the growing importance of cognitive warfare and the information domain, where influencing public will may achieve strategic effects without fighting. Technology must be embraced, but wars will still be won or lost in human minds.



When Technology Redefines Modern Warfare



Amélie Férey
Director of Data Projects and Institutional Relations at the strategic research institute of the French Ministry of Armed Forces (IRSEM)



Thibaud Bezacier
CEO of Alseamar, France



Gauthier Schweitzer
Co-Founder of Sahar, France

If we take "Epic Fury", the US operation in Iran, there were more than 900 strikes in the first few hours of the conflict, that is, more than one strike per minute. If we take the Israeli operation in Lebanon on 8 April, "Eternal Darkness", there were around one hundred strikes in about ten minutes. It is precisely this that nowadays constitutes a change factor to be considered, i.e. the question of pace, and what some in the literature are calling "hyper-war", meaning a much-accelerated decision-making cycle. I will just finish by returning to the point about the high-low mix, because that is really, in my view, the topic at hand. The topic is not so much to establish how we take this technology into account, because the military is already doing so and the matter is already being considered, but instead how to not let ourselves be blinded by this technological power. Indeed, if we take a detached look at current wars, there are powers with technological supremacy, and I am thinking of Israel and the United States, versus powers that have opted for attrition, or in any event, are not afraid of it. I am thinking of not only of Iran, but also Hamas, for example, which is not afraid of all the civilian casualties inflicted in the Gaza Strip. The question is how we manage to rethink our model with not just high-tech solutions, but also low-tech ones, and potentially systems that had previously been ruled out but are now being used again. I am thinking, for example, of cluster bombs. Just before the conference, I was looking at an ARES notification about casualties caused by Iranian cluster bombs fired on Israel. The war we are seeing today is both highly technological and yet also very traditional.

There was a period, between the 1990s and the 2000s, when Western forces were developing the concept of 'zero dead', i.e. the aim was to wage war without losing a single soldier. Deploying drones plays a very important role in this approach, as it offers the possibility of going to war against an enemy while minimising the risk of human losses. [...] The second challenge is data processing. These drones are platforms that collect vast amounts of data, so much so that it exceeds the processing capacity of most of them. In fact, these drones are relatively small compared to the platforms used. This factor leads to the idea of creating constellation-type systems. We talk about swarms of drones or constellations of drones to occupy the airspace. There needs to be some thought therefore about data processing: some will be processed on the edge, by drones. Then some will be retrieved using connectivity solutions to complete processing in a back-office, within data hub systems, using artificial intelligence algorithms, which we will discuss shortly. The purpose of all this is to provide the military with the information it needs so that the right decisions are made and the right resources deployed. This returns us to the time aspect that the General alluded to indirectly. The challenge lies in the loop that the military call the OODA loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. Drones, connectivity and AI have been added to the conventional human resources available during the First World War, with its rudimentary communication methods such as Morse code and the telephone. The aim is circle round this loop as quickly as possible to provide military commanders with the right information at the right time to take the right action. For manufacturers, the challenge is not only to fully understand this military requirement, which, in my view, is unlikely to change in the coming years, but also to ensure that the military benefits from the very best technologies in terms of drones, autonomy and endurance, so as to meet its needs swiftly. And my final point is then that the current challenge is not perfectly meeting the military's needs in future, but meeting them well, right now.

Information warfare is often treated as distinct from conventional warfare. However, as multi-domain operations have already been mentioned, my opinion is that it should not be viewed as separate. Dealing with an intangible field, such as cyberspace, does not mean that there cannot be serious tangible consequences. We have seen many recent examples in this area. A purely information-based attack, when well-executed, can certainly damage the reputation of military hardware. The Rafale was targeted in this way during the Sindoor conflict between India and Pakistan. In this case, information warfare had an extremely significant impact on the hardware's perceived appeal. Similarly, there has been election interference on TikTok, which has even led to elections being cancelled. The information space is not currently a fight over soft power, but is instead combined with kinetic effects designed to create a more all-encompassing conflict. A change in the nature of the fundamental technical problem. Our company works in OSINT, Open Source Intelligence. For a long time, OSINT was like looking for a needle in a haystack. These days, with the advent of information warfare, the needle is made by the enemy and planted straight into your haystack. The objective is to lead you to making a poor decision. One might imagine that identifying false content is the easiest part. However, it is already a complex and often highly subjective matter to distinguish fact from fiction; but importantly, content that is true can be weaponized. Lastly, AI can play a role in separating signal from noise, but here too, we are reaching its limits. When an AI model is given access to a contaminated information space, it may produce a brilliant and coherent analysis, but one that is still wrong. Hence the importance, of putting people back at the centre of this loop, because in principle, only humans are capable of doubt, and it is doubt that must guide us.



Message from Emmanuel Macron



Emmanuel Macron
President of the French Republic

We are living through some upheaval, trite though it is to say so, and much of what used to be taken for granted is in jeopardy. We have seen it with the imperialist wars waged by permanent members of the Security Council, with Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine. We have seen it through disrupted international trade. We are seeing it now with the war started in Iran. Fragmentation, the proliferation of crises, and the unabashed resurgence of power politics and empires are reshaping much of this international order and grounding it in a form of lawlessness. Faced with the turmoil around us, France refuses to merely criticise from the sidelines. We are attempting to act with a clear objective, which I have set out and have tried to explain to our ambassadors since the first speech I was able to give them, describing this concept of being a balancing power that contributes to peace and stability. That is to say, a power that rejects adopting its stance by default, that champions its independence – the independence of a French and European path – which presupposes sovereignty, strategic autonomy and many elements relating to technology, industry and defence, but which also seeks to devise a third way with cooperative solutions in situations where others hamper progress. A third way that is based on a clear understanding of every stakeholder's interests, but which also upholds international law and therefore rejects double standards. I believe this approach is sound and that it is beginning to show its strength. Through the small steps we have taken in recent years – a stronger Europe, an Indo-Pacific policy that embodies this third way, a policy towards Africa based on a new partnership, a policy of re-engagement with emerging powers, and a policy of respect and developing forward-looking partnerships with our major historical partners, from Japan to Canada – all of this sketches the blueprint for the coalition of independents in which we believe. And I believe that this is what must carry weight in the international order as we are now experiencing it.

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The Future of the European Union: What Are the Big Questions?



CHAIR:
Jean-Claude Trichet
Former President of the European Central Bank, Honorary Governor of the Banque de France



Gabriel Felbermayr
Director of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), former President of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)

We are now a continent with some grand ambitions, but that finds itself in a sorry situation. The same applies to gross domestic product per capita, and to productivity gains, which lie at the heart of all our problems. Faced with this sorry assessment, which is shared by everyone, including unfortunately our competitors, a consensus exists to move towards a fully integrated single market in economic and financial terms. As regards the longer term, there are probably some marked differences between us. There are some Europeans who, taking a long-term view, imagine that we will continue along the same path and that we will be content simply to fine-tune existing institutions, in the economic and financial arenas, as well as in the arenas of defence, security and diplomacy. Looking ahead to 2050, I do find myself among those who envisage a European political federation, with shared armed forces, a common defence, a single diplomatic service, and all the advantages associated with a political federation, economically and financially speaking. It is clear that the fact that we are not a political federation, whereas our main competitors are either unified states or political federations, is, I believe, to a large extent, the glass ceiling that restricts Europeans and places them at a disadvantage, not only economically and financially, but also politically and geo-strategically. I am not naive, but I do think we should be aware that we cannot forever compare ourselves to fully-fledged political federations or unitary states, while simultaneously lamenting how Europe is failing to reach their level, despite its tremendous past progress and its current ambition.

I think what we need to do is start with the right assumption, and this assumption is 2,500 years old. Unfortunately, as we all know, the phrase from Thucydides states, 'The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must'. It is a working assumption, a realistic view of the world. The second factor we need to acknowledge is that in the long run, Europe is in decline, and we cannot do much about it. We can become more advanced technologically, we can speed up our processes, we can even have a capital markets union. We should do all that, but in the end, it is population that matters. If we now look at the UN population projections, by 2100 we will have something like 6% of the world population. This is continental Europe, so it includes the United Kingdom and Russia; if we look at the EU 27, it is even less. [...] If we live in the world I have characterized, we should take a sentence very much to heart that comes from a recent paper by two of my colleagues, Markus Brunnermeier at Princeton and Stefan Kolev in Berlin, who say 'we need unity where size matters and diversity where flexibility counts'. I think that must be the principle. Diversity can be a source of resilience and we should use it, which means we need to be very clear about where we need more Europe and where we should maybe have national independence and decisions made at peripheral levels. Of course, this would mean common trade and investment policies; investment is not fully Europeanized, for example. This must include monetary policy and also payment systems; we need to talk about the digital euro here. It must include European Safe Bonds.



The Future of the European Union: What Are the Big Questions?



Thierry de Montbrial
Founder and Executive Chairman of Ifri and the WPC



Cătălin Predoiu
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs of Romania



Norbert Röttgen
Member and former Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Deutscher Bundestag

My first observation is that, historically, the development of the European Union is inseparable from NATO. My second observation is that, historically, we have never seen an alliance survive the disappearance of the threats that forged it. The question of the North Atlantic Alliance's survival first arose, in reality, in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse. Why did NATO survive? It was because NATO was much more than a military organization; it was a political framework that ensured cohesion between the two dimensions. Furthermore, our American counterparts have always referred to Euro-Atlantic institutions. For them, it was a unified whole. I believe that the Atlantic Alliance, if it survives, will no longer be the same entity as the one we have known. Quite simply because, in geopolitical terms, the United States is pivoting elsewhere. It is no longer their central concern, and Russia is not what the USSR used to be, whether we like it or not. If we assume that NATO is set to unravel, can a constantly expanding European Union itself survive as a cohesive unit, with some degree of homogeneity? Can this model survive, and is the federal paradigm realistic? My own personal answer today is no. It is not a question of ethical or other choices; it is a pragmatic approach. The only solution I can see is an alliance, meaning a European confederation with an alliance in the conventional military sense and, why not, an institutional framework for that alliance. Taking, for example, an alliance comprising the members of this reconfigured European Union, there could be an organization for this alliance which, drawing on the expertise we have – because NATO, from this point of view, has been a formidable training ground – could tackle all sorts of problems, including those in the industrial arena. I will conclude with a comment on the issue of Europe's heterogeneity. What has struck me for a number of years now, is that Europe is in reality much more heterogeneous than we perceive it to be.

The European Union stands at a strategic turning point. Conceived after the Second World War as a peace project built on economic integration, prosperity, democratic values and the security umbrella of NATO and the United States, the EU now faces a profoundly different global environment. The shift of American strategic attention toward the Indo-Pacific, Russia's aggression against Ukraine, technological competition, migration, cyber and asymmetric warfare, terrorism, foreign interference and organized crime all challenge Europe's stability, resilience and capacity to act. Europe must transform values into power, legitimacy into delivery, and its legal and normative framework into a strategic instrument. The European project must remain faithful to liberty, justice, fairness and the rule of law, but it must also become more competitive, more effective and more capable of protecting its citizens. The absence of a strong connection between younger generations and the EU's founding values creates political space for extremism and populism. The eastern flank of the EU and NATO should no longer be seen as a periphery, but as the place where Europe first experiences the future. Its daily exposure to Russian aggression and regional instability gives it strategic knowledge that must be integrated into Europe's geopolitical thinking. In conclusion, Europe urgently needs a credible military security pillar, stronger political leadership, deeper democratic education and a renewed sense of identity connected to security, solidarity and shared European values.

I would like to outline three European priorities and briefly describe the political context in which we must pursue them. The first priority is that political Europe must become the guarantor of European security. Ukraine already is and will increasingly become an indispensable contributor to European security. The second priority is that we have to retain or even regain our ability to resist foreign influence and pursue our own interests. This is the China question, and for the next three years, equally a question of American influence. The third priority is the preservation of the West. To preserve the West, meaning to preserve the European Union and the normative West as a political concept. You could perhaps summarize these three goals into one goal we have to achieve, which is new in a collective sense, and this is that we as Europeans have to develop the will to power. There are three circumstances under which we must pursue that. If we fail as democracies to deliver on the major goals, our citizens will ask what we are here for. In post-war European history, there has never been so much debate about identity, sovereignty, national interests. In a time when integrated action is necessary, our ability is diminished – a problematic and dangerous paradox. I do not see the big leap in integration, mostly for democratic reasons: people want to have a say in what is going on and they feel disempowered. Therefore, we have to be pragmatic and work through informal intergovernmental groups that agree on and coordinate foreign and security policy actions.



Conversation with Aleksandar Vučić, President of the Republic of Serbia



CHAIR:
Thierry de Montbrial
Founder and Executive
Chairman of Ifri
and the WPC



Aleksandar Vučić
President of the Republic of Serbia

Give us open borders, we do not need veto rights or Commissioners, we do not even need your funds; that is not what this is about. When I became Prime Minister, our public debt to GDP ratio was 79%; today it is 41%, and we have no big problems with that. The real issue is that someone has to create an opportunity for Serbia and its people, and someone has to say what we can get and to understand our position. Taking 14% of someone's territory and then saying we should be very happy and that we need to please them with all the decisions that we might make after that, is not realistic. We might have had changes in our country and other political movements might or might not soon come into power, but in any case, do you really believe that there is going to be a different position on these issues? For Europe, resolve all the remaining issues on the continent, including Ukraine, Moldova, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, whatever. Resolve it swiftly, smoothly, and efficiently, and focus on spreading your ideas and influence on the African continent and in Asia, and the European role in the Gulf can increase. President Macron was very smart recently with an armaments deal in the Gulf, and he got a lot of respect from the United Arab Emirates and some other countries, and they will never forget it. This is what Europe should do and what Europe will have to take care of.



Innovative Leaders Session: "Beyond Automation, the Agentic AI Revolution"



CHAIR:
Etienne Grass
Global Chief AI Officer at
Capgemini Invent



Thomas Courbe
Head of the Directorate General for Enterprise (DGE) at the French Ministry
of Economics, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty

We have best-in-class companies in Europe that can address the main challenges we have mentioned. It is a very balanced setup that addresses industrial scale ups through agents, agent sustainability in the end of AI, and trust, so we have the talent and the best-in-class companies in Europe to address these challenges. In conclusion, for me, the question is what Europe, and the governments can do to help these companies thrive in a global competition that is stronger than ever. I would say first, is to bring trust to their customers. This is in the spirit of what we are trying to do with this regulation, so that the customers of these companies trust the solutions they are offered. Second, scaling up to reach critical size. One of the challenges we know we have in Europe is channels, sufficient private funding to ensure that these companies find European private funding not just US funding for their development. We still have a lot to do in that field for AI but more generally for tech companies. Finally, it is how we can help them find the right markets for their developments. There is a small but not negligible role for public procurement, which in some cases can be a way to drive these markets but it is more generally about how we can help these companies compete and gain the markets they need with, as much as possible, a level playing field.



Innovative Leaders Session: "Beyond Automation, the Agentic AI Revolution"



Moritz Maier
Co-Founder & CEO of Synera, Germany



Victor Gaspar
Chief Sales Officer of Multiverse Computing, Spain



Nicolas Bodin Guittard
Co-founder & CEO of Label4.ai, France

Looking at Europe in particular, it is not that we lack the technology or the capital, they are there. For me, it is mainly the talent which is missing and we talked about this before, we do not have enough people here to do these jobs. I think this is the major constraint and Agentic AI is actually the opportunity to solve this, so it changes the equation. If you equip and engineer with Agentic AI, he can do the work of 10 others. This is a massive improvement and a unique opportunity for us because Europe has an absolutely unique and unfair advantage. We have been developing hardware engineering for decades, 50 years. We have the Airbuses, the Safrans, the BMWs, the Bosch, this is capital of Europe. There is inside these companies the training data set we actually need to train these AI agents and China does not have anything like this, it just started, so there is a hidden treasure in our companies. In fact, this is not public data. The fundamental models have been trained on the Internet knowledge, in easy words, but the knowledge on how to build cars is the companies' IP. So, I think that if we use this wisely and apply this technology boldly and fast, this might be a gamechanger for Europe to leverage the hidden treasure inside our companies and really become the leader again.

In defense environments you have the problem of size, so as you said, if you are not going to put a large GPU on a drone you are going to have a problem of weight, you cannot move a tank that weighs two tons. In terms of energy, you are constrained by the design of the devices you want to put your intelligence on and typically, your use case is constrained by their processing speed. If you fly a missile at Mach 10 and you want to process an image at that speed, it will have flown kilometers in a second, the area is huge, so you need to process the information really fast. That is a typical constraint you find on an Edge environment. Furthermore, in the defense environment you cannot communicate freely with the Cloud. You cannot outsource the computing capabilities to the Cloud or a data center because when you establish communications they can be detected. That is another limitation, so as much as possible, you want to process all the information on the Edge, on the tank, the drone or the devices that the combat soldier carries. By compressing the models, you can embed more intelligence on the devices they carry. On the Edge you can do computer vision processing or, for example, super maintenance processing, so if a soldier does not know how to operate or how to solve a particular problem, they do not need to communicate, they have the information right there. I will show you how it works.

Label4.ai builds digital watermarking and detection technology for AI-generated content, addressing the obligations introduced by Article 50 of the EU AI Act. A central observation: while the regulation was drafted with machine-to-human interactions in mind, its core requirements apply natively to machine-to-machine contexts. This matters in the agentic era, where input-output chains must be trustworthy by design. On detection, two detection approaches coexist. 1. Active detection (watermarking) embeds an invisible, robust signal at the moment of content creation. It resists compression, format changes, and the rough lifecycle of synthetic media, providing reliable traceability. 2. Passive detection, by contrast, is a fallback. It infers the synthetic nature of content after the fact, with significantly higher false-positive rates. In agentic, machine-to-machine settings, where many nodes must be confirmed, passive detection is insufficient. Label4.ai operates on both fronts: marking AI-generated content at its source, and detecting it downstream across image, audio, video, and text. Google's SynthID confirms this is already industry practice, not a European exception. On competitiveness: regulation is not a tax on innovation. Drawing on Anu Bradford's Brussels Effect thesis, the AI Act may strengthen Europe's position. Customers in banking and insurance consistently prefer a secure model with slightly lower performance over an unsecured one. Compliance is the necessary security architecture around a powerful technology, not a bureaucratic overlay.



Financing Global Public Goods in a Fragmented World



CHAIR:
Jean-Michel Severino
President of Investisseurs & Partenaires, former Vice President of the World Bank for Asia, former CEO of France's International Development Agency (AFD)



Masood Ahmed
President Emeritus of the Center for Global Development, former Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department of the IMF

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, an architecture for our shared objectives on poverty, climate and the environment was gradually built within this international community. These objectives have been expressed through the Millennium Development Goals and their successors, and through a host of international conventions on climate and health, with targets that the international community has set for itself. What is absolutely remarkable is that this architecture has produced significant positive results. For example, since 1990, extreme poverty worldwide has dropped from 40% to 10% of the population. Child mortality in the under-fives has halved over this period. HIV/AIDS is under control, if imperfectly, and polio has almost been eradicated. These are absolutely huge gains. What we are going to talk about today is some very bad news: what could be described as the collapse of this mainstay of financing for shared causes over, shall we say, the last three years. That is why you will notice that I do not even use the terms "solidarity" or "development aid". I am actually talking about financing, and that is our subject for this afternoon, i.e. financing for shared causes. The latest report from the OECD's Development Assistance Committee indicates that, from 2024 to 2025, official development assistance, the technical instrument that underpins the financing of all these actions, decreased worldwide by approximately 20%. This trend, which started in Europe, was continued in the United States, as has been seen by the dismantling of USAID in 2025 and, within 12 months, a reduction in the volume of US aid of around 60%, which had a particular impact in some regions of the world and on certain issues where that aid was concentrated. For example, the United States was the main source of funding for healthcare worldwide which has been hit particularly hard by America's cuts.

There are four points about the role of ODA going underappreciated in the current moment: 1) The US cuts were dramatic, mostly because they were paired with the closure of USAID and a political narrative, but European donors had already been cutting aid more gradually, even as they continued to speak rhetorically about its importance. 2) The muted public reaction in donor countries to last year's dramatic cuts reflects a deeper loss of confidence in the prevailing aid model, particularly as other priorities (climate, migration, etc.) entered the agenda and increasingly became counted as ODA. 3) The muted reaction in recipient countries reflects skepticism about aid as a tool for growth, as well as distrust of a model seen by many as perpetuating dependency rather than enabling self-reliance. 4) Development cooperation is much broader than aid flows alone and will inevitably continue in some form through private finance, remittances, trade, technology transfer, migration, and other channels.



Financing Global Public Goods in a Fragmented World



Bertrand Badré
Managing Partner and Founder of Blue like an Orange
Sustainable Capital, former Managing Director and Chief
Financial Officer of the World Bank Group



Michel Kazatchkine
Special Advisor to the World Health Organization Regional
Office for Europe



Mark Malloch-Brown
Board Member of ODI Global, former Head of the UN
Development Programme (UNDP)

Ten years on from the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement, and the Addis Ababa Agenda on financing for development, the picture is mixed. Some real progress has been achieved, including in the fight against poverty and raised awareness of climate issues. However, the international community is today falling far short of the trajectory it had set itself. The main shortcoming lies in financing. By 2015, it was clear that a few hundred billion dollars of official aid or concessional financing would not be enough to redirect a global economy valued at more than 100,000 billion dollars towards a sustainable, resilient and inclusive model. The challenge was to mobilize several thousand billion every year by combining official funding, private savings, international investment, and remittances from migrants. However, successive crises, rising geopolitical tensions and greater insularity have slowed this momentum. Development aid is declining, the amounts invested in emerging economies are still insufficient, and prudential approaches continue to adversely affect these markets. At the same time, domestic industrial policies are capturing an increasing share of available savings. The notion that the private sector alone would compensate for the shortcomings of nation states and international institutions has proven unfounded. Incentives remain inadequate and the appetite for risk limited. Looking at the growing needs, the paradox is striking: humanity currently directs more than 3,000 billion dollars a year towards military expenditure, a sum broadly comparable to the resources needed to fund the major global public goods. More than ever, it appears essential to rebuild the international financial architecture.

First, a swift analysis, then the reasons. Analysis first, and I will start with the United States. On the first day of his second term, President Trump decided to leave the WHO, disbanded USAID and cancelled all international health programmes in progress at the time, whereas the United States had been the leading funder of international health, accounting for 40%, and the proportion of its official development assistance allocated to health was 30% higher than that of all other donors. These utterly abrupt decisions left recipient countries with no room to adapt, and have already resulted in lost lives, the loss of thousands of jobs among healthcare professionals and NGO personnel, the halting of clinical trials, and have placed hundreds of thousands of people in distress. Now quickly to the reasons. The first is the current priority given to defence, although healthcare is an essential component in public health security. That health is also on the security agenda is being overlooked. The second reason is a kind of fatigue. In way, ODA is a victim of its own success. People tell themselves that the problems have been solved. The third reason that I see is this loss of system legitimacy that Masood mentioned: short-lived, excessively top-down initiatives imposed from outside, a highly bureaucratic system and, importantly in my view, the fact that solidarity and healthcare, in particular, have lost their place on the political agenda, because ultimately, this is definitely a political decision. Look at how pandemics have been completely forgotten. Five years ago, the number one priority for the G7, the G20, the Council of Europe, and ASEAN was health. Our President was reading *The Lancet*. Our English-speaking friends have a term for it, which is "panic and neglect". We are evidently in the "neglect" stage. In my view, we need to rethink the system. We will get there, but above all these issues must be put back on the political agenda, because these issues around investment are also issues around investment in our stability.

The ODA crisis goes much wider than just the US shuttering of USAID. Countries like France and the UK, and indeed most of Europe, have made proportionately similar cuts. They have just been quieter about it! And one should not be taken in by the palliatives that private sector investment can cover the gap. This has long been deployed as an excuse for faltering public commitments but while it is the solution to long-term growth it does not cover pressing social needs such as health or education or even critical public infrastructure alone. The latter often needs a mixed public-private funding model. Yet there is little prospect of ODA recovering. It fell 23% last year alone. The political support for it in western countries has been undermined by geopolitical fragmentation, rising security and defence spending and deep fiscal constraints. The political consensus of past years, which allowed a surge in spending and a record drop in global poverty, is tragically gone. While a more security-centred argument may allow a modest recovery to cover humanitarian needs and support failing states, both often sources of illegal migration flows, the altruistic ambitions of the past are gone. Not least because in developing countries themselves there has also been a re-evaluation of aid. The donor driven, continuously changing priorities of the aid scene, has rarely allowed ODA-dependent countries to assert their own agency over development priorities and strategy. Rather, a post-colonial politics of aid developed where development orthodoxy, while rarely consistent or sustained, was set in western capitals. Now as western grant funding falls away there will be an inevitable shift of ownership to developing countries as they piece together funding from a variety of concessional and private sources. While the short-term costs may be high, including lost lives as health and education systems buckle, in the longer term it provides a much more promising basis for sustained development: countries designing and owning their own development.



New Challenges for Health in a Changing World



CHAIR:
Michel Kazatchkine
Special Advisor to the World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe



Andrew Haines
Former Director of the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine



Margaret Chan
Former Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO)

Nearly 70% of the 24,000+ estimated heat deaths in a selection of European cities last summer could be attributed to human-induced climate change, so very unlikely to occur without it. Also, if you go forward the projection is over 2 million additional temperature-related deaths in these cities by the end of the century but most of them could be prevented with rapid action. Climate change does not just affect physical health, it also affects mental health. We see this after wildfires, floods and droughts. After many extreme climate events you see an increase in mental disorders, which can be sustained for several years after the event. There is also climate anxiety, which we see very much in children and adolescents. In a survey of very diverse countries, including in Europe, Africa, Asia, etc., overall about 45% of the respondents said that they were experiencing climate anxiety that was so severe it was affecting how they functioned, so it is not trivial, it is serious. What do we need to do about it? There are two types of actions we can take. One is to adapt to the change that we cannot prevent and that means, for example, more resilient health systems, emergency preparedness, heat early warning systems, flood protection, and surveillance of infectious diseases.

Aging is happening worldwide at a scale and speed that political leaders must address to ensure sustained, long-term development. The world has invested enormously in extending human life through vaccines, antibiotics, maternal and child health, and disease surveillance. Unlike a serious outbreak or a pandemic, aging does not produce the same sense of urgency—it does not make headlines, and it does not trigger emergency funding. But the consequences of population aging reach into every domain that leaders must manage. I have three observations to offer: 1/ Stop treating aging as a problem and start treating it as a transition. It is a transition that we can shape. This means rethinking retirement, education, urban planning, and labor markets; 2/ Spending on health must be understood as an investment, not simply as a cost. Every additional year of healthy life is not only a gift to the individual; it is an economic asset. But achieving this requires shifting resources upstream—toward prevention, primary care, and the early management of chronic diseases; 3/ This challenge is global, but the responses must be tailored. Demographic realities are different in different countries, so there is no single model. There is a vital need for political leaders to learn from each other. In conclusion, aging is not a problem; it is a transition that we can shape. We have spent decades making it possible for people to live longer. Now, we must make it possible for them to live well. That requires investment, imagination, and above all, political will.



New Challenges for Health in a Changing World



Christine Choirat

Head of Data Science and Artificial Intelligence at the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO)



Antoine Flahault

Professor of global health at University Paris Cité, Hôpital Bichat, Inserm (France)



Juliette Tuakli

Mercy Ships International Diplomatic Ambassador for Africa, former Clinical Professor in Pediatrics at Harvard Medical School, Founder and former Medical Director of CHILD Accra in Ghana

Christine Choirat's intervention frames Artificial Intelligence not as a replacement for human judgment, but as a tool for augmentation. Citing the full OECD definition, she emphasizes that AI systems are designed to influence real environments through predictions and decisions, much like aviation mastered aerodynamics rather than mimicking birds. She identifies three primary risks: the evidence gap (adoption outpacing validation), cognitive atrophy (over-reliance eroding critical skills), and equity biases. Despite these risks, the potential for AI in health, from drug discovery to global disease surveillance, is transformative. She argues that realizing this potential requires a shift toward a "reasonably open world" built on two pillars: 1/ Metadata Discoverability: Making data findable and contextualized without exposing sensitive content; 2/ "Eyes-Off" Analytics: A technical framework enabling trustless cooperation. By using secure enclaves and differential privacy, stakeholders (governments, private sector, researchers) can collaborate on joint analyses without ever sharing or seeing raw data. This approach resolves the tension between innovation and privacy, allowing for cross-border and cross-sector collaboration even in the absence of pre-existing legal frameworks or mutual trust. She concludes with an invitation to global partners to explore the adoption of these Swiss-developed public goods, positioning data sovereignty as the foundation for equitable, evidence-based global health policy.

We have to realize that we are currently building a society that I will call a two-tier aging society, even in our most developed welfare states: those experiencing morbidity compression benefiting from longer healthy life years, and those suffering from morbidity expansion. Morbidity compression means that this segment of society that they will spend a very small part of these years with chronic conditions and dependency. They benefit from morbidity compression, thanks to prevention that has been adopted from an early age throughout their whole lives, and they will benefit from eight to nine more years of healthy life years at 65 if they are wealthy with university degrees than if they are deprived or poorly educated. That means that the other part of society, the most deprived and least educated, will mostly not benefit from this morbidity compression. They will suffer from morbidity expansion. Because of the healthcare system, they will live longer than in the past century but will suffer from chronic conditions that are expensive to treat and lead to dependency. When experiencing morbidity expansion, people cannot afford to work when they retire and have lower participation in society, which is a double-burden for the deprived and less-educated people. That is one of the main risks in our societies, and we probably need to invest much more in targeting preventive measures at those without access to physical activity or a healthy diet, which is always more expensive than junk food and ultra-processed foods. All these preventive services and preventive measures, such as cancer and disease screening, mental health services, and many others, should mainly prioritize this segment of society, which could benefit the most.

Africa still accounts for half of all maternal deaths globally. Many of them are preventable with access to safe emergency obstetric care. Increasingly, our women are facing a dual burden, the communicable risks that still pertain and non-communicable diseases such as, as I said, cancer, heart disease, stroke, diabetes, obesity, etc. This makes one thing absolutely clear. Improving surgical, obstetric and anesthesia care, especially for women, is not just a health priority, it is an economic, social and developmental priority. Women are central to all of our economies and also within our communities, and to our health systems. If women cannot access safe care our system will simply not succeed. Yet, major challenges do remain. Too many facilities lack the appropriate workforce, infrastructure and resources, and there are still too many patients who live beyond the critical two-hour access window for essential surgical care. Regional hospitals are beginning to try to work to redress the situation, but it is slow going. For too long, surgery has been seen as almost secondary and that perception is beginning to change but it must continue to change quickly. We saw a returning point last year in Kigali at the Pan-African Surgical Health Forum where 40 African governments came together and agreed on a shared plan forward, a continent-wide surgical policy and stronger national systems that will include expansion of the workforce capacity and a unified voice.



CHAIR:
Thierry de Montbrial
Founder and Executive
Chairman of Ifri
and the WPC

Conversation with Nabil Fahmy, designated Secretary General of the Arab League



Nabil Fahmy
Designated Secretary General of the Arab League

I have always felt that the Arab Middle East needs to be more proactive in defining its own future rather than reacting to plans from others. I have always felt that we needed to look, view as our immediate problems, all politicians have to deal with today's problems, but also look forward at what is coming next. Yes, I expect that Iran will be in the region for generations to come and there will be period when they are strong and some when they are weak, and they will react positively and negatively in both cases, and we have to be prepared for that situation anyway. Part of it is and I use the term political influence because for me power is its influence, how you project that, and that maybe by creating an Arab incentive for Iran, maybe by creating an Arab deterrent for Iran, or both at the same time. I do not want to only be reacting to an Iran-Middle East proposal, or an Israeli one, or a Turkish one for that matter but I cannot ignore any of them, so let us be proactive, put our thoughts on the table and build ourselves at the same time. It is not possible to depend on even your best friends for your security, or most of the time, because they will have their own priorities. Again, it is not possible to expect them to react to a crisis and your real-time needs if there are other crises, so Arabs need to be individually and collectively strong and to be future-oriented.



The 2026 Conflagration: Regional Fractures, Global Shockwaves, and the End of the Old Order



CHAIR:
Marc Hecker
Executive Director of Ifri, Editor-in-Chief of *Politique étrangère*, and Research Fellow at the Security Studies Center, Ifri



Dorothee Schmid
Head of the Turkey/Middle East program at Ifri

Israel and the US started a war on Iran on February 28. Key leaders including Ayatollah Khamenei were killed on the first day. They were eliminated but the regime did not collapse. The main leaders were replaced and through a mix of decentralization and asymmetric tactics, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the armed forces managed to be resilient. The Iranian leadership opted for a strategy of horizontal escalation targeting neighboring Gulf countries, it was not only US military assets that were targeted but also civilian infrastructures. Iran also decided to enforce a blockade on the Hormuz Strait, later followed by the US. The situation in the Middle East has already had global repercussions, notably in the energy sector, and the longer the war lasts, the more severe the economic consequences will be. Since the fertilizer industry is also impacted, there may even be dire consequences for food security. You probably all know the military saying that during war the first casualty is often the plan, so here the plan was shock and awe, and the result was shock and choke.

I have the feeling that we have now reached that moment of truth, the climax of the conflict, namely the confrontation between Israel and Iran. This is the one we have been expecting for decades, built through public pronouncements, and which marks the end of a very long process. In addition, in terms of economic repercussions, the number of industries affected is very high, and the global economy is dependent on events in the Strait of Hormuz. Ultimately, the resulting asymmetry currently makes it impossible to establish a new power ranking. We have this massive display of American power, but we also have Iran, which, like the United States, is currently claiming to have won the war for the time being, as it is Iran that is reshaping the Middle East. Turning to the issue of alignment and views of security, what has struck me over recent weeks is how Donald Trump, having embarked on this offensive single-handedly, then tried to rally his allies. I mean not only European allies, but also Asian countries that were approached to join an American coalition when the Strait of Hormuz issue took a tangible form. We saw the Western camp start to fall apart, but then some realignment centred on a Franco-British axis. This axis successfully reached out way beyond just Europe and has thus brought in countries from Asia-Pacific via video conferences, the most recent of which, held in Paris, brought together 49 countries. [...] In conclusion, the big unknown is the future role of the United States, but it is also the balance of power with China. I would like us not to forget that, in the way Donald Trump worked with the Gulf states following the Abraham Accords, there was also the aim of attracting funding from the Gulf, including to develop American technology, and that the Gulf states had to be brought over to the American side in the artificial intelligence battle. Will the current crisis of confidence with the United States not tip the balance in China's favour?



The 2026 Conflagration: Regional Fractures, Global Shockwaves, and the End of the Old Order



Itamar Rabinovich

Vice Chairman of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv, Distinguished Fellow at the Brookings Institution, President Emeritus and Counselor of the Israel Institute, Professor Emeritus of Middle Eastern History at Tel Aviv University



Renaud Girard

Senior Reporter and International Columnist at *Le Figaro*



Memduh Karakullukçu

Founding Vice-Chair and Founding President of the Global Relations Forum, Founding Partner of Kanunum, Chairman of Kroton Consulting

Originally, you mentioned that you might want to ask me if Netanyahu has abandoned the traditional policy deterrents and adopted a more offensive policy, the short answer is yes. Among other things, deterrence did not work. There was no deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas, or Hezbollah who, after the October 7 attacks, decided on October 8 to join Hamas in a limited way by launching a war of attrition against Northern Israel. Israeli policy since then is very much a policy characterized by drama, drama of the debacle of October 7, 2023, and offensiveness. When it comes to what we are facing now, Iran will probably still be there at the end of the war. Weakened, but still a determined enemy with very strong reserves of missiles and drones for another round that would remain a threat. As long as the regime is in power in Iran, Hezbollah will probably remain stronger militarily than the Lebanese government. What can Israel do now? It has to be ready for potentially another round with Iran, maybe at the Iranian's initiative. I would say that in terms of active diplomacy it is very much in Israel's interests for Syria to join the Lebanese government and Israel. All three countries are in the Levant, they are all anti-Iranian and anti-Hezbollah and interested in stability. Israel would have to make concessions in Syria, or rather to go back to the lines of 1974. The current government is not likely to do it, and strategic diplomacy will have to wait for the potential change in government in October.

The Iranians' problem is that they are divided. Iran no longer has a mediator, as Mojtaba is ill and weak. He is difficult to reach; you cannot call him on the telephone; you have to send letters for security reasons, etc. There is no mediation, but there are two opposing camps in Iran. There is Ghalibaf, the pragmatist, with Araqchi, who are pro negotiating. Ghalibaf gave a speech six days ago to tell the Iranian people: "We have to be realistic: the Americans are stronger than us." But then there are hardline Revolutionary Guards, led by their commander, Ahmad Vahidi, who do not want to hear such talk, who want to hear nothing about concessions on the nuclear issue. The Iranians are treading a very narrow path. Their salvation seems to lie in recovering as a commercial power; this is the only possible path, as no one will let them to regain political hegemony. Nevertheless, debate is not over in Iran. As regards the Europeans, my point will be very brief, extremely quick, because they count for very little. They want peace, they want the Strait reopened. They did not join the Americans because they do not believe in regime-change operations in Muslim countries. They were vaccinated against that by Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan. These Europeans have not even managed to save the JCPOA, i.e. the agreement of July 14, 2015 that they had initiated with Catherine Ashton. They failed to save it, although they believed in it. They count very little; it is not them who will bring about peace. My conclusion is that today, for the first time in human history, we are seeing Europeans have less influence over affairs in the Middle East than the Chinese.

I think what will probably happen is that powers like Türkiye will feel the need to build these local orders; we will have a geometry of local orders. I do not know how they will relate, but that seems to be the push; that seems to be the instinct coming from our Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from, I think, the President. A middle power can be constructive, destructive, or disruptive. A middle power by definition has to be constructive because to be a power you have to deliver; you have to deliver order and influence, and that requires being constructive. I think in some way Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, and I think Egypt, are rising to the occasion, and the urge to become middle powers involves building these islands of stability around them. That is the urge; whether or not we can deliver is a different matter. [...] Basically, my overall point is that because of the pressure it feels from all the uncertainty and the instability, mostly emanating from the changing stance of the United States, Türkiye has shifted its foreign policy. I think it is instinctively more in tune with the old Republican foreign policy, so we are going back to the original settings of foreign policy, and I think that is welcome. It has all kinds of repercussions, and we can talk about that. Just to give one last preview for our next session when we talk in a year or two, I think we will not be talking about the US being unwilling to provide order, but rather being unable to do so and being unable to protect its allies. That will be a very different world and a very different foreign policy discussion, but that is a preview.



Designing the Day After: Security Architectures, Economic Reconstruction, and the Quest for a Viable Peace



Abdulaziz Othman Sager
Founder and Chairman of the Gulf Research Center, Saudi Arabia



Jihad Azour
Director of the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and Caucasus Region Department of the IMF

Traditionally, we used to have our own capabilities plus foreign forces in the region, based at our request, whether French, British, or American. Now, it is changing, and Iran has entered the equation. We understand that Iran should be part of our security architecture, and we understand that you cannot design a new security architecture in the region without the US being involved in it, so they are part and parcel of all the conflicts in the region. However, we want to do it with consultation and coordination. If they are now negotiating a deal with Iran, they should take into account what we have in mind: we want freedom in the Strait of Hormuz, we want maritime security, and we want regional security. Given the interventionist policy that has been implemented by Iran in using all the militia forces in that region, we want to have compensation. So, we do have our own set of requirements, and they should not simply be left undiscussed. The long-range missiles, the 2,000-kilometre-range missiles, that represent a threat to Israel, have been part of the negotiations, but the 3,000-kilometre-range missiles that represent a major threat to us in the region have not. We would like to see that our agenda and demands have been taken into account in any agreement the US would like to reach with Iran. At the same time, we appreciate the international effort, but we want them to move faster and not wait until the deal is done.

On the eve of this war, the Middle East was poised for sustained growth, and prosperity was very much anticipated. In particular, the Gulf states were preparing to accelerate their economic shift towards diversification, with a focus on technology and internationalization. The war has happened and so many things have changed. The first thing that has changed is that this is the first war in the Middle East in the last five decades to have had such an economic impact on the region and the wider world. Almost six months ago (June 2025), we had a war that had very little impact on the economic situation. This one is different, because it has led to the closure of a vital economic artery, the Strait of Hormuz, which had never happened previously. It has revealed a number of dependencies and vulnerabilities, such as Asia's reliance on supplies of energy and energy-derived products from the region, and the reliance of specific sectors on essential goods. It is the first one that will also determine the attitude of Asian countries if this crisis continues. The second change is the impact this war might have on regions much further away. Farmers in Australia, New Zealand and Africa are affected by this war just as much as someone living in the Middle East. Thirdly, the huge asymmetry, in that you can be in the same combat zone but be affected in a different way. Look at Oman and Kuwait. Oman, because it has export capacity, is sustaining only a minor economic impact. In contrast, Kuwait and Iraq are taking a massive economic hit. There is therefore great disparity in terms of impact. Finally, the bonus provided by resilience. Saudi Arabia has developed infrastructure that now enables it to export around 60% or 70% of its production, profiting from the rise in oil prices. In terms of energy, it is much the same.



Designing the Day After: Security Architectures, Economic Reconstruction, and the Quest for a Viable Peace



Hubert Védrine

Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, Founder of Hubert Védrine Conseil



Kim Gunn

Member of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, former Ambassador for International Security Affairs



Anne-Claire Legendre

President of the *Institut du monde arabe* (Arab World Institute)

I believe that, whatever the outcome of the war in Iran, every decision-maker in the world is examining what new precautions to take so as to co-exist with Trump. Trump admittedly has supporters, who continue to approve of him. Even they, however, will need to take fresh precautions, as cooperating with Trump will incur increasing political costs. Advocates of a post-Western world, such as China and Russia, are watching Trump and are confident they will benefit. It is for those countries that rely on the United States for their security that matters are more complicated. This is a sense of historical vertigo primarily affecting Europeans and a number of Asian countries. These factors all apply to the question of the Middle East. I would say that the key issue concerning the current war in Iran is whether or not an Iranian threat will remain *afterwards*. At some point, whether for domestic economic reasons, because of the mid-term elections, or through lack of munitions, Trump will be forced to stop. When he does stop, he will declare victory to disguise his track record. Will the Gulf monarchies, which had built a sort of ideal, if somewhat artificial, world sheltered from the sources of insecurity, still see any reason to be close to Israel? If it hadn't been for the Iranian threat since 1979, there would have been no Abraham Accords. There was no reason for them, it was illogical. So, there were these rather odd Abraham Accords because of the Iranian threat – which was nonetheless real. If there is no longer any Iranian threat at all, because the regime is seriously weakened or replaced by chaos, we will see a reshaping of the whole region by countries that already believe that, in any case, the United States can no longer be entirely trusted.

What happens is that the United States in the name of burden-sharing has tried to shift some burdens to its allies in Europe and Asia, and naturally, we hesitate to accept this because this is a change from the basic premise of U.S. created international order but that is happening right now. For instance, Korea and Japan are facing a rising China and a burden shifting US, so the only way we can survive or overcome the situation is to coordinate more because one country cannot do it alone. The recent incident in the Middle East, the Iranian situation, tells us that it is not just for Japan and Korea, it is also up to IP4, like Australia and New Zealand, as well as European countries and the Gulf States, to coordinate more to fill the gap where the US has tried to shift the burden. We now need to start laying the groundwork for normal powers to step-up where the US is going to delegate.

Looking at the state of affairs in various countries, will Iran remain a threat in future? What is certain is that, over the last two years, Iran has faced an existential threat, for which it has been constantly bracing itself, including through its pursuit of a nuclear program. What we are seeing today is that, despite this existential threat, which has reduced it to a historically weak position, likewise its network of "proxies", Iran appears to have managed to weather the storm, keeping its regime in place and finding new leverage through the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. It is therefore difficult to imagine that, even if the negotiations currently being conducted by the United States were successful, Iran would cease to be a threat to countries in the region, notably in terms of ballistic missiles. Iran has in fact demonstrated an extremely rapid capacity for rebuilding its ballistic missile arsenal, which, along with drones, now poses the main threat to its Middle East neighbors. Another member of the "demolition squad" is Israel, which over the past two years has developed a new doctrine, a doctrine of preventive war, obviously aimed at ensuring its own security in the wake of the traumatic events of October 7th, but which intends to deliver that security at the expense of the sovereignty of every other state in the region. It therefore constitutes a genuine threat to their stability for some of those states. In any event, what is lacking at present is an architect. There is no architect at the very time when the region's stability is absolutely vital to everyone, whether in Asia, the Gulf or Europe.



The EU as a Strategic Partner: Perspectives from Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia



CHAIR:
Thierry de Montbrial
Founder and Executive
Chairman of Ifri
and the WPC



Lasha Darsalia
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia

The future of Europe is a really important question, and I do not know if it is about analysis or prediction, but I will say what we want the future of Europe to look like from the perspective of Georgia. We want the future of Europe to be as a strategic player worldwide but especially in our region and this is very important for us. After breaking up from the Soviet Union and gaining independence, Georgia made the very bold decision, maybe bolder than anyone else in this space, that it wanted to be part of the European family. Whether it would be the EU later or NATO, which for us is also part of the understanding of Europe, Europe's security architecture and Georgia wanted to be part of that. The result of this, partially or even mainly, was the punishment we received from the Russian Federation; 20% of Georgia's territory has been occupied by Russia. We have gone through four wars with Russia, we have gone through ethnic cleansing of our population in these territories, economic embargoes, all these things, and this is mainly because of this choice by Georgia. Therefore, for us it is important that we see Europe as a strategic player. I also want to say it is not really about the choice of Europe. Unfortunately, in today's world it is a binary situation: either Europe will be a strategic player, or it will not be in the game at all. I realize that this is a very bold statement but unfortunately, today's world and changing international system are going in this direction where we need big and strong strategic players whose foreign policies are based on values and a strong understanding of where they are their importance. I think that is where we are currently. I could even say that I have felt some tensions, that Europe is afraid of this role and does not recognize its strategic importance and the strategic developments taking place worldwide. There is no other way I can explain the attitude to our region. On one hand, everybody talks about the strategic importance of South Caucasus and Central Asia. Yet, at the same time, we did not see the strong and bold decisions or steps in this direction and, without going into it in-depth, sometimes even went looking for excuses not to engage as a strategic actor with these strategic partners.

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The EU as a Strategic Partner: Perspectives from Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia



Vahan Kostanyan
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia



Dmytro Kuleba
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine



Roman Vassilenko
Ambassador of Kazakhstan to the EU, NATO, Belgium and Luxembourg

From the perspective of Armenia, let me first describe the developments on the Armenia-EU track over the last two years. Probably one of the most unconventional benchmarks on Armenia's EU aspiration track is the law that was adopted by the parliament of Armenia in March last year to launch and create the EU accession process. This is a clear political demonstration of where the government of Armenia, but also the people, see themselves in the future. Saying this, we are not naive to think that we will be able to become a member state in 2028 or 2030. However, this is also a political declaration of the direction we are working towards, and with this, we set up a new ambitious agenda of reforms so that we can match European standards. We believe that this reform agenda itself is a very important exercise for us internally and domestically, which we are going through starting with the liberalization dialogue with the European Union. Currently, we are the only country in the world with whom the EU has real negotiations. We are trying to see what the opportunities are for enlarging the cooperation portfolio on different sectorial tracks. In fact, the document between the EU and Armenia on the strategic agenda for their partnership that was adopted last December set a good framework and the roadmap for the sectorial and gradual integration of Armenia into the European Union. For the first time, there were very important components on security and the economy, which was not the case when you look back at the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement in 2017. I should probably mention that the EU became a real strategic partner for us and, as our European colleagues like to say, Armenia-EU relations are closer than ever. For us, this is not the limit; we clearly see the next milestones we need to achieve, and in this regard, I should also mention that we are going to have the first Armenia-EU summit hosted in Yerevan on May 5, right after the European Political Community Summit that we also have the privilege of hosting in Yerevan. Things are moving quite fast, but unfortunately, the European bureaucracy does not always catch up with the speed of geopolitical developments in the region.

I think the European Union is proud of being a safe and rich place because when we hear people speaking about the successes of Europe since the Second World War, the thing that comes to mind first is that we are not at war and we are prosperous. However, both these achievements are now being severely challenged and the European Union as it stands today is struggling to address these two problems and guarantee it will remain a safe and prosperous place. The question is how to take Europe to the next level. I agree with everyone who says we need unconventional solutions. The problem is, who are the people who will come up with unconventional solutions and second, who will stand by them? How do we build consensus around an unconventional solution that makes it conventional? This does not seem to be happening. I think three things have to happen in the following order to put Europe in a better place: rearmament, reform and enlargement. All three of these elements are important. If Europe fails with any of them, I am afraid that neither security nor prosperity will be guaranteed. Starting with rearmament, it has taken off but it is still lagging behind the actual needs. I agree that Europe cannot operate on the same rules after it enlarges to Ukraine and the Western Balkans. First, Europe has to change itself and with all due respect, I think Ukraine will reform itself in preparation for accession faster than Europe will. Reform is needed on the decision-making policy principles and there will be a lot of fighting about that. Then Europe will have to enlarge because everything we have learned over the last decades is that someone will go anywhere Europe is not. That creates pressure on domestic politics, on the countries, transforming them and pushing them in different directions, which will eventually create a problem for Europe. These are the three purposes: rearmament, reform and enlargement, and I am looking forward to seeing leaders in Europe who will be able to build consensus around these three objectives.

We would like Europe to succeed and to become stronger. We see that Europe, in the four years since February 2022, but especially in the year since January 2025, has become more strategically aware and an actor that wants to be more global, active, united and resilient. For us, balance, which was the word used by your President, might be the middle name of the Republic of Kazakhstan. We like balance, we work for balance and we can only survive in our very interesting geopolitical environment if we achieve balance with our neighbors. The European Union and the United States, are extremely important pillars of our foreign policy. I think we have really achieved a lot in the 30 years of our relations with the EU but we see an even greater future. There is now great mutual interest in Brussels and European capitals, in Paris and Astana, in having stronger relations that go way beyond the traditional areas of cooperation, such as oil exports, and venture into critical raw materials and the creation of an efficient and working Middle Corridor. Looking forward, we can see a relationship where Kazakhstan and Central Asia, on the one hand, and a bigger European Union become closer and are interconnected through multiple routes, not just but including the Middle Corridor. We see a relationship that is much stronger, growing from USD 50 billion in trade now to maybe USD 100 billion, USD 150 billion, and expanding. In Kazakhstan the European Union has very a very strong soft power pull. People look up to the European Union, they still believe it stands for values, standards and a high standard of living, but they also see that this Union could be a stronger entity in the future. The EU has responded under duress in the past and we can only hope it will rise to the occasion in the future. We also hope that it not only comes to Central Asia but stays in Central Asia, and we hope that this immense growth in interest we now see from Brussels, Paris, Berlin, Rome, etc., will not subside once, again speaking diplomatically, this very tense geopolitical moment in Ukraine passes. I think the fundamentals for stronger cooperation between our regions are there, so I hope that the commitment will also outlive this period and Central Asia, which is basically already close, will be even closer than you think to the EU.



The United States: Internal and External Perspectives



Jay Truesdale
CEO of TD International



Hiroyuki Akita
Commentator of *Nikkei*, Japan



Vuk Jeremić
President of the Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia

Trust has also been challenged domestically within the United States, and in my view this could contribute to meaningful political shifts, not just in November but beyond. Some of this frustration is evident within segments of the Republican Party base, particularly among those who feel that President Trump campaigned on certain promises that have either not yet been fulfilled or have been pursued differently than they had expected. I think this will become much more apparent as we get closer to November when we see whether inflationary pressures begin to re-emerge more visibly within the economy, whether there is pressure for changes in monetary policy under future Federal Reserve leadership, whether food prices continue to rise, and whether the labor market remains under pressure. These economic factors will play a significant role in shaping voter sentiment. Historically, over the past 100 years, the incumbent President's party has lost, on average, roughly 25 to 30 seats in the House of Representatives and several seats in the Senate during midterm elections. Right now, in addition to one-third of the Senate and the entire House being up for election, we are seeing a significant number of retirements and open races, which could increase electoral volatility. On top of that, we have seen redistricting taking place in a number of states. The ultimate political impact of those changes remains debated, but they are likely to influence the electoral landscape in several key races. We have already seen examples of how these changes may affect political competition in states such as Virginia. There are several states that both parties view as genuine battlegrounds, and we have already seen significant fundraising activity as each side positions itself for what is expected to be a closely contested election cycle.

I argued that while elements of continuity remain in US policy—particularly regarding China, economic competitiveness, and technological leadership—the Trump administration cannot be fully understood through a conventional policy or strategic framework alone. I acknowledged that I had previously tried to interpret and predict the administration primarily through the lens of policy and strategy. Based on that approach, I expected a reduced US military engagement outside the Western Hemisphere. However, recent developments, especially in Iran, suggest that this framework is insufficient. I therefore proposed using a different analytical approach—a “literary lens.” Rather than following a consistent and rational strategic trajectory, the administration’s behavior often resembles a narrative shaped by emotions, personal relationships, preferences, and contingency. In that sense, Shakespeare may offer more insight than Clausewitz. At the same time, I emphasized that, in the medium to long term, US foreign policy is influenced by deeper structural factors, which I described as “strategic DNA.” These include a persistent drive to remain the leading global power and a historical tendency to expand its strategic reach. From this perspective, I expect US–China competition to intensify over time. However, given domestic constraints, the United States may temporarily pursue a form of *détente*, though this is unlikely to represent a stable or lasting structural shift.

I do not know what comes after Trump or what kind of excitement awaits us in the next month, let alone the next two and a half years of the Trump administration. However, I would be very doubtful that America will return to what we had before Trump’s rise. I believe that Trump is not the cause but actually a very powerful and deeply consequential symptom that accelerates this rupture and change. I would not dare to predict what will happen in America domestically, but I think this change and rupture have truly profound consequences internationally. Right now, America is experiencing not the first military adventure that has gone not quite as well as they expected, there was Vietnam, Afghanistan, etc., but this is the very first time that America has been directly denied achieving its military goal by a state actor. Together with that, one of the most important global goods delivered by America, which was the freedom of navigation because there was only one navy capable of doing it, is something it now seems incapable of delivering in a pretty strategic point in the world. There are other points in the world, and one can think about the future of America’s promise and alliances and what it means to focus only on America as an ally. Those are the things that will contribute significantly to uncertainty and instability in the decades to come.



The United States: Internal and External Perspectives



Jean-Claude Gruffat
Member of the Board of Directors and Executive Committee of Atlas Network, Managing Director of Weild and Co LLC New York



Thomas Gomart
Director of Ifri, Member of the Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defence's scientific committee (IHEDN)



Wang Jisi
Founding President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University

Is there something deeply rotten in America today? I do not believe so. While the United States faces numerous dysfunctions, we remain the undisputed global leader in technology, innovation, and military strength. Our higher education institutions are still considered the world's most prestigious, a reality acknowledged even by our Chinese competitors. In November 2024, Donald Trump was elected fair and square, securing a majority of the popular vote, winning all swing states, and taking the electoral college. He succeeded by attracting demographics that traditionally shun the Republican Party: the working class, Latinos, and African Americans. These groups felt abandoned by a Democratic Party that had pivoted toward supporting social minorities rather than ethnic ones. Trump campaigned on a resolute populist agenda: reshoring industries, imposing tariffs on countries running trade surpluses with the US, halting immigration, and deporting undocumented individuals. He promised an end to foreign military adventures and the dismantling of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) frameworks. Unlike in 2016, he staffed his administration with loyalists who swore personal allegiance. The implementation of this agenda was immediate and brutal. Immigration agencies executed aggressive crackdowns that occasionally targeted legally present minorities. The imposition of tariffs was erratic, triggering legal challenges reaching the Supreme Court. Furthermore, contradicting his non-interventionist stance, 2025 and 2026 saw joint US-Israeli military operations against Iran, justified by the claim that the regime posed a permanent, imminent threat. Presently, Trump's popularity has plummeted, though his MAGA base remains loyal. Polls suggest the GOP could lose its congressional majorities in the 2026 midterms. Meanwhile, the Democratic Party is deeply fractured, largely co-opted by its most radical wing. Ultimately, this administration represents a profound paradigm shift. Free trade is now anathema, replaced by protectionist industrial policies. When Trump steps down in 2028, the *America First* doctrine will persist. The diplomatic style may soften, but this structural realignment is here to stay, even under a Democratic administration

Despite anti-interventionist campaign rhetoric, the Trump administration carried out more military strikes in one year than Biden did in four, making military activity a persistent thread of continuity in US foreign policy. The most significant rupture lies in the distrust now embedded within alliance structures, particularly NATO and Asian partnerships, which feeds a broader sense of global insecurity. A second break is the deliberate dismantling of foreign policy expertise, with international affairs effectively handed over to figures who openly devalue professional knowledge. Trump's foreign policy is best understood through the lens of an internal-external enemy dialectic. Domestic threats (fentanyl, migration) are systematically linked to foreign actors, shaping the justification for military operations abroad. Venezuela's intervention was reframed as anti-narcotics law enforcement rather than a military operation. On Iran, Israel's role in drawing the US into conflict is likely to generate serious backlash within the MAGA base. Finally, the current moment represents a deep ideological schism between Europe and the United States. The theological-political dimension, often overlooked in secular European frameworks, is becoming an essential lens for anticipating America's domestic and international trajectory.

Let me focus on something more minor than that, which is personality changes in your government in the United States. What worries me about US strategic planning or its strategic vision is the lack of professionalism in the current Trump administration. Many of the people I know in diplomatic circles, Congress and elsewhere are missing, sidelined and not in the government, for instance, I am unfamiliar with any of the American colleagues I am dealing with on East Asia. Those people have gone. Not many people who are in charge of foreign policy and grand strategy are professionals. For instance, when you look at who are dealing with Iran, Iran specialists, the Middle East specialists are not there. Trump is relying on members of his own family members and people he met many decades ago in the business community, so they come to the region without a lot of professional knowledge or strategic vision, but rather what they have been told by Trump himself. That worries a great deal, and it worries me in US-China relations. I am not talking about whether they are China hawks or friendly to China, the professionals are not there. Let me share some of my personal experience in the United States. I went to Washington DC two weeks ago. One thing that struck me was the popular notion of affordability -- people could not afford things in their daily life. On my first day in Washington DC, I stayed in the Jefferson Hotel and a cup of coffee cost USD 10 plus service and the next day they changed the menu and it cost USD 12 plus service, so a cup of coffee is USD 14, and it is difficult to imagine how people can afford things. Then the gap is widening between the haves and the have-nots and that worries Americans. In the political atmosphere in Washington DC, I found that people were not happy with Trump, but they are cautious not to say very critical things about Trump himself. They avoid naming names. They say they are not happy with the policies, in particular the policy towards Iran, but they are not very outspoken. Freedom of speech and expression is lacking in the United States today, and I am very much worried about that.

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Final Debate



CHAIR:
Thierry de Montbrial
Founder and Executive
Chairman of Ifri and the
WPC



Kamel Abdallah
Managing Director and CEO of Canal Sugar



Jorge Castañeda Gutman
Former Foreign Minister of Mexico



When we talk about food security and food safety, we are not simply talking about agriculture — as important as agriculture is. We are not only talking about water — although water is clearly critical. And we are not only talking about commodities, which my colleague will address. We are talking about a fully integrated food system. For the Middle East, this has been one of our central strategic challenges for the last 50 years. Why? Because less than 5% of our land is suitable for agriculture. At the same time, many of our critical water resources are increasingly contested — whether it is the Nile River between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt, or the Euphrates and Tigris systems involving Türkiye, Syria, and Iraq. More recently, even water resources such as the Litani River have become part of wider regional tensions. Therefore, we are a region that faces not only agricultural limitations but also severe water constraints. On top of this, many countries import between 50% and 90% of their calorie needs. We are deeply dependent on the outside world. For the last five decades, we built our food security model around what I call the “Triple A” framework: Availability, Affordability, and Accessibility. We used financial resources, particularly from energy wealth, to ensure food availability by importing from around the world — from Australia, Argentina, Ukraine, Russia, South Africa, and beyond. We built subsidy systems to maintain affordability, including programs such as food cards, which in Egypt alone cover tens of millions of people. But history has shown us repeatedly that food is not just an economic issue; it is a social stability issue. Many moments of unrest in our region have had food and affordability at their core — from the bread riots during the Sadat era to the Arab Spring.

Trump, in his national security strategy, in his famous ‘Donroe’ doctrine, and in everything he says and does, really does want to marginalize China’s presence in Latin America as much as possible. That, however, is far more complicated than it seems. Firstly, because Latin America, as such, does not exist geopolitically speaking. There is the Caribbean basin, and there is South America. The countries of the Caribbean basin – Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean islands – have long fallen within the United States’ economic sphere of influence. Trade, tourism, and finance are entirely focused on the United States, whilst South America is increasingly trading with and obtaining financing from China. China is the main trading partner of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador. It is the leading investor in Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru. In the Caribbean basin, Trump does not need to exert much effort. China is not really present there, and it won’t be. On the other hand, expelling China from Brazil is highly complex because Brazil exports its soy and iron ore directly to the Chinese. Likewise, Argentina exports its soy to China. It is actually very difficult to push China out of these South American countries where trade, financial, technological, and increasingly military ties are deeply entrenched. By virtue of their size, the stability of their institutions and the breadth of their global diplomatic networks, the Brazilians can probably withstand the pressure. The other nations, however, are forced to accept more or less anything Trump demands. If Trump thinks it will yield electoral gains in November and in 2028 for his successor, he will take action regarding Cuba. It is not entirely clear what he is going to do, but he is going to do something; he will not let the situation stagnate indefinitely.



Final Debate



Philippe Chalmin
Founder of Cercle Cyclope, Professor Emeritus at Paris-Dauphine University



Haïm Korsia
Chief Rabbi of France



Yim Sung-Joon
Senior Advisor at Lee International IP & Law Group, former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, former National Security Advisor to President Kim Dae-Jung

I am going to talk to you about my beloved raw materials. Then came the war, and the Hormuz blockade. 50% of the world's sulphur trade used to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, as did 40% of methanol, 37% of naphtha and 34% of urea. Urea is a very important nitrogenous fertiliser. We have discovered that there was something called helium, and that helium plays a very important role in medical imaging, as well as in semiconductors. There has been talk of ammonia and even polyethylene for your dustbin bags. And that is not even the half of it.[...] Furthermore, still in the arena of commodities, I would simply like to remind you that the Gulf was not merely an importer and exporter of raw materials; it was also itself an essential raw material, namely finance. Dubai had become a major hub for international commodities trading. Most Russian traders found Dubai more pleasant now than Geneva or Switzerland. Dubai also used to be one of the major hubs for the gold trade. Gold did not pass through Hormuz, but despite that, Dubai handled 20% of the world's gold trade. All of this is in jeopardy. What might happen now? If the war ends, of course, it will take time for everything to resume. We are currently experiencing an energy crisis. I do not believe personally that we are in a food crisis. Do not forget that world hunger is a reality, but it is not a reality caused by a lack of food; it is a reality caused by human folly. And the place where that folly is perhaps at its worst today, beyond anywhere else, is undisputedly Sudan.

Hope is presented as a driving force behind human action, dialogue between peoples and global governance. There are two distinct conceptions of peace, i.e. being "at peace" or moving "towards peace". Drawing on the etymology of Christian liturgy and Talmudic tradition, what emerges is that peace is never a state that is achieved, but a goal to be constantly pursued. Hope also appears to mean not resigning oneself to situations. It consists of conceiving of new, feasible solutions, and rejecting the fatalism of "that's just how it is" or "what's the use?". In his eyes, such resignation is the very antithesis of hope. Quoting Bernanos, he reiterates that hope is a risk, perhaps "the risk of all risks", but also the only answer to despair. This transformative strength is illustrated by the example of the Second Vatican Council and the *Nostra Aetate* declaration. This historic turning point, which utterly remodelled the relationship between Judaism and Christianity, arose from the conviction held by a few men that change was possible despite resistance. Hope thus enabled the Catholic Church to reconcile itself with a vital part of its heritage. Applied to global governance, this perspective implies that institutions cannot limit themselves to technical solutions. They must be guided by a sense of purpose and direction. Without hope, governance becomes technocratic or cynical; with hope, it can help to transform conflicts, rivalries and inequalities. It is therefore useful to combine political realism with idealism so as to build a future that is at once achievable, desirable and oriented towards peace – a future yet to be attained.

How then do we build a 'day after' that is stable? The answer lies in a fundamental shift in how we perceive order. Regional order is not imposed; it is constructed through networks, institutions, and coalitions. We must move from being order-takers to order-shapers by utilizing networks like APEC, the CPTPP, and the IP4 framework with NATO. Middle powers like Korea, Japan, Australia, and Canada are actively constructing the institutional and normative foundations of a new order. We are not just waiting for the outcome of the US-China competition, we are reconfiguring the rules of the game. This leads us to the big question: how do we cope with existing US alliances? Whether it is NATO in Europe or our bilateral alliances in Korea and Japan, we must be realistic. Complete decoupling from US security is deemed unrealistic; our economies and architectures are too deeply integrated. However, not decoupling does not mean passive reliance. Our strategy must be to transaction-proof our security. We do this by strengthening our own strategic economy and building horizontal networks among middle powers. We stay at the table with the US, but ensure we are no longer on the menu, instead acting as indispensable architects of regional stability. The rupture of 2026 is a call to action. We cannot return to the old order, but we can prevent a descent into chaos. Let us lead through variable geometry, building flexible coalitions for trade, technology, and security. Let us prove that the Indo-Pacific is not a theatre for hegemonic war but a space for a constructive, resilient peace led by those of us who have the most to lose. The order of tomorrow will be built by the networks we create today.





1. Economy and Finance



CHAIR:

Jean-Claude Trichet

Former President of the European Central Bank, Honorary Governor of the Banque de France

The second message from me is that the rule of the game in the current period is really uncertainty. We did not expect the war in the Middle East, but it is a fact, and the global impact has looked until now to be very significant, if not decisively dramatic, but, of course, it is a materialisation of underlying uncertainty. The power politics that mark the current geopolitical picture are an additional element of uncertainty, and I would say that in this universe, one possible message would be that resilience is key for all entities in the world, of course, the private sector, the public sector, and certainly, everyone who has to take decisions in the present circumstances. Therefore, the rule of resilience has grown quite considerably because of the fundamental uncertainty we are experiencing. Last, to be a bit more positive than I have been until now, I want to mention that despite all the divisions we are observing at the global level between countries, continents, the North and the South, and many more, I am struck by the fact that the so called BIS system and the Financial Stability Board continue to work. I would say that there is no absence of appropriate dialogue and discussions at that level of professionals, and reports are made by this so-called system to the G20. Also, despite everything that is said about the G20's imminent disappearance or replacement by other groupings, nevertheless, in recent years - including the change in the administration of the United States of America, and even considering the extreme tensions between the large number of members, as well as the grouping that more or less thinks it might substitute or complement the G20 - we still had the report given to the G20 and its approval of the essential elements. That is an element of positive vision, and let us try to keep the flame alive for as long as possible in the present circumstances; that had to be noted. Having been at the heart of this system of the BIS and the like, I think, taking everything into account, that it is reassuring.

**John Lipsky**

Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, former First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF

The focus today is on the risks to the outlook created by the war and the uncertainty about the duration, dimension and scope of the impacts. As Kristalina Georgieva explained, the version of the new World Economic Outlook they had planned to release before the war in the Middle East was going to upgrade the global growth forecast without an increase in the perceived risk of inflation. Now that has changed, and as is obvious to everyone, both the outlook to growth has been marked down with the outstanding risk that there could be more damage, while the outlook for inflation has deteriorated and it is expected to be higher. The perceived risk is reflected particularly in concerns about energy importing emerging market countries, in that the risk is that they will find both their terms of trade damaged, external demand for their exports damaged and a need to finance increasing in a situation in which private finance may not be available. At the same time, as Jean-Claude also mentioned, concern is growing already about the level of public debt and deficits that pre-dated the war and will only be exacerbated by this conflict. Of course, this is particularly true in a case like the United States, where to all intents and purposes you can make an easy argument that the economy is at full employment and despite that we have a federal deficit that is going to be around 6% of GDP. Why that is good policy in this context is not clear. Another risk is represented by the disappointment at the latest ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organisation and the risk of renewed trade frictions in the coming year. As part of the risk, obviously if energy prices remain strongly deviated from expectations, similarly for other commodity prices, the potential for new trade frictions is self-evident.



1. Economy and Finance



Yann Coatanlem
President of Club Praxis and Atlantic Council contributor,
former Managing Director and Head of Multi-Assets
Quantitative Analysis at Citigroup

The headline number says it plainly: the United States spends 3.5% of GDP on R&D, far ahead of the EU, with China already in between. In the six sectors that matter most for innovation and defence, private-sector R&D runs at more than five to one between the United States and Europe. China sits in the middle — and even that flatters Europe, because the Commission systematically understates Chinese spending. Use China's own NBS figures and the gap is wider. One can argue about what "private" means in Beijing; one cannot argue the spending away. Quality tells the same story. The ASPI's Technology Tracker shows China leading across the major technologies, with Europe nowhere to be found, and the WIPO patent data confirms it. The one soft spot is telling: when the first Trump administration discouraged Americans from co-publishing with Chinese academics, the quality of Chinese papers dropped sharply after 2018. Chinese science still leans on Western collaboration. Europe's problem is that it is increasingly not in the room. What moves the needle is not another framework but the cost of restructuring. Where it is cheap to reallocate capital and people, R&D flourishes — the United States, Switzerland, Denmark. Where restructuring is punishing, technology investment collapses toward zero, as Italy and Spain show. Europe must make letting go far cheaper. Everything else is commentary. On AI, the predicted returns are, so far, fairly modest. Several models — Wharton, Goldman Sachs, EY — keep returning the same order of magnitude: roughly 0.3% of added growth a year, about 3% over a decade, concentrated in maybe a tenth of the economy. Yet, these relatively small gains are no reason to delay the structural fixes Europe needs to preserve its economy and increase its geopolitical relevance.



Daniel Dăianu
Chairman of the Fiscal Council and Advisor to the Governor
(Euro Area Affairs), former Board Member of the National Bank
of Romania

Fragmentation continues, Bretton Woods institutions are put into question, or at least by some major players, and the Transatlantic relationship is badly crippled in a multipolar world. The European Union is trying to save multilateralism, the G7 and G20 are weaker but still relevant. Large global imbalances are a threat, and financial instruments are increasingly used as weapons; tariffs, sanctions, currencies, crypto assets, all are used in a sort of geopolitical financial warfare. Security considerations take precedence, it is a battle between resilience and efficiency, defense expenditure is growing quite rapidly, and we should think about deficits and public debt in this regard; it is the old dilemma, guns versus bread. Fiscal dominance is on the rise. I think that together with huge benefits it brings, AI poses great risks, apart from an existential threat. I am very worried about a new wave of financial deregulation, and it seems to me that lessons from the great recession crisis seem to be disregarded. I believe that all types of finance need to be regulated because contagion can erupt from any quarter of the financial system. The proliferation of stablecoins is like going back to a world of free banking. For the euro to be a stronger reserve currency, the euro area needs EDIS, a safe asset, a joint fiscal more overall EU integration.



Jeffry Frieden
Professor of International and Public Affairs and Political
Science at Columbia University, Professor of Government
emeritus at Harvard University

The core of geoeconomic policy is the elasticity of substitution. Geoeconomic policies focus on those activities for which the supply is inelastic; the term that was used in some of the panels was indispensability. When we think about this in a more rigorous economic sense, this is all really about the inelasticity of substitution, whether of goods or of other activities. The problem with using geoeconomic policies on goods and trade for which supply is inelastic is that when supply is inelastic the rents available to producers are enormous, so controlling the supply of goods for which supply is inelastic means forfeiting massive profits. We have seen that with the lobbying by some of the firms that were threatened with an interruption of supply, who immediately said if they were prevented from selling to China, for example, they would go bankrupt. Therefore, policymakers unexpectedly and predictably have turned away in many instances from using the most inelastically supplied goods for geoeconomic purposes. That leaves financial tools, which has led for a search for financial vulnerabilities on the part of both senders and targets. In other words, countries that want to use financial instruments for geoeconomic purposes look for the vulnerabilities of their targets, and the targets look for their own vulnerabilities to try to block the possibility of using finance for this purpose. The obvious implication of this is a very substantial, more or less continually increasing intervention in international capital flows. It is understandable that countries do not want to be subject to financial restrictions as they enter into greater conflict with other countries around the world. It is understandable that countries that have geopolitical goals would rather use economic policies to achieve them rather than kinetic, that is military, means. However, what is often ignored in discussion of this, despite the benefits, is that these policies are costly, in particular economically.



1. Economy and Finance



Akinari Horii
Special Advisor and member of the Board of Directors of the Canon Institute for Global Studies

Two wars near Europe and AI have already been discussed but let me frame those two things in a macroeconomic perspective. The wars are generating massive increases in aggregate demand while constraining aggregate supply. Moving to AI, the AI revolution is accelerating, and AI is entering every aspect of business and our daily lives. All in all, aggregate demand is growing faster than supply and at least for now, putting upward pressures on prices. Elevated demand and constrained supply will result in slower economic growth with higher inflation and in this circumstance, savings will shift from glut to shortage. Against this background, market interest rates will remain high or rise further, which could trigger the repricing of financial assets across the board. Despite these concerns, the market appears less cautious, or I should say more sanguine about the world economy. The market's present optimism stems largely from its expectation that the AI revolution will outweigh the negative effects of the war, in economic terms, the aggregate demand elevated by the wars and AI will be met by enhanced productivity gains and supply increases. I hope this will eventually prove true, but the market seems to discount this element over a much shorter horizon that economists do. At the moment, the absence of large excesses in the private sector, particularly in the core parts of our financial systems, in short, banks, is an encouraging fact that supports optimism about continued economic growth with somewhat elevated inflation.



Jean-Claude Meyer
Vice Chairman International of Rothschild & Cie (H.)

The crisis will affect Europe more than the US and will lead to different monetary policies, although both will have to face a dilemma between a rise in inflation and the growth risk, leading to stagflation in a vicious circle with a hawkish shift towards rate increases instead of cuts. In Europe first, we expect limited growth, below 1% and inflation of 3% - 4% as a consequence, we might have two or three rate increases this year. In the US, with interest of 3.5% - 3.75%, with unemployment at 4.3%, a sticky inflation of 3% - although not much contaminated by the tariff tax increase - and with a growth of around 3%, the Fed could take a wait-and-see position even after the departure of Jerome Powell in mid-May and avoid the cuts advocated by President Trump. On the contrary, an increase in the rates because of inflation is not impossible this year if inflation deteriorates. The last Federal Open Market Committee meeting of the Fed was already split between seven members in favour of no cut and seven in favour of just one cut of 25 basis points. However, a monetary policy designed to fight against a shortage of supply, which is now the case, is not good medicine, while it is efficient for fighting excess demand. It will also increase the financing of heavy debts, becoming worrying because of investments in defence, and damaging emerging countries. To conclude, we are probably going to live in a very dangerous way and with uncertainty in the coming years, and we should remain extremely cautious. Even if peace happens shortly in this region, stagflation at least will appear and, to paraphrase, President Hoover, the crisis is at the corner of the street. I say this with the hope that I am completely wrong and that, hopefully, a strong peace arrives very quickly.



Nicolas Véron
Senior Fellow at Bruegel and at the Peterson Institute for International Economics

Of course, the market has been incredibly resilient given the magnitude of the shocks of the last 18 months, particularly I would say the doubts about US institutions. I would make the argument that the political regime in the US has changed, so we did experience regime change in the US last year and my point here is just that the core of the US political regime is the US Constitution and that is not being enforced. We have the Supreme Court blowing hot and cold but letting the executive branch do a lot of things that are clearly contrary to the Constitution and perhaps more importantly, we have Congress not playing its role as the main check on the executive branch under the US Constitution. In that context, it is remarkable how serene, how even upbeat the financial markets have been. I did actually check the evolution of German stocks between early 1933 and five years later in 1938, and they went up 50%, so maybe we should not have anticipated a negative reaction from the stock market to this political regime change. I am not saying that the US now is like Germany in the thirties, not at all, that is not my point, and I have no intuition and certainly even less conviction about where the US will go politically. I suspect it may not come back to where it was 18 months ago but that does not mean the most horrible scenarios will materialise, so this is just a point about market resilience as opposed to US politics. In the EU itself, so far policy has held the ground the lobbying from the banking sector is relentless and very determined, and frankly, they are getting political traction. Of course, the banks have extraordinary access to political leaders and at this point, the technocrat central bankers, financial stability people, and Eurocrats in the European Commission are playing a very defensive game against the pressure of the banking sector to decrease capital requirements. We will probably have an indication later this year on how that is likely to play out ultimately, but it does not look very promising.



2. The New Energy Order: Risks and Opportunities



CHAIR:

Valérie Ducrot

Executive Director of Global Gas Centre

The ongoing conflict involving Iran has brought into sharp focus the structural vulnerability of the global energy system. While the energy transition is progressing, recent events demonstrate that the world remains deeply dependent on a limited number of critical supply routes and producing regions. At the center of the current crisis lies the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of global oil and significant volumes of liquefied natural gas normally transit. Disruptions to this corridor have had immediate and far-reaching consequences. The partial or near total closure of this route has led to what the International Energy Agency has described as one of the largest supply disruptions in the history of global energy markets. This has resulted in a sharp rise in volatility with oil prices surging and at times approaching crisis levels, while already tight gas markets have come under additional strain. Beyond the price effects, the conflict has exposed the fragility of physical infrastructures, as attacks on production facilities and export terminals, as well as disruption to shipping, have led to the suspension of significant portions of global oil and gas supply. In some cases, production cuts have not been a matter of market choice but a physical constraint.

**Olivier Appert**

Member of the French Academy of Engineering, Scientific Advisor of the Center for Energy and Climate of Ifri, former Chairman of France Brevets, former President of the French Energy Council

The Iranian crisis reminds us that geopolitics will remain an unavoidable challenge for the energy sector in the years ahead, just as it has been over the past 40 or 50 years. It is urgent to integrate this dimension into the energy policies of the future.

**Dario Liguti**

Director of Sustainable Energy at the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)

Electricity's share of global energy demand has risen to 20–25% (from ~15% two decades ago) and is growing rapidly at 4–5% per year, driven by new uses such as data centres and cooling, as well as electrification of transport, heating, and industry. This shift is supported by two main factors: electricity's high efficiency (around 90% compared to 30% for fossil fuels) and the dramatic decline in renewable energy costs, with solar down ~80% and wind 65–75%, making them often the cheapest power sources at the single asset level. The level of electrification varies by region, with higher shares in Asia (27–32%) and lower in emerging markets (<20%). However, infrastructure has not kept pace. While power generation has expanded quickly, transmission and distribution systems remain outdated, causing grid instability and difficulties in integrating renewables. Modern energy systems require more decentralized and bidirectional grids. Electrification also faces technical limits: some industries are difficult to electrify, storage is limited (typically ~4 hours), transmission capacity is constrained, and shortages of critical materials like copper pose risks. Rising demand from large users, especially data centres, creates local price pressures, grid stress, and increasing vertical integration by tech companies. To address these challenges, major investments are needed in grids, cross-border transmission, and diversified power generation, alongside the development of regional electricity markets. Additional issues include renewable energy curtailment (up to 20% wasted), cybersecurity risks, and unconnected generation capacity. Electrification will continue to expand, but overcoming infrastructure and system constraints is essential for a cleaner and more efficient energy future.



2. The New Energy Order: Risks and Opportunities



Olivier Hahn
Senior Vice President Strategy & Markets at TotalEnergies

Energy is essential to economic development and growth. The good news is that since 2015 and the Paris Agreement, we have begun to see a decoupling between emissions and energy demand. However, we must acknowledge that energy demand will continue to grow, driven by population growth — with the world's population expected to reach around 10 billion by 2050 — and by rising living standards. Today, 4.6 billion people still lack access to energy, which is unacceptable and must be addressed. When it comes to energy, we are navigating the well-known energy trilemma. We need to deliver energy that is reliable - and reliability sits at the top of the agenda today. We need affordable energy, because affordability matters greatly and, as mentioned, energy is embedded throughout the economy, which is why price matters so consequential. We are likely to see the impact of high energy prices reflected in higher inflation in the months ahead. We also need sustainable energy, as we all share sustainability goals - and sustainability does not have to be in opposition with the other two, because it is also part of the solution. Renewable energy is local, and sustainability is not contrary to affordability or reliability.



Nicolas Piau
Co-Founder & CEO of Tilt Capital

I think what this crisis is also saying is that the big players are back, and I think this is also a reward for concentration and I would say the power of the big energy players. I think this is pretty substantial. 20 years ago the renewables sector was paving way for decentralisation not only of production but also decentralisation of power in the energy sector. What you are saying here is that the people who will come out stronger from this crisis are the people who, as you mentioned, are integrated, diversified, etc. Who can do that? People with balance sheets. This has some virtues, especially for you, Total and the like, but this is potentially very detrimental for the continuing emergence of other models from SME's etc., and we have yet to understand what impact it will have on SMEs. I worked for ENGIE, which is smaller than Total but still bigger than the companies in which I invest and today when I look at them, they are hurting, these are the guys with revenues of around EUR 15 million - EUR 20 million. They do not have access to the ways you can look for new supply contracts, they are completely price takers, completely locked in by energy strategies that are way above their pay grade. I think we should realize that what is currently happening is a reconvergence of power play in the energy sector. I certainly do not have a final view on how this is going to end but I do think the ongoing shift is more fundamental than we can imagine right now.



Nicholas Kairis
Chief Legal Officer at Sagint Inc.

Our ability to verify in real-time how energy and necessary resources are produced, transformed and allocated is still extremely limited (if not absent at all), which is not merely a data-problem but constitutes a systemic limitation. Energy systems, critical mineral supply chains and even emissions accounting still rely on fragmented documentation, delayed reporting and institutional representations rather than continuously verifiable facts, something that leads to uncertain pricing, contested allocation and fragile coordination. Markets cannot accurately price what they cannot verify, which constitutes a core issue of the crisis we are currently facing. It is a crisis of institutional design, not merely of innovation or a failure of regulation. Current systems were implemented in a world of scarce information and costly verification, where intermediation was necessary. The world has indeed evolved, but the systems we still rely on have not. Tokenization means exactly that: Transformation of physical economic activity into continuously verifiable, programmable data, enabling systems to operate not on the grounds of delayed and fragmented representations but of real-time auditable reality. Its impact can be seen on all three aspects discussed above: In Pricing: Tokenization enables markets to rely on live, auditable data and not on delayed disclosures. In Allocation: Tokenization allows rights and claims to be clearly defined, traceable and enforceable within the system itself through the implementation of smart contracts. In Coordination: Tokenization functions as shared system of record across participants, where production, transformation and transfer events are simultaneously visible to all actors, authorized to access the system thus enabling more precise synchronization between e.g. producers, refiners, logistics, transporters, financiers and regulators. All such actors can align decisions based on the same underlying reality. Thus, Tokenization does not merely improve efficiency at the margin. It alters the informational foundation upon which pricing, allocation and coordination depend. It allows markets to operate, not based on assumptions of reality, but on reality itself, which is being constantly monitored and verified.



2. The New Energy Order: Risks and Opportunities



Jean Abiteboul
President of GIGNL (International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers), Non-Executive Board member of Tellurian, Inc. (AMEX: TELL), Founder and Chairman of JA Energy Consulting

Today, gas is 23% of the global energy mix in the world and LNG represents roughly 50% of the international trade in gas, so it is really important in the energy map. There are three main suppliers today, the US, 25%, Qatar, 18%, and Australia roughly 18%. The map shows that US production mainly goes to Europe, about 50%, and 30% to Asia. Up to 75% of Qatar production goes to Asia, 20% to China, 15% to India, 10% to South Korea and 30% to the rest of Asia. Australian production also mainly goes to Asia. There are three tier-two suppliers, Russia, Malaysia and Nigeria. The main thing to keep in mind about what the outcome of the crisis in Hormuz is that there will be a huge increase in liquefaction capacity from now to 2030, leading us from 515 million tons in 2025 to 717 million tons in 2030. This is a 40% increase in five years, which is huge and has never been seen before and last year, or even the beginning of this year, the big topic at conferences was what we were going to do with this volume of energy coming into the market. The main increase will come from the US, almost 100 million tons, then Qatar, 50 million tons, then the rest of the world. The extension of liquefaction capacity under construction will mainly be seen from 2026, 2027 and 2028. [...] You should just keep in mind how countries in Asia have adapted their energy consumption to the situation. To keep it simple, they have mainly put coal powerplants into operation, so there is a quite significant possibility of a shift from gas to coal in India, Bangladesh, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, and maybe in Germany, Poland and other European countries, maybe France where there is one coal-fired plant. This possibility of shifting between gas and coal is an additional flexibility to cope with a crisis.



Christophe Poinssot
Deputy CEO of the *Bureau de recherches géologiques et minières* (BRGM), Member of the French Academy of Technology

I will just take four metals to give you a few figures, but the list is much longer. The last prediction from the International Energy Agency for the anticipated need by 2040 compared to 2023, for copper, lithium, nickel, and rare earths, gives significant increases ranging from 150% for copper up to roughly 900% for lithium. When we look at how much of that increase directly represents what will be used for the energy transition, lithium will mostly be used for the energy transition. Therefore, you can easily understand that if we do not succeed in supplying and providing these metals, we will not ensure that the energy transition takes place in time. [...] In conclusion, low-carbon technologies and economies will create a significant increase in our needs for particular raw materials, which means that we are shifting from dependence on fossil fuels to a new dependence on critical raw material supplies and the countries that can provide them. I will mention that we are in fact going back to the roots of international trade transfers, which centuries ago were already the main drivers for developing such partnerships. Despite the available resources, we anticipate that, from the expert viewpoint right now, the industry will fail to meet the need on time, that is by 2030, 2035, etc. There is insufficient time available to develop the new mines needed to provide the materials, which means that tensions around critical raw materials will be durable, not just a short-term issue, so we need to think about how we can adapt and diversify our transition trajectories. Last but not least, the dominant position of China and our dependence on imports creates a significant systemic risk to our economies, industries, and sovereignty, and that needs to be taken into account.



Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega
Director of the Center for Energy & Climate of Ifri

We currently have a supply shock on oil and gas, which possibly will not be that severe but that will drag on and have cascading effects on manufacturing, economies, etc. However, I think what this discussion has also highlighted is the extent of the pressure on the manufacturing of a number of power electronics, raw materials, etc., which are a real bottleneck on the acceleration of electrification, grid expansion, etc. I think this is a very difficult moment to be in and when I look at all these pieces of the value chain for grids, power electronics, etc., you always find oligopolies, three or four companies on the gas turbine side have 70% of the market and it is the same for transformers, I think it is even worse for invertors. If we look at critical raw materials, depending on where you look, it is more or less the same and by the way, talking about concentrations of reserves of copper, they are all concentrated in five countries, and it is the same situation for cables. I think what we will have to deal with is that these oligopolies will be the top winners and they will basically be rent seeking and that is not what we need. We need actors that deploy much faster and bigger manufacturing, and the fundamental issue is how we take them from being rent seeking to basically maximising outputs. To give you one example, the three top performing companies in the DAX last year were first, Rheinmetall, second, Siemens Energy and third, Saft. I think the most telling thing is that the best strategy for Siemens Energy is not to double production to respond to that, it is just to continue as they are because this year and next, they will be number one alone and I think that is a huge problem.



3. AI: Power Struggles and Societal Challenges

8th EDITION
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
April 24-26, 2026 • Chantilly



CHAIR:
Patrick Nicolet
Executive Chairman of Linebreak Ltd., former Group Chief
Technology Officer of Capgemini

This workshop was designed as a deliberate journey up the technology stack: from physical infrastructure and compute through data, cybersecurity, governance, and societal impact. Rather than debating whether AI is dystopian or utopian, the premise is that it will be both simultaneously, and the pertinent question is how we navigate the consequences. Four structural challenges ran through the entire conversation. First is physical. The infrastructure required to sustain AI's growth is hitting hard limits that capital alone cannot resolve overnight. Compute, energy, and grid infrastructure are under strain, with demand structurally outrunning supply. This is not just an IT problem; it is an energy, geopolitical, and industrial policy problem. Second is data. The quality, accessibility, and governance of data remain hidden constraints on AI's real-world impact. Vast stores of valuable information sit locked in institutional silos. Trustworthy AI is only as good as the data it runs on, and most is not yet fit for purpose. Third is security. AI introduces non-deterministic behaviour into environments built on determinism. In cybersecurity and military conflict, foundational frameworks of attribution, proportionate response, and deterrence are breaking down. The opacity of AI systems is a strategic vulnerability with no adequate answer yet. Fourth is concentration. A small number of companies capture the vast majority of AI's economic value—a gap that will exponentially widen. Paired with fragmented global governance and the continued marginalisation of the Global South, the structural risks are significant and compounding. One conclusion ran beneath all of it: governance mechanisms consistently fail to keep pace with deployment. The most actionable near-term lever is sustained support for the people and organisations building AI with the right ethics and responsibility, while working toward broader consensus. We are only at the beginning. The urgency is real.



Pauline Thomson
Managing Director for Infrastructure Funds & Head of Data
Science at Ardian

One additional constraint is that data centers tend to be deployed in regional hubs, and many regional electricity grids were not designed to accommodate such concentrated, large-scale loads. If you look at the key markets, such as Northern Virginia, which is the largest data center hub in the world, or even in Europe, such as Dublin, Amsterdam and parts of Germany, the grid capacities are already bottlenecked. This leads, first of all, to delays but also, in some cases, to the complete inability to build more. Looking at Ireland, data center energy demand now represents 20% of the country's total demand, it is enormous. On top of that, upgrading and extending the grid infrastructure – including substations, transmission lines and transformers – requires massive capital expenditure and long lead times; consequently, grid expansion is outpaced by the speed at which data center demand is growing. If we now look at a very recent forecast provided by the International Energy Agency, data center electricity grew 17% in 2025 alone, and by 2035, the IEA projects it to more than triple from the 2020 level [1]. In conclusion, it is clear that we are at the beginning of a multi-trillion-dollar infrastructure buildup that is completely reshaping the energy systems, real estate and the digital infrastructure markets. We will still need large-scale investments across these digital and energy infrastructures, and I think we really need to bridge the divide between technology infrastructure, power generation and sustainability.



3. AI: Power Struggles and Societal Challenges



Christine Choirat
Head of Data Science and Artificial Intelligence at the Swiss
Federal Statistical Office (FSO)

Christine Choirat's intervention addresses the critical challenge of leveraging government-held data for public good while maintaining strict confidentiality. She organizes her argument around a foundational principle: trustworthy AI must be built on trustworthy data, and that trust must flow continuously from the moment data is collected through its storage, movement within government infrastructure, and final disclosure as official statistics or restricted research outputs. To overcome current barriers, she identifies two distinct problems. First, to combat data fragmentation and the prevalence of unofficial sources in search engines and LLMs, she introduces the Trusted Data Observatory. Hosted in Geneva with partners like the World Bank and OECD, this initiative focuses on metadata discoverability by cataloging data about data, including its origin, methodology, and reliability, rather than exposing the data itself. The goal is to promote "signal over noise" to ensure that policymakers and researchers can locate official, AI-ready datasets without compromising security. Second, Choirat tackles "dark data," which refers to valuable information siloed within institutions due to legal or privacy constraints. She presents an "eyes-off" analytics approach using differential privacy where algorithms run on sensitive data the researcher never sees. A small mathematical randomness is added to outputs so that individual or corporate records remain protected while aggregate insights remain valid. These tools are developed as public goods designed for cross-sector collaboration without requiring raw data sharing. She frames this as an "inverse Saint Thomas paradox" where trust is established not by seeing the data, but by keeping eyes on the metadata, the method, and the infrastructure. Concluding with a call to shift from "data hoarding" to "data using," she urges the community to measure the tangible impact of data utilization rather than simply accumulating assets.



Tobby Simon
Founder and President of Synergia

AI has transformed cyberattacks from a nuisance into a potential act of war, and the escalation dynamics are dangerously under-governed. The irony is that AI can identify software vulnerabilities and write exploit codes at machine speed. AI does not sleep, it does not need lunch, and it can attempt tens of thousands of algorithmic variation attacks for a few hundred dollars that once took a team of researchers a year. The asymmetry is alarming: attackers are unconstrained, defenders are not. When an AI tool fails in a production environment, people lose their jobs. When an offensive AI tool fails, the attacker simply pivots and finds another approach to the attack. Here is another caveat, a red flag: cybersecurity attack analysts predict that, by 2026–2027, they will see the emergence of a self-learning agent malware code that will learn on its own and that can morph its behavior in real-time based on the defense it encounters and adapt like a living organism. What is the problem? The problem in all this is that attribution is nearly impossible. In the cyber domain, the likelihood of identifying and successfully prosecuting a state-based attacker is approximately 0.5%. This creates a fundamental crisis of deterrence. Traditional deterrence theory rests on two pillars: the ability to attribute an attack to its source and the credibility of your response, proportionately. If you cannot prove who attacked you, you cannot respond proportionately, and if you cannot respond proportionately, your deterrence collapses. AI-enabled cyber operations have fundamentally undermined both these pillars. AI compresses decision-making time. A human commander facing a potential attack has minutes to decide – time enough to call a superior, verify intelligence and seek a diplomatic channel. An autonomous weapon system has milliseconds; when AI is integrated into the command-and-control structure, a crisis that once took days to manage can now escalate to armed conflict in seconds. The risk we see is the likelihood of smaller conflicts germinating all over the world, and these are going to be quick and short but numerous. This is a challenge because highly capable autonomous weapon systems lower the political costs of instigating conflict, as there are no body bags, or very few. In most countries, it is the body bags that create political problems back home, but in this case, there are none.




François Barrault
Founder and Chairman of FDB Partners, Chairman of IDATE
DigiWorld

Artificial Intelligence has suddenly become the subject of every discussion, yet it is far from being a new technology. Having worked in AI since 1982, I often remind audiences that the real revolution is not AI itself, but the extraordinary acceleration of computing power, data processing and adoption driven by tools such as ChatGPT. Large Language Models may appear complex, but in many ways they replicate mechanisms humans have used since childhood: predicting words, recognizing patterns and completing sequences. What has changed is the scale, speed and accessibility of these systems. The global AI race rests on three pillars: hardware, telecommunications and software. In each of these domains, the United States and, increasingly, Asia are investing at a scale that Europe cannot currently match. The massive investments made by hyperscalers in chips, data centres, cloud infrastructure and AI models create a gap that is difficult to close. This reality leads to an important question: if Europe is unlikely to dominate the AI infrastructure race, where can it create value? Europe's greatest opportunity lies in the intelligent deployment of AI rather than in attempting to replicate Silicon Valley. Our strength is the ability to apply technology to improve citizens' lives through healthcare, education, mobility, public services and industrial innovation. Looking ahead, the next major breakthrough will extend beyond Large Language Models towards Large Quantitative Models, combining AI with physics, chemistry, biology and finance. These systems have the potential to transform sectors such as drug discovery, preventive healthcare, financial services and advanced manufacturing. Ultimately, the future of AI should not be measured solely by technological performance or financial returns. The real challenge is ensuring that innovation serves people. Europe may not lead the global race for AI platforms, but it can still become a global leader in using technology to build a more inclusive, efficient and human-centred society.



3. AI: Power Struggles and Societal Challenges



Daniel Andler
Professor Emeritus at Sorbonne University, member of the *Académie des sciences morales et politiques*, philosopher

I claim that there is no AGI. AGI is ill-defined: if you look at the literature, there are dozens of ideas and definitions of AGI. For example, you have this sort of general thing that AGI can do anything a human can do. Really, it is not very likely that you could have an algorithm that can do anything a human can do, and what does "do" mean? Sometimes, the definition is more about how AGI can do anything that a human can do and has economic value, or how AGI can replace a human in all cognitive activities, but what is a cognitive activity? All these are interesting questions, and their answers are given, but none of them I find personally satisfying. I also claim that AGI, in any of the senses in which it is seen as real, authentic, genuine, or full human intelligence, is nowhere to be seen. It is not on the horizon; at best it is built upon hope. In fact, some of the creators of deep learning and LLMs have said as much; they have said that deep learning and LLMs are nice, but if we really want to reach human intelligence – which I take as a substitute for AGI, although human intelligence in an algorithm is a bizarre idea – we will need something else. The rough idea of what these people were saying a few years back was that if we really want to reach full intelligence, then we are going to need some sort of new idea. Some people say that we will see if this new idea comes about, while others are so convinced that it must happen that, of course, they assume this new idea will come about. [...] Why does it matter that there is no AGI? First of all, the level of anguish about AGI goes down; there is no dragon to slay, and there is no takeover by maleficent AI systems. The notion of AGI is the Golden Calf of the AI community; it is a threat to AI, pushing it off track. Once the Calf is ground to powder, as it is in the Bible, then the AI community can focus on real opportunities, which are to augment rather than replace.



Arthur Stril
Chief Financial Officer of Collectis

My biotech company leverages the power of gene editing to develop cell and gene therapies for cancer and other indications, so I am seeing first-hand the impact of AI on medical research and drug development. However, I want to warn you about the hype. While there is excellent progress in some areas, we are still very far from a transformative revolution. Just a bit of context: drug development is the slowest, most expensive, most uncertain, but also the most personal human endeavor. Would you invest USD 1 billion over a decade for a candidate cure that has a 90% chance of failure? Would your answer change if a family member could benefit from it in the future? Over the last few decades, while some diseases have been cured or substantially managed, many others – particularly in neurology and psychiatry, sub-types of oncology, rare diseases and complex chronic conditions – still lack effective treatments. AI is beginning to improve parts of the system, but it is not yet transforming outcomes at scale. What remains to be solved for AI to deliver a cure at scale? The first bottleneck is data fragmentation. Healthcare data is the textbook case of incredibly siloed, poorly structured, and difficult-to-integrate data. Who in this room has access to a digital copy of their entire medical record since they were born? If there is someone, I would love to meet them. Obviously, AI is not yet the ultimate engine for curing diseases. I am still very excited about its potential – the technology and the compute are there – but we need data structures, innovative regulatory frameworks and novel economic models. Only then, hopefully, will we be able to transform our approach to disease.



Jay Truesdale
CEO of TD International

I serve as CEO of a risk intelligence firm in Washington, DC, founded 27 years ago by former members of the U.S. government. Their vision was to apply the information collection and analytical methodologies they had learned and utilized in government to the corporate world, helping clients better understand their competitive landscape, identify opportunities, and mitigate risk. My firm sits within the broader professional services sector, which has been among the industries most affected by advances in AI. Professional services account for a significant share of economic activity across OECD economies. Because these firms advise organizations across nearly every industry, their influence extends far beyond their direct economic contribution. This makes our sector both highly exposed to disruption and uniquely positioned to benefit from generative AI. [...] Ultimately, that's how we think about AI. First, we remain uncompromising on governance, ensuring that client data remains secure and that our models extend beyond the limitations of publicly available training data. Second, we use human expertise—not to compete with AI, but to architect it, supervise it, and continuously improve it. And finally, we use AI not simply to analyze today's environment, but to help clients prepare for tomorrow.



LUNCH & DINNER DEBATES



WORLD
POLICY
CONFERENCE

19^e EDITION
GOUVERNANCE MONDIALE
24-26 avril 2024 - Chantilly

WORLD
POLICY
CONFERENCE

19^e EDITION
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
April 24-26, 2024 - Chantilly





Paul Kagame
President of the Republic of Rwanda

For decades, the "golden age" of globalisation was built on the assumption that economic ties would make war more expensive and peace easily attainable. However, today the very global networks that were supposed to bring us closer together have become a source of vulnerability. Global integration produces shared gains but in moments of crisis they can also lead to choke points. The Covid pandemic was a wakeup call. For one, it reminded us that crises are no longer confined within borders. They easily spread. Second, it showed us the downside of trading resilience for efficiency. When manufacturing hubs are concentrated in a few countries, those nations will prioritise their citizens when there is a shortage. Today, ongoing conflicts are exposing the same structural fragility in the international system. The flow of essential goods can be blocked at a single point of failure, and everyone ends up paying the price. Political scientists call this "weaponised interdependence".

For Africa, what these external shocks reveal is the risk of dependency. To this day, many blame the era of colonialism and structural adjustment for this mindset. While true in a sense, the habit of making excuses only traps us in a cycle where we see ourselves as victims without any power to change our circumstances, and that is completely false. In Rwanda, in the aftermath of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi, we learnt that the best solutions are home-grown. Those that come from within and respond directly to our local context yield the highest returns. This is why, in the past few years, there have been more efforts within Africa to mobilise domestic resources, localize production, strengthen our supply chains and integrate our economies. A more self-reliant Africa with its own fertiliser plants, oil refineries and pharmaceutical firms, will contribute more positively to global stability. What Africa wants is simple: to take care of ourselves and work productively and respectfully with others.





GALA DINNER • SATURDAY, APRIL 25 • 19:30



A taste of Guy Savoy at Les Fontaines

Ladies and Gentlemen, Good evening to you all,

It is a great pleasure to share a few words with you on the occasion of this exceptional evening at the World Policy Conference. I regret not being able to join you in person, but I am thrilled that my cuisine can be there with you, thanks to the dedication of the teams at the Campus des Fontaines. Please allow me to share a warm thought for Thierry de Montbrial, whose immense contribution to international dialogue I wish to acknowledge here. Thierry, you have long been an essential figure at the Institut de France within the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. I am delighted that our paths are now crossing. This coincidence creates a sense of fraternal camaraderie between us that touches me deeply. It expresses something quite beautiful: that cuisine, much like thought, plays a part in connecting men and women, in enlightening, soothing, and bringing people together. When I was asked to create the menu for this dinner, I saw it as much more than a tribute; I saw it as a way to bring our worlds into dialogue. For gastronomy, just like diplomacy or the humanities, is an art of connection, mindfulness, and transmission. It tells a story, invites sharing, and opens doors—sometimes far more effectively than a long speech. Tonight, through these dishes prepared for you, I wanted to offer a moment of culinary delight, serenity, and conviviality, true to the idea that the dining table remains a place for genuine encounters.

I wish you a wonderful evening, rich in conversations, ideas, and, I hope, gourmet sensations.

Sincerely,



LUNCH & DINNER DEBATES













G rard Larcher

It is not so easy, in the French tradition, to turn a conference dealing with international issues into a must-attend event when it does not come from the executive. But that is exactly what you have achieved: the audience you have built up speaks for itself! This result is all the more remarkable given that I am struck by the general loss of content, analysis and nuance in foreign policy, as in so many other areas of intellectual endeavour. And yet, there is a pressing need to reconnect with a high intellectual standard in order to better grasp the scope of the complex issues facing us. The World Policy Conference meets this need perfectly. Because it aims to understand the world as it is, and not to describe a world as it should be and will not be; the World Policy Conference opens eyes and helps to build a governance of what is possible.

Nial  Kaba

I would like to commend your foresight in sustaining, edition after edition, a space where such essential conversations remain possible. The theme you have chosen - "Between fragmentation and interdependence: rethinking global governance"- is not merely academic. It is a precise and compelling diagnosis of the state of global governance in our time.

Paul Kagame

To begin, I want to commend you for continuing to steer the debate about global governance in the right direction. You have managed to do this by bridging different perspectives and I applaud you for this.

Emmanuel Macron

It is an honour for our country to be hosting the World Policy Conference in Chantilly. At a time when the very principle of international cooperation is being called into question by some, your mission, which is to envisage a more open, prosperous and fair world, one respecting every nation, is an absolute necessity.

Aleksandar Vu    

I was listening very carefully to all your panelists and guests, and I have learnt a lot from some of the data and got some new ideas.

Andreas Schaal

Huge thanks to the WPC team and to all your staff for organizing this conference, which could not be more targeted than it is.

Kim Chang-Beom

It is a great pleasure to be back at the WPC here in Chantilly where we are sitting in a very serene forest, but I think that outside this chateau we are faced by burning fronts and theatres, the eastern part of Ukraine and the Middle East.

Yuichi Hosoya

Thanks to the organizers of this conference here in a beautiful castle with many eminent people in this room. It is always good to come back to the WPC community.

Juliette Tuakli

Thank you for inviting me back again to this important conference, it is a real pleasure to be here, it is always so informative.

Memduh Karakulluk  u

Thank you for inviting me. I will do my best to reiterate your point that it was an exquisite night; it is good to be hosted by the WPC in France, in your home, so thank you very much for that.

Jean-Claude Gruffat

First of all, we have tremendously enjoyed this and the previous sessions, and the programme last night, so thanks to the WPC team for hosting us. It is always a pleasure to be here and all the more, in such wonderful scenery.

Kamel Abdallah

The beauty of this conference for the last few years I have been attending is that every time I come wearing my lenses, I change them for three days. As a result, instead of looking at an 'O', it becomes a 'P' or a 'Q', because I am seeing it from someone else's perspective.

Ha  m Korsia

I think the WPC should be thanked for enabling us to debate, exchange views and explore possibilities. It is this force which, wherever it may be, brings together people capable of conceiving of what is possible.

Nicholas Kairis

I should thank you for this magnificent experience and the chance to become part of the wonderful community the WPC have created, as well as to partake of the collective wisdom and foresight of the participants and most importantly Prof. de Montbrial. It was a real pleasure and honor.

Bruno Weymuller

On our return from a fascinating weekend at the 18th World Policy Conference in Chantilly, we would like to congratulate you on delivering an outstanding edition in a setting that was both delightful and perfectly suited to the event. Many thanks for inviting us to take part in these enlightening discussions and for giving us the opportunity to reconnect with so many friends and acquaintances.

Jeremy Fain

Congratulations on this magnificent edition of the World Policy Conference! The setting was beautifully picturesque, the food was delicious, the participants were relaxed and delighted to be there, the conference topics were especially timely, and your team was outstanding.

Vincent Koen

Thank you so much for such an exceptional conference and for the many wonderful moments it gave us!

Jean-Claude Trichet

Congratulations on the outstanding success of this year's World Policy Conference, which was even more remarkable than usual, both in terms of its substance and its organization.

Olivier Appert

Congratulations on the great success of this year's World Policy Conference. It was particularly timely, taking place against the backdrop of an exceptionally eventful international context. As always, the discussions were lively and brought together outstanding speakers. The venue was magnificent.

Jean-David Levitte

I could not let the day end without expressing my heartfelt congratulations on this flawless success. The World Policy Conference was simply perfect, both in substance and in execution. It was a wonderful moment of dialogue and friendship.

Jean Michel Severino

My warmest congratulations on the remarkable success of this year's edition. You devote an extraordinary amount of effort each year to steering this remarkable flagship from one port to the next, and you do so with impressive skill. Beyond the inspiring quality of the discussions, the warmth of the atmosphere, the beauty, comfort and excellence of the venue, as well as the event itself, were all exceptional. The guests you kindly invited me to bring along were delighted and deeply impressed. I wish you every success as you begin the journey towards next year's edition.

Roman Vassilenko

Thank you so much to you and your entire team for your immense work. The memories of our productive and stimulating discussions at Chantilly are still vivid in my mind.

Christine Choirat

It was such a privilege to contribute to such a stimulating discussion, the whole event was fantastic!

Fran  ois Barrault

I truly enjoyed our discussions, and the panel was exceptionally well curated. My sincere thanks to World Policy Conference 2026 for the tremendous work behind the scenes in making this edition such a success.

Abdulaziz Othman Sager

It was a privilege to be part of such an important gathering, and I valued the opportunity to engage in the discussions and exchange perspectives with distinguished colleagues. I very much enjoyed my participation in the conference and look forward to continued collaboration and working alongside colleagues on future initiatives.

Michel Foucher

Thank you so very much for this truly wonderful gathering in Chantilly. Thanks to you, our country truly embodied its tradition of hospitality.

Hiroyuki Akita

It was a real pleasure to take part in the WPC. As always, the conference was truly impressive, and I came away with many valuable insights. Many thanks again for making the event such a success.


Jay Truesdale

It was an excellent conference with so many great memories. Truly enjoyed myself very much, with great thanks to you for your excellent organization.







KEY DATA



Participants – Geographical breakdown
(325 participants from 51 countries)



Participants – Breakdown by function
(325 participants from 51 countries)



Geographical breakdown of main published articles
(total: 102 articles)

INVITED GUESTS





Abdallah, Kamel

Managing Director & CEO of Canal Sugar, a UAE-Egyptian multibillion dollar agricultural industrial group in Egypt that aims to ensure Egypt self-sufficiency in sugar. He is a national food security expert, specializing in turnaround management and leadership of large agricultural industrial groups in the region.

Abdelatif, Soumeya

Medical doctor, director of companies. First Vice President of the Robert Schuman Institute for Europe, she was also an auditor of the Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defence (IHEDN) and of the Center of Diplomatic and Strategic Studies (CEDS).

Abed, Majdi

Vice President International Public Affairs at TotalEnergies. Prior to joining TotalEnergies in 2019, he held several positions at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He notably was Consul General in Dubai, Political Advisor for the French Delegation to NATO and n°2 at the Embassy of France to Qatar.

Abiteboul, Jean

President of GILGNL (International Group of LNG Importers), non-executive Director of Tellurian Inc. Former Executive Vice President for Supply, Trading & Marketing, he was previously President of Gaselys, International Executive Vice President, Advisor to the Chairman & CEO and Secretary of the Board of Directors within Gaz de France.

Adamakis, Emmanuel

Elder Metropolitan of Chalcedon. Former Vice President and President of the Conference of European Churches, he also served as director of the Office of the Orthodox Church to the European Union in Brussels. After being elected Metropolitan of France, he was Co-President of the Council of Christian Churches in France.

Aguiar, Nuno

Chairman & CEO Chief of Staff at Jerónimo Martins, one of Europe's leading food distribution companies. He has extensive experience in the retail and distribution sector, particularly within the Jerónimo Martins Group.

Ahmed, Masood

President emeritus of the Center for Global Development since January 2017. He enjoys a 35-year career driving economic development policy initiatives relating to debt, aid effectiveness, trade, and global economic prospects at major international institutions including the IMF, the World Bank, and the DFID.

Akita, Hiroyuki

Commentator of *Nikkei*. He writes commentaries, columns, and analysis on foreign and international security affairs. Former Beijing Correspondent and Washington Chief Correspondent, he was Senior and Editorial Staff Writer and worked for the "Leader Writing Team" of the *Financial Times*.

Alaux-Lorain, Jean

Investor in the Large Cap division of Bpifrance, the French Public Investment Bank, he supports entrepreneurs and companies in the industry, technology, and aerospace sectors. Previously, he worked in mergers and acquisitions at BNP Paribas in Singapore and in the Life Sciences division of Dassault Systèmes in France.

Amabile, Arno

Member of the Founding Committee of CurrentAI and Advisor to the French Special Envoy for AI. He was Secretary of the French national committee on generative AI and deputy head of the Corps des mines. He also worked for the ministry of Justice to elaborate their new digital transformation plan.

Andler, Daniel

Professor Emeritus at Sorbonne University. Member of the French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, he was the founder and first director of the department of cognitive studies at the École normale supérieure in Paris. He is chiefly interested in cognitive science and artificial intelligence, and in their impacts on education, collective decision and public policy.

Antil, Alain

Director of the Ifri Sub-Saharan Africa Center. He works on Mauritania and security issues in the Sahel. He teaches at the Institut d'études politiques (IEP) of Lille and Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne University. He holds a PhD in political geography from the University of Rouen.

Appert, Olivier

Member of the French Academy of Engineering and advisor of IFRI. He was Chairman of France Brevets, President of the French Energy Council as well as Chairman and CEO of IFP Energies Nouvelles. He was appointed Director of the International Energy Agency's Long-Term Cooperation and Policy Analysis Directorate.

Araújo, Luís

General Manager of the Biedronka chain. He has spent his entire career with the Jerónimo Martins Group, which he joined in 1995. He began as a Deputy Store Manager at Recheio Cash & Carry and subsequently progressed through all stages of his career within the Group.

Arystankulova, Gulsara

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Moldova to the French Republic. She has over twenty years of experience in international affairs and public policy. Throughout her career, she has served in Kazakhstan's embassies in Belgium and France, as well as within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Augé, Benjamin

Associate researcher at Ifri and head of investigations at Africa Intelligence. He teaches the geopolitics of oil and gas in Africa, the comparative African policies of the P5 members and relations between Africa and the Gulf at the Executive Masters programs of HEC and Sciences Po Paris.

Aureau, Tristan

Director of the Centre for Analysis, Planning and Strategy of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has extensive experience in international and European affairs due to his previous functions, as chief of staff to the French Minister for EU Affairs and deputy sherpa to the President of the European Council.

Avital, David

Senior Director of AEye Strategic Solutions. Entrepreneur, venture capitalist and philanthropist who has realized great success in real estate, parking, biotech and other areas thanks to the strong values and principles acquired through his long military career. He also serves on the board of directors of several companies.

Azour, Jihad

Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department at the International Monetary Fund since 2017. He served as Lebanon's Finance Minister. He also did research on emerging economies and their integration into the global economy as a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard.

Badré, Bertrand

Managing Partner and Founder of Blue like an Orange Sustainable Capital. Former Managing Director and Chief Financial Officer of the World Bank Group, he also served as Group Chief Financial Officer of Crédit Agricole and Group Chief Financial Officer at Société Générale.

Bălțeanu, Lorina

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Moldova to the French Republic. She began her professional career as an editor for cultural publications in the Republic of Moldova.

Barbosa, Jean-André

Vice President of Public Affairs for Renault Group He began his career at the European Commission within the Directorates-General for Trade and Energy, notably participating in the WTO Doha Round negotiations and various energy-related negotiations with third countries. He is a Chief Engineer of the Corps des Mines.

Bark, Tae-Ho

President of the Seoul Forum for International Affairs (SFIA). He is Chairman of the Korean Committee of the Trilateral Commission and Professor Emeritus of the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS) at Seoul National University. He was Minister for Trade of Korea and President of the Global Commerce Institute of Lee&Ko.

Barrault, François

Founder and Chairman of FDB Partners SPRL. Chairman of IDATE DigiWorld, he has had unique and diversified entrepreneurial and corporate experiences in the technology sector. He served as President and CEO of Lucent EMEA and then as International CEO and corporate officer, and as CEO of BT Global Services.

HH Bartholomew Ist

Archbishop of Constantinople - New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch. Ordained to the Diaconate in 1961 and to the Priesthood in 1969. His Holiness served as Assistant Dean at the Patriarchal Theological School of Halki and then as Director of the Private Patriarchal Office of Ecumenical Patriarch Dimitrios.

Bas, Jean-Christophe

Vice President of the Aspen Institute France; he is the founder and CEO of The Global Compass and a professor at IRIS. He was the Head of Strategic Dialogue at the World Bank, and as Head of Strategic Development and Partnerships at the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations in New York.

Bébéar, Isabelle

Director of International and European Affairs at Bpifrance since 2019. She also oversees EuroQuity, the digital platform that connects innovative businesses with international investors and new opportunities. More than 20 years ago, she created Averroès Africa, the first European fund of funds dedicated to Africa.

Béhanzin, Francis

Chairman and co-founder of World Network of Security and Defense Professionals for preventing and combating terrorism. Former Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of ECOWAS, he is also a member of the Benin Human Rights Commission of Benin and Lecturer at the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (Paris).

Belais, Alain

Secretary of the Endowment Fund of the French Republican Guard and independent consultant. Previously, he was Adviser to the Chairman and Director of Development at Iris Finance, CEO of the French Agency for Business Creation (APCE), and held a number of positions within French and European institutions.

Benmira, Sephora

Analyst at the Presidency of the French Republic (Élysée), working within the Strategic Monitoring and Analysis Center. Alongside her institutional role, she serves as Head of Communications for the 2026 G7 Youth Summit (Y7) organized by the Open Diplomacy Institute.

Besnainou, Pierre

World Jewish Congress Vice President. Honorary President of the French High Judaism Foundation. He was President of the European Jewish Congress and of the French Unified Jewish Social Fund. He is also a member of the Board of Governors at the Shimon Peres Center for Peace and of the Weisman Institute France.

Biloa, Marie-Roger

Chief Executive Director of The Africa International Media Group and its branch MRB Productions. Media Consultant and Adviser on African Affairs with Africa International, she is also a frequent TV guest (TV5Monde, France24, Aljazeera, RFI, i-Télé, ARD, ZDF) to comment on current news and African politics.

Biot, Jacques

Board member and advisor to companies in the field of digital transformation and artificial intelligence. Former President of the École polytechnique in Paris, he is also Trustee to several scientific academic institutions, and he chairs the Board of Directors of Huawei Technologies France.

Biruta, Vincent

Minister of Interior of the Republic of Rwanda. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, he also held several cabinet positions in the Government of Rwanda. He was the President of the Senate in the Parliament of the Republic of Rwanda and President of the National Transition Assembly.

Bodin-Guittard, Nicolas

CEO and co-founder of Label4.ai, a French deeptech specialised in the identification of AI-generated and manipulated content. Label4.ai is actively engaged with the European Commission on the implementation of Article 50-2 of the AI Act. He is a lawyer by training, former Data Protection Officer and General Counsel.

Boubacar, Sidi Mohamed

Former Prime Minister of Mauritania on two occasions. He served as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Mauritania to Spain, Egypt, and France, and as Permanent Representative of Mauritania to the United Nations.

Bouttes, Jean-Paul

An engineer and economist, member of the Scientific Council of the French High Commission for Strategy and Planning. He was Chief Economist and Executive Vice President of Strategy, Prospective and International Relations at EDF (Électricité de France), following his role as Senior Vice President for Industrial Strategy within the Generation Division.

Breitman, Arthur

Director of Trilitech and Co-Founder of Tezos, a decentralized open source blockchain platform. Prior to that, he worked at X and Waymo on self-driving cars. In his earlier career, he worked as a quantitative analyst at Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.

Bromberg, Gidon

Co-founder and Israeli Director of EcoPeace Middle East. Immersed in the environmental peacebuilding world for over 30 years, he has written extensively on the relationship between water issues and Middle East peace, which he has presented on before the UN Security Council, UN Climate Summit, US Congress, and the European Parliament.

Browne, Miranda

Head of Development at the ESSEC Institute for Geopolitics & Business. Before joining ESSEC, she worked on strategic projects within the marketing and retail teams of leading international brands, including Chanel and Google. She joined the Open Diplomacy Institute as Fellow in 2025.

Burgess, Niall

Ambassador of Ireland to France and Monaco. he previously served as Secretary General of Ireland's Department of Foreign Affairs. A career diplomat, he has devoted much of his career to relations between Ireland and the United Kingdom, particularly cooperation with Northern Ireland.

Cabestan, Jean-Pierre

Senior Researcher Emeritus at the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), attached to the French Research Institute on East Asia (IFRAE) of the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations (INALCO). He is also Professor Emeritus at Hong Kong Baptist University.

Caboche, Thierry

Head of International Public Affairs at Ardian. Former diplomat for the French Foreign Office, he held various Embassy postings across the Middle East and served as the Chief of Staff and Spokesperson of the Ambassador of the French Mission to the United Nations in New York.

Callonico, Guillaume A.

Vice President, Thematic and Emerging Portfolio Risk Foresight at La Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec (CDPQ). A political scientist and risk manager specializing in international relations, democratization process and geopolitical risk, he also teaches political and geopolitical risk management at the University of Montreal.

Campos, Eric

CEO of the French Army Foundation. Having led banks and financial institutions for 35 years, he also founded and ran a renewable energy production and transition consulting company and served as CEO of a microfinance and Social Business Foundation operating in over thirty-five countries across three continents.

Canonne, Raphaël

Fellow of the Open Diplomacy Institute, French Delegate for Global Health and Food Security to the 2026 G20 Youth Summit (Y20). He formerly served in the international team of the International Federation of Medical Student (IFMSA).

Castañeda, Jorge

Former Foreign Minister of Mexico. He is a renowned public intellectual, political scientist, and prolific writer, with an interest in Mexican and Latin American politics, comparative politics and US-Mexican and U.S.-Latin American relations.





Chalmin, Philippe

Founder of Cercle Cyclope, Professor Emeritus at Paris-Dauphine University, Consultant for various International Organisations (OECD, EEC, UNCTAD). He was a member of the Council of Economic Advisers in the Office of the French Prime Minister and has published around forty books, including *Journal de la dissolution* in 2024.

Chan, Margaret

Emeritus Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) and Dean of the Vanke School of Public Health at Tsinghua University. In 1994, she became the first woman to serve as Director at the Hong Kong Department of Health.

Charafeddine, Raed

Executive Chairman at Al Makeen Advisory, he is Central and Commercial Banker. Former First Vice Governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon, he is a high-level senior finance professional with profound expertise in public and private sectors in the Middle East and Africa.

Chesneau-Daumas, Thomas

Fellow of the Open Diplomacy Institute, he was appointed as a French delegate to the 2026 G20 Youth Summit (Y20) in Washington. He has worked as a Corporate Strategy Analyst at Bpifrance, at Thales in strategy and international business development, and within the French Ministry of the Economy and Finance

Chevalier, Fabrice

Deputy VP for International Public Affairs at TotalEnergies. Before joining the Public Affairs team, he spent his entire career in TotalEnergies' Exploration and Production branch, first in Finance, then in Business, and subsequently moved to New Business and the negotiation of oil and gas contracts in Eastern Europe and Asia.

Choirat, Christine

Head of Data Science and Artificial Intelligence at the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. She previously served as Chief Innovation Officer at the Swiss Data Science Center and as Visiting Professor at the University of Geneva. Earlier, she designed large-scale data platforms supporting research that informed environmental and health regulations at Harvard.

Coatanlem, Yann

Economist and President of Club Praxis. Co-founder of GlassView, the inventors of Neuro-Powered MediaTM and Member of the Board of the Paris School of Economics. In 2026, he co-authored a strategic piece for the Atlantic Council proposing original frameworks for the Climate Club to catalyze green financing.

Cohen-Tanugi, Laurent

Member of the Paris and New York bars and the founder of Cohen-Tanugi Avocats, a boutique international corporate law firm. He was previously a partner of the Cleary Gottlieb and Skadden international firms, and VP and General Counsel of Sanofi.

Cotte, Basile

Deputy Head of the Banking Affairs Unit at the French Treasury. He previously worked at the European Commission (DG Competition) on merger control, as well as at Euronext and Morgan Stanley. His professional experience spans investment banking, financial markets, energy, and regulation.

Courbe, Thomas

Director General for Enterprise at the French Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty. He previously was Deputy Director General at the Directorate General of the Treasury. *An Ingénieur général de l'Armement*, he has developed a career focused on industrial strategy, economics, and international relations.

Cozon, Stanislas

Executive Vice President of Capgemini. Former Managing director in charge of global industry sectors within Capgemini, he started his career at the 'Inspection Generale des Finances' (French Treasury).

Da Cunha, Pauline

Fellow of the Open Diplomacy Institute, appointed Deputy Secretary-General of the 2026 Y7 Summit. She is a policy officer at the Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS) of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces and Veterans, where she works on arms control and non-proliferation issues.

Daele (van), Frans

Minister of State of Belgium. Former Chief of Staff of the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and EU 'Sherpa' to the G8. Throughout his extensive diplomatic career, he has been the permanent representative of Belgium to the EU and NATO, as well as Ambassador to the US.

Dăianu, Daniel

Chairman of the Fiscal Council and Advisor to the Governor (Euro Area Affairs), former Board Member of the National Bank of Romania. He is a Member of the Romanian Academy. He served as Finance Minister of Romania and Chief Economist of the National Bank of Romania.

Daly, Elena

Founder and Principal of EM Conseil, an independent consultancy. She served in General Counsel, strategy and risk-related senior positions at alternative investment funds at Citigroup, Fortress Group and Nomura International PLC.

Darsalia, Lasha

First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia. He is chief negotiator from Georgia to the Russian Federation in the Geneva International Discussions. He previously was First Deputy Minister at the State Ministry for Reconciliation and Civic Equity.

David, Dominique

Advisor to the Executive Chairman, Ifri, Editor of *Politique étrangère* and co-director of the annual report *Ramses*. President of the Austro-French Centre for Rapprochement in Europe, he was Deputy Director of the Institut français de polémologie, and then Secretary General of the Fondation pour les études de défense nationale (FEDN).

Desouches, Christine

Honorary lecturer at the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. Expert-consultant to international organizations and member of the strategic council of Ifri, she held various positions in the International Organisation of La Francophonie, and has become a specialist in democratization, crisis and peace-building processes, especially in Africa.

Draghiciu, Beatrice

Founder of BFD Private Diplomacy SRL, a strategic advisory firm specializing in public policy, governance, negotiation strategy, and high-level institutional engagement. She served as adviser to three successive Romanian Ministers of Justice and State Counsellor within the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister of Romania.

Drouin, François

President of ETI FINANCE (SMEs and Midcaps financing, Asset-based lending). Former Vice President of the French Public Investment Bank (BPI), he held numerous leading positions such as Chairman of Caisse d'Épargne de Midi-Pyrénées and Crédit Foncier de France, and CEO of OSEO.

Drouin, Nathalie G.

Lawyer emeritus and Ambassador of Canada to France since March 2026. She will also undertake her role with Monaco in the near future. Prior to this, she was Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council and National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, as well as Deputy Minister of Justice.

Duchêne, Aurélien

Fellow of the Open Diplomacy Institute, he was appointed French Delegate to the 2025 G20 Youth Summit (Y20) and Co-Chair of the 2026 G7 Youth Summit (Y7). Independent consultant on geopolitics and defense, a researcher at the Euro Créative think tank.

Dučka, Dorian

Founder and owner of Alpha Strategy Consulting. He was Deputy Minister of Energy and Industry of Albania. He served as Director of the European Integration and International Projects at the Ministry of the Economy, Trade, and Energy of Albania, as well as Director of Project Management Unit for the Trans Adriatic Pipeline.

Ducrot, Valérie

Executive Director of the Global Gas Centre (GGC). Former Manager of the UNECE (the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) Gas Centre, she has also occupied several positions in the French energy company named today ENGIE.

Elia, Roula

Attorney at Law, CEO of Echo for Peace Foundation and of Rased Lebanon, member of Beirut Bar Association and International election Observer. Legal Consultant to many associations and civic organizations, she was delegated as "Lawyer and Journalist" to attend hearings in the Special Tribunal of Lebanon in The Hague, Netherlands.

Emilsson, Peje

Founder and Owner of Kreab Worldwide and Kunskapsskolan Education. Board member of the Nobel Prize Outreach and Member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA). he was Chef de Cabinet of ICC, the world business organization, and Chairman of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.

Etienne, Philippe

Ambassador of France and Professor of public and international affairs at Columbia University. He also serves as G7 and G20 sherpa. He previously was Ambassador of France to the United States, Germany and Romania, as well as Ambassador and Permanent Representative of France to the European Union.

Eyl-Mazzega, Marc-Antoine

Director of Ifri's Center for Energy & Climate. Prior to joining Ifri, he worked at the International Energy Agency, notably as Russia & Sub-Saharan Africa Program Manager. He was also in charge of a Ukraine observatory at the Robert Schuman Foundation.

Eyre, Wayne

Former Canada's Chief of the Defence Staff. In his 40-year military career, he led numerous domestic operations in Canada, and overseas he served in Cyprus, Croatia, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and South Korea, where he was the most senior Canadian officer ever stationed in the Asia Pacific region.

Fahmy, Nabil

Secretary General of the Arab League and Dean Emeritus at The American University in Cairo. He founded the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy. Former Foreign Minister of Egypt, he also served as Ambassador to the United States and Japan.

Fain, Jeremy

CEO of Blue Water Intelligence. Driven by a passion for technology-driven impact, he co-founded Verteego in 2007 and served as CEO at Welcomr.

Felbermayr, Gabriel

Director of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO). Professor at the Vienna University of Economics and Business, he served as President of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (Institut für Weltwirtschaft – IfW) and as an Associate Consultant with McKinsey & Co, Vienna.

Férey, Amélie

Director of Data Projects and Institutional Relations at the *Institut de recherche stratégique de l'École militaire*, where she leads initiatives at the intersection of research, data, and public decision-making. She also serves as Scientific Director of the Chairs for Advanced Studies on Sovereignty.

Flahault, Antoine

Professor of global health at University Paris Cité, Hôpital Bichat, Inserm (France). Former Director of the Institute of Global Health at the University of Geneva. He previously served as Co-Director of the European Academic Global Health Alliance and Founding Director of the French School of Public Health.

Foucher, Michel

Lecturer and member of the Center for Higher European Studies (former ENA) and senior counsel on studies at MEDEF (Network of French entrepreneurs). He was French Ambassador to Latvia and served as an Advisor to the French Foreign Minister, as well as a Special Envoy to the Balkans and the Caucasus.

Frenzel, Catherine

Director within the International and European Affairs Department of Bpifrance, after having served for four years as Inspector General and member of the Executive Committee. She is also a member of the Audit Committee of the Council of Europe and of the Audit Committee of the French Ministry of Justice.

Friang, Thomas

Executive Director of the ESSEC Institute for Geopolitics & Business. He previously served as Advisor to the French Minister for Development and International Partnerships. He is also the Founder and CEO of the Open Diplomacy Institute.

Frieden, Jeffry A.

Professor of Government emeritus at Harvard University and Professor of International and Public Affairs and Political Science at Columbia University. He specializes in the politics of international economic relations. He is the co-author or co-editor of over a dozen books.

Frossard, Thibaud

Vice-President and Head of Aerospace, Defence and Security at Capgemini, he was Chief of Staff to the Group CEO. Formerly industrial policy advisor at the French Ministry of the Economy and Finance, he also held various senior positions at the Government Shareholding Agency and the Budget Directorate.

Furlain, Carla

Head of International Partnerships and Public Affairs for HDF Energy. By navigating the intersection of policy, regulation, and industry, she secures critical support for transformative projects, ensuring alignment between business objectives and the evolving geopolitical landscape. She is also Head of the French Delegation to the 2026 G20 Youth Summit (Y20).

Galas, Godefroy

Deputy director of the cabinet of the CEO of the Direction Générale des Entreprises (DGE), a French government agency attached to the Ministry of the Economy and Finance. Previously, he was technical analyst in the Operations Department of the ANSSI, the French national cybersecurity agency.

Gargash, Anwar

Diplomatic Advisor to the President of the United Arab Emirates. Member of the Board of Trustees of the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy, he was Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and Minister of State for National Council Affairs.

Germa (de), Nicolas

Vice Chairman of the WPC. Former Vice chairman of the Franco Indian chamber of commerce, he is also chairman and founder of Alandia Industries.

Girard, Renaud

Senior reporter and war correspondent at *Le Figaro*. He has covered major worldwide political crises and armed conflicts for the past 40 years. He is also a Professor at the Institut d'études politiques de Paris and a member of the Editorial Board of *Revue des deux Mondes*.

Gomart, Thomas

Director of the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), he serves on the IHEDN's scientific committee and the editorial boards of *Politique étrangère*, *Revue des deux mondes*, and *Études*. He has published extensively on Russia, digital issues, think tanks, and geopolitical risk.

Grass, Etienne

Global Chief AI Officer at Capgemini Invent, author, columnist for *Les Échos*, and former senior French civil servant. As a recognized expert in healthcare policy and AI driven organizational transformation, he teaches at Sciences Po Paris.

Gruffat, Jean-Claude

Managing Director of Weild & Co in New York. He also serves on the Board of Directors and the Executive Committee of Atlas Network. Governor of the American Hospital in Paris and Vice Chairman of the American Hospital of Paris Foundation. He was a Managing Director with Galileo and Citigroup.

Haines, Andrew

Professor of Environmental Change and Public Health at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine and a leading expert on climate change and health. He has also held advisory roles with the World Health Organization, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and numerous national and international research bodies.





Halalai, Traian

Executive President of Exim Banca Romaneasca. President of the Management Board of Banca Romaneasca SA, he has extensive experience in top management positions in the Romanian banking sector. He is also Associate Professor at the Academy of Economic Studies in Bucharest.

Halferty Hardy, Kerry

Strategic advisor, consultant, and entrepreneur operating at the intersection of global policy, healthcare, agricultural innovation, and emerging technology. She serves on the boards of several international policy and economic organizations, and writes and speaks regularly on geopolitics and global governance.

Hecker, Marc

Executive Director of Ifri and Editor-in-Chief of *Politique étrangère*. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and taught for many years a course on Terrorism at Sciences Po. He published several books including *La Guerre de vingt ans* (Robert Laffont, 2021 with Elie Tenenbaum).

Horii, Akinari

Special Advisor and member of the Board of Directors at the Canon Institute for Global Studies, a research think tank in Tokyo for which he regularly writes articles. He is also a member of *Keizai Doyukai* and the Trilateral Commission. Previously, he served as Assistant Governor at the Bank of Japan.

Hosoya, Yuichi

Professor of International Politics at Keio University. Managing Director and Research Director at the Asia-Pacific Initiative in Tokyo, he is also Senior Researcher at the Nakasone Peace Institute, Senior Fellow at The Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research, and Senior Adjunct Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

Inozemtsev, Vladislav

Director of the Center for Post-Industrial Studies in Moscow, Special Advisor to MEMRI's Russia Media Studies Project in Washington, DC. A Russian economist and political scientist, he is the Founder and Director of the Center for Post-Industrial Studies in Moscow, and a teacher at Moscow State University and the Higher School of Economics.

Jansen, Sabine

Professor of International Relations at the Conservatoire national des arts et métiers and Research Fellow at the Laboratoire interdisciplinaire de recherches en sciences de l'action, she is Vice President of the Committee for Parliamentary and Political History and Delegated President of the Society for the History of the French 5th Republic.

Jean, Sébastien

Associate Director of Ifri's Geoeconomics and Geofinance initiative, professor of Economics at Conservatoire national des arts et métiers, where he holds the chair Jean-Baptiste Say of industrial economics. A member of France's Council of Economic Advisers and National Productivity Council (CNP), he was Director of CEPii, after holding positions at INRAE and OECD.

Jeremić, Vuk

President of the Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development (CIRSD) and Co-Founder of the Global Preventive Diplomacy Initiative, he is a former Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is also Editor-in-Chief of *Horizons* magazine and a Professor of Practice at the Sciences Po Paris School of International Affairs.

Kaba, Nialé

Minister of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Côte d'Ivoire, and Member of Parliament for Bouna, she previously became the country's first female Minister of Economy and Finance. She led major economic reforms, served as Minister of Planning and Development, and chaired the African Development Bank Group Board of Governors (2019 - 2020).

Kagame, Paul

President of the Republic of Rwanda. Elected Chairperson of the East African Community, he has been leading the institutional reform of the African Union (AU) since 2016. He is Chairperson of the AU Development Agency New Partnership for Africa's Development and African Union Leader for Domestic Health Financing.

Kairis, Nicholas

Chief Legal Officer at Sagint Inc. and Head of International Legal Affairs at Mohammed Omar bin Haider Holding Group, he oversees cross-border investments in energy, real estate, and infrastructure. An expert in financial regulation and digital assets, he is a member of the Athens Bar Association.

Karakullukçu, Memduh

Founding Board member of the Global Relations Forum, Founding Partner of Kanunum, Chairman of Kroton Consulting. Former President of the Global Relations Forum, his policy work includes technology and economic development, technology and security, global energy dynamics, and global economic and financial governance.

Kassis, Elias

Vice President Strategy & Sustainability at TotalEnergies since September 2023. Previously he was President of Total E&P UAE and TotalEnergies Country Chair in the United Arab Emirates. Before that he held various positions in the Exploration & Production division of TotalEnergies.

Kazatchkine, Michel

Professor of medicine and diplomat, former Executive Director of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; former ambassador on HIV and communicable diseases and UN Secretary General's Special Envoy on HIV in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Keller, Daniel

President of "Servir en Entreprise" and former member of the Economic, Social and Environmental Council of France as a qualified person, he is Chief Officer in charge of transversal projects of the Division of complementary pension and social action at Malakoff-Humanis.

Khachatryan, Arman

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Armenia to France since 2024. A career diplomat, he previously served as Permanent Representative of Armenia to the Council of Europe from 2021 to 2024. He has held several senior roles at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Kim, Chang-Beom

Vice Chairman & CEO of the Federation of Korean Industries. Prior to joining the FKI, he served as Global Advisor for Hyundai Motor Group. He served as Korean Ambassador to Indonesia. He also worked in Brussels as Korean Ambassador to the European Union and Belgium.

Kim, Gunn

Member of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea representing the People Power Party, he serves as Vice Chair of the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee and is a member of the Intelligence Committee. He has held several key positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Kingston, Brian

President and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers' Association (CVMA), he previously held senior leadership positions at the Business Council of Canada and within several departments of the Government of Canada, including the Department of Finance, Global Affairs Canada, and the Department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development.

Koen, Vincent

Senior Consultant with the OECD and Asian Development Bank. Former Deputy Director in the OECD Economics Department, he supervised work on around 50 countries. He also served as the Economic Counsellor, as the main author of the OECD Economic Outlook and as OECD G10 Secretary.

Korsia, Haïm

Chief Rabbi of France. Member of the *Académie des sciences morales et politiques*, he served as a member of the National Consultative Ethics Committee, General Jewish Chaplain of the Army and the Polytechnic School. Director of the General Chaplain of the Air Force as well as General Secretary of the Association of French Rabbis.

Kostanyan, Vahan

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia since January 2023. He previously held several senior advisory roles within Armenia's National Assembly and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Adviser to the Foreign Minister and to the President of the National Assembly.

Kotti, Randy

Deputy Head of the Savings and Financial Markets Unit at the French Treasury (Direction Générale du Trésor), he previously served as Head of the State's Regional Economic Service in Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur. He has also worked as a consultant for the World Bank on financial inclusion and banking stability issues in the Middle East.

Kowal, Pawel

Professor at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Former member of the European Parliament, he served as Chairman of the EU delegation to the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Committee, Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the National Security Council.

Kuleba, Dmytro

Former minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the Council of Europe, he served as Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine, Ambassador-at-Large at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and worked at the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the OSCE.

La Chapelle (de), Bertrand

Executive Director of the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network (I&JPN), an organization he co-founded in 2012. He is an internationally recognized expert of policy and governance issues related to the internet and Artificial Intelligence.

Laïdi, Zaki

Former Personal Advisor to the High Representative and Vice President of the Commission EEAS. He has been a Professor at Sciences Po for over 20 years.

Landau, Jean-Pierre

Associate Professor of Economics at SciencesPo. He served as Deputy Governor of the Banque de France (2006-2011), Executive Director of the IMF, the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development as well as Undersecretary at the Ministry of Finance.

Larcher, Gérard

President of the French Senate since 2014.

Lee, Hye-Min

Senior Advisor of KIM & CHANG, Visiting Professor of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul. Former Deputy Minister for Trade of Korea, he also served as G20 Sherpa, Chief Negotiator for the Korea-EU FTA and Ambassador to the Philippines and France.

Legendre, Anne-Claire

President of the Arab World Institute since February 2026, she previously served as Advisor on North Africa and the Middle East to the President of the French Republic (2023 to 2026). She was Ambassador of France to Kuwait (2020-2021) and Consul General of France in New York (2016-2020).

Legrand, Domitille

Director of Data -Based Economics Projects at the Direction Générale des Entreprises (DGE). She has worked in various organizations, companies and think tanks in Europe (Germany, UK), Southeast Asia (Singapore) and New Caledonia, on energy, industrial, resources and digital issues.

Lehman, Adrien

Affiliated professor at Sciences Po school of public affairs and vice-president of the Open Diplomacy Institute's board of directors. He was appointed French Delegate to the G8 Youth Summit (Y8) in Washington D.C.

Lepercq, Thierry

President of the ICDM Circles, a network bringing together CEOs, executive committee members, and board-level leaders from international groups to discuss the evolving nature of geopolitical risk. He also leads the Thucydide Circle, which brings together diplomats, military generals, senior civil servants, and geopolitical experts.

Letourneur, Charles

Managing Partner and co-founder of ALVEN, one of the largest and most active venture capital funds in digital technologies in Europe (software, artificial intelligence, fintech). He started his career in M&A with LAZARD in New York, and then Paris. He was appointed Executive Director in 1999.

Levitte, Jean-David

Member of the Institut de France and President of the Geneva Center for Security Policy Fondation Council (GCSP). Ambassador Levitte was the Senior Diplomatic Adviser and Sherpa of President Sarkozy from 2007 to 2012. He was also Ambassador to the United States from 2003 to 2007.

Lévy, Pierre

Ambassador of France, Chairman of the Board of the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (IHEDN). He has devoted most of his professional career to European affairs and issues related to Central and Eastern Europe.

Lévy-Lang, André

Founder and President of the Louis Bachelier Institute. Member of the Board of Ifri, he is also affiliate Emeritus Professor in Finance at Paris-Dauphine University, Non-Executive Chairman of *Les Échos*, and Chairman and Founder of the Fondation du Risque and Institut Louis Bachelier.

Liguti, Dario

Director of Sustainable Energy at the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), he oversees a region comprising 56 member States across North America, Europe, and Asia.

Lipsky, John

Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Institute, at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Chair of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and Co-Chair of the Aspen Institute's Program on the World Economy, he also serves as the Vice Chair of the Bretton Woods Committee, and of the Center for Global Development.

Litman, Gary

Senior Vice-President of Global Initiatives at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. He is responsible for the Chamber's policy advocacy for the economic reform agenda of the G20, G7, and international institutions. He leads the Chamber's participation in a range of global business coalitions and related business summits focused on sustainable economic policies.

Lô, Moubarack

Former Special Advisor to the Prime Minister of Senegal. President of the Institut Emergence, specializing in economic studies and strategic planning. He also serves as Director General of the Economic Prospective Bureau.

Louiba, Amélia

Marketing Analyst at Thales Cybersecurity & Identity. She joined the Fellowship of the Open Diplomacy Institute when she was appointed member of the French Delegation to the 2025 G7 Youth Summit (Y7) in Ottawa.

Maier, Moritz

CEO of Synera, an AI software company trailblazing the field of AI agents for engineering.

Maila, Joseph

Professor of Geopolitics and International Relations and Senior Fellow at ESSEC Business School. He was elected Dean of the *Faculté des sciences sociales et économiques*, then President of the Catholic University of Paris. He was Director of the *Prospective* (Policy Planning Staff) at the French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs.

Mallikarjun, Manu

Social entrepreneur working in the fields of International Relations and Real Estate Development. His current projects include a film series, the goal of which is to find potential paths to a peaceful and sustainable world.

Malloch-Brown, Mark

Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics, Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania's Perry World House. As Head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), he led the global promotion of the UN Millennium Development Goals.

Mariton, Hervé

Chairman of the Federation of French Overseas companies (Fedom) and President of the Franco-British Council. He served as a Member of the French Parliament, Secretary for Overseas Territories and opposition Spokesperson on the Finance Committee.





Martin, Terry

Journalist and TV news anchor. Formerly an anchor with CNN International, he is now Senior Anchor with DW News. He is also the Founder and Director of the research communications agency SPIA. He has provided live coverage from G7 summits, UN climate conferences, and multiple national elections.

Martin de Lagarde, Raphaël

Deputy Vice President for International Public Affairs at TotalEnergies since 2015. He held previously several positions at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs focusing on Eastern Europe, Middle East, Central and South Asia.

Maurice, Paul

Secretary General of The Study Committee on Franco-German Relations (Cerfa) since 2024. He was Head of the Unit for Germany, Alpine and Adriatic Europe at the European Union Direction of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs.

Meyer, Jean-Claude

Vice Chairman International of Rothschild & Cie. Member of the Board of Ifri, he served as General Partner of Rothschild, Advisor to DATAR, an office of the French Prime Minister, and Managing Director of Lazard Frères & Cie.

Monteiller, Pierre

Head of the risks department at the Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur Regional Environment Directorate. He holds an engineering degree from the French Corps des mines and a degree in mathematics from the École normale supérieure de Paris.

Morel, Pierre

Director of the Pharos Observatory of cultural and religious pluralism and Coordinator of the political group of the OSCE Minsk Process on Ukraine. He served as Ambassador to the People's Republic of China and then to the Holy See. He is a graduate of the *Institut d'études politiques* in Paris.

Mourre, Marc

Senior Advisor to Mohamed Kallala, Chief Executive of Natixis since January 2025. He has over 37 years' banking experience, primarily with Morgan Stanley and Natixis. At Morgan Stanley he was latterly Managing Director, Vice Chairman of the Commodities Division and Chairman of the firm's African business.

Mushikiwabo, Louise

Secretary-General of the International Organization of La Francophonie since 2019. She served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and the East African Community and Minister of Information of Rwanda. She previously worked in the communications directorate of the African Development Bank in Tunisia.

Musso, Alexandre

Vice President Sustainability for Europe & North Africa at Accor, a leading hospitality group. He joined the Fellowship of the Open Diplomacy Institute in 2026 and follows particularly the Sustainable transition topics.

Nardon, Laurence

Head of Ifri's Americas Program. Prior to joining the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), she was a research fellow at the Ecole des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), then a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington (2001 - 2003).

Nasr, Samir

President of ECE Consultants SAL. Chairman of Phoenician Funds Holding in Lebanon and Executive Director of the Mouflon Fund in Cyprus, he served as consultant at the OECD, Professor of Economics, Chairman at the National Investment Guarantee Corporation, and economic and financial advisor at various GCC countries.

Nicolet, Patrick

Founder and CEO of Linebreak Ltd. He worked at Capgemini, assuming several global leadership positions. In 2020, he concluded his last mandate as Group Chief Technology Officer during which he oversaw the Group's Technology, Innovation and Ventures agenda, global cybersecurity, and IT functions.

Nkulikiyimfura, François

Ambassador of the Republic of Rwanda to France since 2022, with accreditation to Spain and Portugal, and designated Ambassador to Italy and Monaco, he also serves as Permanent Delegate to several international organizations, including UNESCO, OIF and OECD.

Noland, Marcus

Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, he was Senior Economist at the Council of Economic Advisers in the Executive Office of the President of the United States.

Nordmann, François

Former Ambassador of Switzerland to France. Former Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Guatemala and other States of Central America, he also served as Head of the Swiss Delegation to UNESCO, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the international organizations in Geneva and Chairman of FN Conseil.

Okwulehie, Sam

Chairman and CEO of LATC Group. Member of the global advisory board of the Commonwealth Enterprise & Investment Council (CWEIC) in London, he is also a Senior Advisor at Boston Consulting Group (BCG) and worked within the Air France/KLM & Kenya Airways group.

Orlowski, Tomasz

Current Ambassador of Poland to Morocco. Former Polish ambassador to France, then to Italy. He is corresponding member of the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques.

Paal, Douglas

Distinguished Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Former Vice Chairman of JPMorgan Chase International, he also served as an unofficial US representative to Taiwan as Director of the American Institute in Taiwan, worked as a Senior Analyst for the CIA, and worked at the US embassies in Singapore and Beijing.

Piau, Nicolas

Co-founder and CEO of TiLT Capital Partners. First Mover Fellow of the Aspen Institute, he works in the field of energy and project development / M&A. Nicolas was Senior Vice President in charge of M&A and Corporate Development for Engie.

Ploquin, Xavier

Senior Associate and Chief of Staff to the Chief Executive Officer of Meridiam. Former Advisor for Energy, Industry and Innovation in the private office of the French Ministry for the Ecological and Inclusive Transition, he held various positions in the French Ministry of Economy and Finance.

Poinssot, Christophe

Deputy Director General and Scientific Director of the French Geological Survey BRGM. Former elected president of the association EuroGeoSurveys, he worked in the French Atomic and Alternative Energy Commission (CEA) and was the Nuclear Counsellor at the French Embassy in China (Beijing) and the CEA representative in this country.

Poterszman, Baptiste

Deputy Head of the Risk Prevention Division at the Regional Directorate for the Environment of Île-de-France. His role revolves around the implementation of public policies to prevent industrial pollution and risks. Prior to this, he worked for Neoen, a renewable energy producer, in Sweden, and for the rail company Eurostar.

Pouzet, Hugo

French senior civil servant, he serves as Deputy Head of the Sustainable Finance, Corporate Law, Accounting and Corporate Governance Unit at the Direction générale du Trésor, within the French Ministry for the Economy, Finance and Industrial, Energy and Digital Sovereignty.

Pouyanné, Patrick

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of TotalEnergies SE. He is a Knight of the French Legion of Honour.

Predoiu, Cătălin

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs of Romania. His work has focused on strengthening institutional capacity to address organized crime, human trafficking, irregular migration, cyber risks and other cross-border security challenges, while enhancing cooperation with European and transatlantic partners.

Prieto, Angel

Head of the Industrial Decarbonization Unit at the French Ministry for the Economy. He oversees the design and implementation of public policies aimed at decarbonizing French industry.

Prieux, Pierre

President of Alcen, group composed of high technology companies in the fields of Defense and Security, Energy, Medical and Healthcare, Aeronautics and space, Large Scientific Instruments

Qiao, Yide

Vice Chairman and Secretary-General of Shanghai Development Research Foundation, a non-profit institution with the purpose of promoting research on the issues of development. He is also an Outside Expert for International Finance and Economy at the Ministry of Finance in China.

Rabinovich, Itamar

Professor Emeritus of Middle Eastern History at Tel Aviv University. President Emeritus and Counselor of the Israel Institute (Washington and Tel Aviv), he is also a Distinguished Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and the Vice Chairman of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv. He served as Ambassador of Israel to the United States.

Revillon D'Apréval, Dorian

Advisor in the Environment Director's Office at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Previously, as a Policy Officer at the French Ministry of Ecological Transition, he directed the coordination of France's multilateral environmental negotiating positions (UN, G7, G20, WTO, OECD).

Rivoalen, Inés

Project Manager at ArianeGroup. She contributes to the development and validation of next-generation space propulsion systems. She joined the Fellowship of the Open Diplomacy Institute when she was appointed member of the French Delegation to the 2026 G7 Youth Summit (Y7).

Robert, Virginie

Foreign Desk Editor of *Les Échos*, the French business newspaper. She was the daily newspaper's New York correspondent. Vice President of the European-American Press Club in Paris, she is also a member of the French Diplomatic Press Association.

Rogé, Arthur

Head of modelling and analysis for energy access at the International Energy Agency (IEA). He joined the Fellowship of the Open Diplomacy Institute as he was appointed member of the French Delegation to the 2026 G7 Youth Summit (Y7).

Röttgen, Norbert

Member of the Deutscher Bundestag and member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Former Federal Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, he is the Co-Chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and Board Member of various institutions.

Sager, Abdulaziz Othman

A Saudi expert on Gulf politics and strategic issues. He is the founder and Chairman of the Gulf Research Center, a global think tank based in Saudi Arabia with a well-established presence and worldwide network of partners and offices in both the Gulf region and Europe.

Salomé, Bernard

Senior international advisor and economist with more than 40 years of experience working with international organizations and presidential offices. A specialist in development and public finance, he is currently working on artificial intelligence solutions aimed at broadening the tax base across Africa.

Sano, Tadakatsu

Attorney-at-law at Jones Day. Former Director-General of the Trade Policy Bureau and Vice Minister for International Affairs, he also worked at the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and served as Chief Executive Assistant to Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama.

Schaal, Andreas

Director for OECD Global Relations and Co-operation, as well as the OECD Sherpa to the G7, the G20 and APEC.

Schmid, Dorothee

Head of the Turkey / Middle East program at the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri). She started the "Contemporary Turkey" research program, to follow the emergence of Turkey as a global power. Her present research focuses on Turkish diplomacy, new regional conflicts and their impact on Middle East economies.

Schweitzer, Gauthier

Co-founder and CTO of Sahar. Sahar is a French company that develops solutions to transform large volumes of open-source data into actionable insights. It works with governments and major corporations in sectors such as defense, energy, and finance.

Senequier, Dominique

President and Founder of Ardian, a world leader in private investment, she is a pioneer in the private equity industry. She was appointed an Officer of the French Legion of Honour in 2021 and was elected to the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques in 2023.

Severino, Jean-Michel

Chairman of Investisseurs et Partenaires (I&P), member of the Académie des technologies and French General Inspector of Finance. Former Director in charge of international development at the Ministry of Cooperation and Development, he served as Vice President of the World Bank for Asia, and CEO of France's International Development Agency.

Shek, Daniel

Former Ambassador of Israel to France. During his 27-year long career in Israel's diplomatic service, he also served as Director of European Affairs, Spokesman of the Foreign Ministry and Consul General in San Francisco. He has extensive experience in European Affairs and has participated in several chapters of Arab-Israeli negotiations.

Simon, Jean-Marc

Ambassador of France. He was advisor to the French Foreign Minister and the Minister of Cooperation. He served in numerous embassies all over the world, as Counselor and Consul General before being appointed as French Ambassador to Central African Republic, to Nigeria, to Gabon, and to Côte d'Ivoire.

Simon, Tobby

Founder and President of Synergia Foundation, a strategic think tank. Commissioner with the Global Commission for Internet Governance (GCIG) and member of the Trilateral Commission, he also served as advisory board member of the Center for New American Security (CNAS) and counsellor to several organizations such as the WTO.

Sinapi-Thomas, Lucia

Executive Director of Capgemini Ventures. She held various positions in Capgemini, including Deputy Chief Financial Officer and Executive Director Business Platforms of Capgemini Group. She is a member of the Board of Directors of Capgemini SE, Bureau Veritas and Dassault Aviation.

Sollogoub, Tania

Head of research on Emerging countries and Global Geopolitics at Crédit Agricole Group's Economic Research Department. Former head of the Master's in Finance and Strategy, she teaches economics and country risk analysis at Sciences Po Paris. She has been expert for the European Commission and member of the London Club for the restructuring of Russian debt.





Šoth, Ján

Ambassador of the Slovak Republic to France since 2023. Prior to this, he headed the Strategic Analysis Unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bratislava (2021 - 2023), following his tenure as Ambassador of the Slovak Republic to Italy, Malta, and the Republic of San Marino from 2015 to 2021.

Stoian, Marius

President of Club România. Former Under Secretary of State for Foreign Trade, he also served as Personal Advisor for the Secretary of State for the Romanians Abroad and for the Minister of Tourism. He is a member of Chatham House and the Aspen Institute Romania.

Stril, Arthur

Chief Financial Officer and member of the Executive Committee at Collectis. He served at the European Commission's Directorate-General for Competition controlling global pharmaceutical mergers and as Head of the Hospital Financing unit at the French Ministry of Health.

Stuewe, James

Director of the Regulatory Affairs Division at Natural Resources Canada. He worked at the heart of the Canadian federal public service in both the Privy Council Office and Treasury Board Secretariat. He began his career in management consulting with Deloitte and later with the Royal Bank of Canada in Toronto.

Sur, Serge

Member of the *Académie des sciences morales et politiques*. Agrégé in Public Law, he is Emeritus Professor of Public Law, University of Paris Panthéon-Assas, where he set up the Master's in International Relations. He was Deputy Director of the UNIDIR (1986-1996) and *ad hoc* Judge at the International Court of Justice (2009-2012).

Suzuki, Kazuto

Professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Tokyo, Japan, and Director of the Institute of Geoeconomics at International House of Japan. Senior Fellow of Asia Pacific Initiative, he is President of Japan Association of International Security and Trade.

Tabet, Riad

President of Berit International Holding SA, President of Batiliban-France, Franco-Arab Consortium for development. Board member of the Executive Committee of the Franco-Arab Chamber of Commerce in Paris, he is a Board member and Founding member of the Lebanese American Chamber of Commerce in Beirut.

Tarka, Wiesław

Chargé d'affaires a.i. and Titular Ambassador of the Republic of Poland in France. He held senior positions within the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and abroad. He served as Ambassador of Poland to Croatia (2008 -2012) and to Sweden (2015 - 2018).

Tenenbaum, Elie

Director of Ifri's Security Studies Center. He holds a PhD in History (2015) and graduated from Sciences Po (2010). He was a visiting fellow at Columbia University between 2013 and 2014 and has also taught international security at Sciences Po.

Thomson, Pauline

Head of Data Science and Managing Director in Ardian's Infrastructure Team. Since joining Ardian in 2011, she has played a pivotal role in embedding data science at the heart of investment and value creation strategies.

Touraine, Agnès

Chief Executive Officer of Act III Consultants, a management-consulting firm dedicated to digital transformation. McKinsey Senior Advisor, she is also a Board member of several non-profit organizations such as IDATE and the French American Foundation. She chaired the French Institute of Directors (IFA).

Trichet, Jean-Claude

Former President of the French Académie des sciences morales et politiques. He is honorary chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bruegel Institute, honorary chairman of the Group of Thirty and former European Chairman of the Trilateral Commission. He also served as President of the ECB, Governor of Banque de France and Director of the French Treasury.

Tromler, Miklós

Accredited Ambassador of Hungary to France since December 2025, he has extensive diplomatic experience. He served as Ambassador to the Kingdom of Morocco and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. He also served as Dean of the European Diplomatic Corps in Morocco.

Truesdale, Jay

CEO at TD International, a Washington-based top global advisor on geopolitical strategy, market intelligence, and risk compliance. Prior to joining TDI, he served as CEO of Veracity Worldwide. He previously was a leader at McKinsey & Company, and served as Foreign Service Officer, with postings including Russia and Ukraine.

Tuakli, Juliette M.

Mercy Ships International Diplomatic Ambassador for Africa since 2022. She facilitates partnerships with governments, diplomatic entities and communities, supporting Mercy Ships' mission to deliver free medical and surgical care to those in need across the African continent. She was the first African woman clinical professor in Pediatrics at Harvard Medical School.

Vassilenko, Roman

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Former Assistant to the Head of the Prime Minister's Office, he worked as Chief Inspector of the Secretariat of the Secretary of State, Consultant of the President's Chancery of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Deputy Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State.

Védrine, Hubert

Founder of Hubert Védrine Conseil, a public affairs consultancy specialized in international, economic and geopolitical issues. He was President of the Institut François Mitterrand. He served as Minister of Foreign Affairs under the government of Lionel Jospin. He was a partner in the law firm Jeantet et Associés.

Véron, Nicolas

Senior Fellow at Bruegel in Brussels and at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, he focuses his research on financial systems and financial services policy, with a particular emphasis on Europe. Previously, he held senior positions in both the French government and the private sector.

Vincent-Rostowski, Jan

Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Poland to the OECD and a Member of the Board of Katalyst Education, a leading digital education charity operating in Poland and Ukraine. He was Poland's longest-serving Minister of Finance (2007 - 2013).

Vučić, Aleksandar

President of the Republic of Serbia since April 2017. As Head of State, he has positioned Serbia as a key regional actor, promoting economic modernization, political stability, and European integration.

Wang, Jisi

Professor in the School of International Studies and President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University. Honorary President of the Chinese Association for American Studies, he was a member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of China's Foreign Ministry.

Weymuller, Bruno

Member of Total Professeurs Associés, and of the French Energy Council. Former Executive Vice President at Total in charge of Strategy and Risk Assessment and Chief Financial Officer of Elf Aquitaine, he worked at the Ministry for Industry, and at the Prime Minister Raymond Barre's cabinet.

Yaha, Mohamed Abdellahi

Chairman and CEO, Maurinvest Group. Chairman/CEO of MAURILOG a logistics services & transport company for Industrial Projects, Oil & Gas and Mining activities in Mauritania, he served as in Charge of the Promotion of Private Investments.

Yasseen, Fareed

Former Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq to France and later to the United States. He was until recently Iraq's Climate Envoy. He has worked and consulted for various UN agencies and think tanks. He served as Head of Policy Planning, Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Diplomatic Advisor to Deputy President Adil Abd al-Mahdi.

Yim, Sung-Joon

Senior Advisor at Lee International IP & Law Group. Former President of the Korea Foundation, he served as Korean Ambassador to Canada and Egypt, and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. He also served as the National Security Advisor to President Kim Dae-Jung.

Yurgens, Igor Y.

Professor of Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and Director of the MGIMO Centre for Sustainable Development and ESG Transformation, a member of the Board of Trustees of the Russian International Affairs Council. He is also Honorary Consul General of Monaco.

Montbrial (de), Thierry

Thierry de Montbrial is Executive Chairman of the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), which he founded in 1979. He is Professor Emeritus at the Conservatoire national des arts et métiers. In 2008, he launched the World Policy Conference. He has been a member of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques of the Institut de France since 1992 and is a member of a number of foreign academies. Thierry de Montbrial chaired the Department of Economics at the Ecole polytechnique from 1974 to 1992. He was the first Chairman of the Foundation for Strategic Research (1993-2001). Entrusted with the creation of the Policy Planning Staff (*Centre d'analyse et de prévision*) at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he was its first Director (1973-1979). He has authored more than twenty books, several of them translated in various languages, including *Action and Reaction in the World System – The Dynamics of Economic and Political Power* (UBC Press, Vancouver, Toronto, 2013) and *Living in Troubled Times, A New Political Era* (World Scientific, 2018). He is a Grand Officer of the Légion d'honneur, Grand Officer of the Ordre national du Mérite. He has been awarded the Order of the Rising Sun – Gold and Silver Star, Japan (2009), Commander of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany (2016) and other state honors by the French and several foreign governments. Thierry de Montbrial is a graduate of the École polytechnique and the École des mines and received a Ph.D. in Mathematical Economics from the University of California at Berkeley.



OPENING SPEECHES
FULL VERSIONS





Emmanuel Macron

President of the French Republic

Ladies and gentlemen, my dear Thierry, it is an honour for our country to be hosting the World Policy Conference in Chantilly. At a time when the very principle of international cooperation is being called into question by some, your mission, which is to envisage a more open, prosperous and fair world, one respecting every nation, is an absolute necessity. I am unable to be with you today, but I was keen to say a few words about the main diplomatic avenues we are taking.

We are living through some upheaval, trite though it is to say so, and much of what used to be taken for granted is in jeopardy. We have seen it with the imperialist wars waged by permanent members of the Security Council, with Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine. We have seen it through disrupted international trade. We are seeing it now with the war started in Iran.

Fragmentation, the proliferation of crises, and the unabashed resurgence of power politics and empires are reshaping much of this international order and grounding it in a form of lawlessness. Faced with the turmoil around us, France refuses to merely criticise from the sidelines. We are attempting to act with a clear objective, which I have set out and have tried to explain to our ambassadors since the first speech I was able to give them, describing this concept of being a balancing power that contributes to peace and stability.

That is to say, a power that rejects adopting its stance by default, that champions its independence – the independence of a French and European path – which presupposes sovereignty, strategic autonomy and many elements relating to technology, industry and defence, but which also seeks to devise a third way with cooperative solutions in situations where others hamper progress. A third way that is based on a clear understanding of every stakeholder's interests, but which also upholds international law and therefore rejects double standards.

I believe this approach is sound and that it is beginning to show its strength. Through the small steps we have taken in recent years – a stronger Europe, an Indo-Pacific policy that embodies this third way, a policy towards Africa based on a new partnership, a policy of re-engagement with emerging powers, and a policy of respect and developing forward-looking partnerships with our major historical partners, from Japan to Canada – all of this sketches the blueprint for the coalition of independents in which we believe. And I believe that this is what must carry weight in the international order as we are now experiencing it.

This coalition of independents is a body that wants to build solutions to these crises together, at the very time when those who should be the ultimate guarantors of international order are no longer playing that role.

I am going to give three very simple examples in this regard. In Ukraine, we saw early in 2025 that we were no longer completely sure of knowing whether the United States were going to continue to help Ukraine long-term, or whether they would push for surrender.

The initiative we took in February in Paris, on which we subsequently built at the Franco-British level, has enabled this coalition of the willing for Ukraine to be formed, ensuring security guarantees for the country once a peace agreement is signed, so that this peace may be lasting.

This coalition of the willing pulls together European nations – and when I say European, I do also mean the UK and Norway, who are major contributors – Canada, the Balkans, as well as New Zealand, Japan and Australia, who are standing alongside us.

This axis genuinely enables useful solutions to be produced. For the first time, we have planned operations together to deliver security guarantees. We were definitely a major factor in the discussions in 2025 and at the start of 2026 to prevent the situation unravelling. In early 2026, we persuaded the Americans to recommit to making their contribution, i.e. providing support, but without being on the front line. We incorporated this diplomatic response into the military component.

The second example I would like to take, is what we are currently doing in the Middle East, with the meeting held a few days ago in Paris on opening the Strait of Hormuz.

France has held a very straightforward and very clear position on Iran from day one. We are in favour of respect for international law and a return to peace as soon as possible. We are in favour of resuming negotiations on the nuclear issue, the ballistic missile programme, and regional destabilisation, and also of incorporating a respectful international framework over the Strait of Hormuz, thereby ensuring freedom of navigation.

We have advocated such supervision from the outset, while being allies of the Gulf States with which we have defence agreements to help them protect themselves. That is the right kind of framework. We brought together 49 states around Hormuz, there also under Franco-British leadership, with the European Union and the International Maritime Organisation.

The aim was to build a diplomatic and military framework – albeit strictly defensive, by deconflicting with Iran should the situation arise – as well as technical, financial and insurance arrangements, to ensure the resumption of shipping along this route. This is a major step forward. It is also this same framework that we want to promote to continue to support Lebanon and defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

However, I want to emphasise here that this special-purpose mission, this meeting that we held, overturned all the simplifications masquerading as truth presented to us. The global South said to be pitted against the North? Not at all. There are people who want to continue to believe in international law and peace, and who want to re-establish shipping routes for their economies, often because they have been severely affected. From South-East Asia to Africa, via the Pacific, Europe,

Canada once again and Latin America, everyone was there. And that itself was also a step forward. This is exactly the same thing I believe as regards trade issues. I think that many countries, and in particular the European Union and the CPTPP alliance – and I would also readily include India in such an initiative – believe in open, free and fair trade that respects international law and is aligned with the WTO as its framework, albeit trade that is probably improved and more effective.

We must try to make progress on this matter, on a trade agenda and also on a strategic agenda, an agenda on critical minerals and rare-earth elements, within this coalition of independents, because if we are able to build common rules to move forward, we will be able to find solutions. In a way, we were in a far more comfortable position at that point with regard to the United States and the Chinese. We are nobody's vassals. We want no hegemony. We are making progress. That is our line, and we are sticking with it.

I could have spoken to you about the initiatives we have taken on Gaza, and what we want to continue doing in the Near and Middle East. I could have spoken to you about our policy on Africa. I will have the opportunity to champion this in a few weeks' time at the Africa Forward summit in Nairobi, since this is an area where we have been keen to forge a new partnership with the African continent. I believe that since 2017 and the speech in Ouagadougou, via our fairly atypical policy in relation to the African Union during the Covid period, joint vaccine production, and the FARM initiative we launched to ensure food security during the Ukraine war, we have shown that, here too, Africa was a partner for us, and that we are including it in this coalition of independents, because we want Africa to gain sovereignty.

The main message that I wanted to share with you regarding your work is that we are living through a moment of truth if France is to be more independent. Diplomatically, we are. Militarily, we are, through a comprehensive armed forces model, because we have shouldered our responsibilities for the past ten years. We will have doubled our armed forces' budget, through our deterrence and our military technological sovereignty. We must consolidate our sovereignty in the industrial, food, technological and research arenas. This is vital.

The role that I am talking about, this driving force that we possess, we will only be able to preserve if we manage to make these efforts. We must next continue to make progress at the European level to see a more sovereign Europe. That is what I have been advocating since 2017. I see that the ideological shift that has quite clearly been underway since 2022, and the doubts that have taken root about the reliability of the US as a partner, are leading many people, including the most staunch supporters of trans-Atlantic links, to commit more resolutely to a more Europe-focused policy.

Here too, the devil is in the detail, and we must, in all fields, embrace and uphold a preference for European solutions, European goods and services, and joint operations. This is fundamental. We are at a point where Europe emerges from a position of geopolitical minority to pursue a policy of power. This is essential.

Then, we must build new partnerships. It is this coalition of independents in which we believe. That is also why, when we organised the G7 summit in Évian a few weeks from now, we have decided to bring together, alongside the G7 in its traditional format, a number of emerging democratic powers that share this philosophy, namely India, South Korea, Kenya by virtue of the joint summit we are holding in Nairobi which will bring together, if I may say so, African voices, and Brazil. It does not include everybody, but these are important partners in moving forward and consolidating this coalition of independents in which we believe.

France as a stabilising force, a more independent France within a stronger and more independent Europe, which is ready alongside other democracies and other respectful powers to forge a common policy that will entail agreements and disagreements, but that will enable us to defend our interests, consolidate international law and reduce volatility and disorder. This is what will enable us to implement effective multilateralism of the kind we advocate on each of these issues, and the kind we also advocate on climate and health issues, as we showed a few weeks ago in Lyon.

I have probably gone on a bit too long, please forgive me, but these are the firm beliefs that I wanted to share with you. I will be glad to receive your feedback on your work and your own thoughts. Good luck to you all and goodbye for now. Thank you very much.

Gérard Larcher

President of the French Senate

Your Holiness,

Madam Minister of State, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Special Envoy of the President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, whom I wish to greet via you, Mr. Executive Chairman of the French Institute of International Relations and the World Policy Conference,

Ambassadors, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am honoured by your invitation, dear Thierry de Montbrial, to give one of the opening speeches at this conference, especially as I understand that it has only been held in France three times in the last eighteen years.

It is not so easy, in the French tradition, to turn a conference dealing with international issues into a must-attend event when it does not come from the executive. But that is exactly what you have achieved: the audience you have built up speaks for itself!

This result is all the more remarkable given that I am struck by the general loss of content, analysis

and nuance in foreign policy, as in so many other areas of intellectual endeavour.

And yet, there is a pressing need to reconnect with a high intellectual standard in order to better grasp the scope of the complex issues facing us. The World Policy Conference meets this need perfectly.

Because it aims to understand the world as it is, and not to describe a world as it should be and will not be; the World Policy Conference opens eyes and helps to build a governance of what is possible. It is in its footsteps and in yours that I will try to align myself, by speaking to you about France's place in the world, and what seems to me to be realistic and achievable for France.

1 - There are prophecies that resonate powerfully more than a century since they were uttered: in La Crise de l'esprit, two modest letters written in April and May 1919, Paul Valéry writes: "Will Europe become what it really is, a small cape on the Asian continent? Or will Europe remain what it seems: the pearl of the world, the brain of a vast body?" And Paul Valéry summed up his thoughts in a few famous words: "We civilizations now know that we are mortal."

But the nature of prophecy, according to Paul Valéry himself, is not to write destiny in an inevitable form. It is only the most likely future if the free will that guides people and shapes societies does not come into play.

And, in fact, Paul Valéry's prophetic vision, which he applied to Europe without limiting it to the European continent, has not been fulfilled. In 1939, Europe fell, then rose again, succeeding in overcoming the division into two blocs brought about by the war on its soil, and in building a European Union when one of these blocs collapsed.

But today, when China is achieving technological and economic prowess at unprecedented speed, and the primacy of the West is being called into question despite American military superiority, perhaps its ultimate avatar. Today, in fact, it is legitimate to wonder whether Paul Valéry's prophecy is not taking shape before our very eyes, just as in their time the fall of the Roman Empire consecrated a new equation of power to the detriment of Southern Europe, and to the advantage of the Europe of the barbarians from the North – just as the Renaissance began with a shift from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic world.

2 - Paul Valéry's reflection in 1919 remains equally fertile, as it raises the question of power, not in terms of its traditional determinants – population, economy, politics, military strength – but above all in terms of "civilization". Nothing "in reality" predestined Europe, a "small cape on the Asian continent", for power. And yet Europe has achieved this power, by taking greater control of its own destiny than other parts of the world.

But European countries are gradually losing control of their own destiny.

For France today, the wake-up call is all the more brutal given that it used to play the leading role in foreign policy in Europe. It was an anomaly if one measured this role by its economic performances, even during the Thirty Glorious Years, or by its actual capacity to project influence. We owe it to the genius of one man, General de Gaulle, to have enabled France, defeated in 1940, to take its place among the victors after 1945!

A singular internal equation, at a given moment, is capable, in foreign policy, of overcoming real fragilities.

And I'd like to stress this point. Today, it is not so much the rise of the global South or new powers that is weakening France's relative weight; it is first and foremost its domestic situation.

And if we have to challenge the ideological elements and solutions presented in the US vice-president's speech at the Munich conference on February 14, 2025, as well as the US National Security Strategy of January 2026, at least we can make the same general diagnosis: never before has the correlation between foreign policy and the domestic situation been so closely linked and so decisive in its scope.

For France, this observation is most acute.

There is no need to dwell here on the structural factors that weaken France's role: its budgetary situation, which leaves little room for manoeuvre; the burden of taxation; its difficulties in creating a climate conducive to innovation or enterprise; its loss of control over its territory, faced with illegal immigration that it is unable to control; its political situation, in the absence of a majority, and because of a 2nd presidential term that is coming to an end without clear prospects. Yes, it is a "crisis of the mind", as Paul Valéry called it, which makes us doubt our past and deludes us into wanting to rewrite it, like a demiurge, with repentance committees and restitution laws.

There are no powerful countries that have a coherent national identity in democracies.

France will face crucial electoral deadlines in 2027. I know that these deadlines are of concern to our partners who fear their results or the paralysis that would result, once again, from the absence of a majority.

But I want to try to reassure them. I believe in voluntarism in politics. We have been given a new opportunity to remedy the excessive discrepancy between the role France aspires to on the international stage and its domestic situation. I am one of those who, in the months to come, will be working to ensure that an ambitious programme of reforms prevails, preventing dead ends.

Popular sovereignty, in its wisdom, must avoid one pitfall: appointing to the highest office a political leader who has not had the opportunity to gain experience in diplomatic affairs.

Under the Fifth Republic, the President of the Republic is all-powerful in foreign policy matters from the moment he is sworn in. Foreign policy cannot be improvised once the highest level of state has been reached.

3 - In addition to its internal weaknesses, France needs to face strategic challenges requiring reassessment. I will focus on three of its challenges.

First of all, the relationship with Africa. From the end of the 19th century until the end of the 2010s,

France's power was inextricably linked to its relationship with a number of African countries. It is not about expressing nostalgia for a colonial empire that has long since disappeared or for an obsolete "France-Africa". But to underline the absurd nature, in my view, of the assertion – this was in 2017 – that there should no longer be a "French policy on Africa". At the same time, and this is not the lesser of the paradoxes, it prolongs military interventions that have already lasted a long time, with no clear perspective.

We can now measure the result: France faces competition everywhere – competition is legitimate, but not from states outside Africa, whose policies contain all the ingredients of a neo-colonialism that is rightly condemned; France has been expelled in some cases; it has distanced itself from leaders who were among its main supporters; and it has not always been able to support its partners. France's influence has been partly unravelled by France itself, without rebuilding anything solid, by betting on civil societies to the detriment of political leaders, or by trying to gain a foothold in African countries where no one was expecting it.

Today, France is reduced to counting its supporters in Africa!

But France's procrastination has cost it more than just its relationship with one African partner or another. It has lost what they collectively provided it on the international stage: an essential part of its influence.

In order to rebuild trust, I believe that the next Head of State will have primary responsibility for reshaping French policy towards African countries, in direct dialogue with their leaders: giving priority to our traditional partners – Côte d'Ivoire is a pillar – and their political leaders; reviewing our official development assistance, concentrating its resources on our traditional allies and not broadening its scope, a fortiori in a period of budget restrictions; and preparing ourselves to find our way back to Sahelo-Saharan Africa, on the basis of well-understood mutual interests.

An ambitious programme!

The second strategic challenge facing France is that of its influence in the Middle East. In recent years we have witnessed an accelerated erosion of France's role and influence, with the country becoming at best a power like any other, and at worst an undesirable player.

This erasure is the result of the underestimation of the scope of the Abraham Accords and the reconfiguration that drives them. It is no longer Israel that Arab countries fear, but primarily Iran and its affiliates, from Hamas to Hezbollah, with the Mullahs' nuclear programme, its ballistic capabilities and its power to destabilize.

There follows a reversal of perspectives. The deluge of bombs that fell on the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, and the humanitarian crisis that accompanied it, were felt even more acutely in European countries than in Arab countries. The Palestinian question is no longer the mother of all crises. It has lost none of its acuity, of course. The situation in the West Bank is just as worrying as that in the Gaza Strip, for other reasons.

But the fear roused by Iran confines the Palestinian question to a crisis arising from Arab-Iranian and Israeli-Iranian tensions. The Palestinian question will only regain some of its centrality once the Iranian threat has been contained, if not eliminated.

However, France has not sufficiently revised its approach, and as a result has been relegated to the role of "outsider". It took the justified decision to recognize the State of Palestine, but it was too late or too early for this recognition to have any diplomatic impact! For the first time in its history, French diplomacy is not among the international "sponsors" of discussions relating to Lebanon, at least at this stage. This was unthinkable just a few years ago!

Our withdrawal from the Middle East also weakens our friends, especially our Lebanese friends. The Arab world is now convinced that Washington is the only viable way of moderating the Israeli government: anything else would be futile.

Reversing the trend will be difficult. However, our country still has undeniable strengths, not least its ability to communicate, if not to everyone, then at least to a wide variety of players. We should reclaim our role when the focus is less on a war we did not want and the time comes to rebuild and heal.

In Lebanon, the strengthening of the state and the army, the disarmament of Hezbollah and the country's territorial integrity are as likely to be achieved as France is to become an active player. One way or another, we will also have to find the eye of the needle

allowing a "modus vivendi" to be restored with the Israeli government. And that would already be a lot!

The third strategic challenge is the defence and security of Europe. European defence, European sovereignty, the European defence pillar: European countries have added a lot to the semantic debate! But they have done less to advance the defence of Europe!

One observation will suffice: almost ten years after the Sorbonne speech promising a European defence, and as Russia's aggression against Ukraine enters its fifth year, we would search in vain for a European Union capable of making up for American disengagement. What is more, with necessity dictating the law, and at the cost of sacrifices and courage that compel admiration, Ukraine has made more progress in arms production and innovation than the European Union itself!

This situation is undoubtedly the successor to a desperate belief on the part of certain Member States in the supposedly "eternal" nature of the transatlantic link through NATO, and to the downplaying of the security threat posed by Russia. Although France was vaccinated against the first, it has not escaped the second. It struggles to convince its partners that the United States' distancing from Europe is not an epiphenomenon linked to "Trumpism" but reflects an underlying trend and the gradual ending of an interlude that began in 1941.

How can we meet Europe's security challenge?





In my view, support for Ukraine is essential. Of course, geography is what it is: Russia and the European Union will always be neighbours. But a Russia recognized for its hegemonic territorial ambitions, reaping the rewards of its military aggression in 2022, is an entirely different Russia from the one that would be brought to the negotiating table, accepting concessions and security guarantees for Ukraine. I much prefer this second Russia to the first!

Thus, the question is: do Ukraine and the Europeans have the means, in the long term, to counter the Russian government's imperial endeavour?

I think so. What do we really know about the state of Russia? When the USSR collapsed, Western observers were surprised to realize the extent to which they had overestimated Soviet capabilities ... Admittedly, there are still many shortcomings in our defence efforts, and money, the sinews of war, is sometimes in short supply: we are all too aware of this in France. The military machine of the European states produces few of the most sought-after weapons: like Sparta, which had to equip itself with a fleet to defeat Athens and win the Peloponnesian War, France and the European Union are going to have to make up for their

considerable backlog in surface-to-air defences and drone production, one key to the battles of today.

But if awareness takes time, too much time, acceleration is being felt and the movement is widespread within the European Union. In the end, pragmatism prevails: military cooperation between European states, industrial agreements in the defence field, joint exercises, military reassurance missions within the framework of NATO, ad hoc coalitions between European states when NATO is reluctant to commit itself are all on the increase. Even Germany, with its first military strategy since World War II!

As you will have gathered, I am more of an advocate of defending Europe than of a Europe of defence, which seems to me to be rather far-fetched in a man's lifetime!

4 - Ladies and gentlemen, if Paul Valéry in *La crise de l'esprit* enlightens us, it is precisely the fact that the end of history, proclaimed for a time by Mr. Fukuyama, is only a parenthesis of history itself, and that history is in perpetual motion: no position is acquired indefinitely or by anticipation. To our friends in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia: the gradual disappearance of Europe and France is not just about Europe and France. It should be of concern to any country whose ambition is not to be reduced to the status of a relay or satellite power for more powerful countries. Yes, it should concern any country worried about exercising its full sovereignty.

However, this disappearance is not inevitable: in a world that is becoming less and less globalized, there are as many signs of the structuring of international issues around superpowers such as China or the United States as there are of centrifugal movements and resistance to these trends, in Europe or elsewhere.

Perhaps the time has come for middle and emerging powers.

When we speak of "middle powers" we do not mean minor powers, operating in the gaps left free by major powers, but rather an alternative way of asserting sovereignty vis-à-vis block structures or relations of strict subordination. The middle power is one that wants to control its own destiny, without limiting itself to its immediate environment, and refuses to rely on those more powerful than itself.

Let us not be afraid to say it: France has all the characteristics of a middle power, even if it finds it difficult to see itself as such. I am convinced that this is not a decline for my country but an opportunity, if it wants to regain a more credible voice and action. When a country speaks, it must have the means to turn its words into deeds: this fundamental rule of diplomacy has too often been forgotten. The European Union is the epitome of an alliance of middle powers. But it struggles to see itself as a major power on the world stage because, for too many years, it has refused to equip itself with certain instruments of power, in the name of unbridled neoliberalism. It has also been paralysed by internal differences.

European countries that want to go further should, in my view, form "ad hoc pioneer groupings" within the Union.

A change of focus is therefore essential.

For France and the European Union, the transatlantic relationship cannot be limited to the United States; it must also more closely include Canada and the countries of Latin America.

Mediterranean policy, the great orphan of our diplomacy, must be "put back on the drawing board." With Morocco today, and hopefully with Algeria tomorrow, we can build a centre of security and growth in the western Mediterranean.

And we could cite many examples, from the Middle East to Asia, via Africa, where the development of relations with the middle powers of these regions constitutes a horizon of shared benefits, between partners, with potentially stabilising effects.

In fact, there is a gap between, on the one hand, the Global South, the BRICS and the other Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, over which China and, to a lesser extent, Russia have led a successful takeover bid, and, on the other hand, the G7, which is elitist by definition, or the G20, whose practice is too restrictive.

This area would bring together middle or emerging powers from several regions of the world, seeking to go off on a "diplomatic tangent", to move away from overly exclusive partnerships and to escape the narrow North-South or East-West divides, exploited for hegemonic purposes by a number of powers.

Middle power diplomacy means breaking down such barriers in action.

I submit to the sagacity of your Conference this reflection on the grouping of like-minded middle and emerging powers, beyond the framework of the dominant powers.

Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends,

I've tried to be clear-headed.

Lucidity means affirming that France's waning influence on the international stage is another name for its difficulties on the domestic scene, its sovereignty tested in a number of areas and the questioning of its identity. All these questions will be on the table in the run-up to the French elections in 2027, and I will be working with others to try and come up with viable proposals for answers.

In examining the strategic challenges we face, we need to be clear-headed and make the necessary adjustments where errors of judgment have been made – I am thinking in particular of our relations with African countries and the need to grow stronger more quickly in order to respond to the security threats coming from the East.

Lucidity means occupying an appropriate place, aligning discourse with action, forging partnerships that do not dominate to bring about a "new grammar" of international relations, centred on middle powers. And why not bring them together, by affinity, in a new arena?

Yes, France is a middle power, and that is its good fortune!

A French poet, René Char, wrote during the dark hours of the Occupation, when he was a member of the Resistance: "Lucidity is the wound that brings us closest to the sun"(Feuillets d'Hypnos). He regarded lucidity as a catharsis which, through an uncompromising but never pessimistic or negative perspective, allows one to reach a form of transcendence, liberation from constraints, and truth.

War, brutality and violent domination are not inevitable. France, Europe and many countries in all regions of the world aspire to a civilized international framework that is functional, protects them and increases the number of centers of stability.

Nialé Kaba

Special Envoy of the President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Minister of State, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire

Mr. President of the Senate of the French Republic,
His All-Holiness, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew Ist,
Mr. President of the World Policy Conference, dear Thierry de Montbrial,
Excellencies, Heads of State and Government,
Excellencies, Ministers,
Excellencies, Ambassadors,
Dear panelists and speakers,
Ladies and Gentlemen, Representatives of international financial and economic institutions, Academics and Experts,
Distinguished participants, in your respective ranks and titles,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
First of all, I would like to convey the regrets of His Excellency Mr. Alassane Ouattara, President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, who was unable to attend this important gathering due to pressing duties in Abidjan. He has entrusted me with the honor of representing him.

It is therefore with great honor and legitimate pride that I address this distinguished assembly on his behalf.

Allow me to extend my greetings to Mr. President Larcher, who has rightly recalled France's commitment to multilateral dialogue — a position fully shared by my country.

Your All-Holiness, Patriarch Bartholomew Ist, your presence reminds us that the governance of human affairs cannot be devoid of a moral compass.

And you, dear Thierry de Montbrial, I would like to commend your foresight in sustaining, edition after edition, a space where such essential conversations remain possible.

The theme you have chosen — "Between fragmentation and interdependence: rethinking global governance"— is not merely academic. It is a precise and compelling diagnosis of the state of global governance in our time.

Distinguished personalities, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The global order painstakingly built after the Second World War — this framework of rules, shared norms, and multilateral institutions — is now being fundamentally challenged.

We are witnessing a triple fracture:

A geopolitical fracture: great power competition has returned to the forefront, undermining decades of multilateral cooperation. Bloc dynamics, once thought obsolete, are re-emerging in new forms.

A technological fracture: the digital revolution, instead of being a universal public good, is amplifying inequalities and widening unprecedented gaps between nations.

A climate and humanitarian fracture: environmental disruptions threaten to destabilize entire regions, accelerate forced migration, and exacerbate tensions that already fuel conflicts.

These fractures deepen economic inequalities, which, far from diminishing, continue to widen between developed and developing countries, eroding the legitimacy of institutions meant to address them.

For Africa, this fragmentation is not theoretical — it is lived reality: in regional instability, in the volatility of global financial markets, in the difficulty of financing structural transformation, in migration flows reflecting deep inequalities, and in the persistent marginalization of the continent in global decision-making.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Yet, paradoxically, never have global value chains, financial flows, climate challenges, security



concerns, and the governance of shared natural resources been so interconnected.

This interdependence reminds us that beyond our differences, we form a true community of destiny, where the choices of some inevitably shape the future of all.

From Abidjan, we experience this interdependence daily. Côte d'Ivoire, the world's leading cocoa producer, is directly affected by global market fluctuations, trade policies of importing countries, WTO rules, and climate agreements negotiated thousands of miles away — all of which have tangible impacts on the lives of millions of our citizens.

In light of this reality, rethinking global governance has become an imperative.

As President Alassane Ouattara stated at the 5th edition of the WPC in Cannes in December 2012, and I quote:

"It is necessary to strengthen global governance so that it reflects the realities of the world and responds to the aspirations of peoples."

In our view, a renewed global governance should rest on several key pillars:

First, representativeness.

Côte d'Ivoire, in line with the African Union's position, reiterates its call for a deep and inclusive reform of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, including permanent representation of Africa on the UN Security Council.

Second, the reform of the international financial architecture, to ensure that developing countries have adequate access to financing for structural transformation and for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.

In this regard, developing countries — which contribute only marginally to global greenhouse gas emissions — call for climate transition financing not to weigh on sovereign debt, but to be considered as an investment in global stability.

Finally, digital governance.

While the digital revolution is a driver of development in Africa, it also brings new challenges: disinformation, cyberattacks on emerging critical infrastructure, and the use of autonomous tools by non-state armed groups.

Africa and the Global South can no longer remain passive consumers of these technologies without participating in their regulation.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In West Africa, Côte d'Ivoire stands as a hub of stability and human development—a land of dialogue, an open economy full of opportunities, and a reliable partner for all who believe that humanity's destiny must converge rather than diverge.

Faced with persistent regional crises, terrorist threats along our northern borders, and migration flows that we manage in accordance with our international commitments, Côte d'Ivoire has not chosen isolation or alignment with competing blocs.

Instead, we have chosen cooperation — an assumed and structured interdependence built on concrete projects.

President Alassane Ouattara firmly believes — and we share this conviction — that the peace of the 21st century will not be proclaimed in treaties alone. It will be built through concrete actions, shared projects, and the pursuit of mutual interests.

That cocoa farmer, that mother, that young graduate — it is to them that we must be accountable. Not through declarations, but through results.

It is on this note of hope that, on behalf of the President of the Republic, H.E. Mr. Alassane Ouattara, I wish you productive, bold, and above all, meaningful discussions for the benefit of our shared humanity.

Thank you for your kind attention.

HH Bartholomew Ist

Archbishop of Constantinople - New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch

Eminences,
Your Excellencies,
Dear Thierry de Montbrial,
Honorable participants,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Friends,

The global community is now at a decisive turning point in its history. Building genuine peace can no longer be limited to the traditional instruments of diplomacy: it is becoming an absolute condition for the very survival of our world. The issue that brings us together – the search for a stable and sustainable framework for global governance – goes far beyond provisional arrangements and fluctuating geopolitical balance. It impacts the very heart of human coexistence.

For peace is not simply another political objective. It is the deepest expression of communion between people. It is also the ultimate condition for preserving creation in the face of the forces of fragmentation that threaten it. Since the very beginning, humanity has been possessed by an irreducible longing for unity.

And yet contemporary reality seems contradictory thereof. The world we live in is marked by constant tension between reconciliation and division. On the one hand, technological advances

and economic interconnection have brought us closer than ever before. On the other hand, we are witnessing increasing fragmentation, both geopolitical and socioeconomic, explicitly manifested in the increased vulnerability of international trade, market instability and a gradual decline in global prosperity. The international trading system, which could be an instrument of peaceful cooperation, tends to be transformed into a set of regional blocs that are sometimes antagonistic, structured around dominant powers. In this context, universality of law is undermined, and the sense of injustice grows.

Yet the experience of history teaches us a fundamental truth: only solid institutional cohesion can contain the forces of disintegration. After decades of global economic integration, often seen as inevitable, we are now entering a phase of uncertainty and reconfiguration.

But this crisis goes far beyond the economic and technical dimensions. It reveals a deeper crisis, a spiritual crisis. It highlights our difficulty in recognizing the other – whether an individual or a nation – as our neighbor, a partner in our destiny.

From this perspective, global governance cannot be reduced to the management of power relations. It must be understood as a service to humanity. It is up to us to rethink our responsibility towards future generations, by seeing peace not simply as the absence of war, but as the fullness of life.

In this respect, the Evangelical message remains strikingly topical: "Peace I leave with you, my peace I give to you" (John 14:27). This gift cannot remain an abstraction. It calls for concrete reflection in our institutions, in our public policies and in the way we organize our common life.

But the current system of global governance is considerably weakened. Despite the proliferation of international organizations, we are not seeing greater unity, but rather increasing complexity, sometimes verging on fragmentation. Without a common moral vision, this network of institutions risks becoming a new Tower of Babel: a plurality of voices lacking any real harmony.

This then raises the legitimate question of whether traditional diplomacy is still enough to meet the challenges of today. Everything points to the need for a paradigm shift.

Reforming international institutions is now a matter of urgency. In Europe, for example, economic and social stability requires an adaptation of budgetary and financial frameworks. On a global scale, the emerging powers are called upon to play a more active and responsible role, going beyond strictly national approaches to contribute to more cooperative governance.

But no institutional reform will be truly effective without an internal transformation. Economics and politics cannot be dissociated from the spiritual condition of humanity. In this respect, the experience of the Orthodox Church offers a valuable perspective.

Through synodality, the Church bears witness to a mode of governance based not on imposition but on communion. The Holy and Great Council, meeting in Crete in 2016, forcefully recalled that the unity of humanity is both a gift from God and a historical responsibility. This experience shows that it is possible to reconcile unity and diversity, authority and dialogue.

This model, without being mechanically transposed, can inspire renewed reflection on global governance. Because peace, in its deepest reality, is not simply a legal agreement. It is a mode of existence. It presupposes a transformed gaze, capable of recognizing the image of God in every individual.

However, the limitations of the current international system remain obvious. The United Nations Security Council, in particular, remains shaped by balances of power inherited from another era. A reform of its structures appears necessary to more accurately reflect contemporary realities. Without fair representation, the sense of injustice can only grow – and injustice is always a breeding ground for conflict.

In addition, new challenges are emerging that go beyond the traditional frameworks of sovereignty. The development of artificial intelligence is a striking example. This technology presents considerable opportunities but also raises major ethical issues. In the absence of a global governance framework, there is a great risk that imbalance and abuse will increase.

The environmental crisis is undoubtedly one of the most alarming signs of our fragmentation. The degradation of our planet, our "common home", is causing growing injustice and fueling new tensions. Pollution, climate change, resource depletion: these phenomena have a direct impact on the most vulnerable populations and are causing massive displacements.

For several decades, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has consistently reiterated that environmental protection is inseparable from peace. Man is not the absolute owner of creation, but its steward. He is called upon to care for it responsibly, to receive it as a gift and to return it with an attitude of gratitude.

Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends,

Faced with these challenges, it would be illusory to take refuge in purely technocratic approaches. Behind the statistics and economic analyses, there are human realities: shattered lives, silent suffering, uprooted peoples. The fragmentation of the world is not just a question of structures. It is the reflection of an anthropological crisis.

We are thus faced with a decisive choice. Either we accept division as inevitable, or we commit ourselves resolutely to building a world order based on solidarity. Awareness of our interdependence then becomes essential.

The Orthodox theological tradition expresses this reality through the concept of "perichoresis", which designates a dynamic communion, a living interdependence. No one can exist alone. No one can be saved alone. Peace therefore presupposes the overcoming of selfishness, whether individual or collective.

The history of nations has too often been marked by domination, exclusion and violence. It is time to consider another pathway: that of governance inspired by justice, truth and love. Governance that is not simply a regulatory mechanism, but a living organism in the service of human dignity.

For history is not determined by economic forces or power relations alone. It is also shaped by human freedom: the ability to choose, to convert, to forgive and to cooperate.





In this sense, hope remains possible. It is not based on naivety, but on the conviction that man is capable of transformation. That division is not inevitable. That peace can be built. To conclude, allow us to express one wish. Our work should not be limited to analyses, however pertinent, but should open up concrete avenues. May our reflections translate into real commitments. May our search for peace become a shared responsibility. May the God of peace and reconciliation enlighten our minds and guide our decisions. May He give us the wisdom to overcome our divisions and the courage to work together for the common good. "Pursue love" (I Corinthians 14:1), says the Apostle Paul. May this exhortation become our compass in a world called upon to rediscover, at the heart of its fractures, the profound vocation to unity. Thank you for listening.

Thierry de Montbrial
Founder and Executive Chairman of Ifri and the WPC

The beginnings of liberal globalisation had already been announced in the early 1980s, beyond the final rebounds of the Cold War, with the Euromissiles Crisis, and in what was still called the Third World. Similarly, the first political hiccup in this globalisation, also described as a happy one, occurred in 2004-2005, with the return of mutual mistrust between the Euro-Atlantic community and post-communist Russia, mainly around Ukraine. Over the years, this mistrust was bound to grow into an ideological confrontation between 'the West' and the so-called 'Global South'. The first major economic hiccup came with the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and its aftermath. This episode demolished the claims of many theorists who were convinced that they had solved the quadrilateral of growth, full employment, price stability and external equilibrium once and for all. As a magician, Keynes had no successor. Then in 2011 came the much-maligned 'Arab Spring', the consequences of which we are still suffering. All this against the backdrop of the rise of China, with its surprising flashes of brilliance, and the growing anxiety it caused, mainly in the United States. In the United States, as elsewhere, society is changing at breakneck speed. It was amid early doubts about globalisation that the first World Policy Conference was held in Evian from 6-8 October 2008, in the wake of the collapse of Lehman-Brothers. Three simple ideas continue to drive us today, as we all question the sustainability of a 'reasonably open' world. The first idea is the importance of global governance as a set of rules of the game that are acceptable and accepted by most states in order to resolve their conflicts in the best interests of all. This is within the framework of the United Nations Charter. When we say 'rules of the game', we mean the combination of multilateralism and international law. We are all aware of the limits inherent in this law, but more than three quarters of a century of experience has taught us that the governments of even the most powerful states cannot do away with it without inconveniencing public opinion. That can change. The second key idea of the WPC is to highlight the 'middle powers', i.e. countries which, without claiming to rival the great powers, have the will and the means to make a constructive contribution to certain aspects of global governance. The third idea, also seemingly simple, highlights the need to work towards finding a balance within the international system between two extremes: on the one hand, globalisation that is completely open, as if the nation-state had been abolished; and on the other, a return to hard forms of protectionism within spheres of influence dominated by imperial powers, some of which base or would base their legitimacy on the rejection of the West. A rejection to which, paradoxically, certain Western ideologists are contributing. Spheres of influence or blocs, in any case competing for access to planetary or potentially extra-planetary resources. The balance we need to strike is what I have called a 'reasonably open' world. Since the beginning of this decade and the COVID-19 pandemic, it has been as if we have entered a vicious cycle that some interpret as a 'return of the empires', with a non-zero risk of slipping into a third world war. This phenomenon is underpinned by fierce competition for technological, and ultimately monetary and financial, domination, in directions and with consequences that are largely unpredictable. The main challenge is artificial intelligence. It is already permeating all economic activities, starting with warfare. Since the beginning of the 2020s, 'high-intensity wars' have returned, in defiance of international law and multilateralism. Moreover, wars have long since ceased to be declared and concluded by treaties. The war in Ukraine began with the Russian aggression of 24 February 2022 and more than four years since it began, it seems to be permanently mired. At least one million people have been killed or wounded in the fighting. On another theatre, in less than a year, the United States and Israel have launched two wars against Iran: the 'Twelve-Day' war in June 2025, whose objectives were clearly defined; and the other, seemingly Venezuelan-inspired if I dare say so, begun at the end of February 2026, even more hand in hand between the two attackers, which, according to Prime Minister Netanyahu's wishes, is also tragically hitting Lebanon. Whether we are talking about Ukraine or Iran and its proxies, things have not gone according to plan. In the first case, European geopolitics and geoeconomics as a whole are irreversibly disrupted, to the detriment of all the parties directly affected. In the second case, the Israelis and Americans had probably bet on the downfall of the Islamic Republic. The United States clearly did not foresee that by concentrating on the Strait of Hormuz, this war would trigger an earthquake whose effects are already considerable. It is to be welcomed that, during these four years of madness, China has refrained from adding fuel to the fire. But all this can only

intensify its technological efforts and the arms race, as well as its determination regarding Taiwan. The geopolitics of East Asia as a whole is affected by these developments. Japan's disinhibition and rearmament are therefore likely. I will add two more remarks. This is only the third time we've met in France since our first event in Evian in 2008. This will give us a natural opportunity to talk about the European Union more than usual. This is because, taken together, the course of events since the fall of communism in 1989-1991 has profoundly transformed this Union, which is now in jeopardy. Its structure and effectiveness are fragile. Would the EU resist a softening of NATO or, which would amount to the same thing, lasting estrangement from the United States? How can it carry out the economic reforms and internal cooperation needed to become a truly non imperialistic balanced power? Is such an ambition legitimate and realistic? We must consider its future together with our eyes open. In conclusion, how can we fail to remember that human beings do not live on bread alone? The question of the true nature of peace is too serious to be left to experts in economics or politics alone. The return of the spiritual to world affairs should make us question it. In Russia, communism's heir leans on Orthodoxy; in Turkey, Mustapha Kemal Atatürk's successor leans on Islam; in India, Nehru's heir leans on Hinduism; in China, Mao's successor does not disdain Confucius. But those who are driven by the spiritual quest do not solely have reasons to rejoice. Unfortunately, in certain circumstances, nothing is easier than manipulating the masses, especially when spiritual or religious leaders are complicit in authoritarian regimes. In these times of great disarray, the quest for peace requires in-depth reflection on the meaning of this concept, which inevitably has a spiritual dimension. This, ladies and gentlemen, is the spirit in which we have drawn up a programme for our 18th WPC, designed to address the main economic, technological and political aspects of an international system that is once again undergoing profound change – aspects that we must try to grasp in the situation and movement of a moment. I am convinced that only a shared understanding of reality can enable us to identify the challenges to be overcome and the solutions to be found in order to avoid the recurrence of global disasters and finally give the younger generations reasons to hope and to act in the interests of the common good of humanity.



France – Le Monde – 06/24/2026

Le patron de TotalEnergies, Patrick Pouyanné, a estimé vendredi, lors d'une intervention à la World Policy Conference organisée par l'Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI) à Chantilly, près de Paris, que si le blocage du détroit d'Ormuz, dans le Golfe, perdurait « encore deux ou trois mois » la France entrerait « dans une ère de pénurie énergétique ».

France – Le Figaro – 04/27/2026

« L'affrontement entre Israël et l'Iran, l'acmé du conflit au Moyen-Orient, se préparait depuis des décennies. Mais il a élargi le champ de bataille. On a ouvert une boîte de Pandore qu'on n'arrive pas à refermer. La question iranienne est en train de remodeler la région », analyse la spécialiste de l'Ifri Dorothee Schmid à l'occasion de la « World Policy Conference », dont la 18e édition s'est tenue à Chantilly.

France – Les Échos – 05/05/2026

Le ciment reste la méfiance vis-à-vis de l'Iran : « 10 % de leurs missiles ont visé des installations militaires, 89 % ont ciblé des infrastructures énergétiques et civiles. Ce n'était pas des attaques sur les installations américaines. C'était une stratégie prédéfinie parce qu'ils ne sont pas capables de se confronter aux Américains et qu'ils ont vu la région comme un ventre mou. Ils ne s'attendaient pas à ce qu'on arrête 96 % de leurs tirs », a commenté Anwar Gargash, le conseiller diplomatique de MBZ, lors de la World Policy Conference (WPC) à Chantilly.

France – Mediapart – 04/25/2026

« Nous croyons, à tort, avoir une sorte de supériorité morale et démocratique sur les autres, ce qui est totalement faux. Je pense que c'est comme pour l'Empire romain d'Occident qui ne comprenait pas ce qui se passait à ses frontières, ne voulait pas le reconnaître et a fini par s'effondrer », a déclaré le président serbe Aleksandar Vucic lors d'une intervention à la World Policy Conference organisée par l'Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) à Chantilly (Oise), près de Paris.

Switzerland – Le Temps – 04/27/2026

L'incertitude, le désarroi et la crainte d'une aggravation de la situation internationale caractérisent l'état des lieux auquel s'est livrée le week-end dernier la dix-huitième édition de la Conférence annuelle de politique mondiale organisée par Thierry de Montbrial, son président fondateur.

Côte d'Ivoire – L'Intelligent d'Abidjan – 04/27/2026

Créée en 2008 par Thierry de Montbrial, la World Policy Conférence réunit chaque année chefs d'État, ministres, experts et dirigeants autour des grands enjeux planétaires. Représentant le chef de l'Etat Alassane Ouattara, la Ministre d'État a, dans son intervention, évoqué une triple fracture mondiale : géopolitique, avec le retour des rivalités entre puissances ; technologique, qui accentue les inégalités ; et climatique et humanitaire, source d'instabilité et de migrations forcées.

Côte d'Ivoire – Abidjan.net – 04/25/2026

Fondée en 2008 par Thierry de Montbrial, éminent diplomate et intellectuel français, fondateur et président de l'Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri), la World Policy Conference est bien plus qu'un forum annuel. Elle est, depuis plus de quinze ans, l'un des rares espaces au monde où se rencontrent, dans la liberté du dialogue authentique, des chefs d'État, des ministres, des décideurs économiques, des académiciens et des experts pour débattre des grandes questions qui façonnent l'ordre mondial.

Rwanda – Rwanda News Agency – 04/24/2026

President Kagame is in Chantilly for the 2026 World Policy Conference (WPC), joining founder and Chairperson of the WPC and the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), Thierry de Montbrial, and other high-level political and business leaders, academics and opinion leaders, for the eighteenth edition of the forum.

France – Mediapart – 04/24/2026

« Rétablir la confiance est illusoire (...). On ne peut pas être attaqué avec 2 800 missiles et drones et ensuite parler de confiance. Cela prendra une éternité », a affirmé l'influent conseiller diplomatique émirati, Anwar Gargash, lors d'une intervention en visioconférence à la World Policy Conference organisée par l'Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI) à Chantilly, près de Paris.

France – Le Nouvel Obs – 04/25/2026

Invité à la World Policy Conference organisée par l'Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) à Chantilly, près de Paris, Patrick Pouyanné a appelé à la « résilience » face au blocage du détroit d'Ormuz, évoquant des investissements « probablement dans de nouveaux pipelines » afin de réduire la dépendance à ce passage maritime stratégique.

Belgium – La Libre – 04/24/2026

Affirmant qu'il sera difficile de se passer du pétrole issu du Golfe, « très bon marché », M. Pouyanné a plaidé pour l'émergence d'alternatives au détroit d'Ormuz. « Ce qui est sûr - et nous n'avons pas été très bons dans ce domaine - c'est que si nous investissons au Moyen-Orient, nous devons investir dans la résilience du système », a-t-il affirmé lors d'une intervention à la World Policy Conference organisée par l'Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) à Chantilly, près de Paris.

Greece – The Orthodox Times – 04/25/2026

Τη σημασία διαφύλαξης της ειρήνης και της κοινωνικής δικαιοσύνης στο σημερινό παγκόσμιο περιβάλλον που κλονίζεται, υπογράμμισε ο Οικουμενικός Πατριάρχης κ. Βαρθολομαίος την Παρασκευή, 24 Απριλίου 2026, στην επίσημη ομιλία του στον 18ο κύκλο του Διεθνούς Συνεδρίου “World Policy Conference”, που πραγματοποιείται στην πόλη Chantilly της Γαλλίας.

Ukraine - Union of Orthodox Journalists – 04/26/2026

Serbia – Kosovo Online 1 – 04/25/2026

Mislim da sam na relativno dobar način, u nejednostavnim uslovima, govorio o tome kako su gažena prava Srbije i srpskog naroda, posebno vezano za situaciju na Kosovu i Metohiji. Govorio sam i o principijelnoj poziciji Srbije, koliko uspešno - bolje da vi procenite, nego da ja o tome govorim", kazao je Vučić u izjavi medijima nakon učešća na WPC u Francuskoj.

Romania - Adevarul.ro – 04/28/2026

Vicepremierul Cătălin Predoiu, ministru al Afacerilor Interne, a participat între 24 și 26 aprilie la World Policy Conference 2026, desfășurată la Chantilly, Franța, unde a susținut o intervenție în cadrul panelului dedicat viitorului Uniunii Europene. Evenimentul, considerat unul dintre cele mai importante forumuri internaționale de dezbattere pe teme de guvernanță globală, a reunit lideri politici, economici și academici din întreaga lume.

Armenia – Armenpress – 04/27/2026

Համաշխարհային քաղաքականության համաժողովի շրջանակում ՄԵԸ-ն որպես ռազմավարական գործընկեր՝ թեմայով պանելային քննարկման ընթացքում ՀՀ ԱԳ նախարարի տեղակալ Վահան Կոստանյանն անդրադարձել է Հայաստան-ԵՄ հարաբերություններին և որանց զարգացման հեռանկարներին:

South Korea – MAEIL BUSINESS NEWSPAPER – 04/29/2026

알렉산다르 부치치 세르비아 대통령은 제18회 세계정책포럼스(WPC) 이틀째인 지난 25일 유럽에 반성을 촉구했다. 프랑스 샹티이 도멘 레 종텐에서 열린 티에리 드 몽브리알 프랑스 국제관계연구소(IFRI) 소장과의 대담 세션에서 그는 유럽이 현실을 직시해야 한다고 강조했다.

Japan – Nikkei – 05/02/2026

At the World Policy Conference, held in Chantilly near Paris from April 24 to April 26, the accelerating transformation of warfare through AI emerged as an urgent theme. Gen. Wayne Eyre, Canada's former chief of the defense staff, warned that modern conflict is speeding up the military "adaptation cycle" -- the process by which forces recognize a threat, formulate a policy and execute a response.

Kurdistan – K24 – 04/26/2026

"If it lasts two, three months more, we are entering in a world of scarcity of energy, which Asian countries have already suffered," Pouyanne said on Friday at the World Policy Conference in Chantilly. "You cannot have 20% of the oil and gas of the planet being stranded and not accessible without major consequences."

Israel - l24 news – 04/24/2026

Le conseiller diplomatique du président des Émirats arabes unis, Anwar Gargash, a dressé un constat sévère des relations avec Téhéran, affirmant que « rétablir la confiance est illusoire » après les frappes iraniennes contre son pays. « On ne peut pas être attaqué avec 2.800 missiles et drones et ensuite parler de confiance. Cela prendra une éternité », a-t-il déclaré lors d'une intervention en visioconférence à la World Policy Conference organisée par l'IFRI.

Qatar – The New Arab – 04/24/2026

Rebuilding trust between Abu Dhabi and Tehran will take "ages and ages", UAE presidential advisor Anwar Gargash said Friday, after Iran targeted the United Arab Emirates during the Middle East conflict.

"You can't be attacked with 2,800 missiles and drones and then talk to me about trust. That will take ages and ages," Gargash said at a World Policy Conference in the town of Chantilly north of Paris.

Saudi Arabia – Arab News – 04/25/2026

"If it lasts two, three months more, we are entering in a world of scarcity of energy, which Asian countries have already suffered," Pouyanné told the World Policy Conference in Chantilly, outside Paris.



Rwanda – Rwanda News Agency – 04/24/2026

President Kagame is in Chantilly for the 2026 World Policy Conference (WPC), joining founder and Chairperson of the WPC and the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), Thierry de Montbrial, and other high-level political and business leaders, academics and opinion leaders, for the eighteenth edition of the forum.

Rwanda – Afrik.com – 04/30/2026

« L'ordre mondial que beaucoup pensaient stable n'a jamais vraiment été stable pour tout le monde ». La formule de Paul Kagame, prononcée devant un parterre de dirigeants internationaux réunis en France au château de Chantilly lors de la 18ème édition de la World Policy Conférence, résume une conviction portée depuis des années par le président rwandais : l'Afrique n'a pas subi les crises récentes, il les a anticipées, parce qu'il en a longtemps payé le prix. Ce que l'Occident vit aujourd'hui comme une rupture, l'Afrique l'a vécue comme une condition ordinaire.

Kazakhstan – Enbekshi QazaQ – 04/24/2026

Қазақстан Республикасының Еуропалық Одақ жанындағы Елшісі Роман Василенко шақырылған спикер ретінде Франция халықаралық қатынастар институты (IFRI) ұйымдастырған «Фрагментация мен өзара тәуелділік арасында: жаһандық басқаруды қайта пайымдау» тақырыбындағы 18-ші жыл сайынғы «Әлемдік саясат конференциясының» (World Policy Conference).

Pakistan – Dawn – 04/25/2026

"You can't be attacked with 2,800 missiles and drones and then talk to me about trust. That will take ages and ages," Anwar Gargash said at a World Policy Conference in the town of Chantilly, north of Paris. The top official said that 89 per cent of the Iranian attacks targeted "civilians, civilian infrastructure, energy infrastructure".

Philippines - Malaya Business Insight – 04/27/2026

"If it lasts two, three months more, we are entering in a world of scarcity of energy, which Asian countries have already suffered," Pouyanne told the World Policy Conference in Chantilly, outside Paris. "You cannot have 20 percent of the oil and gas of the planet being stranded and not accessible without major consequences."



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
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Thierry de Montbrial
Founder and Chairman

Nicolas de Germay
Vice Chairman

Song-Nim Kwon
Executive Director

Florent de Chantérac
Executive Producer

Guillaume Foucault
Head of Communications

Contact:

Dr. Song-Nim Kwon: +33 (0)1 40 61 72 81
E-mail: kwon@worldpolicyconference.com

For more information:

www.worldpolicyconference.com
www.worldpolicyconferencetv.com



Credits

Artistic and editorial direction
Song-Nim Kwon

Processing of data and proofreading
Elsa Merle
Angélique Ferreira Nangbo

Graphic realization and layout
Studio RBN

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