For a reasonably open world
Now that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his Russian and Iranian sponsors have reclaimed most of the territory previously held by opposition forces, his regime will soon be able to claim victory after seven years of carnage. For Europeans, it is imperative that that victory proves hollow.
9 juillet – 24 août 2018
Jean-Yves le Gall, CNES via Europe 1
Du lundi au vendredi, du 9 juillet au 24 août, la matinale d’Europe 1 accueille Jean-Yves Le Gall pour une chronique spatiale quotidienne intitulée « L’espace en tête, un été avec Jean-Yves Le Gall ».
Une occasion de découvrir l’actualité et les programmes du CNES, le contexte historique dans lequel se développent les activités spatiales, les mystères de notre système solaire révélés par les nombreuses missions d’exploration, ainsi que les innovations qui forgent le spatial de demain.
Chaque chronique de 3 minutes couvrira de nombreuses thématiques, parmi lesquelles l’exploration, la géopolitique, l’Homme dans l’espace, climat, ou encore l’innovation.
Comment mesure-t-on la hausse du niveau des océans ? l’Homme ira-t-il sur Mars ? Quel avenir pour les lanceurs ? A quel moment la science-fiction se confond-elle avec la réalité ? Autant de questions auxquelles Jean-Yves Le Gall apportera des éléments de réponse, afin de toujours mieux connaître l’univers qui nous entoure.
AUGUST 9, 2018
Masood Ahmed, CGD
Late last month, around 54 million Pakistanis went to the polls in a hotly contested fight between the old incumbents represented by former PM Nawaz Sharif’s party and political outsider and former cricket star Imran Khan. Although the new government has yet to take office, Khan, who as of Monday has won the most seats in parliament, is expected to realize his long-term aim of becoming prime minister. Having run on a platform of ending corruption and promoting human development, expectations are high especially amongst his younger urban supporters. However, he takes over at a time when Pakistan faces a serious economic challenge and its relations with key global players are under strain.
Mirroring the buzz around Naya Pakistan (New Pakistan) inside the country, Pakistan economy watchers in Washington, DC are also engaged in a lively discussion on how the new economic team should deal with the imminent challenges facing the economy. Taking advantage of the number of eminent Pakistani economists in Washington, I convened a roundtable last week to discuss these issues with them and other experts in the field. The discussion was led by Ishrat Husain, former governor of the State Bank of Pakistan. As the meeting was under Chatham House rules, I won’t report on the discussion itself but the three key messages I took away were encouraging: 1) there was a broad consensus on the nature of the problem; 2) a similar consensus on what needs to be done and why previous attempts to fix it have been unsuccessful; and 3) a degree of guarded optimism that a PTI-led government, without the historical baggage and the vested interests, has a reasonable chance of success in putting Pakistan’s economy on a more sustainable growth path.
More on our key takeaways below.
With forex reserves at $10 billion and falling, a budget deficit exceeding 7 percent of GDP, and the largest current account deficit in its history, there is little time to delay long overdue action to stem the hemorrhage and stabilize the economy. Nor is there any value in spending weeks or months exploring illusory heterodox solutions to what is a textbook problem of macroeconomic mismanagement.
It is important to both recognize this reality and to prepare the country for it, especially after the populist rhetoric that characterized the economic debate in the run-up to the elections. However, careful design of the program can ensure that the negative impacts are minimized for the poor and vulnerable. Even in the near term, a combination of better tax administration and curtailing losses of public enterprises could reduce the fiscal deficit by 2-3 percent of GDP. The recent 14 percent increase in exports and continued action to bring the exchange rate in line with economic fundamentals will help to bring the current account gap to more manageable levels.
The proximate causes of the macro crisis—a large and growing imbalance between government spending and tax revenues and an even sharper worsening of the gap between exports and imports—are both the result of chronic weaknesses in Pakistan’s economy. They reflect a combination of structural, institutional, and cyclical factors which make Pakistan prone to such macroeconomic crises every few years.
The inescapable lesson from the history of Pakistan’s economic management is that a band-aid approach to stabilizing the economy without addressing chronic underlying weaknesses is the principal reason for the country’s proclivity to repeated financial crises.
Whether it’s broadening the tax base and rationalizing an increasingly oppressive and distorted structure of taxes; privatizing and commercializing the scores of loss making public enterprises (of which the Pakistan Steel Mill, PIA and the Pakistan Railways lead the pack but many smaller ones hide in the slipstream); ensuring that government spending on education and health is both raised and made more effective to start improving Pakistan’s dismal human development indicators; or addressing the distortions and anti-export bias in the business environment—the technical solutions are sufficiently clear to initiate decisive actions.
In the face of crisis, many governments—civilian and military—have managed to take the actions necessary to stabilize the situation. However, it has proven far harder to follow through on the key structural reforms even when the technical solutions were clear. The pressure of powerful lobbies (often backers of the government in power) and an overactive judiciary have stymied the good intentions with which incoming governments have started their term in office. Halfway through that term, most governments have become defenders and apologists for the status quo.
Developing such a consensus is the most important challenge that will determine the success of the new economic team. The lobbies and vested interests that blocked previous attempts at economic reform may be temporarily weakened—and it is important to take advantage of the initial honeymoon period to take some important if unpopular decisions. But in the longer term, transformative and sustained economic reforms will only come about if the government can build and carry a broad-based coalition of support for these actions. An essential start to building such a coalition would be to recognize and continue the positive reforms and initiatives of the previous government. An important lesson of cross-country experience is that investors like it when any government adopts positive economic policies but they are most impressed when the positive policies of one government are celebrated and maintained by their successors.
It is unrealistic to think that the external financial support required to deal with gross external financing needs of between $25-30 billion in each of the next five years can be met without the imprimatur of the IMF or its own financial contribution. It is also misguided to believe that without IMF engagement, the necessary stabilization program would entail less pain. The underlying imbalances still need to be curtailed, and without the IMF (and related) financing, the adjustment to aggregate demand will be larger and more painful. However, the IMF will not be able to provide all the financing that is needed from its own account without some commitments by Pakistan’s other creditors. It is important therefore to engage early and constructively in a dialogue with those creditors. Also, mirroring the earlier comment about the importance of embedding the macro stabilization effort in a broader structural reform program, any IMF program must be complemented by complementary programs addressing issues outside the IMF’s core competence but essential to the realization of Pakistan’s economic transformation vision.
The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), an approximately $60 billion program of infrastructure and energy projects that is part of the larger Belt and Road Project, is an important reality but the hype around it has created both unrealistic expectations and exaggerated concerns. Unrealistic expectations about the near-term impact on growth and exports of CPEC funded projects have led to imprudent financing and fuzzy thinking about how their balance of payments consequences will be managed. Equally, a lack of clarity about just how much of the oft-cited $60-odd billion has actually been committed or disbursed (answer: probably less than a third) has led to an exaggerated worry about the role of CPEC in any package of international support.
PTI’s focus on governance and on human development, combined with its track record of service delivery in Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa, the province it has governed for five years, provide some grounds for optimism that it will make a more determined effort to address Pakistan’s seemingly intractable problems of political economy. However, there is also a concern that many of these problems will require taking on powerful vested interests and the political polarization of the country will make it harder to build the necessary cross party consensus on transformative reforms. Of course, it is early days and the roundtable participants were both willing to give the new team time to settle in and hopeful that this time will be different.
Minister of State of Belgium. Former Chief of Staff of the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and in that capacity he was EU ‘Sherpa’ to the G8. Mr. van Daele joined the Belgium diplomatic service in 1971 and throughout his extensive diplomatic career he has been the representative of Belgium in the Security Council and the permanent representative of Belgium to the EU and NATO, as well as Ambassador to the US. He is a former Director of the Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and has held various other positions in the Belgian Ministry of Foreign affairs (i.a. Director-General of Political Affairs). Mr. van Daele holds a Master in Philosophy and Arts (romance philology) from the University of Leuven. Between 2013 and 2017, he served as Chief of Staff to His Majesty the King of the Belgians. On retirement Baron van Daele was appointed Minister of State.
Patricia Danzi has been regional director for Africa at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) since 2015, overseeing all ICRC operations on the continent. She is responsible for over 7,000 staff and a budget of up to USD 750 million. She has been with the ICRC since 1996, working in a range of roles worldwide. She holds a master’s degree in agricultural economics, geography and environmental science, and carried out postgraduate research in development studies in Geneva. Patricia is a mother of two teenage boys, a former Olympic athlete and fluent in seven languages.
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania since January 2017 for the third time (previously in 1992 – 1996 and 2014). Minister Meleșcanu has extensive political and administrative experience: three times senator in the Romanian Parliament, re-elected in 2016, he held numerous high-level positions in the administration. He was defence minister (2007 – 2008) and State Advisor on defence and security in the Prime Minister Chancellery in 2015. He was also head of the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service (2012 – 2014). Minister Meleșcanu is professor at the doctoral school of the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration. He graduated from the Faculty of Law (University of Bucharest) and holds a PhD in social and political science, specializing in international law, from the University of Geneva.
Publié
Par Renaud Girard, Le Figaro
Dans l’inconscient collectif des Tchèques durant toute la seconde moitié du XXème siècle, l’ennemi principal de leur nation siégeait à Moscou. Deux années étaient traumatisantes pour eux: 1948 et 1968. En février 1948, Staline avait ordonné au parti communiste le sabotage du gouvernement d’union nationale d’après guerre et sa prise de pouvoir par la force, quitte à défénestrer Jan Mazaryk, le ministre des affaires étrangères pro-occidental. Le 21 août 1968 à l’aube, sur ordre de Léonid Brejnev (un communiste ukrainien qui était alors le maître du Kremlin), les chars du Pacte de Varsovie envahirent la Tchécoslovaquie, pour tuer le vent de liberté du Printemps de Prague. A cette occasion, Brejnev avait élaboré sa théorie de la “souveraineté limitée” des pays de l’Est, formellement alliés de l’Union soviétique au sein du Pacte de Varsovie.
En 1948, une partie non négligeable de l’intelligentsia tchèque était acquise à l’idéologie du communisme moscoutaire. En revanche, en 1968, la quasi-totalité des intellectuels tchèques se trouvèrent du côté du Printemps de Prague. La “normalisation” qui suivit l’invasion soviétique ne fut pas aussi impitoyable que la conversion forcée au communisme de 1948 mais elle fut quand même sévère: tous les intellectuels qui n’avaient pas choisi de s’exiler furent chassés de leurs emplois de professeurs, de chercheurs, d’éditeurs, de cinéastes ou de journalistes; ils furent contraints d’exercer des travaux manuels subalternes.
C’est ce qui arriva par exemple à Milos Zeman, l’actuel président de la République tchèque, réélu à son poste au mois de janvier dernier. Jeune économiste, Zeman avait adhéré au parti communiste réformateur de Dubcek pendant le printemps de Prague. En 1970, il en fut exclu, en raison de son opposition à l’invasion de son pays par les pays “frères” du Pacte de Varsovie, et il perdit son emploi. En 1989, il participe à la Révolution de velours. A la tête du parti social-démocrate, il gagne les élections législatives de 1998 et devient premier ministre de son pays, fonction qu’il exercera jusqu’en 2001. Après avoir un moment quitté la politique, Zeman y revint en 2013, pour gagner la première élection présidentielle organisée au suffrage universel.
Dans sa carrière politique, Zeman milita avec efficacité pour l’adhésion de la République tchèque à l’Otan et à l’Union européenne. Après l’annexion de la Crimée par la Russie en 2014, et au moment où on pensait encore que les chars russes pouvaient à tout moment déferler en Ukraine, Zeman préconisa publiquement un déploiement préventif de l’Otan à l’ouest de ce pays. Zeman n’est donc clairement pas un pion du Kremlin.
Mais ce qui est intéressant chez lui est qu’il se refuse à être anti-russe de manière systématique. Le 9 mai 2015, alors qu’il est devenu clair que l’armée russe n’envahira pas l’Ukraine, il se rend à Moscou pour assister au défilé célébrant le 70ème anniversaire de la victoire sur le nazisme. A ceux qui le critiquent, il répond: “n’est-ce pas grâce aux Russes que nous, Tchèques, ne sommes pas obligés de dire “Heil Hitler”?” Il interdit de palais présidentiel l’ambassadeur américain à Prague qui a critiqué publiquement son voyage à Moscou. “Que diraient les Américains si l’ambassadeur tchèque à Washington se permettait de dire à leur Président où aller ou ne pas aller en voyage?”, explique-t-il.
En novembre 2017, il se rend en visite d’Etat en Russie, accompagné par 140 hommes d’affaires tchèques. Devant Poutine, il déclare publiquement que “le futur de l’Union européenne réside dans de bonnes relations avec la Russie!” De nombreux Tchèques reprochent alors au russophone Zeman de faire une politique étrangère divergente de celle de son premier ministre, demeuré dans une ligne otanienne classique. En dépit de ses sentiments prorusses clairement affichés, Zeman est réélu au suffrage universel en janvier 2018.
Comment expliquer un tel tournant stratégique au sein de la population tchèque, pourtant restée très attachée à l’UE ? La Russie n’est plus ressentie par les Tchèques comme leur ennemi principal. “L’ennemi, c’est cette anti-civilisation qui s’étend de l’Afrique du Nord à l’Indonésie. Deux milliards de gens y vivent et elle est financée en partie par les ventes de pétrole, et en partie par le trafic de drogue”, proclama, dès 2011, Milos Zeman.
Comme leurs voisins du groupe de Visegrad (Slovaquie, Pologne, Hongrie), les Tchèques sont effarés par les problèmes que se sont créés les Européens occidentaux avec leur immigration musulmane massive. Jamais ils n’auraient pu imaginer qu’un massacre comme celui du Bataclan puisse arriver à Paris. Ils refusent donc les migrants que la France et l’Allemagne leur demandent d’accueillir chez eux. Comme réfugiés du Moyen-Orient, ils n’acceptent que les chrétiens. Entre 1968 et 2018, le ressenti de la menace venue de l’étranger a totalement changé au sein de la population tchèque…
14 August 2018
by Prince Michael of Liechtenstein, GIS
Since the beginning of the year, the Turkish lira has plunged some 40 percent against the U.S. dollar. Much of the nosedive occurred last week, after Washington announced higher tariffs for steel and aluminum from Turkey.
The Turkish authorities have put an evangelical American pastor, Andrew Brunson, on trial for alleged involvement with terrorist groups, as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is officially and internationally classified. The United States has asked him to be freed; Turkey, while relaxing Mr. Brunson’s two-year prison detention to house arrest, has said its judicial process is independent and must run its course. In retaliation, Washington imposed tariffs and put sanctions on two Turkish cabinet ministers.
We can now read and hear a cocktail of opinions about the lira crash, ranging from blaming the U.S. and especially President Donald Trump’s administration (the usual scapegoats) to castigating the domestic and foreign policies of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan(another favorite culprit).
Although these political actors and their administrations can trigger momentary movements (and in this case, their basically unrelated actions accelerated the currency’s weakening), the underlying causes of the market turmoil run much deeper.
Since Mr. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) took power in 2002, the Turkish economy has grown at a breakneck pace. However, as Turkey’s low savings rate did not provide sufficient capital, economic growth was largely financed in foreign currencies, especially in U.S. dollars and euros. This made Turkey’s rapid expansion dependent on foreign investment and capital inflows, and drastically increased business liabilities in foreign currencies. Since the country needs to import almost all of its energy along with most intermediate goods for exporters, it also runs a structural foreign trade deficit, worsening its payments balance.
With the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank following policies of low or negative interest rates, Turkey – which offered higher yields and fast economic growth – was confronted with an excessive inflow of foreign capital. This kept the lira exchange rate strong.
When the Fed started “tapering” – in other words, phasing out quantitative easing and reintroducing higher interest rates – investors responded by cutting their exposure to emerging markets. Countries such as Brazil, Indonesia and Turkey were left without enough capital to keep financing growth.
Following the example of the U.S. and EU members, Turkey tried to stimulate the economy with strong public spending
In the meantime, following the example of the U.S. and many European Union governments, Turkey tried to further stimulate the economy with strong public expenditures and interest rates that were perhaps lower than necessary. These policies have now resulted in downward pressure on the lira.
Given the export orientation of Turkey’s economy, there were good reasons for monetary policymakers to be wary about increasing interest rates, which could have resulted in a strongly overvalued lira. However, once the currency began to weaken, the large foreign debt of Turkish businesses became a very serious problem.
The Turkish economy is now caught in a vicious circle, partly due to its structural imbalances, but also to the unintended consequences of global monetary policies. The lira is becoming drastically oversold, just as it was probably overvalued in the recent past. This is the same trap that other smaller currencies have fallen into, because they are exposed through trade and investments to the extreme policies in the large currency areas – the U.S. dollar and the euro.
Washington cannot be blamed for these problems. However, taking advantage of Turkey’s financial difficulties to secure political gains (freeing Mr. Brunson, blocking procurement of Russian arms, influencing Ankara’s policies in Syria) will only worsen the lira’s downward spiral. In the long term, it might prove shortsighted. Experience shows that political bargains are more likely to be struck through quiet diplomacy, applying leverage behind the scenes, rather than by twisting arms in public. That only makes the negotiating partner lose face.
Europe would also be well advised to look for ways to help Ankara instead of indulging in schadenfreude. Turkey is an important partner in politics and trade. Berlin, at least, appears to have recognized this and will be receiving Mr. Erdogan for a visit in late August. One hopes the discussions will be constructive.
What Turkey needs now are friends. Bashing the country, or using the crisis to back it into a corner to achieve other objectives, can only backfire and make the monetary crisis worse. All it would accomplish would be to push a longtime ally in the wrong direction. It certainly will not help Ankara make the right decisions.
Aug. 15, 2018
BRUSSELS — From the start of the torturous negotiations over Brexit, as Britain’s exit from the European Union is known, the talks have followed an all too familiar dynamic.
The Europeans set the agenda; the British push for concessions or special deals, while trying to work out among themselves what they really want. The Europeans say no, sticking to a pretty hard line.
But now, with 85 percent of a deal completed, and the toughest issues remaining, European officials say they are increasingly worried that Prime Minister Theresa May’s government is so divided and fragile that it could collapse, scuttling a deal and inflicting damage on the Continental economy.
So the Europeans are now exploring ways to finesse their position, three senior European officials say, to sign a withdrawal agreement by the end of the year so it can be ratified by the end of March, when Brexit occurs regardless.
That would formally divorce Britain from the bloc after more than 40 years of marriage. But some of the hardest issues would be left for transition talks that will last another 19 months, until the end of 2020.
All of the officials spoke anonymously, following diplomatic practice, and because they do not have permission to be quoted by name.
The aim is to reduce internal British political warfare over how to best keep the promise of no hard border between Ireland, which will remain in the European Union, and Northern Ireland, which will not.
The new British Foreign Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, has been traveling through northern Europe, lobbying for Britain’s position, warning of a chaotic no deal Brexit, and urging “a change in approach” by Brussels. The British and European Union negotiators will meet again on Thursday and Friday, an unusual mid-vacation session.
A big sticking point is how to oversee disputes between Britain and the bloc, since Mrs. May, pushed by fervent Brexiteers, does not want to give the European Court of Justice, the bloc’s highest court, any authority over Britain once it leaves the European Union.
But the thorniest issue is the nature of the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, because its status hinges on some understanding of the future trading relationship between Britain and the bloc, which remains up in the air.
Mrs. May, at her meeting with her cabinet at Chequers in July, supported the concept of a “free trade area for goods” — but not services — made possible by what she called a “facilitated customs arrangement.”
European officials said that the Chequers statement at least clarified for the first time what Britain wants, even if they rejected her customs proposal out of hand.
What was objectionable, they say, is that Britain talks of wanting an “economic partnership” with the bloc that is akin to being part of the single market for goods alone.
The Europeans have been clear that Britain cannot keep what it had as a member without the obligations of membership, in particular the free movement of goods, as well as capital, services and labor.
Nor can it be in a formal customs union if it wishes to make its own trading deals, as Mrs. May continues to insist.
Britain has failed to understand, the Europeans say, how much the European Union itself feels threatened by the world since the Brexit referendum — by the challenges of President Trump, Russia and China, as well as the rise of authoritarian leaders in Hungary and Poland and populists in general who are largely anti-Brussels, as are those in Italy.
So there is even less willingness now to compromise on key European Union principles, and a desire, especially from France, to make it clear that membership in the bloc has privileges not shared by other countries.
There is also a growing weariness with Britain and Mrs. May, who seems to be arguing that she is politically so weak that she cannot talk honestly with her own citizens about what Brexit actually means.
“The U.K. is looking at this from the angle of the future relationship,” a senior European official said. “The other 27 are looking at this as an attack on what the E.U. is.”
“We regret the loss of the U.K., which is a cost for everyone,” the official added. “But it would be even worse if this is the occasion for compromising on the core of the E.U. — that’s to say, the single market.”
That understanding finally seems to be coming home to the British, the Europeans feel, but they are reluctant to specify the consequences, for fear of hurting Mrs. May and creating a new political crisis in Britain that would throw the whole Brexit process into chaos.
Image
So the Europeans are discussing vague language about a future relationship, hoping that will be enough to make Britain accept the need for a backstop to ensure there is no hard or visible border on the island of Ireland.
“The aim,” a second European official said, “is to make what seems unacceptable merely unpalatable.”
European officials are also searching for compromise.
If a formal customs union is impossible, European officials say one solution might be a future free-trade agreement with the European Union, much as Canada and Japan now have, but one that could allow the unencumbered movement of goods across the British (and Irish) borders.
But there is no guarantee that such a free-trade deal will be quick or easy. Normally such agreements take years to negotiate.
There is also discussion of limiting the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and European Union customs officials over Northern Ireland as part of the “backstop” deal, which Ireland (with the support of Brussels) has insisted be written into the withdrawal agreement.
If Britain and Brussels cannot work out their future trading relationship in time, the backstop would essentially establish a border between the entire island of Ireland and the rest of Britain for customs, regulatory standards and value-added tax.
Given the difficulties, some in Britain have been forecasting no deal at all, a so-called cliff-edge Brexit. But senior European officials think that a deal is still more likely than not, if both sides are “reasonable.”
They also say they would be willing to extend the “transition” period to negotiate a new relationship with Britain past December 2020, its current end date. But a specific clause to that effect, with a time limit, must be included in the withdrawal agreement.
The problem for Britain is that any extension would mean additional payments into the European Union budget and a continuation of “rule taking” without a vote, which would outrage Brexiteers.
What many European officials fear is less a cliff-edge Brexit next March than one at the end of 2020, if a final free-trade deal is not completed.
To negotiate a special free-trade deal with Britain that avoids a hard border in Ireland, plus a possible second agreement on security, would ordinarily take years.
But the Brexit withdrawal agreement comes first, and the remaining issues are difficult.
At least now though, European officials say, the talks, at long last, can get more serious.
As if there was any remaining doubt, the past few weeks have shown that US President Donald Trump is fully committed to demolishing the American-led post-war order and free-trade system. Europeans no longer have any time to waste: The EU must assert itself as a unitary, self-sufficient global power before it is too late.
BERLIN – After US President Donald Trump’s recent European tour – which culminated in his infamous press conference with Russian President Vladimir Putin – there can no longer be any doubt that he and his supporters want to destroy the American-led international order and global trade system.
To be sure, Trump is not synonymous with the United States. He triumphed in the 2016 election despite winning three million fewer votes than his opponent, and his public approval rating has never surpassed 50%. Still, he is the US president, and that makes him the most powerful man in the world. His actions, though often absurd and contradictory, have serious real-world consequences, particularly for America’s closest partners. During his recent stop in the United Kingdom, Trump went so far as to describe the European Union as a “foe.”
By seeking to disrupt virtually all that has defined the West since the end of World War II, Trump has brought the world to a historical turning point. At stake is not the US-EU relationship, which remains strong, but rather the West’s dominant position on the world stage. Trump is accelerating a shift in the global balance of power that will leave both America and Europe weaker in relative terms. As income and wealth shift from the West to the East, China will increasingly be able to challenge the US as the world’s leading geopolitical, economic, and technological power.
This transition will not happen smoothly. For Europe, the stakes could not be higher. The rebalancing of power that is already underway could determine the fate of Europe’s democracies, welfare states, independence, and way of life. If Europe does not prepare itself, it will be left with no other choice than to become a dependent of either America or China – Atlanticism or Eurasianism.
Europeans should not count on existing alliances and rules to offer much protection during this period. But nor can we fall back on the logic of traditional nineteenth-century power politics. The world may well be heading toward a situation in which there is no clear hegemon, and great powers constantly jostle for position. But circumstances today are very different from those of the “Great Game” era. An escalating rivalry between China and America will be anything but advantageous for the Old Continent.
For Europeans, the nineteenth century was shaped by the aftermath of the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, whereas the twentieth century was driven by two world wars, the Cold War, and the development of nuclear weapons. At the end of WWII, two non-European powers on either side of the old European state system – the US and the Soviet Union – asserted themselves, and Europe became just another square on the chess board.
Up to that time, Europe had ruled the world, owing largely to its technological prowess. But with the end of WWII, its dominance came to an end. Europe – and particularly Germany – was thereafter divided between the two new powers, and European sovereignty was effectively subsumed by the US foreign-policy establishment and the Kremlin.
To be sure, France and Great Britain, as the two victorious European powers, retained a remnant of sovereignty as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (and later as nuclear-armed states). But, given the global balance of power, this was more symbolic than a reflection of their real influence.
Then came the end of the Cold War, when all of Europe adopted a staunch transatlantic orientation. In terms of security, Europe remained dependent on the US. But on the economic and technological fronts, Europeans had regained their sovereignty. Institutionally, this division of labor was manifested in NATO and the EU, respectively. It is an arrangement that has served us well; but it is now under attack by Trump.
Three developments, in particular, have given Europe reason to fear for its future. First, Trump has continued to question the US commitment to mutual defense under the North Atlantic Treaty. Second, his administration is actively undermining the World Trade Organization and the global trade system upon which much of Europe’s prosperity rests. And third, the rise of digitization and artificial intelligence now threatens to upend global technological hierarchies.
These developments are each challenging Europe’s place in the world. The question now is whether the EU will reclaim its full sovereignty and assert itself as a power on the global stage,or let itself fall behind for good. This is the moment of truth. There will be no second chances.
Only the EU can win back European sovereignty for the twenty-first century. If the task falls to traditional nation-states such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, it will fail. Reclaiming sovereignty will require not just enormous effort, but also a united front, and a new understanding of the relationship between the EU and its member states. The European project will continue to facilitate trade and ensure peace; but it must now also enshrine joint sovereignty.
If the EU succeeds in this task, Trump will have inadvertently done it a big favor. History sometimes proceeds in strange ways. The key is to take it as it comes, and not hesitate when the moment for decisive action arrives.
US President Donald Trump’s supporters justify his mendacity on the grounds that “all politicians lie,” and a little introspection leads us to admit that all humans do. But the amount and type of lying make a difference.
CAMBRIDGE – By June 1 of this year, US President Donald Trump had made 3,259 false or misleading claims, according to The Washington Post Fact Checker’s database, which tracks and categorizes every suspect statement uttered by the president. That’s an average of more than 6.5 false claims a day, up from a daily average of 4.9 untrue claims in his first 100 days, and reaching eight per day in May. Trump is clearly going for a record.
Trump’s supporters justify his mendacity on the grounds that “all politicians lie.” Indeed they do, and a little introspection leads us to admit that all humans lie. But the amount and type of lying make a difference. Too many lies debases the currency of trust.
Not all lies are born equal. Some are self-serving. A president may lie to cover his tracks, avoid embarrassment, harm a rival, or for convenience.
Other presidential lies serve a loftier purpose. In some circumstances, historians even applaud the fact that a president decided to deceive the public for what he considered a larger or later good. John F. Kennedy misled the public about the role of American missiles in Turkey in the deal that ended the Cuban missile crisis in 1962; but that was certainly better for their interests than a high risk of nuclear war.
A more ambiguous example occurred in 1941, before the United States entered World War II. In trying to persuade an isolationist public that Hitler’s Germany was a threat, President Franklin D. Roosevelt said that a German submarine had attacked a US destroyer, when in fact it was the American side that had initiated the action. In wartime, when loose lips can sink ships and secrets are crucial, Winston Churchill argued that the truth may be “so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.”
Machiavellian deception is often part of a strategy in bargaining to get a deal, and Trump claims to be a master of that art. Perhaps that explains his lies about North Korean weapons, European tariffs, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s interference in the 2016 US presidential election. But his dishonesty concerning the size of the crowd at his inauguration, the payment of hush money to women, or his reasons for firing former FBI Director James Comey has nothing to do with statecraft. It is purely self-serving manipulation of others and the public.
Even when a president’s motives are not self-serving, he should be cautious about choosing to lie. Before he turns to lying as an instrument of statecraft, he should consider the importance of the goal, the availability of alternative means to achieve it, and whether the deception can be contained or is likely to establish a pattern.
The more a leader deceives the public, the more he erodes trust, weakens institutions, and creates damaging precedents. Roosevelt’s lies in 1941 were intended to awaken the American people, but he also set a precedent that Lyndon B. Johnson could use in 1964 to win congressional support for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which led to a dramatic escalation of the Vietnam War. The danger is that leaders tell themselves they are lying for the public good when they are doing so for political or personal gain.
Johnson did not want to seem cowardly or to be portrayed as the man who lost Vietnam. He continually lied to the American people about the progress that was being made in the war. He also wanted to keep the war limited.
One of the moral benefits of a limited war is the prevention of damage through escalation. But such wars involve an element of bluffing. To maintain credibility in bargaining with the enemy, a president must maintain a relentless public optimism, which serves to misinform the public. In Johnson’s case, this imperative was reinforced by his personal motives. By 1968, people were saying that the only way to tell if he was lying was to see if his lips were moving. He decided not to run again.
Johnson’s successor, Richard Nixon, also lied about the Vietnam War, including his expansion of it into Cambodia. This was followed by his lying about his role in the cover-up of the break-in at the Democratic Party’s headquarters, which had been carried out at the behest of his administration. When this was finally revealed by the Watergate tape recordings, Nixon resigned the presidency in 1974 to avoid impeachment.
The damage that Johnson and Nixon did was not only to their presidencies but also to public trust. At the beginning of the 1960s, polls showed that three-quarters of Americans had a great deal of confidence in government. By the end of the following decade, only a quarter felt that way. While the causes of the decline were complex, presidential lies played a part.
Some observers, pointing to his record in the private sector, argue that Trump merely lies out of habit. Others believe that the frequency, repetition, and blatant nature of his lies reflect not habit but a deliberate political strategy to damage institutions associated with truth. Either way, Trump has eroded the credibility of institutions such as the press, the intelligence agencies, and the US Department of Justice, making everything relative and playing to his extremely loyal base.1
Can a post-Trump America recover? It is worth remembering that Johnson and Nixon were succeeded by Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, who were notably more honest, and that public trust in government rose somewhat under Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. But as the sheer number of lies indicates, the US has never seen a president like Donald Trump.
Since Donald Trump took office as US president, a new cottage industry in rational theories of his seemingly irrational behavior has developed. On one issue, however, no amount of theorizing has made sense of Trump: his treatment of America’s oldest and most reliable ally.
PARIS – Since Donald Trump became US president in January 2017, his conduct has been astonishingly erratic, but his policies have been more consistent than foreseen by most observers. Trump’s volatility has been disconcerting, but on the whole he has acted in accordance with promises made on the campaign trail and with views held long before anyone considered his election possible. Accordingly, a new cottage industry in rational theories of Trump’s seemingly irrational behavior has developed.
The latest challenge is to make sense of his stance towards Europe. At a rally on June 28, he said: “We love the countries of the European Union. But the European Union, of course, was set up to take advantage of the United States. And you know what, we can’t let that happen.” During his recent trip to the continent, he called the EU “a foe” and said it was “possibly as bad as China.” Regarding Brexit, he declared that British Prime Minister Theresa May should have “sued” the EU. Then came the truce, on July 25: Trump and Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, agreed to work jointly on an agenda of free trade and World Trade Organization reform.
So it seems we are friends again – or perhaps just resting before the dispute resumes. But the deeper question remains: Why has Trump repeatedly attacked America’s oldest and most reliable ally? Why does he seem to despise the EU so deeply? Why should the US try to undermine Europe, rather than seeking closer cooperation to protect its economic and geopolitical interests?
Trump’s approach is particularly striking given that China’s rapid emergence as a strategic rival is America’s main national security issue. Contrary to earlier hopes, China is converging with the West neither politically nor economically, because the role of the state and the ruling party in coordinating activities remains far greater. Geopolitically, China has been actively building clienteles, most visibly through its Belt and Road Initiative, and it intends to “foster a new type of international relations” that departs from the model promoted by the US in the twentieth century. Militarily, it has embarked on a significant build-up. Obviously, China, not Europe, is the number one challenge to US world supremacy.
Former President Barack Obama’s China strategy combined dialogue and pressure. He started building two mega-economic alliances that excluded China and Russia: the Trans-Pacific Partnership with 11 other Pacific Rim countries, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union. But Trump withdrew the US from the TPP and killed the TTIP before it was born. Then he opened a trade rift with the EU. And he has attacked both the EU and its member states, especially Germany.
There are three possible explanations. One is Trump’s peculiar obsession with bilateral trade balances. According to this view, Trump regards Germany, the rest of Europe, and China as equally threatening competitors. Nobody else thinks this makes economic sense. And the only result he can expect from this strategy is to hurt and weaken the long-standing Atlantic partnership. But he has been complaining about Mercedes cars in the streets of New York City at least since the 1990s.
A second explanation is that Trump wants to prevent the EU from positioning itself as the third player in a trilateral game. If the US intends to turn the relationship with China into a bilateral power struggle, there are good reasons for it to regard the EU as an obstacle. Because it is itself governed by law, the EU is bound to oppose a purely transactional approach to international relations. And a united Europe that commands access to the world’s largest market is not a trivial player. But after the EU has been undermined, if not disbanded, weak and divided European countries would have no choice but to rally behind the US.
Finally, a more political reading of Trump’s behavior is that he is seeking regime change in Europe. In fact, he has not disguised his belief that Europe is “losing its culture” because it has let immigration “change its fabric.” And Stephen Bannon, his former chief strategist, has announced that he will spend half of his time in Europe to help build an alliance of nationalist parties and win a majority in next May’s European Parliament elections.
A few weeks ago, only the first reading looked plausible. The other two could be dismissed as fantasies inspired by conspiracy theories. No US president had ever presented the EU as a plot to weaken the US. Indeed, all of Trump’s postwar predecessors would have recoiled in horror at the idea of the EU’s dissolution. But the US president has gone too far for Europe to dismiss the more dismal scenarios.
For the EU, this is a pivotal moment. In the 1950s, it was launched beneath the US security umbrella and with America’s blessing. Since then, it has been built as a geopolitical experiment conducted under US protection and in the context of a US-led international system. For this reason, its external dimensions – economically, diplomatically, or regarding security – have always come second to its internal development.
What the recent crisis signifies is that this is no longer true. Europe must now define its strategic stance vis-à-vis a more distant and possibly hostile US, and vis-à-vis rising powers that have no reason to be kind to it. It must stand for its values. And it must urgently decide what it intends to do regarding its security and defense, its neighborhood policy, and its border protection. This is an acid test.
Economically, the EU still has the potential to be a global player. The size of its market, the strength of its major companies, a unified trade policy, a common regulatory policy, a single competition authority, and a currency that is second only to the dollar are major assets. It could – and should – use them to push for a revamping of international relations that addresses legitimate US grievances vis-à-vis China and legitimate Chinese concerns over its international role. Europe has played a leading role in fighting climate change; it could do the same for trade, investment, or finance.
Europe’s main problem is political, not economic. The challenge it is facing comes at a moment when it is divided between island and continent, North and South, and East and West. And the questions posed are fundamental: What defines a nation? Who is in charge of borders? Who guarantees security? Is the EU based on shared values or on the pure calculus of national interests?
If the EU fails to define itself for a world that is fundamentally different from that of ten years ago, it probably will not survive as a meaningful institution. If it does, however, it may regain the sense of purpose and legitimacy in the eyes of citizens that years of economic and political setbacks have eroded.
,
Global markets are now more important than national markets for small and medium-size countries, and approaching that status for large economies. The emergence of such a truly global capitalism means that more and more economic activity will no longer be embedded in the politics or regulatory systems of various nation-states.
WASHINGTON, DC – From the end of World War II to the mid-2010s, economic globalization progressed relentlessly through expanded trade, proliferating capital flows, faster (and cheaper) communication, and, to a lesser extent, human migration. Yet, even as these linkages have deepened and multiplied, the global economy has remained fundamentally a collection of national economies, each embedded in national politics. This is now changing.
In the democratic countries that have built the market capitalism that dominates the world today, the building blocks of the economy – taxation, public spending, and regulatory frameworks – are enacted by the legislature and interpreted by the legal system. This lends legitimacy to them and the economic activities they facilitate.
But a shift is occurring: global markets already are more important than national markets for small and medium-size countries, and they are approaching that status for large economies. In less than a decade, it will be the huge world market, rather than national markets, that allocates capital, finance, and skilled labor. Many firms will be truly multinational, with headquarters located in one place (probably where tax liabilities can be minimized), production and sales happening largely elsewhere, and managers and workers sourced from all over the world.
The emergence of such a truly global capitalism – a process that, to be sure, is far from complete – means that markets will no longer be embedded in the politics or regulatory systems of various nation-states. If they are to produce desirable outcomes, they will need to be embedded more deeply in – and regulated more effectively by – global institutions.
Of course, international economic institutions – from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to the economic bodies of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization – already exist and have long served as platforms for member states to adopt shared rules. The IMF and the WTO, in particular, have acquired some real regulatory authority in macroeconomic and trade policy, respectively.
Domestic politics were largely eschewed in establishing and sustaining these international institutions. Though treasuries, central banks, and trade ministries – especially of the advanced countries – acted politically, they did so with very little public debate. Even today, the average citizen in the United States, France, or India knows little about what the WTO actually does.
In other words, the emergence of a global market is not embedded in any legitimacy-conferring political process. Multilateral institutions are thus viewed as elitist, making them a political target. This is reminiscent of the European Union’s “democratic deficit,” which has fueled resistance to further integration.
In fact, resistance to global capitalism is also rampant and rising. In particular, US President Donald Trump espouses a kind of “go-it-alone” neo-nationalism. Far from deepening multilateral structures, he wants to dismantle them, dislodging the global market from the regulatory institutions in which it is already only weakly embedded. At both the national and international levels, Trump believes that the less regulation, the better.
The EU, meanwhile, pursues the opposite line. Despite the internal challenges it faces, it continues to try to regulate markets beyond national borders. This year alone, the European Commission has imposed over €5 billion ($5.8 billion) in fines on Alphabet Inc., Google’s parent company, and Qualcomm for breaching antitrust restrictions. And with its General Data Protection Regulation, the EU has sought to tighten restrictions on the use, sharing, and control of personal data.
Because the EU has such a large market, such actions have a far-reaching impact. But when it comes to setting truly international standards, the EU obviously falls short. This has become all the more true with figures like Trump actively working against its efforts and espousing deregulation at a time when the level of global economic interconnectedness demands just the opposite.
Allowing major multinational companies, which are already reaping massive profits and crowding smaller players out of entire industries, to avoid paying much tax does far-reaching damage, not least by exacerbating inequality and weakening public budgets. But such firms can be regulated effectively only through multilateral cooperation. Likewise, the only way to make any headway on combating the effects of climate change is for all countries to work together.
The realities of today’s global economy demand that we make multilateral institutions work. That means not only increasing the clout of existing institutions – here, reform is a prerequisite – but also establishing new institutions, such as a Global Competition Authority. None of this will be possible without a real global political debate.
Of course, the emergence of a global politics has far-reaching potential implications for traditional ideas about democracy, not to mention national sovereignty. At the same time, however, allowing the global market to function without adapted regulation, enacted by legitimate and effective international institutions, would amount to abandoning the essence of democracy.
The challenge ahead has been presented by Harvard economist Dani Rodrik in the form of a trilemma: when it comes to democracy, national sovereignty, and globalization, we can have any two, but never all three. Rodrik advocates less globalization and more democracy. Nationalists like Trump prefer strengthening the nation-state, in ways that could weaken both democracy and globalization, at least in the longer term.
In the medium term, however, further globalization seems unavoidable, meaning that it is the nation-state, and national politics, that must be constrained. One way to lend legitimacy to the new global politics would be to ensure that it is grounded at the local level. This will require local political leaders to adopt a narrative that explains how global problems impact their constituents. Climate change is a successful example of this form of localized global politics.
Whatever institutional arrangements are chosen, ensuring that a new global politics strengthens, rather than undermines, democracy is the central political challenge of the twenty-first century. We can no longer afford to shy away from it.
US President Donald Trump escalated his war on US alliances and multilateral institutions at NATO’s summit in Brussels and then at his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki. There is now little doubt that Trump’s strange affinity for Putin represents a serious threat to European security.
STOCKHOLM – What is left of NATO and the transatlantic order after US President Donald Trump’s tumultuous week in Brussels, the United Kingdom, and Helsinki, where he defended Russian President Vladimir Putin against accusations of cyber warfare by America’s own intelligence agencies?
Watching events unfold through rose-tinted glasses, one might think that the West’s most important strategic alliance is more or less okay, or even growing stronger. In fact, NATO is in peril, and its fate now lies in Trump’s contemptuous hands.
Prior to and during the NATO summit, there was much hand-wringing over member states’ military spending as a share of GDP. Each member is expected to increase its spending to 2% of GDP by 2024, but Trump seems to think that this already should have been done. And at the summit last week, he suddenly called for a new target of 4% of GDP – which is more than even the United States spends.
To be sure, over the past few decades, NATO’s primary focus was on peacekeeping operations in distant places, rather than on its core function of territorial defense. For most European member states, the peace dividend from the alliance’s operations justified cuts in domestic military spending.
But this attitude changed in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and launched secretive military incursions into Eastern Ukraine. Since then, NATO member states’ defense budgets have increased by around 4% per year on average, making the 2024 target eminently achievable.
More fundamentally, Trump’s complaint that the US is shouldering an unfair share of the burden for NATO’s collective defense is dubious. While the US military budget equals roughly 72% of combined defense spending by all NATO member states, roughly three-quarters of US military spending is directed toward regions other than Europe. Around half of the US defense budget is spent on maintaining a presence in the Pacific, and another quarter is spent on operations in the Middle East, strategic nuclear command and control, and other areas.
Moreover, although the US has increased its defense outlays in Europe substantially over the past few years, it is worth remembering that most US forces and facilities there are actually focused on the geostrategic arc from India to South Africa. With facilities such as Ramstein, Fairford, Rota, Vicenza, and Sigonella, the US has long used Europe as a staging ground for deploying forces elsewhere. And the early-warning and surveillance facilities that the US maintains in the United Kingdom and Norway are there to defend the continental US, not Europe.
The fact is that total European defense spending is around twice what the US spends on European security, and also roughly twice what Russia spends on defense, according to estimates produced at the US National Defense University.
The critical importance of US command, control, and intelligence forces in Europe should not be minimized, but it should at least be put into perspective. Although the US Army recently rotated heavy brigades through Europe for military exercises, its permanently stationed troops are equipped only for limited interventions.
This is why NATO must continue to improve its defense capacity in Europe. At a minimum, Europe needs more military forces, and those forces need to be equipped for rapid deployment to critical areas. The new mobility command that is being established in Germany is a promising first step.
And yet, Russia’s advantages over NATO have less to do with resources than with command and control. As a single country, Russia’s military forces are more integrated, and can be deployed more quickly in pursuit of strategic directives from the Kremlin. Such nimbleness was amply demonstrated in Crimea in 2014 and in Syria the following year.
For its part, NATO does have a deeply integrated command structure for the forces that are assigned to it. But that hardly matters if political decisions to deploy forces or launch operations are not taken in time. In any military confrontation, unity of will and the speed of high-level decision-making determine the outcome.
The problem is that while NATO’s military capacity is actually improving, its political decision-making capacity is deteriorating. Imagine what would happen if a NATO member state sounded the alarm about Russia launching a secretive Crimea-style military operation within its borders. Then, imagine that US intelligence agencies confirmed that an act of aggression was indeed underway, despite Putin’s denials.
Finally, imagine how Trump might respond. Would he call Putin to ask what’s going on? And would Putin make another “incredible offer” to help US investigators get to the bottom of things? Even more to the point: Would Trump quickly invoke the principle of collective defense under Article 5 of the NATO treaty? Or would he hesitate, question the intelligence, belittle US allies, and validate Putin’s denials?
These are truly disturbing questions to have to ask of an American president. They will now hang over Europe’s head indefinitely.
Turkey’s currency crisis and standoff with the United States over the imprisonment of an American pastor have exposed the crumbling edifice of the two countries’ Cold War-era partnership. Rather than hold out hope that Turkey will return to the Western fold, US and European policymakers must consider a new policy toward the country.
NEW YORK – Now that Turkey is at loggerheads with its erstwhile ally, the United States, the country’s currency crisis has morphed into a political problem of the first order. The immediate issue is Turkey’s refusal to release the American pastor Andrew Brunson, who is being held on charges of terrorism, espionage, and subversion for his alleged role in the failed July 2016 coup against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
The US government is right to object to Brunson’s detention. But its reaction has been counterproductive. In particular, the imposition of additional US tariffs on imports of Turkish steel and aluminum could further undermine confidence in Turkey’s economy, triggering a wider crisis that would do serious harm to the global economy. Moreover, tariffs allow Erdoğan to blame his country’s economic woes on America, rather than on his own government’s incompetence.
It is still possible that the Turkish government will find a way to release Brunson, and that US President Donald Trump, anxious to demonstrate fealty to the evangelicals who form a core part of his base, will rescind the tariffs. But even if the immediate crisis is resolved, the structural crisis in US-Turkish relations – and Western-Turkish relations generally – will remain. We are witnessing the gradual but steady demise of a relationship that is already an alliance in name only. Though the Trump administration is right to have confronted Turkey, it chose not only the wrong response, but also the wrong issue.
The relationship between Turkey and the West has long been predicated on two principles, neither of which obtains any longer. The first is that Turkey is a part of the West, which implies that it is a liberal democracy. Yet Turkey is neither liberal nor a democracy. It has effectively been subjected to one-party rule under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), and power has become concentrated in the hands of Erdoğan, who is also the AKP’s leader.
Under Erdoğan, checks and balances have largely been eliminated from the Turkish political system, and the president controls the media, the bureaucracy, and the courts. The same failed coup that Erdoğan cites as grounds to imprison Brunson has also served as an excuse for detaining thousands of others. At this point, it is impossible to see how Erdoğan’s Turkey could ever qualify for EU membership.
The second principle underlying Turkey’s “Western” status is alignment on foreign policy. Turkey recently bought more than 100 advanced F-35 fighter jets from the US. Yet, in recent years, Turkey has also supported jihadist groups in Syria, moved closer to Iran, and contracted to purchase S-400 surface-to-air missiles from Russia.
Above all, Turkey and the US find themselves on different sides in Syria. While the Syrian Kurds have been close partners of the US, they have been deemed terrorists by Turkey, owing to their ties to Kurdish groups inside Turkey that historically have sought autonomy, if not independence. Against this backdrop, it is not far-fetched to imagine US and Turkish forces coming to blows.
Some might say that the current level of US-Turkish friction is nothing new; the two countries have long had their share of differences. The Turks were not happy with the US decision to withdraw medium-range missiles from Turkey as part of the deal that ended the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The two countries clashed repeatedly over the Turkish intervention and subsequent occupation of Northern Cyprus in 1974, and over US support for Greece. Turkey refused to give US military forces access to Incirlik Air Base during the Iraq war in 2003. And in recent years, the Turkish government has been infuriated by America’s refusal to extradite the Pennsylvania-based cleric Fethullah Gülen, whom Erdoğan believes masterminded the 2016 coup attempt.
Still, what we are seeing today is something different. The anti-Soviet glue that kept the two countries close during the Cold War is long gone. What we have now is a loveless marriage in which the two parties continue to cohabitate under the same roof, even though there is no longer any real connection between them.
The problem is that the NATO treaty provides no mechanism for divorce. Turkey can withdraw from the alliance, but it cannot be forced out. Given this reality, the US and the European Union should maintain a two-pronged approach toward Turkey.
First, policymakers should criticize Turkish policy when warranted. But they must also reduce their reliance on access to Turkish bases such as Incirlik, deny Turkey access to advanced military hardware like F-35s, and reconsider the policy of basing nuclear weapons in Turkey. Moreover, the US should not extradite Gülen unless Turkey can prove his involvement in the coup with evidence that would stand up in a US court and satisfy the provisions of the 1981 mutual extradition treaty. Nor should the US abandon the Kurds, given their invaluable role in the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS).
Second, the US and Europe should wait until the Erdoğan era is over, and then approach Turkey’s new leadership with a grand bargain. The offer should be Western support in exchange for a Turkish commitment to liberal democracy and to a foreign policy focused on fighting terrorism and pushing back against Russia.
Erdoğan recently warned in the New York Times that the US-Turkish partnership “could be in jeopardy,” and that Turkey would soon start looking for new friends and allies if US unilateralism and disrespect were not reversed. In fact, the partnership was already in jeopardy, largely because of Turkish actions, and Erdoğan had already begun the process of looking for new friends and allies. It is time for the US and Europe to adjust to this reality.
Chief Economic Strategist at the MITRE Corporation, a $2.1 billion nonprofit corporation working across government, business, and academia to advance the safety, stability, and well-being of the United States, and Nonresident Scholar in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In both positions, she focuses on the nature of strategic economic competition in today’s international system, the role of innovation and emerging technologies, macroeconomic risks and their impact on policymaking, and U.S. economic statecraft. Senior executive in charge of the Office of Macroeconomic Analysis in the U.S. Treasury Department (October 2016 – August 2018). National Intelligence Manager and National Intelligence Officer for Economics in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2013-2016). Former economics faculty at the U.S. Naval Academy, National Defense University, New York University, and the U.S. Military Academy. She holds a PhD in Economics from Columbia University and a MSc in Economic History from the London School of Economics.
23 juillet 2018
Renaud Girard, Le Figaro
S’exprimant dimanche 22 juillet 2018 devant un parterre de diplomates iraniens, le Président Rohani a tendu une demi-branche d’olivier aux Etats-Unis. « L’Amérique devrait comprendre que sa paix avec l’Iran serait la mère de toutes les paix mais que lui faire la guerre serait la mère de toutes les guerres ! », a dit ce président réformateur, élu en 2013 et réélu en 2017 par la population iranienne, sur un programme d’ouverture à l’Occident. Rejetant cet appel du pied diplomatique de Téhéran, le Président Trump a réagi le 23 juillet par un tweet d’une extrême intransigeance : « Au Président Rouhani : ne vous avisez plus jamais de proférer des menaces contre les Etats-Unis ; sauf à vous exposer à des conséquences que très peu de peuples ont subi jusqu’à présent dans l’Histoire ! »
Tout se passe comme si les Etats-Unis avaient bel et bien renoncé à trouver un arrangement diplomatique avec le régime des mollahs, parvenus au pouvoir en 1979 à Téhéran, après avoir renversé un Shah qui était jusque-là l’allié le plus fiable de l’Amérique au Moyen-Orient. Logiquement, l’accord nucléaire du 14 juillet 2015 (où l’Iran renonçait à poursuivre son enrichissement d’uranium en échange d’un abandon des sanctions commerciales internationales), signé entre les mollahs et les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité de l’Onu plus l’Allemagne, devait conduire à terme à un rétablissement des relations diplomatiques entre Washington et Téhéran. L’Agence internationale de l’Energie atomique de Vienne avait publié plusieurs rapports soulignant que l’Iran remplissait entièrement ses obligations de dénucléarisation. Mais, en mai 2018, en dépit d’un appel de ses alliés à la tempérance, Donald Trump a dénoncé unilatéralement la signature de l’Amérique, jugeant trop laxiste l’accord qui avait été négocié et signé par John Kerry, le Secrétaire d’Etat du Président Obama. Pire, en proférant des menaces de représailles contre toutes les entreprises occidentales qui continueraient à commercer avec l’Iran et à lui acheter son pétrole, le président américain actuel a institué une sorte de blocus de la République islamique.
Le 22 juillet, dans un discours adressé à la nombreuse diaspora iranienne installée en Californie, le Secrétaire d’Etat Mike Pompeo a qualifié de « mafia » les autorités au pouvoir en Iran. Il a aussi annoncé la constitution d’un média audiovisuel en persan, financé par le gouvernement américain. Le chef de la diplomatie américaine reprend ainsi des instruments qui avaient cours lors de la guerre froide contre l’URSS, comme Radio Free Europe. Est-ce à dire que les Etats-Unis ont secrètement décidé d’un « regime change » en Iran, en dépit de proclamations antérieures du président Trump critiquant le droit-de-l’hommisme botté de ses prédécesseurs ? Est-ce plutôt un coup de bluff devant aboutir à une négociation, sur le modèle de sa tumultueuse relation avec la Corée du Nord ?
Comparaison n’est pas raison. Car l’Iran est dans une situation beaucoup plus précaire que celle de la Corée du Nord. Elle a réussi à réactiver son alliance stratégique avec la Chine, envers laquelle les Etats-Unis ont entamé une guerre commerciale de vaste ampleur. Il est désormais improbable que la Corée du Nord s’engage dans une dénucléarisation sans condition, et fort probable que Pékin et Moscou ne feront plus de zèle dans l’application des sanctions commerciales onusiennes contre Pyongyang.
L’Iran se trouve dans un double état de faiblesse, qui n’a pas échappé aux stratèges de l’administration Trump. Intérieurement, la jeunesse iranienne, fort instruite des mœurs occidentales grâce à internet, ne supporte plus le carcan de la dictature religieuse. Extérieurement, le régime des mollahs vient d’être lâché par la Russie, au profit d’Israël. Depuis 2012, Moscou et Téhéran ont entretenu une alliance de circonstance pour sauver de la déroute le régime baasiste de Damas, vieil allié de l’un comme de l’autre. Mais, entre la Russie et Israël, il existe une alliance de cœur et de sang. Le 9 mai 2018, assistant au défilé de la Victoire sur la Place Rouge, Benjamin Netanyahou arborait un ruban de Saint-Georges au revers de son veston. Ce mardi 24 juillet, le ministre des affaires étrangères et le chef d’état-major russes sont en visite en Israël, pour discuter du dossier syrien avec leurs homologues juifs.
Au Moyen-Orient, les vues russes et israéliennes convergent. En mai 2018, l’aviation israélienne a détruit de très nombreuses implantations militaires iraniennes en Syrie. Les Russes n’ont pas bronché, ayant auparavant renoncé à livrer à l’Iran les missiles antiaériens S-400 qu’ils leur avaient pourtant promis. Moscou souhaite le rétablissement du Statu quo ante en Syrie : un pays qui soit son allié, tout en renonçant à s’en prendre militairement à Israël – politique suivi par Hafez al-Assad dès 1982. La Russie, qui souhaite conserver de bonnes relations avec la communauté sunnite à travers la planète, n’a aucun intérêt aujourd’hui à favoriser la constitution d’un axe chiite allant de Téhéran jusqu’à la Méditerranée. Visant le Hezbollah libanais et les conseillers de la force spéciale iranienne Al Qods, le président Poutine a appelé « toutes les forces étrangères » à quitter le territoire syrien.
Le président iranien a menacé de répondre à l’agression commerciale américaine par la fermeture du détroit d’Ormuz, par lequel passent 30% des exportations mondiales de pétrole. Fermer un détroit international est un acte de guerre tout court. Rohani a commis là une double erreur stratégique : il a affaibli l’autorité de son pays car chacun sait que sa marine n’est pas de taille face à l’US Navy ; il a donné un prétexte en or à Trump pour nourrir son escalade.
Trump ne forge sa politique extérieure qu’en fonction des gains qu’il peut en retirer pour son image intérieure. Il dit ne pas vouloir la guerre avec l’Iran. Mais il sait aussi qu’un petit Trafalgar infligé aux mollahs renforcerait considérablement sa main avant les élections américaines législatives de mi-mandat. Il n’a pas oublié comment l’expédition navale aux Malouines de 1982 contre la dictature argentine avait renforcé, en Grande-Bretagne, l’autorité intérieure de Margaret Thatcher…
Par Frédéric Rivière
Justin Vaïsse, président du Forum de Paris sur la paix est l’invité du matin de Frédéric Rivière (7h50-8h00).
PROPOS RECUEILLIS PAR | 18 JUILLET 2018
Emmanuel Macron, Coupe du monde de football oblige, vient d’effectuer sa troisième visite en Russie en moins de deux mois. L’occasion pour lui de rencontrer à nouveau Vladimir Poutine avec lequel ses prédécesseurs entretenaient des rapports distants, souvent difficiles. De l’aveu même de l’Élysée, les deux hommes se parlent régulièrement – chaque semaine – au téléphone. Le chroniqueur de politique internationale du Figaro, Renaud Girard, qui a interviewé le président Poutine lors de sa venue à Versailles en mai 2017 et a eu la possibilité d’accompagner le président Macron à Saint-Pétersbourg en mai dernier, revient pour le Courrier de Russie sur ces relations inattendues entre le maître du Kremlin, qui dirige son pays depuis plus de dix-huit ans, et le jeune chef d’État français, étoile politique montante de l’Europe et du monde occidental.
Le Courrier de Russie : Vous êtes un spécialiste de la Russie, vous avez récemment été l’invité du président de la République, Emmanuel Macron, lors de sa visite au Forum économique international de Saint-Pétersbourg (SPIEF) et, à cette occasion, le témoin privilégié de sa rencontre avec Vladimir Poutine. Comment jugez-vous les relations entre les deux hommes ?
Renaud Girard : Avant tout, je pense qu’il était important que le président Macron accueille le président Poutine à Versailles, l’an dernier, le 29 mai 2017, ne serait-ce que pour la symbolique que représentait ce voyage – il s’agissait du 300e anniversaire de la visite de Pierre le Grand et de l’instauration de relations diplomatiques entre la France et la Russie. Cette année, à Saint-Pétersbourg, dans la ville même de Pierre le Grand, il s’agissait en quelque sorte d’un nouvel hommage. D’ailleurs, le président Macron n’a pas hésité à critiquer rétrospectivement Louis XIV qui n’avait pas su recevoir le jeune Pierre le Grand, lors de son premier voyage en Occident [la « Grande Ambassade », 1697-1698, ndlr], n’ayant pas alors la préscience du pouvoir qu’allait prendre la Russie dans l’Europe du Nord, notamment après la bataille de Poltava et la victoire de Pierre sur la Suède [8 juillet 1709, ndlr].
« Le président Macron a réussi a tisser des liens d’amitié, ou de proximité avec Vladimir Poutine, des liens personnels. »
Sur la plan du symbole, la visite du président Macron à Saint-Pétersbourg est donc un moment fort pour les relations entre les deux pays, dont l’histoire et les racines historiques communes ponctuent les relations. Le symbolique, dans les relations internationales, est d’ailleurs beaucoup plus important qu’on ne le croit généralement.
Ensuite, ce qui m’a frappé dans ce voyage, c’est que le président français est parvenu à tisser des liens d’amitié, ou de proximité avec Vladimir Poutine, des liens personnels.
Et la politique, qui se fait par les hommes, et non par une fatalité économique, dépend de ces liens. Ils ont ici réussi à instaurer un dialogue dans lequel ils se font confiance : « le courant passe bien ». À Versailles, Emmanuel Macron était un président complètement « neuf », tout juste élu. Poutine était impressionné par ce jeune homme sorti de nulle part et qui l’accueillait comme un « roi de France ». Cette année, les choses sont différentes: Emmanuel Macron est arrivé à Saint-Pétersbourg comme une figure politique de premier plan, à la fois dans l’Union européenne et face aux États-Unis.
La qualité des relations personnelles qui se sont établies entre les deux hommes pourra, le jour venu, être utile pour construire ensemble, mais aujourd’hui différents dossiers sont encore bloqués et les circonstances ne sont pas réunies pour qu’ils puissent être débloqués.
LCDR : Certains prétendent que la persistance de ces blocages vient de ce que les personnes en charge, à Paris, des relations avec la Russie, notamment au Quai d’Orsay, sont les mêmes qui s’en occupaient avant l’élection d’Emmanuel Macron. D’aucuns déplorent leur alignement sur la diplomatie américaine. Pensez-vous que ces critiques soient justifiées ?
R. G. : Je crois qu’Emmanuel Macron est un homme qui sait se faire respecter, et faire respecter ses décisions. Il sait écouter, mais une fois que la décision est prise il attend qu’elle soit appliquée – puisque, comme chacun sait, dans la Constitution de la Ve République, c’est le président qui est chargé de la politique étrangère du pays.
Pour autant, en ce qui concerne les sanctions, par exemple [adoptées contre Moscou pour son implication dans la crise ukrainienne, ndlr] ‒ et bien que la France y soit beaucoup moins favorable, comparée à certains pays comme l’Allemagne, les Pays-Bas ou la Suède ‒, il est très difficile de les lever alors qu’aucun progrès n’a été constaté en Ukraine, sur le plan tant politique que militaire.
Au passage, il faut souligner la difficulté à établir les responsabilités : qui n’applique pas les Accords de Minsk ? Sur le volet politique, les Ukrainiens disent avoir voté le statut de région autonome réclamé par ces accords pour les régions de Donetsk et Lougansk. Les Russes, eux, prétendent que ce processus n’est pas achevé.
La situation est donc aujourd’hui bloquée, et je n’ai pas l’impression qu’elle pourra évoluer avant l’élection présidentielle, à Kiev, prévue au printemps 2019.
« Nous payons pour les autres et pour une politique qui n’est pas la nôtre. »
LCDR : Tout le monde semble englué dans ce dossier : la Russie, mais aussi la France et l’Allemagne, ces deux pays étant les garants des accords de Minsk, une initiative politique française au départ. Même Emmanuel Macron, avec cette capacité à convaincre que lui reconnaissent ses interlocuteurs, n’arrive pas à relancer le processus…
R. G. : Le problème c’est que nous sommes pénalisés, Allemands, Français et Italiens, par ce système de sanctions et de contre-sanctions [décidées par Moscou, ndlr], alors que ceux qui ont réellement voulu les mettre en place, les Américains, n’ont pas de commerce avec la Russie. Cela revient à une situation où nous payons pour les autres et pour une politique qui n’est pas la nôtre. En réalité, les Américains n’ont pas renoncé à un élargissement de l’OTAN aux anciennes républiques de l’URSS, alors que nous nous sommes opposés à l’entrée de la Géorgie et de l’Ukraine dans l’OTAN, en avril 2008, lors du sommet de Bucarest. Hélas, notre message, à l’époque, n’a pas été très clair : il eût été plus judicieux d’exposer clairement notre volonté d’en finir avec l’extension de l’OTAN à l’Est de l’Europe, ce chiffon rouge agité au nez et à la barbe des Russes qui ont historiquement un complexe obsidional.
« Si, en 2014, l’opposition ukrainienne a lâché les Européens, c’est parce qu’elle avait conscience du soutien que lui apportaient les Américains. »
LCDR : Complexe qui n’avait pas été pris en compte par les prédécesseurs d’Emmanuel Macron…
R. G. : Le ressenti russe a très certainement échappé à François Hollande, un peu moins à Nicolas Sarkozy, et encore moins à Jacques Chirac, qui comprenait mieux les Russes et entretenait avec eux de bonnes relations.
Il est avéré aujourd’hui que dans cette région du monde et d’autres, dans l’ensemble de l’Orient, qu’il soit russe ou arabo-musulman, les Américains et leurs alliés européens mènent des politiques divergentes.
Si l’accord du 21 février 2014, passé entre les leaders de l’opposition ukrainienne et le président prorusse Viktor Ianoukovitch (parrainé par la France, l’Allemagne et la Pologne), avait tenu, il est vraisemblable que les États Unis ‒ notamment par l’intermédiaire de la néoconservatrice, Victoria Nuland, leur secrétaire d’État de l’époque pour l’Europe ‒ auraient aussitôt tout fait pour le saboter.
Si, en 2014, l’opposition ukrainienne a lâché les Européens, c’est parce qu’elle avait conscience du soutien que lui apportaient les Américains.
Cette divergence de politique se retrouve au Moyen-Orient, où les Européens considèrent l’Iran comme une grande nation avec laquelle il faut commercer ; une nation qui doit revenir sur la scène internationale et ne plus être traitée en paria. Les États-Unis, en revanche, après avoir été à l’initiative de ce magnifique traité diplomatique qu’était l’accord de dénucléarisation de l’Iran [conclu à Vienne le 14 juillet 2015, ndlr], sont revenus sur leur signature.
LCDR : Le soutien américain à l’Ukraine n’a jamais été aussi fort qu’aujourd’hui. Pourquoi Kiev accepterait-elle d’appliquer les accords de Minsk alors que Washington lui promet l’intégration à l’OTAN ?
R.G. : Il n’est absolument pas dans l’intérêt des Russes et des Ukrainiens de maintenir cet état d’hostilité : commercer, faire du business, serait évidemment plus avantageux pour les deux pays. Cela crève les yeux. Le problème est que les présidents Porochenko et Poutine, chacun dans son pays, sont des centristes. Mais ils sont dépassés par la virulence de leurs nationalistes. Ils n’ont pas envie, en faisant des concessions, d’être taxés de trahison.
Il s’agit aussi de sauver la face et de rassurer les Russes. Or, autant il est envisageable pour les puissances européennes qui restent dans l’Union ‒ c’est-à-dire l’Allemagne, la France et l’Italie ‒ de dire à la Russie : l’Ukraine n’intègrera jamais l’OTAN, autant il ne faut pas espérer l’entendre des Américains.
À cela s’ajoute le fait que les relations russo-européennes sont difficiles par elles-mêmes : la Chancelière Merkel reproche à Vladimir Poutine de lui avoir menti pendant la crise de Crimée en mars 2014 ; les Pays-Bas n’ont pas oublié le crash de l’avion de la compagnie Malaysia Airline, rempli de touristes hollandais et abattu par un missile de fabrication russe… Ces rapports russo-européens, déjà tendus, sont rendus plus difficiles encore par les dissensions transatlantiques, qui ne permettent pas d’avoir une politique coordonnée et raisonnable à l’égard de la Russie.
« L’Europe et la France ne sont pas vraiment capables de faire le pari de la Russie. La France, comme les autres pays européens, ne fait ce pari qu’à demi-mot, sans s’impliquer entièrement. »
En réalité, une forte défiance persiste entre la Russie et les États-Unis, surtout du côté du Congrès, puisque le président Trump a des foucades prorusses, comme nous venons de le voir à Helsinki, lors de sa rencontre avec le président Poutine ou, il y a quelques semaines, lorsqu’il a proposé que la Russie réintègre le G7.
Mais quand le général de Gaulle menait, à partir de son voyage en Russie de 1966, une politique de détente et de rapprochement avec l’URSS, elle pouvait se révéler utile et donc être utilisée par l’allié américain de la France. Aujourd’hui on a des divergences et une mésentente très fortes entre l’Europe et l’Amérique, sans qu’il en ressorte aucun effet bénéfique. Les effets de la politique gaullienne, eux, était très clairs, puisque c’est à Paris qu’ont été signés les traité de paix sur le Vietnam et que c’est de Gaulle qui a conseillé à Nixon de reconnaître la République populaire de Chine. Aujourd’hui, nous sommes devant une scène politique internationale éclatée, une Europe et une France qui ne sont pas vraiment capables de faire le pari de la Russie : la France, comme les autres pays, ne fait ce pari qu’à demi-mot, à mi-lèvre, sans s’impliquer entièrement. Aucun pays ne se risque à faire ce pari à 100 %. Le dernier sommet de Bruxelles n’a fait que confirmer ces valses-hésitations : les Italiens n’ont pas osé voter contre les sanctions à l’encontre de la Russie.
LCDR : Comment prendre ce pari de la Russie ?
R.G. : Les Européens pourraient dire : « Nous abolissons le régime des sanctions à l’égard de la Russie mais nous voulons en échange des gestes de bonne volonté de sa part. » Ces gestes de bonne volonté, sont, avant tout, la reprise du contrôle par les Ukrainiens de leur frontière du Donbass. Pour ce qui est de la Crimée, c’est une affaire qui ne pourra être réglée que par un accord bilatéral russo-ukrainien (peut-être un accord de co-souveraineté), or cet accord ne se fera pas tout de suite.
Notez que l’Union européenne n’est pas un partenaire facile à appréhender puisqu’elle a ses propres divisions : il est évident que les Néerlandais et les Allemands n’ont pas la même vision des Russes que les Français, qui n’ont toujours eu qu’à se réjouir des rapprochements franco-russes dans leur histoire.
LCDR : Peut-on parler d’une politique russe d’Emmanuel Macron ?
R. G. : Il a posé des principes qui permettent un rapprochement, ce qui est important. Au Forum de Saint-Pétersbourg, il a dit clairement que la France avait renoncé à tout néo-conservatisme et qu’elle respectait la souveraineté des États : c’était une déclaration majeure à la fois pour Vladimir Poutine et pour la Russie, qui estiment que les Occidentaux n’ont pas à imposer des changements de régime politique aux autres pays. Emmanuel Macron a posé un principe qui le rapproche de la Russie et qui est une critique du comportement passé des Américains, lesquels avaient ouvertement pris le parti du regime-change en Ukraine, au moment de Maïdan.
« Les Occidentaux n’ont pas entendu le discours de Vladimir Poutine lors de la conférence sur la sécurité à Munich, en février 2007, dans lequel il exprimait son irritation face à ce qu’il considérait comme un expansionnisme de l’OTAN à l’est de l’Europe. »
L’annonce du président Macron est très claire mais, malgré cela, il va être difficile de reconstruire des relations de confiance avec la Russie. On pourrait comparer les relations internationales à un aquarium : il est aisé de préparer une soupe avec les poissons qui y vivent, mais beaucoup plus compliqué de repeupler l’aquarium lorsqu’on a dans son assiette une soupe de poisson ! Quand les relations se sont détériorées au point de déclencher une annexion, un changement de frontière comme en Crimée, quand des milliers de vies humaines ont été perdues en Ukraine, c’est-à-dire en Europe, alors il est très difficile de reconstituer l’aquarium.
Les Occidentaux n’ont pas été capables d’entendre le discours de Vladimir Poutine, prononcé lors de la conférence de Munich sur la sécurité, en février 2007, dans lequel il exprimait son irritation face à ce qu’il considérait comme un expansionnisme de l’OTAN à l’est de l’Europe et une conduite désinvolte de l’Occident à l’égard de la Russie. Les Européens et les Américains ne l’ont pas pris au sérieux et n’ont jamais traité le problème qu’il soulevait. Celui-ci, au demeurant, ne sera pas traité avant longtemps : les Européens sont frileux lorsqu’il s’agit d’assumer une nouvelle politique à l’égard de la Russie. Cette frilosité est due à la pression des États-Unis, mais aussi à leur propre désunion. Au sein de l’Union européenne, se confrontent les puissances prorusses (l’Espagne, l’Italie, l’Autriche, la Hongrie et même la France d’une certaine façon) et les puissances hostiles à la Russie, comme les pays baltes, la Pologne, l’Allemagne de Merkel, la Hollande et l’Angleterre, bien que cette dernière quitte l’Union. Dans un contexte comme celui-là, avoir une politique efficace pour « reconstituer l’aquarium » est particulièrement ardu.
Avec nous pour en parler : Laurence Nardon, spécialiste des Etats-Unis à l’Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI), et François Durpaire, historien des Etats-Unis.
In today’s deeply interconnected world, we need rules and institutions to govern markets and economic activity more than ever. Yet multilateralism is under increasing strain, and the lack of a clear and consistent means for assessing changing global power dynamics is not helping.
WASHINGTON, DC – It is often said that the unipolar world order, dominated by the United States, that emerged at the end of the Cold War has lately shifted to a “multipolar” arrangement, owing to the growing geopolitical “weight” of countries such as China, as well as many emerging economies. But the actual metrics by which we weigh global powers are typically discussed in only vague terms, if at all.
There is no agreed scale with which to measure a country’s international weight relative to others. For example, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank use economic metrics, such as GDP and trade volumes, that are not standardized across other institutions. The United Nations does not even use the same metrics across all of its agencies: in the General Assembly, every country is weighted equally, and there are no veto rights; in the Security Council, the five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US) have veto rights.
At a time when multilateralism is under increasing strain, it is useful to understand the underlying shift in key weights and try to judge how much of what we are experiencing reflects structural shifts in these weights and how much is simply due to independent policy changes.
Three metrics of countries’ international weight stand out: the size of the population; the size of the economy, measured by GDP at market prices (GDP in purchasing power parity terms is more useful for measuring welfare); and military might, measured imperfectly by defense expenditure. If we consider all three metrics to be equally or similarly important, the world’s most “important” powers would seem to be the US, China, the European Union, Japan, India, Russia, and Brazil.
Of course, there are many questions, beginning with whether the EU – which negotiates trade arrangements as one entity, but comprises members with sovereignty in many areas – should be regarded as a unified actor in global affairs. Moreover, it is certainly not clear that the three metrics should, in fact, be regarded as equally important.
In any case, these three metrics represent a useful starting point for comparing the configuration of global weights in 1990, when the so-called unipolar order was emerging, and 2017, when the contours of a multipolar order should be visible.
These figures highlight, first and foremost, the rise of China, whose shares of both GDP and military expenditure have increased considerably (from 1.7% to 15% and from 1.6% to 13.8%, respectively). India has also increased its share in both areas, but from a much smaller base (from 1.4% to 3.3%, and from 1.4% to 3.6%, respectively). No other power has achieved a similar increase in “size.” The US has lost a little in terms of both GDP and population but remains the biggest power by far when military might is taken into account. With a (declining) population and GDP of just 2% of the world totals, Russia is very “small,” although its possession of nuclear weapons is a factor that must be taken into account.
Judging by these metrics, the world is entering the next decade in a kind of bipolar state, strongly dominated by the US and China. If the EU is treated as a single power – including by its own members (say, by pursuing common policies) – it could represent a third pole. India, whose GDP is now growing at nearly 8% annually, could eventually comprise a fourth, but it has some way to go.
An international order that rests on three and a half legs does not quite live up to the multipolar hype. This holds important implications for efforts to revive multilateralism. In particular, because the world is not quite multipolar, it is not structurally as conducive to a multipolar multilateralism as many have assumed. To survive, multilateralism will need the support of the big players.
Many have been hoping that China would put its weight behind a multilateral world order, but China’s leaders seem prepared to use multilateral structures only when it suits them. The EU, for its part, clearly has a strong multilateral bent, but it is weakened by internal divisions. If it were to overcome them, it could be the champion of multilateralism we need; for now, however, it is too divided. India could become an important advocate of multilateralism, but it is currently pursuing unilateral policies and still lacks the requisite international influence.
This leaves the US, still, as the lynchpin of global cooperation. Coalitions can be built to address particular issues or on a regional basis; but preserving – let alone deepening – the existing system of global governance will be impossible without US support.
At a time when the US is increasingly resisting and even actively undermining international cooperation, this is a source of serious concern. After all, as Robert Kagan recently pointed out, in today’s deeply interconnected world, we need rules and institutions to govern markets and economic activity more than ever. This will only become more obvious as new technologies like artificial intelligence and genetic engineering pose political and ethical issues that must be addressed on an international level.
Of course, the US is far from united in its opposition to multilateralism, and the country has so much to gain from openness and cooperation that it may embrace its previous role again within a few years. In the meantime, however, it is essential for other actors to continue to use and encourage multilateralism at every opportunity. Limited sectoral or geographical cooperation can be achieved and should be promoted whenever possible.
More broadly, the larger ideological battle for a rules-based international system must be fought using a strong dose of global civics as an antidote to neo-nationalism. The tactical defeats currently suffered can be reversed if the ideological battle is won. Given the need for inclusive cooperation, adapting and strengthening a rules-based and ethical global governance system is crucial to securing long-term peace and progress. Given America’s continuing “size,” it is critical for the world as a whole that the US is fully engaged and again becomes a global-governance leader for the digital age.
Publié le 20 juillet 2018
Le nom d’Arago n’évoque au plus grand nombre qu’un boulevard. Et pourtant, son impact sur le XIXe siècle fut décisif. Tout d’abord, comme scientifique. Jeune, Arago transforme l’astronomie. Puis, plus âgé, comme passeur tout comme patron de science, Arago enthousiasme un large public pour cette science et rénove l’Académie des sciences. Enfin, comme homme politique, à l’âge mûr, il signe l’abolition de l’esclavage en France et dans les colonies. Comment s’articulent les moments si divers de cette existence ? Quelles traces ont-ils laissées dans l’histoire? Telles sont les questions auxquelles ce “5 à 7 d’histoire et philosophie des sciences” cherchera à répondre.
Publié le 23 juillet 2018
Intervention de Thierry de Montbrial aux Ateliers Maurice Allais.
La réponse de l’Europe à ses nouveaux défis nécessite de concevoir le présent comme le choc du passé et du futur. Une vision de long terme solide et convaincante est au prix de cet effort de conception. Les recommandations que l’on peut en tirer résident autant dans l’apprentissage des modes de coopérations que dans la création d’un nouveau type d’unité au sein d’une Europe renforcée. Dans la période de mondialisation que nous connaissons, l’idée européenne ne trouvera de solutions qu’à travers le retour d’une légitimité de ses structures de gouvernance.
« L’Union européenne est une construction originale, davantage par la voie qu’elle suit que par son but. La paix du monde dans les décennies qui viennent dépend en grande partie de son développement. Car elle a une capacité de rayonnement économique et culturel sans affirmation de puissance au sens le plus classique du terme. Donc il faut choyer cette Union européenne, la réformer, la renforcer. Et alors, elle pourra exercer un leadership dans la gouvernance mondiale. »
Graduated from HEC, Jean-Paul Agon joined L’Oréal in 1978, in which he has worked his entire career. He successively led several of its brands, countries and geographical zones. He created in particular the Asia-Pacific zone in 1997, that has become the 1st region of the Group since, and then managed the North America Zone as of 2001. He became CEO of L’Oréal in 2006, and then Chairman and CEO from 2011 to 2021. In 15 years, Jean-Paul Agon adapted the company by leading in-depth strategic transformations, notably the digital and e-commerce revolution and the one of responsibility and sustainability. With a double ambition: combining economic performance and exemplarity in environmental, social, ethical and societal fields. The Ethics Resource Center awarded him the “Pace Leadership in Ethics Award” for L’Oréal’s achievements in the area of business ethics, diversity, financial transparency and sustainable development. He is a Director of Air Liquide, co-chairman of the France China Committee, a member of the European Round Table of Industrialists, and a Director of the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri). He is an officer of the French Legion of Honour.
Charles and Marie Robertson Visiting Professor in International Economic Policy at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. He is author of EuroTragedy: A Drama in Nine Acts. Previously, he was Deputy Director in the International Monetary Fund’s Research and European Departments. He has worked at the World Bank, AT&T’s Bell Laboratories, and the Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum. He has been a Visiting Professor at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School and is a non-resident fellow at the Center for Financial Studies, Frankfurt. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Boston University.
President of “Servir en Entreprise” since September 2024, the ENA alumni community in the corporate sector, previously President of Servir (former ENA Alumni Association) from 2017 to 2023 and former member of the Economic, Social and Environmental Council of France as a qualified person (2015-2021), Daniel Keller is Chief Officer in charge of transversal projects of the Division of complementary pension and social action at Malakoff-Humanis. Graduate of the École normale supérieure de Fontenay-Saint-Cloud, holder of an Agrégation in Literature and former student of the École nationale d’administration (ENA), he began his career at the French Ministry of the Economy and Finance as a Civil Administrator in the General Tax Directorate and then in the Tax Legislation Department. He joined the Renault Group where he held various responsibilities in the sales department, in the distribution network, in France and in Europe, as well as in central functions, as Head of Worldwide Sales Quality for the Group. He then managed a group of Renault-Dacia car dealerships in the Paris region. President of the Grand Orient de France from 2013 to 2016, he was then Director of Transformation and Digital at Humanis, in charge of organization, project management and operational efficiency, before becoming Deputy Director for the supplementary pension businesses from 2019 to 2022.
Prime Minister, Minister of State Budget, Head of the government of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire. Previously, he served as Secretary General of the Presidency. Minister of State, Minister of Agriculture (2003-2005), then Minister of Agriculture (2006-2010). Director of Economic and Financial Studies at the Direction du Contrôle des Grands Travaux (DCGTX) and Deputy Director General (1994-1995). He was mayor of Korhogo from 2001 to 2018. In January 2019, he has been appointed Chairman of the Management Board of the “Houphouétistes Rally for Democracy and Peace” (RHDP) since January 2019.
Publié le 16 juillet 2018
Virginie Robert, Les Echos
« Il n’y a aucune collusion » : Donald Trump a été prompt à affirmer, lundi à Helsinki, qu’il ne croyait pas à l’ingérence des services de renseignements russe dans la campagne de 2016. « Nous avons fait une campagne [électorale] remarquable et c’est la raison pour laquelle je suis président », a-t-il ajouté.
A côté d’un Vladimir Poutine qui n’en demandait pas tant, il a assuré que « l’enquête était un désastre pour les Etats-Unis » et qu’elle ruinait un dialogue entre les deux pays qui aurait dû être repris depuis longtemps. Le président russe, qui a nié toute ingérence, a de son côté offert d’inviter les enquêteurs de l’équipe de Robert Mueller, l’ex-patron du FBI et procureur spécial, en Russie, à condition que les autorités russes puissent interroger des proches d’un donateur de Hillary Clinton, le financier Bill Browder.
Donald Trump’s press conference performance in Helsinki rises to & exceeds the threshold of “high crimes & misdemeanors.” It was nothing short of treasonous. Not only were Trump’s comments imbecilic, he is wholly in the pocket of Putin. Republican Patriots: Where are you???
— John O. Brennan (@JohnBrennan) 16 juillet 2018
L’entretien entre les deux chefs d’Etat aura duré plus de deux heures, avec l’aide de seulement deux interprètes, et s’est poursuivi par un déjeuner de travail avec leurs équipes. Avant même son entrevue avec Vladimir Poutine, le président américain a beaucoup choqué en attribuant aux Etats-Unis l’état de la mauvaise relation du pays avec la Russie. « Nous sommes d’accord », a d’ailleurs répondu le ministre des affaires étrangères russe, Sergueï Lavrov.
Our relationship with Russia has NEVER been worse thanks to many years of U.S. foolishness and stupidity and now, the Rigged Witch Hunt!
— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) 16 juillet 2018
Le tweet a été d’autant moins apprécié que « la chasse aux sorcières » évoquée a eu pour conséquence la mise en examen d’une douzaine d’agents russes.
Très impatient avec ses alliés de l’Otan, difficile avec la chancelière Angela Merkel comme avec la Première ministre britannique Theresa May, considérant Européens, Chinois et Russes comme des « ennemis » pour certains aspects, Donald Trump a voulu privilégier la relation personnelle avec son homologue russe. Plutôt qu’un adversaire, il voit « un compétiteur », avec lequel il a mené un premier round de « négociations » via « un dialogue profondément productif ». Rappelant qu’à eux deux ils représentent 90 % de la capacité nucléaire dans le monde, il a assuré que les deux Etats voudraient travailler ensemble pour améliorer, avec l’aide d’Israël, la situation en Syrie, stopper la prolifération nucléaire, lutter contre le terrorisme islamiste et ranimer les liens d’affaires entre Moscou et Washington. Le contrôle des armes, l’Ukraine et l’Iran ont également été mentionnés dans les conversations des deux dirigeants.
Donald Trump a proposé la création d’un forum d’experts (politologues, militaires) pour améliorer la relation entre les deux Etats. Vladimir Poutine a également proposé de coopérer dans le domaine de l’énergie. « Nous pourrions travailler de manière constructive pour réguler les marchés internationaux, car nous ne sommes pas intéressés par une baisse extrême des prix ».
En montrant plus de connivences avec le président russe qu’avec n’importe quel allié de l’Amérique, Donald Trump n’a pas manqué de susciter une pluie de critiques, y compris dans son propre camp. Le sénateur Républicain John McCain a notamment vu la conférence de presse commune des deux présidents comme l’« un des pires moments de l’histoire de la présidence américaine ».
17 july 2018
Prince Michael of Liechtenstein, GIS
Pedro Sanchez, who twice led Spain’s Socialist Party, the PSOE, to crushing electoral defeats, engineered a parliamentary coup last month that ousted the government of Mariano Rajoy by a tiny margin and succeeded in installing his own minority cabinet.
Mr. Sanchez was helped by two factors. First were the corruption allegations against members of Mr. Rajoy’s People’s Party (PP), and second was backing from the radical, broadly Marxist Podemos party, along with far-left Catalonian separatists. Since the Socialists have only 84 seats in the 350-seat Congress of Deputies, or lower house of parliament, Mr. Sanchez’s government can only function awith the support of these two allies.
Spain’s economic situation improved strongly over the last few years of Mr. Rajoy’s premiership (2011-2018), but voters were unhappy with the political establishment, and incidents of corruption were unfortunately real.
Mr. Sanchez, by contrast, is a far-left socialist, and will now have to consolidate his fragile position by catering to the Marxist ideology of Podemos on one side and the radicalism of Catalan nationalists on the other.
At the same time, the new prime minister is cultivating Brussels with pro-European rhetoric, creating the expectation of drastic improvements in Spain. Mr. Sanchez aspires to play a much stronger European role than his predecessors. He has received recognition on the European Union level by comforting language and a vow to continue Mr. Rajoy’s fiscal consolidation strategy.
Nevertheless, a closer look at Mr. Sanchez’s actions shows a disturbing push to consolidate power – both for ideological reasons, and also to satisfy the desires of his Marxist-leaning and separatist allies.
Showing his radical anti-Christian position, the prime minister refused – for the first time in Spanish history – to take the oath of office with a bible or a cross. Even for an atheist, this was an unnecessary demonstration, striking an ideological rather than a simply secular attitude.
Another of his first acts was to replace the head of RTVE, Spain’s public broadcaster, with a personality agreeable to Podemos. This will pave the way for news coverage of the government with a strong pro-left slant. One of Mr. Sanchez’s close associates was also installed at the Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas (CIS), an influential state-owned institute for public opinion polling.
Optimism about Mr. Sanchez should not blind European observers to clear signs of an internal power grab
These are clear signs of a strong internal power grab from the left, and certainly not proof of a healthy democratic self-confidence about the government’s intended policies. Optimism about Mr. Sanchez’s “pro-EU” declarations should not blind European observers to these disquieting developments.
As indicated by his recent meeting with Catalan leader Quim Torra, Prime Minister Sanchez will also be forced to court the separatist movements in Catalonia with an opportunistic policy, as he needs their support.
Pedro Sanchez appears to believe that his youthful vocation to change and lead is irresistible. Youthful elan is certainly good, but it is likely to fail when hitched to an outdated socialist belief in the efficacy of government planning and intervention.
Both in terms of reviving the economy and improving social cohesion, experience has shown that these methods do not work – except sometimes as short-term fixes that bring adverse unintended consequences in the long run.
Certainly Spain – like many other European countries – needs action and reform. Pragmatic leadership and charisma are valuable, but do not express themselves in ideological demonstrations. A mix of ideology, power grabbing, opportunistic policies and activism could prove to be a dangerous cocktail for Spain.
On the European level, the new government could have a similarly detrimental effect. It may give French President Emmanuel Macron an energetic new ally to push his agenda for a more centralized EU. But that might only further alienate other member countries, especially Germany – polarizing rather than integrating an already battered Union.
Publié le 17 juillet 2018
Renaud Girard, Le Figaro
Le vote référendaire du 23 juin 2016, où le peuple britannique a décidé de quitter l’Union européenne (UE) a créé beaucoup de confusion et de colère de part et d’autre de la Manche. Maintenant que les émotions sont retombées et que les Européens ont découvert que la stratégie de leur allié américain pouvait être encore plus erratique que celle de leur allié britannique, le moment est venu pour la France de réfléchir calmement au futur de ses relations avec la Grande-Bretagne, sans laisser les technocrates de la Commission européenne gérer seuls ce dossier politique important.
L’été est propice à la réflexion, puis à la négociation, puisque tous les éléments sont désormais en place. Le 12 juillet 2018, après deux ans d’atermoiements, le gouvernement britannique de Theresa May a enfin publié un livre blanc, contenant ses propositions pour le futur des relations entre le Royaume-Uni et l’UE. En désaccord avec ce texte qui fait des concessions à Bruxelles, ses ministres les plus eurosceptiques, Boris Johnson et David Davis, ont démissionné. Le nouveau cabinet May souhaiterait qu’un accord soit trouvé avec le Conseil européen dès le mois d’octobre 2018, afin de laisser du temps pour les ratifications parlementaires, avant l’entrée en vigueur du Brexit, prévu pour mars 2019.
Il est évident que le Royaume-Uni devra payer à l’UE le montant de toutes les dépenses auxquelles il s’était engagé comme membre de l’Union (cela fait un total de l’ordre de 40 milliards d’euros). Il est évident que la City ne pourra plus jouer le même rôle dans les affaires financières européennes et qu’elle perdra le privilège, unique au monde, de tenir des comptes en euros. Aujourd’hui, les banques britanniques n’ont pas l’obligation d’avoir « un compte de correspondant » en euros dans une banque de la zone, elles peuvent ouvrir directement un compte en euros auprès de la Banque centrale européenne de Francfort.
Mais les Français ne sauraient souscrire à une intransigeance excessive de la Commission face au Royaume-Uni, au risque de se pénaliser eux-mêmes. Les traités de l’UE ont créé quatre libertés de circulation : pour les biens, pour les personnes, pour les services, pour les capitaux. Le gouvernement de Sa Majesté souhaiterait ne pas toucher à la première mais reprendre sa souveraineté sur les trois autres. Theresa May a compris l’importance de ne pas entraver les échanges industriels (majeurs, par exemple, pour Airbus, qui produit en Angleterre la voilure de ses avions, et qui y achète beaucoup de ses moteurs).
La Commission ne veut pas laisser le client britannique choisir à la carte, elle veut lui imposer soit le menu gastronomique, soit le menu diététique, mais rien entre les deux. Elle a peur du mauvais exemple que cela créerait envers d’autres membres de l’UE. Cette peur est excessive : le cas anglais est très particulier ; aucun autre membre ne songe sérieusement à partir.
La France a un excédent commercial de 6 milliards d’euros avec le Royaume-Uni. Elle n’a donc aucun intérêt à un changement des règles de commerce sur les biens avec lui. Dans le cas de figure où l’on accepterait la proposition de Theresa May, les Britanniques devraient bien sûr appliquer toutes les normes (de qualité, de santé, etc.) décidées par l’UE, sans pouvoir participer à leur élaboration. Si le maintien de la liberté de circulation des biens avec le Royaume-Uni ne coûte rien à l’Union européenne, pourquoi ne pas la maintenir ? Il est évident que tous les coûts administratifs de gestion de cette situation particulière devraient être pris en charge par les Britanniques.
En matière de sécurité, la coopération directe entre les polices devrait être maintenue. La Commission préconise le transfert des données par le biais d’officiers de liaison au sein d’Europol. C’est un détour superflu. La coopération franco-britannique directe en matière de lutte contre la criminalité organisée et contre le terrorisme fonctionne bien. Laissons-la en état. On ne change pas une équipe qui gagne. Tant pis si les fonctionnaires de la Commission n’y retrouvent pas le schéma logique auxquels ils aspirent. Ces technocrates prétendent aujourd’hui exclure la Grande-Bretagne du système satellitaire Galileo, qui donne à l’Europe une indépendance indispensable en matière d’accès au GPS. Considèrent-ils les Britanniques comme des alliés moins sûrs que les Maltais ou les Chypriotes ?
Soyons clair. La relation des Britanniques avec la construction européenne a été du grand n’importe quoi. Un jour, ils refusent d’y participer ; le lendemain, ils nous supplient d’intégrer le Marché commun ; le surlendemain, ils veulent en changer les règles, etc., etc.
Le général de Gaulle l’avait compris avant tout le monde, qui avait expliqué dans une Conférence de presse prophétique de 1963 que la Grande-Bretagne ne se sentirait jamais à l’aise dans ce club (conçu pour être à terme un contrepoids amical à la puissance américaine). Cédant à la pression des Hollandais, le président Pompidou a commis l’erreur stratégique de la faire entrer.
Mais ce qui est fait, est fait. Est-ce une raison pour punir la Grande-Bretagne ? Bien sûr que non. Nous, Français, devons accepter son caractère parfois fantasque et maintenir des liens d’excellence avec elle. Car nous devons prendre en compte des enjeux beaucoup plus importants. Historiquement, c’est une alliée depuis plus d’un siècle. C’est à elle que nous devons notre siège permanent au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies. C’est une démocratie parlementaire qui fonctionne admirablement (sauf quand elle commet l’erreur de recourir à l’instrument latin du référendum…). Militairement, c’est notre seul partenaire efficace sur le continent européen (où aucun autre pays, à part la France, n’a démontré un tel « fighting spirit »). Culturellement, beaucoup d’Anglais gardent une passion pour la civilisation des Français et réciproquement.
Punir les Britanniques serait nous punir nous-mêmes. Il nous faut au contraire aider Theresa May, actuellement en difficulté. Car elle a offert la pire des solutions, à l’exception de toutes les autres, pour paraphraser le mot célèbre de Churchill sur la démocratie…
STOCKHOLM – After a suspiciously sudden conversion, Russian President Vladimir Putin now claims to be worried about the fate of millions of refugees who have fled the carnage in Syria. In a recent meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Putin expressed his hope that the European Union would help to rebuild Syria so that its displaced people could start to return home. And in recent weeks, Russian diplomats have been hawking the same message across European capitals.
To be sure, now that Bashar al-Assad’s regime has reclaimed most of the country’s territory, Syria’s civil war is clearly winding down. But that outcome was not inevitable. On the contrary, the Syrian army was very close to collapsing at one point. Only with the crucial help of Iranian-backed militias and Russian air support did Assad manage to turn things around.
Meanwhile, US efforts to establish a “moderate” armed opposition achieved little, apart from giving the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) – an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – control of the strip of northern Syria abutting the Turkish border. The only thing left to do now is to destroy Al Nusra’s remaining enclave in Idlib and broker some kind of settlement between the YPG and Assad.
Assad has survived at a horrible cost. More than half of the Syrian population has been displaced internally or forced to flee to nearby countries or to Europe. Much of Syria’s infrastructure – from housing blocks to hospitals – lies in ruins. And, needless to say, the country’s economy has been shattered, owing to the direct effects of the conflict and to sanctions that were imposed as part of the failed effort to force Assad into a political settlement.
No other country in the past half-century has suffered so heavy a toll in human lives and physical destruction. There can be no doubt that the responsibility for this tragedy rests with the Assad regime and its Russian and Iranian sponsors. Of course, they will say they were fighting terrorism, as if that excuses their indiscriminate methods and reckless disregard for civilian lives. But future generations will remember the true source of the terror that was visited upon the Levant over the past seven years.
The estimated cost of rebuilding Syria varies widely. While a 2017 World Bank study puts the price at around $225 billion, more recent assessments suggest a total closer to $400 billion; others expect the sum to approach $1 trillion. And that does not even count the human costs of the war.
It is clear from Putin’s European charm offensive that Russia has no intention of footing even a small part of the bill. Apparently, the Kremlin does not feel as though it has a duty to rebuild the cities and restore the livelihoods that its bombs destroyed.
Nor is the United States particularly eager to help. Just last week, the Trump administration canceled $230 million in funding for the reconstruction of Raqqa and other areas liberated from ISIS. It is now hoping that Saudi Arabia will foot the bill instead. If there is any wisdom in that move, it remains to be seen.
With the US stepping back, it is obvious why Putin suddenly wants to talk to the Europeans about the plight of Syrian refugees. He didn’t care about them when his bombs were falling on their neighborhoods and forcing them to flee. But now that he wants Europe to bail out Assad, he has found some compassion.
But it is not clear that Assad even wants displaced Syrians to return. If anything, he seems ready to exploit the situation to reengineer the country’s ethnic and political composition, making it safer for his own minority sect, the Alawites. Hence, a new law grants refugees just one year to reclaim their property before the government seizes it; and other bureaucratic requirements seem designed to allow Syrian authorities to refuse reentry to anyone they don’t like.
Moreover, Assad has stated explicitly that European companies are not welcome to help with the reconstruction, and that preference should be given to Russian firms. Clearly, the regime is preparing to profit from any rebuilding assistance that comes its way. For all of these reasons, the last thing that Europeans should do is send money directly to Assad. A far better option is to offer direct financial support to individuals and families that are willing and able to return to their country.
At the same time, the EU should not lift sanctions until a credible political settlement between the regime and opposition forces has been reached. The question is whether such a settlement is even possible. So far, every realistic proposal has been torpedoed by Assad’s insistence that he remain in power.
Assad would do well to remember that he now rules over the wreckage of a country. Even when the guns fall silent, his regime will not be secure. His inability to revive Syria will leave him vulnerable in the same way that his refusal to countenance political reforms did eight years ago. Europe has no interest in saving Assad from that dilemma. Help for Syria must await a genuine political solution. After the destruction that the Assad regime has wrought, there is no other way forward.