Russia is weaker — but no less dangerous

Russia is weaker — but no less dangerous
Putin steps up cyber and other hybrid attacks against US allies in Europe
Hiroyuki AKITA, chroniqueur Nikkei

31 mai 2026

TALLINN, Estonia — Russian President Vladimir Putin must have left Beijing in a sour mood, quietly nursing frustration and disappointment.
During his two-day visit to the Chinese capital through May 20, Putin failed to clinch a final agreement from Chinese President Xi Jinping on Power of Siberia 2, a long-awaited pipeline that would carry Russian natural gas to China through Mongolia.
Xi dashed Putin’s hopes of winning a firm Chinese commitment on the project. For Moscow, the pipeline is central to its effort to redirect gas exports from Europe to Asia after Western sanctions and the war in Ukraine shattered its access to European markets. But Beijing was in no hurry, fully aware of its leverage. It appears to still be pressing for discounted gas supplies.
Putin faces tightening headwinds on several fronts. Russia’s economy is showing signs of strain, while on the battlefield in Ukraine, Russian forces continue to suffer heavy casualties even as the front lines remain deadlocked.
It would be dangerously ill-advised, however, to assume that a weakened Russia is necessarily less dangerous. History offers little comfort on this point: A declining autocrat does not always become more restrained. Russia may grow more reckless, more brutal and more unpredictable precisely because it is under pressure.
That risk was not lost on experts who attended two recent security conferences in Europe in mid-May: PISM Strategic Ark in Warsaw, Poland, and the Lennart Meri Conference in Tallinn, Estonia. At both gatherings, officials, analysts and other security specialists delivered a consistent warning: The Russian threat is growing, not receding.
European and NATO participants particularly emphasized that, despite worsening conditions, Russia is pressing ahead with the reconstitution of its military. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank, Russia’s active-duty troop strength, roughly 900,000 before its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, had grown to about 1.13 million by early 2025. Putin has ordered a further expansion to 1.5 million personnel.
The buildup is not aimed solely at Ukraine. Lithuanian intelligence and other security services report that since the invasion began, Russia has steadily reinforced troop concentrations along the borders of NATO member states.
At PISM Strategic Ark, Lt. Gen. Nicole Schilling, deputy inspector general of the German Armed Forces and the country’s second-highest-ranking military officer, warned that Russia should not be viewed as having exhausted its military capacity in Ukraine. Moscow, she suggested, is maintaining separate forces along the NATO front.
Perhaps most alarming is a recent line of analysis suggesting that Russia may be preparing for a possible attack on U.S. allies in Europe. In December, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte issued a dire warning, saying, « Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO within five years. »
At first glance, the idea may seem implausible. A Russia struggling to subdue a single, smaller country could hardly expect to prevail against NATO, an alliance of more than 30 members.
According to senior European military officers and security experts who attended the conferences in Poland and Estonia, the scenario Russia is most likely to be contemplating is a localized, short operation designed to paralyze the transatlantic alliance.
For example, one gambit Putin may be considering would proceed roughly along the following lines: Russian forces, or proxy troops operating without insignia, suddenly cross into part of the Baltic states or other neighboring territories. They destroy infrastructure, kill or wound civilians, and then withdraw, while leaving Russia in control of a narrow strip of land along the frontier.
NATO would then face an agonizing choice: invoke collective defense and risk full-scale war with Russia, or waver. The alliance would soon splinter, and over time NATO’s unity would begin to unravel.
If Putin is seriously entertaining such a plan, it could prove suicidal for Russia itself. Even if NATO as a whole failed to act, individual member states might retaliate. The result could be an all-out war Moscow neither wanted nor planned for.
Lt. Gen. Andrus Merilo, commander of the Estonian Defence Forces, told me that the danger lies in the way Putin may assess the confluence of factors. Merilo said it is hard to believe such a Russian gambit could succeed, but Putin may not see it that way and that could make the situation very dangerous.
Meanwhile, Russia is already waging war in the gray zone. Across Europe, hybrid operations are intensifying: infrastructure sabotage, arson attacks, drone provocations, cyberattacks and assassination plots.
According to a 2025 paper by Bart Schuurman, a professor of terrorism and political violence at Leiden University’s The Hague campus in the Netherlands, Russian hybrid attacks against Europe reached 44 incidents in 2024, more than seven times the number recorded in 2022.
What could further embolden Moscow is the widening rift between the U.S. and Europe. In May, Washington announced the withdrawal of about 5,000 troops from Germany, while leaving open the possibility of further reductions in Italy and Spain.
Europe has responded to the risk of a declining U.S. presence with a rearmament drive. In 2025, defense spending across Europe and Canada rose roughly 20% from the previous year.
But the picture is murkier than the headline figures suggest. Some of the new military equipment being acquired overlaps with purchases already being made by neighboring countries. Increased defense spending does not automatically result in greater military strength. Europe remains far from capable of mounting a credible defense without American support, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
The pressure and sense of urgency among NATO members were palpable at the Lennart Meri Conference.
Thomas Rowekamp, chairman of the German Bundestag’s defense committee, made the case for reintroducing conscription. He argued that Germany needs to increase its active-duty force from about 180,000 to 260,000 personnel, and said he doubted this could be achieved through a purely voluntary system alone. He called for a national debate on the possible return of conscription.
All that said, the West must also guard against the opposite error: overestimating Russian capabilities and allowing fear to harden into paralysis.
« There is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness, » Winston Churchill said about the Russians in a 1946 speech, offering insight into how to deal with them.
The West must not grow complacent about Russia’s waning power, nor flinch in the face of its provocations. To do so would be to hand Putin what he wants. Intimidation is his preferred instrument, and it works only if the other side allows itself to be intimidated.
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Le Président Paul Kagame appelle à la coopération renforcée face aux fractures mondiales

25.04.2026

Le Président Paul Kagame appelle à la coopération renforcée face aux fractures mondiales

Le président rwandais Paul Kagame a plaidé pour une coopération renforcée entre les nations, face à la montée des divisions dans le monde. Il s’exprimait au premier jour de la World Policy Conference 2026 (WPC 2026), hier, vendredi 24 avril 2026.

Dans son intervention, le chef de l’État a exposé la vision africaine du développement. Il affirme que le continent aspire avant tout à assurer sa propre prise en charge tout en maintenant des relations productives avec ses partenaires. Selon lui. Le contexte international marqué par une fragmentation croissante ne doit pas conduire à davantage d’isolement. Il estime qu’une telle orientation renforcerait les rivalités et accentuerait les divisions.

Le président rwandais défend une approche fondée sur la complémentarité. Il explique que le développement doit être perçu comme un jeu à somme positive, et non comme une compétition entre États. Cette vision, précise-t-il, peut favoriser une meilleure prévisibilité ainsi qu’une plus grande cohérence du système mondial.

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Hiroshima and Nagasaki disasters offer lesson for AI governance

Prevention of tech-driven catastrophe requires quicker response than nuclear arms control
Hiroyuki AKITA, chroniqueur Nikkei

4 octobre 2026

TOKYO — Restricting artificial intelligence while still harnessing it for human prosperity has emerged as one of the 21st century’s greatest challenges. U.S. President Donald Trump and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, agreed at their summit on Sept. 24 to further discuss the issue.
The superpowers have different strategic calculations regarding AI. The U.S., which currently leads the technological race, is cautious about hindering it with regulations, while China hopes to catch up by taking the lead in setting rules that work to its advantage. This is why Xi emphasized the need for AI governance during his visit to the U.S.
Opinions are divided even among Western countries. One camp argues that the pace of AI development should be slowed, with priority placed on creating safety measures to prevent catastrophic outcomes. The other contends that development must accelerate to keep from losing ground to China, a view strongly favored by Trump.
But the West should strive to achieve both goals simultaneously; this is not impossible.
If priorities are set, the top one should be to impede AI from running out of control. Even if the West were to win its competition with China, that victory would be meaningless if AI-driven biological or chemical attacks, or the destruction of critical infrastructure, were to occur.
The history of nuclear weapons demonstrates how difficult it will be to control AI-related risks.
In June 1945, scientists involved in the development of the atomic bomb produced the Franck Report, which argued that an « unannounced attack against Japan » was inadvisable to avoid sacrificing public support for the U.S. throughout the world. Yet in August of that year, bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
After World War II, the U.S. and Soviet Union engaged in a nuclear arms race. Serious efforts at arms control only began after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis that had brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. The following year, the countries established a hotline, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force in 1970.
It took 25 years after the atomic bombings until a global safety framework was established.
That much time is not left in the AI era. AI models can be replicated quickly, and once they spread, recalling them becomes difficult. Their owners are not limited to governments but also include companies, universities and individuals. If abused for military or terrorist purposes, the consequences could be catastrophic.
China is also concerned about uncontrolled AI, as indicated by one of its military officials at the Shangri-La Dialogue security summit in Singapore in late May. The militarization of emerging technologies, including AI, « is challenging traditional rules of engagement and ethics of war, increasing the risk of losing control, » Major General Meng Xiangqing said.
At the U.S.-China « Track 1.5 » dialogue of government and industry officials held in Beijing in late August, AI safety was a central topic.
A framework to prevent AI-related disasters would benefit both the U.S. and China. The countries should establish mechanisms to ensure that major accidents and cyberattacks can be reported quickly, and share information on misuse by terrorist and criminal organizations.
Nevertheless, the West cannot afford to lose the AI race to China. Chinese AI systems have been widely criticized for refusing to answer questions about human rights issues or Taiwan, and for echoing Beijing’s official positions.
If such AI systems become deeply embedded in public administrations, schools and media around the world, the Chinese government’s narrative could gain greater acceptance around the world. China is also striving to create an international order for the technology by launching the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization.
Yet it is difficult to exclude Chinese AI entirely. Many AI models from the country are inexpensive and highly customizable, making them increasingly popular, particularly in emerging countries. If the U.S. blocks them from its market and those of its allies, Chinese models would only dominate the remaining nations.
As such, it would be wise for the U.S. and its Western allies to work together to develop AI systems that outperform Chinese alternatives and are easier to use.
The U.S. enjoys a significant lead in cutting-edge AI models and cloud infrastructure. Among its allies, Japan has manufacturing strengths that may prove advantageous in physical AI. Taiwan and South Korea are indispensable for semiconductor production, while Japan and Europe can play key roles in manufacturing equipment.
Maintaining U.S. leadership requires building AI models that its allies can trust.
In June, the U.S. Commerce Department temporarily restricted access to the latest model developed by Anthropic for national security reasons. If Washington is going to step in like this, it would help if it could inform the industry’s customers when access to AI models could be restricted and for how long.
With this kind of transparency, the U.S. could build the confidence it will need as it takes on China in the field. Cooperating with China to prevent AI-related disasters and preventing China from achieving AI hegemony are not mutually exclusive objectives.
In the case of nuclear weapons, the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, followed by the Cuban Missile Crisis, resulted in a globally shared understanding that unchecked escalation could lead to catastrophe.
« As for AI, such a sense of crisis is not yet widely shared, making it difficult [for countries] to agree on a comprehensive regulation, » said Nobumasa Akiyama, a professor at Hitotsubashi University and an expert on nuclear arms control. « For now, practical measures would be to create a system for accident reporting and a framework for crisis management.
« More important than the specific mechanisms, however, is confirming that countries in conflict can cooperate to protect their common interest of avoiding catastrophe. »
Major power rivalries hindered progress toward nuclear disarmament in the quarter century from the atomic bombings of Japan to the ratification of the NPT. Now similar rivalries are getting in the way of safeguarding humanity from the potential risks of AI.
Mechanisms to contain these risks must be established before they bring us to the edge of disaster.
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A cornered Putin might recklessly provoke NATO

As Russia struggles in Ukraine, its options are narrowing as resources at home dwindle
Hiroyuki AKITA, chroniqueur Nikkei

19 septembre 2026

TOKYO — Negotiations aimed at ending the war in Ukraine have resumed. But it is difficult to believe that Russian President Vladimir Putin has abandoned his ambition to dominate the neighboring country. Rather, signs of a more dangerous trend are emerging.
CIA Director John Ratcliffe visited Moscow on Aug. 25 amid concerns that Russia could intensify provocations against NATO. According to U.S. media reports, Ratcliffe warned Russian officials against attacking the alliance.
The news reverberated across Europe.
A senior security official from a major European country said that the U.S. has not yet provided any explanation about Ratcliffe’s warning, adding that it is difficult to predict how Putin might act if he feels cornered.
Speculation about possible Russian military action against Europe is nothing new. In a speech made last December, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte warned that Russia could be in a position to launch an attack within five years.
According to the Wall Street Journal, U.S. intelligence reports say Putin could try to test NATO’s resolve with a limited assault on an allied country as early as autumn this year, or if not, at least before 2030.
What worries NATO is not a full-scale invasion of alliance territory but rather limited attacks by special forces or large-scale strikes on infrastructure. European security officials have grown increasingly concerned that Russia could orchestrate actions against NATO member states that stop just short of outright war.
Russia’s military continues to struggle in Ukraine. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank, Russian casualties surpassed 30,000 per month in 2026, with the cumulative number reaching about 1.4 million by June since the invasion began in February 2022. A direct military confrontation with the 32-member NATO alliance would be close to suicidal.
Yet there is no guarantee that Putin sees the situation the same way. Russia’s armed forces are exhausted and lack the capacity for a major offensive on the Ukrainian front. The Russian president may conclude that escalating tensions with Europe offers a better chance of breaking the current stalemate in Ukraine. In that case, Putin would have three options.
The first one is to continue the war of attrition and wait for Ukraine and its Western backers to tire and move toward compromise.
The second is to accept a ceasefire and save time to rebuild Russia’s military strength.
The third is to destabilize NATO through a hybrid campaign combining military provocations and intelligence warfare, thereby undermining the alliance’s unity.
At first glance, Russia would likely choose the first path. But a closer look at conditions inside Russia suggests otherwise. The country’s military and economic resources appear to be under strain, reducing its chances of winning a prolonged war of attrition.
While battlefield casualties continue to rise, recruitment is plateauing. Russia has relied on generous signing bonuses to attract contract soldiers. Compensation has been raised across the country, but the number of new contract recruits in the first half of 2026 totaled about 200,000, down from more than 210,000 a year earlier, according to figures released by Russia.
Ukrainian attacks are also hitting Russian oil refineries and transport infrastructure. Refinery throughput fell to an estimated 3.6 million barrels a day in July, the lowest level since May 2002.
Rising government spending and weaker energy revenues have further strained public finances. Russia’s budget deficit reached roughly $78.5 billion in the first four months of 2026, already exceeding the government’s original full-year target of about $50.6 billion. Liquid assets in the National Wealth Fund, which can be used to cover fiscal shortfalls, had shrunk to 1.5% of gross domestic product as of July 1 from 6.5% before the war.
There are few signs that these trends will reverse anytime soon. The longer Putin waits, the greater the risk that Russia’s position will deteriorate.
Then, a ceasefire, the second option, would look like the most sensible path. But for Putin, it would carry political risks. Once the fighting stops, it would become difficult to justify the extraordinary social controls imposed under wartime conditions.
Critics could also argue that Russia has failed to deliver gains commensurate with the sacrifices made. Returning veterans could become another source of domestic discontent.
Therefore, Putin may find himself drawn toward the third scenario: escalating provocations against NATO. The more pressure he faces, the stronger the temptation to bet on risky gambles.
« Russia has long embraced the concept of using measures short of war to deter an adversary or compel it to take action [in favor of Moscow], » said Yu Koizumi, an associate professor at the University of Tokyo’s Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology.
« If Russia attacks a NATO country, the objective would not be war itself but rather to sow divisions within Europe with the aim of forcing [the alliance] to reduce support for Ukraine and lift sanctions against Moscow, » he added.
This is not simply a European concern. Among Asian nations, Japan is a supporter of Ukraine, and Russia has designated it an « unfriendly country. » On Aug. 13, Putin became the first sitting Russian president to visit Etorofu Island, one of the Russian-controlled islands claimed by Japan as part of the so-called Northern Territories. Further provocations cannot be ruled out.
« Japan, as a supporter of Ukraine, needs to prepare for scenarios similar to those facing Europe, » Koizumi said. One possibility, he said, is that Russia could begin stopping, boarding or even seizing Western vessels operating near the Northern Territories.
Russia is often compared to a giant bear. When cornered, it bares its teeth and becomes more dangerous. Yet that does not mean the West can afford to ease the pressure out of fear of provoking Moscow. The U.S., Europe and Japan should calmly analyze Putin’s next moves, strengthen their coordination and reinforce their defenses accordingly.
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How China’s Japan-bashing is indirectly targeting Washington

Broad strategy aims to weaken foundations of US-led order in Asia
Hiroyuki AKITA, chroniqueur Nikkei

9 août 2026

TOKYO — China’s Japan-bashing shows no sign of abating, pressuring the two nations’ relationship in areas such as diplomacy, security and trade.
Since spring, diplomats in the U.S. and Europe have often quietly talked about how Chinese President Xi Jinping behaved during meetings with foreign leaders visiting his country.
According to diplomatic sources, Xi on several occasions abruptly shifted the topic to Japan after otherwise friendly conversations. The sources said the Chinese president sternly accused Tokyo of moving toward rearmament and of undermining regional peace and stability, surprising some leaders.
China’s Japan-bashing began last November after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made a remark on a potential Taiwan contingency.
Takaichi told the Japanese parliament that if China were to take military action against Taiwan and U.S. forces responded to such a conflict, Japan could face what is known under its law as a « survival-threatening situation. »
Under such circumstances, Tokyo could exercise the right to collective self-defense and authorize the deployment of the nation’s Self-Defense Forces. While the Japanese government has explained that the remark does not mean Tokyo has changed its long-held position on Taiwan, Beijing interpreted it as signaling the possibility of Japan’s military involvement in a Taiwan conflict.
Even so, Xi appears to have gone too far. Criticizing Japan in multiple meetings with foreign leaders is definitely unusual.
Beijing has stepped up its anti-Japan diplomatic campaign in meetings with foreign leaders and through state media. It has labelled Tokyo’s defense buildup as « new militarism. »
Moreover, China has urged its citizens to refrain from traveling to Japan and tightened restrictions on exports of dual-use products, including rare earths, to Japan. From June to July, Beijing increased military activity around the Japanese archipelago including joint operations involving Chinese and Russian bombers and naval vessels.
Why has Beijing chosen to intensify pressure on Japan?
There are three factors behind the move, based on analysis by Japanese authorities and experts on China.
The first is that Xi’s hostile reaction to Takaichi’s Taiwan remark has prompted Chinese Communist Party officials and government bureaucrats to take an increasingly tough line toward Japan, partly as a way of demonstrating loyalty to the Chinese leader.
One episode illustrates this point. Earlier this year, when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi dined with a senior Southeast Asian leader, he devoted nearly half of the conversation to Japan, according to diplomatic sources in the region.
The second factor is Beijing’s desire to warn other countries over the Taiwan issue by making an example of Japan.
By targeting Japan, China seeks to send a message that countries that challenge Beijing on Taiwan could face serious consequences.
Such « make-an-example » diplomacy has become a familiar feature of China’s foreign policy. In 2018, after Canada detained a senior executive of China’s Huawei Technologies, Beijing restricted imports of Canadian agricultural products. In 2020, Beijing imposed sweeping economic sanctions on Australia after Canberra called for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19, which was first confirmed in the Chinese city of Wuhan.
Yet these factors alone do not fully explain why Beijing has gone so far as to accuse Japan of pursuing « new militarism. »
That leads to the third factor: China’s long-term strategy to compete with the U.S. over the international order.
Xi’s government has openly criticized the U.S.-led international system and has sought to promote an alternative version of global governance. In recent years, Beijing has promoted a concept of a « community with a shared future for mankind » and the Global Security Initiative framework as part of its effort to expand the China-led international system.
One of the biggest obstacles to that strategy, from Beijing’s perspective, is Japan’s deepening alliance with America.
Japan is located along the so-called First Island Chain, which stretches through the Japanese archipelago, Taiwan and the Philippines. Chinese strategists have long regarded the island chain as a geographic barrier that limits China’s ability to project power into the Pacific. From Beijing’s view, Japan represents a key pillar of the regional security architecture that constrains the expansion of its influence.
Against this backdrop came Takaichi’s remark on Taiwan.
Beijing seized on the remark to reinforce its narrative that Japan is returning to militarism. By doing so, Beijing hopes to undermine support for Japan’s efforts to strengthen its security framework.
In other words, China’s pressure against Japan is not aimed solely at Japan. It is part of a broader strategy to weaken the foundations of the U.S.-led order in Asia.
Analysts say Beijing may also believe that U.S. President Donald Trump places less emphasis on alliances, making it easier for China to take a tougher approach toward Japan.
Ryousei Kokubun, professor emeritus at Keio University, said China’s campaign should be viewed in a broader context.
« China has accused Japan of reviving militarism in the past over historical issues and Taiwan-related matters, » Kokubun said. « This time, however, Beijing’s criticism of what it calls Japan’s ‘new militarism’ is directed not only at Japan itself. It is also aimed at the U.S. behind Japan and at the U.S.-Japan alliance. »
China’s strategy nevertheless has its limits.
No major country in North America, Europe or Asia has echoed Beijing’s accusations that Japan is becoming more militaristic. If China continues its coercive action towards Japan, it could instead fuel greater concern among other countries about China’s own behavior.
Akio Takahara, a distinguished visiting professor at Tokyo Woman’s Christian University, argued that China’s gains from the campaign are likely to be limited.
« There is little benefit China can obtain from attacking Japan to this extent, » Takahara said. « Japanese investment in China could decline even further. Even so, it may be difficult for Beijing to lower a fist that it has already raised. »
Japan’s best response is to avoid being drawn into China’s provocations and to continue calling calmly for dialogue. On its side, China would also want to avoid a higher risk of unintentional military collision in the waters around Japan and elsewhere.
At the same time, Tokyo should coordinate more closely with Washington on China strategy while steadily strengthening its defense capabilities and alliance network. It will also become increasingly important for Japan to explain to the international community how such efforts contribute to regional stability.
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China and North Korea absorb lessons from Ukraine’s evolving battlefield

Drone production is only part of a broader shift toward networked warfare
Hiroyuki AKITA, chroniqueur Nikkei

27 juin 2026

TOKYO — War is humanity’s greatest tragedy, claiming countless lives, fracturing societies and leaving scars that endure for generations. Yet war is also, in its ironic way, a furnace of invention. Technologies forged in conflict spill into civilian life and, over time, reshape the character of conflict itself.
World War I produced the tank, built to claw through trench lines. World War II brought radar and code-breaking to maturity, altering the course of entire campaigns. For better or worse, nations race to absorb each new wave of battlefield innovation, hoping to turn it to their own advantage. In Ukraine today, that cycle is repeating with startling speed.
Cheap, expendable drones have enabled Ukraine to destroy Russian tanks and even warships, overturning decades of conventional military assumptions. As Russia has responded in kind, unmanned combat has rapidly proliferated, a shift many analysts view as a revolution in modern warfare.
Countries around the world, eager to grasp the technological transformation sweeping the battlefield, are closely studying the war unleashed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Nowhere is that attention more intense than in the Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — which lie on Russia’s doorstep and live with an acute sense of peril.
On May 14, I observed Spring Storm, one of Estonia’s largest military exercises. The multinational drill, which runs for about a month from early May, drew forces from more than a dozen nations, including the U.S., Britain and France.
The training grounds lay close to the Russian border, and to guard against hacking we were told to switch off our phones. Before reaching the site, I had expected to see tanks rumbling across fields and fighter jets carving through the sky. Instead, the area reverberated with the metallic whine of drones. The day’s drill focused on unmanned combat, with drones and other systems used for reconnaissance, strikes and electronic disruption.
A British Army soldier monitors the front line using unmanned surveillance equipment during a joint military exercise in Estonia. (Photo by Hiroyuki Akita)
What stood out was the presence of Ukrainian troops, invited so others could learn the latest techniques of drone warfare. « In drones and electronic warfare, we are behind Russia and Ukraine, » said Col. Aron Kalmus of the Estonian Defence Forces, who commanded the exercise. « We have to catch up, and quickly. »
The rapid, radical transformation of front-line combat is visible in a single statistic. Ukraine’s drone production surged from just 1,200 units in 2022 to around 1.7 million in 2024, marking a roughly 1,400-fold increase, according to the Kyiv-based think tank StateWatch. Russia, too, ramped up its production target to 1.4 million units in 2024.
But the deeper transformation lies not in volume alone. A new way of fighting is taking shape, one in which drones are fused into a unified network with ground forces, aircraft and missile units. Electronic warfare, the countermeasure of choice, is advancing just as quickly, creating a relentless contest in which each side races to blind, jam or hijack the other’s unmanned fleets.
One development, however, casts a darker shadow: the role of Pyongyang. North Korea is the only third nation to have sent troops to support Russia on the ground, reportedly more than 10,000 so far, with some analysts warning that another 25,000 to 30,000 could follow.
On Ukraine’s battlefields, North Korean forces are being exposed to some of the most advanced forms of unmanned and electronic warfare currently in use. In return for its troop deployment, Pyongyang is believed to have received Russian assistance in drone and electronic warfare technology, as well as technical support for reconnaissance satellites and missile development, according to assessments by South Korean intelligence and others. North Korea may be honing its ability to control drone swarms and counter enemy drones through sophisticated electronic warfare systems.
North Korea’s support for Russia extends well beyond manpower. It has shipped vast quantities of ammunition and even its KN-23, a short-range ballistic missile closely modeled on Russia’s Iskander system. Ukrainian intelligence now warns that live-fire data from those launches may be shared between Moscow and Pyongyang and used to enhance the missile’s accuracy.
« There is a danger that the North Korean military is absorbing the most advanced ways of fighting from Russia ahead of every other nation, » said Shinae Lee, a researcher at Japan’s Sasakawa Peace Foundation who in late May published an analysis of the risks of the deepening military partnership. « For the security of Asia, that is an extraordinarily grave threat. »
What unsettles the wider world is mounting signs that Russia is also sharing its combat experience in Ukraine with the Chinese military. Moscow relies heavily on China for the semiconductors and machine tools essential to sustaining mass arms production. Training assistance, it seems, is part of the repayment.
In June 2025, the Kyiv Post reported that Russia planned to host and train some 600 Chinese military personnel by year’s end, drawing directly on lessons from real combat to strengthen China’s ability to counter NATO-standard weapons systems. The Chinese military, for its part, secretly invited Russian personnel for training in the latter half of last year, according to Reuters.
China already commands one of the world’s largest shares of drone production and possesses formidable operational know-how. In March, it demonstrated Atlas, a drone swarm system capable of coordinating nearly 100 drones for missions including reconnaissance and attack. Combat data and operational experience gained in Ukraine could help speed China’s military transformation.
Sadly, there is little indication that Russia’s invasion will end soon and peace will return to Ukraine. As military innovation continues to evolve on the battlefield, the U.S., Europe, China and North Korea will likely race to draw lessons from it.
The countries most at risk of falling behind are Japan and South Korea, both situated close to China and North Korea. Tokyo and Seoul have refrained from full-fledged, direct military support for Ukraine, and their security exchanges with Kyiv remain limited compared with those of the U.S. and Europe.
Yet there is still much they can do, including deepening cooperation in civilian drone technology. What is important is to see Ukraine not merely as a recipient of aid, but as a partner whose battlefield experience offers valuable insights into the future of warfare.
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Asia shaken as US abandons role as guardian of rules-based order

Japan must step up efforts to safeguard peace in region
Hiroyuki AKITA, chroniqueur Nikkei

13 juin 2026

SINGAPORE — Defense ministers and senior military officers from Asia, the U.S. and Europe sparred at the Shangri-La Dialogue security summit in late May amid growing concern that U.S. President Donald Trump’s « peace through strength » approach could come at the expense of the « rules-based order. » U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth appealed for understanding of Washington’s security strategy at the three-day conference, which concluded on May 31 in Singapore. However, listening to his speech firsthand, I could not help feeling that America’s leadership in upholding order in the Indo-Pacific is likely to erode further.
« We let ourselves get distracted by empty globalist rhetoric about the rules-based international order, » Hegseth said in his speech on May 30, rejecting the position of many European and other countries that place a premium on international law and rules. Instead, he advocated stability through strength, urging U.S. allies in Asia to accelerate efforts to bolster their defense capabilities.
Military buildups by China and North Korea have altered the balance of power in Asia and increased instability across the region. In this new reality, Hegseth’s argument that strength matters more than rules is not without merit. Even so, he went too far by denying the rules-based order, calling it nothing more than empty rhetoric. A world devoid of rules and order would leave major powers largely unchecked, with survival of the fittest becoming the governing principle.
Japan has pursued the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific based on international law and order since it was first championed by the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe about a decade ago. The current U.S. approach points in the opposite direction.
Many Southeast Asian conference participants voiced concern about the current situation.
« Institutions such as the United Nations, established to uphold stability, multilateralism and international law, are becoming increasingly weakened in the face of geopolitical rivalry, » Malaysian Defense Minister Mohamed Khaled Nordin said. « When developing nations violate agreements, they face condemnation and pressure. But when powerful countries or their allies do the same, the international response becomes conspicuously muted. »
Khaled did not mention any country by name but implicitly criticized what he suggested were military actions by the Trump administration of questionable legality under international law, including its strike on Iran.
The U.N. Security Council is responsible for maintaining international peace and order by identifying violations of international law and imposing sanctions on those responsible. But the council’s authority has been undermined since Russia, one of its permanent members, became an aggressor. If the U.S. retreats from its role in maintaining international order and the rule of law, global security will be dealt another blow.
However, this is not the first time the U.S. has scaled back its commitment to the international order. Weary of prolonged « war on terror » operations in Afghanistan and the Middle East, the Barack Obama administration declared in 2013 that America would no longer serve as the world’s policeman. The shift, then, did not begin with the inauguration of the Trump administration; it had been underway for years.
International law and rules are not only needed to prevent maritime and territorial disputes; they are also urgently needed to establish limits on the military use of artificial intelligence.
At a special session of the Shangri-La summit, participants discussed the risks posed by the military application of AI, which could lower the threshold for the outbreak of war. Senior military officials from Pakistan and China, both nuclear-armed states, warned that the use of AI could accelerate the pace of conflict to the point where it becomes difficult to control.
If the international order continues to erode and security tensions keep rising, Asia’s geopolitical landscape could be profoundly affected. There are three possible scenarios.
The first is that Asia splits into three camps as the U.S.-China rivalry intensifies. China’s neighbors, including Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, would deepen their ties with Beijing, while maritime nations such as Japan, Australia and the Philippines would strengthen their alliances with America to counter China’s growing influence. Meanwhile, countries such as Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia would seek a middle ground, avoiding alignment with either side.
The second would see a stronger sense of urgency driving deeper security cooperation among Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and Southeast Asian countries. By fostering regional cohesion, such cooperation could prevent Asia from fragmenting into rival camps and help preserve a certain level of stability.
The third lies somewhere in between. There is little doubt that the first would be the worst outcome and the second the most desirable.
Achieving the best-case scenario will be difficult but not impossible. « If there are concerns that U.S. military engagement in Asia may waver, momentum will grow even further to deepen security cooperation within the Asia region as a hedge against that risk, » said Bilahari Kausikan, former permanent secretary of Singapore’s foreign ministry. « We are already seeing such signs emerging even within ASEAN. »
ASEAN defense ministers in October agreed to conduct joint military exercises and expand cooperation to protect undersea cables and strengthen cybersecurity. However, unity among ASEAN members alone will not be sufficient to counter China’s formidable military power and preserve regional order. Japan’s actions will be crucial.
Japan needs to further strengthen its defense capabilities and support the U.S. to help ensure that it remains engaged in Asia. Tokyo should then expand defense assistance to ASEAN members and other regional partners.
Japan is taking steps in the right direction by drastically increasing defense spending and relaxing restrictions on defense equipment exports. Yet Asia’s geopolitical environment is deteriorating rapidly. The key question is whether Japan can adapt quickly enough to keep pace with the fast-changing situation.
Lisez l’article sur le site de Nikkei.

Aleksandar Vučić

Président de la République de Serbie depuis 2017, Aleksandar Vučić a précédemment exercé les fonctions de Premier ministre de la Serbie de 2014 à 2017, après avoir été Premier vice-Premier ministre et ministre de la Défense. Figure majeure de la vie politique serbe depuis plus de trois décennies, il a cofondé le Parti progressiste serbe en 2008 et en est devenu le président en 2012. Auparavant, il a notamment été ministre de l’Information (1998-2000), député à l’Assemblée nationale de Serbie ainsi qu’à l’Assemblée fédérale de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie, et a occupé plusieurs hautes responsabilités au sein des institutions politiques serbes. En tant que Premier vice-Premier ministre, il a joué un rôle de premier plan dans la lutte contre la corruption en Serbie et a contribué au dialogue facilité par l’Union européenne entre Belgrade et Pristina, qui a conduit à la signature de l’Accord de Bruxelles en 2013. En qualité de Premier ministre, il a conduit un programme de réformes économiques visant à restaurer la stabilité budgétaire, réduire la dette publique et renforcer les performances économiques du pays. Aleksandar Vučić est diplômé de la faculté de droit de l’Université de Belgrade, dont il est sorti diplômé en 1994. Il parle couramment l’anglais et le russe et possède une connaissance pratique du français et de l’allemand.

Russia is weaker — but no less dangerous

Russia is weaker — but no less dangerous
Putin steps up cyber and other hybrid attacks against US allies in Europe
Hiroyuki AKITA, chroniqueur Nikkei

31 mai 2026

TALLINN, Estonia — Russian President Vladimir Putin must have left Beijing in a sour mood, quietly nursing frustration and disappointment.
During his two-day visit to the Chinese capital through May 20, Putin failed to clinch a final agreement from Chinese President Xi Jinping on Power of Siberia 2, a long-awaited pipeline that would carry Russian natural gas to China through Mongolia.
Xi dashed Putin’s hopes of winning a firm Chinese commitment on the project. For Moscow, the pipeline is central to its effort to redirect gas exports from Europe to Asia after Western sanctions and the war in Ukraine shattered its access to European markets. But Beijing was in no hurry, fully aware of its leverage. It appears to still be pressing for discounted gas supplies.
Putin faces tightening headwinds on several fronts. Russia’s economy is showing signs of strain, while on the battlefield in Ukraine, Russian forces continue to suffer heavy casualties even as the front lines remain deadlocked.
It would be dangerously ill-advised, however, to assume that a weakened Russia is necessarily less dangerous. History offers little comfort on this point: A declining autocrat does not always become more restrained. Russia may grow more reckless, more brutal and more unpredictable precisely because it is under pressure.
That risk was not lost on experts who attended two recent security conferences in Europe in mid-May: PISM Strategic Ark in Warsaw, Poland, and the Lennart Meri Conference in Tallinn, Estonia. At both gatherings, officials, analysts and other security specialists delivered a consistent warning: The Russian threat is growing, not receding.
European and NATO participants particularly emphasized that, despite worsening conditions, Russia is pressing ahead with the reconstitution of its military. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank, Russia’s active-duty troop strength, roughly 900,000 before its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, had grown to about 1.13 million by early 2025. Putin has ordered a further expansion to 1.5 million personnel.
The buildup is not aimed solely at Ukraine. Lithuanian intelligence and other security services report that since the invasion began, Russia has steadily reinforced troop concentrations along the borders of NATO member states.
At PISM Strategic Ark, Lt. Gen. Nicole Schilling, deputy inspector general of the German Armed Forces and the country’s second-highest-ranking military officer, warned that Russia should not be viewed as having exhausted its military capacity in Ukraine. Moscow, she suggested, is maintaining separate forces along the NATO front.
Perhaps most alarming is a recent line of analysis suggesting that Russia may be preparing for a possible attack on U.S. allies in Europe. In December, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte issued a dire warning, saying, « Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO within five years. »
At first glance, the idea may seem implausible. A Russia struggling to subdue a single, smaller country could hardly expect to prevail against NATO, an alliance of more than 30 members.
According to senior European military officers and security experts who attended the conferences in Poland and Estonia, the scenario Russia is most likely to be contemplating is a localized, short operation designed to paralyze the transatlantic alliance.
For example, one gambit Putin may be considering would proceed roughly along the following lines: Russian forces, or proxy troops operating without insignia, suddenly cross into part of the Baltic states or other neighboring territories. They destroy infrastructure, kill or wound civilians, and then withdraw, while leaving Russia in control of a narrow strip of land along the frontier.
NATO would then face an agonizing choice: invoke collective defense and risk full-scale war with Russia, or waver. The alliance would soon splinter, and over time NATO’s unity would begin to unravel.
If Putin is seriously entertaining such a plan, it could prove suicidal for Russia itself. Even if NATO as a whole failed to act, individual member states might retaliate. The result could be an all-out war Moscow neither wanted nor planned for.
Lt. Gen. Andrus Merilo, commander of the Estonian Defence Forces, told me that the danger lies in the way Putin may assess the confluence of factors. Merilo said it is hard to believe such a Russian gambit could succeed, but Putin may not see it that way and that could make the situation very dangerous.
Meanwhile, Russia is already waging war in the gray zone. Across Europe, hybrid operations are intensifying: infrastructure sabotage, arson attacks, drone provocations, cyberattacks and assassination plots.
According to a 2025 paper by Bart Schuurman, a professor of terrorism and political violence at Leiden University’s The Hague campus in the Netherlands, Russian hybrid attacks against Europe reached 44 incidents in 2024, more than seven times the number recorded in 2022.
What could further embolden Moscow is the widening rift between the U.S. and Europe. In May, Washington announced the withdrawal of about 5,000 troops from Germany, while leaving open the possibility of further reductions in Italy and Spain.
Europe has responded to the risk of a declining U.S. presence with a rearmament drive. In 2025, defense spending across Europe and Canada rose roughly 20% from the previous year.
But the picture is murkier than the headline figures suggest. Some of the new military equipment being acquired overlaps with purchases already being made by neighboring countries. Increased defense spending does not automatically result in greater military strength. Europe remains far from capable of mounting a credible defense without American support, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
The pressure and sense of urgency among NATO members were palpable at the Lennart Meri Conference.
Thomas Rowekamp, chairman of the German Bundestag’s defense committee, made the case for reintroducing conscription. He argued that Germany needs to increase its active-duty force from about 180,000 to 260,000 personnel, and said he doubted this could be achieved through a purely voluntary system alone. He called for a national debate on the possible return of conscription.
All that said, the West must also guard against the opposite error: overestimating Russian capabilities and allowing fear to harden into paralysis.
« There is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness, » Winston Churchill said about the Russians in a 1946 speech, offering insight into how to deal with them.
The West must not grow complacent about Russia’s waning power, nor flinch in the face of its provocations. To do so would be to hand Putin what he wants. Intimidation is his preferred instrument, and it works only if the other side allows itself to be intimidated.
Lisez l’article sur le site de Nikkei.

Anne-Claire Legendre

Présidente de l’Institut du monde arabe depuis février 2026, Anne-Claire Legendre a auparavant été conseillère Afrique du Nord et Moyen-Orient du Président de la République française de décembre 2023 à février 2026. Diplomate de carrière, elle a occupé les fonctions de Porte-parole et Directrice de la communication et de la presse du ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères de 2021 à 2023. Elle a auparavant été Ambassadrice de France auprès de l’État du Koweït (2020-2021) et Consule générale de France à New York de 2016 à 2020. Entre 2013 et 2016, elle a servi au cabinet du ministre des Affaires étrangères et du Développement international, Laurent Fabius, en qualité de conseillère pour l’Afrique du Nord et le Moyen-Orient. Auparavant, elle a été affectée à la Mission permanente de la France auprès des Nations unies à New York (2010-2013), où elle suivait les questions relatives au Moyen-Orient au Conseil de sécurité. Elle a également exercé au sein de la direction d’Afrique du Nord et du Moyen-Orient du ministère des Affaires étrangères, en charge des relations bilatérales entre la France et l’Algérie (2008-2010), après avoir contribué au développement de la coopération consulaire européenne à la direction des Français de l’étranger (2007-2008). Elle a débuté sa carrière à l’Ambassade de France au Yémen en tant que conseillère en communication (2005-2006). Diplômée de Sciences Po, elle a également étudié la langue arabe à l’Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales et les lettres modernes à l’Université Sorbonne Nouvelle.

Jean-Pierre Landau

Professeur associé d’économie à Sciences Po (Paris). Il a effectué l’essentiel de sa carrière au sein de l’administration française. Il a notamment occupé les fonctions de Sous-gouverneur de la Banque de France de 2006 à 2011, d’Administrateur pour la France auprès du Fonds monétaire international, du Groupe de la Banque mondiale et de la Banque européenne pour la reconstruction et le développement, ainsi que de Sous-directeur au ministère des Finances. Il a également été professeur invité à Princeton University (Woodrow Wilson School), professeur invité à Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies à Washington D.C., ainsi que chercheur senior invité à la Harvard Kennedy School. Enfin, il a exercé les fonctions de doyen de l’École des affaires publiques de Sciences Po durant l’année universitaire 2014-2015.

Alexandre Musso

Vice-président Développement durable pour l’Europe et l’Afrique du Nord chez Accor, l’un des principaux groupes hôteliers mondiaux, il accompagne les propriétaires d’hôtels dans la transformation durable du secteur de l’hôtellerie. Il occupait depuis 2021 les fonctions de Chef de cabinet de la Directrice du développement durable d’Accor ainsi que de Directeur de la performance durable au sein du département Développement durable du Groupe. Il a également travaillé dans l’économie sociale et solidaire au sein du Groupe SOS, acteur majeur de l’économie sociale en France et en Europe, où il a contribué à la conception et à la mise en œuvre de plusieurs innovations sociales. Il fait partie des membres de l’Open Diplomacy Institute depuis 2026 et s’intéresse particulièrement aux enjeux liés à la transition durable. Il est titulaire de deux diplômes de master : l’un en économie de l’ESCP Business School, et l’autre en politiques publiques de Sciences Po.

Arthur Rogé

Responsable de la modélisation et de l’analyse sur l’accès à l’énergie à l’Agence internationale de l’énergie (AIE), il travaille au sein de l’équipe du World Energy Outlook, publication de référence sur les perspectives énergétiques mondiales. À ce titre, il contribue à l’élaboration d’analyses prospectives et de scénarios portant sur les grands enjeux énergétiques internationaux. Il a participé à la rédaction de plus de vingt publications de l’AIE et a développé une expertise couvrant un large éventail de thématiques, notamment l’accès à l’énergie, les émissions de CO₂, la modélisation de la demande énergétique et l’accessibilité financière de l’énergie. Diplômé des Arts et Métiers, où il a obtenu un diplôme d’ingénieur en génie mécanique et industriel, il est également titulaire d’un Master of Science en ingénierie aérospatiale de l’Imperial College London ainsi que d’un master en énergie internationale de Sciences Po Paris. Il a rejoint le Fellowship de l’Open Diplomacy Institute lorsqu’il a été nommé membre de la délégation française au Sommet de la jeunesse du G7 (Y7) 2026. Dans ce cadre, il contribue aux réflexions de l’Institut sur les enjeux énergétiques, climatiques et de développement durable à l’échelle internationale.

Inès Rivoalen

Cheffe de projet chez ArianeGroup, Inès travaille sur le développement d’un banc d’essai destiné à un moteur de fusée réutilisable. Dans ce cadre, elle contribue à la conception, à la mise au point et à la validation des systèmes de propulsion spatiale de nouvelle génération. Diplômée d’un double cursus en ingénierie générale et en ingénierie spatiale, elle bénéficie d’une formation pluridisciplinaire qui lui confère une approche systémique des défis technologiques complexes et des grands projets industriels. Parallèlement à ses activités professionnelles, elle s’investit activement en faveur de la promotion de la diversité dans les filières scientifiques et technologiques. En tant que marraine au sein de l’association Elles Bougent, elle accompagne et encourage les jeunes femmes à s’orienter vers les carrières de l’ingénierie, de l’industrie et de la recherche. Elle a rejoint le Fellowship de l’Open Diplomacy Institute lorsqu’elle a été nommée membre de la délégation française au Sommet de la jeunesse du G7 (Y7) 2026. À ce titre, elle contribue aux réflexions menées par l’Institut sur les enjeux d’innovation, de souveraineté technologique et de coopération internationale.

Dorian Revillon d’Apreval

Conseiller au sein du cabinet du directeur de l’Environnement de l’Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE), il apporte un appui stratégique à la direction exécutive, coordonne les relations institutionnelles de l’Organisation dans les enceintes multilatérales et favorise la coopération transversale au sein de la Direction de l’environnement. Auparavant, en tant que chargé de mission au ministère français de la Transition écologique, il a piloté la coordination des positions françaises dans les négociations environnementales multilatérales, notamment au sein des Nations unies, du G7, du G20, de l’Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) et de l’OCDE. Durant la présidence française du Conseil de l’Union européenne, il a représenté l’Union européenne et ses États membres lors des négociations de plusieurs résolutions à la cinquième Assemblée des Nations unies pour l’environnement. Dorian a rejoint le Fellowship de l’Open Diplomacy Institute lorsqu’il a été nommé membre de la délégation française au Sommet de la jeunesse du G7 (Y7) 2025 à Ottawa. Il dirige aujourd’hui la préparation et la formation de la délégation française aux Sommets de la jeunesse du G7 et du G20 (Y7 et Y20) de 2026. Son expertise en matière de politiques publiques s’appuie sur une formation pluridisciplinaire associant sciences, droit et économie. Il est titulaire de deux masters de l’Université de Maastricht, respectivement en sciences de la durabilité (Sustainability Science) et en mondialisation et droit (Globalisation and Law), ainsi que d’un master en droit des affaires de l’Université Paris-Saclay.

Raphaël Martin de Lagarde

Raphaël Martin de Lagarde a rejoint TotalEnergies en 2025 comme directeur délégué aux affaires publiques internationales. Il a exercé auparavant différentes responsabilités au sein du ministère français des affaires étrangères, travaillant sur l’Europe orientale, le Moyen Orient, l’Asie centrale et méridionale.

Amélia Louiba

Analyste marketing chez Thales Cybersecurity & Identity, Amélia est actuellement basée à Munich dans le cadre d’un Volontariat International en Entreprise (VIE). À ce titre, elle contribue au développement commercial de solutions de cybersécurité et d’identification biométrique destinées aux administrations et aux clients gouvernementaux. Cette mission s’inscrit dans la continuité de deux années d’alternance au sein de la même entité, où elle occupait les fonctions d’analyste de marché. Diplômée d’une école de commerce après avoir effectué deux années de classes préparatoires littéraires, elle a développé un intérêt marqué pour les questions historiques, géopolitiques et diplomatiques. Ces centres d’intérêt continuent d’orienter son parcours professionnel et nourrissent son approche analytique des enjeux internationaux. Elle a rejoint le Fellowship de l’Open Diplomacy Institute lorsqu’elle a été nommée membre de la délégation française au Sommet de la jeunesse du G7 (Y7) 2025 à Ottawa. Depuis lors, elle contribue aux travaux de l’Institut sur les enjeux internationaux et le dialogue entre les jeunes générations et les décideurs publics.

Adrien Lehman

Professeur affilié à l’École d’affaires publiques de Sciences Po et vice-président du conseil d’administration de l’Open Diplomacy Institute. Inspecteur au sein d’une institution financière publique française, il est l’auteur de trois ouvrages consacrés à l’économie monétaire et bancaire ainsi qu’à l’économie des politiques publiques. Adrien Lehman a rejoint le Fellowship de l’Open Diplomacy Institute en 2012, lorsqu’il a été nommé délégué français au Sommet de la jeunesse du G8 (Y8) à Washington D.C. Depuis lors, il contribue activement aux réflexions et initiatives de l’Institut en matière de gouvernance économique, de politiques publiques et de coopération internationale.

Elias Kassis

Vice-président Stratégie et Développement durable de TotalEnergies depuis septembre 2023. Il était auparavant président de TotalEnergies E&P UAE et Country Chair de TotalEnergies aux Émirats arabes unis. Avant cette nomination, il a occupé plusieurs fonctions de direction au sein de la branche Exploration & Production de TotalEnergies. Il a notamment été vice-président Afrique du Nord dans la division Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord (MENA), ainsi que directeur général de plusieurs filiales du Groupe au Moyen-Orient et en Asie, notamment au Yémen, en Malaisie et en Irak. Il a également exercé diverses responsabilités à Paris, au Venezuela et au Qatar. Entré chez TotalEnergies en 1991, Elias Kassis a débuté sa carrière dans les activités de Trading puis de Gas & Power, où il a occupé plusieurs postes jusqu’en 2002 avant de rejoindre les activités internationales du Groupe. Fort de plus de trois décennies d’expérience dans le secteur de l’énergie, il a développé une expertise reconnue dans les domaines de la stratégie, de la transition énergétique, du développement international et de la gestion d’opérations complexes dans des environnements géopolitiques exigeants. Il est diplômé de l’Institut national polytechnique de Grenoble, où il a obtenu un diplôme d’ingénieur, et est également titulaire d’un Master en finance de l’ESSEC Business School.

Carla Furlan

Responsable des partenariats internationaux et des affaires publiques chez HDF Energy, Clara accompagne le développement d’une entreprise française pionnière dans les domaines des énergies renouvelables et de l’hydrogène. À ce titre, elle conçoit et met en œuvre des stratégies d’engagement auprès de décideurs politiques de haut niveau, contribuant à rapprocher les priorités du secteur privé des objectifs des politiques publiques afin d’accélérer la transition énergétique. Son expertise se situe à l’intersection des enjeux réglementaires, industriels et géopolitiques. Elle œuvre à mobiliser les soutiens institutionnels nécessaires au déploiement de projets innovants et stratégiques, tout en veillant à l’alignement entre les objectifs de l’entreprise et les évolutions de l’environnement international. Diplômée de l’emlyon business school, où elle s’est spécialisée en négociation internationale et en développement des affaires, elle possède une solide compréhension des dynamiques économiques et géopolitiques mondiales. Parallèlement à ses responsabilités professionnelles, Clara préside la délégation française au Sommet de la jeunesse du G20 (Y20) 2026. Dans ce cadre, elle coordonne l’élaboration de propositions prospectives visant à répondre aux défis énergétiques et environnementaux au cœur des crises contemporaines, en défendant des solutions conciliant ambition, réalisme et coopération internationale.

Aurélien Duchêne

Fellow de l’Open Diplomacy Institute, il a été nommé délégué français au Sommet de la jeunesse du G20 (Y20) 2025 à Johannesburg et coprésident du Sommet de la jeunesse du G7 (Y7) 2026. Consultant indépendant en géopolitique et en défense, il est également chercheur au sein du think tank Euro Créative et enseignant à l’Université Catholique de Lyon ainsi qu’à l’ILERI. Spécialiste des questions stratégiques et de sécurité internationale, il intervient régulièrement dans les médias français, notamment en tant qu’analyste sur la chaîne LCI, ainsi que dans plusieurs médias internationaux pour décrypter les évolutions géopolitiques contemporaines. Aurélien Duchêne est l’auteur de plusieurs ouvrages consacrés aux relations internationales et aux questions de défense. Son premier livre, La Russie : la prochaine surprise stratégique ? (2021), anticipait notamment une invasion russe de l’Ukraine. Il a ensuite publié La Russie de Poutine face à l’Occident (Eyrolles, 2024), traduit en polonais, puis L’Europe et ses armées (Eyrolles, 2026), coécrit avec Robin Gastaldi. Parallèlement à ses activités de recherche et d’enseignement, il contribue régulièrement aux débats publics à travers des articles publiés dans de grands quotidiens français, notamment Le Monde et Le Figaro, ainsi que dans diverses revues spécialisées consacrées aux questions internationales, stratégiques et de défense.

Fabrice Chevalier

Directeur Délégué aux Affaires Publiques Internationales de TotalEnergies depuis décembre 2022. Avant de rejoindre les affaires publiques, il a effectué toute sa carrière au sein de l’exploration-production de TotalEnergies, d’abord dans la finance (directeur financier de plusieurs filiales), puis dans le business : il a été à la tête de la division Economie et Plan, et a ensuite bifurqué vers les Affaires Nouvelles et la négociation de nouveaux contrats pétroliers et gaziers, en Europe de l’Est et en Asie.

Raphaël Canonne

Fellow de l’Open Diplomacy Institute, il a été nommé délégué français chargé des questions de santé mondiale et de sécurité alimentaire au Sommet de la jeunesse du G20 (Y20) 2026. Dans ce cadre, il travaille au croisement de la santé mondiale, des politiques publiques et du plaidoyer, en collaboration avec d’autres délégués et experts internationaux. Étudiant en sixième année de médecine à Sorbonne Université, il s’investit activement dans les domaines de la santé mondiale et du plaidoyer international. Il a notamment fait partie de l’équipe internationale de la Fédération internationale des associations d’étudiants en médecine (IFMSA), où il a représenté près de 1,5 million d’étudiants en médecine lors de conférences, événements et négociations consacrés aux enjeux de santé mondiale. Raphaël a également contribué au développement du programme français des Jeunes Délégués auprès de l’Organisation mondiale de la Santé (OMS), en coopération avec le ministère français de la Santé. Ses travaux portent principalement sur le renforcement de la diplomatie sanitaire, la promotion de la coopération internationale en matière de santé et l’accompagnement de la nouvelle génération de leaders engagés dans les enjeux de santé mondiale.

Pauline Da Cunha

Fellow de l’Open Diplomacy Institute, elle a été nommée Secrétaire générale adjointe du Sommet de la jeunesse du G7 (Y7) 2026. À ce titre, elle pilote les actions de rayonnement et de mobilisation du G7, en renforçant l’engagement de la société civile et des acteurs locaux, tout en contribuant à la promotion des recommandations formulées à l’attention des dirigeants du G7. Diplômée du Master en sécurité internationale de Sciences Po Paris, elle est chargée de mission à la Direction générale des relations internationales et de la stratégie (DGRIS) du ministère français des Armées et des Anciens combattants, où elle travaille sur les questions de maîtrise des armements et de non-prolifération. Parallèlement à ses fonctions civiles, elle sert en qualité d’officier de renseignement au sein de la réserve opérationnelle de la Marine nationale. Elle a acquis une expérience diversifiée au sein de l’état-major des Armées, de l’Assemblée nationale, de l’ambassade de France à Djibouti, ainsi que dans les secteurs privé et de la recherche. Ce parcours lui confère une compréhension transversale des enjeux de sécurité internationale, de diplomatie de défense et de coopération stratégique.

Thomas Chesneau-Daumas

Fellow de l’Open Diplomacy Institute, il a été nommé délégué français au Sommet de la jeunesse du G20 (Y20) 2026 à Washington. Il poursuit actuellement un double cursus en ingénierie à Mines Nancy et en politiques publiques à Sciences Po Paris, avec une spécialisation dans les politiques industrielles, l’innovation et les affaires internationales. Au cours de son parcours, il a acquis une expérience significative au sein des secteurs public et privé. Il a notamment exercé les fonctions d’analyste en stratégie d’entreprise à Bpifrance, la banque publique d’investissement française, a travaillé chez Thales dans les domaines de la stratégie et du développement international, ainsi qu’au ministère français de l’Économie et des Finances, où il a contribué aux travaux relatifs à la politique industrielle européenne. Parallèlement à ses activités académiques et professionnelles, il a été élu représentant des étudiants au conseil d’administration de Mines Nancy et a présidé TEDxMinesNancy, où il a piloté des initiatives favorisant le dialogue entre innovation, diffusion des idées et engagement citoyen.

Héloïse Chapuis

Sociologue et consultante en stratégie. Elle conduit des projets de recherche ethnographique principalement consacrés aux secteurs de la santé et de l’industrie pharmaceutique. Elle est titulaire d’un Master of Science en Science and Technology Studies de l’University College London (UCL) ainsi que d’un Bachelor interdisciplinaire en biologie des organismes et sciences politiques de l’Université McGill. Parallèlement à son activité professionnelle, elle est secouriste bénévole et responsable locale du pôle Solidarité et Action sociale au sein de l’antenne Paris 11 de l’Association de Protection Civile. À ce titre, elle coordonne les maraudes auprès des personnes sans domicile, pilote des initiatives de solidarité et supervise la formation ainsi que l’accompagnement des secouristes engagés dans les actions sociales. Elle a rejoint l’Open Diplomacy Institute en tant que Fellow en 2025. Dans ce cadre, elle encadre des délégations de jeunes participants chargés de mener un vaste processus de consultation auprès d’experts, de représentants de la société civile et du monde académique, afin d’élaborer des recommandations destinées à alimenter les travaux des Sommets de la jeunesse du G7 et du G20 (Y7 et Y20).

Miranda Browne

Responsable du développement de l’Institut Géopolitique & Business de l’ESSEC, où elle œuvre au développement de partenariats stratégiques et accompagne les entreprises dans leur capacité à anticiper et à s’adapter aux bouleversements géopolitiques de l’ère post-mondialisation. À travers ses activités, elle contribue à renforcer le dialogue entre les sphères économique, institutionnelle et internationale. Avant de rejoindre l’ESSEC, elle a participé à des projets stratégiques au sein des équipes marketing et commerciales de grandes entreprises internationales, notamment Chanel et Google. Parallèlement à cette expérience, elle s’est fortement investie dans la promotion de la diversité et de l’inclusion, en contribuant à plusieurs initiatives menées aussi bien au sein d’organisations non gouvernementales françaises que dans le secteur privé. Elle a rejoint l’Open Diplomacy Institute en qualité de Fellow en 2025.

Sephora Benmira

Analyste à la Présidence de la République française, elle exerce ses fonctions au sein du Centre d’analyse, de prévision et de stratégie, où elle contribue depuis près de deux ans aux travaux de veille stratégique et d’analyse des enjeux nationaux et internationaux. Avant de rejoindre l’Élysée, elle a acquis une première expérience au sein du cabinet de la Présidente de l’Assemblée nationale, Yaël Braun-Pivet, ainsi qu’à l’Association française pour les Nations unies, où elle a travaillé sur les questions de coopération internationale et de multilatéralisme. Diplômée de l’ESSEC Business School, elle est également titulaire d’un Master of Science en Management of Governments and International Organizations de l’Université Bocconi à Milan, qui lui a permis d’acquérir une solide expertise en matière de politiques publiques et de gouvernance internationale.Parallèlement à ses fonctions institutionnelles, elle occupe le poste de responsable de la communication du Sommet de la Jeunesse du G7 (Y7) 2026, organisé par l’Open Diplomacy Institute.

Thomas Friang

Directeur exécutif de l’Institut Géopolitique & Business de l’ESSEC, où il développe des programmes de recherche, de formation initiale et de formation exécutive consacrés aux interactions entre géopolitique et stratégie d’entreprise, avec pour objectif d’aider les organisations à anticiper et à s’adapter aux mutations de l’environnement international. Avant de rejoindre l’ESSEC Business School, il a exercé les fonctions de conseiller auprès du ministre français chargé du Développement et des Partenariats internationaux, contribuant à l’élaboration et à la mise en œuvre de la politique française de coopération internationale. Il est également fondateur et directeur général de l’Open Diplomacy Institute, un groupe de réflexion indépendant consacré à l’élaboration de solutions en matière de politiques publiques et de leadership face aux crises multiples qui freinent la réalisation des Objectifs de développement durable (ODD) des Nations unies. Engagé de longue date dans la diplomatie multilatérale et la participation de la jeunesse aux affaires internationales, il a lancé et présidé le Sommet du Y20 en 2011 puis le Sommet du Y7 en 2019, deux plateformes de dialogue intégrées respectivement aux processus diplomatiques du G20 et du G7. Son action en faveur du développement durable, de la coopération internationale et du renouvellement du leadership a été saluée par plusieurs distinctions. Il a reçu la Médaille de l’engagement de la République française en 2021, a été lauréat du Prix Giverny du leadership pour la durabilité en 2022, désigné « SDG Goalkeeper » par la Fondation Gates en 2023, puis nommé Aspen Young Leader en 2024.

Beatrice Drăghiciu

Fondatrice de BFD Private Diplomacy SRL (novembre 2025), cabinet de conseil stratégique spécialisé dans les politiques publiques, la gouvernance, les stratégies de négociation et les relations institutionnelles de haut niveau. À travers cette structure, elle accompagne des organisations dans la gestion de leurs relations avec les parties prenantes et leur positionnement stratégique au sein d’environnements politiques et réglementaires complexes. Experte en affaires juridiques et publiques en Roumanie, elle exerce des responsabilités de premier plan en matière de conseil stratégique, gouvernance institutionnelle, réforme de la justice et coordination de politiques publiques au plus haut niveau. Forte d’une vaste expérience auprès des principaux décideurs de l’État, elle s’est imposée comme une conseillère de confiance dans les domaines de la justice, des affaires intérieures et de la coopération internationale. Entre 2018 et 2023, elle a été conseillère auprès de trois ministres roumains successifs de la Justice. À ce titre, elle a apporté une expertise juridique et stratégique en matière de réforme institutionnelle, de politique judiciaire et de coopération interinstitutionnelle. Elle a joué un rôle central dans la coordination du dialogue entre le ministère de la Justice, le Gouvernement roumain, le Parlement, les autorités judiciaires et les institutions européennes, notamment la Commission européenne. En 2023, elle a été nommée conseillère d’État au sein du Cabinet du Vice-Premier ministre de Roumanie, où elle a contribué aux processus décisionnels de l’exécutif et coordonné des initiatives nationales et internationales d’importance stratégique. Parallèlement, elle a exercé les fonctions de conseillère honoraire auprès du ministère des Affaires intérieures jusqu’en octobre 2025, participant à la coordination des politiques publiques et au dialogue institutionnel sur des enjeux majeurs d’intérêt national. Elle a été directement impliquée dans deux avancées stratégiques majeures pour la Roumanie : la clôture du Mécanisme de coopération et de vérification (MCV) dans le domaine de la justice et les négociations ayant conduit à l’adhésion de la Roumanie à l’espace Schengen en 2023-2024. Son engagement au service de l’État a été salué par plusieurs distinctions de haut rang, dont l’Ordre national « Pour le Mérite » au grade de Chevalier (2025), l’Emblème d’honneur du ministère des Affaires intérieures (2025) et la Distinction d’honneur du ministère des Affaires intérieures (2024). Parallèlement à ses activités professionnelles, Beatrice Drăghiciu a également contribué au monde académique en tant que chargée d’enseignement associée à l’Université d’études économiques de Bucarest et assistante de recherche en sciences juridiques à l’Université Titu Maiorescu. Titulaire d’un diplôme en droit et d’un master en sciences criminelles, elle poursuit actuellement des recherches doctorales consacrées à la responsabilité internationale des États en droit de l’environnement. Maîtrisant l’anglais et l’espagnol, elle allie expertise juridique, analyse des politiques publiques, sens diplomatique et expérience de la coordination exécutive.