The pronouncement comes as tensions fray between Tbilisi and Brussels over a ‘Kremlin-inspired’ foreign agent law.

Georgia is unlikely to join the European Union any time soon, despite having been granted candidate status last year, the chairman of the country’s ruling party said on Saturday.

“Last December, we became a candidate country. The next step is joining,” Irakli Garibashvili told reporters on Saturday. “Today, we are not ready to become a member country.”

Despite widespread protests, the Georgian Dream politician and former prime minister defended a controversial new bill that would label NGOs, campaign groups and media outlets that receive more than 20 percent of their funding from abroad as agents of foreign influence. Critics say the legislation would drive a wedge between Georgia and the West and stifle opposition in the same way similar rules have in Russia.

“If we are told that tomorrow we will become a member of the EU, then it will be possible to very easily cancel it, revise, transform or adopt a new one,” Garibashvili said.

At the same time, he claimed that “there is no consensus a country can become a member of the EU today” because the bloc “is not ready for enlargement and it will take time and these next steps depend on many things.”

The EU has told Georgia the proposals, which have brought thousands onto the streets in protest in recent weeks, are incompatible with European values and should be withdrawn, while Washington branded the “Kremlin-inspired” legislation as an attack on civil society.

When the European Commission granted Georgia candidate status last year, it set out specific steps needed for the South Caucasus country to be admitted as a full member, including tackling political polarization and strengthening human rights protections. According to the bloc’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, passing the foreign agent law, as well as the government’s new proposals cracking down on LGBTQ+ rights, “would negatively impact Georgia’s progress on its EU path.”

A December 2023 poll conducted by the National Democratic Institute found that 79 percent of Georgian respondents supported their country’s EU membership ambitions.

Read the article on the website of Politico

https://www.politico.eu/article/georgia-not-ready-eu-membership-georgian-dream-irakli-garibashvili-russian-law-agent-bill-protest-tbilisi/

Dans son livre Holocaustes. Israël, Gaza et la guerre contre l’Occident (Plon), le politologue Gilles Kepel estime que le conflit entre Israël et le Hamas constitue un choc qui prend l’allure d’une guerre planétaire et a plus fracturé les sociétés occidentales que les attentats du 11 septembre 2001.

Dans votre livre, vous écrivez que l’attaque du Hamas contre Israël du 7 octobre 2023 est un moment de bascule. Pourquoi ?

« Elle marque un tournant dans le conflit israélo-palestinien et un autre dans l’organisation de l’ordre mondial, plus important que les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 qui n’avaient pas fracturé autant les sociétés occidentales. L’opération terrifiante du Hamas a fait voler en éclats le sentiment que l’État d’Israël était un refuge pour les Juifs. Le Premier ministre Benjamin Netanyahou joue sa survie politique car il porte la responsabilité personnelle de ne pas avoir empêché Israël de subir…

Read the entire article on the website of L’Alsace

https://www.lalsace.fr/defense-guerre-conflit/2024/04/06/gilles-keppel-l-attaque-du-7-octobre-a-marque-un-tournant-dans-l-ordre-mondial

Official highlights Jordan’s role as voice of reason in supporting Palestinian cause.

After the American Civil War, Black people in the South were granted new political and civil rights, only for such gains to be reversed within a few decades by white supremacists. This column studies how dramatic institutional change in the Reconstruction era affected the political and socioeconomic outcomes of Black people in the American South. Reconstruction led to higher education, literacy, occupational status, and property ownership among the Black population. But changing laws and rules alone was not enough. The organised power of the state, including military power, was needed to enforce the legal changes.

One of the most prominent research agendas in political science and economics concerns the impact of institutions on comparative economic development. This literature can be traced back to the pioneering work of Nobel laureate Douglass North, including Davis and North (1971), North and Thomas (1973), North and Weingast (1989), and North (1990). These early studies laid the foundations for the seminal works of Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), who emphasise the impact of factor endowments on political and economic development, and Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), who contributed to our understanding of institutions by distinguishing between de jure and de facto political power.

In recent work (Frieden et al. 2024), we study how dramatic institutional change interacted with factor endowments in the American South during the Reconstruction era. In the aftermath of the Civil War, the victorious Union embarked on a massive social experiment. A million formerly enslaved adult men gained the right to vote, while many former Confederates were disenfranchised. Tens of thousands of federal troops occupied the former Confederacy, and nearly a thousand offices of the Freedmen’s Bureaus were set up across the region (Figure 1) to assist freed people in securing their political and legal rights, as well as to provide educational and social services. Eyewitness accounts suggest that this federal presence was important in securing the rights of the formerly enslaved. As one observer put it, “[t]he wrongs increase just in proportion to the distance from the US authorities” (White 2017: 69).

Black people, who made up a significant portion of the population of the South, took enthusiastic advantage of their new political and civil rights. The enfranchisement of freedmen in the former Confederacy led to the electoral dominance of the Republican Party, which was firmly committed to guaranteeing the legal and civil rights of freed people. This also resulted in the election of well over a thousand Black politicians, including many at the local and state level who were responsible for setting local policy and enforcing the law (Foner 1988). Freedmen’s Bureau offices helped to establish 4,300 schools that were educating 250,000 formerly enslaved children by 1870.

After the Hayes-Tilden agreement following the 1876 election, federal troops gradually returned to their barracks. Within a few decades, white supremacists reversed the political gains made by Black people and their white allies with a combination of extra-legal terror, legal manipulation, and fraud.

How did this massive political change affect the lives of Black people in the South? Did these major political reforms have an impact on the social and economic opportunities available to freed people? Did enfranchisement, political engagement, and civil rights – however transitory – lead to Black socioeconomic advances in the South? And did these changes, if any, persist after Reconstruction policies were largely reversed?

We use the location of federal troops and Freedmen’s Bureaus across Southern counties as an indicator of the intensity of Reconstruction, and the county’s cotton suitability as an indicator of the presence of an anti-Reconstruction planter elite. We then look at the political and socioeconomic outcomes for Black Americans in the former Confederacy to answer questions about the short- and longer-term consequences of Reconstruction.

We find that a greater federal presence during Reconstruction was associated with more Black political engagement, including higher Black voter registration, more votes for the Republican Party, and more Black office holders at the state and local levels. This effect was less pronounced in areas dominated by cotton plantations. Using data from the 1880 census, we find that areas that had a greater federal presence exhibited higher levels of school attendance by Black youths aged 6–16. We also find that the Black populations of these counties had higher literacy, average occupational status, and agricultural position – that is, a higher percentage in high-status/pay occupations (e.g. professions, managers, skilled craftsmen) and a lower percentage in low-status/pay occupations (e.g. farm labour). This effect, too, was less pronounced in cotton plantation regions.

We then use data from the 1900 and 1910 censuses to see if these effects were persistent. Again, we find that in counties where there had been a greater federal presence during Reconstruction, Black citizens were more likely to have higher-skilled/paid occupations, were more likely to be home and farm owners, and less likely to be share tenants nearly a quarter of a century after the end of Reconstruction. And, yet again, these effects are lessened in cotton plantation areas.

We further assess the mechanism that might have been at play in explaining our results. We find that greater Republican majorities and more Black local office holders in a county in the1870s led to higher local property tax rates – an effect that was reduced in cotton plantation areas. Previous work has shown that the election of Black politicians was associated with higher tax revenues and higher Black literacy rates and land tenancy (Logan 2020, Suryanarayan and White 2021). We believe that higher tax rates led to greater investment in local education during the Reconstruction period, and indeed they were associated with a higher proportion of Black children attending school. This investment led to long-term benefits for the formerly enslaved. Despite the concerted – and, ultimately, successful – effort by white supremacists to disenfranchise Blacks through all manner of legal and extra-legal tactics, the educational gains made during Reconstruction were less reversible and, as a consequence, had a lasting positive on Black socioeconomic achievement.

Our findings strongly suggest that the major institutional changes put in place during Reconstruction had many of the positive effects intended by their architects. Reconstruction facilitated, for a time at least, Black political empowerment. Combined with a strong federal presence, political empowerment had important and lasting socioeconomic effects. Black people and their allies in the former Confederacy were able to massively expand Black children’s access to education and to facilitate access to occupational and professional opportunities from which they had previously been excluded. Although white supremacists eventually reversed the enfranchisement of most Black men, the socioeconomic impact of the advances achieved during and after Reconstruction endured for decades.

The evidence presented here is very strongly in line with the proposition that political-institutional reforms to expand the franchise, especially to disadvantaged segments of the population, lead to improvements in the lot of those newly empowered. An important implication of the Reconstruction experience, however, is that formal institutional change is not enough to ensure long-term institutional change. At one level this is obvious, since the franchise was eventually stolen back by white supremacists. More to the point, the presence of federal troops and the Freedmen’s Bureau had a powerful impact on political and socioeconomic outcomes; it took the power of the state to enforce the rights enumerated by formal legal changes. This suggests an important amendment, even corrective, to a simple – perhaps naïve – focus on institutions and institutional change as in and of themselves catalysts of political and socioeconomic change. In the Reconstruction context, institutional reform required the support of military might and dedicated government officials.

Another important corrective to the purely institutional view is that the underlying economic structure of the region affected the impact of the institutional changes. Counties in the cotton plantation zone lagged well behind the rest of the South, so much so that in some of our analyses being in a cotton region negated the impact of Black political engagement and federal presence. This is consistent with much of the secondary literature, which typically characterises cotton plantations as enclaves within which the planter elite could exercise major pressure on Black workers and could often manipulate local institutions to produce desired political results almost at will. The production structure affected social and political power and could in some instances overcome institutional change.

Reconstruction and the federal presence had direct, important, and long-lasting positive effects on a whole range of Black socioeconomic outcomes, including schooling, literacy, occupational status, and property ownership. The evidence we present demonstrates the profound and lasting impact that changes in political institutions can have on both political and socioeconomic outcomes. However, it also suggests some cautionary notes. First, it makes clear that changing institutions – laws and rules – is not sufficient to overcome historical disadvantages and entrenched opposition. In the case of Reconstruction, it took the organised power of the state – including military power, in ways that mattered at the very local level – to make meaningful and lasting change possible. Second, it makes clear that the underlying economic structure of an area can have a powerful impact on its susceptibility to reform. More specifically, the effects of political-institutional change can be stymied or blocked by entrenched interests, such as the cotton planter elite represented in the South. We believe that all these lessons remain relevant and are of profound interest and value, today.

Read this article on the website of Vox EU

https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/political-and-socioeconomic-effects-reconstruction-american-south

OPINION. Berlin et Paris doivent parler d’une même voix et régler leurs différends loin de la scène publique car ils font sinon le jeu de la Russie, écrit l’ancien ministre allemand vert Joschka Fischer, inquiet de l’affaiblissement de l’Union européenne.

La relation franco-allemande a toujours été compliquée et n’a jamais été dénuée de conflits ou de tensions. Tout le monde comprend que la coopération entre ces deux pays clés de l’Union européenne est nécessaire et dans l’intérêt de l’ensemble du bloc. Ils n’ont cependant jamais complètement surmonté leur rivalité actuelle – et historique.

Les financiers Bertrand Badré et François Faure appellent, dans une tribune au « Monde », à l’introduction d’un principe démocratique dans la gestion de l’épargne, afin de mieux refléter la préférence sociale pour un avenir durable.

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https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2024/03/22/finance-verte-notre-epargne-est-un-bulletin-de-vote-qui-construit-le-monde-de-demain_6223525_3232.html

« Si tu veux faire rire Dieu, parle-lui de tes plans », dit le proverbe. Combien de gérants de fonds ont vu leurs plans déjoués par le Covid-19, la guerre en Ukraine ou le retour de l’inflation ; comment prendre en compte, dans les allocations d’actifs, le danger Trump, les tensions autour de Taïwan, la poussée des extrêmes droites en Europe ? Ces crises multiples sont pour certaines imprévisibles, et pour la plupart échappent à toutes les législations, en défiant parfois la raison. Nous sommes contraints de les affronter comme des poussées tectoniques.

Mais d’autres faits – le réchauffement climatique, l’effondrement de la biodiversité, la raréfaction des ressources naturelles – sont connus : sur ceux-ci les Etats, les entreprises, les consommateurs et la finance peuvent agir. Ces faits-là nous obligent à une transformation de nos modes de vie : devenir plus sobres et plus solidaires. Nous n’avons pas le choix, nous sommes embarqués, comme le disait en son temps le philosophe Emmanuel Mounier (1905-1950).

A la racine de ces faits, il y a évidemment la question de la quête du profit, indispensable aux investissements pour la transformation de l’économie et défini par les normes comptables internationales. A quelques exceptions près, les entreprises labellisées B Corp, soit la plupart des grandes entreprises cotées, ne sont pas des entreprises à mission. Elles sont calées sur l’objet social de l’entreprise, qui est le profit pour les actionnaires. La responsabilité fiduciaire des représentants des actionnaires est la défense de leurs intérêts financiers. C’est l’orthodoxie.

Le profit n’est qu’un moyen

Mais nous voyons bien qu’il y a déconnexion entre cette orthodoxie et le réchauffement climatique. Un profit qui ne prend pas en compte ces contraintes est un faux profit, car il soustrait de l’argent au corps social et à la nature, sans se préoccuper de leur pérennité.

Une responsabilité fiduciaire « responsable » a donc deux faces : celle de l’objet social des entreprises (entreprises à mission) et celle des investisseurs à la recherche d’un rendement associant des critères de durabilité.

Read the entire article on the website of Le Monde

https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2024/03/22/finance-verte-notre-epargne-est-un-bulletin-de-vote-qui-construit-le-monde-de-demain_6223525_3232.html

PUBLISHED MARCH 21, 2024

Read the article on the website of The Globe and Mail

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-indo-pacific-strategys-fatal-blind-spot/

The act sets targets, timelines and new risk assessment mandates.

CHRONIQUE – À l’heure où ni l’Ukraine ni la Russie n’imaginent d’autre issue que la victoire, une réflexion à la lumière des exemples du passé s’impose pour envisager la fin de la guerre.

À l’occasion de la publication de son nouvel ouvrage, Grands Diplomates, l’ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères analyse les derniers développements de la guerre en Ukraine.

By keeping interest rates steady, the European Central Bank may be hoping to tackle the impact of its poor past decisions.

Last week, the European Central Bank (ECB) held a session where they chose to keep the key interest rates unchanged. This decision came as a disappointment to many who were hoping for a slight reduction, given that inflation seemed to be under control.

However, the situation may not be that straightforward. Across the eurozone, unions are advocating for significant wage increases, with some demands in Germany reaching double-digit percentages. The costs of these wage hikes will likely be passed on to consumers to a certain extent, unless they are balanced by an increase in labor productivity. Unfortunately, productivity gains in the eurozone have been modest at best, hovering around 1 percent in recent years, and it is unrealistic to expect a sharp improvement soon.

In the longer term, these persistently high levels of debt and staggering public deficits – fueled by excessive administrative spending and inefficiency – will lead to monetary destabilization and create potent inflationary pressures.

It seems the ECB is beginning to acknowledge the genuine risk of inflation. The bank has been a significant enabler of public deficits through its extensive quantitative easing program, which contradicted its own guidelines. Now, it appears the bank is grappling with the consequences of its past actions.

Read the article on the website of GIS

Past policies haunt the European Central Bank

L’Organisation mondiale du commerce est paralysée depuis cinq ans. En son absence, la loi de la jungle qui s’impose dans les négociations bilatérales est une « régression qui ne profite qu’aux Etats-Unis et à la Chine », prévient Philippe Chalmin.

Autrefois, c’est-à-dire il y a une bonne trentaine d’années, les réunions portant sur le commerce international organisées dans le cadre du GATT étaient des événements marquants sur la scène mondiale. A Seattle, à Hong Kong ou à Genève, les débats étaient certes dans la salle, mais surtout dans les rues : c’était l’époque où les « altermondialistes » fustigeaient l’Uruguay Round qui se négociait alors.

Les manifestations étaient souvent violentes comme d’ailleurs à l’occasion des sommets du G7. La « société civile » y gagna ses premiers galons. Nostalgiques du « nouvel ordre économique international » des années 1970, celui qui avait été dominé par la conférence des Nations unies sur le commerce et le développement (Cnuced) et dont l’échec avait été patent, les contestataires s’opposaient à la « mondialisation libérale » dont le GATT, puis l’OMC, semblaient être le nom.

Read the entire article on the website of Les Echos

https://www.lesechos.fr/idees-debats/editos-analyses/requiem-pour-lomc-2082097

CHRONIQUE – Si l’État hébreu persévère dans la riposte militaire sans envisager la création d’un État palestinien, il laisse planer le spectre d’une guerre sans fin.

Paul Kamage, 66 ans, dirige le Rwanda d’une main de fer depuis le milieu des années 1990 et a remporté la présidence, à chaque fois avec plus de 90 % des voix, lors des élections de 2003, de 2010 et de 2017.

Le parti au pouvoir au Rwanda, le Front patriotique rwandais (FPR), a désigné, samedi 9 mars, le président du pays, Paul Kagame, comme son candidat à l’élection présidentielle du 15 juillet, pour un probable quatrième mandat de sept ans.

Le FPR a déclaré l’avoir élu, sans opposition, lors d’un congrès qui s’est terminé samedi. Paul Kamage, 66 ans, dirige le Rwanda d’une main de fer depuis le milieu des années 1990 et a remporté la présidence, à chaque fois avec plus de 90 % des voix, lors des élections de 2003, de 2010 et de 2017.

L’un de ses rares concurrents au scrutin présidentiel est le chef du Parti vert, dans l’opposition, Frank Habineza. Député de 47 ans, ce dernier n’a obtenu que 0,45 % des voix à la présidentielle de 2017. Il est donné troisième par les sondages actuels, critiqués par les associations de défense des droits pour leurs irrégularités et les intimidations à l’encontre des électeurs.

Elections présidentielle et législatives à la même date

L’autre concurrente possible de M. Kagame, Victoire Ingabire, leader du mouvement non enregistré DALFA-Umurunzi (« développement et liberté pour tous »), est à ce stade exclue de la course à la présidentielle en raison d’une condamnation antérieure. Une décision de justice, prévue le 13 mars, dira si elle est autorisée ou non à se présenter à cette élection.

Le Rwanda prévoit ses élections présidentielle et législatives le 15 juillet, conformément à une décision l’an dernier du gouvernement d’organiser ces scrutins à la même date.

Vingt-quatre femmes parlementaires, deux représentants des jeunes et un représentant des Rwandais souffrant de handicaps seront par ailleurs choisis par des collèges et comités électoraux le 16 juillet. Les candidats pourront faire campagne du 22 juin au 12 juillet, selon la commission électorale.

Le Rwanda se présente comme l’un des pays les plus stables du continent africain, mais plusieurs groupes de défense des droits humains accusent M. Kagame de le diriger dans un climat de peur, étouffant la dissidence et la liberté d’expression.

Read the article on the website of Le Monde

https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/03/09/au-rwanda-le-parti-au-pouvoir-designe-paul-kagame-comme-candidat-a-la-presidentielle_6221084_3212.html

La WJRO a révélé le noms d’économies majeures et d’États membres de l’UE en infraction lors d’un événement co-organisé par le Département d’État en faveur de la restitution.

https://fr.timesofisrael.com/24-etats-nont-que-peu-ou-pas-progresse-dans-la-restitution-doeuvres-spoliees/

Le professeur à l’Ecole d’économie de Paris et ancien économiste en chef du Fonds monétaire international redoute que l’Europe ne cherche à réduire trop vite ses déficits publics, au moment où la croissance ralentit.

A l’heure où les tensions croissantes déstabilisent l’économie mondiale, la France doit augmenter ses dépenses de défense contre la Russie et contre le réchauffement climatique, s’alarme Olivier Blanchard. Professeur à l’Ecole d’économie de Paris et ancien économiste en chef du Fonds monétaire international (FMI), il estime également que les coupes budgétaires de 10 milliards d’euros annoncées par Bercy n’interviennent pas au bon moment et manquent de clarté.

Vous aviez sonné l’alarme à propos de la dette publique en novembre 2023, quand les taux américains dépassaient les 5 %. Ils sont redescendus depuis. Le pire est-il derrière nous ?

J’étais surtout inquiet à propos de l’énorme déficit primaire américain qui, même si les taux baissent, fera gonfler la dette publique. Il est vrai que les Etats-Unis ont un énorme avantage : leurs bons du Trésor sont considérés comme sans risque et prisés des investisseurs – ils peuvent donc s’endetter plus largement que n’importe quel autre pays.

Mais il y a une limite. On peut imaginer un scénario où une administration Trump continue de creuser les déficits jusqu’à ce que les investisseurs se demandent s’il n’y a pas un risque. Cela se traduirait par une série de petites crises : des obligations qui peinent à trouver preneurs, une hausse de taux d’intérêt qui effraie le Congrès, des efforts qui se révèlent insuffisants pour rassurer les marchés. Ce qui pourrait finir par déclencher une crise conséquente.

L’Europe, elle, renoue avec la rigueur budgétaire. Commet-elle la même erreur qu’en 2011, quand l’austérité avait étouffé la reprise ?

Réduire le déficit trop vite quand l’activité freine risque en effet d’accentuer le ralentissement.

Read the entire article on the website of Le Monde

https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2024/03/04/olivier-blanchard-il-faut-etre-pret-a-soutenir-encore-l-economie_6219898_3234.html

La Géorgie s’intéresse au développement du processus de conclusion d’un traité de paix entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan et offre sa plate-forme de négociation à ses voisins fiables.
« Nous avons espoir qu’Erevan et Bakou parviendront à un accord » a affirmé Vice-ministre des Affaires étrangères de Géorgie Lasha Darsalia qui l’a annoncé lors du Forum diplomatique en cours à Antalya, rapporte Infoport.

Selon lui, la paix dans la région est importante pour Tbilissi et la partie géorgienne espère qu’Erevan et Bakou parviendront à un accord dont les deux parties bénéficieront.
Lasha Darsalia a affirmé que la Géorgie voit, comprend et prend en compte certaines difficultés qui existent dans les négociations bilatérales entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan. À cette fin, Tbilissi avait déjà pris l’initiative d’un bon voisinage pacifique et avait proposé son soutien aux deux pays dans la conduite des négociations. « Il est clair pour nous que nous devons encourager la collaboration plutôt que de laisser entrer des acteurs extérieurs dans notre arène. »

Il a souligné qu’il n’y a pas d’alternative à la paix dans la région, c’est pourquoi Tbilissi soutient les négociations et l’établissement de la stabilité dans le Sud-Caucase.
« Il y a quelques mois, nous avons renouvelé nos relations avec l’Arménie, les portant au niveau de partenariat stratégique. Nous pensons que cela apportera une grande contribution au processus de coopération dans la région », a-t-il déclaré.

Read the article on the website of Nouvelles d’Arménie Magazine

https://www.armenews.com/spip.php?page=article&id_article=113283

Carl Bildt adds that Ukraine accession to alliance is a question of ‘when, not if’.

TOKYO — Sweden’s successful bid to join NATO will increase cooperation between the EU and the military alliance, the country’s former Prime Minister Carl Bildt said in an interview during a trip to Tokyo.

Bildt spoke to Nikkei while he was in Japan after visiting Kyiv in late February to mark the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

« They are very determined to continue to fight, » he said of the political leaders and soldiers he met in the Ukrainian capital.

While some analysts have pointed to « Ukraine fatigue » growing in some Western countries over the prolonged conflict, Bildt said, « I don’t see any Ukraine fatigue in Europe, really. »

« There’s a lot of determination to do whatever we can in order to support Ukraine, » he said.

Sweden’s NATO membership was approved by Hungary’s parliament on Monday, the last hurdle to membership. With the addition of Finland, which had also maintained a neutral stance, security cooperation between the West and the Baltic Sea area will be strengthened.

The joining of Sweden and Finland « gives a new strategic depth to the north of Europe and increases the defense potential of the three Baltic States, » Bildt said.

Bildt commented on Sweden’s ability to help deter Russia, including plans to send a battalion to Latvia. « While Sweden in the past, our defense has been sort of purely national within our borders…now it’s going to be within a broader framework, » he said.

In his annual address to the Federal Assembly on Thursday, Russian President Vladimir Putin said, « We need to shore up the forces in the western strategic theatre in order to counteract the threats posed by NATO’s further eastward expansion, with Sweden and Finland joining the alliance. »

Some analysts have warned that expanding NATO could provoke Russia. Bildt rejected this, saying, « This war is also going to weaken Russia for quite some time to come. »

« Their army has taken a lot of casualties and a lot of losses, » he added. « So, we are going to deal with a militarily significantly weaker Russia for quite some time to come. »

He said Sweden and Finland joining NATO was « a significant strategic setback » for Putin.

French President Emmanuel Macron said on Monday that nothing should be ruled out concerning a future deployment of troops to Ukraine.

« I don’t know what happened, » Bildt said of Macron’s comments. « I think that was profound misunderstanding and miscommunication on that issue, because I mean, that issue has never been on the agenda, » he added, indicating that mobilizing troops was not Europe’s consensus.

Regarding Ukraine’s potential addition to NATO, Bildt acknowledged some hesitation in the U.S. as the November election approaches, but said Ukraine’s accession was « a question of when, not if. »

Ukraine has also applied to join the European Union. Concerning the timing, Bildt said that if the political will is there, « within five years should be possible. »

He also spoke about the challenges that would come should Donald Trump win a second presidential term in the U.S.

« I think the biggest danger is to the Americans themselves, that they will have a presidency concentrated on domestic revenge, » he said.

Pointing specifically to Trump’s efforts to overturn the results of the 2020 election, Bildt said, « If you listen to what he says in his speeches and his interviews, it’s all about backward-looking things. »

Regarding a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Bildt said that while he doesn’t see any big risk for now, « things could change. »

« We will see what the new president [of Taiwan Lai Ching-te] says when he has his inauguration speech in May, » he said, adding that « Beijing’s reaction in this election has been fairly muted, which is a good sign. »

While Europe faces challenges regarding relations with China in areas like economic and trade competition, as well as human rights in Hong Kong, Bildt said there is a need to build a constructive relationship with China on things like climate change and artificial intelligence.

Read the article on the website of NIkkei Asia

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Sweden-joining-NATO-bolsters-Northern-Europe-s-defense-ex-PM-says

Politics is often messy, but it’s how society puts a value on things economists can’t measure

Even as the United States took its place as the world’s preeminent economic power after World War II, manufacturing firms fled towns in the Northeast and Midwest, leaving behind rusting steel mills and scarred communities. Society as a whole became richer as new industries sprang up elsewhere, but many rust belt communities are still dealing with the consequences of deindustrialization.

The US postwar economic transformation is one example of how policies and trends that increase aggregate social welfare can have painful distributional effects: they beget winners and losers. This makes them controversial. Controversy is no reason to avoid an economic policy, especially if the policy makes society substantially better-off. Policymakers often struggle to persuade the public to accept economic policies that improve well-being. To make them more palatable to the public, policymakers must recognize that policies and trends take place in a broader social and political environment. It is vital that policies gain the acceptance of important social and political actors.

Economics is good at identifying policies that could raise aggregate social welfare. One such policy is free trade. Virtually all economists believe that most economies could be improved by removing barriers to trade. No sensible economist or policymaker pretends that this is costless: while consumers and exporters may benefit, firms and industries that have trouble competing with imports are likely to suffer.

There is a simple economic solution. If a social-welfare-improving policy creates losers, the benefits it generates for society can be used to compensate those harmed. The government can tax those advantaged by trade liberalization—exporters, consumers—to help those disadvantaged, autoworkers for instance. Since by definition the policy increases social welfare, spreading the gains will still leave society better-off, only in a more equitable fashion than if we simply left newly unemployed autoworkers to fend for themselves.

Compensation’s problems

Compensation may be simple and powerful in theory, but it’s not easy in practice. Those who gain from a new policy—such as consumers and exporters when trade is liberalized—are rarely enthusiastic about having some of their gains taxed away. Compensation can be costly and politically difficult, which is why it happens far less frequently than economists would recommend.

Compensation can be difficult for other, more complex, reasons. One is timing: in some cases the appropriate measure would be for one generation to compensate another. For instance, there might be a certain equity, as well as mutual benefit, in asking future generations to contribute to the society of 2024 if the latter bore the cost of tackling climate change—for example, to address jobs lost to the green transition. But how do we get “the future” to pay up? One way would be for the government to borrow and let the debt-service payments fall on future generations. Sensible as this may be in practice, it risks the prospect of debt burdens that are not sustainable. Indeed, it is hardly in a country’s long-term interest to tempt current legislatures to bankrupt governments of the future, and financial markets may not let them—they may be unwilling to fund debts they consider excessive.

Another problem with compensation is that it’s often unclear exactly who will be helped and harmed by a policy. There is almost always uncertainty about how a complex economy will react to change. Economists may have faith in their models, but workers and managers may be less confident in their predictions. The danger of subjecting constituents to unknown risks can make legislators wary of battling for one policy or another.

A related obstacle to compensation is lack of credibility. Governments can promise to make things right for those who may be harmed by, say, freer trade or climate policy. But, at least in democratic countries, governments change. Newly elected officials, often having attained office by criticizing their predecessors, are not always keen to maintain their predecessors’ policies. Many administrations don’t even keep their own promises, let alone those of others. In a world where both outcomes and government policies can vary, those who think they might be affected have plenty of reasons to be cautious.

The most serious reservations about compensation may be noneconomic. Economic analysis focuses on the purely material or pecuniary impact of policies and trends, and of eventual compensation. People, though, may be concerned about less clearly material impacts that are hard to put a price on.

For instance, trade liberalization has contributed to the decline of traditional manufacturing in the US industrial belt—as well as in the north of England, northern France, eastern Germany, and other formerly industrial areas. When the jobs go, there is clearly an economic cost, in lost jobs, wages, tax revenue, and general economic activity.

Distressed regions

But distressed regions may lose something just as real, though less tangible, as well-paying jobs. A small city or town whose factories close can enter a downward socioeconomic spiral: incomes decline, property values and property taxes plummet, local services suffer, and the community’s social fabric unravels. This was the prelude to an epidemic of “deaths of despair” by alcoholism, drug abuse, and suicide (Case and Deaton 2020). Even when the impact is not so acute, when Main Street goes dark, the quality of life—for everyone in town—suffers. The collapse of a stable economic base undermines the foundations of the community (Broz, Frieden, and Weymouth 2021).

A common remedy is to encourage those left without work to move to places where jobs are available. This can be difficult or impossible for economic reasons, since those wanting to move from depressed areas are often saddled with plummeting home values. Residents may be reluctant to move for nonpecuniary reasons, too. They may have family and extended family in the area, decades of friends and neighbors, and attachments to local traditions. Depressed or not, it’s what they know, and it’s home.

The deterioration of coal mining regions illustrates the problem. The coal industry has been declining for years because of both environmental concerns and technological change—and more recently, of course, climate policies. Its decline has devastated entire areas—and not just the coal miners (Blonz, Tran, and Troland 2023). Many coal mining communities were isolated, and few were economically diversified, so once the decline set in there was little to break their fall. One World Bank study found that of 222 Appalachian coal counties, only four had managed to remain “economically viable” (Lobao and others 2021). East and West coast city dwellers may be scarcely aware of them, yet millions of people lived in coal counties, often in tight-knit towns where families had lived for generations bound by social, cultural, and religious ties.

The cost of leaving your family’s historical community is not solely monetary—it means giving up all those personal ties. And there’s no point in asking people what it would take for them to leave: each person’s decision depends on the decisions of others. Why stay if everyone is leaving? Why leave if everyone is staying? And the future of the community may depend on whether its members stay together—and at least preserve the hope of forging a more promising future.

In this context, how can society weigh the consumer benefits of cheaper clothing or cars against the human costs of the collapse of cities and towns in Ohio, the Meuse Valley, or south Yorkshire? Some of these costs are certainly economic and might be suitable for monetary compensation. But some are noneconomic, with a value impossible to establish with any precision. How do you put a price on membership in a close-knit multigenerational community?

Politics as a measure

Society does, in fact, have a way to try to establish the relative importance of these difficult-to-measure values: politics. When we debate the merits of free trade versus local factories, or of coal and oil versus wind and sun, we are implicitly or explicitly discussing how heavily to weight the interests of consumers and producers, the harmed and the helped, current and future generations.

Most studies of trade politics, for example, show that elected officials are more likely to protect (with tariffs and other trade barriers) industries with low-wage workers than industries dominated by high-wage workers. There may be many reasons for this tendency; one reason is almost certainly that people have more sympathy for displaced low-wage workers. In another context, city dwellers who have never lived on a farm appear willing to pay more for their food in order to help sustain family farmers, largely out of a wistful attachment to and sympathy for the rural way of life.

Trade protection or farm subsidies may make political, if not economic, sense—and thus be entirely defensible. The political process weighs people’s values, including those that are hard to price. In this balance, caring deeply about something counts more than caring only a little—so it matters that consumers may care only a little about the price of toys, whereas the residents of a factory town may care a great deal about the cohesion of their community. In the political arena, intensely held views matter more than those that are held only lightly—and that is probably as it should be.

Politics is the mechanism by which societies make difficult choices among things that are often hard to compare. The choices are rarely perfect, and they are usually contentious. But this is how modern societies assess the value citizens place on their own values. It is in the political arena that people get to balance, say, the viability of a small town against the benefits to shoppers of cheaper clothing. Economic growth and progress matter a lot, but people care about other things too, and those other cares deserve consideration.

Oscar Wilde wrote of those who know the price of everything but the value of nothing. It would be fairer and more accurate—and more useful—to note that economists are able to put a price on many things, but not on everything of value. Democratic politics may not give us a universally accepted sense of the value of priceless things—such as community, culture, and family. But it can tell us something about how members of society feel about these things and how they weigh them against each other.

Read this article on the website of the IMF

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2024/03/A-Place-for-Politics-Jeffry-Frieden

Investopia conference draws thousands to Abu Dhabi’s Saadiyat Island, including fund managers who handle more than $500 billion in assets.

ABU DHABI, United Arab Emirates – Kicking off the UAE’s annual Investopia conference on Wednesday, Mubadala chief Khaldoon Al Mubarak pointed to the more active stance that the country’s sovereign wealth funds are taking in the global investment landscape.

“Sovereign funds now have the responsibility and opportunity to go from asset allocators to enablers of global progress,” the Managing Director and Group CEO of Abu Dhabi’s second-largest sovereign wealth fund said. Al Mubarak noted that the emirate’s sovereign funds — Mubadala, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and ADQ — are among the world’s top 10 most active sovereign investors in 2023, which he said, “speaks to the momentum that is building over here.”

Mubadala plans to invest more in the U.S. and has increased its long-term allocations for Asia “in line with megatrends and demographics, including “Japan, China, Korea and, of course, India,” Al Mubarak said.

On the domestic front, UAE Minister of Economy Abdulla bin Touq said in his opening remarks that the ministry is working to better integrate the seven disparate emirates that make up the country. “In the UAE, each emirate has its own strength. We’re now working to enable those emirates to integrate and complement each other to build economic clusters that supercharge the whole economy.”

Thousands of investors have flocked to the third edition of Investopia, a marquee event for the government’s “Projects of the 50” initiative, first announced in 2021. The UAE aims to build the world’s most innovative economy in collaboration with the global investment community. Funds that manage a total of more than $500 billion in assets are attending, according to organizers.

Slated to speak during the two-day conference are Adam Goldstein, Founder and CEO of aviation startup Archer; Eric Cantor, General Manager and Vice Chairman of Moelis; Antonio González, Founder and CEO of Sunset Hospitality Group; Nathan Sheets, Global Chief Economist at Citi; Giorgio Furlani, CEO of AC Milan; Ulrike Hoffmann-Burchardi, Head of CIO Equities at UBS and Gabrielle Rubenstein, Co-Founder and Managing Partner of Manna Tree.

Read this article on the website of The Circuit

https://circuit.news/2024/02/28/mubadalas-al-mubarak-says-sovereign-funds-taking-the-lead/

The alliance’s expansion, with Finland last year and soon Sweden, was a consequence from the invasion of Ukraine that Russia’s president may not have calculated.

BERLIN — Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine two years ago was an enormous shock to Europeans. Used to 30 years of post-Cold War peace, they had imagined European security would be built alongside a more democratic Russia, not reconstructed against a revisionist imperial war machine.

There was no bigger shock than in Finland, with its long border and historical tension with Russia, and in Sweden, which had dismantled 90 percent of its army and 70 percent of its air force and navy in the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

After the decision by Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin, to try to destroy a sovereign neighbor, both Finland and Sweden rapidly decided to apply to join the NATO alliance, the only clear guarantee of collective defense against a newly aggressive and reckless Russia.

With Finland having joined last year, and the Hungarian Parliament finally approving Sweden’s application on Monday, Mr. Putin now finds himself faced with an enlarged and motivated NATO, one that is no longer dreaming of a permanent peace.

As NATO countries look with some trepidation at the possibility that the unpredictable Donald J. Trump, no fan of the alliance, may become U.S. president again, its European members are taking measures to ensure their own defenses regardless.

Critics consider their actions to be too slow and too small, but NATO is spending more money on defense, making more tanks, artillery shells, drones and jet fighters, putting more troops on Russia’s borders and approving more serious military plans for any potential war — while funneling billions of dollars into Ukraine’s efforts to blunt Russia’s ambitions.

The reason is sheer deterrence. Some member states already suggest that if Mr. Putin succeeds in Ukraine, he will test NATO’s collective will in the next three to five years.

If Mr. Trump is elected and casts serious doubt on the commitment of the United States to come to the defense of NATO allies, “that might tip the scales for Putin to test NATO’s resolve,” said Robert Dalsjo, director of studies at the Swedish Defense Research Agency.

Even now, Mr. Dalsjo said, Mr. Trump or not, Europe must prepare for at least a generation of heightened European containment and deterrence of a Russia becoming militarized, and where Mr. Putin clearly “has considerable public support for his aggressive revanchism.”

Still, with Hungary finally voting for Sweden’s accession to NATO, at last the pieces are falling into place for a sharply enhanced NATO deterrent in the Baltic and North Seas, with greater protection for the frontline states of Finland, Norway and the Baltic nations, which border Russia.

Once Hungary hands in a letter certifying parliamentary approval to the U.S. State Department, Sweden will become the 32nd member of NATO, and all the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea, with the exception of Russia, will be part of the alliance.

“Sweden brings predictability, removing any uncertainty about how we would act in a crisis or a war,” Mr. Dalsjo said. Given Sweden’s geography, including Gotland, the island that helps control the entrance to the Baltic Sea, membership “will make defense and deterrence much easier to accomplish,” he said.

It was Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine two years ago that pushed Finland into deciding to join NATO, and Helsinki pulled a somewhat more reluctant Sweden into applying to join as well.

Finland, with its long border with Russia, saw the most imminent danger; the Swedes did too, but were also convinced, especially on the political left, by a sense of moral outrage that Russia, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, would seek to destroy a peaceful, sovereign neighbor.

“Overall the feeling is that we’ll be safer,” said Anna Wieslander, a Swede who is director for northern Europe for the Atlantic Council.

History mattered, too, said Mr. Dalsjo. “If Finland joined we had to — we could not be a wall between Finland and its helpers in the West one more time,” as neutral Sweden had been during Finland’s brave but losing “Winter War” against the Soviet Union in 1939, when Finland had to cede some 11 percent of its territory to Moscow.

With Sweden and Finland together in NATO, it will be much easier to bottle up the Russian surface navy in the Baltic Sea and to monitor the High North. Russia still has up to two-thirds of its second-strike nuclear weapons there, based on the Kola Peninsula.

So the new members will help provide enhanced monitoring of a crucial part of Russia’s military, said Niklas Granholm, the deputy director of studies at the Defense Research Agency.

Russia’s fleet in Kaliningrad, on the Baltic Sea between Poland and Lithuania, is only 200 miles away, and so are its Iskander nuclear-capable missiles. NATO planners have long worried about how to support the Baltic nations if Russia seized the 40-mile “Suwalki Gap” between Kaliningrad and Belarus, but Sweden’s position straddling both the North and Baltic Seas would make it much easier to send NATO reinforcements.

Russia will still retain its land-based missiles, of course, but its nuclear-armed submarines may find it more difficult to maneuver out into the open sea without detection.

Sweden, with its own advanced high-tech defense industry, makes its own excellent fighter planes, naval corvettes and submarines, designed to operate in the difficult environment of the Baltic Sea. It has already begun to develop and build a new class of modern submarines and larger corvettes for coastal and air defense.

With NATO membership, it will be easier now to coordinate with Finland and Denmark, which also have key islands in the Baltic Sea, and with Norway.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Stockholm decided that war was a thing of the past. It removed nearly all of its forces from Gotland, and reduced the national army by around 90 percent and the navy and air force by about 70 percent.

The forces are slowly being restored, and spending on the military, which was close to 3 percent of gross domestic product during the Cold War but sank to about 1 percent, this year will reach 2 percent, the current NATO standard. “These investments will take time, and we need to move faster,” Mr. Granholm said.

Sweden may also join NATO’s multinational enhanced forward brigade in Latvia, intended to put allied troops in all the alliance countries bordering Russia.

Sweden’s main tasks, Ms. Wieslander said, will be to help guard the Baltic Sea and the airspace over Kaliningrad; to ensure the security of Gothenburg, which is key for resupply and reinforcements; and to serve as a staging area for American and NATO troops, with agreements for the advance positioning of equipment, ammunition, supplies and field hospitals.

For both Finland and Sweden, membership is the end of a long 30-year process of what Mr. Dalsjo called “our long goodbye to neutrality.” First came the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decision to join the European Union, which meant dropping neutrality for what both countries called “military nonalignment.”

Sweden, which had quiet defense guarantees from the United States, gradually became more explicitly Atlanticist and integrated more and more with NATO, he said. “And now we take the final step.”

Sweden will need to adapt its strategic culture to working within an alliance, Ms. Wieslander said. “It will be a big difference for us, and allies will expect Sweden to show some leadership.”

Like Finland, Sweden will need to integrate its forces into NATO and develop new capabilities for collective defense rather than concentrating solely on defending the homeland.

“It’s a steep learning curve,” said Mr. Granholm. “We don’t yet have the full picture of NATO’s regional plans,” but will now as a full member. “Then we need to sink our teeth into what NATO wants us to do, and what we want to do. We are doing this to protect ourselves, after all.”

Read the article on the website of The New York Times

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/26/world/europe/nato-sweden-ukraine-russia.html

Devant la crise politique et institutionnelle que traverse son pays, l’ancienne première ministre de Macky Sall en 2013, Aminata Touré, revient sur une société prête à résister malgré les arrestations arbitraires. Elle appelle la France à bien réfléchir aux conséquences de ses actes.

Le 2 avril, le mandat de Macky Sall se terminera. Le Conseil constitutionnel lui impose d’organiser le scrutin présidentiel « dans les meilleurs délais ». Le chef de l’État devait prendre la parole ce jeudi soir lors d’un entretien accordé à trois médias sénégalais, dont la Radio Télévision sénégalaise (RTS, publique). L’occasion de dire quels sont ses plans après avoir repoussé l’élection présidentielle prévue le 25 février. Les Sénégalais attendent de pouvoir « tourner la page », comme l’affirme l’ancienne première ministre Aminata Touré.

Un quatrième étudiant est mort à la suite des manifestations du 10 février contre le report de l’élection. Que cela révèle-t-il de la situation du pays ?

C’est d’abord un sentiment profond de tristesse, doublé d’indignation. Cela résume l’état du pays depuis environ deux ans : une violence exercée sur les Sénégalais dans beaucoup de domaines. J’ai moi-même été expulsée de l’Assemblée nationale sur son ordre. Ousmane Sonko (leader du Pastef, les Patriotes africains du Sénégal pour le travail, l’éthique et la fraternité, opposant à Macky Sall – NDLR) est en prison et interdit de participer aux élections. Le candidat que je soutiens aujourd’hui, Bassirou Diomaye Faye, est lui aussi en prison. Ma candidature a été écartée sous un prétexte fallacieux. Le Sénégal est une démocratie que Macky Sall a fait dérailler de son seul fait, car les forces démocratiques se battent.

The writer is co-founder of GlassView and co-author of ‘Le Capitalisme contre les inégalités’

In its latest annual report, Nvidia, the main provider of semiconductors for artificial intelligence, did not even bother reporting its revenues in Europe. This is suggestive of a wider trend. Today, investment in tech research and development in Europe is only one-fifth of what it is in the US, and half that in China. Investment in AI is around 50 times higher in the US than in Europe. European tech is falling behind its competitors at an alarming rate. How did we get here? The recent wave of tech lay-offs offers insights into some of the key structural weaknesses of the European model. Restructuring in Europe takes much longer and costs much more than in the US, which impedes investment in AI. In the US, Microsoft laid off 10,000 employees in January 2023, and reported severance costs of $800mn, or $80,000 a head. The restructuring costs amount to 5.9 months of the median pay. Oliver Coste, a tech entrepreneur, and I found that the corresponding figures were 4.2 months for Meta, 7.5 months for Google and only three months for Twitter. Powerful brakes facilitate powerful re-acceleration. The groundbreaking success of ChatGPT triggered immediate reactions. Microsoft streamlined its workforce and invested $10bn in OpenAI and more in its own AI infrastructure. Meta paused its efforts on the metaverse, laid off 20,000 employees within a few months and boosted its investments in AI to $37bn this year. Challenged in its dominance in search, Google stopped major projects, laid off 12,000 employees and accelerated on AI by ramping up its R&D investments to $45bn in 2023. In Europe, the three tech leaders — Nokia, SAP and Ericsson — also announced restructuring plans. While a sharp decline in sales last year for Nokia, the largest European investor in tech, required immediate action, it will take the company until 2026 to implement its plan due to labour regulations in Germany, France and Finland. SAP, Europe’s software leader, cannot react much faster and, at the same time, can only invest in AI at a rate of €500mn a year, compared with the tens of billions being invested by each of the so-called Magnificent Seven. The complexity of restructuring in Germany, for instance, can be illustrated by the two-year plan announced in October by Volkswagen. The carmaker said the plan still requires approval from its works council, which has guaranteed jobs for workers until the middle of 2025. Restructuring matters more in tech than in any other sector. Why? Simply because frontier-tech investments are riskier. It is not uncommon to see failure rates of 80 per cent. The consequences are profound. As Coste shows in his book Europe, Tech and War, investments that are deemed profitable in the US don’t make the cut in Europe, precisely because of the lack of cheap and swift restructuring capabilities at large companies. At a more macro level, this diagnosis is confirmed by a McKinsey study which shows that large European companies are much less profitable than their American counterparts, and that 90 per cent of that gap can be attributed to technology-creating industries. Tech is unpredictable, disruptive and volatile. With higher severance costs and longer delays, the costs of adaptation in Europe are about 10 times higher than in the US. After decades of greater agility, American companies have the financial means to invest in AI; European companies simply can’t compare. AI is powering the current industrial revolution, just like the steam engine in the 19th century and the internal combustion engine in the 20th. Global investment in AI infrastructure is forecast to reach around $150bn in 2024, primarily driven by the US and China. In Europe, by contrast, we have been able to identify just a couple of billion dollars-worth of investment, by both tech leaders and start-ups. This shortfall cannot be allowed to continue. Other factors can explain European difficulties in tech — market integration, market size, funding, regulation and even culture. Yet none of these factors seems to have prevented the emergence of European leaders in mature, lower-risk industries such as automobiles or aeronautics. We are facing a tech-specific problem that will quickly permeate all sectors if we are not careful. A solution that does not threaten the European social model, and which could be highly effective, would be to reform employment protection laws for salaries above a high threshold. That, more than anything else, could help bring Europe back to the forefront of innovation.

Read the article on the website of the Financial Times

https://www.ft.com/content/d4fda2ec-91cd-4a13-a058-e6718ec38dd1

The head of the government, Edi Rama, has started an official visit to Ankara, where he was welcomed  with a state ceremony by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

During his stay, Rama signed several agreements with the Turkish president, Erdogan.

Agreements and Memorandums signed today within the framework of further strengthening of cooperation between Albania and Turkey:

1. Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Tourism and Environment of the Republic of Albania and the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change of the Republic of Turkey for cooperation in the field of environment.
2. Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Tourism and Environment of the Republic of Albania and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of the Republic of Turkey for the sustainable management of forests and protected areas.
3. Agreement between the Prime Minister of Republic of Albania and the Government of the Republic of Turkey on the status of the coordination office of the TIKA Tirana program.
4. Agreement within the military framework between the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania and the Government of the Republic of Turkey.
5. Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Republic of Albania and the Government of the Republic of Turkey in the Media and Communication Fields for communication and public information.
6. Cooperation Protocol between the Turkish Radio Television Corporation and Albanian Radio Television.

Read the article originally published by Euronews

Edi Rama in Turkey, signs several agreements with Erdogan

WARSAW — 

The European Union on Tuesday welcomed Poland’s plan to « restore the rule of law » and dismantle policies by the former nationalist government which led to the freezing of billions of euros in EU funds due to concerns over judicial independence.

Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, which ruled for eight years, carried out a deep overhaul of the judiciary which the EU said damaged democratic checks and balances and brought courts under political influence.

As a result, the European Commission held back billions of euros in funds earmarked for Poland.

EU commissioners said the plan by the new pro-EU government, in power since last December, and which involves several bills rolling back PiS reforms, was well received.

« This was very impressive for the Commission to listen to so many positive comments around the table… the reactions are very positive, » European Union Justice Commissioner Didier Reynders told reporters.

The deputy head of the European Commission, Vera Jourova, called the action plan « realistic ».

Poland’s new prime minister, Donald Tusk, has vowed to restore judicial independence and get the funds released. But he faces resistance from PiS supporters and allies, who include President Andrzej Duda and some high-profile judges.

« I think that the very positive reaction from the member states is also associated with a certain level of trust that we will do it in a way that is predictable and consistent with the rule of law, » Polish Justice Minister Adam Bodnar said after presenting the plan in Brussels.

Bodnar said earlier the plan includes changes to the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ), which appoints judges, and the Constitutional Tribunal which critics say has been politicized under PiS.

In a sign that the government is committed to implementing the changes soon, Tusk’s cabinet approved on Tuesday a bill on the NCJ proposed by Bodnar, which will now go to parliament.

The bill assumes members of the Council would be chosen by judges, not politicians as they were under changes introduced under PiS. The European Court of Human Rights and Court of Justice of the EU had pointed to irregularities in the procedure.

« On the day of announcing the results of the new election to the NCJ, those judges in the Council who were elected in an unconstitutional manner by the (parliament), on the basis of provisions adopted in December 2017, will cease to function in the Council, » the government said.

Read the article originally published on the website of VOA

https://www.voanews.com/a/eu-welcomes-new-polish-government-s-plan-to-restore-rule-of-law-/7495000.html

It is time for Europe to finally take its own defense seriously.

At a rally in South Carolina on February 10, former United States President Donald Trump shocked many as he recalled a discussion he had with a European NATO ally when he was president. In response to a question about whether the U.S. would come to a country’s aid even if it had not spent the NATO target commitment of 2 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, he told the crowd: “I said, ‘You didn’t pay, you’re delinquent? No, I would not protect you. In fact, I would encourage [Russia] to do whatever the hell they want.’ ”

This statement elicited strong reactions, especially in Europe, where many NATO countries still do not spend 2 percent of GDP on defense. Some have also claimed that the statements undermine NATO’s principle of solidarity.

Although Mr. Trump used his customary aggressive tone, and the suggestion that a U.S. president would invite Russia to attack an ally is grotesque, the essence of his message has merit. After nearly 80 years of peace due to U.S. protection, European countries should be able to shoulder responsibility for their security.

Europe is in a tough spot. The war in Ukraine has turned into a war of attrition. Kyiv is fully dependent on support from the West, especially Washington. Ukraine-fatigue is setting in with the American populace, and not only among Republicans. The Biden administration will not be able to indefinitely sustain support for Ukraine.

Unfortunately, it is increasingly likely that a cease-fire compromise will be reached, resulting in territorial gains for Russia. This might encourage the Kremlin to continue its policy of reconstituting the old Soviet Union borders and neutralizing Central Europe. Hanno Pevkur, the Estonian minister of defense, recently said that a Russian attack on his country could be a realistic scenario in three or four years. Similar concerns exist in the other Baltic states.

America might not always be there

Regardless of American politics, Europe’s sovereignty in defense will be crucial, not just when it comes to its relationship with Russia. France has been a leader in this regard since General Charles de Gaulle was at the helm in the 1960s.

In this spirit, President Emmanuel Macron made a statement in a 2019 interview with The Economist that was heavily criticized – just as Mr. Trump’s was: “What we are currently experiencing is the brain death of NATO,” he said, adding that Europe was on “the edge of a precipice” and needed to start thinking of itself strategically as a geopolitical power. Without such thinking, Europe would “no longer be in control of [its] destiny.” While this made sense at the time, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has led to a reinvigoration of NATO.

Given the possibility of a new Trump presidency, Europe’s political establishment is worried, particularly regarding issues of trade, Ukraine and defense. These concerns are justified – but not because Mr. Trump could end up back in the White House. Politics in Washington depends on a wide array of factors, most of which the president has little to no influence upon. U.S. politics simply may not always go Europe’s way.

Yet instead of coming up with realistic ways to increase military readiness in three aspects – willingness to defend, sufficient trained soldiers and effective weapons – Europe’s leaders are dithering, lamenting the possibility of Mr. Trump becoming president again.

Europe needs to achieve military sovereignty. Recently, some prominent politicians have begun discussing whether the European Union should build its own nuclear deterrent. Doing so makes little sense given the risk scenario. Responsible actors will only escalate if the threat from an aggressor is existential. Conflicts in Central Europe will not suffice to trigger this escalation.

Furthermore, a nuclear deterrent does nothing to address some of Europe’s other security challenges, including those beyond its southern borders, in Africa and the Middle East. Houthi attacks on ships traveling through the Red Sea, for example, present a clear economic threat that nuclear weapons cannot solve. Russia cannot be the sole focus of Europe’s military rebuild.

Eyes wide open

Nor will it help to whine about former President Trump’s words potentially splitting NATO. Instead, his harangue could benefit Europe, serving as a wake-up call to countries that until now have been snuggling comfortably under the U.S. security blanket.

There are already signs that some European countries are opening their eyes. France, Germany and Poland are revitalizing the Weimar Triangle alliance format, where discussions will hopefully include defense issues. But whatever happens, reinvigorating Europe’s defense capabilities will require close cooperation with the United Kingdom.

Germany appears to support France’s “force de dissuasion” – formerly known as “force de frappe” – the country’s nuclear deterrence force. That, plus the UK’s own nuclear deterrence, should suffice for Europe. EU-wide nuclear weapons are not necessary.

What will be necessary are sufficient budgets with less bureaucracy. The funds must be spent efficiently, and the popular mood and political attitudes must change (this latter concern is the biggest challenge). For this, we might again thank individuals like Donald Trump.

There is another aspect to consider: European countries should be equal partners with the U.S., not just profiteers. This would allow for a more independent European geopolitics in the troubled decades to come and would also alleviate pressure on the U.S., whose main challenge lies in the Pacific.

Regardless of who is elected president, it is unlikely that the U.S. will become isolationist in terms of security – the challenge in the Pacific is too great. However, the mood in Washington could turn to consider conflicts in Europe’s east as primarily a European affair.

The Munich Security Conference just wrapped up a few days ago. In a recent interview, Christoph Heusgen, the seasoned German diplomat and head of the conference, aptly described how Europe should move forward:

“Trump is erratic. We have to adapt to that. If he becomes president, we have to be able to stand up to him and say, ‘We’ll do what you asked. Now let us continue to work together in this alliance that has brought us peace in the transatlantic region over the past decades.’ ”

Read the article, originally published by GIS

Europe should focus on its own defense readiness, not on Trump

President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine said that Aleksei Navalny, the Russian dissident, “was killed by Putin, like thousands of others.”

Read the entire article on the website of The New York Times

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/16/world/europe/aleksei-navalny-reactions-eu.html