Putin and Xi see right through Trump

TOKYO — Few could have predicted the recent developments that have plunged the once-vaunted friendship between U.S. President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi into sudden and serious conflict.

For nearly two decades, the U.S. and India have drawn closer in a strategic bid to counter China. But now their once-celebrated partnership shows signs of unraveling, a prospect that would be welcomed both in Beijing and Moscow.

One of the major flashpoints is trade. Washington has been pressing New Delhi to further open its agricultural sector under the threat of higher tariffs, yet bilateral negotiations have stalled.

On Aug. 6, Trump escalated the pressure, announcing that U.S. tariffs on Indian goods would be doubled from 25% to 50% as of Aug. 27, citing India’s massive imports of Russian crude oil.

Modi reacted with fury to what he saw as an outright threat, vowing he would “never compromise” and signaling that India was prepared to stand firm against U.S. pressure.

According to Indian diplomatic experts, Trump recently attempted multiple times to call Modi in search of a compromise. But the Indian leader has consistently refused to take the calls, further heightening Trump’s frustration.

To grasp how things came to this impasse, it is worth recalling the key milestones in the U.S.-India relationship in the past two decades. That story starts in 2008, with the landmark nuclear deal the administration of then U.S. President George W. Bush struck with India, which effectively set the stage for a new era of closer ties. With Beijing’s rise in mind, Washington and New Delhi steadily deepened their cooperation in diplomacy and security.

It was also under Trump’s first term that the Quad security framework bringing together the U.S., Australia, India and Japan held its inaugural meeting of foreign ministers. Behind the scenes, according to advisers at India’s Ministry of Defense, Washington even explored the possibility of supplying weapons to India should another border conflict with China erupt.

The sudden reversal in the trajectory of U.S.-India relations after this period cannot be explained by tariffs alone. Indian officials and diplomatic experts say the strain runs deeper, pointing to two more fundamental sources of conflict.

The first is a widening gap over how to handle China. Confronted with the constant threat of Chinese military power, India seeks to strengthen cooperation with the U.S. to keep increasingly assertive China in check. But in New Delhi, disappointment has grown over the perception that Trump is far less confrontational toward Beijing than many had hoped.

Despite expectations of a hardline stance, Trump has frequently mixed tough rhetoric with conciliatory gestures, often displaying open admiration for Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Reflecting this posture of strategic ambiguity, he partially relaxed export controls on advanced semiconductors for artificial intelligence bound for China. In another move widely seen as accommodating Beijing, he reportedly blocked Taiwan President Lai Ching-te from making a stopover in New York this August.

Meanwhile, China, like India, has been consuming large volumes of Russian crude oil. Yet Washington shows no sign of imposing punitive tariffs on Beijing, deepening India’s sense of dismay.

At the end of August, Modi is set to visit China for the first time in seven years. Officially, the trip is to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. Unofficially, it is also viewed as an attempt to ease tensions with Beijing while keeping a close watch on the unpredictable trajectory of U.S.-China relations.

The second source of strain lies in Trump’s showy, deal-driven style of diplomacy. In May, he claimed that it was his mediation that stopped fighting between India and Pakistan, hostilities that carried the risk of nuclear escalation.

Indian officials say Modi was incensed. From New Delhi’s perspective, it was Pakistan’s acceptance of a ceasefire that reflected the deterrent power of India’s military, not Trump’s intervention. India has long held that third-party involvement in its disputes with Pakistan is unacceptable.

Adding insult to injury, Trump invited Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, to the White House for lunch in mid-June, a move that only deepened the fissures between Washington and New Delhi.

Even if Washington and New Delhi manage to stage a reconciliation, however, a swift return to their former closeness as allies appears unlikely. Rebuilding trust, once broken, is never easy.

A disintegration of the U.S.-India honeymoon would weaken the Quad framework and disrupt the broader strategy pursued by the U.S. and its partners to respond to the challenges posed by China’s aggressive ambitions. Since the days of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan has pressed hard for the U.S., Australia, and India to deepen their coordination, making the Quad a central pillar of Japan’s Indo-Pacific vision.

“Strategic cooperation between the U.S. and India and within the Quad framework are essential for the U.S. to constrain China’s assertiveness and to ensure no one power dominates the region,” said Manish Chand, founder and chief executive officer of the Center for Global India Insights who specializes in Indian diplomacy. “If the Trump administration continues to pressure India over tariffs and its defense and energy ties with Russia, it will affect the Quad and undermine the efforts the US has made to contain China.”

The erosion of the Quad would carry global consequences. Reduced pressure on Beijing could embolden China, while Russia would also stand to gain. For the U.S., India, and many other countries, such an outcome would be deeply unwelcome.