With plenty of cachet still left, the UK has an opportunity to play a leading western role on the world stage.
The UK stands to regain its role as a leading foreign policy player. Eight years since the Brexit vote and the internal politics that has consumed the UK since, the country has entered a new era. Beginnings often provide a sense of optimism, except for those who lose elections, but that optimism holds for only a short window of time. That limited time must be seized upon, and quickly.
UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has shown he understands the need for swift movement in the first 72 hours in office.
With a new government in Downing Street and the beginning of a new chapter in the country, the UK has an opportunity to play a leading western role on the world stage. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a leading member of Nato, a nuclear power and having the sixth-largest national economy in the world by gross domestic product, in addition to the legacy of the British Empire and the soft power of British culture and heritage, its sources of influence are many.
The opportunity for the UK to be a leading western power is more pronounced as the US becomes ever more consumed by the bizarre election campaign across the Atlantic and France contends with its own political troubles. With both US President Joe Biden and French President Emmanuel Macron appearing increasingly as lame duck presidents, Mr Starmer can fill a void in representing western interests. Many around the world are aware of this opportunity and will be watching Mr Starmer closely.
Undoubtedly, his government will have immediate domestic concerns – from long NHS waiting times to a housing crisis – as its top priority. That means Foreign Secretary David Lammy should be given more autonomy to act on foreign affairs. Mr Lammy will have to forge ahead with policy development and relationship building – or rectifying. While the last foreign secretary, David Cameron, was often well-received globally, he represented a weak prime minister in Rishi Sunak, in addition to the fact that an upcoming electoral deadline meant that whoever he met or negotiated with knew he would only be in office for mere months.
Since 2010, the foreign policy portfolio changed hands nine times, with eight foreign secretaries over 14 turbulent years of Conservative rule before Mr Lammy took office. Often, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office was a holding place for an ambitious Tory MP taking the role as a holding position before elbowing their way into 10 Downing Street.
The Foreign Office itself went through much tumult, when in 2020 Boris Johnson shut down the department dedicated to aid, the Department for International Development, DFID, and merged it with the Foreign and Commonwealth office, to become FCDO. The move created chaos for several months and a survey of civil service leaders found that just 7.5 per cent of respondents believed the creation of FCDO was a success.
While a popular position among many Conservatives, the elimination of DFID has eroded the UK’s influence in global development. Since 2021, UK spending on overseas aid has dropped to 0.5 per cent of gross national income, a reduction from the 0.7 per cent aid target that the UN has set and that the UK hit in 2013 and maintained until three years ago. The UK had been one of the few countries to adhere to the ambition of 0.7 per cent set since 1960. Only 15 countries have ever met the UN target. In 2021, Mr Sunak, as chancellor, published a statement linking overseas aid spending to the ratio of debt in the country, deciding that the 0.7 per cent would not be met, despite being mandated according to the International Development Act 2015. Mr Starmer could immediately reposition its role in the world by restoring the 0.7 per cent target.
To turn the fortunes of British foreign policy around and rebuild influence, particularly in rising centres of power like New Delhi, Abu Dhabi, Brasilia and beyond, Mr Starmer and his team will have to move quickly. Initial signs, with Mr Starmer calling UAE President Sheikh Mohamed, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, while Mr Lammy called UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah on his first day on the job, are promising.
The last time Labour was in power, their foreign policy record got marred by the Iraq war of 2003 and disastrous mishandling of its aftermath. After the party’s dramatic loss of power in 2010, it went through a number of iterations including being led by the left-wing Jeremy Corbyn who is known for his sympathy with questionable armed groups and states such as Iran and Cuba. Today, Mr Starmer and Mr Lammy need to forge their own path – while keeping their constituents happy.
Of course, repairing ties with Europe is a top priority as has been clear this week, but Mr Starmer has already clarified he will not be seeking to open negotiations with the EU to return to the single market, or try to restore the UK’s membership.
In addition to restoring the UK’s reputation as a serious country, the new foreign secretary has four pressing issues to attend to – the war in Gaza and its multi-dimensional fall-out in the Middle East and beyond, the deep crisis in Sudan and ramifications in Africa, and the war in Ukraine that is facing the prospect of ever-increasing western divisions on its end game. The three wars, particularly Palestine and Ukraine, are pushing the so-called rules-based order to its absolute limits. And thus, the fourth issue is the need to bring the rules-based order back from the brink, while some argue the world has already crossed that Rubicon.
As the penholder at the UN Security Council for the “protection of civilians”, meaning it is responsible for discussions and resolution on the issue, the UK must find a way to bring back principles such as the “right to protect”, which no longer hold true. The UK is also the penholder at the UN for a number of other pressing files, including Afghanistan.
While complex issues such as climate change and restoring the “right to protect” are of major importance, the war in Gaza and its ramifications must be a priority. In addition to its devastating human toll, the possibility of it expanding beyond the Lebanon-Israel border increases as each day pass. How Iranian-backed groups, from Yemen to Iraq, respond if the war was to expand, will set the tone for the region for decades to come. While US, Qatari and Egyptian mediation efforts continue, the UK can come in with years of experience – some of it with bitter memories for many in the region, including the Balfour Declaration – and offer its good offices. Further, the UK has its own interests in the region, from protecting maritime security through to ensuring the safety of the millions of Britons living there.
The US has disillusioned many around the world, and in particular Arab and Muslim-majority countries with the position it has taken on the war. And while it took Mr Starmer four months to call for a ceasefire, his election manifesto pledges to recognise the State of Palestine. This would be a significant move but not enough on its own to resolve the decades-old conflict – and end the occupation of Palestine. Setting about a clear and serious path for peace in Palestine and Israel, and the wider region, is necessary.
The UK has an opportunity to come back from its Brexit-era isolationism to playing a role as a middle-sized country, as Mr Lammy likes to describe it. However, its influence, history and potential are much more than those of the average middle-sized country. It just needs a leadership that can think big and seize the opportunity.
Read the article on the website of The National
https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2024/07/08/a-british-foreign-policy-moment-in-the-making/
BERLIN – With Iran’s drone and missile attack on Israel on the night of April 13, the war in the Middle East has taken on a new dimension. For years, the conflict between Iran and Israel had been a “shadow war” in which both sides avoided direct military strikes on each other’s territory. Instead, the conflict reached furtively into the streets of Tehran, where there have been assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists and engineers, and into war-torn areas of Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Gaza. In those hot spots, the so-called Axis of Resistance – comprising Hezbollah (in Lebanon), Hamas (in Gaza), and the Houthis (in Yemen) – receives extensive support in the form of Iranian money, weapons, and training.
The current war started on October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched an attack on Israel that claimed 1,200 lives and 253 hostages. Israel soon hit back, and the war has been raging in Gaza ever since. As a result of the Israel Defense Forces’ campaign to eliminate Hamas once and for all, more than 30,000 Palestinians have been killed, and the enclave has been laid to waste.
Despite these horrors and the appalling conditions in Gaza, the war is the latest chapter in a bloody conflict that Israelis and Palestinians have been fighting over the same stretch of land for almost 80 years. By contrast, Iran’s direct attack against Israel represents something new. To launch a strike from Iranian territory, rather than operating through proxies, is to invite retaliation against Iran itself. The Iranian regime either must feel very sure of itself, or is under enormous pressure to make a show of strength, even if that means risking “open war” not only with Israel but also with the United States.
The immediate trigger was Israel’s April 1 strike on an Iranian consulate building next to Iran’s embassy in Damascus, where several members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, including two high-ranking commanders, were killed. Though these were hardly the first casualties of Iran’s “shadow war” in Syria and Lebanon, the Iranian leadership nonetheless felt compelled to respond.
True, Iran did reportedly let the US know through informal channels that its counterattack was imminent, and no one was particularly surprised when it came. Nonetheless, the implications of the move are profound. The war is no longer an Israeli-Palestinian one over the same stretch of land; it has been regionalized – even globalized.
Looming ominously in the background is the potential threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program. Given the latest developments, this existential threat to Israel is becoming less hypothetical by the day. Will Iran take the final steps to cross the nuclear threshold, and does the mere possibility increase the odds of a war with Israel and the US? That is now the big question for the entire region.
Moreover, we know that Iran’s aims extend beyond achieving regional predominance. The regime would welcome the replacement of the US-led international order by a more multipolar system in which great and emerging powers compete. To command a powerful position in this new international order will require nuclear weapons, access to state-of-the-art technology, and an end to the economic isolation implied by far-reaching Western sanctions. All this now looks to be within reach through its deepening ties with China, Russia, and parts of the Global South.
Iran’s theocrats know that they are in a fraught position domestically. Large-scale protests led by women, young people, and ethnic minorities (in Kurdistan and Baluchistan, for example) have discredited the regime, as has rampant corruption among the ruling elite. The country’s aging leadership no longer has any legitimacy; it is merely surviving through outright repression. But while relying on truncheons and bullets may work for a while, it is hardly a recipe for long-term success.
In geopolitical terms, however, the situation is completely different. Iran’s theocratic regime is among the big winners of the transition away from the US-led world order. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran’s nuclear program has advanced further than ever, putting it on the threshold of enriching enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb. One also should assume that Iran has the technological know-how to build a nuclear warhead and the systems for delivering it.
In an increasingly favorable geopolitical landscape, Iran’s marriage of convenience with Russia and China is of paramount importance, not least because it will allow the regime to escape its decades-long international isolation. As new and emerging powers seek to develop new multilateral structures beyond the reach of Western hegemony, Iran will almost inevitably benefit.
The war in the Middle East must be understood in this broader context, which also includes Ukraine and Taiwan. We are witnessing increasingly bold and ambitious efforts to topple the old Western-led order through any means necessary – even outright war.