Chine-Russie : les raisons du grand décalage

Publié 

Renaud Girard, Le Figaro

Le 17 mars 2018, Xi Jinping a été réélu à l’unanimité président pour cinq ans par les 2970 députés de l’Assemblée nationale populaire de Chine. C’est un progrès par rapport à 2013, où un député avait voté contre lui et trois autres s’étaient abstenus… Le 18 mars 2018, Vladimir Poutine a été réélu président de Russie pour six ans au suffrage universel, avec 76% des voix, en net progrès par rapport à 2012 (63% des suffrages).

Ni en Chine, ni en Russie, ne s’est établi un Etat de droit à la Montesquieu à la suite de la mort de l’idéologie communiste en 1989 (massacre de Tiananmen le 5 juin qui fait 10000 morts, chute du Mur de Berlin le 9 novembre sans une seule victime). La différence entre les deux grandes autocraties orientales est que la dissidence, tolérée à Moscou, est interdite à Pékin. Les Russes peuvent critiquer leur président dans certains journaux ou sur les réseaux sociaux ; en Chine, c’est impossible.

Est-ce à dire qu’il y aurait une loi d’airain autorisant le succès économique dans les pays totalitaires mais jamais chez les demi-despotes ? Qui expliquerait que le PNB par tête ait été multiplié par 17 au cours des 35 dernières années en Chine et qu’il ait, hors rente pétrolière, stagné en Russie au cours de la même période ?

Non. Le grand décalage entre les deux grandes puissances nucléaires orientales n’est pas dû à la plus ou moins grande dilution de leur autoritarisme. Il s’explique par le fait que, depuis 1989, la Chine n’a pas commis une seule erreur stratégique, alors que la stratégie russe a été, au mieux, brouillonne.

Politiquement, la Russie et la Chine étaient structurés par le parti communiste. A Moscou, Gorbatchev puis Eltsine ont détruit cette grande organisation qui encadrait à la fois l’Etat et la société russe. Mais ils l’ont remplacée par rien. A Pékin, les dirigeants n’ont cessé de renforcer l’efficacité du parti communiste, dont le but est de gérer au mieux la nouvelle société capitaliste chinoise. C’est par le biais des structures du parti que s’est déroulée la grande purge lancée contre la corruption par Xi Jinping (un million et demi d’arrestations). Les leaders chinois se moquent du sens original des mots « communiste » ou « capitaliste » ; ce sont des nationalistes, pour qui seul compte le rétablissement de la Chine comme 1ère puissance en Asie, rang qu’elle avait au début du XIXème siècle, avant que les Européens, les Américains et les Japonais ne viennent la soumettre à leurs intérêts.

Pour succéder au communisme, les dirigeants du parti ont choisi une voie proprement chinoise. Ils ont tablé sur le sens du commerce et de l’entreprenariat de leur population, qui avait été inhibé par le maoïsme, mais qui restait patent dans la diaspora (Singapour, Taïwan, Hong Kong, etc.). Ils ont gardé les conglomérats d’Etat, tout en encourageant l’entreprise privée à se développer non contre eux mais à côté d’eux. Face à l’étranger, ils ont montré trois visages successifs. D’abord celui d’un pays très sous-développé que l’Occident charitable devait aider. Ensuite celui d’une puissance commerciale amicale, respectueuse des règles de l’OMC, ouverte à des transferts technologiques maîtrisés. Les Occidentaux les ont cru sur parole et les Chinois se sont livrés à un gigantesque pillage technologique pour devenir le grand atelier du monde. Troisième phase avec Xi Jinping : la consolidation de leur hégémonisme commercial avec la stratégie de la « Route de la Soie » vers une Europe qu’il s’agit de coloniser petit à petit.

Pour remplacer le communisme, les dirigeants russes ont fait juste le contraire. Ils ont naïvement choisi une voie qu’ils croyaient occidentale, en faisant venir d’Harvard des « experts », économistes en chambre qui se sont livrés à de catastrophiques expériences. Tout l’appareil industriel a été privatisée de manière si précipitée qu’il s’est retrouvé aux mains d’oligarques mafieux, qui ont ensuite tenté d’imposer leurs vues au Kremlin. Poutine a rétabli l’ordre dans la rue, la prééminence du pouvoir central contre ces nouveaux boyards, le prestige international de la Russie. Mais il n’a pas su construire l’Etat de droit qui lui aurait permis de conserver en Russie ses chercheurs et ses investisseurs potentiels. En politique étrangère, il a repris la Crimée, mais a perdu l’Ukraine et les banques occidentales. Il a gagné en Syrie : mais que va rapporter concrètement sa victoire à la population russe ? Il présente des missiles nucléaires nouveaux, mais pour quel bénéfice réel ? Poutine patine dans de la tactique à court terme, tandis que Xi avance avec une stratégie à long terme.

Face à une Amérique qui les méprise et à une Chine qui veut les dévorer, les Européens n’ont plus qu’une option : comprendre la paranoïa de la Russie, puis la guérir, avant de la ramener dans la famille européenne. Pousser les Russes dans les bras des Chinois serait pour eux de la folie furieuse.

As Poland and Hungary Flout Democratic Values, Europe Eyes the Aid Spigot

May 1, 2018
Steven Erlanger, The New York Times

BRUSSELS — The European Union is largely about money — who gives it, who gets it and why. In the face of a challenge to European democratic values from Poland and Hungary, Brussels is naturally turning to money to get at least some leverage over the popular, populist governments there.

The struggle at the heart of the European Union has infused what would normally be a humdrum moment in the life of its bureaucracy — the publishing of its proposed long-term budget on Wednesday — with novel importance.

How the European Union disperses its money will be hashed out over months — debated, amended and approved by the leaders of the member states and by the European Parliament, too.

But suddenly at stake in the tedium is whether the money that richer states transfer to poorer ones — long seen as a means of democratizing former dictatorships, like Portugal, Spain or Greece — is instead enabling new ones, namely in Poland and Hungary, among the top money-getters in the European Union.

That money is no small change. In Poland, European Union money has represented some 61 percent of infrastructure spending; in Hungary, the figure is 55 percent.

But both countries have been criticized for increasing state control over the news media and especially the judiciary, which goes to the heart of European commitments to freedom of the press, the rule of law and democratic transparency.

The means to influence or punish member states for violations of European principles are very weak, however. Real censure is subject to veto, making it difficult for Brussels to challenge democratically elected leaders, even when their practices in office are suspect.

But the challenge is of fundamental importance, argued Adam LeBor, an analyst of Central Europe. “Beyond Brexit and migration,” he wrote in The Financial Times, “the new Kulturkampf over national identity may be the biggest threat to the E.U.’s future unity and stability.”

So the European Commission, the bloc’s bureaucracy, is considering tying new aid to the credibility of the judiciary in member states, on the principle that oversight of European Union spending must depend on the rule of law and independent judges.

Such a change would attempt to skirt contentious judgments about “values” and instead shift the debate to sound financial management. Importantly, the finance rules work on a form of majority voting, eliminating the veto.

Fines would be considered approved unless the European Council, made up of the heads of government, votes to repeal them.

And even if those fines and aid reductions are passed, governments that are punished would still be liable to fulfill their budget obligations to fund agricultural and investment subsidies out of their own tax receipts.

That all may be too clever to survive the long process of approval. And even if successful, it would not take effect until at least 2021. But it is an effort to hit countries that have flouted European values and norms in the pocketbook.

All this is cresting because the European Union is beginning to debate its budget framework for 2021 through 2027, a budget that will have to deal with a significant reduction in funds given Britain’s intention to leave the bloc and stop paying into its budget after a transition period that will end in December 2020. Currently, about 10 percent of the European Union’s budget comes from Britain.

Compared with the national budgets of its 28 member states, the European Union budget is small. The last seven-year budget, passed in 2013, amounted to only about one percent of the European Union’s gross national income, about 155 billion euros, or about $186 billion, a year.

But about 9 percent of the European Union budget goes to Poland alone. Another 2.5 percent goes to much smaller Hungary.

That money reflects the bloc’s extraordinary commitment to aiding the development of its newer and poorer members, measured by gross domestic product per capita. It is also important to those countries’ growth and the popularity of their governments.

For instance, Hungary’s healthy growth rate of 3 percent a year would be as low as 1 percent without those regional support funds, known also as cohesion funds.

Recipient countries argue that much of that money is spent on buying equipment and services from some net-contributor states, like Germany and France, and returns to them in the form of markets and profits.

The Hungarian government spokesman, Zoltan Kovacs, has called the suggestion to tie political conditions to European Union funds “political blackmail.” He has pointed out that Hungary opened its markets to the bloc in 2004, when the economy was far from competitive.

“Don’t try to suggest that the E.U. cohesion fund is a gift for central and eastern member states,” he said here last year.

There are expected to be other contentious proposals, too. The distribution of regional support would be based not just on national income per capita but on other indicators like youth unemployment and migration burdens.

That is a clear effort to help older members like Italy and Greece that have borne the brunt of refugee and migrant flows, and other southern countries like Spain and Portugal, where youth unemployment is high.

Cohesion funds for newer member states could be cut by as much as 6 percent to make room for these other kinds of aid.

Of course, the talk of cuts also comes in the context of Britain’s exit from the European Union, along with its hefty contributions.

Some countries, like France, Germany, Poland and Hungary, have said that they would increase their future contributions to Brussels to help make up for Britain’s departure.

Other countries, like the Netherlands, have said that they do not want to contribute more, but that the bloc’s budget should absorb the loss of Britain by shrinking and becoming more efficient.

But the commission itself is expected to propose a larger budget than the current one, and aim for an overall amount of 1.13 to 1.18 percent of the bloc’s gross national income, compared with 1.03 percent when the current framework was approved.

But the prevailing mood, led by the Commission vice president, Frans Timmermans, is that the challenge of Poland and Hungary cannot go unmet, and that other countries flirting with forms of “illiberal democracy,” like Slovakia and the Czech Republic, should see consequences.

In an unusually explicit Twitter thread after the Czech elections last autumn, Juho Romakkaniemi, the former head of the cabinet of another European Commission vice president, Jyrki Katainen, asked: “How long the other MS [member states] are willing to pay large sums for cohesion if it leads to divergence?”

Mr. Romakkaniemi noted that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were among the highest net recipients of European Union funds, while their governments indulge in euroskeptic politics. “My fear is that the populistic path leads to divergence from the E.U. core values of freedom and Rule of Law — until a breaking point,” he said.

“This would be a very sad and dangerous development,” he added. “But I can see big risks here. It is not too late to reconsider this path carefully.”

 

UE : face à Trump, l’épreuve de vérité

Publié 

Renaud Girard, Le Figaro

Ce mardi 15 mai 2018, se tient à Bruxelles une réunion diplomatique d’une importance cruciale pour l’avenir de l’Union européenne (UE) en tant qu’entité politique. Autour de la Haute Représentante pour les affaires étrangères, Federica Mogherini, se réuniront les ministres des affaires étrangères d’Allemagne, de France et du Royaume-Uni. Ces trois puissances furent signataires, au nom de l’Europe, de l’accord international de Vienne du 14 juillet 2015 sur le nucléaire iranien. Le ministre iranien des affaires étrangères est invité à se joindre à la deuxième partie de la réunion de Bruxelles.

Négocié pendant près de dix ans, cet accord, dont le nom exact est JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), permet à la Perse de redevenir une grande puissance commerciale (grâce à la suspension des sanctions internationales dirigées contre elle), en échange de son renoncement à devenir une puissance nucléaire. Mme Mogherini a affirmé le 11 mai 2018 que l’UE était « déterminée à préserver » le JCPOA, qu’elle a qualifié, à juste titre, de « l’une des plus belles réussites jamais réalisées de la diplomatie ».

Malgré le travail considérable qu’avait réalisé le Secrétaire d’Etat américain John Kerry pour obtenir cet accord garantissant l’arrêt de la prolifération nucléaire au Moyen-Orient, Donald Trump a décidé de le déchirer. L’allocution solennelle, le mardi 8 mai 2018, du président des Etats-Unis pour annoncer leur retrait du JCPOA et le rétablissement de leurs embargos contre l’Iran, restera dans l’Histoire diplomatique pour deux raisons:
1. Son accumulation d’inexactitudes factuelles;
2. Le reniement de sa signature par une grande puissance, pourtant jadis fondatrice de l’Onu (laquelle avait entériné le JCPOA sous forme de résolution du Conseil de sécurité).

Que vaut un engagement international de l’Amérique, s’il peut être déchiré à tout moment, en fonction des changements de locataire à la Maison Blanche ? Opposé au traité de Rome de 1957, Charles de Gaulle, revenu aux affaires en 1958, n’avait-il pas mis un point d’honneur à ce que l’Etat remplisse à l’avance toutes ses obligations découlant du traité européen, car était en jeu le respect de la signature de la France ?

Lors de leur réunion du 15 mai, les trois ministres auront à relever deux défis. Le premier, immédiat, consiste à sauver le JCPOA, afin de prévenir la reprise par l’Iran de ses activités d’enrichissement d’uranium, et sa possible sortie du TNP (Traité de non-prolifération nucléaire de 1968). Ils trouveront, dans cette tâche, le soutien de la Russie et de la Chine, cosignataires avec eux du JCPOA.

Le deuxième défi est encore plus ardu. Les Européens devront trouver une voie pour protéger leurs entreprises des sanctions promises par les Etats-Unis. John Bolton, le nouveau Conseiller à la Sécurité nationale de Donald Trump, a fait savoir qu’il n’hésiterait pas à faire sanctionner les sociétés européennes qui continueraient à investir ou commercer en Iran, dans les secteurs stratégiques définis par Washington. Le 10 mai, Richard Grenell, le nouvel ambassadeur américain à Berlin avait, dans un tweet, publiquement ordonné : « les entreprises allemandes qui font des affaires en Iran, doivent immédiatement se retirer ! » Les Allemands croyaient avoir recouvré leur pleine souveraineté il y a plus d’une génération. Ils s’aperçoivent que ce n’est pas une réalité internationale pour tout le monde…

La Maison Blanche menace de punir des entreprises européennes qui ne font qu’appliquer une résolution du Conseil de sécurité de l’Onu, adoptée unanimement il y a trois ans. On croit rêver !

Que peuvent faire les Européens face à une telle arrogance ? A court terme, ils peuvent activer un règlement du Conseil des Communautés européennes de novembre 1996 – surnommé « Blocking Regulations » -, qui interdit à toute personne physique ou morale européenne de se soumettre à des actes administratifs, législatifs ou judiciaires décidés par une puissance étrangère. Cela rassurera un peu les PME européennes, mais pas les grandes sociétés, qui ont trop d’intérêts en jeu sur le territoire américain. A moyen terme, les Européens peuvent dissuader les Américains de passer à l’acte, en promettant que toute sanction de leur part fera l’objet de représailles de même grandeur. A long terme, les Européens devront se préparer à ne commercer qu’en euros. La BNP a été condamné en 2016 à 9 milliards de dollars d’amende, au prétexte d’avoir utilisé des dollars pour financer le commerce de pays sous embargo américain. La compensation finale s’étant faite sur le territoire américain (au compte de la BNP à New York), il était donc « normal » que le droit américain s’appliquât à l’ensemble de l’opération…

A l’occasion de ce diktat américain inouï, les Européens sauront-ils recouvrer leur indépendance ? C’est l’épreuve de vérité pour le volet politique de l’UE. Si elle se soumet à Trump, elle perdra toute raison d’exister.

Europe, Again Humiliated by Trump, Struggles to Defend Its Interests

By Steven Erlanger, The New York Times

BRUSSELS — It is by now a familiar, humiliating pattern. European leaders cajole, argue and beg, trying to persuade President Trump to change his mind on a vital issue for the trans-Atlantic alliance. Mr. Trump appears to enjoy the show, dangling them, before ultimately choosing not to listen.

Instead, he demands compliance, seemingly bent on providing just the split with powerful and important allies that China, Iran and Russia would like to exploit.

Such is the case with the efforts to preserve the 2015 Iran nuclear pact. Both the French president, Emmanuel Macron, and the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, made the pilgrimage to Washington to urge Mr. Trump not to scrap the agreement. Their failure is very similar to what happened with the Paris climate accord, and to what is happening now with unilateral American sanctions imposed on steel and aluminum imports, and to Mr. Trump’s decision to move the United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.

And with each breach, it becomes clearer that trans-Atlantic relations are in trouble, and that the options are not good for the United States’ closest European allies.

However angry and humiliated, those allies do not seem ready to confront Mr. Trump, wishing to believe that he and his aides can be influenced over time. To some, it is reminiscent of what Samuel Johnson said of second marriages: a triumph of hope over experience.

But there are signs that patience is wearing thin, and that many are searching for solutions as Mr. Trump, in the name of “America First,” creates a vacuum of trans-Atlantic leadership that the Europeans have so far seemed incapable or unwilling to fill.

“The allies are certainly sick of this but don’t seem to have an alternative,” said Jeremy Shapiro, a former career State Department official now at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

“The Europeans are invested down a path of trying to please the president, not out of belief but more hope against hope that they will convince him,” he added. “And they only pursue this at such a level of embarrassment because they don’t have an alternative.”

At least for now. After their statement on Tuesday regretting Mr. Trump’s response and promising to work with Iran to preserve the deal, the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany are to meet on Monday with Iranian officials “to consider the entire situation,” said the French foreign minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian.

Already, Mr. Macron spoke by telephone on Wednesday with his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Rouhani. Afterward the Élysée Palace issued a statement saying that it was “the will of France to continue to enforce the Iran nuclear deal in all its dimensions,” potentially widening a breach with the Trump administration.

“He pointed out the necessity for Iran to do the same,” the statement added.

But the real question for the Europeans, Mr. Shapiro said, “is not if they stick with the deal but will they stand up to the American effort to unravel it and take active measures to protect their companies and banks trading in Iran?” That would be “an extremely confrontational stance,” he said, “and it’s not clear that their companies really want that.”

While some think that they should double down on what has now become a pattern — keep talking to Mr. Trump and his aides, hoping to convince them of the need for trans-Atlantic solidarity — others have had enough.

There are increasing voices for rupture within the European Union. In a reflection of the mood, Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, the bloc’s bureaucracy, said that under Mr. Trump, the United States is turning its back on multilateral relations and friendly cooperation “with a ferocity that can only surprise us.”

He told Belgium’s Flemish regional parliament that Washington “no longer wants to cooperate with other parts in the world,” according to The Associated Press. “At this point, we have to replace the United States, which as an international actor has lost vigor, and because of it, in the long term, influence,” he said.

In Britain, Emily Thornberry, the Labour Party spokeswoman on foreign affairs, said on Tuesday that it was time for Europeans to stop “this long and unnecessary indulgence of Donald Trump.”

A senior adviser to the European Union, Nathalie Tocci, said that the Iran deal was a lost cause, because “Trump and Europe have fundamentally different objectives.”

“We have to stop being wimps,” she added.

On climate and trade, on international law, and on the importance of multilateral institutions like the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, the rift with the Trump administration is real, said Ms. Tocci, director of the Italian Institute of International Relations and a close adviser to the European Union foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini.

“Can’t we defend what our own interests are?” Ms. Tocci asked. “There is something as fundamental at stake here as the trans-Atlantic bond, because Europe can’t exist in a nonmultilateral space,” a world of competing nationalism and protectionism.

“Isn’t it wiser,” she asked, “to temporarily part ways with the Trump administration?” After all, she noted, something similar happened in 2003 over the American-led invasion of Iraq, yet relations were repaired when a new president came along.

Ivo H. Daalder, a former American ambassador to NATO, sees such as break as inevitable. “At some point — after having pushed the Europeans on NATO, Paris, the Jerusalem embassy move, trade and now Iran — the Europeans will come to the conclusion that they’re better off going their own way,” he said. “And that point is rapidly approaching.”

But whatever the mutterings in Berlin, London and Paris, European governments currently show no palpable sign that they are ready to make that sort of separation.

The European Union has instead been preoccupied with other dangers — populism, migration, Islamophobia — and the challenge to its values of democracy and rule of law from member states like Hungary and Poland.

On the Iran deal, Britain, France and Germany have already said that they will uphold the terms and will work to keep Iran in the agreement, while trying to protect their companies.

That is likely to include euro-based financing for some companies and efforts at legislation to block secondary sanctions from the United States.

The European Union has a “blocking regulation” dating from 1996, designed as a countermeasure against United States sanctions against Cuba and Iran, and later only Cuba, that seeks to prohibit compliance with foreign-trade restrictions. But it is rarely used, it would have to be amended to deal with United States sanctions on Iran, and it would not entirely reassure companies that also trade with the United States.

But Mr. Shapiro pointed out that European companies feel too vulnerableto risk American sanctions. “What they might lose in Iran is dwarfed by the American market and the reach of the American banking system,” he said.

The French also say that they will use the time before the sanctions come back into force to seek American exemptions for some of their companies.

Ellie Geranmayeh, an Iran expert with the European Council on Foreign Relations, said Europe was “increasingly irrelevant.”

“From Washington’s perspective, the Europeans seem happy to kick the can down the road, which is effectively hollowing out the deal the Europeans spent 10 years trying to conclude,” she said.

If the Europeans “are not willing or able to put more teeth into talks with Washington,” she said, “we risk becoming irrelevant on the political side, too.”

There are also calmer voices, more resigned to adaptation. “Nobody thinks the trans-Atlantic alliance is over,” said Pierre Vimont, a former French ambassador to Washington.

“But how do we make it work with a U.S. leadership that doesn’t want to play the role of leader?” he asked. “How do we move ahead in a world, not without the U.S., but with an American leadership not willing to play its traditional role?”

The hard part for Europe, Mr. Vimont said, would be saving the partnership with Washington while avoiding “the slow drift toward confrontation between Iran and its neighbors and Washington.”

With Europe pushed by the United States to side with Iran on the nuclear deal and to side with China on the trade deal, he said, “it’s going to be very tricky.”

 

Europe’s Double Opportunity

 
KEMAL DERVIS ,  CAROLINE CONROY, Project Syndicate
Some view the rise of populism – mostly of the right-wing variety – in the EU as a sign that, far from being ready to play a global leadership role, the EU may be disintegrating. But the EU’s situation is much more complicated than the pessimists make it out to be – and not nearly as bleak.WASHINGTON, DC – Europe has a decision to make. It can stand by as nationalism and authoritarianism flourish from the United States (with Donald Trump’s “America First” approach) to China (which is moving from a single-party system to a single-leader regime). Or it can lead a reinvigoration of democratic values and international cooperation, at a time when rapid technology-driven change demands major political, economic, and social reforms.

Some view the rise of populism – mostly of the right-wing variety – in the European Union as a sign that, far from being ready to play a leadership role, the EU may be disintegrating. But the EU’s situation is much more complicated than the pessimists make it out to be – and not nearly as bleak.

Last autumn, the Special Eurobarometer 467 survey showed that 75% of respondents viewed the EU positively. Though a majority of respondents think their children’s lives will be more difficult than theirs own, two-thirds believe that the EU offers hope for Europe’s youth – an increase of six percentage points from 2016.

Young people seem to agree. The share of younger respondents (ages 15-39) who view the EU positively is particularly high. And, despite concerns about the EU’s “democratic deficit,” this cohort seems to appreciate the potential for political participation.

Faith in the EU’s future was buoyed last May by the election of French President Emmanuel Macron. If Macron can secure Germany’s cooperation for his European reform program, the EU’s prospects will be strengthened further.

While last September’s German federal election didn’t produce such a strongly pro-EU result – the far-right Alternative for Germany is now the largest opposition party, having secured nearly 13% of the vote – the main moderate parties still won the day, gaining more than 60% of the vote. Germany’s new coalition government is at least as pro-European as the one that preceded it, and a stronger Europe could be a fitting legacy for Chancellor Angela Merkel.

Italy’s recent election – in which the anti-immigrant League party (with its electoral base in the north) and the left-leaning populist Five Star Movement (whose support is concentrated in the south) together won more than 50% of the vote – is more worrying. Yet, given the antagonism between the two parties, it is likely that a governing coalition that can last will include the pro-European Democratic Party. Ultimately, whatever barriers Italy, with its debt-laden economy, poses to greater EU integration are unlikely to be insurmountable, if France and Germany exercise decisive leadership.

Of course, Brexit will not be easy on Europe. But, overall, Europe no longer appears to be a continent in crisis. Even in Greece, which has restored GDP growth, a majority of respondents now supports the EU.

In this context, the EU may be facing two related opportunities. Internally, it can adopt reforms that boost institutional efficiency and advance integration. Externally, it can stand strongly for international cooperation, human rights, and open society.

Europe must make progress on the first opportunity if it is to seize the second, and that means strengthening the eurozone. On this front, Macron has already offered ambitious proposals: a separate eurozone budget, a eurozone finance minister responsible for it, and a eurozone parliament (composed of members of the European Parliament and national parliamentarians) to hold the finance minister accountable.

Before Germany’s new coalition government was formed, a Franco-German working group was established to consider Macron’s proposals. Now that Merkel’s new administration is in place, we will find out how far Germany is willing to go in supporting greater eurozone cohesion.

In the short run, it seems unlikely that the new government will support Macron’s proposals in their current form. But it may back the completion of the banking union and some mechanism for greater coordination of eurozone economic policies.

In the longer run, some of Macron’s reforms should be possible, especially if the eurozone countries are allowed to move forward without unanimous approval from all 27 EU member countries. Such changes – along with more military and intelligence cooperation – will imbue the European project with a new dynamism, spurring more enthusiasm, not to mention a greater sense of security, among Europe’s citizens.

A more integrated and secure EU would be well positioned to assert itself more effectively on the international stage. With the European Single Market still boasting a larger GDP than China or the US, the EU can act as the third “pole” in a new world order. Its model of economic openness, social cohesion, and strong institutions can provide an alternative to the isolationist and nationalist tendencies that are threatening global cooperation.

And make no mistake: in areas such as trade, climate change, financial-sector regulation, competition policy, and cyber security, international cooperation remains critical. And it will become indispensable as advances in artificial intelligence and biotechnology raise thorny ethical issues that can be addressed effectively only at the international level.

The liberal world order that arose from the ruins of World War II to help prevent future catastrophes is facing its most difficult test yet. We must reaffirm the importance of internationalism, openness, and democracy in this new digital age, while adapting our policies and rules to new realities. Europe, with its unique experience of creating a democratic model of supranational governance, should lead the way. The world – especially its young people – is counting on it.

Another Debt Crisis for Poor Countries?

April 17, 2018
Masood Ahmed, Center for Global Development

When the world’s finance ministers and central bank governors assemble in Washington later this month for their semi-annual IMF meeting, they will no doubt set aside time for yet another discussion of the lingering debt problems in the Eurozone or how impaired bank debt could impact financial stability in China. They would do well to also focus on another looming debt crisis that could hit some of the poorest countries in the world, many of whom are also struggling with problems of conflict and fragility and none of which has the institutional capacity to cope with a major debt crisis without lasting damage to their already-challenged development prospects.

Nearly two decades ago, an unprecedented international effort—the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt initiative—resulted in writing off the unsustainable debt of poor countries to levels that they could manage without compromising their economic and social development. The hope was that a combination of responsible borrowing and lending practices and a more productive use of any new liabilities, all under the watchful eyes of the IMF and World Bank, would prevent a recurrence of excessive debt buildup.

Alas, as a just-released IMF paper points out, the situation has turned out to be much less favorable. Since the financial crisis and the more recent collapse in commodity prices, there has been a sharp buildup of debt by low-income countries, to the point that 40 percent of them (24 out of 60) are now either already in a debt crisis or highly vulnerable to one—twice as many as only five years ago. Moreover, the majority, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa, have fallen into difficulties through relatively recent actions by themselves or their creditors. They include, predictably, commodity exporters like Chad, Congo, and Zambia who have run up debt as they adjusted (or not) to revenue loss from the collapse in oil and metals prices. But they also include a large number of diversified exporters (Ethiopia, Ghana, and the Gambia among others) where the run-up in debt is a reflection of larger-than-planned fiscal deficits, often financing overruns in current spending or, in a few cases, substantial fraud and corruption (the Gambia, Moldova, and Mozambique).

The increased appetite of sovereign borrowers has been facilitated by the willingness of commercial lenders looking for yield in a market awash with liquidity, and by credit from China and other bilateral lenders who are not part of the Paris Club. It is striking that between 2013-16, China’s share of the debt of poor countries increased by more than that held by the Paris Club, the World Bank and all the regional development banks put together.

Nor do traditional donors come out entirely blameless. Concessional funding for low-income countries from the (largely OECD) members of the DAC fell by 20 percent between 2013–16, precisely the period in which their other liabilities increased dramatically. As for the IMF and World Bank, while it may have been wishful thinking to hope they could prevent a recurrence of excessive debt, it was not unreasonable to expect that they would have been more aware as this buildup was taking place and sounded the alarm earlier for the international community. There is also a plausible argument that excessively rigid rules limiting the access of low-income countries to the non-concessional funding windows of the IMF and World Bank left no recourse but to go for more expensive commercial borrowing, with the consequences now visible.

How likely is it that these countries are heading for a debt crisis, and how difficult will it be to resolve one if it happens? The fact that there has been a near doubling in the past five years of the number of countries in debt distress or at high risk is itself not encouraging. And while debt ratios are still below the levels that led to HIPC, the risks are higher because much more of the debt is on commercial terms with higher interest rates, shorter maturities and more unpredictable lender behavior than the traditional multilaterals. More importantly, while the projections for all countries are based on improved policies for the future, the IMF itself acknowledges that this may turn out to be unrealistic. And finally, the debt numbers, worrying as they are, miss out some contingent liabilities that haven’t been recorded or disclosed as transparently as they should have been but which will need to be dealt with in any restructuring or write-off.

The changing composition of creditors also means that we can no longer rely on the traditional arrangements for dealing with low-income country debt problems. The Paris Club is now dwarfed by the six-times-larger holdings of debt by countries outside the Paris Club. Commodity traders have lent money that is collateralized by assets, making the overall resolution process more complicated. And a whole slew of new plurilateral lenders have claims that they believe need to be serviced before others, a position that has yet to be tested.

It is too late to prevent some low-income countries from falling into debt difficulties, but action now can prevent a crisis in many others. The principal responsibility lies with borrowing country governments, but their development partners and donors need to raise the profile of this issue in the conversations they will have in Washington. There is also an urgent need to work with China and other new lenders to create a fit-for-purpose framework for resolving low-income country debt problems when they occur. This is not about persuading these lenders to join the Paris Club but rather about evolution towards a new mechanism that recognizes the much larger role of the new lenders, and demonstrates why it is in their own interest to have such a mechanism for collective action.

Traditional donors also need to look at their allocation of ODA resources, which face the risk of further fragmentation under competing pressures, including for financing the costs in donor countries of hosting refugees. Finally, the assembled policymakers should urge the IMF to prioritize building a complete picture of debt and contingent liabilities as part of its country surveillance and lending programs, and to base its projections for future economic and debt outcomes on more realistic expectations. They should also commission a review to examine the scope for increased access to non-concessional IFI funding for (at least) the more creditworthy low-income borrowers.

It is the poor and vulnerable that pay the heaviest price in a national debt crisis. They have the right to demand action by global financial leaders to make such a crisis less likely.

 

Macron’s internationalism and the new politics

KEMAL DERVIŞ, Project Syndicate

French President Emmanuel Macron initially described his new political movement as being “neither on the right nor on the left,” and now says that it is “on both the right and the left.” But he won’t be able to fudge it indefinitely: sooner or later, he will have to pick a side with which to ally.

WASHINGTON, DC – French President Emmanuel Macron’s state visit to the United States last month was a study in contrasts. Despite the friendly dynamic, Macron’s agenda and rhetoric were almost diametrically opposed to US President Donald Trump’s. But Macron’s leadership is subject to an even more fundamental challenge; how he manages it could point the way forward for liberal-democratic politics.

Addressing the US Congress in English, Macron articulated a staunchly internationalist worldview, calling for stronger international institutions, a recommitment to the rules-based system of international trade, and a general embrace of globalization. With regard to Iran, he reiterated the need to preserve the 2015 nuclear deal, from which Trump has just withdrawn, though he did call for complementary agreements on topics that the existing agreement does not address.

Macron has also signaled that he will pursue a pan-European campaign for the 2019 European Parliament election. As a democrat, he believes that the deepening of the European Union must go hand in hand with the development of a truly European political space.

At a time of much hand-wringing over the decline of liberalism, the future of social democracy, the rise of nationalism, and the backlash against globalization, Macron’s unapologetically internationalist stance is notable. In fact, Macron has taken a leap into the unknown of the West’s “new politics,” a terrain no longer defined entirely by competition between large center-right and center-left parties. But is politics really turning the page on the traditional right-left cleavage?

It would be wrong to describe Macron, who served as a minister in his predecessor François Hollande’s Socialist government, simply as a centrist. Although he has moved toward the center, he did not join one of the small traditional centrist parties, but instead created his own “movement.”

Early on, Macron described that movement – which he called En Marche ! – as “neither on the right nor on the left” – avoiding the term “centrist.” Now, he says it is on “both the right and the left,” signaling his desire to win over traditional center-left and center-right voters.

If the traditional left-right divide is blurring, however, the question is what will replace it. With globalization at the center of political debate in most countries, it may seem that the answer is a division between cosmopolitan and parochial forces.

According to this interpretation, Macron leads France’s pro-globalization (and pro-European) movement, and those who oppose him, on the right or the left, are linked by a shared opposition to economic openness. And, indeed, the far right and the far left are espousing similar economic messages.

Meanwhile, existing center-left and center-right political parties – in France and throughout the West – tend to comprise internationally oriented factions and those who are more suspicious of globalization. If globalization is becoming the main electoral cleavage in Western countries, these two camps, the logic goes, are likely to split and form new political families.

Yet, while I believe there will be some movement in this direction, the traditional left-right cleavage seems unlikely to disappear. Traditional parties will continue to debate issues concerning income distribution, including the progressivity of tax systems and the proper scope and aims of social policy. The globalization “platform” alone will not be robust enough to define a large political party.

This means that in the coming years, Macron will have to align himself more closely with either the center-right or the center-left. The particular circumstances that enabled his electoral victory in 2017 – a discredited center-left, and a center-right candidate disqualified by scandal – will not reproduce themselves. He will have to become an internationalist left-leaning leader or an internationalist right-leaning one.

Only one of those appears to be a tenable option. The traditional policies of the center-right would not easily be compatible with a strong internationalist bent. If globalization, in its various dimensions, is to be backed by a popular majority, it will have to be accompanied by modernized social policies that provide effective help to those who need it. At a time of  continuous economic disruption, this will be all the more important.

Economic openness demands social solidarity. That does not means protecting specific jobs from trade competition or technological innovation. It means assisting people to adapt to continuous change, by providing all citizens with the necessary resources, such as education, accessible health care, and transitional support. In short, a popular pro-globalization stance must be accompanied by a new social contract – backed by public resources – that appeals to a large majority. Otherwise, the siren song of neo-nationalism will be difficult to resist.

While completing the necessary tax and labor-market reforms on which he has embarked, Macron will need to address this challenge. In the current political paradigm shift, those who favor openness will outshine nationalist unilateralism only by adopting as their primary objective a modernized approach to social solidarity.

 

 

Back Is the North Atlantic partnership in danger?

16 May 2018

Prince Michael of Liechtenstein, GIS

Geographically, Europe is a peninsula on the northwestern end of the Afro-Eurasian continent, on the eastern shore of the North Atlantic. The United States, on the other side of the easily navigable ocean, can be considered – as former U.S. President Ronald Reagan once pointed out during a speech in Germany – a European power. Indeed, the U.S. has provided a protective shield over Europe since the end of World War II.

While the Soviet threat remained in place, Europe, and especially Germany, was highly appreciative of the U.S. However, the relationship began to deteriorate in the late 1960s, enhanced by Soviet disinformation and supported by protest movements of the so-called “1968 Generation” and the Vietnam War.

Since then, Europe’s relations with the U.S. have become increasingly schizophrenic: Europe still needs American protection, but is trying to build increasingly important relationships with Russia and China. This, however – due to lack of military power – is insufficient to balance Europe’s position as a North Atlantic and Eurasian region.

To keep good relationships, Europe needs both sides. However, in instances of tensions between the Atlantic partners, the European public and politicians have – especially over the past 20 years – taken a very one-sided course, looking for faults only on the American side.

European schizophrenia
This has been especially striking in the relationship with U.S. presidents. In Europe, President George W. Bush was considered a danger, while President Barack Obama was well-liked. Now, Donald Trump is considered a major threat to world peace. However, if one ignores some of his rude behavior, one can find sound policies and people in his administration who consider Europe’s protection a top priority.

There is a European schizophrenia in the admiration of President Obama’s policies and the claim that Presidents Bush and Trump hurt the transatlantic relationship. Both the Bush and Trump administrations considered Europe an important issue, while Mr. Obama’s pivot to Asia had a distinctively different orientation. Europe was clearly a less significant concern.

President Trump’s decision to withdraw the U.S. from the Iran nuclear agreement has again caused strain in the relationship. Some claim the move is a major threat to the international framework and stability. According to the European mantra, there is one culprit: Donald Trump. On the surface this might appear correct, but if we dive a little deeper, the story looks somewhat different.

Iran’s politics, as well as its military and paramilitary activities, including the support of terrorism, is destabilizing the entire Middle East. Tehran intends to become the dominant regional power and advances that agenda with all means, it supports civil wars and threatens Israel’s very existence. Moreover, it poses an existential danger to Saudi Arabia, doing its utmost to control Syria and Yemen. Its support of terrorist organization Hezbollah weakens Lebanon, strengthens its own access to the Mediterranean and makes possible direct attacks on Israel. All of this also presents significant challenges for Turkey.

The Iran nuclear agreement, which was reached between Iran, the five permanent members of the Security Council (the U.S., Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China) plus Germany, did not include any of the neighboring countries. It contained no provision that protected Iran’s Middle Eastern neighbors from its subversive and terrorist agitation. The agreement was a priority for President Obama, and the administration was in a rush to conclude it, but the Europeans could have pointed out this problem.

The European leaders in the UK, Germany and France are now appalled that the new administration withdrew, considering the deal damaging and incomplete. French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel both visited Washington in April, begging President Trump to maintain the agreement. President Macron tried to use French “grandeur” and youthful charm, while Chancellor Merkel tried the German attitude of “Bedenken” (compunction). Both in vain. Does that mean that Washington made the wrong move, and the White House is at fault? Not necessarily.

Since the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign it had been well-known that Mr. Trump considered the agreement deficient and that he wanted a replacement. Once he was elected, London, Paris and Berlin had ample time to try to renegotiate with the other partners of the agreement. This was neglected, and President Trump’s move cannot be a surprise.

The consequences of the withdrawal are still unknown. But now the paradox is that the UK, France and Germany are seeking the support of Russia and China in counterbalancing the U.S. This situation was only triggered by Washington’s decision, but widely caused by European negligence. The losers in all of this are certainly the countries of the Middle East, but also, and especially, the Western alliance.

Les défis du voyage de Macron en Russie

Publié le 21/05/2018

Renaud Girard, Le Figaro

Même si elles sont anciennes, les relations entre grandes nations ont besoin d’être nourries de rencontres régulières au sommet. C’est le sens du voyage d’Emmanuel Macron à Saint-Pétersbourg les 24 et 25 mai prochains, qui répond à la visite de Vladimir Poutine du 29 mai 2017 à Versailles, laquelle célébrait 300 ans de relations diplomatiques entre la France et la Russie. Les deux présidents vont pouvoir renforcer le « Dialogue de Trianon », qui lance des ponts culturels et universitaires entre les deux nations. Mais améliorer les relations politiques et économiques sera beaucoup plus difficile, tant sont nombreux les obstacles obstruant la voie d’un rapprochement franco-russe.

Stratégiquement, l’objectif à long terme des Français devrait être clair : garder les Russes en Europe, ne pas les précipiter vers l’Asie, afin de constituer un bloc capable de parler d’égal à égal avec les Chinois, dont les tendances hégémoniques ne cessent de s’affirmer. La Chine vient de montrer doublement sa puissance. Le 18 mai 2018, elle a fait atterrir des avions H-6K (bombardiers à long rayon d’action) sur un îlot des Paracels, qu’elle a accaparé en mer de Chine méridionale, et où elle a construit un aérodrome militaire. De là, ses bombardiers stratégiques peuvent désormais atteindre le Nord de l’Australie ou l’île américaine de Guam. Deuxième signe de l’omnipotence chinoise, les Etats-Unis ont annoncé le 20 mai qu’ils suspendaient leurs mesures tarifaires punitives à l’égard de Pékin, confiants que les Chinois allaient augmenter leurs importations américaines – au détriment des Européens, cela va sans dire.

A long terme, la Chine inquiète les Russes, propriétaires d’une Sibérie quasi dépeuplée. Mais, à court et moyen terme, ils apprécient cette amie forte et fiable – si différente de l’Europe -, qui montre cohésion et indépendance, qui est leur premier partenaire commercial, qui ne leur fait pas la morale, et qui ne leur inflige pas de sanctions.

Trois sujets politiques principaux sont au menu du sommet Macron-Poutine : l’Ukraine, l’Iran et la Syrie.

Au Donbass, Moscou a accepté le principe d’un déploiement de Casques bleus de l’Onu, sur la ligne de cessez-le-feu séparant l’armée ukrainienne des séparatistes pro-russes. Berlin et Paris ont salué le geste. Mais les Russes ne vont pas permettre aux Casques bleus de se déployer sur la frontière russo-ukrainienne, tant que l’Ukraine n’aura pas voté une loi donnant une pleine autonomie culturelle et linguistique à la région du Donbass, assortie d’une amnistie générale pour les combattants séparatistes. Or, à Kiev, théâtre actuel d’une surenchère nationaliste, il n’y aura aucune initiative politique avant l’élection présidentielle de mars 2019. Mais si le Kremlin faisait un geste concret allant vers le rétablissement de la souveraineté de Kiev sur le Donbass, les Français pourraient encourager, dès juillet 2018, une suspension des sanctions de l’Union européenne contre la Russie.

Les Russes ne supportent pas l’idée d’une entrée de l’Ukraine dans l’Otan. Pourquoi l’Allemagne et la France n’inscriraient-elles pas dans le marbre leur veto d’avril 2008 d’une adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’Otan ? Pourquoi ce pays ne deviendrait-il pas neutre militairement, à l’instar de l’Autriche ? Le sommet Macron-Poutine ne débloquera pas la situation en Ukraine. Mais rien n’empêche les deux présidents de préparer l’avenir !

Sur le dossier iranien, Russes et Français s’accorderont sur la nécessité de maintenir l’accord nucléaire du 14 juillet 2015, dont les Américains se sont retirés unilatéralement. A court terme, les grandes sociétés françaises obéiront au diktat américain, car leurs échanges avec les Etats-Unis sont incomparablement supérieurs avec ceux qu’elles ont avec l’Iran. Mais Macron pourra aussi exposer à Poutine l’idée des Européens de faire financer le commerce avec l’Iran, en euros, par la BEI (Banque européenne d’investissement), institution à l’abri des représailles américaines.

C’est sur le dossier syrien que le président français aura avec son homologue russe la position la plus difficile. Depuis qu’elle a fermé son ambassade à Damas en mars 2012, la France a disparu du jeu. Elle n’a comme allié sur place que les Kurdes du Rojava (bande nord de la Syrie), courageux adversaires de Daesh. Or l’Amérique a déjà abandonné ces progressistes à l’armée turque dans le canton d’Afrine, au nord-ouest de la Syrie. Respectée par tous les Etats, la Russie est devenue la puissance pivotale du Moyen-Orient. Les Israéliens viennent de lui demander de prévenir une guerre avec les Iraniens en Syrie. Recevant Bachar al-Assad à Sotchi le 17 mai 2018, Poutine a donc prôné un prompt départ de « toutes les troupes étrangères » de Syrie.

Au Congrès de Vienne, Talleyrand avait déjà noté qu’on pouvait être le meilleur négociateur du monde, les rapports de force sur le terrain finissaient toujours pas se rappeler à vous. . .

Allies at Cross-Purposes: Trump Puts Europe Into Damage-Control Mode

May 15, 2018

By Steven Erlanger, The New York Times

BRUSSELS — After a series of decisions by President Trump that have split the trans-Atlantic alliance, European foreign ministers have begun a scramble to contain the fallout to their own interests, global institutions and stability in the Middle East.

But even the initial steps of Europe’s effort to devise a separate strategyand save the nuclear accord with Iran showed that the allies might now be working at cross-purposes with the United States, further straining years of international consensus.

That was demonstrated on Tuesday, as European foreign ministers met in Brussels with their Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, to try to preserve the deal that constrained Iran’s nuclear program. Mr. Trump pulled out of the deal last week, calling it a “disaster.”

The Europeans — as well as the cosignatories Russia and China — want Iran to continue to abide by the deal, which is considered a signal accomplishment of European diplomacy. It sharply restricts Tehran’s ability to enrich uranium to prevent the development of a nuclear weapon.

To preserve the deal, the Europeans are trying to figure out ways to provide some of the economic benefits it promised Iran, which are threatened now with the renewal of tough American sanctions.

Their efforts come against the backdrop of Gazans being shot in large numbers in demonstrations tied to Israel’s 70th birthday and Mr. Trump’s decision to move the United States Embassy to Jerusalem — another move made in the face of European opposition.

The European response to the bloodshed in Gaza has been to criticize Israel for what Ireland’s foreign minister, Simon Coveney, called a “disproportionate use of force” against mostly unarmed protesters. The European Union’s foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, called on Israel to show “utmost restraint to avoid further loss of life.”

The Europeans have also emphasized their disagreement over the embassy move.

In contrast to the full-throated support of Israel from the United States, the foreign minister of France, Jean-Yves Le Drian, restated his country’s position that the embassy move “contravenes international law and in particular the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.”

Ms. Mogherini said Europeans would continue “to respect the international consensus on Jerusalem” and not move their embassies until the city’s final status was resolved in a peace treaty.

Ian Bond, foreign policy analyst with the Center for European Reform, argued that “Europeans and Atlanticist Americans must preserve what they can of the trans-Atlantic partnership” while Mr. Trump is in office.

“But he is doing a lot of damage in the meantime — not just hurting allies, but actively helping potential adversaries,” he said, pointing to the Iran deal pullout, the Jerusalem embassy and unilateral tariffs on steel that harm Europe.

Nathalie Tocci, the director of Italy’s Institute of International Affairs and a senior adviser to Ms. Mogherini, said that Europe’s foreign and defense policy “has become more difficult now, not least because of the Trump administration efforts to undercut the E.U.”

She warned that “if Europeans are serious about their strategic autonomy, now is the time to demonstrate it by standing united behind their shared interests.” And she said saving the Iran deal “is the place to start.”

Indeed it was. In their meetings with Mr. Zarif, the foreign ministers were preparing for broader discussions among European leaders Wednesday night at a meeting in Bulgaria, which was supposed to center on outreach to the six nations of the Western Balkans.

Ms. Mogherini said that the three European countries that helped negotiate the Iran deal would stay with it as long as Iran did. “We will save it together,” she said.

Mr. Zarif said that the talks had gone well, and that “we are on the right path to move forward” and had agreed on “the importance of full implementation of the nuclear deal.” Further talks with the Europeans, he said, will “continue in the next two weeks.”

On Tuesday night, after the meeting, Ms. Mogherini said that the foreign ministers had agreed to begin work, to “find solutions in the next few weeks,” on issues like Iran’s energy sales, banking transactions, export credits and investment, and protections for European companies working in Iran.

But preserving or increasing European investment in Iran in the face of the American sanctions is a difficult challenge — especially since the White House has made clear to Europeans that their companies will not get exemptions from the sanctions, which Washington hopes will pressure Iran into a new set of negotiations.

It was an irony that escaped few European officials: They were trying to find ways to ease the economic pressure on Iran and keep it in the nuclear deal, while Washington was trying to increase that pressure for unclear ends.

Many Europeans, like Ms. Tocci, believe that the unstated American aim is “regime change” in Iran, something that the British and French foreign ministers, Boris Johnson and Mr. Le Drian, have specifically ruled out as a European goal.

These same foreign ministers once spent weeks trying to toughen sanctions on Iran over its ballistic missile program and its support for groups like Hamas and Hezbollah to please Mr. Trump and get him to agree to stay in the nuclear accord. Now they have dropped all such attempts. Instead, they were working to keep Iran in the deal at all and find ways to compensate Tehran for doing so.

While Mr. Trump’s national security adviser, John R. Bolton, has said that the American intention is to force Iran into new, broader negotiations, European officials said they had heard no American strategy for doing that.

European diplomats, speaking on background because they did not have authorization to talk otherwise, said on Tuesday that they felt no great urgency, which was just as well, given the difficulty of the task. They had the impression, they said, that Iran wants to remain in the deal so long as the government can show benefits to the population, and of course to avoid a more open confrontation with Washington.

The Europeans will try to uphold their side of the bargain, one senior European diplomat said, but it will be very difficult to preserve the economic benefits for Iran.

For all the talk about so-called blocking regulations to protect European companies from American sanctions and the possible use of the European Investment Bank to provide euro-based financing for deals with Iran, there was little optimism that these solutions would work very well.

Many European companies that have invested in Iran — or might want to — also do business in the United States, a much more important market, and are unlikely to want to test the American sanctions.

Nor do the Europeans want competition with the United States, which is still Europe’s most important ally and partner, to tip into confrontation, as Ms. Mogherini has said. That is especially important for Britain, which is leaving the European Union and wants Washington’s support.

As the Europeans met with Mr. Zarif, elsewhere in Brussels the American chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., was meeting with NATO allies to discuss Afghanistan and European security.

For all Mr. Trump’s criticism and even misunderstanding of NATO, and his admiration for President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia — who opened the first bridge on Monday between Russia and Crimea, which he annexed from Ukraine — the United States has beefed up its military commitment to NATO and its members bordering Russia.

While NATO had no role in the Iran deal, the three European nations trying to preserve it are also Washington’s most powerful allies in NATO.

But Europeans, in general, feel that the fundamentals of the trans-Atlantic partnership are all under threat from Washington. That can only help countries like Russia and China, which seek to undermine the current world order.

On Friday, speaking to a Roman Catholic conference in Münster, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany said that with his decision on Iran, Mr. Trump had thrown the global order into “real crisis.”

She said: “If we always step away from multilateral agreements as soon as we don’t like something about them, that would be a bad message for the world. We want to strengthen multilateralism.”

It is less clear what she and other Europeans are willing to do about it.

Thomas Gibbons-Neff contributed reporting.