TBILISI, Georgia — It was a rare instance of a senior Chinese official speaking with unusual candor: On July 2, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told European Union top diplomat Kaja Kallas that he does not want to see Russia lose the war in Ukraine.

The remark was first reported by the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, and later picked up by CNN and other outlets. Wang reportedly expressed concern that if Russia were defeated, the U.S. would shift its full attention to China.

Russia is China’s only major-power partner in countering Washington. Beijing cannot afford a weakened Russia if it hopes to replace the U.S.-led global order with one centered on itself.

Compared with China, Russia possesses greater capabilities to undermine democratic societies and inflame internal divisions through sabotage, espionage and information warfare — tactics it has employed consistently since the Soviet Union’s founding following the Russian Revolution in the 1920s.

« Russia’s capacity for covert operations has remained robust since the breakup of the Soviet Union and continues to pose a serious threat, even to American society, » a U.S. intelligence source said.

China, by contrast, has poured resources into advanced technology, creating the world’s most sophisticated digital surveillance state and is now one of the top exporters of such systems.

When Russia’s covert operations are paired with China’s digital surveillance power, the threat to democracy is significantly amplified. The situation in Georgia serves as a case in point.

In 2008, the former Soviet republic was invaded by Russia, which still occupies about 20% of its territory. While roughly 80% of the Georgian population supports joining the EU, the ruling Georgian Dream party has grown increasingly anti-Western and is aligning more closely with Russia, driven in part by Moscow’s growing political penetration of the country, which it has achieved through financial influence, intimidation and disinformation.

According to some Georgian lawmakers and former senior officials, the Kremlin is deepening its influence over senior leadership through its association with billionaire former prime minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, a dominant figure in the nation’s political landscape. Concurrently, it is orchestrating widespread information operations aimed at stoking anti-Western sentiment.

Meanwhile, China’s presence is quietly expanding. When I visited the Georgian capital of Tbilisi in late June, the city looked noticeably different from my trip nine months earlier — surveillance cameras had been installed in many prominent locations. They were especially visible near the parliament and along major streets. Surveillance cameras have increased rapidly since last fall, with over 2,000 already installed in Tbilisi, according to one report.

Local political analysts and other experts point to China as a key driver behind the sharp increase in surveillance cameras. In late December, Chinese Ambassador to Georgia Zhou Qian met with then-Deputy Prime Minister and Internal Affairs Minister Vakhtang Gomelauri and agreed to deepen cooperation between their law enforcement and police agencies. In effect, this suggests that China is assisting Georgian authorities in suppressing anti-government activities.

A survey by the Georgian nongovernmental organization Civic IDEA found that the government spent 2 million lari ($740,000) last year to procure Chinese surveillance cameras, more than 13 times the amount spent the previous year. Between 70% and 80% of the cameras installed by government entities are Chinese-made, a recent news report indicates.

The pro-Russian Georgian Dream party claimed victory in last October’s parliamentary elections, despite widespread allegations of electoral fraud. Opposition parties have rejected the results, and citizens have responded with sporadic protests.

Security personnel initially used batons and tear gas as their main tools to suppress protests and rallies, but with the introduction of the Chinese surveillance system, they have also begun adopting Beijing’s methods for cracking down on dissidents.

This year, security authorities have stepped up their use of surveillance camera footage to identify protesters and intimidate them on an individual basis, according to local experts and lawmakers. One protest participant was reportedly fined 5,000 lari — more than twice the average monthly wage, based on the newly enacted law.

« Repression by the authorities has been intensifying, » said Anna Dolidze, founder and chairwoman of the opposition party For the People. « Opposition leaders have been arrested one after another.

« If this continues, Georgia will become a Russian satellite state, like Belarus. »

The extent to which China and Russia are coordinating over Georgia remains unclear. However, both pursue a similar strategy: weakening democracy by expanding their influence in geopolitically significant regions such as Central and Eastern Europe, former Soviet republics and key Global South countries.

At their summit on May 8, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed their commitment to work more closely to reshape the U.S.-led global order. This has sparked fears that as Chinese surveillance systems proliferate globally, they may be combined with Russia’s covert networks, further reinforcing authoritarian regimes.

In fact, the National Endowment for Democracy, a U.S. nonprofit organization, reported in February that more than 80 countries have adopted Chinese surveillance systems powered by artificial intelligence.

Despite warming ties, deep distrust persists between China and Russia, which fought a border war in the late 1960s. As the gap in national power continues to widen, Moscow is likely to become increasingly wary of Beijing. Even so, the example of Georgia shows that their coordinated efforts to undermine democracy should not be underestimated.

Trump’s Iran strikes: Masterstroke or political Kabuki?
Middle East turmoil could help China expand its influence in Indo-Pacific

ISTANBUL — In a high-stakes, high-risk operation that sent shockwaves around the globe, U.S. President Donald Trump ordered airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities on June 21 — then swiftly pivoted to broker a ceasefire between Israel and Tehran.

Trump hailed the bombing as a strategic triumph, claiming everything went exactly as planned. But skepticism lingers among experts and policymakers, questioning whether the attack truly curtailed Iran’s nuclear ambitions or simply hit pause.

While Trump insists the strikes set back Iran’s nuclear program by several years, the International Atomic Energy Agency has indicated that uranium enrichment could resume within months.

Like the hero of a Kabuki play taking center stage with flourish, Trump touted his handling of Iran as a resounding success, asserting he had followed the « script » to perfection. He cast the operation as proof that decisive military action could achieve what he calls « peace through strength. »

It is plausible that had he not intervened when he did, Iran might have enriched uranium to near weapons-grade levels. Limiting the airstrikes to a single sortie — and thus avoiding all-out war or the collapse of the Iranian regime — was arguably a prudent decision. However, the ultimate judgment of Trump’s actions will largely hinge on whether Iran genuinely abandons its nuclear ambitions in the months ahead.

During the tense period between the U.S. bombing and the ceasefire, I happened to be in Turkey. As a NATO member bordering Iran and viewing it as a key threat, Turkey has been monitoring the situation with both vigilance and calculated distance. Its perspective offers a valuable reference point for countries seeking to assess the unfolding developments.

In conversations with security experts and former officials in Turkey, many welcomed the U.S. airstrikes for directly delaying Iran’s nuclear progress.

« The risks of regional escalation, surging oil prices and refugee flows have so far been averted, » said Sinan Ulgen, director of the Istanbul think tank EDAM. « If Iran’s nuclear development is hindered and it will be forced to return to the negotiation table because of U.S. strikes, this is a positive outcome for Turkey. »

However, when it comes to the long-term outlook, many within Turkey’s diplomatic and security circles express deep concern. Their apprehensions center on three key areas.

First, a widely held assessment is that while the airstrikes damaged Iran’s nuclear facilities, they may not have fully eliminated its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. If that proves true, some experts warn that rather than abandoning its nuclear program, Tehran may instead accelerate its efforts to develop nuclear weapons as a means of safeguarding the regime.

« I seriously question what was achieved by the airstrikes, » said Selim Yenel, former Turkish ambassador to the European Union and now chairman of the Global Relations Forum, a Turkish think tank. « The Iranian regime still remains intact, and the nuclear material has likely been moved to a secure location.

« All Trump did was flaunt a superficial show of force — in reality, it’s easy to attack from afar. »

Even Ulgen, while crediting the airstrikes with delaying Iran’s nuclear program, expressed concern that the effort to achieve denuclearization may ultimately fall short.

« If Iran’s nuclear facilities have not been destroyed and Iran instead accelerates its nuclear development, another strike could be carried out, » he said. « However, President Trump tends to avoid war and prefers outcomes achieved through negotiation, so it is uncertain whether he would authorize another attack. »

Second, while the airstrikes sent a strong message to countries hostile to the U.S., they also risk fueling nuclear proliferation. Several Turkish security experts predict that nations like North Korea will become even more determined to maintain their nuclear arsenals as a deterrent against potential U.S. attacks. If Iran continues its nuclear development, nearby countries such as Saudi Arabia may be tempted to pursue their own nuclear capabilities in response.

Third, there is concern that the « deception tactics » Trump employed against Iran could backfire. Although he publicly announced on June 19 that he would decide within « two weeks » whether to order airstrikes, he abruptly launched the attack just two days later.

While deception has long been a part of warfare, it is most effective when used sparingly. Trump’s reputation for frequently shifting his diplomatic policy adds unpredictability, which can be both an asset and a liability. The recent airstrikes may have reinforced international skepticism about the credibility of his statements and the extent to which his words can be taken at face value.

« It seems likely that Trump’s remarks and promises have led many countries to view him with deep skepticism, » said a professor at Ozyegin University in Istanbul. « Even if he attempts to pressure or engage in dealmaking with countries like North Korea, Russia or China, they may not take his approach seriously — potentially diminishing the U.S’s diplomatic influence. »

Such concerns are echoed, to varying degrees, among U.S. allies in Asia, including Japan. In many Asian countries, there is keen interest not only in whether Iran’s denuclearization will succeed but also in how U.S. military involvement in the Middle East will develop.

What most worries Japanese security officials is the possibility that the trajectory the U.S. followed after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks could repeat itself. At the time, then-President George W. Bush had begun to view a rising China as a strategic competitor. However, just as his administration was preparing to take its first comprehensive steps to counter Beijing, the attacks occurred, abruptly redirecting America’s focus to the Middle East.

What followed were two protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. For more than a decade, U.S. foreign policy was dominated by counterterrorism, while its long-term strategy toward China was relegated to the back burner. It was not until former President Barack Obama’s second term, in the mid-2010s, that Washington fully recognized the risks of this approach. Alarmed by China’s militarization of the South China Sea, the U.S. began implementing measures to curb Beijing’s strategic ambitions.

That said, Trump has shown no intention of committing ground forces to a Middle Eastern war, and today’s circumstances differ significantly from those of the Bush era. Still, it remains uncertain whether the U.S. can quickly scale back its military involvement in the region. In its effort to fully dismantle Tehran’s nuclear program, Israel may once again escalate its attacks on Iran.

If the current Iranian regime were to collapse, widespread turmoil across the Middle East would be almost inevitable. In such a scenario, could the Trump administration truly remain on the sidelines?

A senior Japanese official raised concerns about how the crisis could affect the Indo-Pacific balance of power.

« Provided the U.S. refrains from committing ground forces to the Middle East, the risk of overextending its military resources remains relatively low, » the official said. « However, if instability spreads across the region, there is a real risk that Trump will be unable to devote sufficient attention to China in matters of foreign and security policy, potentially allowing Beijing to expand its geopolitical influence in the Indo-Pacific. »

In Kabuki theater, masterful performances captivate audiences precisely because every gesture is meticulously choreographed and the outcome is known in advance. But diplomacy and security management are not Kabuki. In these arenas, results matter far more than performance. Trump may boast that he acted brilliantly in carrying out the dramatic airstrikes on Iran — but unlike a Kabuki play, there is no script to guarantee the outcome.

SINGAPORE — Few now dispute that the U.S. and China have entered a new cold war. The pressing question is whether these two superpowers, locked in an escalating rivalry, can manage their competition and prevent tensions from spiraling out of control.

Recent developments have only heightened these concerns. China is increasingly working to challenge the U.S.-led international order and establish a parallel system more closely aligned with its own interests.

This troubling trend became evident at this year’s Asia Security Summit, known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, held in Singapore through June 1. Hosted annually by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think tank focused on security policy, the conference brings together defense ministers and senior military officials from the U.S., Europe and Asia.

Since 2019, China has consistently sent its defense minister to this high-profile forum, except in 2020 and 2021 when the event was canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Beijing aims to use the platform to achieve two key objectives: to articulate its stance on contentious issues such as Taiwan and the South China Sea, and to soften its image as a regional and global threat.

Successive U.S. defense chiefs have attended the forum, often using the opportunity to hold sideline talks with their Chinese counterparts. In this way, the Shangri-La Dialogue has served as a fragile but crucial conduit between the military leaderships of two increasingly adversarial nations.

This year, however, marked a dramatic shift: China did not send its defense minister — or even a top-ranking uniformed official. Instead, it was represented by Rear Adm. Hu Gangfeng, vice president of the People’s Liberation Army National Defense University.

In effect, Hu lacks the authority to speak on behalf of the Chinese military as a whole, rendering China’s presence largely symbolic. In previous years, Chinese delegations engaged with the media, but such interactions were markedly limited this time.

According to sources close to the organizers, a program slot was left open until the final moment in the hope that China’s defense minister would attend. Beijing’s decision to forgo participation in the dialogue raised eyebrows and quickly became a dominant topic of conversation during coffee breaks and meals throughout the summit.

In response to inquiries about the downgraded delegation, Hu stated that China sends representatives of varying ranks depending on the year, describing this year’s participation as part of « normal » arrangements. However, Western participants offered a different interpretation, with analyses generally falling into two main camps.

One explanation points to China’s complex domestic political landscape. Under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, a sweeping anti-corruption campaign has unsettled the military establishment, leading to the downfall of several senior officers.

He Weidong — the second-highest-ranking uniformed officer and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission — has not made a public appearance in nearly three months, and his whereabouts remains unknown. In November, Miao Hua, then head of the commission’s Political Work Department, was suspended and placed under investigation for « serious violations of discipline. »

Both officials are reportedly under scrutiny for corruption. In this climate, many observers believe that China’s top military leadership is in no position to take part in major international forums.

The other interpretation emphasizes external factors. The tariff war launched by the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has sparked global backlash and diminished America’s international standing. From this perspective, Beijing may have calculated that China can afford to forgo Western-led forums without risking diplomatic isolation.

Both explanations are certainly relevant, but the latter may offer a more accurate reading of the situation, especially given that Xi’s military purges are not a recent development.

One notable development reinforces this interpretation: China has moved to establish the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed) in Hong Kong, an international body focused on dispute resolution and clearly positioned as a rival to existing global conflict-settlement mechanisms.

In a pointed symbolic move, the signing ceremony for the organization’s founding was held in Hong Kong on May 30 — the opening day of the Shangri-La Dialogue. The event was attended by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, a member of the Communist Party’s Politburo, along with representatives from numerous countries. Thirty-two countries, largely from emerging and developing regions, signed the convention that established the organization.

In a broader perspective, the establishment of the IOMed signals a new phase in China’s diplomatic strategy as a major power on the world stage. Until around the 2010s, China sought to expand its global influence by increasing funding and personnel contributions to United Nations institutions. In a strategy often likened to a hermit crab occupying an empty shell, Beijing attempted to embed itself within the existing international system dominated by the U.S. and its European allies.

Over the same period, however, China began shifting to a second phase: constructing its own parallel economic architecture. This included high-profile initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, a vast infrastructure and development program, and the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

Now, with the launch of the IOMed, China appears to be entering a third phase — one focused on establishing its own international institutions not only in the economic sphere but also in the political and diplomatic realms.

China already engages in regional cooperation through frameworks such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. However, the establishment of the new mediation body represents a shift of different dimension — it positions China not just as a participant, but as a leader in international conflict resolution, signaling a far greater level of ambition.

If China’s initiative genuinely contributes to reducing global conflicts, it should not be dismissed outright. Yet serious questions remain about the country’s fitness to lead international mediation.

Established institutions such as the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration already serve as forums for resolving inter-state disputes. In 2016, the latter issued a landmark ruling rejecting China’s sweeping territorial claims in the South China Sea. Beijing, however, dismissed the verdict as « nothing but a scrap of paper » and has refused to comply.

Doubts also remain about the suitability of Hong Kong as the headquarters for the IOMed, an institution that must be perceived as impartial to be effective. The « one country, two systems » framework, which once promised autonomy for the territory, has been steadily eroded. Beijing’s tightening control over Hong Kong only deepens skepticism regarding the city’s ability to serve as a neutral and independent host for an international organization.

« A multipolar world order is already a reality, » said a member of the Chinese delegation to the Shangri-La Dialogue. « The power gap between the U.S. and China is narrowing, and China is poised to play an increasingly prominent role on the global stage. »

In his debut speech at the forum in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth underscored Washington’s resolve to counter what he described as the « real » security threat posed by China in the Indo-Pacific. He emphasized the U.S. commitment to deterring any aggression against its allies and partners in Asia. « But if deterrence fails, and if called upon by my commander in chief, we are prepared to do what the Department of Defense does best — fight and win — decisively, » he said.

As the contest over the global order intensifies, the risk of economic and military confrontation becoming irreconcilable grows. In 1940, Japan — seeking to challenge the Anglo-American-led international order — put forward the concept of the « Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. » One year later, in December 1941, it launched a war.

If China’s efforts to build a parallel world order continue to accelerate, global polarization will deepen — and so too will the cold war between the U.S. and China. With that, the risk of a hot war could intensify.

TALLINN, Estonia — Europe is undergoing its most dramatic security realignment since the end of the Cold War, a shift with far-reaching implications for the continent and beyond. At the heart of this transformation is a growing determination to strengthen its own defense capabilities while reducing reliance on the U.S. military.

The impetus for this pivot is twofold: the immediate threat posed by an increasingly belligerent Russia, and growing unease over the unpredictability of U.S. military support under President Donald Trump. But this is not solely Europe’s concern. Asia, despite its geographic distance, cannot afford to see these developments as completely irrelevant.

Estonia, a Baltic nation bordering Russia, stands at the forefront of Europe’s rapidly evolving security landscape. When I returned in mid-May after a year away, the country was in a state of heightened, quasi-war tensions, fueled by Moscow’s relentless assault on Ukraine.

On May 13, the day before my arrival, an unflagged tanker — suspected of being part of the so-called shadow fleet, a secretive network of ships transporting Russian oil around the world — appeared off Estonia’s coast. When the Estonian Navy attempted to inspect the vessel, a Russian fighter jet entered Estonian airspace in what appeared to be an effort to disrupt the operation, the first such intervention by Russia.

Russian cyberattacks and acts of sabotage targeting Estonia’s critical infrastructure have also intensified. In response, NATO conducted a large-scale military exercise in May, code-named Hedgehog, simulating an invasion of Estonia, a member of the alliance.

At Amari Air Base in northern Estonia, the roar of British helicopters and Portuguese F-16s filled the skies as they carried out combat drills.

« In my mind, Europe is already [at] war. … We have to end living in a dream, » Major Gen. Andrus Merilo, commander of the Estonian Defence Forces replied when I asked about Russia’s threat.

« Currently the battlefield is in Ukraine, but [the] war will not end in Ukraine. … [Russia’s] aim is to restore the dominance in the region, including Estonia.

« We would like to live in peace. But unfortunately, peace is temporarily over. Now, it’s in our hands to start not only managing escalation but also building whatever [capabilities] we can to control this [situation]. »

Amid rising tensions, ministers, military leaders and policy experts from the U.S., Europe and beyond gathered in Tallinn, Estonia’s capital, from May 16 to 18 for the Lennart Meri Conference, an annual forum on international security and foreign policy.

This year’s gathering differed markedly from previous ones, both in tone and substance. The debates were more urgent, more pointed and more detailed, focusing on Europe’s accelerating shift away from an excessive reliance on a U.S. security umbrella. At the center of the discussions was a pressing question: What must Europe do to build credible defense capabilities? From defense spending and force readiness to the resilience of the arms industry, participants engaged in impassioned exchanges of views.

Europe’s increased sense of vulnerability was most evident in the debate over the continent’s reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Some participants openly questioned whether the U.S. would continue to extend its nuclear deterrent to Europe, prompting discussion over the extent to which France’s nuclear arsenal could serve as a viable alternative.

In addition to the growing threat posed by Russia, urgency was heightened by Trump’s rhetoric and policies, which have raised doubts about the reliability of U.S. commitments to its allies. The Trump administration is now actively weighing a reduction in U.S. troop deployments in Europe.

« It’s more than 30 years of U.S. desire [to reduce troops in Europe], President Trump just said, enough, this is going to happen and it’s going to happen now, this is going to be orderly, but we are not going to have any more patience for foot dragging in this situation, » U.S. Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker said at the conference.

Whitaker indicated that formal negotiations with Europe regarding U.S. troop reductions might commence later this year. While the details remain uncertain, one conclusion was clear: Europe must urgently prepare for a future less reliant on American protection.

The question is how feasible such autonomy truly is. Judging by defense spending alone, Europe’s resolve appears genuine: 22 of NATO’s 30 European members seem to have met the goal of spending 2% of gross domestic product on defense by 2024. Yet the path forward is fraught with challenges, not least because Europe lacks a unified security vision. Perceptions of the Russian threat vary widely, shaped largely by each member state’s geographic proximity to Russia.

According to European security officials, NATO Europe can be broadly divided into three camps. The first mostly consists of northern European countries that view the Russian threat with utmost seriousness — among them the Nordic nations, the Baltic states, the U.K. and Poland.

The second group comprises southern European countries such as Spain, Portugal and Italy. While they acknowledge the threat posed by Russia, their more immediate concerns center on refugees arriving from Africa and other pressing regional issues.

The third group occupies a middle ground, with Germany as a typical example. According to a German ambassador stationed in Europe, Berlin is primarily focused on preventing a war with Russia — a priority that diverges somewhat from the more hardline stance of the Baltic states, among the alliance’s most vocal critics of Moscow.

Ultimately, the future of European defense will likely be shaped by a coalition of willing nations.

« There are differences in position within NATO, making it difficult for all members to act in unison, » said Michael Clarke, an expert on European security and a former director-general of the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based defense think tank. « For example, in the case of the conflict with Russia, it is likely that about a dozen northern European countries, including the U.K., would form a coalition of the willing with NATO’s endorsement and act together. »

Across the Atlantic, Washington now regards China as its foremost threat, while concerns over North Korea continue to intensify. But it would be misguided for countries like Japan and South Korea to assume that Asia will be spared from potential U.S. troop reductions.

Within the Trump administration — particularly among proponents of the « America First » or MAGA (Make America Great Again) policy, such as Vice President JD Vance — there is a belief that responsibility for addressing threats posed by China and North Korea should fall primarily on those most directly affected: Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.

According to U.S. media reports, proposals have already emerged to cut U.S. troop levels in South Korea by around 4,500 personnel, with plans to redeploy them elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. military footprint in Japan may not remain untouched either.

But a former senior U.S. Defense Department official familiar with internal Trump administration deliberations said opinions within the government remain far from unified regarding the future scale of U.S. forces in Asia. While some MAGA-aligned officials question the need to maintain current troop levels, others, particularly within the Pentagon, State Department and military, argue for reinforcing the U.S. presence to better deter China’s growing assertiveness.

The most dangerous near-term scenario would be the simultaneous escalation of crises in Europe and Asia, triggering a scramble for America’s finite military resources. Preventing such a development will require close coordination and strategic alignment among U.S. allies on both sides of the globe.

The need for transatlantic and Indo-Pacific cooperation has never been more urgent.

TOKYO — In poker, players who believe they hold a strong hand usually stay quiet and play on, aiming to raise the stakes and extract more money from their opponents.

But U.S. President Donald Trump, who often touts his dealmaking prowess and casts himself as a poker expert, has been acting in ways that defy this logic. His impatience for a quick tariff deal with China is a prime example.

On the surface, the deal announced on Monday appears to be a balanced compromise. In reality, it marks a significant climbdown for Trump, involving sharp reductions to previously imposed tariffs. As part of a 90-day truce, both countries agreed to roll back their respective rates by 115 percentage points: The U.S. will cut duties on Chinese imports from 145% to 30%, while China will reduce tariffs on American goods from 125% to 10%.

Trump had long vowed to exert unparalleled pressure on Beijing to dismantle what he called an « unfair » trade regime. Yet he pulled back his most potent card, even though China offered no written commitment to structural reforms. In poker terms, Trump tipped his weak hand.

He might have had little choice, given the mounting headwinds he faces. According to the polling average compiled by U.S. media company RealClearPolitics, his approval rating stood at just 46% at the 100-day mark of his presidency. Over the nearly half-century, he is the only U.S. president to have fallen below the 50% threshold so early in office. While support among Republican voters remains solid, independents are beginning to drift away.

A major source of the turbulence is his underperforming economic agenda. In early April, Trump announced a sweeping set of « reciprocal » tariffs targeting multiple countries. But the move spooked financial markets, prompting the administration to backtrack 13 hours later by offering a 90-day grace period. Key electronic goods, including smartphones, were also temporarily exempted from the tariffs.

In a separate episode, Trump called for the resignation of Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, frustrated by the Fed’s resistance to lowering interest rates as aggressively as he wanted. But facing a sharp decline in stock prices, Trump ultimately backed down from the demand.

In light of these developments, some policymakers in Europe and Japan have begun to express cautious optimism. The weakening economic sentiment in the U.S., combined with sharp price declines and other warning signs from financial markets, might have heightened Trump’s awareness of the risks associated with a prolonged tariff war. Looking ahead, they hope he will be compelled to gradually moderate both his rhetoric and his actions.

The latest U.S.-China tariff agreement is likely to reinforce optimism that Trump may be shifting toward a more pragmatic approach.

However, the belief that mounting political and economic pressure will temper Trump’s combative style could be misguided. His overriding priority remains rallying his core supporters — fervent backers of his « America First » agenda — and securing a decisive victory in next year’s midterm elections.

If he is forced to scale back his signature tariff offensive, he is likely to double down on his hardline stance in other areas. With the stakes high in the midterm elections, alienating his loyal base is a risk he is unwilling to take.

The central question is whether the U.S. can extract enough concessions from China during the next 90 days of negotiations for Trump to claim a « victory. » But the road ahead is anything but smooth. While the tariff war is certain to take a toll on China’s economy, President Xi Jinping and his administration appear confident that the country is better positioned to endure the pain.

Unlike Trump, Xi faces no electoral pressures, and in China, the government, central bank and state-owned enterprises all operate in lockstep with his directives.

« If the situation remains unchanged, Chinese-made household goods, clothing and toys will start to disappear from U.S. store shelves, fueling consumer frustration, » said a Chinese political analyst familiar with Beijing’s U.S. strategy, speaking before the latest U.S.-China tariff deal was announced. « While the tariff war is undoubtedly challenging for China, it poses greater political risks for Trump.

« The Chinese government believes it holds the upper hand in this game of chicken. »

If a compromise is reached and a full-blown tariff war is averted, it would be a welcome development for the global economy. However, such an outcome is unlikely to soften Trump’s confrontational stance. Should he conclude that the China tariffs have failed to achieve his objectives, it becomes more likely that he will escalate bold and potentially disruptive policies in other areas, domestic and international, to keep his base energized.

At home, Trump is already ramping up pressure on groups and institutions he views as ideological adversaries. A notable example is his targeting of elite universities like Harvard and Columbia, which he considers liberal strongholds. Citing what he calls their failure to adequately address « antisemitic activity » on campus, Trump has taken steps to revoke federal research grants and other funding.

In foreign policy, Trump is expected to intensify his pursuit of high-profile achievements. If successful, these efforts could benefit the broader international community. However, if they fail, his impatience and erratic policymaking may become even more pronounced.

Trump’s top diplomatic priority is brokering a ceasefire in Ukraine, but progress remains stalled due to the wide gulf between Russia and Ukraine. If negotiations fail to yield concrete results, he may opt to publicly criticize both sides and withdraw from the mediation process. Such a move could result in the suspension of U.S. military aid to Ukraine, further destabilizing an already volatile situation.

If Trump abandons his ceasefire efforts, he is likely to shift his focus to other high-stakes issues — most notably, the Iran nuclear talks or the North Korea situation. He may attempt to pressure Tehran into dismantling or halting its nuclear program, and if no concessions are made, he could escalate military threats.

People tend to believe in the outcomes they desire. However, assuming that a desperate Trump will soften his position is a risky bet. A wiser strategy would be to brace for the possibility that, when cornered, he may take unpredictable — and potentially destabilizing — actions.