Trump’s Iran strikes: Masterstroke or political Kabuki?

Trump’s Iran strikes: Masterstroke or political Kabuki?
Middle East turmoil could help China expand its influence in Indo-Pacific

ISTANBUL — In a high-stakes, high-risk operation that sent shockwaves around the globe, U.S. President Donald Trump ordered airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities on June 21 — then swiftly pivoted to broker a ceasefire between Israel and Tehran.

Trump hailed the bombing as a strategic triumph, claiming everything went exactly as planned. But skepticism lingers among experts and policymakers, questioning whether the attack truly curtailed Iran’s nuclear ambitions or simply hit pause.

While Trump insists the strikes set back Iran’s nuclear program by several years, the International Atomic Energy Agency has indicated that uranium enrichment could resume within months.

Like the hero of a Kabuki play taking center stage with flourish, Trump touted his handling of Iran as a resounding success, asserting he had followed the « script » to perfection. He cast the operation as proof that decisive military action could achieve what he calls « peace through strength. »

It is plausible that had he not intervened when he did, Iran might have enriched uranium to near weapons-grade levels. Limiting the airstrikes to a single sortie — and thus avoiding all-out war or the collapse of the Iranian regime — was arguably a prudent decision. However, the ultimate judgment of Trump’s actions will largely hinge on whether Iran genuinely abandons its nuclear ambitions in the months ahead.

During the tense period between the U.S. bombing and the ceasefire, I happened to be in Turkey. As a NATO member bordering Iran and viewing it as a key threat, Turkey has been monitoring the situation with both vigilance and calculated distance. Its perspective offers a valuable reference point for countries seeking to assess the unfolding developments.

In conversations with security experts and former officials in Turkey, many welcomed the U.S. airstrikes for directly delaying Iran’s nuclear progress.

« The risks of regional escalation, surging oil prices and refugee flows have so far been averted, » said Sinan Ulgen, director of the Istanbul think tank EDAM. « If Iran’s nuclear development is hindered and it will be forced to return to the negotiation table because of U.S. strikes, this is a positive outcome for Turkey. »

However, when it comes to the long-term outlook, many within Turkey’s diplomatic and security circles express deep concern. Their apprehensions center on three key areas.

First, a widely held assessment is that while the airstrikes damaged Iran’s nuclear facilities, they may not have fully eliminated its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. If that proves true, some experts warn that rather than abandoning its nuclear program, Tehran may instead accelerate its efforts to develop nuclear weapons as a means of safeguarding the regime.

« I seriously question what was achieved by the airstrikes, » said Selim Yenel, former Turkish ambassador to the European Union and now chairman of the Global Relations Forum, a Turkish think tank. « The Iranian regime still remains intact, and the nuclear material has likely been moved to a secure location.

« All Trump did was flaunt a superficial show of force — in reality, it’s easy to attack from afar. »

Even Ulgen, while crediting the airstrikes with delaying Iran’s nuclear program, expressed concern that the effort to achieve denuclearization may ultimately fall short.

« If Iran’s nuclear facilities have not been destroyed and Iran instead accelerates its nuclear development, another strike could be carried out, » he said. « However, President Trump tends to avoid war and prefers outcomes achieved through negotiation, so it is uncertain whether he would authorize another attack. »

Second, while the airstrikes sent a strong message to countries hostile to the U.S., they also risk fueling nuclear proliferation. Several Turkish security experts predict that nations like North Korea will become even more determined to maintain their nuclear arsenals as a deterrent against potential U.S. attacks. If Iran continues its nuclear development, nearby countries such as Saudi Arabia may be tempted to pursue their own nuclear capabilities in response.

Third, there is concern that the « deception tactics » Trump employed against Iran could backfire. Although he publicly announced on June 19 that he would decide within « two weeks » whether to order airstrikes, he abruptly launched the attack just two days later.

While deception has long been a part of warfare, it is most effective when used sparingly. Trump’s reputation for frequently shifting his diplomatic policy adds unpredictability, which can be both an asset and a liability. The recent airstrikes may have reinforced international skepticism about the credibility of his statements and the extent to which his words can be taken at face value.

« It seems likely that Trump’s remarks and promises have led many countries to view him with deep skepticism, » said a professor at Ozyegin University in Istanbul. « Even if he attempts to pressure or engage in dealmaking with countries like North Korea, Russia or China, they may not take his approach seriously — potentially diminishing the U.S’s diplomatic influence. »

Such concerns are echoed, to varying degrees, among U.S. allies in Asia, including Japan. In many Asian countries, there is keen interest not only in whether Iran’s denuclearization will succeed but also in how U.S. military involvement in the Middle East will develop.

What most worries Japanese security officials is the possibility that the trajectory the U.S. followed after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks could repeat itself. At the time, then-President George W. Bush had begun to view a rising China as a strategic competitor. However, just as his administration was preparing to take its first comprehensive steps to counter Beijing, the attacks occurred, abruptly redirecting America’s focus to the Middle East.

What followed were two protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. For more than a decade, U.S. foreign policy was dominated by counterterrorism, while its long-term strategy toward China was relegated to the back burner. It was not until former President Barack Obama’s second term, in the mid-2010s, that Washington fully recognized the risks of this approach. Alarmed by China’s militarization of the South China Sea, the U.S. began implementing measures to curb Beijing’s strategic ambitions.

That said, Trump has shown no intention of committing ground forces to a Middle Eastern war, and today’s circumstances differ significantly from those of the Bush era. Still, it remains uncertain whether the U.S. can quickly scale back its military involvement in the region. In its effort to fully dismantle Tehran’s nuclear program, Israel may once again escalate its attacks on Iran.

If the current Iranian regime were to collapse, widespread turmoil across the Middle East would be almost inevitable. In such a scenario, could the Trump administration truly remain on the sidelines?

A senior Japanese official raised concerns about how the crisis could affect the Indo-Pacific balance of power.

« Provided the U.S. refrains from committing ground forces to the Middle East, the risk of overextending its military resources remains relatively low, » the official said. « However, if instability spreads across the region, there is a real risk that Trump will be unable to devote sufficient attention to China in matters of foreign and security policy, potentially allowing Beijing to expand its geopolitical influence in the Indo-Pacific. »

In Kabuki theater, masterful performances captivate audiences precisely because every gesture is meticulously choreographed and the outcome is known in advance. But diplomacy and security management are not Kabuki. In these arenas, results matter far more than performance. Trump may boast that he acted brilliantly in carrying out the dramatic airstrikes on Iran — but unlike a Kabuki play, there is no script to guarantee the outcome.