Category: Themes

Opening Session

Thierry de Montbrial, President and founder of the WPC
Park Geun-Hye, President of the Republic of Korea

Session I. The Organisation of Security in East Asia and Europe

In Asia, the major development has been the rise of China, which caused all players in the region to reposition themselves, in particular with respect to the United States, while the wounds inflicted by History remain unhealed. Unlike Europe, East Asia did not inherit any security-related structures from the past. In Europe, however, those that exist could be destroyed by the Ukrainian crisis, nearly forty years after the Helsinki Conference. How can the potentially-disastrous developments of the day be countered in order to maintain peace on the Eurasian continent?

Session II. The Outlook for the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia

This session will pick up where the previous one left off, focusing on Northeast Asia and the future of the Korean peninsula. In particular, we will endeavour to review the reunification scenarios and diplomatic initiatives, especially those put forth by Korea, likely to facilitate them.

Session III. Inequalities and Globalisation

The rampant rise of inequalities has stirred lively discussion across all continents and provides fodder to all those opposed to globalisation and, more broadly speaking, capitalism. During this session, we will aim to lay out the problem and identify the governance measures most appropriate and attainable in this area. The session will give pride of place to the institutional points of view (OECD and IMF).

Session IV. Conversation with Prince Turki Al Faisal of Saudi Arabia

Session V. Africa in a Global Setting

Africa is one of the recurring themes of WPC events. While the continent’s development prospects remain considerable, it is important not to underestimate the difficulties with which it is grappling, including epidemics and, in some States, terrorism. Emphasis this year will be placed on relations between Africa and Asia.

Session VI. Geopolitics and Geo-economics in Eurasia

Questions around Eurasia have attracted a great deal of attention over the past quarter-century. However, there is no single definition as to what the term implies. The Eurasian continent can be described in geographic terms as one extending from the European coastline in the west to the Eastern fronts of Russia and China in the East. However, this is by no means what Russia has in mind when it refers to an Eurasian Union. The latter’s purely geopolitical view can be likened to the Monroe Doctrine. Meanwhile, Korea has taken a rather geo-economic perspective, looking first and foremost to the construction or reconstruction of lines or groupings with trade purposes. The aim of this session will be to clarify the intentions underpinning each project.

Session VII. Trade and Policy

Commercial affairs, in the broad sense of the term, have always been a central part of international relations and always interfered with security issues. In our day and age, as a result of globalization, economic exchanges have gone largely beyond commercial exchanges (services, capital flows, direct investments, etc.) and form a more and more tightly-meshed network. The objective of this session will be to: consider the economic and political implications of today’s waning multi-lateralism alongside the mushrooming of often-competing bilateral agreements; take stock of the major negotiations underway, such as the TTIP and TPP; and also to address the problem of economic arms (sanctions) in international relations.

Session VIII. The Middle East in a Global Setting

Since the last WPC in Monaco, the situation has consistently deteriorated in the Middle East, with the unexpected emergence of the “Islamic State”. The aim of this session will be to: explain this strategic surprise; analyse the behaviour of the main players, both outside the region (including the United States, the European Union and Russia) and inside (Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Israel); take stock of the nuclear negotiations underway with Iran; and last but not least, exchange views on what lies ahead. One particular painful aspect of this dramatic situation, the future of the Christian minorities, should be discussed.

Session IX. The Economic and Political Consequences of the Big Data Revolution

The Big Data revolution is turning each and every business model on end. Where industrial organisation is concerned, it holds a risk that industrial companies (in the broadest sense of the term, in other words, including for instance insurance companies or, more generally speaking, service companies) are fated to be dependent on a Big Brother like Google. From the political standpoint, one of the main issues has to do with the relations between Big Brothers and Nations themselves, first and foremost, the United States. The question of Big Data necessarily calls for the issue of State industrial policies to be reframed. In particular, are we headed for a duopoly between China and the United States in these areas?

Session X. Conversation about the Role of China-US Relations in the World Order

Session XI. Open Discussion

As has become traditional at this annual event, the final plenary session will be dedicated to open discussion about the latest news and topics discussed during the conference.

1. The United States: what does the world expect from the “indispensable nation” ?

The “unipolar moment” of post-Cold War came to a close but, for the predicable future, the United States still remains the power of reference. On the eve of a presidential elections and after a strong erosion of the soft power of the United States, what should the world expect from the “indispensable nation”? Is the United States ready to reassess its role positively, taking into account the other powers and multilateral organizations in a world becoming multipolar?

2. Russia : domestic developments and external policies

Russia is “back”, in particular because the rising price of hydrocarbons stimulates its economic growth and increases its international leverage. How to stabilize this growth which is excessively reliant on raw materials? Will Russia’s new “cards” determine a new capacity of proposal, and a new approach over spaces involving its strategic interests? What should the world expect from Russia – and through which policies? Conversely, what should Moscow expect from its partners?

3. China: domestic developments and assertion of power

What effects will the economic emergence of China, whether it continues or stops, have on the economies of the area and those of the world at large? More broadly, should the redefinition of equilibrium, on a regional and world scale, be based on China’s assertion of its global power? How can Chinese strategy be made compatible with those of other regional or global actors?

4. Japan: what power, what strategies?

Because of its economy and its military and technological force – and especially because it stands as “a nuclear threshold” country – Japan is a major power, insufficiently considered as such. Tokyo is now readjusting its international surface to the evolution of its society, and the ongoing mutation of regional power struggles, crucially affected mainly by the emergence of China. How must we assess the place of Japan within Asia, whose internal structure and world weight are undergoing a rapid change? Beyond Asia, what does Japan want, and what does the world hope for Japan?

5. India: regional power and/or world actor?

The shape of tomorrow’s multipolarity in great part depends on the structure and modalities of the growth of India. Will India want and manage to play both the cards of economic emergence and those of political power? India will have to redefine its regional relations (China, Pakistan…), and at a more global level, to say what role it intends to play in world affairs and in the elaboration of common rules.

6. Sub-Saharan Africa: implosion or takeoff?

Africa may be viewed both as the continent of hope (economic takeoff in some countries, regional organization, progress of democracy) and as threatened of implosion (crisis of the States, strong inequalities of development, increasing number of domestic conflicts, etc.). What methods could best contribute to develop the cards of the African countries? And what is, what could be the role of outside actors?

7. Is Europe with 27 and more members sustainable?

A European Union with nearly thirty members is inevitably more heterogeneous. The EU will remain, and further expand, but around what projects? Will it have to relinquish the goal of achieving political power? Should the EU become an actor in the new multipolar world? In what sense? Over what geographical areas and foreign policies will this Union be able to be influential?

8. Israel/Palestine, a crucial international issue: what commitments for external actors?

Most international actors agree that the coexistence of both states could bring a solution to the conflict. The urgency of the situation demands putting out of the way opponents to this idea. Is the perpetuation of the status quo not carrying the most dangerous risks? What part, – in ways yet to be defined – can important global or regional actors (first and foremost the United States, but also the Arab states, Russia, EU, UN, NATO…) concretely take to solve this issue?

9. An arc of crisis from Iraq to Pakistan

The Iraqi disaster could lead to the activation of a “Shia arc” and/or to the break-up of the country, the further deterioration of the relations between Western powers and Teheran, internal instability in Pakistan, no clear way out of the war in Afghanistan. All these elements turn the region into a particularly alarming arc of crisis. What internal stabilisation means at political societies level, what regional means of equilibrium can be used? Which actors could help negotiating ways out of the crisis?

10. Which governance for which stability?

The “multilateralism” developed during and after the cold war showed both its merits (arms control and disarmament, NPT, role of UN and the regional security institutions, International Penal Tribunal…) and its limits (crisis management, proliferation…). After a period of systematic “dismantling” of multilateralism, and while new powers emerge, how to conciliate “multipolarity” and “multilateralism”? Which institutions, which procedures are necessary to get towards an organized multipolar world?

11. The economy of knowledge, or education, still deserves an effort

The “economy of knowledge” constitutes a major challenge for the economies on the whole, whether emergent or developed. Few countries have been successful in that matter. Governments encounter many difficulties to achieve their ambition. In Europe, the Lisbon strategy is a failure. How to organize more effectively the efforts in favour of education? Where to focus the effort? Which initiatives to take so that innovation can create new growth opportunities? How to facilitate the adhesion of the social strata to these changes?

12. Credit crisis, financial crisis, economic crisis: what to do?

The current crisis appears to be more serious than those of the last 20 years. Why? Which lesson to draw from the errors done? Did we show an excessive zeal in deregulating? Which initiatives to take to avoid the repetition of this, presumably in new fashion, in the future? What new rules for the financial planet?

13. Regulation of migrations, a world issue

The human migrations South to North, South to South, or within developed countries constitute an important aspect of globalization, badly apprehended and badly controlled. The question is too complex (development issues, internal stability of “exporting” societies, “importing” societies or transit issue…) to be dealt with only at national, or only at international level. A management mode combining domestic and foreign policies, and taking cues from all states, North and South, remains to be invented.

14. Energy and climate: what diplomatic challenges?

Energy has always been an international key stake. This is a question which has reached new dimensions primarily because of the explosion of demand. If the scarcity of resources comes from lack of investments, how to stimulate them? It is necessary to put nuclear power back on the agenda? How to make national interests compatible? In addition, climatic change has become everywhere in the world a declared priority of foreign policy. Which proposals to make in order to create after Bali the “carbon governance” that the planet needs? Will Europe be able, and at what price, to exercise the leadership which it believes it obtained from the agreement of Kyoto?

15. Is the Gulf becoming an arc of hope?

Caught between a spectacular economic development partly based on the rising price of hydrocarbons and the growth of geopolitical and geo-economic risks mainly resulting from its geographic position, the Arabian Gulf Peninsula is at a crossroad. Will it move towards the geography of hope of Asia, with the dream of its many city States of becoming “new Singapore” or will it drift into the geography of tension of the Greater Middle-East?

16. Global food crisis

I. Political Governance

Globalization has multiplied political units that play a role in the international system and have a capacity to affect it more or less seriously. How to ensure coexistence among these political units? How to make their conflicts manageable in peaceful ways, compatible with the system’s global stability? Two decades after the end of the Cold War, the progressive emergence of a new multipolar world, heterogeneous and global, first suggests the need to evaluate the pertinence of existing institutions at the global and regional levels. What assessment can be given of the mutations of the United Nations and what reforms are needed in order to overcome current blockages – including the blockage of reform itself? How efficient are regional security systems today – systems from which we expected so much in the 1990s – or regional defense groupings? European examples (OSCE, Atlantic Alliance, European Union etc.) as well as African ones (reform of the UA, initiatives for sub-regional groupings) and Asian ones (ASEAN, attempts to build new security forums) all provide the first series of lessons in this respect.

In parallel to the institutions, with their triple functions as forums, norms producers and crisis regulators, other processes play an important role for the resolution of today’s central problems: in particular, weapons proliferation and disarmament. The North Korean and Iranian crises – following the Iraki or Libyan examples – visibly confront non-proliferation measures, be they institutional or not (Non Proliferation Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency, Proliferation Security Initiative). Similarly, the resumption, after a long hiatus, of disarmament negotiations between Washington and Moscow does not resolve the problem: what role will nuclear arms play tomorrow in the global equilibrium? On what vision of the world will a new NPT have to be based? And what processes must be established to deal effectively with other types of arms (conventional weapons in general, or low caliber murderous ones)?
Beyond the institutions and the processes which must be reinforced or developed, one must also integrate the tools inherited from thinking and experimentation these last few decades. This brings to mind confidence-building measures which are now present universally, whose establishment and development are essential, in particular when it comes to preventive conflict management. As for the methods of crisis management, with the help of strategic cultures and the experience of all the actors who have gotten to know them over the last 20 years, they constitute a promising field for the study of and cooperation between states.

Together, these institutional, political, conceptual approaches will have to combine in a global governance of the international system to organize peaceful yet competitive coexistence to which the society of states aspires.

The topic will be covered during two sessions:

1. Architecture of Political Governance
2. Security

II. Economic and Financial Governance

The economic and financial crisis has dashed hopes for a tranquil form of globalization that would peacefully promote the expansion of free-markets and democracy. In the face of this crisis, and out of necessity, governments are the first responders. States have made a massive comeback. In a world in which several forms of capitalism seem to be competing, Western values and interests are called into question. Today, globalization appears much more fragile than it was once thought to be. And yet, there is no viable alternative: the failure of globalization would be the worst of all scenarios. The challenges which the world economy must overcome are tremendous: the rise of unemployment, financial uncertainty, a dearth of resources – all of this makes the future unclear, puts the decisions that companies must make into a more uncertain and riskier context and jeopardizes development projects.

Today, the world economy requires a comprehensive form of regulation. In the face of these challenges, the governance of the international system has aged. We are inheriting institutions that reflect the realities of the period that followed World War II, decolonization and the Cold War. They are poorly adapted to a world now marked by the emergence of new powers. The meeting of Heads of State in the G20 format is a hopeful initiative. By tackling financial regulation, it has taken only the first step. It is the next series of steps that we must now imagine and put into practice.

• • Has globalization reached its peak?
• • What are the appropriate budgetary and monetary policies? Do we need a more active international cooperation?
• • What is the appropriate exit strategy and how to put it into practice?
• • How far should we push the harmonization of new financial regulations?
• • How to ensure a better adjustment between savings and investment on a global scale? How to ensure the harmonious evolution of balances of payments?
• • What initiatives could more powerfully push back nationalist and protectionist temptations and stimulate international trade?
• • What could be the consequences of calling into question the anglo-saxon financial capitalism system?
• • What political consequences could derive from economic and social strains? How to confront the risks of economic nationalism?
• • Taking the G20 initiatives further, is there a need for new forms of world governance in the economic and financial domain?

These issues will be discussed during 3 sessions:

1. Macro-economic Governance: the efficiency of budgetary policies, non-conventional monetary policies; exit strategies, world trade, economic nationalism; the future of poor countries, movement of capital and exchange rates; international monetary system, governance (G20, IMF etc.)
2. Economic and Financial Regulations: banking supervision, the infrastructure of globalization (accounting standards, rating agencies…); a new business model for banks; remittances, governance (G20, Financial Stability Board etc.)
3. The future of capitalism: the recasting of the anglo-saxon model; the diversity of models; the creation and distribution of wealth; shareholders and stakeholders; challenges to the middle class; risk aversion and seeking protection; “Animal Spirits” and the intervention of the State; what kind of international cooperation for this new phase of globalization?

III. International Law

For some, the notion of governance has nothing to do with international law, and even with law more generally. It refers to the process of articulation and decision-making among different instances, of different statutes, which cooperate so as to resolve problems of common concern. The G 7, G 8 or G 20 forums, which have been constituted empirically but regularly, partly satisfy this demand. But this remains above all a desire and a need, more than it does a reality. What role could international law play in this context? It would have to satisfy the double dimension of governance. In its regulatory dimension, governance creates norms of sustainable behavior, so as to ensure the security of relations among actors, their mutual trust, the predictability of their behavior, the efficiency of established prescriptions. In it decisional dimension, it must allow to adapt rapidly to change, to react to crises or urgent situations by casting aside ordinary rules, or even modifying them in light of a new durable context.

International law as an instrument of governance’s double dimension 

International law governs societies based on a plurality of actors: States. Each one conducts its own policies but they share common interests. Their relations are theoretically not based on a hierarchical structure, but on a horizontal contractual logic, and their interests adjust through negotiation. Their common wish is to preserve their dominant status as legitimate and efficient actors of international regulation, but also as principal actors faced with international crises and situations which call for quick and coherent decisions. In this context, international law offers a number of useful techniques.

International law as a regulatory instrument 

In the field of peaceful relations, that of economic and commercial exchanges, the WTO is the last great organizations to have been established after the end of the East-West confrontation. With a light structure and limited power, but with strong ambitions, the WTO rests upon two pillars, adaptation and adjustment – adaptation through agreements which progressively open markets ; and adjustment by resolving the various trade disputes among states, as they pertain to these agreements. How to emerge from the current gridlock ? What lessons should be drawn from the original techniques of conflict resolution for other aspects of international relations?

International law as a mechanism of crisis management

The UN Security Council, which is the principal instance and tool of international crisis management, sanctions juridical inequality among state, resting upon the privileged position of the permanent members. It can take decisions that are binding for all, and make use of constraints. It must respond to crisis situations in a timely manner. It is in keeping with the decisional dimension of governance, since it can cast aside ordinary rules and substitute exceptional measures. It has demonstrated a great ability to adapt in the face of major crises in the last decades, but is often criticized for creating inequality among States though a composition which many deem archaic, and even recused by the United States, which are reluctant to accept the constraints that it seeks to imply. This instrument is not always made sufficient use of. How to reinforce it, adapt it and enhance its efficiency? Would reforming it not bring on its demise?

Legal techniques for global governance

The principles and techniques of international law are indispensable for a balanced and efficient system of global governance.

The absolute primacy of States in international society, their sovereignty and their equality are based on principles of rationality, stability and equilibrium which are indispensable for effective governance. What role for non-State actors? Classical multilateralism calls for a combination of universal participation and an allocation of tasks based on the relative power of states. Lacking an organizing project, it is unable to define a common interest which would transcend the specific requests from the members of a deeply heterogeneous international society. How to contribute to the revival of multilateralism, which is a key of global governance? As for institutional unilateralism, it does not limit itself to the Security Council. It can manifest itself in response to urgent situations and also in response to the need for universal norms, notably in the domain of public health. How to make it more legitimate and effective?

Soft law, or concerted instruments which are not conventional and not legally binding but respected when they are well-balanced and carry mutual trust, is a flexible technique which is well-suited for governance. On the other hand, what role for international jurisdictions which have multiplied over the last several decades, in the political and non judicial process of governance? Can they efficiently handle crises or urgent situations? Can they serve as mainstream regulatory instruments?

IV. Migrations

International cross-border migration is a global challenge to which all States are confronted. In the last 15 years, migration has expanded to reach all regions of the planet. Across the globe, the population of migrants has increased dramatically. The impact of remittances on the economies of migrants’ countries of origin is considerable. Departure points and regions of emigration have also become hubs of transit and arrival. Cross-border migrations have transformed international relations. At the same time, this is a politically loaded topic with much media coverage, which can cloud the assessment of the true issues at stake.

Today, states find themselves in a difficult conundrum. They increasingly consider cross-border migration to be a factor of economic growth and global development; yet they put into place restrictive policies, which have actually proven to be less effective than predicted. In this context, the idea of a world governance for migration has progressively taken hold. It was a matter of reconciling the policy objectives of “Northern” countries, the interests at play on the international marketplace, the development of “Southern” countries and the respect of the rights and security of migrants. Today, does a consensus exist on the diagnosis of the limits of national migratory policies? Would a form of world governance in the area of migration make sense? And if it does, what can the objectives be, and the common means to achieve it? What can be the role of non-state actors, and in particular of companies?

This raises several challenges: how to adapt the national sovereignty of States to the global phenomenon of cross-border migration? A global governance of migration will not be possible without States. Nevertheless, what can be the appropriate institutional and political means to regulate migration? Another decisive question: what is the impact of migrations on North / South relations? Can cross-border migration pave the way to new, more balanced and symmetrical relations between the countries of departure, transit and arrival? What are the real common issues at stake with respect to migration and development? How to solve the dilemma of the “brain drain”? How to foresee the future, and notably the anticipated impact of climate change on migratory flows? Is migration also a global means of regulation for demographic problems in the North as well as in the South? Last challenge: the evolution of national societies in a world of migration. A stronger human mobility should not be accompanied by a rise of xenophobic and racist identities. How to ensure that this is the case?

V. Energy and Climate

The same energy that warms us, lights us and cooks our food is at the center of some of the greatest challenges to mankind. There has never been any question that there is ample clean, reliable energy for every man, woman and child on earth, but many do without. Man’s use of energy has evolved over the millennia, but it is only in the past 150 years that fossil fuels have come to dominate our energy requirements. We extract these fossil fuels from the earth wherever they are found. They are not evenly distributed around the world and create therefore haves and have nots. This has led to competition and aggression between nations and within nations. They are extracted from nature often without due regard for the impact on the global commons or the interests of neighboring populations. Trade in these fuels enriches governments and exporting nations, but depending on the quality of governance in those countries, the wealth generated by fossil fuels can be a source of growth and improving welfare, or it can lead to corruption, autocracy and exclusion. The resource curse has been written about and well studied, but it still ravages many resource rich countries. For the future, which starts now, the burning of vast quantities of fossil fuels is having a discernable negative effect on world climate and will have a catastrophic effect in the next decades if we continue on our present path.

What are the energies of the future and how do we deploy them rapidly enough to forestall insurmountable consequences? What are the carbon trajectories to 2050 for countries in which carbon emissions vary from 44 tons per capita to 0.01 tons per capita? How do we assure that more of the world’s population can have access to clean, reliable, affordable energy? And how do we improve international governance so as to reduce conflicts that take their origin in the uneven distribution of natural energy resources?

The institutions looking for answers to these challenges have not really evolved since the 1960s. They are still basically bimodal, north/south, G-77/Industrialised countries, rich/poor. They still centralize the debates and seek to negotiate consensual outcomes – but anyone can block or bolt. This mode of negotiation hasn’t worked for nearly two decades. What was the last successful multilateral trade negotiation? The Law of the Sea took 14 years and is still not fully ratified. The Energy Charter lacks the US and Russia ratification. The Kyoto Protocol is a stool with two legs.

Foreign Policy editor Moise Naim has suggested replacing multilateralism with minilateralism. Can Kyoto succeed in December in Copenhagen with 180 countries around the table? The same bimodal debates dominate although they are often bimodal for convenience – not conviction. It is defensive multilaterism. Should the debate be moved to or shaped in a smaller forum? There is the G8, the G20 and the Major Economies Forum (MEF) (16 countries). But in all of these, major European states speak with several voices – China and India with one each. Possibly the core of any effective climate change solution is to be found first in a bilateral US/China entente on broad principles – then expanded via the MEF or G20 to the Kyoto Conference of the Parties . Does inclusiveness need to mean paralysis?

The European Community has long practiced subsidiarity. Yet in current multilateralism, countries seek both to establish principles and to identify modalities. This is an overload on heads of state. Once principles are established, implementation and modalities should be split off into subsidiary bodies with the relevant technical competence. Political posturing and defense of the moral high-ground can be kept out of these subsidiary talks.

Climate talks began to take shape in 1988. It is already 20 years later and GHG emissions continue to grow. There remain only 40 years to 2050, a deadline for emissions stabilisation and decline. We cannot afford to lose more time.

VI. Health and the Environment

Health and the environment have gradually imposed themselves as objects of international relations since the 19th century. Epidemics and pollution know no borders, and in their wake human communities find themselves inescapably interdependent. The increasing pace of globalization adds another dimension to this objective interdependence, fostered by the media whose coverage of events puts together and homogenizes the experiences and reactions of different audiences, confronted with a trans-border industrial accident or an influenza epidemic. In the face of this globalization process, political responses to health and environment issues remain partial. New institutions, norms, innovative financing mechanisms have been created, implemented or consolidated at the global level, but taken together, they present the picture of a shapeless global governance network, of a sketchy and uneven texture. How can those emerging forms of governance be improved and empowered to respond to crises and prevent health and environmental risks? Do we need a true formal and centralized governance system – for instance around the WHO, which remains highly decentralized today – or a “World Environment Organization,” which is yet to be created? Or should one rather aim to strengthen the existing fluid framework, which allows for a progressive harmonization of policies through the dissemination of ideas and analyses across different political spheres? And are there other options?

Such questions, relative to the structure of a global governance system, raise other ones, more specific but just as essential. How can we improve the strategic coherence between the many actors of the global health and environmental governance field? How can we consolidate the interest and the mobilization that alone can allow for the pooling of sufficient funding in a period of financial and economic crisis? How can we take care of the less visible, more delicate or more ambitious issues, such as the fight against the pollution of the Global Commons – ocean, space, etc. – the fight against non communicable diseases, the structural reform of health systems? How can we frame the contribution of science to political decision-making, taking into account the uncertainties that come with any form of knowledge? How can we develop equitable processes to allow for a better access to medicine and technological innovation (for example to the technological transfers needed in most developing countries to address climate change)? What balance can and should be established between the protection of trade and economic benefits on one side, and health and the environment, on the other, especially with regards to lessons that could be learned for the management of the new A/H1N1 influenza? How can we ensure that commitments taken by key actors are fulfilled, and how could we palliate to their failures? Should evaluation processes and audits be generalized? Should a health and environmental “responsibility to protect” be adopted? All these questions, some old and some emerging must be addressed to prepare for the future, and for the development of a new global health and environmental governance system or at the very least the refinement of existing options.

VII. Water, Agriculture and Food

Water
Today every human being is entitled to have access to water. There is a universal “quasi-right” to water for all. But, because of exploding and diversifying needs, water, a basic and vital element, traditionally seen as unlimited, is becoming a good in short supply, which must have a price, ruled by economic laws. If one kilo of wheat requires 1000 liters of water, one kilo of meat requires 15000 liters.
Water issues are first of all regional: industrial areas that generate a great deal of pollution, deserts or semi-deserts faced with sudden increases of water consumption (demographic growth, food production, industrialization, urbanization….). Moreover, in many parts of the world (particularly in the case of rivers flowing through several states), the water issue cannot be separated from the main political challenges of the region, affecting questions of peace, security, relations among regional actors. For example, the planning of the Danube river, disputes over the Tigris and Euphrates, the Middle East peace process, the fact that the Nile is shared among ten states, the Sinkiang rivers (Irtysh, Ili)

• • What kinds of regional plans promote more effective water management?
• • Are global rules and institutions needed in this field?

Agriculture and Food
As access to water for all is a universally recognized right, a sufficient and healthy food supply for the whole population belongs to the basic needs which today must be fulfilled by any credible society. Around one billion people suffer from malnutrition (measured as having to live on one dollar or less per day). The so-called new middle classes in emerging countries (In 1990, 1.4 billion people were living on $2-13 per day; this number climbed to 2.6 billion in 2006) remain very dependent on food price fluctuations (in 2008, the striking rise of food prices reminded these people how precarious is their condition).

Food is perceived as a major sign of human inequality, the poor being both underfed and badly fed (huge spread of obesity). More generally, increasingly numerous populations and societies are claiming a balanced diet (a better diet being a way to an improved way of living).
Can food markets be handled like any other market, governed by free and open world competition? Or should agriculture, providing food and survival for human beings, be driven by security priorities, and demanding public intervention (regulations, subsidies, protection)?
Land takes on a role in the global free-for-all. China, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar are buying or renting arable grounds on a huge scale in foreign countries.
Ideally a viable global governance in agriculture and food should set up the following goals:

• • To guarantee that no human being is underfed or badly fed.
• • To promote healthy food in the whole world, being strongly aware of the links between food and public health.
• • To monitor a better use of resources (soil, livestock…) within a global framework of sustainable development.
• • To work out some form of international legal protection for land torn among at least three forces: an increasing demand for land; state sovereignty; the seeking of new income by the same states.

The plenary sessions of the third edition of the World Policy Conference (WPC) will focus on the five following major themes.

1. The problem of the medium- to long-term interaction between demographic trends, climate change and public health challenges. Each of these topics is generally the object of separate in-depth research work and certain specialised international institutions are very concerned about each of them. However, although these three topics make up a whole, they are rarely treated as such. The purpose of the plenary session dedicated to this theme in Marrakech will be to formulate the problem properly and to identify the institutional improvements likely to strengthen world governance within the framework of the overall issue of development.

2. The second plenary session will be dedicated to global monetary and financial governance. Since the start of the financial crisis in 2008, the G20 has been established and measures have been taken, first, to prevent a great depression or, at least, to mitigate the deflationary impact of the crisis, and second, to reduce the likelihood of another recession. This second point is all the more important as the leeway given to governments and central banks is now extremely limited. The aim of this session will be to assess the progress made and to identify the remaining shortcomings. Particular attention may be paid to the lessons that are to be drawn from the euro crisis triggered by the Greek debt crisis.

3. This year, we are introducing a theme of fundamental importance, which has hardly been explored yet: the governance of digital information or, to use the terminology we prefer, the governance of cyberspace. The purpose of this session will be to identify the major challenges of the Internet, such as cybercriminality or digital warfare. We shall also attempt to formulate properly the issue of Internet governance.

4. The ongoing institutionalisation of the G20 poses two problems. First, this new entity may be considered too light for its job and too heavy to do it. We therefore need to think about its future in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy. Second, the emergence of the G20 calls for a review of the overall architecture of global governance and, in particular, a re-assessment of the reform of the United Nations system.

5. The global move towards multipolarity is accelerating year by year. A plenary session will therefore be dedicated to the views of powers such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey and South Africa on the subject of their responsibilities in terms of linking regional and global governance.

6. A sixth plenary session will allow key figures to discuss the issues of current international affairs from the point of view of global governance.

Finally, we plan to hold three workshops, each of which will deal with a fundamental facet of global governance:

• · Energy, raw materials and the environment;
• · Food security and nutrition;
• · Global monetary and financial governance.

The first two workshops will tackle questions of literally vital importance relating to the overall issue of development. The third one will be a natural follow-up to the second plenary session. Each of the plenary sessions and all of the workshops will be introduced by leading figures who occupy high positions of authority or who participate actively in international brainstormings. The interactive debates with participants will be facilitated by journalists and commentators of worldwide repute.

A number of top public figures will also be speaking at extra meetings to be held during the conference.

After a general introduction, the opening session of the fourth edition of the WPC will focus on the viewpoints, at the highest level, of two key players in the Muslim world: Turkey and Qatar. This will be followed by ten plenary sessions and four workshops.

1. The first session will be organised around the new president of the European Central Bank. The ECB, whose statutes leave little room for interpretation, is subject to pressure from those who would like to see it deployed, at least partially, as a crisis backstop in the euro zone. Germany is resisting such a proposal, while the peoples of Europe become increasingly angry.

2. The second session will be devoted to the “Arab Spring” and its consequences in terms of world governance. Important political figures from the region will take the floor. Economic aspects, notably energy, will also be discussed, as will the comparison, often made in Europe, between the current crisis and previous historic events such as the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991.

3. One aspect of the growing interdependency characteristic of globalisation is the increased risk of truly global catastrophes. Nuclear proliferation is an example that is often mentioned, particularly in relation to North Korea and Iran. Another possibility is digital terrorism, which has perhaps been less systematically explored until now. This could be practised by states or small non-state political units. The third session will address these two topics.

4. Contrary to still widely held preconceived ideas, Africa is undergoing thriving development and has abundant resources. On the whole, however, this continent suffers from poor governance, which has significant global consequences. The fourth session will look at this issue.

5. The G8 and especially the G20 have become the two pillars of global political and economic governance. Their efficiency and legitimacy, however, remain controversial. It is therefore natural that each year this subject is taken up by the WPC. This year, it is centred on the main players under the Korean (2010), French (2011) and Mexican (2012) Presidencies.

6. The European Union is a true governance laboratory, on the scale of a continent. Perhaps it could foreshadow the very long-term evolution of global governance. Beyond the current crisis, what lessons can be learned from its experiences? In the sixth session, this issue will be discussed, from various angles, by some major players, both from inside and outside the EU.

7. Globalisation benefits active units all over the world, including terrorists and criminals, adding another dimension to the issue of governance. This will be the topic of the seventh session, based on the experience of India and of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

8. Even though states are still the principal actors of the international system, they are no longer the only ones. Global companies have responsibilities both at the level of the countries in which they operate, as well as in terms of global governance. This important issue will be explored by two prominent figures, one from the world of politics and the other from the world of business.

9. For unique historical reasons, Israel has a specific role to play on the world stage, the scope and influence of which extends far beyond the Near and Middle East. The Jewish State is therefore a world player, whose vision in terms of global governance is rarely discussed. The ninth session will examine this issue with a very important figure from the Israeli government.

10. The last session will be devoted to an overall debate led by several figures, each of whom has played an important role in recent events. They will try to draw some lessons from the conference and open up new perspectives and possibilities.

The four workshops will look at some of the fundamental, and thus recurring, elements of global governance.

WORKSHOPS

Energy and environment

From a governance perspective, the link between these two issues is increasingly strong, due to climate change and the impact of events such as the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster. The workshop will look at these issues from the varying perspectives of a large company, an NGO and a specialised rating agency.

Food security

This topic is connected to world population growth, climate change and hazards, changing food habits and market volatility. The debate on the role of states and international organisations in regulating – in the broadest sense – markets has given rise to strong opposition. The topic will be addressed in this workshop by prominent specialists from the private and public sectors.

Health

Public health issues have become an integral part of the problem of global governance, due to the increased mobility of people and goods. The subject will be addressed this year by two major pharmaceutical firms and a public policy generalist.

Global governance and its current state

The aim of this workshop is to exchange overall views on governance, using the data collected by the observatory set up by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and Washington, as well as the results of the work on this subject by a prominent Singaporean intellectual and two industry leaders operating globally.

Plenary Session 1: “Global Economic Governance”

Globalization was once perceived as an irreversible transformation toward a uniform and flat-but-prosperous world. It was as if, at least from an economic viewpoint, the so-called “obstacles” of national or regional identity were to be abolished; as if the whole world were to become a single market, regulated by international organizations and headed by competent technocrats. With the financial and economic crisis of the last five years, we now observe quite different tendencies: more aggressiveness in the assertion of collective identities, more demand for renationalization of economic policies, protectionist pressures, etc. This evolution is visible, even within the rather integrated framework of the European Union. The idea that globalization is irreversible can no longer be taken for granted. The purpose of this session is to assess the stability of the global economic system and to make recommendations on how to strengthen it, in order to preserve the benefits of an open world, all the while paying respect to political demands for collective identities and social justice.

Plenary Session 2: “G2?”

Although the United States is likely to remain the only superpower for the foreseeable future, China has become a credible challenger. It is now the second largest world economy and, barring an economic or political accident, might become the first in the coming decades. Not only does it endow itself with all the attributes of power, but it behaves more and more like a power in the classical sense, at least in its “near abroad”. Both countries are somewhat allergic to multilateralism, but while the United States has developed a sense of leadership during the twentieth century, China has no such historical experience. They do experience tough economic and political competition, especially, but not exclusively, in Asia. Are the US and China heading toward confrontation? Or, alternatively, could there be some kind of “entente, detente and cooperation”, to use the old Cold War vocabulary – i.e. some kind of G2? How could such a G2 be acceptable to the rest of the world? What are the forces that will decide which alternative prevails?

Plenary Session 3

We expect President Mario Monti to present his views on the subject of global governance.

Plenary Session 4: “The Future of the EU”

The EU is, on a regional level, a unique laboratory of global governance. Yet, in the last few years, it has suffered two major setbacks: the Euro zone crisis and an identity crisis. Despite a number of significant steps, the first crisis is not yet over. If it survives, the Euro zone should emerge much stronger and as the natural core of a rehabilitated Union. How long can we allow the rescue process to last? Could it fail, and could the EU itself resist such a shock? The second crisis, identity, is illustrated by Britain’s temptation to distance itself and by invigorated nationalist movements, especially, but not exclusively, within certain recent member countries. The spirit of the founding fathers is gone, and the EU seems to have lost its sense of identity. Its institutions are widely perceived as undemocratic and inefficient. Yet, its extraordinary contribution to peace and prosperity is recognized by many internationally and symbolized by this year’s attribution of the Nobel Peace Prize. How might EU members agree on a common vision of their common future? Is such agreement prerequisite for future enlargement?

Plenary Session 5: “Good Governance and Economic Success”

The concept of governance is relevant at various levels. It refers to the art and science of setting and reaching goals in complex systems. Sustainable economic success implies “good governance” at at least three levels: (1) at the corporate level, which means good management; (2) at the national level, which means good public policies to ensure a business climate that promotes growth and employment in the short, medium and long term, while remaining socially acceptable and preserving the environment; (3) at the international level, which means optimizing coordination among national policies, managing externalities and reducing systemic risks. The third level is crucial if globalization is to survive. The purpose of this session is to explore the relationship between the three levels, and therefore the links between business and politics. How should we define Corporate Social Responsibility in this context? Is the diversity of cultures and values an asset or an obstacle? Does the media have a specific role to play?

Plenary Session 6: “The Future of the Middle East”

Whatever its immediate causes, the fundamental cause of the “Arab Spring” is the non-viability of the order that emerged in the MENA region (Middle East – North Africa) in the aftermath of decolonization, and in the context of the Cold War. The “Arab Spring” has released powerful centrifugal forces, which are now at work among and within the region’s countries. The emergence of a new order is probably a matter of at least one generation. External powers will clearly influence the process, as their major economic and security interests are involved. Moreover, there is evidence of a new kind of East-West rivalry in the region. Thus, the permanent members of the Security Council are openly divided over Syria. Be that as it may, the fate of MENA is likely to be determined primarily by internal factors, among which culture and ideology will play a crucial role. The purpose of this session is to look at the future of the Middle East at large, essentially from the viewpoint of the region itself. What are the risks and opportunities, in the region and beyond, in the post-Arab Spring era?

Plenary Session 7: “Africa”

Africa is no longer perceived as a lost continent. It enjoys sustainable growth (5% on average over the last decade), with considerable natural and human (demographic bonus) resources. A huge middle class (300 million people) is emerging, together with urbanization. In the long term, good governance and education – two related factors – will be the key determinants of economic and social success. For the time being, governance is making some progress, although too often strong presidential regimes continue to coexist with weak states. Such a situation feeds both big and small corruption. The fragility of many states is also a major cause for local and regional conflict. It must be recognized, though, that the number and lethality of conflicts in Africa are less than during the Cold War. At the same time, their external effects have become more important in some cases (Mali). The purpose of this session is to look at the state of Africa in the context of globalization and global governance, both from the political and economic viewpoints.

Plenary Session 8: “General Debate”

As in the previous editions of the WPC, the General Debate will focus on current issues in relation to global governance. Of particular importance this year is the prospect of stable, medium-term leadership in three major countries: the United States, China and Russia.

WORKSHOPS

Workshop “Finance”

The parallel Workshop on Finance will examine the present state of the financial regulatory reforms that have been launched by the International Community to prevent a new global financial crisis.
The following issues should be examined with a view to respond on each of them to the three following questions:

• · Which progress have been made so far?
• · What are the major remaining weaknesses from the financial stability standpoint?
• · And what are the appropriate avenues to correct the situation in a medium term perspective?

1. Building resilient banksA first important point is to assess the present implementation of the Basel III decisions in the various jurisdictions; At this point only 8 of the 22 member jurisdictions of the Basel Committee have issued the full set of the Basel III related regulations.
   Passing appropriate legislation as soon as possible in all jurisdictions is of the essence.
   Another crucial issue are systemic and moral hazard risks associated with the Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). Ending the “too big to fail” concept calls for progress in a number of dimensions which have to be addressed: the reforms of national resolution regimes; the recovery and resolution plans and resolvability assessments for each global SIFI; a more intensive and effective supervision; additional capital requirements above minimum standards. Particular attention should also be given to “Domestically Systemic Important Banks” (D-SIB’s).
2. Addressing the issue of shadow banking and non banksThe objective of the International Community is to ensure that shadow banking is subject to appropriate oversight and regulation to address a crisis that could emerge outside the regulated banking system.
   The following dimensions should be particularly examined: mitigating the spillover effect between the banking system and the non banks; reducing the vulnerability of Money Market Funds; aligning the incentives associated with securitization to prevent excessive leverage in the financial system; vigilant oversight of new shadow banking activities coming from market mutations.
3. Coping with procyclicality in many dimensions of the financial market’s functioningThe stable functioning of financial markets relies not only on resilient financial institutions, whether banks or not banks, but also on a host of factors like, for instance, accounting rules, credit rating agencies, legal entity identifier, market infrastructure –in particular as regards the OTC derivatives market reforms-. The International Community has to make sure that we make all what is possible to minimize the endogenous tendency of the financial system to generate booms and busts and, in so doing, foster stability in the global financial system.
4. Preventing systemic risks and reinforcing macroprudential oversightAll previous dimensions are important to minimize the systemic risks at the level of the various individual economies, regions, like the Euro area and the European Union and the global economy itself. It is also necessary to take stock of the actions of the new specific institutions created on both sides of the Atlantic on the prevention of systemic risks, like the “European Systemic risk Board” (ESRB) and the “Financial Stability Oversight Council”.
   Amongst many other issues a better handling of macroprudentials and a deeper intellectual understanding of the endogenous systemic instability of global finance, of the new extreme rapidity of shocks transmission and of the financial instability consequences of macroeconomic imbalances, appear of the essence.

Workshop “Energy and Environment”

The quest for energy has always been a key component of international relations, both in times of war and peace. The sustainability of an open world is therefore hardly thinkable without a form of global governance that secures every country’s access to various sources of energy at fair prices. With rising concerns about climate change, this fundamental concern has taken even a greater dimension. So far, the “international community” has failed to reach a consensus on how to cooperate on the matter. This workshop will be organized in three parts, though the majority of the time will be consecrated to Part III.
Part I will provide an overview of the current energy scene from political, economic and environmental standpoints. Part II will specifically address the crucial issue of inconsistencies in energy policies, at regional and international levels. For instance, the European Union has proved thus far unable to create a common energy policy, despite the coal and steel community being the heart of its foundation. Part III will concentrate on energy supply with an emphasis on new sources in the context of climate change. Five topics will be covered: two technical (unconventional oil and gas, and renewables), one social and political (“acceptability”), one economic (energy costs and economic competitiveness), and one international (the geopolitics of energy). The last two topics will certainly raise questions about economic integration and globalization more generally.

Workshop “Major Risks”

Increasing interdependence is accompanied by increasing, and sometimes unpredictable, risk. This is because the number of non-linear relations increases, i.e. non-proportionality between causes and consequences, or the so-called “butterfly effect”. In such a context, classical statistical methods based on the so-called “normal” or “Gaussian law” (bell curve) often become irrelevant. Major catastrophes are likely to happen, whereas in the classical context their probabilities of occurrence were considered negligible. These phenomena raise vital questions on risk prevention and risk sharing, in particular for insurance economics. The workshop will be organized in three parts. Part I will address the issue of major risks from the standpoint of research. Part II will discuss the myopia of states. Historically speaking, governments have proved unable to prevent catastrophes even in favorable contexts when the risks could be clearly identified, as is typically the case for many demography-related issues. How is it possible to improve long-term public decision making under well- or ill-identified risks without falling into the trap of pusillanimity, as with some interpretations of the precautionary principle? Is there a correlation between collective risk taking and political regimes? Does the concept of global public good make any practical sense in the context of major risks? Part III will cover three disparate examples: cyber security, which is now widely recognized as an explosive issue; aging, with its potentially undermining economic and financial consequences; and food security, which much like energy must be considered as a key component of global governance. It should be noted that the two other parallel workshops, particularly “Finance”, carry a important major risk dimension.

Session 1. The state of the world economy and governance

During this session, eminent international figures from both the public and private sectors will discuss the state of the global economy at the end of 2013, focusing on its weaknesses, the improvements needed in short-term and structural economic policies, and major ongoing projects such as the TTIP and the TPP. They will also be invited to talk about the changes in governance bodies like the G20.

Session 2 & 3. Middle East

While the civil war continues to rage in syria and political instability reigns in the arab spring countries, the most interesting development in the Middle East over the last few months has been the overtures made by Iran following the election of President Rohani in June 2013. During these two sessions, the possibility of Iran rejoining the “international community” and the chances of gradually achieving greater unity in the Middle East will be explored by some of the key stakeholders in the region, as well as from an external perspective.

Session 4. Asia’s strengths and weaknesses

Asia is still driving the global economy, but its security systems are extremely vulnerable. Numerous territorial conflicts have the potential to trigger a serious incident at any time, and the danger that these conflicts will degenerate is even greater because of ancestral hostility and resentment over events that happened in the 20th century. There are still many questions and a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the Korean peninsula; the purpose of this session – which will be attended by people of various nationalities, representing the full range of political and economic issues at stake – is to better understand the challenges presented by this huge region, where much of 21st century history will be played out.

Session 5. The challenges of the cyberspace

This session will address the challenges of cyberspace from three perspectives:

1. The technological aspects and their possible or probable impact on the economy, society and international competition (are we heading towards an american political-industrial monopoly or a balance of power between the United states and China, in what respect and with what consequences?);
2. The american strategy in this area;
3. Europe’s interests.

We will focus on one particularly important aspect of the current revolution: the future of the media, as seen by the head of a large press corporation in a middle power (Korea).

Session 6. Whither the ‘european social model’?”

People all over the old continent still see social protection as a fundamental part of european life, even if the old Welfare state concept and what it entails has been damaged by globalisation. In fact, there are several “social models” in europe and the Member states of the European Union (EU) have demonstrated unequal capacity for reform in this area. Under these circumstances, is it really possible, from a prospective point of view, to talk about a single european social model that would embody the EU’s identity over the long term, and without which the Union’s very existence would be at stake?

Lunch Debate on Saturday, 14th December: The future of diplomacy
The information and communication technology revolution is moving forward fast and while it has not naturally changed the fundamental role of human nature in negotiations, it has completely transformed the exercise and practice of diplomacy. Two people with a great deal of experience in this area – a former american Under-secretary of state who is now a Professor at Harvard and a former French Foreign Minister – will be discussing the future consequences of this.

Session 7. Destruction or metamorphosis of the legal order?

Globalisation has created such a high degree of interdependence that it seems to be affecting both the legitimacy and the efficiency of legal systems. Legitimacy is built upon the universalism of values, which is an integral part of instruments to protect human rights and combat crimes that threaten humanity (war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide) and underlies the emergence of “global public goods”. As for the efficiency of legal systems, it is being undermined by the globalisation of flows (economic and financial flows, digital information flows), hazards (notably health and environmental hazards) and crime (terrorism, corruption and various types of trafficking, including human and organ trafficking).
In practice, interactions between legal systems are increasing. such interactions may be horizontal (distribution of standards, dialogue between judges) or vertical (internationalisation of standards, creation of supranational courts); they overturn traditional perspectives, which associate national legal systems with the state and the international legal system with an inter-state structure. Of course, the state is still a fundamental component of the legal system, but it seems to be subject to competition from non-state bodies such as international organisations, multinational companies, non-governmental organisations and, occasionally, scientific experts.
The effects of globalisation would be destructive if they were to:

• · dilute responsibilities by increasing the number of judicial and quasi-judicial players and bodies with competing remits;
• · challenge the principle of territoriality, bearing in mind that borders are sometimes transgressed by the extension of national jurisdiction (extraterritoriality), sometimes integrated into a complex system combining national and international jurisdictions (multi-territoriality) and sometimes neutralised by the dematerialisation of information;
• · weaken the principle of sovereignty, the independence of which is under threat.

Unless globalisation is regarded as the start of a three-dimensional metamorphosis:

• · from responsibility to “co-responsibility”, which would create a link between the exercise of global power by either state or non-state parties and the obligation to assume responsibility for the effects of this power;
• · from territoriality to an area that is geographically diverse but governed by the same standards, which would call for coordination and, in some cases, a harmonisation of the rules of jurisdiction;
• · from absolute sovereignty to “shared” sovereignty; perhaps a better term would be “inclusive” sovereignty, as it implies the inclusion of new powers rather than the exclusion of traditional powers, thus encompassing the solidarity generated by growing interdependence. In this case, the word “metamorphosis” reflects an evolutionary vision of the legal system and the hope that change will lead us from chaos to peace.

Session 8. Reports from parallel workshops

Session 9. Towards a european banking Union

The banking union project is a direct result of the eurozone crisis, which began in 2010 in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crash in the United states. Many believe that the banking union is vital to the long-term future of the euro, but the project could be compromised by the reticence of some of the stakeholders. This subject will be addressed in depth during the finance workshop. However, it is also a very political subject, since it concerns the viability of the European Union itself. Therefore, it will also be discussed at a plenary session.

Session 10. Africa

This session, which has now become a tradition at the WPC, will focus on three major issues: changes in the internal governance of african states; economic trends in africa; the great Lakes regional crisis. Some of the debates will also address China’s african policy.

Session 11. Politics and religions

The relationship between politics and religion lies at the heart of world history, since any religion is also a source of collective identity, culture and ideology and therefore a factor in power politics. With the transformation or the collapse of Communist systems and of the secular ideologies that prevailed in the “third world” for a third of a century after the second World War, the instrumentalisation of religions is playing an increasingly preeminent role in the geopolitics of conflict. This subject will be addressed by representatives of the three monotheisms, who will focus in particular on religious institutions as an instrument of better global governance.

Session 12. general debate

Like every year, the final session will include several people who currently occupy an eminent position or have held such a position in the recent past. They will endeavour not only to learn something from the conference, but also to explore new avenues.