Macron’s internationalism and the new politics

KEMAL DERVIŞ, Project Syndicate

French President Emmanuel Macron initially described his new political movement as being “neither on the right nor on the left,” and now says that it is “on both the right and the left.” But he won’t be able to fudge it indefinitely: sooner or later, he will have to pick a side with which to ally.

WASHINGTON, DC – French President Emmanuel Macron’s state visit to the United States last month was a study in contrasts. Despite the friendly dynamic, Macron’s agenda and rhetoric were almost diametrically opposed to US President Donald Trump’s. But Macron’s leadership is subject to an even more fundamental challenge; how he manages it could point the way forward for liberal-democratic politics.

Addressing the US Congress in English, Macron articulated a staunchly internationalist worldview, calling for stronger international institutions, a recommitment to the rules-based system of international trade, and a general embrace of globalization. With regard to Iran, he reiterated the need to preserve the 2015 nuclear deal, from which Trump has just withdrawn, though he did call for complementary agreements on topics that the existing agreement does not address.

Macron has also signaled that he will pursue a pan-European campaign for the 2019 European Parliament election. As a democrat, he believes that the deepening of the European Union must go hand in hand with the development of a truly European political space.

At a time of much hand-wringing over the decline of liberalism, the future of social democracy, the rise of nationalism, and the backlash against globalization, Macron’s unapologetically internationalist stance is notable. In fact, Macron has taken a leap into the unknown of the West’s “new politics,” a terrain no longer defined entirely by competition between large center-right and center-left parties. But is politics really turning the page on the traditional right-left cleavage?

It would be wrong to describe Macron, who served as a minister in his predecessor François Hollande’s Socialist government, simply as a centrist. Although he has moved toward the center, he did not join one of the small traditional centrist parties, but instead created his own “movement.”

Early on, Macron described that movement – which he called En Marche ! – as “neither on the right nor on the left” – avoiding the term “centrist.” Now, he says it is on “both the right and the left,” signaling his desire to win over traditional center-left and center-right voters.

If the traditional left-right divide is blurring, however, the question is what will replace it. With globalization at the center of political debate in most countries, it may seem that the answer is a division between cosmopolitan and parochial forces.

According to this interpretation, Macron leads France’s pro-globalization (and pro-European) movement, and those who oppose him, on the right or the left, are linked by a shared opposition to economic openness. And, indeed, the far right and the far left are espousing similar economic messages.

Meanwhile, existing center-left and center-right political parties – in France and throughout the West – tend to comprise internationally oriented factions and those who are more suspicious of globalization. If globalization is becoming the main electoral cleavage in Western countries, these two camps, the logic goes, are likely to split and form new political families.

Yet, while I believe there will be some movement in this direction, the traditional left-right cleavage seems unlikely to disappear. Traditional parties will continue to debate issues concerning income distribution, including the progressivity of tax systems and the proper scope and aims of social policy. The globalization “platform” alone will not be robust enough to define a large political party.

This means that in the coming years, Macron will have to align himself more closely with either the center-right or the center-left. The particular circumstances that enabled his electoral victory in 2017 – a discredited center-left, and a center-right candidate disqualified by scandal – will not reproduce themselves. He will have to become an internationalist left-leaning leader or an internationalist right-leaning one.

Only one of those appears to be a tenable option. The traditional policies of the center-right would not easily be compatible with a strong internationalist bent. If globalization, in its various dimensions, is to be backed by a popular majority, it will have to be accompanied by modernized social policies that provide effective help to those who need it. At a time of  continuous economic disruption, this will be all the more important.

Economic openness demands social solidarity. That does not means protecting specific jobs from trade competition or technological innovation. It means assisting people to adapt to continuous change, by providing all citizens with the necessary resources, such as education, accessible health care, and transitional support. In short, a popular pro-globalization stance must be accompanied by a new social contract – backed by public resources – that appeals to a large majority. Otherwise, the siren song of neo-nationalism will be difficult to resist.

While completing the necessary tax and labor-market reforms on which he has embarked, Macron will need to address this challenge. In the current political paradigm shift, those who favor openness will outshine nationalist unilateralism only by adopting as their primary objective a modernized approach to social solidarity.

 

 

Back Is the North Atlantic partnership in danger?

16 May 2018

Prince Michael of Liechtenstein, GIS

Geographically, Europe is a peninsula on the northwestern end of the Afro-Eurasian continent, on the eastern shore of the North Atlantic. The United States, on the other side of the easily navigable ocean, can be considered – as former U.S. President Ronald Reagan once pointed out during a speech in Germany – a European power. Indeed, the U.S. has provided a protective shield over Europe since the end of World War II.

While the Soviet threat remained in place, Europe, and especially Germany, was highly appreciative of the U.S. However, the relationship began to deteriorate in the late 1960s, enhanced by Soviet disinformation and supported by protest movements of the so-called “1968 Generation” and the Vietnam War.

Since then, Europe’s relations with the U.S. have become increasingly schizophrenic: Europe still needs American protection, but is trying to build increasingly important relationships with Russia and China. This, however – due to lack of military power – is insufficient to balance Europe’s position as a North Atlantic and Eurasian region.

To keep good relationships, Europe needs both sides. However, in instances of tensions between the Atlantic partners, the European public and politicians have – especially over the past 20 years – taken a very one-sided course, looking for faults only on the American side.

European schizophrenia
This has been especially striking in the relationship with U.S. presidents. In Europe, President George W. Bush was considered a danger, while President Barack Obama was well-liked. Now, Donald Trump is considered a major threat to world peace. However, if one ignores some of his rude behavior, one can find sound policies and people in his administration who consider Europe’s protection a top priority.

There is a European schizophrenia in the admiration of President Obama’s policies and the claim that Presidents Bush and Trump hurt the transatlantic relationship. Both the Bush and Trump administrations considered Europe an important issue, while Mr. Obama’s pivot to Asia had a distinctively different orientation. Europe was clearly a less significant concern.

President Trump’s decision to withdraw the U.S. from the Iran nuclear agreement has again caused strain in the relationship. Some claim the move is a major threat to the international framework and stability. According to the European mantra, there is one culprit: Donald Trump. On the surface this might appear correct, but if we dive a little deeper, the story looks somewhat different.

Iran’s politics, as well as its military and paramilitary activities, including the support of terrorism, is destabilizing the entire Middle East. Tehran intends to become the dominant regional power and advances that agenda with all means, it supports civil wars and threatens Israel’s very existence. Moreover, it poses an existential danger to Saudi Arabia, doing its utmost to control Syria and Yemen. Its support of terrorist organization Hezbollah weakens Lebanon, strengthens its own access to the Mediterranean and makes possible direct attacks on Israel. All of this also presents significant challenges for Turkey.

The Iran nuclear agreement, which was reached between Iran, the five permanent members of the Security Council (the U.S., Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China) plus Germany, did not include any of the neighboring countries. It contained no provision that protected Iran’s Middle Eastern neighbors from its subversive and terrorist agitation. The agreement was a priority for President Obama, and the administration was in a rush to conclude it, but the Europeans could have pointed out this problem.

The European leaders in the UK, Germany and France are now appalled that the new administration withdrew, considering the deal damaging and incomplete. French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel both visited Washington in April, begging President Trump to maintain the agreement. President Macron tried to use French “grandeur” and youthful charm, while Chancellor Merkel tried the German attitude of “Bedenken” (compunction). Both in vain. Does that mean that Washington made the wrong move, and the White House is at fault? Not necessarily.

Since the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign it had been well-known that Mr. Trump considered the agreement deficient and that he wanted a replacement. Once he was elected, London, Paris and Berlin had ample time to try to renegotiate with the other partners of the agreement. This was neglected, and President Trump’s move cannot be a surprise.

The consequences of the withdrawal are still unknown. But now the paradox is that the UK, France and Germany are seeking the support of Russia and China in counterbalancing the U.S. This situation was only triggered by Washington’s decision, but widely caused by European negligence. The losers in all of this are certainly the countries of the Middle East, but also, and especially, the Western alliance.

Les défis du voyage de Macron en Russie

Publié le 21/05/2018

Renaud Girard, Le Figaro

Même si elles sont anciennes, les relations entre grandes nations ont besoin d’être nourries de rencontres régulières au sommet. C’est le sens du voyage d’Emmanuel Macron à Saint-Pétersbourg les 24 et 25 mai prochains, qui répond à la visite de Vladimir Poutine du 29 mai 2017 à Versailles, laquelle célébrait 300 ans de relations diplomatiques entre la France et la Russie. Les deux présidents vont pouvoir renforcer le « Dialogue de Trianon », qui lance des ponts culturels et universitaires entre les deux nations. Mais améliorer les relations politiques et économiques sera beaucoup plus difficile, tant sont nombreux les obstacles obstruant la voie d’un rapprochement franco-russe.

Stratégiquement, l’objectif à long terme des Français devrait être clair : garder les Russes en Europe, ne pas les précipiter vers l’Asie, afin de constituer un bloc capable de parler d’égal à égal avec les Chinois, dont les tendances hégémoniques ne cessent de s’affirmer. La Chine vient de montrer doublement sa puissance. Le 18 mai 2018, elle a fait atterrir des avions H-6K (bombardiers à long rayon d’action) sur un îlot des Paracels, qu’elle a accaparé en mer de Chine méridionale, et où elle a construit un aérodrome militaire. De là, ses bombardiers stratégiques peuvent désormais atteindre le Nord de l’Australie ou l’île américaine de Guam. Deuxième signe de l’omnipotence chinoise, les Etats-Unis ont annoncé le 20 mai qu’ils suspendaient leurs mesures tarifaires punitives à l’égard de Pékin, confiants que les Chinois allaient augmenter leurs importations américaines – au détriment des Européens, cela va sans dire.

A long terme, la Chine inquiète les Russes, propriétaires d’une Sibérie quasi dépeuplée. Mais, à court et moyen terme, ils apprécient cette amie forte et fiable – si différente de l’Europe -, qui montre cohésion et indépendance, qui est leur premier partenaire commercial, qui ne leur fait pas la morale, et qui ne leur inflige pas de sanctions.

Trois sujets politiques principaux sont au menu du sommet Macron-Poutine : l’Ukraine, l’Iran et la Syrie.

Au Donbass, Moscou a accepté le principe d’un déploiement de Casques bleus de l’Onu, sur la ligne de cessez-le-feu séparant l’armée ukrainienne des séparatistes pro-russes. Berlin et Paris ont salué le geste. Mais les Russes ne vont pas permettre aux Casques bleus de se déployer sur la frontière russo-ukrainienne, tant que l’Ukraine n’aura pas voté une loi donnant une pleine autonomie culturelle et linguistique à la région du Donbass, assortie d’une amnistie générale pour les combattants séparatistes. Or, à Kiev, théâtre actuel d’une surenchère nationaliste, il n’y aura aucune initiative politique avant l’élection présidentielle de mars 2019. Mais si le Kremlin faisait un geste concret allant vers le rétablissement de la souveraineté de Kiev sur le Donbass, les Français pourraient encourager, dès juillet 2018, une suspension des sanctions de l’Union européenne contre la Russie.

Les Russes ne supportent pas l’idée d’une entrée de l’Ukraine dans l’Otan. Pourquoi l’Allemagne et la France n’inscriraient-elles pas dans le marbre leur veto d’avril 2008 d’une adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’Otan ? Pourquoi ce pays ne deviendrait-il pas neutre militairement, à l’instar de l’Autriche ? Le sommet Macron-Poutine ne débloquera pas la situation en Ukraine. Mais rien n’empêche les deux présidents de préparer l’avenir !

Sur le dossier iranien, Russes et Français s’accorderont sur la nécessité de maintenir l’accord nucléaire du 14 juillet 2015, dont les Américains se sont retirés unilatéralement. A court terme, les grandes sociétés françaises obéiront au diktat américain, car leurs échanges avec les Etats-Unis sont incomparablement supérieurs avec ceux qu’elles ont avec l’Iran. Mais Macron pourra aussi exposer à Poutine l’idée des Européens de faire financer le commerce avec l’Iran, en euros, par la BEI (Banque européenne d’investissement), institution à l’abri des représailles américaines.

C’est sur le dossier syrien que le président français aura avec son homologue russe la position la plus difficile. Depuis qu’elle a fermé son ambassade à Damas en mars 2012, la France a disparu du jeu. Elle n’a comme allié sur place que les Kurdes du Rojava (bande nord de la Syrie), courageux adversaires de Daesh. Or l’Amérique a déjà abandonné ces progressistes à l’armée turque dans le canton d’Afrine, au nord-ouest de la Syrie. Respectée par tous les Etats, la Russie est devenue la puissance pivotale du Moyen-Orient. Les Israéliens viennent de lui demander de prévenir une guerre avec les Iraniens en Syrie. Recevant Bachar al-Assad à Sotchi le 17 mai 2018, Poutine a donc prôné un prompt départ de « toutes les troupes étrangères » de Syrie.

Au Congrès de Vienne, Talleyrand avait déjà noté qu’on pouvait être le meilleur négociateur du monde, les rapports de force sur le terrain finissaient toujours pas se rappeler à vous. . .

Allies at Cross-Purposes: Trump Puts Europe Into Damage-Control Mode

May 15, 2018

By Steven Erlanger, The New York Times

BRUSSELS — After a series of decisions by President Trump that have split the trans-Atlantic alliance, European foreign ministers have begun a scramble to contain the fallout to their own interests, global institutions and stability in the Middle East.

But even the initial steps of Europe’s effort to devise a separate strategyand save the nuclear accord with Iran showed that the allies might now be working at cross-purposes with the United States, further straining years of international consensus.

That was demonstrated on Tuesday, as European foreign ministers met in Brussels with their Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, to try to preserve the deal that constrained Iran’s nuclear program. Mr. Trump pulled out of the deal last week, calling it a “disaster.”

The Europeans — as well as the cosignatories Russia and China — want Iran to continue to abide by the deal, which is considered a signal accomplishment of European diplomacy. It sharply restricts Tehran’s ability to enrich uranium to prevent the development of a nuclear weapon.

To preserve the deal, the Europeans are trying to figure out ways to provide some of the economic benefits it promised Iran, which are threatened now with the renewal of tough American sanctions.

Their efforts come against the backdrop of Gazans being shot in large numbers in demonstrations tied to Israel’s 70th birthday and Mr. Trump’s decision to move the United States Embassy to Jerusalem — another move made in the face of European opposition.

The European response to the bloodshed in Gaza has been to criticize Israel for what Ireland’s foreign minister, Simon Coveney, called a “disproportionate use of force” against mostly unarmed protesters. The European Union’s foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, called on Israel to show “utmost restraint to avoid further loss of life.”

The Europeans have also emphasized their disagreement over the embassy move.

In contrast to the full-throated support of Israel from the United States, the foreign minister of France, Jean-Yves Le Drian, restated his country’s position that the embassy move “contravenes international law and in particular the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.”

Ms. Mogherini said Europeans would continue “to respect the international consensus on Jerusalem” and not move their embassies until the city’s final status was resolved in a peace treaty.

Ian Bond, foreign policy analyst with the Center for European Reform, argued that “Europeans and Atlanticist Americans must preserve what they can of the trans-Atlantic partnership” while Mr. Trump is in office.

“But he is doing a lot of damage in the meantime — not just hurting allies, but actively helping potential adversaries,” he said, pointing to the Iran deal pullout, the Jerusalem embassy and unilateral tariffs on steel that harm Europe.

Nathalie Tocci, the director of Italy’s Institute of International Affairs and a senior adviser to Ms. Mogherini, said that Europe’s foreign and defense policy “has become more difficult now, not least because of the Trump administration efforts to undercut the E.U.”

She warned that “if Europeans are serious about their strategic autonomy, now is the time to demonstrate it by standing united behind their shared interests.” And she said saving the Iran deal “is the place to start.”

Indeed it was. In their meetings with Mr. Zarif, the foreign ministers were preparing for broader discussions among European leaders Wednesday night at a meeting in Bulgaria, which was supposed to center on outreach to the six nations of the Western Balkans.

Ms. Mogherini said that the three European countries that helped negotiate the Iran deal would stay with it as long as Iran did. “We will save it together,” she said.

Mr. Zarif said that the talks had gone well, and that “we are on the right path to move forward” and had agreed on “the importance of full implementation of the nuclear deal.” Further talks with the Europeans, he said, will “continue in the next two weeks.”

On Tuesday night, after the meeting, Ms. Mogherini said that the foreign ministers had agreed to begin work, to “find solutions in the next few weeks,” on issues like Iran’s energy sales, banking transactions, export credits and investment, and protections for European companies working in Iran.

But preserving or increasing European investment in Iran in the face of the American sanctions is a difficult challenge — especially since the White House has made clear to Europeans that their companies will not get exemptions from the sanctions, which Washington hopes will pressure Iran into a new set of negotiations.

It was an irony that escaped few European officials: They were trying to find ways to ease the economic pressure on Iran and keep it in the nuclear deal, while Washington was trying to increase that pressure for unclear ends.

Many Europeans, like Ms. Tocci, believe that the unstated American aim is “regime change” in Iran, something that the British and French foreign ministers, Boris Johnson and Mr. Le Drian, have specifically ruled out as a European goal.

These same foreign ministers once spent weeks trying to toughen sanctions on Iran over its ballistic missile program and its support for groups like Hamas and Hezbollah to please Mr. Trump and get him to agree to stay in the nuclear accord. Now they have dropped all such attempts. Instead, they were working to keep Iran in the deal at all and find ways to compensate Tehran for doing so.

While Mr. Trump’s national security adviser, John R. Bolton, has said that the American intention is to force Iran into new, broader negotiations, European officials said they had heard no American strategy for doing that.

European diplomats, speaking on background because they did not have authorization to talk otherwise, said on Tuesday that they felt no great urgency, which was just as well, given the difficulty of the task. They had the impression, they said, that Iran wants to remain in the deal so long as the government can show benefits to the population, and of course to avoid a more open confrontation with Washington.

The Europeans will try to uphold their side of the bargain, one senior European diplomat said, but it will be very difficult to preserve the economic benefits for Iran.

For all the talk about so-called blocking regulations to protect European companies from American sanctions and the possible use of the European Investment Bank to provide euro-based financing for deals with Iran, there was little optimism that these solutions would work very well.

Many European companies that have invested in Iran — or might want to — also do business in the United States, a much more important market, and are unlikely to want to test the American sanctions.

Nor do the Europeans want competition with the United States, which is still Europe’s most important ally and partner, to tip into confrontation, as Ms. Mogherini has said. That is especially important for Britain, which is leaving the European Union and wants Washington’s support.

As the Europeans met with Mr. Zarif, elsewhere in Brussels the American chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., was meeting with NATO allies to discuss Afghanistan and European security.

For all Mr. Trump’s criticism and even misunderstanding of NATO, and his admiration for President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia — who opened the first bridge on Monday between Russia and Crimea, which he annexed from Ukraine — the United States has beefed up its military commitment to NATO and its members bordering Russia.

While NATO had no role in the Iran deal, the three European nations trying to preserve it are also Washington’s most powerful allies in NATO.

But Europeans, in general, feel that the fundamentals of the trans-Atlantic partnership are all under threat from Washington. That can only help countries like Russia and China, which seek to undermine the current world order.

On Friday, speaking to a Roman Catholic conference in Münster, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany said that with his decision on Iran, Mr. Trump had thrown the global order into “real crisis.”

She said: “If we always step away from multilateral agreements as soon as we don’t like something about them, that would be a bad message for the world. We want to strengthen multilateralism.”

It is less clear what she and other Europeans are willing to do about it.

Thomas Gibbons-Neff contributed reporting.