Auteur/autrice : wpc_editor

Read the entire article on the site of Project Syndicate.

BRUSSELS (AP) — The European Union started membership negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia on Tuesday, a long-delayed step in the Balkan nations’ paths toward EU membership that gained momentum amid the war in Ukraine.

Officially, the process kicked off with the presentation of the negotiating frameworks, which allow the bloc’s head office to screen how prepared each country is to take on all the EU’s laws, rules and regulations.

The move comes at a crucial time for the EU, which in June made Ukraine and neighboring Moldova candidates for membership even though Western Balkan nations were kept waiting in line for a long time. North Macedonia and Albania became EU candidates 19 years ago, but their accession talks never commenced.

“This is not the beginning of the end, it is just the end of the beginning,” Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama said. “We need this to continue to build a strong, democratic, European Albania and a strong, democratic, Western and open Balkans.”

Read the article on the AP website.

by Masood Ahmed and Vera Songwe
JULY 15, 2022

When G20 Finance Ministers meet this weekend in Bali, their meeting will likely be no more harmonious than their Foreign Minister counterparts managed ten days ago. But the world, and developing countries in particular, deserves better. The reality for the world’s poorest countries is getting bleaker by the day, and decisions taken by G20 Finance Ministers can avert complete collapse.

An economic tsunami is about to engulf the developing world and many poor countries are simply not prepared to deal with the economic, social, and political consequences. When daily life is disrupted by fuel and medicine shortages, power supply is turned off because every kilowatt hour sold costs more than consumers can afford to pay, and rising food bills consume much of meager household incomes, any spark can trigger a blaze of discontent. Sri Lanka is a visible example of how quickly economic crisis can lead to societal collapse. But sporadic protests are breaking out in many countries where governments are struggling to balance popular expectations with harsh financial realities.

The first responsibility for weathering the storm is with the leaders of the countries most at risk. Many of them had set forth 2022 budgetary plans to launch the recovery, increase investments, build reserves and pull back on COVID-19 induced spending. Others have been slower to act and will be more vulnerable. But all of them are constrained by a common reality: this crisis comes sharp on the heels of a devastating pandemic from which they have not yet emerged and during which they used up what little financial space existed to support households and firms. Unlike many in the G20, these poor countries cannot just print more money or borrow from international financial markets at concessional rates. They stand naked in the face of this onslaught.

G20 leaders cannot make the storm go away but they can help the poorest countries get better prepared to face it. Even as they struggle to find common ground on much else, here are five decisions they could make this weekend to positively improve the lives of a billion people living in the poorest countries in the world.

First, fund the World Food Program and avert the worst famine in a decade. According to WFP’s latest analysis, a record 345 million people are on the brink of starvation and 50 million are on the brink of famine. As the fallout of the war in Ukraine compounds hunger caused by conflict, climate shocks, the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, and rising food prices, WFP needs $22 billion to avert catastrophe. Hard-earned development gains and millions of lives are at stake.

Second, immediate liquidity is needed for the developing countries which are now facing a more severe economic shock than faced during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The fastest way to do this is by deferring debt repayments. The G20 can itself extend to end-2023 the bilateral Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) it so wisely put in place in 2020. However, we can also learn from two years of implementation and extend the repayment period over three years so countries do not face a steep bullet in 2024. This could defer at least $15 billion in debt service payments which could be used to provide safety nets for the most vulnerable. An enhanced DSSI initiative would go further by securing more robust creditor participation from all G20 creditors and the private sector.

Also on debt, the IMF should be asked to restart its own debt service relief program through the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), which provided nearly $1 billion of relief during the pandemic to 31 vulnerable countries.

Third, developing countries urgently need more grant and concessional resources. An immediate step would be to ask the International Financial Institutions to respond to this crisis with the same scale and urgency as they announced for the pandemic. The IMF still has a formidable $700 billion of unused resources that could be deployed to contain the worst impact of the crisis. For the World Bank, IDA could be accelerated to reach $50 billion IDA program this year, and its equity could be used more aggressively to go even further. The G20 can also give a green light to some of the proposals for channeling surplus SDRs to the countries that need them most. A bolder step bring advocated by African Finance Ministers is the issuance of a second round of SDRs to shore up country reserves and strengthen their currencies.

Fourth, it is time to accept that the current debt management and resolution system is not working, largely because the G20 cannot agree among themselves on burden sharing, particularly with new creditors like China. As a result, the Common Framework is stuck and the three countries that have entered into a Kafkaesque process see no light at the end of the tunnel. The World Bank thinks as many as a dozen countries will need some form of debt treatment. Unless they can be offered a fast-paced and more predictable debt resolution framework, they will likely allow economic problems to fester and delay coming for the help they clearly need to get out of the crisis. Well defined proposals are already on the table to make the Common Framework fit for purpose: – including the IMF conducting transparent assessment of the debt relief needed, introducing comparability of treatment, and giving greater ownership of the process to new creditors. The IMF could introduce lending into arrears for countries undergoing restructuring – acting as a liquidity support tool – while implementing a full moratorium on payments during debt restructuring negotiations could also provide needed liquidity. The Bali meeting is the moment for G20 ministers to seize the mantle and adopt these proposals.

Finally, the G20 needs to agree how to get grain, fertilizer, and fuel shipping again from Russia and Ukraine. Costs for these products have as much as tripled, leading governments to spend substantial amounts on subsidies for food and fuel, placing stress on national budgets – and taking away from social protection programs. High fertilizer costs also jeopardize the productivity of planting seasons, further decreasing future food supplies. The sooner these products can flow again, the sooner prices will ease for essential imports.

The G20 acted swiftly and decisively during the COVID crisis. Today, the poorest countries are confronting a challenge which is bigger, more damaging and whose scarring potential is immense. The leaders know the remedies and have the authority to deploy them to demonstrate true solidarity with the poorest countries. They must make the meeting in Bali meaningful for all.

Read the original article on Relief web website.

Peacetime partners could turn wartime rivals in seeking American military aid

U.S. military personnel board a transport plane for deployment to Eastern Europe amid escalating tensions between Ukraine and Russia on Feb. 3.   © Reuters

HIROYUKI AKITA, Nikkei commentator

July 18, 2022

TOKYO — U.S. security allies in Asia and Europe are now closer to each other than ever, as seen in the first participation of Japan, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand in a NATO summit late last month.

Read the original article on the Nikkei website.

Lire l’article sur le site de Bénin Web TV.

Louise Mushikiwabo was named as secretary general of L’Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) in 2018. Rwanda is in the unique position of having temporary stewardship of arguably both the most influential English and French speaking organisation in the world. File photo

Read the original article in The New Times.

In an indication that Russian forces were ending what they called an operational pause in their invasion of Ukraine, the defense minister of Russia, Sergei Shoigu, on Saturday ordered his forces to intensify attacks “in all operational sectors” of the war.

As the Ukrainian government disclosed modest new ground attacks by Russian forces, the Russian defense ministry said in a statement that Shoigu had instructed that combat be intensified to stop Ukraine from shelling civilian areas in Russian-occupied territory.

After deadly Russian missile strikes across Ukraine in recent days that killed civilians, the statement was a new signal from Moscow that its invasion may be entering a more aggressive phase.

Shoigu’s statement appeared to be a response to Ukraine’s new ability to hit Russian targets in occupied areas due to more advanced, longer-range Western weapons, including the U.S. HIMARS precision-guided rocket systems and the French Caesar artillery pieces. Ukraine claims to have hit at least 30 Russian ammunition and logistics sites with the new longer-range weapons in the past two weeks.

Earlier this month, Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested to lawmakers that Russia would escalate the war. “Everyone should know that, by and large, we have not started anything seriously yet,” Putin said.

There were signs of new ground fighting in the hotly contested Donbas region, where Russian forces have taken one of its provinces, Luhansk, and are trying to take the rest of another, Donetsk, as well. Ukrainian military and regional officials reported five probing attacks along the crescent-shaped front line in the Donbas.

Ukrainian troops using “heavy fire” repelled a renewed overnight ground assault to capture the main road link between the cities of Lysychansk and Bakhmut, said Serhii Haidai, military governor of Luhansk, an assertion echoed in a report Saturday by Ukraine’s general staff. The road has been bitterly contested for months.

The latest analysis by the Institute for the Study of War said Russian forces were “likely emerging from their operational pause,” citing a series of limited ground assaults northwest of Sloviansk, southeast of Siversk, along the Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway and southwest of the city of Donetsk. “These assaults may indicate that Russian forces are attempting to resume their offensive operations in Donbas,” the analysis said, while noting that “the assaults are still small-scale and were largely unsuccessful.”

Some soldiers serving on front-line positions in the Donetsk region question whether the Russians ever actually paused, saying they have been under constant attack on the ground and with artillery and aerial bombardment.

The sound of heavy explosions is often audible from the front-line cities of Sloviansk and Bakhmut. Smoke from fires dots the horizon south and east of Bakhmut, where Russian forces have been trying to advance.

A rocket hit a small fruit-and-vegetable market in Bakhmut on Friday afternoon, wounding several people. Early Saturday, three more rockets struck a factory and a house in Kostiantynivka but without causing any casualties. “My cafe is broken. Factories are smashed. Everything is closed,” said Vitaliy, 40, as he repaired the boards on his cafe windows the day after the blast. “There is nothing left. What will the people buy?”

In the early hours of Saturday, at least three civilians were killed and three more were injured in a Russian rocket strike on the northern Ukrainian city of Chuhuiv, about 75 miles from the Russian border, regional police said.

In the neighboring Sumy region, one civilian was killed and at least seven more were injured after Russians opened mortar and artillery fire on three towns and villages not far from the Russian border, the regional governor said Saturday.

In Donetsk, seven civilians were killed and 14 more injured, the regional governor said Saturday.

The major strike came Thursday, when a Russian submarine fired cruise missiles into the heart of Vinnytsia, a city of 370,000 people about 125 miles southwest of Kyiv, the capital.

Ukrainian officials said that strike killed at least 23 people, including a 4-year-old girl with Down syndrome, causing outrage in Ukraine and the West.

The Russian defense ministry said the strike on Vinnytsia was directed at a building where top officials from Ukraine’s armed forces were meeting foreign arms suppliers. Ukrainian officials have denied that the building contained military targets.

The war is causing significant economic stress in the rest of the world, reducing global growth both this year and next, Kristalina Georgieva, managing director of the International Monetary Fund, told a hybrid meeting of Group of 20 finance ministers and heads of central banks.

“The war in Ukraine has intensified, exerting added pressures on commodity and food prices,” she said in a statement Saturday. “Global financial conditions are tightening more than previously anticipated. And continuing pandemic-related disruptions and renewed bottlenecks in global supply chains are weighing on economic activity.”

Adding to the stress in Germany, which has been dependent on Russian energy, was a new statement by the Russian gas monopoly, Gazprom, urging German company Siemens to return a turbine it has repaired in Canada to ensure the Nord Stream 1 pipeline delivering gas to Europe can resume working after a 10-day maintenance period that began Monday.

Despite Western sanctions on Russia, Canada has agreed to grant what it has described as a time-limited and revocable permit for Siemens Canada to allow the turbine’s return. But Gazprom claims it has received no guarantees that the unit will be returned.

Germany was already coping with a 60% reduction in gas supplies through that pipeline, amid fears that Russia will not resume deliveries after maintenance. Conservative politicians have revived debate on extending the life of the country’s three remaining nuclear power plants, which produce about 6% of Germany’s electricity, a sensitive topic for the Greens, now in government. The plants are supposed to be shut down by the end of this year.

The European Union has banned the import of Russian coal, but a ban it imposed on oil imports is only gradual and partial. And there is no agreement on banning imports of natural gas. Brussels has also compromised on allowing Gazprom to be paid effectively in rubles, as Russia has demanded, with euro deposits into Gazprom’s own bank immediately shifted into rubles.

The EU has also backed off on enforcing full sanctions on goods moving from mainland Russia to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea. The enclave is separated from the rest of Russia by Poland and Lithuania; Lithuania created tensions with Moscow by announcing that it would impose EU sanctions on Russian goods traveling by train to Russian Kaliningrad through Lithuania.

After fierce Russian complaints, Brussels “updated” its guidelines and said Russia would be allowed to transport civilian-use goods on the sanctions list through Lithuania by rail — though not by road — in amounts comparable to pre-invasion deliveries over the past three years.

There can be targeted checks, Brussels said, to ensure that sanctioned military and dual-use goods and related technologies are not part of the rail shipments.

As Russia seeks more answers to counter the newer NATO mobile artillery systems, it has turned to Iran to explore buying that country’s sophisticated armed drones, the U.S. national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, said last week. On Saturday, a senior American official said that satellite images showed a Russian delegation visiting Iran to view unmanned, weapons-capable drones that could be purchased for use in the war in Ukraine and that could be used to better target the new NATO artillery in counter-battery strikes.

Read the article on the Japan Times, originally published in the New York Times.

La reprise des exportations de céréales depuis l’Ukraine est une « question de vie ou de mort » et nous avons « espoir » qu’un accord soit trouvé cette semaine pour débloquer le port d’Odessa, a déclaré lundi le chef de la diplomatie européenne, Josep Borrell.

« La vie de (…) dizaines de milliers de personnes dépend de cet accord » en train d’être négocié entre la Russie, l’Ukraine, la Turquie et les Nations Unies, a-t-il expliqué à son arrivée à Bruxelles pour une réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères de l’UE consacrée à la guerre en Ukraine.

Le projet d’accord vise à faire sortir par la mer Noire quelque 20 millions de tonnes de céréales bloquées dans des silos ukrainiens à cause de l’offensive menée par Moscou. Il doit aussi faciliter les exportations russes de céréales et d’engrais, affectées par les sanctions occidentales qui frappent les chaînes logistiques et financières russes.

Les sanctions, une erreur?

La Russie a annoncé un « document final » pour une réunion organisée cette semaine par la Turquie. L’Union européenne entend poursuivre sa pression sur Moscou avec de nouvelles sanctions ainsi qu’un soutien financier et militaire à l’Ukraine, a annoncé Josep Borrell.

« Certains dirigeants européens ont déclaré que les sanctions étaient une erreur, une faute. Je ne pense pas que ce soit une erreur, c’est ce que nous devons faire, et nous continuerons à le faire », a-t-il affirmé en réponse à une déclaration du Premier ministre hongrois, Viktor Orban.

Ce dernier avait dénoncé les sanctions vendredi, y voyant « une erreur » car « elles n’ont pas atteint leur but, et ont même eu un effet contraire ». « L’économie européenne s’est tiré une balle dans les poumons et est asphyxiée », avait-il affirmé dans une allocution.

La Commission européenne a présenté vendredi de nouvelles mesures, dont un embargo sur les achats d’or à la Russie. Les ministres doivent par ailleurs se prononcer sur le déblocage d’une cinquième tranche de 500 millions d’euros de la « Facilité européenne pour la paix » pour financer les équipements militaires et les armes fournies à l’Ukraine.

Lire l’article sur le site de BFM TV.

Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, left, with U.S. President Donald Trump in 2017. Abe met Trump 14 times when he led Japan, helping to bolster bilateral relations.   © Kyodo

HIROYUKI AKITA, Nikkei commentator

July 14, 2022

TOKYO — Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s contribution to diplomacy and security cannot be underestimated. While having significantly reinforced the Japan-U.S. alliance, his Indo-Pacific initiative has prompted major nations to rethink their geopolitical strategies.

Read the original article on the Nikkei website.

Read the entire article in Project Syndicate.

OPINION. L’ancien ministre français des Affaires étrangères Hubert Védrine, propose une cogestion des flux migratoires économiques entre les pays de départ, de transit et d’arrivée, par la fixation périodique de quotas par métier

On pourrait évidemment prendre la question migratoire de façon manichéenne. Ce serait plus facile! Soit considérer que les pays d’Europe doivent se fermer complètement à tous les mouvements migratoires et que les demandeurs d’asile ne sont que des immigrants illégaux à refouler de toutes les façons, et exciter les foules contre ces invasions. Soit, au contraire, considérer que tous les immigrants (rebaptisés réfugiés), méritent de trouver asile, au sens le plus élargi du terme, dans les différents pays d’Europe et pourchasser de façon vindicative, par des déclarations morales grandiloquentes et des guérillas judiciaires, tous ceux qui n’acceptent pas ce principe d’ouverture généralisée.

Lire l’article original sur le site Le Temps.

Publié le 11/07/2022 à 20:35

CHRONIQUE – La leçon de morale est un instrument diplomatique périmé à l’ère numérique. Ce qui compte, c’est le soft power décrit par Joseph Nye.

L’UE refuse que la Russie se serve des réunions du G20 en Indonésie comme d’«une plateforme pour sa propagande» sur le conflit en Ukraine, a averti jeudi la porte-parole du chef de la diplomatie européenne Josep Borrell.

Une rencontre des ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays du G20 se déroule dans l’île de Bali jeudi et vendredi pour préparer le sommet des dirigeants des vingt puissances prévu pour novembre au même endroit. Josep Borrell n’a programmé aucune rencontre avec le chef de la diplomatie russe Sergueï Lavrov pendant ces deux journées, ont indiqué ses services.

«Une menace pour la crédibilité»

«La guerre effroyable contre l’Ukraine et les conséquences de l’agression de la Russie seront abordées au cours de ces réunions, mais nous ne permettrons pas que Moscou utilise le G20 comme une plateforme pour sa propagande», a déclaré sa porte-parole, Nabila Massrali, au cours du point de presse quotidien de la Commission européenne. «La participation de la Russie à un haut niveau peut constituer une menace pour la crédibilité, l’efficacité et la pertinence du G20», a-t-elle mis en garde.

L’Indonésie a invité le président russe Vladimir Poutine au sommet de novembre à Bali, malgré la pression occidentale, notamment des États-Unis, pour l’isoler. En guise de solution de compromis, Jakarta a également convié le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky. «Il n’est pas question pour l’UE de boycotter le G20, car il reste un forum essentiel. Nous devons nous assurer que le multilatéralisme peut fonctionner en temps de crise», a ajouté la porte-parole, alors que le monde est confronté à des menaces de famine, à la flambée des prix de l’énergie et de l’alimentation et à l’emballement des risques climatiques.

Le G20, le club des 20 plus grandes économies du monde, compte dans ses rangs des États occidentaux qui ont imposé des sanctions à Moscou, mais également d’autres pays plus réservés, comme la Chine, l’Inde et l’Afrique du Sud.

Lire l’article sur le site du Figaro

https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/ukraine-l-ue-refuse-que-le-g20-serve-de-plateforme-de-propagande-pour-moscou-20220707

CHRONIQUE – L’ambition de Xi Jinping est de rester dans l’histoire comme l’un des trois empereurs contemporains.

Le 1er juillet 1997 la Chine reprenait possession de Hong Kong. Vingt-cinq ans plus tard, Hong Kong connaît une reprise en main par Pékin de plus en plus sévère. Mais tout n’est pas joué, selon le sinologue Jean-Pierre Cabestan, de l’Université Baptiste de Hong Kong.

En seulement vingt-cinq ans, dans un mouvement qui s’est largement accéléré depuis l’arrivée de Xi Jinping à la tête du pouvoir chinois en 2013, Hong Kong a perdu une grande partie des libertés d’expression politique qui la caractérisaient sous le contrôle des Britanniques. Xi Jinping a même tenu à venir, en personne, à l’occasion de cet anniversaire, marquer ce qu’il qualifie de «renaissance» de l’ancienne colonie. Analyse avec Jean-Pierre professeur à l’Université Baptiste de Hong Kong.

Lors de la rétrocession de Hong Kong, le Royaume-Uni et la Chine se sont engagés à respecter le principe : « un pays, deux systèmes ». Que prévoyait ce « deal » ?

La Grande Bretagne exigeait des garanties politiques, institutionnelles et juridiques pour préserver les libertés existantes et la démocratie. La Chine a accepté de préserver l’économie et le mode de vie « capitalistes » de Hong Kong, alors que le reste du pays vivait sous le « socialisme ». Mais c’est la distinction fondamentale faite par le Parti communiste chinois : préserver le « capitalisme », oui, mais il ne parle pas de démocratie.

La promesse a-t-elle été tenue ?

Hong Kong a vécu avec une certaine autonomie politique. La plupart des libertés politiques ont été préservées (presse, association, multipartisme, parole, manifestation) et les élections devaient devenir courantes… Sauf que, dès le départ, le Chef de l’exécutif a été choisi par Pékin, et formellement élu par un comité électoral dominé par ses partisans. On est loin de l’idée de départ qui était d’évoluer progressivement vers une élection du parlement (le Conseil législatif) et du Chef de l’exécutif au suffrage universel direct ; promesse non tenue, d’où la frustration des Hongkongais.

Comment s’est construite la reprise en main chinoise de Hong Kong ?

Elle a pris un virage décisif en août 2014. Pékin annonce une réforme du mode d’élection du chef de l’exécutif, qui peut se résumer ainsi : ok, on introduit le suffrage universel direct mais c’est nous (le PC chinois) qui choisissons les deux ou trois candidats susceptibles de se présenter ». ​Personne d’autre que Pékin ne pouvait proposer des candidats à ce poste, pas même les partis politiques de Hong Kong.

Lire l’entretien dans son intégralité sur le site de Ouest France.

Les cryptomonnaies portent mal leur nom. Leurs cours sont très volatils et les coûts de transactions sont gigantesques, or ce sont deux des principales caractéristiques d’une monnaie, explique Hélène Rey. Leur régulation devient inéluctable, ce qui fera prendre conscience de leurs déficiences.

Lire l’article dans son intégralité sur le site des Echos.

The world is split into three major political blocs, with « neutral » powers like India and Turkey gaining influence by playing the two old camps, Western and Russia-China, off against each other.

HIROYUKI AKITA, Nikkei commentator

July 3, 2022

TOKYO — Japan is one of the major powers that is least sensitive to changes in the world order, thanks to its « privileged » U.S. protection from foreign aggression, and it continues to develop its security policy on the assumption that the U.S.-led global order will continue.

This is by no means misguided, but recent geopolitical developments have made a coolheaded reassessment of the long-term viability of the U.S.-centric order more urgent than ever.

Roughly four months after Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, it has become clear that the postwar order built on Washington’s leadership is on the verge of collapse. There is no dearth of facts to support this view. When the United Nations voted on a resolution to strip Russia of its seat on the Human Rights Council on April 7, 100 countries either voted against, abstained or did not vote, versus 93 nations that voted in favor.

According to the Economist Intelligent Unit, as of March 30, countries that have joined the international sanctions against Russia, or at least criticized it for its aggression against Ukraine, account for just 36% of the world’s population. Most are Western democracies.

Meanwhile, 64% of the world’s people live in countries that are either neutral on the conflict in Ukraine or have expressed « understanding » or « support » for Russia. The neutrals make up 32% of the global population and include India, Brazil and South Africa. The rest, the pro-Russian camp, includes China and Iran.

A tally shows the results of a vote to remove Russia from the United Nations Human Rights Council during an emergency session of the U.N. General Assembly on April 7.    © Reuters

The leaders of major Western democracies, including U.S. President Joe Biden, like to say the world is united in denouncing Russia’s aggression, but that is obviously not the case. This reality was highlighted by the Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s premier defense summit, held on June 10-12 in Singapore.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida denounced Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, as did defense ministers from Japan, the U.S., South Korea and Australia. All of them warned of China’s increasingly assertive military behavior, calling for unity to counter what they see as a Chinese threat.

But their criticism of Moscow and Beijing was not echoed by many countries in Southeast Asia or the South Pacific. Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto said his country has healthy ties with Russia, which he described as « a very good friend. » He also called China its close partner.

Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein made clear his country’s neutral position, while his Fijian counterpart, Inia Seruiratu, said the island nation will try to reap benefits from its relations with all countries, including China.

Indonesia’s Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto speaks at the second plenary session of the 19th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 11.    © Reuters

Such remarks would have been unthinkable in a world where the U.S. was securely in charge. Many participants from Southeast Asia and India at the conference said U.S. leadership has been in steady decline for around 10 years, with many citing the following events:

In August 2012, then-U.S. President Barack Obama warned his Syrian counterpart, Bashar al-Assad, that the use of chemical weapons would cross a « red line » and invite U.S. intervention. Undeterred, Syrian forces killed hundreds of people with sarin gas the following year. Obama did not respond. Also in 2013, Obama declared the U.S. would no longer act as « the world’s policeman. » He took no action to stop the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 or to prevent China from building military bases in the South China Sea.

His successor, Donald Trump, adopted an « America First » policy, in effect ceding U.S. leadership in world affairs. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is taking place against this geopolitical backdrop.

In hopes of further undermining U.S. influence, Moscow has been stepping up its pressure on Asia. For example, it has threatened to halt shipments of arms components to Southeast Asian nations if they back the Western condemnation of Russia’s « special military operation » in Ukraine, according to one diplomatic source in the region.

Russia is Southeast Asia’s largest arms supplier. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia sold some $10.9 billion of weapons to countries in the region between 2000 and 2021, more than the U.S. did.

Big buyers of Russian arms, especially Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia, would have trouble operating their militaries if Russia were to cut them off. It is safe to assume that Moscow is applying similar pressure to countries in the Middle East and Africa that rely on Russian military equipment.

China is using not just diplomatic pressure but also economic aid and investment to win over developing countries.

These development point to the end of the U.S.-led world order and its replacement not by a world without poles, or « G-zero, » as some experts have predicted, but by a tripolar world where three blocs of nations compete for global influence.

The first group consists of Western and Asian democracies, such as the U.S., the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Britain and Canada. The second bloc comprises China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and other authoritarian countries. The third is a loose coalition of « neutral » nations not allied with either the West or the China-Russia bloc. This camp includes India, South Africa, Indonesia, Turkey and Brazil.

As the confrontation between the « West » — including its Asian members — and the China-Russia bloc intensifies, the neutrals sense an opportunity to expand their influence through a careful balancing act. Encouraged by their success, large countries in this third group, such as India and Turkey, are now more actively pursuing their own agendas.

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, right, meets British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss in Ankara, Turkey on June 23.    © Reuters

Turkey, for instance, brokered peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, then held a foreign ministers meeting with Britain on June 23 to explore ways of ending Russia’s blockade of Black Sea ports.

India, for its part, has stepped up its imports of Russian oil since March, but at the same time is working with Japan, the U.S. and Australia as part of the Quad group to counter China’s expansion.

As many of these « neutral » nations do not rely on a security alliance with any leading power, they eschew grand statements of principle, tending to focus on narrower interests. This makes it harder for them to stay as united on any given issue as either the Western democracies or the China-Russia alliance.

Leading Western powers need to bring these fence-sitters to their side and restore the status quo. But doing so will not be easy. To have a hope of success, Western countries must identify the needs of these nations and patiently build relationships with them based on mutual interest. The West may not have much choice: China is set to engage in diplomatic efforts with the same goal in mind.

Read the original article on the Nikkei website.

L’économiste liste, dans sa chronique, les sujets sur lesquels le gouvernement et les différentes oppositions pourraient trouver un accord au cas par cas.

Emmanuel Macron a clairement annoncé que seuls les partis ayant déjà gouverné, ensemble ou séparément – Parti communiste (PC), Europe Ecologie-Les Verts (EELV), Parti socialiste (PS), Ensemble ! et Les Républicains (LR) –, pourront faire partie d’une possible « coalition d’action », tandis qu’en seraient exclus La France insoumise (LFI) et le Rassemblement national (RN), qui n’ont jamais gouverné. Le programme de gouvernement va devoir faire rapidement se confronter les protagonistes de la campagne électorale à la réalité. Il va falloir, en effet, prendre la mesure des investissements indispensables à brève échéance, que ce soit en matière de transition écologique, de résilience économique, de restructuration du système énergétique, d’éducation, de santé ou de défense. Dans l’immédiat, il va falloir, en outre, accepter qu’on ne pourra pas faire entendre raison à un agresseur – la Russie –, prêt à réduire ses revenus de 20 %, si on ne peut pas supporter que les nôtres baissent de 2 %. Ainsi, tout cela impliquera une ponction notable sur le pouvoir d’achat.

C’est au gouvernement bientôt remanié qu’il appartiendra de fixer l’addition. Et il devra compter juste. La soudaine remontée des alarmes sur les taux d’intérêt publics est sans nul doute excessive, mais elle signale un risque de panique qu’il faut endiguer. La France, dans ce contexte, doit trouver le bon équilibre budgétaire : certainement pas replier bagage de manière précipitée, comme en 2011-2014. Pas non plus, cependant, oublier toute discipline, à la manière du « quoi qu’il en coûte » de la période 2020-2022, qui n’a en fait pas été si onéreux, mais qui a laissé une trace politique impérissable. La première ministre ne peut pas décemment exiger des partenaires potentiels de la « coalition d’action » de s’inscrire dans la seule logique du projet présidentiel, mais M. Macron a cependant fixé certaines limites à la possibilité de s’en affranchir.

Terrains de compromis

Quels sont alors les terrains du compromis ? Les écologistes seront jugés sur un seul sujet : l’ambition climatique et, au-delà, l’ambition écologique du programme. La France est gravement en retard sur l’horizon d’une réduction de 50 % des émissions de gaz à effet de serre d’ici à 2030, et elle ne peut rattraper ce retard qu’en accélérant le déploiement des renouvelables et en misant sur la sobriété.

Lire la chronique dans son intégralité sur le site du Monde.

Black Sea Oil and Gas (BSOG) does not have war risk insurance for the Ana and Doina natural gas fields, which have recently started production, but the project moves forward, BSOG CEO Mark Beacom said on Tuesday.

He participated in a ceremony at Vadu, Constanta County, to mark the start of natural gas exploitation under the Midia project operated by BSOG. The first gas from these blocks entered the national grid on June 15.

According to Beacom, there is no war in Romania’s economic zone, but there is an impact. Mines have been detected near the platform, there were warships around, planes flying over the platform. Serpent Island, he said, is not far away, and they have witnessed Crimean platforms being bombed and everything is so close. But he added the company will carry through its project.

Asked if the project is insured against such events, he said no. He said you can’t have insurance when you’re operating near a war, so the company has to take up the risks.

Asked if BSOG will drop the lawsuit filed against Romania over some provisions in the Offshore Drilling Law that are still in force, he replied that he has not yet made a decision.

In his turn, Gabriel Comanescu, CEO of Grup Servicii Petroliere (GSP), the company that built the project, pointed out that this is the largest infrastructure project carried out in Romania in the last 30 years.

« It was a complicated project. The first engineering works started in 2019, laying the pipeline on land and under the sea took 90 days, and training started a year before. The offshore platform has no human operators, there is only maintenance and emergency response, » Comanescu said.

According to him, the BSOG project is a huge step forward towards reducing Romania’s dependence on natural gas imports.

« It is a project made 95% by GSP. From my point of view, it is the largest infrastructure project of the last 30 years, a brand new, tailor-made one. It is made by our strength, made by a Romanian company. It’s like we started with a Trabant and ended with a Mercedes S Class, » added Comanescu.

Read the original article on the website Act News

https://www.actmedia.eu/energy-and-environment/bsog-s-beacom-says-company-has-no-war-risk-insurance-for-black-sea-gas-projects/98413

Lebanon’s parliament speaker is calling for a unity government that will rescue the country from its calamities. However, the reasons for these calamities and for Lebanon’s failure to have proper governance are mutilated concepts like unity government, “mithakia,” which means proper representation among all sects, and “consensual democracy,” which means all the different parties should be included in policymaking.
Lebanon has always had unity governments and none have been able to put forward any real program for the country. The concept of unity government came about after the death of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and was enforced after the Doha Agreement. During the time of Hariri, which extended from 1992, shortly after the end of the civil war, until 2005, the government was one of technocrats.
When Hariri took power after the Taif Agreement, the two main Christian parties were put out of power. Michel Aoun was in exile and Samir Geagea was in prison. Other politicians who kept their places under Taif, like Nabih Berri, the speaker of the parliament, and Walid Jumblatt, benefited from inflated government contracts in return for their acquiescence.
Many say the Hariri years institutionalized corruption. However, during the Hariri years, there was a business plan driving the country. After his death in 2005 came the concept of unity government. This was enforced after the 2008 Doha Agreement, which gave Hezbollah and Amal a third of the Cabinet and the power to veto government decisions.
Lebanon also has the mutilated concept of mithakia, or the fallacy of representation among the sects, which was reinforced after the Doha Agreement, i.e., each one that is strongest in his denomination should be assigned a position for that denomination. So, the Sunni party that gets most of the Sunni seats in parliament should have the premiership, the Shiite party that has most of the Shiite seats should have the speaker’s position, and similarly for the Christians and the presidential role.
The political class has no plan for the country, just a power-sharing scheme that ultimately shares the spoils of the state and through which each party uses some government facility or department as its fief, from which to extract as much money as possible. Former foreign minister and the president’s son-in-law, Gebran Bassil, who is a main pillar of corruption in the country, spelled it out on the sidelines of the 2019 World Economic Forum at Davos. He said that Lebanon could teach London and Washington how to manage a country without a budget.
Thus, the country was turned into a “farm,” as one of my Gulf colleagues described it. Although he added that even a farm has more order than Lebanon. There is no order to anything, just a corrupt class of elites agreeing among themselves to pillage the country. They fight over the ministerial quotas for each party and compete over the most lucrative ministries, like the Ministry of Energy and Water, where all the fatty fuel contracts go. No one can be held accountable as they are all part of the government. This was the motivation for the memorable slogan of the protest groups, “killun yaani killun” (all means all).

The political class has been very clever in benefiting the most from power while holding no responsibility for what has happened. This is mostly represented by Bassil’s famous line, “ma khalouna,” meaning “they did not let us,” blaming the failure on others.
A unity government is not really a democratic practice. Democracy means the minority follows the majority, which rules while the minority is in opposition and keeps a check on those who rule. Today, in the US, the administration is a Democratic one and not a hybrid between Democrats and Republicans. Similarly, in the UK, the government is a Conservative one headed by Boris Johnson, while the Labour Party is in opposition. The party that wins an election puts together a comprehensive political, economic and security strategy for the country and is held responsible for its success or failure.
One might say that, in the US, the people directly elect the head of state, while in Lebanon the parliament elects the president. Others might say that, unlike the US and UK, where there are dual-party systems and where the political scenes are divided between the liberal left and conservative right, Lebanon is a country where the political configuration is divided along sectarian lines.
Still, in the elections they are standing as blocks. For example, Hezbollah, Amal and the Free Patriotic Movement formed one block in the parliamentary elections. They represent the so-called resistance block. In the case of Lebanon, parties of similar thinking should form a coalition, with the coalition that has the majority of seats in parliament forming a government to put together a comprehensive plan and be held accountable for its execution and success. However, the leaders of the political class do not want any accountability. They know that, despite their differences on policy issues, they are “brothers” in corruption. They want to stay together and keep the status quo.
Today, Lebanon is collapsing and is in dire need of an International Monetary Fund bailout package. The Najib Mikati government, which is a unity government that took office from September 2021 to May 2022 and is now in caretaker status, was not able to seal a deal with the IMF. This was also the case of the government of Hassan Diab, which was in power from January 2020 until August 2021, when its members resigned en masse following the Beirut blast and it became a caretaker government. In total, two-and-a-half years of governments and caretaker governments have been unable to reach a deal with the IMF, which Lebanon badly needs because of this consensual democracy.
The mutilated concept of unity government and mithakia are driving political paralysis. It is giving an escape route to the different political parties, allowing them to blame the situation on others. The solution is to have one block form a government, put a comprehensive plan in place and be responsible in front of the Lebanese people and the international community.

Read the original article on the website Arab News

https://www.arabnews.com/node/2113571

Postwar relations between China and Japan have seen a number of epoch-making occasions, and one of the most important events in recent years was the November 2014 summit meeting between then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

The meeting became an opportunity for the two countries, which had been experiencing increased friction and tensions over the Senkaku Islands, to ease and stabilize strained relations.

Prior to the Abe-Xi meeting on Nov. 10, 2014, the governments of the two countries released a four-point statement titled “Regarding Discussions toward Improving Japan-China Relations.”

The statement said, “Both sides confirmed that they would observe the principles and spirit of the four basic documents between Japan and China and that they would continue to develop a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.”

The four documents are the joint communique released on Sept. 29, 1972; the peace and friendship treaty issued on Aug. 12, 1978; the joint declaration released on Nov. 26, 1998; and the joint statement issued on May 7, 2008.

We can say that both countries share the common view that the documents serve as the basis of today’s China-Japan relations, although there are difficulties and uncertainties existing between them.

Nevertheless, Japan’s China policy fluctuated largely in the 30 years after the end of the Cold War and as a result it has been difficult for Tokyo to plan long-term policies.

But what constitutes a favorable Japan-China relationship from Tokyo’s viewpoint, and what kind of approach is Japan trying to take?

Several other questions also arise when trying to understand the ties between Beijing and Tokyo.

How should Japan regard China’s economic growth?

How does establishing favorable China-Japan ties comply with the U.S.-Japan alliance?

And how will Japan achieve a balance between the national interests of maintaining economic ties with China and the threats posed by Beijing from national security perspectives?

Japan’s basic stance on China seems to have been not having a China strategy.

In other words, it is difficult to show any documents that clearly describe Japan’s strategy on China.

Complexity

So why did Japan lack a China strategy until now? There are three main reasons.

First is the complexity of Japan’s relationship with Taiwan.

The postwar China-Japan relationship had been based on ties with the “two Chinas” — the relations with Taiwan defined by the peace treaty signed by Tokyo and Taipei on April 28, 1952, the same day that the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force, and relations with China defined by the 1972 China-Japan joint communique and the 1978 peace and friendship treaty signed by Beijing and Tokyo.

And the outline of these relations was not built by Japan on its own initiative but rather was largely determined by the U.S.-China relationship of the times.

At the time of signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in September 1951, how to handle the two Chinas had been a difficult diplomatic issue between the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as between the U.S. and Japan. But the policy had been established for Japan to choose to side with the government in Taiwan.

After Japan normalized diplomatic ties with China in 1972, it became difficult for Tokyo to come up with a proactive strategy that would respond to the sensitive question of how to balance between China and Taiwan while respecting Beijing’s “one China” position.

Second is the issue of postwar settlements and perceptions of history.

Unlike other developed countries such as the U.S., the U.K. or France, Japan had to handle postwar settlements as a top diplomatic agenda in its relations with the governments of both Taiwan and China.

In other words, building a foundation for a diplomatic relationship with Beijing was postwar Japan’s one and only China policy goal, and Tokyo put in a great amount of effort to achieve it.

It was not the kind of goal that could simply be achieved with the conclusion of a peace treaty.

Third, in providing official development assistance (ODA) to China, Japan regarded it as an alternative to war reparations and, at the same time, tended to prioritize pursuing mutual economic benefits rather than political strategies.

Moreover, it is widely recognized in Japan that its ODA supported China’s modernization and economic growth. And it is true that such assistance strengthened economic ties between the two countries and nurtured mutual benefits.

The Foreign Ministry’s review of Japan’s ODA to China says: “Since 1979, ODA to China has contributed to maintaining and promoting the Reform and Opening Up Policy of China, and at the same time, it has formed a strong foundation to support Japan-China relations.”

Japan’s cooperation toward boosting the Chinese economy was inseparably interlocked with the issue of wartime settlements and perceptions of history.

The Foreign Ministry also said in 2018 that new ODA projects would be terminated in fiscal 2018 and all multiyear projects would be concluded by the end of fiscal 2021. This means that the end of fiscal 2021 in March this year represented the completion of a period in the postwar history of Japan-China relations.

Because of these reasons, it has been difficult for Japan to proactively plan a China strategy from long-term perspectives.

Japan’s China policy has so far been focused on short-term efforts to repair the relationship when it deteriorated, as well as on strengthening economic cooperation and friendship.

However, such times are coming to an end. We are now facing an era in which Japan needs to create a desirable China strategy on its own initiative, taking into account its long-term national interests.

Establishing ties

Then what is a desirable China strategy for Japan?

Japan’s China policy has been based on supporting China’s economic growth through ODA, regarding it as being in Japan’s national interests and hoping Beijing will play a constructive role in the Asia-Pacific region. But this is being forced to change.

Japan and China normalized diplomatic ties in 1972, thanks to great contributions by Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, who headed the Liberal Democratic Party’s middle-of-the-road Keiseikai faction, and Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, who headed the party’s liberal Kochikai faction.

Meanwhile, the party’s conservative Fukuda faction headed by Takeo Fukuda had many pro-Taiwan lawmakers who were cautious about cutting ties with Taiwan and establishing diplomatic ties with the communist regime in Beijing.

The 1972 system stepped up further in 1978 when the Fukuda administration signed a peace and friendship treaty with China. This was a major step in that support for boosting economic ties and friendly relations with China had been established within the LDP regardless of factions.

The largest opposition Japan Socialist Party had been even more active than the LDP in developing ties with Beijing, and the Foreign Ministry’s China school had also been backing such efforts behind the scenes.

Such a consensus eroded gradually with the end of the Cold War and due to change in the power balance between Tokyo and Beijing brought about by Japan’s economic slowdown.

Furthermore, the current international environment largely differs from the Cold War era when the 1972 system was established.

China and Russia are now demonstrating a cooperative relationship, effectively working together like allies. A joint statement issued following a meeting between Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin on Feb. 4 said, “Friendship between the two states has no limits, there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation, strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries.”

As two authoritarian regimes — China and Russia — deepen cooperation while democracies including Japan and Western countries enhance their partnerships, the international society is being increasingly divided into two camps, centered around the two sides of U.S.-China confrontations.

Japan must consider a China strategy by setting the framework for future China-Japan relations in a broader context of the changing global balance of power.

Japan’s diplomacy

Taking into account such changes in the global community, the government should make use of the meeting of the four ministers — the prime minister, the foreign minister, the defense minister and the chief Cabinet secretary — within the National Security Council and come up with a long-term basic policy to place the China strategy at the core of the nation’s security strategy.

Amid increasing tensions between Washington and Beijing, Japan needs to strengthen deterrence against China based on the U.S.-Japan alliance and at the same time maintain and boost multilayered communications with China, making diplomatic efforts to stably develop China-Japan ties to a certain extent.

On top of this, unlike the U.S., it is also important for Tokyo to take part in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership free trade agreement to proactively facilitate regional economic cooperation in East Asia in view of Japan’s national interests.

It is possible to advance cooperation with China for regional economic development while stepping up deterrence against Beijing and restricting economic relations with the country in certain economic areas from the perspective of economic security.

Completion of all ODA projects in China at the end of fiscal 2021 in March indicates an end to one era after World War II.

This means it is important for Japan to plan a long-term China strategy for the next 50 years within this year — the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties with Beijing — and share it within the government and also with the Japanese people.

Find the original article on the website The Japan Times

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2022/06/30/commentary/japan-commentary/japan-china-strategy/

Ce mardi 28 juin, Nathalie Collin, directrice générale adjointe du Groupe La Poste, Patrice Geoffron, directeur du Centre de géopolitique de l’énergie et des matières premières (CGEMP Paris Dauphine), ainsi que Philippe Chalmin, fondateur du Cercle Cyclope et spécialiste des matières premières, étaient les invités dans la deuxième partie de l’émission Le Grand Journal de l’Éco présentée par Hedwige Chevriillon. Le Grand Journal de l’Éco est à voir ou écouter du lundi au vendredi sur BFM Business.

Regarder son intervention sur le site de BFM.

Seules les décisions portées par Bruxelles et les poussées écologistes contre le nucléaire depuis vingt-cinq ans expliquent la situation actuelle.

Par Jean de Kervasdoué

La crise de l’énergie, dont on n’a pas fini de payer les conséquences, ne doit à la guerre en Ukraine que d’en être la brutale révélatrice, car elle trouve son origine dans les politiques allemande, européenne et française menées depuis un quart de siècle.

Sa première source figure dans l’idéologie libérale qui a inspiré la folle régulation du marché européen de l’énergie en général, celui de l’électricité en particulier. La seconde est à rechercher dans l’idéologie écologique qui a combattu avec succès en France, mais surtout en Allemagne, tout développement de l’énergie nucléaire en laissant penser que le robinet du gaz russe serait toujours ouvert et que le vent, le soleil, et même la mer et la biomasse, suffiraient à le compléter.

Lire l’article intégral sur le site du Point.

Alors que se tient à Kigali la réunion des chefs d’État et de gouvernement du Commonwealth, la Rwandaise Louise Mushikiwabo revient sur les liens compliqués entre l’OIF, qu’elle dirige, et son pendant anglo-saxon.