Aucune guerre n’est gratuite. Pour l’Europe, l’invasion de l’Ukraine est un choc économique de premier ordre. Dans cette pièce de doctrine, Olivier Blanchard et Jean Pisani-Ferry articulent une réponse macroéconomique.
Personne ne peut prédire avec certitude comment évoluera la guerre en Ukraine et quelles seront ses conséquences géopolitiques sur les prochains mois, a fortiori sur les prochaines années. Néanmoins, les responsables politiques doivent dès aujourd’hui penser les conséquences de la guerre et les réponses à y apporter, en sachant qu’elles devront être adaptées au fil des évolutions de la situation. Par ailleurs, ils doivent réfléchir à la cohérence de leurs actions conjointes, qu’il s’agisse des sanctions contre la Russie ou des subventions et transferts à leurs propres citoyens. C’est ce que nous essayons de faire dans ce texte, en nous concentrant sur les problèmes macroéconomiques les plus pertinents pour l’Europe.
Nous commençons par envisager les implications potentielles de la guerre et passons en revue les différents canaux par lesquels elle affecte les perspectives macroéconomiques. Il en ressort essentiellement que, même si les canaux de la demande et de la finance entrent tous en jeu, et même si les implications budgétaires directes de la guerre sont importantes – en raison de l’augmentation des dépenses de défense et du coût de la protection des réfugiés -, l’impact le plus fort de la guerre en Europe se fera probablement sentir sur les prix de l’énergie et, dans une moindre mesure, sur les prix des denrées alimentaires.
Nous analysons ensuite les déterminants du prix de l’énergie. Tout dépend à la fois des décisions de la Russie, quand bien même il n’y aurait pas de sanctions, et de l’effet de potentielles sanctions sur ses décisions. À cet égard, il faut distinguer pétrole et charbon d’une part, et le gaz d’autre part. Concernant le pétrole et le charbon, la Russie doit plus ou moins aligner son prix sur celui du marché mondial et concurrentiel, sur lequel elle est confrontée à une demande très élastique. Pour le gaz, dont le commerce repose sur des infrastructures spécifiques faisant de l’Union européenne un marché à part, la demande est plutôt inélastique et la Russie peut donc être considérée comme en quasi-monopole.
Il aura fallu attendre la publication des bilans démographiques de l’année 2021 pour pouvoir apprécier objectivement la gestion de l’épidémie du Covid-19 par les États de la planète. Les statistiques en la matière sont en effet simples et fiables, même si certaines ne sont encore, dans certains pays, que des estimations pour 2021. Grâce à elles, au-delà de la seule évolution de la santé des populations, l’on peut mesurer l’ampleur des inégalités et le degré de cohésion sociale.
Nous avions déjà souligné dans ces colonnes l’importance que nous attachons à ces données et à un indicateur qui en est issu : l’espérance de vie à la naissance.
D’autres pays dépendants du gaz russe pourraient-ils eux aussi s’en voir privés? Philippe Chalmin, professeur d’histoire économique à l’université Paris-Dauphine, répond à cette question.
The European Commission on Monday called for Eurojust’s mandate to be strengthened to facilitate investigations into possible war crimes in Ukraine.
The European Union’s executive branch wants the agency — which coordinates judicial cooperation between member states’ national authorities to prosecute transnational criminal activities including human trafficking, smuggling, terrorism and cybercrime — to be able to collect and store evidence of alleged war crimes in Ukraine.
It would also be able to process the data including videos, audio recordings and satellite images, and share the evidence with the relevant national and international authorities, including the International Criminal Court.
« Since the start of the Russian invasion, the world has been witnessing the atrocities committed in Bucha, Kramatorsk and other Ukrainian cities. Those responsible for the war crimes in Ukraine must be held accountable, » Didier Reynders, EU Commissioner for Justice, said in a statement.
« To this end, we must ensure that evidence is safely preserved, analysed and exchanged with national and international authorities, including the International Criminal Court, » he added.
Marialena Pantazi, research assistant at the European Policy Centre at the Brussels-based European Policy Centre think tank, explained to Euronews that Eurojust’s general mandate « adapts accordingly to ongoing crises » with the agency cracking down on a migrant smuggling network in 2020 or on crimes including fraud and smuggling during the pandemic.
The Commission’s proposal to extend its mandate over its work pertaining to alleged crimes in Ukraine « would enable Eurojust to collect and store evidence on the crimes committed by Russia and share this information with other authorities. »
« Evidence is already being gathered by national authorities but the situation will not allow their safe storage in Ukraine, therefore, here is where the Eurojust’s mandate changes. Although they can provide support to the investigation and prosecution of crimes initiated by other member states, up to now, Eurojust was not able to preserve and analyse such evidence. Another innovation proposed is that the Agency would probably be able to directly cooperate with the International Criminal Court, » she underlined.
The head of the agency, Ladislav Hamran, welcomed the proposal in a statement, arguing that « the mandate to store and preserve evidence related to war crimes and other core international crimes will further bear witness to the European Union’s commitment to the rule of law, including in war situations, and to Eurojust’s mission of getting justice done across borders. »
The Commission’s proposal will need approval from the Parliament and European Council.
Eurojust supported the creation on 25 march of a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) into international crimes committed in Ukraine under the impulsion of Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine.
The JIT was joined on Monday by the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan QC, in what he described as a « landmark step ».
« The JIT aims to facilitate investigations and prosecutions in the concerned states as well as those that could be taken forward before the International Criminal Court. Through its participation in the JIT, my Office will significantly enhance its ability to access and collect information relevant to our independent investigations, » he said.
« Critically, we will be able to conduct rapid and real-time coordination and cooperation with the JIT partner countries, » he added in a statement.
Après la réélection d’Emmanuel Marcon à l’Elysée, les relations franco-marocaines sont face au défi du renouveau après cinq ans de vicissitudes. Détails.
Comme prévu par les sondages, le président français Emmanuel Macron a pu se faire réélire. Le locataire de l’Elysée a pu s’imposer face à sa rivale du Rassemblement National (RN), Marine Le Pen, au second tour de l’élection présidentielle en obtenant 58,5% des suffrages. Le candidat de la République en Marche a pu ainsi succéder à lui-même, fait inédit depuis la fin du mandat de Jacques Chirac étant que ni Nicolas Sarkozy ni François Hollande n’ont pu faire de même. Au Maroc, pays qui abrite la plus grande communauté française en Afrique, les ressortissants français ont voté massivement pour le président sortant, en lui accordant 87,44% des voix.
En obtenant un nouveau mandat à l’Elysée, le président français est confronté à une mission de taille sur le plan diplomatique : rétablir le prestige de la France sur la scène internationale d’autant que son quinquennat précédent a été émaillé de revers, dont la crise avec le Mali et le retrait des troupes françaises de ce pays historiquement sous influence française est l’exemple le plus marquant.
Sur l’échiquier africain, le Maroc occupe une place importante aux yeux de la France qui considère le Royaume comme un « pays ami ». Une appellation qui date de l’époque de l’indépendance et qui demeure d’actualité malgré les crises qui ont pu surgir. Les spéculations abondent de toutes parts pour tenter d’entrevoir ce à quoi ressembleront les relations entre Rabat et Paris durant le second mandat d’Emmanuel Macron, surtout que les relations bilatérales n’ont pas été si prospères récemment. Les malentendus ont été nombreux.
Flashback : le président français n’a pas visité le Maroc depuis le 15 novembre 2018, date de l’inauguration du TGV Tanger-Kénitra où il a accompagné SM le Roi. Une autre visite a été prévue en juin 2019 pour l’inauguration de l’Usine PSA à Kénitra mais elle a fini par être annulée. Malgré les justifications d’agenda avancées par l’Elysée, de nombreux commentateurs ont estimé que cette annulation n’a pas été fortuite et serait due à des divergences sur plusieurs sujets dont celui de la ligne TGV Agadir-Marrakech.
Depuis lors, le dialogue entre Rabat et Paris est moins chaleureux, sachant que des visites ont été effectuées par les ministres de l’Intérieur, de la Justice et des Affaires étrangères au Maroc mais pour régler des problèmes qui persistent toujours. La question migratoire demeure l’un des points épineux, la décision de Paris de réduire de moitié les visas accordés aux Marocains a été accueillie avec agacement par les autorités marocaines qui, pourtant, coopèrent de façon proactive dans le dossier des mineurs isolés. Aussi, la crise du Covid-19, la guerre en Ukraine ont-elles éloigné les deux pays l’un de l’autre, laissant le vide s’installer entre eux.
Macron plutôt que Le Pen ?
L’élection de Macron demeure préférable aux yeux du Maroc, estime Jawad Kerdoudi, président de l’Institut marocain des Relations internationales qui estime que la candidate du RN, Marine Le Pen, aurait été plus dure sur la question migratoire si elle était élue. Notre interlocuteur juge que la France est un appui précieux du Maroc dans l’affaire du Sahara. « Dans les cinq prochaines années, le Maroc doit profiter de la présidence française de l’Union Européenne pour obtenir une position plus audacieuse de l’UE sur la question du Sahara », a-t-il précisé.
En plus de la question migratoire, l’affaire Pegasus n’a pas été de nature à réchauffer les relations. Le gouvernement français n’a pas réagi aux accusations mensongères d’espionnage émises contre le Maroc, tellement grotesques comme de hautes personnalités françaises le reconnaissent.
Pour autant, l’attitude de la Justice française, qui a jugé irrecevables les poursuites engagées par le Maroc contre les médias français ayant relayé ces accusations, a interloqué l’opinion publique marocaine. À quoi s’ajoute une question beaucoup plus complexe : l’Afrique de l’Ouest où la présence économique de plus en plus importante du Maroc est vue avec méfiance en France qui préfère ne pas avoir un concurrent supplémentaire dans sa zone d’influence traditionnelle.
La diplomatie des coulisses en ordre de bataille
En dépit de tous les soucis qui puissent subsister, les relations entre Paris et Rabat sont très enracinées. La France est le deuxième partenaire commercial et le premier investisseur étranger au Maroc avec un réseau de 1000 entreprises implantées. Raison pour laquelle les deux pays sont condamnés à coopérer.
Comme ses anciens soutiens traditionnels au sein de la classe politique française (Jean Louis Borloo, Dominique De Villepin, Jack Lang…) ne sont plus politiquement actifs, le Maroc mise sur le réseautage pour réactiver ses réseaux à Paris. Mission qui incombe au nouvel Ambassadeur du Royaume, Mohammed Benchaâboun. Ce dernier multiplie les rencontres avec le groupe d’amitié Maroc-France au Sénat, dont le président, Christian Cambon, est l’uns des fervents défenseurs de l’amitié franco-marocaine.
In this special episode, Why It Matters follows up with CFR President Richard Haass to hear his insights on the war in Ukraine.
The war in Ukraine continues to rattle the world. As the conflict drags on, the West faces serious questions about how to proceed. Why It Matters Host Gabrielle Sierra sits down with CFR President Richard Haass to discuss the current situation and the global repercussions, including alleged Russian war crimes, the refugee crisis, and the energy debate.
Our rapidly changing world raises questions about what is happening this minute, this week, this year and beyond.
So often, we read headlines on the impact of technology in our lives and could be forgiven for feeling a sense of doom, gloom and resistance to change. People have a lot to say about the fear and risks of what new technologies might take away from us as humans, particularly when it comes to AI and data security and privacy. These are valid concerns. But I think we risk missing the point.
Radical new technology offers up so many opportunities to do good. It can be a democratiser, an enabler and a source of sustainable change for businesses as they undertake digital transformation. It can also be a powerful force for social good too. We need to change the narrative around technology. We must reframe the conversation to focus less on the elimination of jobs, and instead more on how we can enable meaningful work – and to share more widely the ways in which technology can be harnessed for good and at scale.
From Data to Wisdom
New technology affords us a huge opportunity to make a difference. It can widen access to data – quality data, data at scale – and improve our ability to mine that data for meaningful and actionable insights. This is a significant capacity that has been lacking in the past. How do we find out the information we really need to go from data to wisdom? How can we cut through the immense volume of data to find meaning, and how can we reuse data from the past?
At the moment, about 90% of the data we archive is never ever touched again, but there could be incredible information at hand – a potential treasure trove, in fact – which could be repurposed in the future for the benefit of humankind.
Getting Smart with Healthcare
Let’s think about the role of data in the healthcare sector – the most precious, personal and sensitive data there is: our DNA. It’s valuable to both the owner of that data and those who want to study it for the insights it could hold. There are many conditions for which we are yet to identify a cause, much less a cure – particularly those affecting ethnic minority groups – because researchers have not yet got a bank of high-quality high-volume data to work with. And it’s a massive problem. One that, ultimately, comes down to trust in both how that data is stored and what an organisation will do with it.
But, when we draw the capabilities of blockchain into the mix to ensure the owner’s control and that this precious data remains secure and immutable, there is a huge potential to build back trust and encourage people to donate to clinical trials. Add in the incredible data-mining capabilities of AI and Machine Learning to draw insights from that DNA and we have an opportunity to make a transformational difference to healthcare that can not only transform lives, but actually save lives in the future.
Enacting Social Change
These are the types of gains possible when human intelligence and AI work in complementary partnership rather than at odds. It’s also the reason why changing the narrative is key so we can share the potential of this partnership with a broader audience.
By empowering people with education, giving them an opportunity to learn and get involved in the technology industry and showcasing the real-life case studies that are making a difference, the potential for enacting social change for the good of us all is massive.
For me, none of this is an either/or between meeting business goals and achieving social impact. Using technology for good is a global imperative. It should be embedded in everything we do. Digital transformation and social transformation can go hand in hand, and that’s really the genesis of creating shared value.
Not only does this approach empower the individual but, in a business sense, I see it as the biggest catalyst for sustainable competitive advantage.
Getting Smart with Storage
As many organisations are beginning to realise, collecting data is only the start. By getting smart about how we store and manage the data we hold – and the smart technologies we have at hand to reduce costs and infuse our data with intelligence – we build important foundations for the potential value we can draw from it.
ISTANBUL, April 24 (Reuters) – Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, the spiritual head of Eastern Orthodox Christians worldwide, called overnight for the opening of humanitarian corridors in Ukraine where he said « an indescribable human tragedy is unfolding ».
Bartholomew, who has previously called for an end to war in Ukraine, said that he hoped this year’s Easter would be « the impetus to open humanitarian corridors, safe passages to truly safe areas for the thousands of people surrounded in Mariupol. »
« The same applies to all other regions of Ukraine, where an indescribable human tragedy is unfolding… We call once again for an immediate end to the fratricidal war, which, like any war, undermines human dignity, » Bartholomew said after an Easter service in Istanbul, where he is based.
The leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, whose backing for Moscow’s « special military operation » in Ukraine has dismayed many fellow Christians, said on Saturday he hoped it would end quickly but again did not condemn it.
In 2019, Bartholomew, the spiritual head of some 300 million Eastern Orthodox Christians worldwide, granted autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, making it independent, in a historic split strongly opposed by Russia.
Reporting by Murad Sezer Writing by Daren Butler Editing by Raissa Kasolowsky
Voters cast their ballots in the second round of the presidential election in Paris on Sunday, April 24, 2022. The New York Times
There were sighs of relief throughout the European Union after President Emmanuel Macron beat back a serious challenge in France from populist far-right champion Marine Le Pen.
Then another populist went down, in Slovenia, where the country’s three-time prime minister, Janez Jansa, lost to a loose coalition of centrist rivals in parliamentary elections Sunday.
Those two defeats were widely seen as a reprieve for the EU and its fundamental principles, including judicial independence, shared sovereignty and the supremacy of European law. That is because they dealt a blow to the ambitions and worldview of Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister, who avidly supported both Le Pen and Jansa in an effort to create a coalition of more nationalist, religious and anti-immigration politics that could undermine the authority of the EU itself.
“Europe can breathe,” said Jean-Dominique Giuliani, chair of the Robert Schuman Foundation, a pro-European research center.
After his own electoral victory earlier this month, Orban declared: “The whole world has seen tonight in Budapest that Christian democratic politics, conservative civic politics and patriotic politics have won. We are telling Europe that this is not the past: This is the future. This will be our common European future.”
Not yet, it seems.
With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Orban, who has been close to both former US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, is more isolated in Europe than in many years. He has been a model for the Polish government of the Law and Justice party, which has also challenged what it considers the liberal politics and the overbearing bureaucratic and judicial influence of Brussels. But Law and Justice is deeply anti-Putin, a mood sharpened by the war.
“The international environment for Orban has never been so dire,” said Peter Kreko, director of Political Capital, a Budapest-based research institution.
Orban found support from Trump, former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and Italian populist leader and former Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini. But they are all gone, as Jansa is expected to be, and now Orban “has fewer friends in the world,” Kreko said.
Le Pen’s party was given a 10.7 million-euro loan (about $11.5 million) in March to help fund her campaign from Hungary’s MKB bank, whose major shareholders are considered close to Orban. And Hungarian media and social media openly supported both Le Pen and Jansa.
Le Pen’s strong showing was a reminder that populism — on both the right and the left — remains a vibrant force in a Europe, with high voter dissatisfaction over rising inflation, soaring energy prices, slow growth, immigration and the bureaucracy emanating from EU headquarters in Brussels.
But now Macron, as the first French president to be reelected in 20 years, has new authority to press his ideas for more European responsibility and collective defence.
After the retirement late last year of Angela Merkel, the former chancellor of Germany, Macron will inevitably be seen as the de facto leader of the EU, with a stronger voice and standing to push issues he cares about. Those include a more robust European pillar in defence and security, economic reform and fighting climate change.
“He is going to want to go further and faster,” said Georgina Wright, an analyst at the Institut Montaigne in Paris.
But Wright and other analysts say he must also learn lessons from his first term and try to consult more widely. His penchant for announcing proposals rather than building coalitions at times annoyed his European counterparts, leaving him portrayed as a vanguard of one, leading with no followers.
“Europe is central to his policy and will be in his second term, too,” said Jeremy Shapiro, research director for the European Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin. “In the first term, he underachieved relative to his expectations on Europe — he had a lot of grand plans but failed to create the coalitions he needed, with Germany and the central European states, to implement them.”
The Dutch, too, as the Netherlands and Germany together lead Europe’s “frugal” nations, are sceptical about Macron’s penchant to spend more of their money on European projects.
Macron “knows that lesson and is making some efforts in the context of the Russian war against Ukraine,” Shapiro said. “But he’s still Emmanuel Macron.”
In his second term, Macron “will double down” on the ideas for Europe that he presented in his speech to the Sorbonne in 2017, “especially the idea of European sovereignty,” said Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, director of the Paris office of the German Marshall Fund.
But in his second term, she predicted, he will be more pragmatic, building “coalitions of the willing and able” even if he cannot find unanimity among the other 26 EU members.
France holds the rotating presidency of the bloc until the end of June, and one of Macron’s priorities will be to push forward an oil embargo on Russia, de Hoop Scheffer said, a move that has been complicated by the fact that many in the bloc are dependent on Moscow for energy.
The climate agenda is important for him, especially if he wants to reach out to the angry left and the Greens in France. And to get much done in Europe, he will need to restore and strengthen the Franco-German relationship with a new, very different and divided German government.
“That relationship is not easy, and when you look at the Franco-German couple, not a lot keeps us together,” de Hoop Scheffer said.
There are differences over Macron’s desire for more collective debt for another European recovery plan, given the effects of war. There is also a lack of consensus over how to manage the response to Russia’s aggression, she said — how much to keep lines open to Putin and what kinds of military support should be provided to Ukraine in the face of German hesitancy to supply heavy weapons.
Germany is much happier to work in wartime within NATO under US leadership than to spend much time on Macron’s concept of European strategic autonomy, she noted. And Poland and the other front-line states bordering Russia have never had much confidence in Macron’s goal of strategic autonomy or his promise to do nothing to undermine NATO, a feeling underscored by the current war.
If Macron is clever, “French leadership in Europe will not be followership by the other EU countries, but their empowerment, by their commitment to a new European vision,” said Nicholas Dungan, a senior fellow of the Atlantic Council. “Macron can do this.”
L’arrêt des exportations en raison de l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie risque de faire basculer le monde dans une crise alimentaire
Dès le début du xviii e siècle, l’Ukraine acquiert le surnom de grenier à blé de l’Europe. Une part importante de l’alimentation mondiale – blé, maïs, huile de tournesol, soja et orge en particulier, mais aussi volailles et œufs – provient aujourd’hui encore de ce pays: environ 15 % du marché alimentaire mondial. Un rôle qui est remis en cause du fait de l’invasion du pays par Vladimir Poutine. Mais c’est avant tout la production de blé qui pâtit de cette guerre qui l’oppose à la Russie – autre producteur majeur du céréale.
En Russie aussi les exportations de blé se réduisent sensiblement. “En ces temps où les prix montent partout dans le monde, le Kremlin fait en sorte que le prix des aliments n’augmente pas trop en Russie même. Cela monterait la population contre le régime et Poutine n’a vraiment pas besoin de ça en ce moment”, note Martin Qaim, professeur d’agroéconomie à l’université de Bonn. “Il a donc un intérêt réel à ne pas exporter afin de garder des prix bas dans son pays”.
Pour tous les pays qui dépendent du blé russe et ukrainien, c’est une très mauvaise nouvelle. Les deux pays réalisent ensemble plus de 30% de la production mondiale de blé. Il s’agit principalement de pays arabes et du Maghreb. L’Egypte dépend ainsi à 80% d’exportations venues de ces deux pays, la Libye 75%. Plus largement, l’Afrique dépend à 44% de ces exportations.
Une crise aux causes multiples
En mars la tonne de blé dépassait les 400 euros sous l’effet de l’offensive russe en Ukraine. Elle se situe désormais à 364 euros, contre 207 l’an dernier – un prix déjà élevé du fait des ralentissements du commerce mondial induit par le Covid. La fermeture des frontières avait alors désorganisé les marchés agricoles et il était devenu plus difficile d’acheminer les productions vers les lieux de consommation. La guerre n’a rien arrangé.
“La faim dans le monde risque de s’aggraver de façon spectaculaire” prévient Andriy Dykun, président du Conseil agricole ukrainien. Mais si la guerre en Ukraine perturbe la chaîne d’approvisionnement, elle n’explique pas à elle seule la flambée des prix. S’y ajoute bien sûr la pandémie, mais aussi l’inflation, qui influe sur le pouvoir d’achat et le dérèglement climatique, qui menace les récoltes via notamment l’augmentation des phénomènes extrêmes.
“Cette fois, la situation est assez exceptionnelle : la guerre éclate alors même que les cours avaient connu un extraordinaire rebond en 2021, après la pandémie. La crise ukrainienne intervient comme une étincelle supplémentaire sur un baril prêt à exploser”, résume Philippe Chalmin, économiste, professeur à l’université Paris Dauphine, président du cercle CyclOpe et de l’Observatoire de formation des prix et des marges des produits alimentaires.
Le risque d’un effet domino
Les prix alimentaires dans le monde ont bondi de près de 13% en mars, selon la FAO. Une augmentation qui affecte déjà de nombreux pays, et en particulier les plus pauvres déjà fragilisés par la pandémie de Covid-19. Le Sri Lanka a ainsi annoncé être dans l’incapacité de payersa dette en 2022. Des mouvements de protestation contre la hausse des prix des produits alimentaires se sont par ailleurs déclenchés dans plusieurs pays, comme la Tunisie et l’Egypte ou plus de la moitié du revenu est en moyenne dépense pour se nourrir.
166 millions de personnes sont déjà chroniquement sous-alimentées d’après l’ONU. La hausse des prix alimentaires pourrait alors plonger 10 millions de personnes dans la pauvreté, a estimé mardi la secrétaire au Trésor américain Janet Yellen. “Des initiatives sont en cours pour éviter que la spéculation et les famines ne déstabilisent des sociétés dépendantes des céréales russes et ukrainiennes qui pourraient être amenées à manquer cette année, mais surtout dans un an ou deux” précise le geopolitologue Pierre Haski.
Mais devant cette crise en puissance, certains pays ont pris des mesures de protection, contribuant à leur tour à cette hausse. La Chine a ainsi emboîté le pas à Moscou et a cessé ses exportations à son tour pour sécuriser son propre approvisionnement. Si Pékin n’est absolument pas dépendante de ces deux pays, les fortes intempéries qui ont touché le pays l’an dernier ont en effet largement réduit la production de blé d’hiver, semé à partir de la mi-septembre et récolté à partir de la mi-mai.
La Chine, qui a doublé ses achats de céréales, est devenue le premier importateur mondial – un approvisionnement qui vient principalement d’Europe et d’Amérique. Une hausse que Philippe Chalmin explique par une autre crise : “En 2019, près de la moitié du cheptel porcin chinois avait dû être éliminé, touché par la peste africaine. L’empire du Milieu a ensuite relancé la production et profité de la reconstitution de son cheptel pour revoir son modèle d’élevage avec des structures beaucoup plus intensives.” Structures de production qui impliquent des besoins accrus en blé et contribuent à leur tour à la crise.
The world’s sixth-largest oil producer still suffers from fuel shortages and power outages.
By Mina Al-Oraibi, a columnist at Foreign Policy and the editor in chief of the National.
A long line of cars stretches down a city street from a gas station.
Motorists wait in line to fill their cars with petrol in Mosul, Iraq, on Feb. 18. ZAID AL-OBEIDI/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES
As Iraq marks 19 years since the U.S.-led invasion and the fall of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime this month, the country hasn’t turned into the stable, prosperous democracy that the United States and its allies promised and Iraqis hoped it would. Militias roam the country, corruption is rife, basic services are still lacking, and the country’s politicians have been unable to form a government in the six months that have passed since the last national election.
But nothing better symbolizes Iraq’s dysfunction than the absurd fact that the world’s sixth-largest oil producer still suffers from fuel shortages and power outages as it struggles to supply its own population with fuel and electricity.
On average, a household in Baghdad gets six hours of electricity a day from the national grid. Those who can afford it pay for private generator providers to cover the shortfall. For the millions of people who cannot afford the exuberant prices, power can be out for hours on end daily. In addition to daily suffering without power, much of Iraq’s economic activity is affected. Businesses cannot flourish when electricity sources are unreliable.
While Iraqi politicians are quick to point to the fact that energy demand in the country more than quadrupled in the past two decades, the reality is that Iraq would be capable of producing enough electricity to meet that demand if sufficient planning were put in place and corruption weeded out. Experts point to losses in transmission and Iraq’s electricity distribution being among the worst in the world—a matter that could be solved with investment and effective governance in the sector.
Furthermore, private electricity generators are a source of income for some militant groups and influential businessmen who often work behind the scenes to disrupt electricity provision. Extremist groups also regularly target the electricity sector. In 2014, Islamic State militants captured and destroyed the Baiji power plant, located approximately 150 miles north of Baghdad. Today, seven years after Baiji’s liberation from Islamic State control, the plant’s reconstruction has yet to begin, despite projects having been awarded—proof once again of the many problems with governance in Iraq. In December 2020, a parliamentary committee declared that $81 billion had been spent on the sector in the past 15 years, with little to show for it.
Electricity is just one dimension of a complex energy dilemma in Iraq. As oil prices increase, a number of Iraq’s cities face increased fuel shortages. Motorists in the city of Mosul can sit in line for up to an hour to fill their cars. Part of the shortage is due to the smuggling of fuel to Iraq’s Kurdistan region, where fuel prices are double those in other parts of the country, where fuel is more heavily subsidized. Some is smuggled to Syria, reflecting the wider crises in the region.
Iraq’s dysfunctional energy sector also impacts its environment. Private generators, which make up approximately 20 percent of Iraq’s electricity provision, run on diesel fuel, adding to Iraq’s pollution. Gas flaring, the burning of natural gas that is a byproduct of oil extraction, is among the worst polluters, yet Iraq continues to flare more than half the natural gas its oil fields produce.
Solutions are readily available, such as projects overseen by the Basrah Gas Co.—a joint venture between Iraq’s South Gas Co., Shell, and Mitsubishi—that work to capture gas for domestic use. Developing gas capture, in which Iraq is meant to invest $3 billion over the next five years, will be vital to reducing Iraq’s illogical dependence on Iran for gas imports—reaching up to 50 million cubic meters per day at their peak.
If the $3 billion investment is spent on gas capture projects and a reduction of gas imports from Iran, the benefits would be a reduction of the extortionate bills paid to Iran for gas and an improvement in Iraq’s environment. In February, Iraq’s acting electricity minister, Adel Karim, said Iraq is $1.6 billion in arrears on payments for imports of Iranian gas. Ironically, Iraq is gas rich in a number of locations, including in the Kurdistan region, but political wrangling blocks its proper development.
Another layer of complexity in the energy mix is the lack of a hydrocarbons law in the country that can regulate this and other matters. That has allowed for an increased politicization of the energy issue, including Iraq’s federal court deciding that the Kurdistan region’s oil exports were unconstitutional—after years of not passing a judgment on the matter.
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has been extracting and selling crude oil, independent of the federal government and Iraq’s Oil Ministry, for years and in 2007 passed its own oil law. In February, Iraq’s supreme court handed a win to the federal government by decreeing that oil should be administered at the federal level, in line with the constitution. The ruling also forfeited the KRG’s contracts with foreign companies, without which the Kurdistan region would struggle to maintain its energy sector.
The energy portfolio is at the heart of Iraq’s political, security, and economic crises. Smuggling of Iranian oil through Iraq has helped Tehran circumvent sanctions, and it is keen to maintain that lifeline, especially as nuclear talks falter. Iran has tried to influence Iraq’s oil sector, particularly in the south, but is meeting increased resistance.
Furthermore, the corruption that hamstrings Iraq’s public life is tied to the energy sector, from private generator gangs to oil contracts divvied out among different political groupings. Since elections last October, the country’s political parties have worked themselves into political gridlock.
Meanwhile, Iran is working furiously to influence the next government formation, fearing the exclusion of its proxies. Iraqi Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose candidates won 73 seats in Iraq’s 329-seat parliament, has the right to form the next government as part of a majority coalition. Sadr has been the most vocal of Iran’s critics among the Islamist Shiite parties in Iraq and has joined forces with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani, and the Sovereign coalition, led by the speaker of the parliament, Mohammed al-Halbousi. Some Kurdish officials believe the court’s ruling is part of efforts to pressure the KRG to acquiesce on government formation.
As Iran and its proxies fight the formation of a government that excludes their influence, the energy sector in the Kurdistan region has come under increased attack. In addition to the federal court’s decision to stop oil exports, there have been physical attacks on the energy sector. On March 13, Iran publicly claimed responsibility for a series of missile strikes on the home of Baz Karim Barzinji, the CEO of the KAR Group, an Iraqi Kurdish oil company. While Tehran claimed the attack was against Israeli “Mossad agents,” an assertion both the Iraqi government and the KRG denied, the message was that Iran wants to exert maximum pressure on the KDP and show its ability to strike vital lifelines. An attack on a KAR-owned oil refinery three weeks later further reinforced that message.
If not for all this dysfunction, with the global rise in oil prices, Iraq would be well positioned to capitalize on its energy resources going forward. In March, Iraq’s oil revenues were $11 billion, the highest in half a century, according to the Oil Ministry. With Iraq’s budget based on oil prices at $55 per barrel, the windfall from high prices could provide a rare opportunity to invest in the country’s infrastructure, particularly in its energy sector.
However, the reality is much more complex. Iraq’s overreliance on oil, with its revenues accounting for 92 percent of government budget revenues, means that little is done to diversify Iraq’s economy. With higher oil prices, what little incentive exists to resuscitate Iraq’s industrial and agricultural sectors dissipates as officials fall back on oil as the main revenue driver. Furthermore, divisions between Baghdad and Erbil over oil become more complicated as higher revenues are at stake.
Without a government in place and with ongoing political infighting, chances for reforms are slim. As Iraq heads into another heated summer, with temperatures frequently surpassing 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit), the fear is that more revenue will simply mean more corruption and the continued siphoning off of Iraq’s riches.
Dans une économie où les choix de chacun pèsent sur tous, il faut repenser le rôle de la puissance publique. Et donc oui, planifier. La question est de savoir comment, considère l’économiste dans sa chronique.
Publié le 22 avril 2022 à 22h00 – Mis à jour le 22 avril 2022 à 22h00 | Lecture 4 min. Article réservé aux abonnés
Chronique. A défaut d’accéder au second tour, Jean-Luc Mélenchon a réussi à imposer son thème-phare, la planification écologique, qu’Emmanuel Macron a repris à son compte en annonçant qu’il en chargerait directement le premier ministre.
L’expression surprend : le dernier plan français a pris fin en 1992. Mais, surtout, on a longtemps dit que la transition écologique reposerait sur le marché. Les économistes répétaient que le rôle des gouvernements n’était pas de jouer les chefs d’orchestre, mais de donner un prix au carbone. Le reste– choix des technologies, spécialisation sectorielle, consommation, modes de vie – serait du ressort des agents privés. L’Etat serait l’ampleur et le rythme de la transformation, le marché en déterminerait les modalités. Cette belle architecture s’est défaite. En France, la hausse de la fiscalité carbone est suspendue depuis fin 2018 ; aux Etats-Unis, Joe Biden a renoncé à cet instrument ; dans le reste du monde, les recettes correspondantes sont neuf fois inférieures aux subventions aux énergies fossiles, selon les calculs de l’Institut d’économie pour le climat. Certes, le marché européen des quotas fonctionne, et l’UE envisage de l’étendre. Mais ce ne sera, au mieux, qu’un instrument partiel. La raison première de cet échec est une hostilité sociale profonde à la tarification du carbone. Celle-ci n’est pas sans fondement : en France, en 2019, un quart seulement du produit des nouvelles taxes devait être redistribué aux ménages. Mais même une restitution intégrale, pour un montant égalitaire, est perçue comme injuste. Pour celles et ceux que le prix des combustibles contraint à se restreindre, l’équité commande d’obliger les plus aisés à renoncer à leurs week-ends à Rome. Pas d’en augmenter le prix.
Modèles de jadis
Il y a pire. Si l’on veut qu’entreprises et ménages investissent pour réduire leurs émissions, il ne suffit pas de fixer le prix du carbone pour aujourd’hui, il faut aussi le programmer pour dans vingt ans. Or, les gouvernants ne peuvent pas lier les mains de leurs successeurs. Et quand ils le font, cela n’empêche pas l’Etat de se dédire : en 2013, l’abandon de l’écotaxe poids lourds lui a coûté 1 milliard d’euros en indemnités. Ce manque de crédibilité affaiblit grandement l’instrument. Toujours nécessaire, le prix du carbone ne sera donc plus la pierre angulaire de la stratégie climat. L’Etat va agir davantage par la réglementation, la subvention, l’investissement, et assumer la responsabilité de choix technologiques, territoriaux ou sociaux. C’est, au fond, normal : entre nucléaire et renouvelables, entre mobilité électrique et hydrogène, entre métropolisation et renaissance des villes moyennes, la décision appartient à la société. Dans une économie où les choix de chacun pèsent sur tous, il faut repenser le rôle de la puissance publique. Et donc, oui, planifier. La question est comment. En Allemagne, la nouvelle coalition a créé un ministère de l’économie et du climat, confié au dirigeant vert Robert Habeck. C’est une bonne solution dans un pays fédéral où chaque département ministériel est une grande féodalité. Mais, en France, l’économie sans les finances est aussi faible que l’écologie. Les rapprocher ne permettrait ni de convertir un monde agricole majoritairement crispé sur les modèles de jadis, ni d’organiser la difficile transition entre les emplois d’hier et ceux de demain, ni de décider si les investissements climatiques doivent être financés par l’impôt ou par la dette. Mieux vaut, comme le projette Emmanuel Macron, traiter le sujet au niveau interministériel et, pour deux ans, donner au premier ministre la tâche prioritaire de mettre la transition sur de bons rails.
Clivage écologique
Mais cela ne suffira pas à fixer les choix sociaux. En France, il n’y a plus guère de climatosceptiques, mais nombreux sont ceux auxquels la transformation à venir donne le vertige. C’est à eux que Marine Le Pen s’est adressée en appelant à «ralentir la transition». Le clivage écologique recouvre et amplifie les clivages générationnels, éducationnels et territoriaux qui fracturent le pays. Et même si le choix est tranché par l’élection, restera à y associer les Français, aussi largement et de manière aussi décentralisée que possible. Il n’y aura de transition réussie que si les citoyens se reconnaissent dans un projet collectif, y voient la possibilité d’un avenir désirable et en deviennent les acteurs. Vient enfin la programmation économique. La méthode reste à construire. D’abord pour assurer la cohérence et faire en sorte que d’un décret à l’autre, le coût de la tonne de carbone évitée ne varie pas du simple au triple. Ensuite pour mobiliser l’innovation : la bataille pour la planète n’oppose pas planification et marché, mais plutôt capitalisme brun et capitalisme vert. Sur ce plan, l’Europe est paradoxalement en retard sur les Etats-Unis. Enfin, pour prendre la pleine mesure de l’impact économique de la transition. Aujourd’hui, légitime, l’optimisme sur son aboutissement ne justifie pas qu’on se berce de contes de fées. Le changement de modèle économique va dévaloriser des équipements, renverser des positions établies, bouleverser les modes de vie. Il va demander d’investir plus et donc d’épargner plus pour produire différemment à peu près la même quantité. C’est seulement si elle regarde cette réalité en face que la France réussira une mutation analogue par son ampleur à la modernisation de l’après-seconde seconde mondiale.
Planifier, c’est nécessaire. Mettre le premier ministre en responsabilité, c’est bien. Mais, pour réussir, il faudra beaucoup d’écoute, beaucoup de réalisme et beaucoup de persévérance.
Jean Pisani-Ferry est professeur d’économie à Sciences Po et à l’Institut universitaire européen -de Florence, et chercheur à l’Institut Bruegel.
Rasmus Paludan, a politician in Sweden who has failed to gather enough signatures to run in parliamentary elections in September, has gained notoriety by visiting Muslim neighborhoods during Ramadan to burn copies of the Qur’an.
Of course, such despicable behavior generated a backlash, and a violent one. A politician trying to make a name for himself is one thing, but the deeper question we should be asking ourselves is where the far right wants to take Europe.
Freedom of expression is sacred to Europeans, but this freedom has been abused to create polarization and hate speech. Police in Malmo, Sweden’s third-largest city, have filed a case against Paludan for incitement.
The far right thrives on Islamic fundamentalism by hyping up the fear of “the other” — who comes from Africa or the Middle East, looks different, and has different habits and a different faith. They portray “the other” as athreat to Europe’s culture. They say Islam is incompatible with the European way of life and that Muslim immigrants will change the face of their countries, destroy their identity and impose an alien culture. A threat is a great tool to rally people, and the far right have used it skillfully.
However, Europe did not open its doors to migrants out of charity, but rather out of necessity. Its population is aging, and Europe needs a young workforce. Those who view these newcomers as intruders seem to forget the economic value of immigration.
Now, however, immigration is an issue because immigrants are starting to organize; they want to integrate, not to assimilate, and they are no longer as invisible as the far right wants them to be. The straightforward argument of politicians such as the French hard-liner Eric Zemmour is that migrants must transform into Europeans and forget their backgrounds: “When in Rome, do as the Romans do.” Zemmour has totally embraced the supposedly “French” way of life and rejected his own background as the offspring of Algerian immigrants, and he believes all migrants must do the same in order to be accepted. But in liberal democracies, a “way of living” cannot be imposed. The far right have not yet perpetrated the excesses of Adolf Hitler, but they are laying the foundation for a new wave of fascist thinking. Where will it lead?
We need an in-depth discussion about what it means to be European
Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib
During last week’s French presidential election debate, incumbent Emmanuel Macron warned his right-wing challenger Marine Le Pen that if she delivered on her promise of banning the Muslim headscarf she woulddrive the country into civil war. Would she have police in the streets to arrest women who wore a veil, he asked? Her answer was vague, leaving us guessing what kind of social policies she would impose. Le Pen spoke of defending everything that made the soul of France — but what does that mean, and who decides what it is? Is it about the decision whether to wear a hijab, or the rights of individuals to freedom and dignity?
Behind the slogans of the far right there is no real substance. Do Le Pen and her supporters want to run Chinese-style “re-education” camps to teach immigrants how to become “truly” French? Will those who cannot be molded be kicked out and sent back to their country of origin? What would this make of France? What would it make of Sweden if the likes of Paludan ever gained a majority in parliament?
It is valid to ask whether Europe is reliving the horrors of antisemitism, but this time with a new victim.Europeans should think twice and examine the far right. It is not immigrants, but far-right extremists who are the real threat to the European way of living and the liberal order that is the foundation of Western societies.
To make this point clear, we need an in-depth discussion about what it means to be European. A good starting point would be the concept of the European Muslim introduced into public discourse by Afzal Khan — who came to the UK from Pakistan at the age of 11, became the first Muslim Lord Mayor of Manchester, served in the European Parliament, was honored by Queen Elizabeth for his race relations work, and is now a British MP. Prominent public figures such as Khan are the key because they can streamline the relationship between Muslim communities and larger European societies, a reconciliation that would deliver a knockout blow to the far right once and for all.
• Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib is a specialist in US-Arab relations with a focus on lobbying. She is co-founder of the Research Center for Cooperation and Peace Building, a Lebanese nongovernmental organization focused on Track II.
Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News’ point of view
Le Haut représentant de l’Union européenne, Josep Borrell, qui revient d’Ukraine, s’exprime sur la guerre menée par Vladimir Poutine. Il réaffirme le soutien politique et militaire de l’Europe aux Ukrainiens et insiste sur les conséquences économiques et énergétiques de cette offensive.
Selon Josep Borrell, chef de la diplomatie européenne, Vladimir Poutine « ne souhaite pas de négociations, mais veut continuer la guerre ». Le Haut représentant de l’UE insiste sur l’importance des sanctions : « Il faudrait aller très rapidement vers un embargo sur le pétrole ». Selon lui, il faut aussi diversifier les achats en pétrole et en gaz et chercher des alternatives. Il ajoute qu' »en ce moment, l’Europe reçoit plus de gaz naturel liquéfié que provenant des gazoducs ». Il n’exclut pas que Vladimir Poutine soit condamné pour crimes de guerre dans l’avenir, mais, pour l’heure « c’est une guerre pour l’existence de l’Ukraine » et ce sont les Ukrainiens qu’il faut soutenir.
D’un point de vue diplomatique, il faut « contrecarrer le narratif russe » qui accuse les sanctions occidentales d’être cause de famine et qui veut dissuader certains pays d’Afrique, d’Asie ou d’Amérique du Sud de soutenir le point de vue des Occidentaux : « Ce sont les Russes qui bloquent les exportations ukrainiennes de blé vers l’Afrique ». Selon lui, il va y avoir « une diplomatie de la nourriture, comme il y a eu une diplomatie des masques et des vaccins. »
La crise économique et énergétique est la conséquence de l’agression russe en Ukraine et non des sanctions occidentales.
French President Emmanuel Macron and his far-right challenger Marine Le Pen went head-to-head in a televised debate days before a run-off in the presidential election. CNN’s Jim Bittermann reports.
To prevent the sustainability agenda from becoming a casualty of Russia’s war on Ukraine, policymakers and citizens must recognize the imperatives raised by the crisis and adjust their strategies accordingly. That means making our approach to environmental, social, and governance issues both more holistic and more granular.
PARIS – Beyond the immense tragedy which Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war has brought upon Ukraine and its people, we are starting to grasp its potentially devastating consequences for the global sustainability agenda.
Already, the COVID-19 pandemic redirected global attention and resources away from the targets enshrined in the 2015 Paris climate agreement, as countries focused on their immediate public-health needs. Now, Putin’s war is intensifying the economic, social, and geopolitical pressures countries face, while deepening divisions among them. This does not bode well for efforts to address the shared challenge of climate change.
Ukrainian service members unpack Javelin anti-tank missiles, delivered by plane as part of the U.S. military support package for Ukraine, in Kyiv on Feb. 10. | REUTERS
BY STEVEN ERLANGER, ERIC SCHMITT AND JULIAN E. BARNES
THE NEW YORK TIMES
As columns of Russian troops began pouring into Ukraine nearly two months ago, the United States and its allies started supplying Kyiv with weapons and equipment for what many expected to be a short war: sniper rifles, helmets, medical kits, encrypted communications, lots of bullets and the portable, shoulder-held Stinger and Javelin missiles that quickly became icons of the conflict.
Defying the odds, Ukraine held on to its capital and pushed Russia from the north. Now, as the Kremlin switches gears and begins a concerted effort to capture eastern Ukraine, Washington and its allies are pivoting as well, scrambling to supply Ukraine with bigger and more advanced weapons to defend itself in a grinding war.
The West is focused on sending longer-range weapons like howitzers, anti-aircraft systems, anti-ship missiles, armed drones, armored trucks, personnel carriers and even tanks — the type of arms that President Joe Biden said were tailored to stop “the wider assault we expect Russia to launch in eastern Ukraine.”
“The steady supply of weapons” has helped “ensure that Putin failed in his initial war aims to conquer and control Ukraine,” Biden said last week. “We cannot rest now.”
Then, after a video call with allies on Tuesday, Biden told reporters that the United States would send more artillery to Ukraine. He is expected to announce a new military aid package for Ukraine in the coming days, according to a person briefed on his plans. The aid amount will be on par with the $800 million package of weapons and artillery that was announced last week, the person said.
But the strategy comes with a notable risk: antagonizing Russia so much that it ignites a wider, international conflict.
Russia recently sent a formal warning to the United States, saying that Western deliveries of the “most sensitive” weapons systems to Ukraine could bring “unpredictable consequences.”
U.S. officials say the warning shows that the weapons being sent are making a big difference on the battlefield. So, for Washington at least, concerns about supplying arms that Russia might consider “escalatory” have ebbed — as has the initial worry that Ukraine will use longer-range weapons, like jet fighters, to attack Moscow itself and set off a bigger war.
Officials in Washington are now grappling with how much intelligence to give the Ukrainians about bases inside Russia, given that the Ukrainians have already made small helicopter raids on Russian fuel depots. The White House has also held back on supplying some weapons that could strike Russian forces across the border, like rocket artillery, ground attack planes and medium-range drones.
Some argue the Americans are being too cautious.
“Seven weeks ago, they were arguing over whether to give Stinger missiles — how silly does that seem now?” said retired Lt. Gen. Frederick B. Hodges, the former top U.S. Army commander in Europe. “We have been deterred out of an exaggerated fear of what possibly could happen.”
Anxiety about provoking a wider war persists among some NATO allies, most visibly in Germany, which worries that supplying Marder infantry-fighting vehicles, considered one of the world’s best armored vehicles, could be perceived by Russia as making Berlin and NATO parties to the war.
Robert Habeck, an influential minister in Germany’s new government, has said that supplying tanks would be an escalation and should be a matter of consensus within NATO and the European Union. “Heavy weapons are synonymous with tanks, and all NATO countries have so far ruled this out to not become targets themselves,” he said.
But these are sovereign — not alliance — decisions, and Washington and numerous allies are shipping such weapons anyway, concentrating on supplying Soviet-era weapons that the Ukrainians know how to use, along with Western arms the Ukrainians can absorb fairly easily.
Russia is striking Ukraine with abandon, complicating the flow of these newer weapons from Ukraine’s western borders with Poland, Romania and Slovakia to the battle in the east. That presents another risk: that Russian attacks could also stray across the Ukrainian border and hit NATO countries, “every inch” of which Biden has vowed to defend militarily.
How this logistical race goes could well shape the outcome of the war.
Russian forces, having suffered an embarrassing retreat from northern Ukraine and the suburbs of the capital, Kyiv, are repositioning for what the Kremlin and Ukrainian officials call a pivotal offensive to take eastern Ukraine.
Unlike many of the earlier battles, this one is expected to feature more tank battles on open ground, more long-range artillery and more weaponized drones.
The Western effort is both sprawling and expensive, with as many as 30 countries, not all of them members of NATO. The push now is to get countries with Soviet-era tanks, artillery and perhaps even fighter planes to provide them to Ukraine, with the promise that the United States will replenish them with more modern, Western-made arms in return. There is an especially acute need for Soviet-bloc standard 152-millimeter howitzer shells, since NATO uses a different, 155-millimeter shell.
The United States has also agreed to provide some 155-millimeter howitzers, along with 40,000 matching rounds, while trying to buy Soviet-standard ammunition from countries that use it, including nations outside Europe, like Afghanistan and even India, a long-standing buyer of Russian arms.
But that is not enough, Hodges argued. “We are still not thinking big,” he said. “We are still not thinking in terms of Ukraine winning.”
An apartment building that was destroyed by Russian missiles in the first days of the invasion in Vasylkiv, Ukraine, on March 30. | IVOR PRICKETT / THE NEW YORK TIMES
Unlike the early part of the war, when many countries seemed to compete to announce what they were providing Ukraine, the current race is being run largely in secret.
Much of the coordination, including how to get materiel into Ukraine, is being handled through the United States European Command, or EUCOM, based in Stuttgart, Germany, and through a blandly named International Donors Coordination Center set up with the British.
The command said that it established a “control center” to coordinate weapons and humanitarian assistance “from around the world” for Ukraine in early March. But it declined to discuss the details.
The Pentagon gave a hint, saying that the State Department had authorized transfers to Ukraine of American-provided defensive equipment from more than 14 countries this year.
But nations are trying not to advertise to Moscow exactly what is being provided. France says it has supplied 100 million euros of military equipment to Ukraine, without specifying what it has sent. Some countries have no desire to goad the Russian bear.
A clear example was the confusion over reports that Poland had supplied more than 100 Soviet-era T-72 and T-55 tanks to Ukraine. Poland refuses to confirm any such shipment.
Not all nations are being coy. The Czech government says it has supplied Ukraine with T-72 tanks and BMP-1 armored vehicles, while the Slovak government has made a big show of supplying a Soviet-era S-300 anti-aircraft missile system.
As for Germany, part of the problem is that its own supply of working armor is so low that it has little to spare. Beyond that, learning to operate a modern British, American or German tank can take up to six months, while Ukrainian fighters would have little difficulty operating familiar Soviet-era armor.
“We don’t really have time to get a lot of heavy American armor into Ukraine, and there isn’t time to train the Ukrainian military,” said Robert Gates, a former U.S. defense secretary. “But there is a lot of former Soviet military equipment still in the arsenals of the East European states.”
The United States, he said, “ought to be ransacking the arsenals” of former Warsaw Pact countries for armor and anti-aircraft systems, “with a promise from the U.S. to backfill over time with our equipment to our NATO allies.”
That is exactly what the United States is racing to do, Pentagon officials said, describing their own efforts to persuade the Slovaks to provide the S-300 missile system to Ukraine. On March 9, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin began speaking with their defense minister, Jaroslav Nad, and has agreed to send in Patriot batteries to replace it.
Ukrainian troops and armored vehicles roll through the recently recaptured town of Bucha, northwest of Kyiv, on April 6. | IVOR PRICKETT / THE NEW YORK TIMES
Similar conversations are taking place with other allies that have Soviet-era weapons and ammunition, the officials said. The Americans say they are also speaking several times a day with their Ukrainian counterparts about what Ukraine wants and needs, and what Western countries think they can best provide.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy repeatedly expresses gratitude for the aid but wants more, sooner. He admitted to being fed up with listing the same set of requirements over and over again to different national interlocutors, telling The Atlantic in Kyiv: “When some leaders ask me what weapons I need, I need a moment to calm myself, because I already told them the week before. It’s Groundhog Day. I feel like Bill Murray.”
There are also supply issues with Western weapons, like the older Stinger anti-aircraft missile or the Javelin anti-tank missile.
The Pentagon has urged manufacturers to ramp up production. So far, some 7,000 Javelins have been given to Ukraine, about a third of the total American inventory, which will probably take three or four years to replace, wrote Mark F. Cancian of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
Last week, the Pentagon met with leaders of eight large military contractors, like Raytheon Co. and Lockheed Martin Corp., to discuss how to overcome any supply problems – both to replenish American weapons stocks that have been drawn down to help Ukraine and to keep Kyiv in the fight. The two companies together make the Javelin, and Raytheon makes the Stinger.
The United States alone has spent or allocated some $2.6 billion worth of such materiel since the war began Feb. 24, and the European Union has provided €1.5 billion ($1.6 billion). But there is no prospect of U.S. or NATO troops going to the aid of Ukraine, officials say. The West is providing the weapons and intelligence — and cheerleading from behind.
The known list of what has been provided already is long, and there is little doubt that supplies from NATO countries — and the training of Ukrainian forces after Russia seized Crimea in 2014, not to mention Ukraine’s tenacity and adaptability — have surprised the Russians, badly damaged their morale and extended the war.
In the months leading up to the war and afterward, the United States and its allies have sent Ukraine 25,000 anti-aircraft weapons and 60,000 anti-tank weapons, including 10,000 provided by Washington, Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress last week.
The United States has also provided more than 50 million rounds of ammunition, 7,000 small arms, 75,000 sets of body armor and helmets, and night-vision goggles, encrypted radios, armored trucks and personnel carriers, largely drawn from pre-positioned U.S. military stockpiles, much of it in Europe, according to the latest public list from the Pentagon.
Since the invasion, the Pentagon has cranked up its vast logistical and transportation network. Within four to six days after the White House approves a transfer of weapons from American military stockpiles, the Pentagon has been able to load the materiel onto cargo planes and fly it to about half a dozen staging bases in countries near Ukraine, chiefly Poland and Romania.
From there, U.S. officials say, the weapons and equipment are loaded onto hundreds of trucks and shipped into western Ukraine using a variety of overland routes. John Kirby, the Pentagon spokesperson, said it takes about 24 to 48 hours for the weapons to make their way from the staging areas into the hands of Ukrainian troops.
“Eight to 10 flights a day are coming into the region, not just from the United States, but from other nations as well,” Kirby said. “That stuff isn’t sitting around.”
Despite repeated threats to do so, the Russians have rarely tried to stop this flow of Western materiel into Ukraine. Pentagon officials say the Russians have been busy fighting in other parts of the country and fear Ukraine’s air defenses. “That flow still continues,” Kirby said.
Britain, which has been more public about its contributions in the post-Brexit period, has supplied about $588 million of materiel, including anti-tank and anti-ship missiles and long-range artillery.
Training the Ukrainians on new equipment in the middle of a war is a challenge, though. About a dozen Ukrainian soldiers were already training in the United States, and the Pentagon has taught them to use modern armed drones, like the 700 or so Switchblade drones that Washington is now providing.
Military officials call the weapon, which is carried in a backpack, the “kamikaze drone,” because it can be flown directly at a tank or a group of troops and is destroyed when it hits the target and explodes.
Bigger armed drones, like American-made Predators or Reapers, would be difficult for Ukrainians to fly and would be easily destroyed by Russian fighter planes. But Pentagon officials said the small, portable kamikaze drones could prove more cost-effective and elusive against Russian armored convoys.
After the White House announced the latest $800 million tranche of weapons for Ukraine last week, Kirby said that American soldiers would train Ukrainian forces in neighboring countries to use some of the newer, more sophisticated equipment Washington is providing, like radar systems, as well as the 155-millimeter howitzers and 11 Mi-17 helicopters.
“We’re aware of the clock, and we know time is not our friend,” he said.
A group #DiasporaSupport4Adesina has said that with former President Olusegun Obasanjo reportedly endorsing the President of African Development Bank (AfDB), Dr Akinwumi Adesina in 2021 for the number one seat in the country, means that Nigeria will experience transformation under Adesina led government.
The group in a statement signed by Dr Tony Bello, Chairman and Founder, Shine Bridge Global Inc., Chesapeake-Virginia, USA, said they were not surprised that Chief Obasanjo would endorse Dr Adesina for the highest office in the land because of the achievements he recorded as Nigerian Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development and as the President of AfDB.
“On May 2, 2021, an article came out in a national newspaper, the Vanguard, attributed to Chief Olusegun Obasanjo signalling Dr Akinwumi Adesina as the best person to occupy the position of President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
“If you conduct a poll today asking Nigerians who the cap of Nigeria’s leadership best fits, we are certain that most will support Chief Obasanjo’s choice of Dr. Akinwumi Ayodeji Adesina, President of Africa Development Bank (AfDB) and one-time Minister of Agriculture.
“This is one of the many reasons why we, in the Diaspora, are giving support to the efforts being made to co-opt Adesina into the forthcoming Presidential race. We have examined his contributions and personal commitment towards a better Nigeria, and Africa at large.
“As Nigeria’s political barometer, Chief Obasanjo’s residence has become a beehive of activities for politicians and political groups seeking his endorsement! Obasanjo is not shy to quick criticisms of leaders for non-performance in office, especially leaders who came to elective positions through his support.
“We are therefore not surprised that Chief Obasanjo would endorse Dr. Adesina for the highest office in the land. However, we are certain that Adesina’s presidency will not suffer any shortcomings to face the criticism of “Baba”, as Chief Obasanjo is fondly called in Nigeria”, the statement said.
The group further said that recognizing the urgent need for economic resurgence, President Muhammadu Buhari invited Adesina to articulate a roadmap for Nigeria’s economic resurgence at the 2021 Midterm Ministerial Performance Review Retreat.
The retreat according to the group had all the Nigerian government functionaries, including the Executive, Legislature as well as State governors.
The group therefore expressed hope that Adesina’s presidency will usher in a robust economic resurgence that will, in addition, put an end to our children drowning in the high seas of Africa and Europe in their quest for a better life.
The group also recalled how Obasanjo has successfully identified and supported the candidacy of the incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015, Former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan in 2011 and Late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua in 2007.
Dr Bello through the statement, said when Dr Adesina was given the opportunity to serve as Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, he distinguished himself as a selfless servant to all Nigerians.
“He worked tirelessly with his team to transform the mindset of millions of smallholder farmers and the youth that “agriculture is a business, not a development program.” He advocated for policy and institutional reforms that attracted private sector investment commitments of over $5 billion into Nigeria’s Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA).
The statement further stated that Dr. Adesina had recently engaged with President Joe Biden’s Administration and his top-officials including Vice President Kamala Harris, and the Secretary of Treasury on climate financing among other global economic challenges facing Africa and Africans at home and in the United States.
“It is therefore not surprising, that Chief Obasanjo, himself, a globally recognized leader in domestic and international politics, has gone so far as to beckon on Dr. Adesina as one best prepared and fit for the job of the President of Nigeria after the incumbent, President Buhari,” the statement added.
Bill Dudley, Bloomberg Opinion & Former New York Fed President, argues that the slower the Fed moves, the harder the landing will be. John Lipsky, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Distinguished Scholar and former IMF First Deputy Managing Director, says the war in Ukraine has the potential for very serious and long-lasting disruptions in grain markets. Daniel Skelly, Morgan Stanley Wealth Management Head of Market Research & Strategy, says he’s seeing mixed messages from the stock and bond markets. Michelle Meyer, MasterCard Chief U.S. Economist, says consumer spending is still strong in the U.S. Alina Polyakova, Center for European Policy Analysis President & CEO, says Mariupol is the only thing standing in the way of Russia connecting its land and naval forces in Ukraine.
CHRONIQUE – Comment répondre à ce désir de France dans un Moyen-Orient déçu par l’effacement américain, inquiet par l’hégémonisme commercial chinois, sceptique sur les intentions russes?
Comme le chef de l’État est le chef des armées et de la diplomatie, une élection présidentielle est toujours l’occasion de repenser les priorités de la politique étrangère de la France. Évidemment, le premier sujet sera celui de la défense de l’Europe face à l’agressivité militaire de la Russie, au pillage technologique de la Chine, à l’hégémonie juridique et financière de l’Amérique. Pour avoir une chance de contrer ces trois monstres, la France ne pourra pas se passer du levier européen. Cela prendra du temps car, à 27 membres, l’Union européenne est devenue une machine extrêmement lourde.
Mais, immédiatement, la France pourrait, seule, relancer sa politique arabe. De l’eau a coulé sous les ponts depuis que Charles de Gaulle a formulé la sienne, le 29 juin 1967, juste après le troisième conflit israélo-arabe. Guérie des blessures de la guerre d’Algérie et soucieuse d’afficher une politique d’équilibre au Moyen-Orient, la France tendait la main à toutes les nations arabes.
Lire l’article dans son intégralité sur le site du Figaro.
Everyone in Europe is tense watching the elections in France. Though Emmanuel Macron is taking the lead, a Marine Le Pen win is more likely than in the last elections. A Le Pen victory would be catastrophic for the EU and even endanger its existence.
Le Pen inherited her father’s National Front party, which advocated an ultra-nationalist and vehemently xenophobic stance. Though she tried to rebrand the party by changing the name from “Front National” (National Front) to “Rassemblement National” (National Rally), the party’s ultranationalism did not change.
This ultra-nationalism brings with it an anti-Europe stand. The ultra-nationalist who adheres to a rigid and jaded national identity sees in the integration of a larger framework such as the EU a dissolution of their character as French. Another reason for this stand is that with the EU they have less control over their borders. If she wins, Le Pen will exercise discrimination against EU citizens in France, in opposition to some of the founding principles of the union. The ascension of Le Pen, who is against sanctioning Russian energy and is overtly sympathetic to Russian President Vladimir Putin, would be catastrophic for Europe — especially at the moment.
A united Europe presents a threat to the Russian leader, while a disunified Europe represents an opportunity for influence. The war in Ukraine has shaken the European psyche. Now Russia is the main threat, while for a long time it was Islamic extremism, especially for the French. This could be a drawback for Le Pen. Suddenly, her main tagline, which is to fight Islamism, is less attractive and her admiration for Putin is a liability.
Nevertheless, Le Pen has been able to adapt. She has been campaigning on the cost of living, focusing her message on the working class who she calls the forgotten France. She has held small rallies in poor areas outside major cities, describing Macron as an elitist who is out of touch with reality. Le Pen’s messaging has partly justified her pro-Russian stance by focusing on energy prices — particularly, that her audience live in remote areas and rely on driving long distances. She is against sanctioning Russian energy as it will increase the price of fuel for those people.
On the other hand, Macron has lost his appeal for immigrants.
Initially, he was seen as sympathetic to immigrants. After his arrival at the Elysee, he gradually shifted to the right. His position on the cartoons and on France’s colonialist past in Algeria, among other issues, has turned off an important faction of his original constituency. Macron’s position on Islam has been somehow targeted to show a strong stand on national security and French principles. However, he has helped Le Pen indirectly by normalizing racism. Le Pen is no longer seen as a hardcore far-right racist as she is taking a similar stance to the supposedly “centrist” president. Hence the voters that once turned out in droves on election day to vote her out will remain at home as for them Macron is no better. On the other hand, she is touching on the average French citizen’s daily struggle while Macron comes across as arrogant and detached from the grassroots. Macron has just started ramping up his campaign.
Macron’s mistake was that instead of governing as a centrist, he migrated to the right and lost his distinction from Le Pen.
Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib
The fight today is between the right, represented by Macron (though he presents himself as a centrist), and the extreme right, represented by Le Pen. Macron has been able to benefit from the absence of the socialist party, which has not presented an audible message. Anne Hidalgo, who represents the center left, only received 1.7 percent support. The left has been hijacked by the extreme left, such as Jean-Luc Melenchon, who wants to tax 100 percent inheritance on everything above €12 million ($12.9 million), which is a killer to the free market economy.
There are many factors that can play into the equation now.
The key now is the voters of Melenchon, who received 22 percent in the first round. Polls show that 34 percent will vote for Macron and 30 percent will vote for Le Pen. Macron’s mistake was that instead of governing as a centrist, he migrated to the right and lost his distinction from Le Pen. Her defeat will depend on how many people will go to the polls to vote her out.
Though Le Pen did not mention the word “Frexit,” as people now realize the lies that led to Brexit and their consequences, she will set a French preference in all international relationships, which will weaken the negotiating power and weight of the EU on the global scene. Nevertheless, the French generally are proud Europeans and want to see more French leadership at the heart of the union. Hence it will be difficult for her to break existing agreements.
The three main powers in the EU previously were Germany, France and the UK. With Brexit, the European policy became mainly a Franco-German policy, and the two countries balance each other in decisions. The fact that there are two main powers in the EU ensures a minimum level of multilateralism that the union is founded on. The EU needs members with political muscle to drive it, especially when it comes to foreign policy. While Macron has called for more federalized power and an ever-closer union, Le Pen will probably do the opposite and will greatly weaken the EU.
The election of Le Pen would not only have an effect on French citizen state relations and French foreign policy but on the entire future of Europe. If Le Pen wins and Europe and NATO — which she has pledged to withdraw from — are in crisis, they have no one to blame but the incumbent president who normalized the far right.
Read the original article on the site of Arab News.
Russia’s struggle both feeds and blunts Xi’s ambitions for the island
Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Experts say Beijing is evaluating Moscow’s performance in Ukraine. (Source photos by Kremlin/Reuters and AP)
HIROYUKI AKITA
TOKYO — When Russia invaded Ukraine in late February, many policymakers and pundits in the U.S., Europe and Asia warned about the possibility of the conflict triggering a security crisis in the Taiwan Strait.
Seeing U.S. President Joe Biden unable to stop the aggression and reluctant to intervene militarily, Beijing may be tempted to start planning an invasion of Taiwan, they said.
Seven weeks on, the key questions now are what lessons China has learned from Russia’s war of aggression and how they will affect Beijing’s strategy for Taiwan. The answers could greatly affect global stability.
The conflict has led Chinese leaders to hold two contradictory views based on what they have learned from the war, according to Japanese and U.S. experts: One is that an attempt to annex Taiwan by force could have disastrous consequences for China; the other is that it is still possible to stage a military campaign to seize and control the island.
But Chinese leaders may now realize how hard it would be to forcibly occupy Taiwan after seeing the dismal performance of the Russian military in Ukraine.
The Ukraine crisis has proved that military superiority does not guarantee victory. Horrifying images of atrocities perpetrated by Russian troops have been captured by smartphones and news cameras and spread around the world, making Russia a global villain.
A former senior U.S. military officer who has been involved for years in developing Washington’s China strategy said Ukraine has overwhelmed Russia — not only militarily but also in information warfare, garnering Ukraine massive support from Western nations. China must have been shocked, he added.
History is littered with examples of small countries beating bigger and more powerful foes. In the 1970s, the U.S. suffered a bitter defeat in Vietnam. The Soviet Union and the U.S. both failed to win their respective wars in Afghanistan. Moscow pulled forces out of the country around 1988, while Washington withdrew in the summer of 2021.
The Chinese military has carefully studied this history, but it must have been disturbed by how Ukraine has pushed back Russian forces from areas around Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital, and other strategic locations.
For the U.S., the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan were large-scale campaigns that took place far from home. Russia is now struggling to subdue a neighbor with which it shares a border.
This is a dire warning to the Chinese military about its ambition to take over Taiwan. Beijing has also been rudely awakened to the fact that it will not be easy to stage a surprise attack on the island.
Since last autumn, Russian moves to mass troops along the border with Ukraine were closely monitored by satellites and disclosed to the media. If China opts to invade Taiwan, it needs to deploy far more troops and warships in the Taiwan Strait. Such moves would be immediately known to the entire world and trigger a global backlash.
Ukraine’s tactical success in resisting Russian assaults should also make China think twice before invading Taiwan. Yasuyuki Sugiura, senior research fellow at the Japanese Defense Ministry’s National Institute for Defense Studies and a specialist in Chinese military affairs, has been impressed with the way Ukraine’s defenses have withstood missile, cyber and bomber attacks by Russia.
« China’s initial operations against Taiwan would involve attempts to paralyze and destroy the island’s air defense system with missile, cyber and bomber attacks so that its special forces could parachute in for ground operations, » says Sugiura. « Such plans would not be viable if air defenses cannot be disabled swiftly. »
Adding more doubt to Beijing’s strategy has been the quick and concerted action by major Western democracies to impose economic sanctions on Russia. It would be difficult for these powers to impose similar sanctions against China, whose economy is 10 times larger than Russia’s. Still, it has become clear that China would face serious and damaging economic sanctions if it invades Taiwan.
Yasuhiro Matsuda, professor of international politics at the University of Tokyo’s Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia and an expert in China-Taiwan relations, says leaders in Beijing must be « getting cold feet after having witnessed the sanctions slapped on Russia. » It has become clear that China would suffer from harsh sanctions for years even if it can occupy Taiwan by force, he pointed out. « If such sanctions push the Chinese economy into a downturn, the Communist government would lose public support. »
Despite these deterrents, however, Russia’s war in Ukraine still may have emboldened Chinese President Xi Jinping to pursue his ambition to seize the island.
Especially worrisome is Beijing’s renewed recognition of the power of nuclear arms. The Biden administration has cited the risk of nuclear warfare with Russia as the reason for its refusal to intervene militarily in the war.
Though far smaller than Russia’s stockpiles, China is said to have a nuclear arsenal of more than 300 warheads. Some Japanese and South Korean policymakers are worried that Xi now believes that China’s nuclear arms would also deter Washington from taking military action if it invades Taiwan.
The question is what will influence Xi’s decision.
The answer will be determined by how Russia’s invasion pans out. In the short term, Ukraine’s surprisingly effective resistance will lead Beijing to rethink its Taiwan strategy and deter an attack on the island.
That does not mean, however, that Xi will give up the idea of annexing Taiwan by force. Beijing will learn lessons from Russia’s mistakes and take steps to make China less vulnerable to economic sanctions by the West. China will also take every means possible to bolster its military might with an eye on an eventual invasion of Taiwan.
Yet, everything is based on the assumption that Xi receives accurate information and reliable analyses from his military and other sources. If, like Russian President Vladimir Putin, Xi is surrounded by sycophants who feed him only « good news, » the world could face a very dangerous China.
MSNBC’s Ayman Mohyeldin interviews Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass for a general discussion about « the state of the world. »
« Ukraine is both a reflection of it and a driver of it, but you have a couple of things going on here at the moment that make this a remarkable moment in history, » Haass said. « The revival of the familiar stuff of history, geopolitical competition, obviously with Russia now i Europe, China in Asia, increasingly called the Indo-Pacific. A lot going on. »
« Three decades after the end of the Cold War, suddenly this is not the world that lots of people were expecting or hoping for, » Haass said. « And the whole other set of challenges from climate change to Covid and the rest, these global issues. »
« The gap is pretty large. Geopolitical competition plus the growing gap between global challenges and the collective responses, it adds up to a not good answer. It’s a big foreign policy challenge for the United States and the rest of the world. »
How should the business world respond to the increasing pressure to change its ways fast to address the climate crisis?
HÉLÈNE REY
14 APRIL 2022
What are the principal challenges of climate change?
David Kotler: As a banker, I’m looking at it from a money perspective and the figures coming out of the most reputable studies on this are just staggering. We’re looking to have to spend $130 trillion between now and 2050 to get to net zero. That translates to around $4.5 billion a year, every year, if we have any hope of capping global warming at 1.5 degrees.
Governments and the private sector are going to need to work hard to find the capital to affect the energy transition, and it’s not going to be easy. Take the European oil majors alone. The top five have a market capitalisation of more than $500 billion. That’s a huge amount of capital to have to transition.
Financial markets, businesses and policymakers are going to have to get very creative and think quite differently about how we finance this. Commercial banks in particular will need to be inventive if they’re going to be able to move their loan books away from traditional clients into new areas. We are seeing some traction in the insurance sector, where big players like AXA are no longer willing to lend money to oil and gas projects. But the challenge remains huge: how can the market deploy the vast amount of capital that we need to drive the energy transition.
Hélène Rey: From the macro-economic point of view, it’s just as daunting.
Covid-19 gave us a glimpse of what’s at stake. In 2020 global emissions dropped by 6% during lockdowns. But the trade-off for the global economy was devastating, with negative growth of -3.5% and even worse for advanced economies.
To reach our target of 1.5 degrees, we would need to reduce emissions by at least 6% every year between now and 2030. This is out of our reach, unless we radically change the structure of our economies. Doing this would entail huge investment, as David says, and entail knock-on effects for businesses and investors that are hard to predict.
The thing is: we really don’t have much choice. In terms of economic costs, climate change is another black swan, just like the crisis of 2008. Black swans are extremely costly and disruptive events, which are hard to predict. For climate change, some economists are speaking of a green swan. The difference is that we already know it is coming and we can already say that costs will be huge. There is therefore a real imperative to start defining the incentives, policies and business responses to meet this huge challenge now; and to focus resources on the technologies we need to drive the energy transition. Things look pretty bad for us if we don’t act immediately.
What are we seeing now in terms of a response to the challenge of climate change?
DK: As green technologies have evolved over the last few years, there’s been a concomitant drop in their costs. We’re also seeing tremendous improvements in energy efficiency across areas like solar energy and offshore wind turbines; especially as capital investment in these technologies has picked up. One of the most promising and exciting technologies under development right now is hydrogen, which has multiple applications in shipping and air travel and beyond.
That said, we still need to see more collaboration between governments and private sector financial institutions to really unlock the potential of green technologies. One good example of this is the original subsidy regime for offshore wind in the UK, which included a Government backed Green Investment Bank that helped to crowd in private capital. More of these kinds of mechanisms are needed around the world; particularly in hydrogen where we want to see production scaling up and costs coming down.
There is a cause for cautious optimism in the upswing in energy efficiency driven by technology. That and the increasing flow of venture capital and alternative forms of funding into new energy businesses, as investors around the world look for “the next Amazon” in renewables.
HR: In Europe there are also some encouraging initiatives recently. The Next Generation EU recovery package has a significant amount of money earmarked for green projects, and there’s a collective desire to bring together the right minds and resources to pull off the next break-through in this space.
The challenge we face here is two-fold: there’s a need to change production technology but at the same time, we need to drive scalability and global transferability. It’s not just about pushing the frontiers in science; it’s also about ensuring that other countries – emerging economies and less developed ones in particular – can also benefit from green innovation. We need to see greater diffusion of new technologies all over the globe.
We also need to replace our legacy energy production – the so-called brown technologies. And the solution here is probably a price system or carbon tax. In the EU this is starting to happen, with the price of carbon rising recently to 60 Euros per ton. China has introduced a similar emission trading system, though prices remain low there with surging demand for energy. Nonetheless, increasing the cost of carbon systematically and predictably should have the effect of incentivising investment in renewables, as brown technologies provide lower and lower returns over time.
DK: I agree that rewards and penalties are a great means of incentivising behaviours. Though, the problem with the penalty is that you need governments to align and have a unified approach. Otherwise, you have the risk of organisations moving operations to lower carbon tax areas, creating market distortions and effectively slowing the transition.
HR: Yes, any differentiation in prices opens the door to carbon leakages and the delocalisation of production – a kind of brown dumping. Carbon adjustment mechanisms are needed at borders to ensure a level playing field. And we need everyone to be on board. Whatever policies and practices we enact in Europe, we still only account for 8% of all global emissions. We need everyone to pull their weight because frankly, we’re all in this together.
We need to find the mechanisms – carbon offset trading markets for instance – that will help create and sustain a truly globalised strategy.
Can businesses or financial institutions help incentivise global cooperation and a global strategy for climate change?
DK: Well recently, we’re seeing the cost of debt increase and the knock-on effect of financial institutions making borrowing more expensive and less available to the big oil and gas companies, as the cost of capital has increased.
Traditionally big oil and gas producers would borrow to invest in new plants that have a lifespan of 30 to 40 years. With the cost of debt on the rise, banks have more doubts about these kinds of long-term commitments. And if you add in the increasing ubiquity of carbon tax and rising carbon costs, they become less and less attractive. The world is starting to change for these brown technology companies, and quite dramatically.
HR: Oil and gas plants are assets, and in today’s economic climate, assets face two types of risk. First, there’s the physical risk, much of it associated with climate change itself: things like drought or flooding. Then there’s the transition risk associated with the price of capital increasing, as well as the take-off in carbon tax, as David says. These risks have enormous implications for the value of assets like oil and gas plants. And banks are increasingly sensitive to their exposure, not only to these risks, but to correlated and interconnected risks in the insurance sector who have to underwrite these assets. Financial institutions, be they banks or insurers, have to grapple with a lot of complexity with these brown companies. And there’s often a dearth of really solid, granular data surrounding plants: where are they located exactly? We do not know enough about the physical risks they face.
Banks have real and justified concerns around the lack of mandatory disclosure too. There is no real transparency or standardization when it comes to companies having to disclose information about their CO2 emissions for instance.
DK: This is an area where the market is nonetheless driving some innovation. We’re beginning to see more and more third-party certification groups that can issue a rating for green-house gas emission – a kind of Standard & Poor set up in carbon footprints. Increasingly, commercial banks and other lenders are demanding to see a full audit of emissions before they approve credit. These benchmarks are moving more, as lenders are also open to public scrutiny and criticism: they don’t want to be seen as lending money to unscrupulous or polluting organisations.
Clearly, there are encouraging signs in the market. Although the challenges ahead remain enormous and there is a long way still to go.
HR: Yes, the window for action is more or less now. Our efforts to slow climate change need to happen as quickly as possible to ensure our goals are realistic or even remote possibilities.
What is your interim prognosis?
DK: I think companies are going to have to make a decision about whether they will continue to support fossil fuels in the longer term without a concrete plan. My feeling is that organisations are going to be obliged to make a real plan about energy transition; and those that fail to come up with a convincing plan will be penalized in the minds of investors. I think the financial markets provide a market mechanism to penalize, and reward those who take the right decisions.
HR: The way the macroeconomic context is moving, it’s no longer an option to remain static in the corporate world. Relative prices are going to be changing. Climate change is advancing and technology is advancing to keep pace.
To stay ahead, you need to be thinking ahead and factoring in things like the rising price of carbon, new technologies changing the energy scene, and new incoming regulations that are hard to predict. The status quo is no longer a choice.
The Middle East and North Africa have been political hotspots for the last 70 years. This was not limited to the Israeli-Palestinian and Arab conflicts. The interests of global and regional powers clashed there, with alliances often changing. New borders, carved out of the Ottoman Empire by the victors of World War I, led to the creation of artificial nations and the emergence of non-state political and military actors.
The region unfortunately allowed foreign actors to play a role in their interstate relations. This increased tensions between local powers, but also affected the internal affairs of these countries. It is significant that the agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear aspirations, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was only signed by Tehran and the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and China) as well as Germany. None of the neighboring countries or regional powers, like Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia or Egypt, were involved. The deal had important flaws, and did not demand that Iran halt its sponsoring of terrorist activities and its warmongering in Lebanon and Yemen. The JCPOA was then canceled by the Trump administration. Iran remained a major sponsor of terrorism in the region and beyond.
In other areas, diverting interests between global and regional powers led to wars, unrest, and diplomatic and economic conflicts. The main regional powers were Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran. Turkey, a NATO member, maintained good relations with Israel until the mid-2000s but otherwise tended to not get involved in Middle Eastern politics.
Region in flux
In the 1960s, Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser tried to play a leading role in the region. Cairo pushed for a socialist union of Arab countries, threatened Israel and caused unrest in Yemen, while still managing to remain unaligned throughout the Cold War.
At the time, Mohammad Reza Shah’s Iran played a stabilizing role – but this ended in 1979 when Ayatollah Khomeini took over and created the Islamic Republic. A bloodbath ensued during the brutal Iran-Iraq war. Chemical weapons were used, especially by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Iran was supported by the Soviets and Iraq had Washington’s tacit backing.
The West also carried out direct military interventions during the two Iraq wars and bombings in Muammar Qaddafi’s Libya.
The continuing threat posed by Tehran’s subversive activities in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen is uniting the Arab countries.
With the start of the so-called “Arab Spring” in 2011, a protest movement triggered by food price inflation, the cards were reshuffled. The military took over in Egypt to cast out a radical Islamist government led by the Muslim Brotherhood after the fall of President Hosni Mubarak. He resigned under pressure from protesters, but especially from then U.S. President Barack Obama. In Libya, Qaddafi, a tyrant and sponsor of terrorism, was killed, and the civil war that followed is still unresolved a decade later. Opposing factions have various foreign sponsors. Meanwhile, Syria’s devastating civil war started as a proxy conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, combined with pressure from the U.S., Russia, Turkey and Europe. The rise of Islamic State (also known as ISIS or Daesh) complicated matters, and Kurdish fighters in both Iraq and Syria contributed to crushing the terrorist organization.
Under Recep Tayyip Erdogan – first as prime minister, then as president – Turkey started to play a more active role in the region, becoming a crucial actor in the conflict in neighboring Syria. Moreover, Kurdish terrorism caused problems for Ankara.
Relations between Turkey and Israel started to deteriorate some 15 years ago. Ankara adopted a more Islamic (although not radical) leaning and antagonized President El-Sisi’s Egypt. This affected the country’s relations with Saudi Arabia, which supports Mr. El-Sisi.
However, the area has begun to come together and is trying to find regional solutions. Turkey and Saudi Arabia are now important players. The continuing threat posed by Tehran’s subversive activities in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen is uniting the Arab countries. The Abraham Accords agreement between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, unofficially approved by Saudi Arabia, is a sign of this regional rapprochement.
Turkey’s relations with key countries are improving, not only with Israel but also with Saudi Arabia – as demonstrated by the fact that Ankara has now transferred the jurisdiction for procedures concerning the Jamal Khashoggi murder to Riyadh.
Hopefully, this trend will limit Iran’s harmful activities. Lifting sanctions without Tehran’s commitment to stop sponsoring terrorism would have negative consequences. In this context, it would be preferable if the JCPOA agreement in its proposed form was not renewed. This would also improve Israel’s security and create a more favorable environment to solve the Palestinian conflict.
Israel’s outgoing air force chief Amikam Norkin said this month that Israel has lost its air supremacy over Lebanon after a drone was nearly shot down by Hezbollah a year ago. Tel Aviv has an understanding with Russia whereby the latter gives the former the freedom to operate in Syrian airspace and hit Iranian and Hezbollah targets, while at the same time Israel regularly violates Lebanese airspace to conduct reconnaissance operations. However, Norkin’s testimony shows that such operations are no longer effective, so what will Israel do next?
Israel is in a tough spot. The recent attacks in Tel Aviv show the limits of its attempts to “manage the conflict” with the Palestinians. What applies to Lebanon and Syria also applies to Palestine. Israel has been trying to keep the conflict under control and contain its symptoms rather than cure its causes. But this is not working.
The best remedy would be to solve the Palestinian issue by realizing a two-state solution. However, no Israeli leader has had the courage to take this step by making concessions and relinquishing the Zionist dream of acquiring Judea and Samaria. An outsider can see that the most pragmatic solution would be to divide historical Palestine into two states and live in peace. However, the Zionist ideology is based on the return of the Jews to their ancestral homeland. Hence, the concession has a larger significance than giving up land — it requires a major shake-up of the Israeli psyche.
It is unlikely that Naftali Bennett’s fractured and incoherent coalition government, which gathers a wide spectrum of political parties whose only common denominator was a desire to oust Benjamin Netanyahu, will make such a concession due to the major popular backlash it would likely provoke. While the Arab countries at last month’s Negev summit urged Israel to resume negotiations regarding a two-state solution, Bennett rebuffed their request, claiming that the current conditions are not suitable.
The Palestinians are insisting on an end to the occupation, which is not something the Israelis are yet ready to offer. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas does not want to repeat Yasser Arafat’s mistake. Arafat went to Oslo and promised his people a state and he ended up lingering in fruitless negotiations while his people remained under occupation with no viable state on the horizon.
Israel has recently suffered attacks in its main cities. Meanwhile, America’s return to the Iran nuclear deal is imminent. With it, Iran will be emboldened, but Tehran will try to prove to its domestic audience that it did not give up on its values, meaning it is unlikely to decrease its proxy activities in the region. As for the agreement between Israel and Russia, the war in Ukraine is putting it to the test.
It is today facing an increased internal threat, while it can also no longer keep Hezbollah and the Iranian militias in Lebanon and Syria under control.
Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib
Iran was against the decision to remove Russia from the UN Human Rights Council, while Israel supported it. Previously, Russia was trying to keep Iran contained in Syria and Israel’s airstrikes were serving this purpose, but now Russia needs Tehran more than ever. Will the understanding between Israel and Russia on Syria hold? On Saturday, Israel launched a daylight attack, which is unprecedented, as all its previous strikes were conducted at night. However, Russia can threaten to revoke the understanding to get some type of support from Tel Aviv.
Iran, on the other hand, which has improved bargaining power with Russia, is in a better position to sabotage such an understanding.
So Israel is today facing an increased internal threat, while it can also no longer keep Hezbollah and the Iranian militias in Lebanon and Syria under control. Therefore, what will it do? The Biden administration is not so focused on Israel. Unlike the Trump administration, it does not seem to be willing to use its capital with Arab countries to push them to normalize ties with Tel Aviv.
Israel is growing increasingly nervous about Hezbollah’s military capabilities. A preventive strike could be an option, but it is a difficult one. Last year’s Gaza war showed how public opinion is no longer in favor of Israel. Also, if Tel Aviv strikes to neutralize Hezbollah’s arsenal, the group will retaliate. Hence, it will incur huge damage before it can neutralize the pro-Iran group.
Israel is now in wait-and-see mode. It nervously awaits the signing of the nuclear deal and how Iran will act after that. No one is expecting Tehran to take it easy. On the contrary, all parties are assuming Iran will increase its activism. If so, what will Israel’s response be? Since its inception, Israel has resorted to military strikes whenever it has been faced with a threat. However, recently, with every strike, Israel has been slowly losing. Its enemies have been able to inflict more damage and it has been increasingly drawing criticism. It is unlikely that Israel’s Arab allies will support it if it strikes an Arab country.
Though the Negev summit took place to discuss creating a front to face Iran, this front will not materialize if Israel attacks Lebanon, even if that inflicts damage on Hezbollah. Who will the next casualty of Israeli insecurity be? Could it be Lebanon? Maybe, but again, if Israel takes this path, it will not be a walk in the park. It will be a hard and costly option to take.
CHRONIQUE – Même si le peuple ukrainien accepte un jour de renoncer à adhérer à l’Otan – ce qui est tout sauf certain -, le pays continuera à s’équiper d’armes occidentales.
La guerre déclenchée par Vladimir Poutine contre l’Ukraine dure depuis plus d’un mois et demi. Elle n’est donc pas la blitzkrieg qu’elle était censée être dans la tête des dirigeants russes. Dans le même intervalle de temps, au printemps 1940, l’Allemagne avait réussi à vaincre l’armée de la France et le corps expéditionnaire du Royaume-Uni, deux puissances qui avaient gagné la guerre vingt-deux ans plus tôt. Les Français avaient été défaits, mais ils s’étaient battus avec courage, perdant 60.000 soldats, morts au champ d’honneur. Les Britanniques avaient eu quant à eux 4500 tués sur le sol français.
Pour justifier son «opération militaire spéciale» auprès du peuple russe, le maître du Kremlin avait présenté, dans une allocution télévisée le 24 février 2022, deux objectifs stratégiques: la «dénazification» de l’Ukraine et sa démilitarisation.
Sanctions are an important and powerful weapon, and they are putting some pressure on the Kremlin. But unless the West employs them judiciously, Russian President Vladimir Putin, who appears to believe his paranoid propaganda and oversees the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, may conclude that his regime has nothing to lose.
MADRID – The gruesome scenes left behind after Russia’s withdrawal from Bucha, where Ukraine accuses Russian troops of torturing and slaughtering civilians, have intensified pressure on the West to provide more offensive weapons to Ukraine and for Europe to ban Russian energy imports. But beyond the legitimate question of Europe’s willingness to pay such a high price on Ukraine’s behalf lies the stark reality that sanctions are hardly a silver bullet.
Calls for sanctions began well before the invasion. When Russia was massing troops near Ukraine’s border, the Ukrainian government – and some American lawmakers – urged the United States and Europe to impose preemptive sanctions and offer Ukraine stronger security guarantees. But Western leaders demurred, arguing that sanctions would impede their ability to reach a diplomatic solution.
Le chef de la diplomatie européenne Josep Borrell a annoncé son intention de lancer la discussion sur un embargo pétrolier. Mais l’arrêt des achats de pétrole russe divise les 27.
Par L’Obs avec AFP
Publié le
Ursula von der Leyen, Volodymyr Zelensky et Josep Borrell à Kiev, le 8 avril 2022. (STRINGER / AFP)
Les ministres des Affaires étrangères de l’UE vont discuter lundi à Luxembourg d’un 6e paquet de sanctions contre Moscou.
Nous venons d’imposer de lourdes sanctions à la Russie et nous sommes en train de préparer une sixième vague », a annoncé vendredi la présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula von der Leyen, lors de sa visite à Kiev avec le chef de la diplomatie Josep Borrell.
Le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky ne cesse de demander à tous ses interlocuteurs européens « l’adoption de sanctions puissantes ». Il réclame un arrêt des achats de pétrole et de gaz et la fourniture d’armes lourdes pour résister à l’offensive annoncée dans la région du Donbass.
Vers un embargo pétrolier ?
Josep Borrell a annoncé son intention de lancer lundi la discussion sur un embargo pétrolier, « mais une proposition formelle n’est pas sur la table », a reconnu vendredi un haut fonctionnaire européen. « L’unanimité est nécessaire pour l’adoption des sanctions. Or on voit bien les dépendances vis-à-vis de la Russie dans plusieurs Etats membres », a-t-il souligné.
L’Allemagne, l’Italie, l’Autriche et la Hongrie sont très dépendantes du gaz russe. « On ne va pas présenter quelque chose qui ne passera pas. Les propositions doivent être faites au moment opportun », a-t-il expliqué.
Depuis le début de la guerre en Ukraine fin février, le Kremlin a engrangé 27,3 milliards de dollars avec les achats de pétrole, gaz et charbon de l’UE, selon Velina Tchakarova, directrice de l’Institut autrichien pour l’Europe et la politique de sécurité (AIES).
L’UE a décrété un embargo sur les achats de charbon mais leur montant est très inférieur à ceux de gaz et pétrole.
500 millions d’euros débloqués
Les ministres vont en revanche valider le déblocage de 500 millions d’euros supplémentaires pour financer et livrer de nouvelles armes à Kiev, selon plusieurs diplomates de l’UE.
« Les sanctions sont importantes, mais elles ne résoudront pas le problème dans le Donbass. La bataille dans le Donbass sera décisive pour l’issue de la guerre », a souligné samedi Josep Borrell.
La Russie bombarde l’Ukraine depuis la mer à partir de navires situés hors de portée des armes ukrainiennes et les forces de Kiev ont besoin « d’armes à longue portée et de davantage de véhicules blindés », a expliqué un haut responsable européen. La Slovaquie a annoncé vendredi avoir fourni à Kiev un système de défense anti-aérien russe S-300.
Lors de leur réunion, les ministres s’entretiendront avec le procureur de la Cour pénale internationale (CPI), Karim Khan, du soutien de l’UE aux enquêtes sur de possibles crimes de guerre en Ukraine.
PARIS – Beyond the immense tragedy which Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war has brought upon Ukraine and its people, we are starting to grasp its potentially devastating consequences for the global sustainability agenda.
Already, the COVID-19 pandemic redirected global attention and resources away from the targets enshrined in the 2015 Paris climate agreement, as countries focused on their immediate public-health needs. Now, Putin’s war is intensifying the economic, social, and geopolitical pressures countries face, while deepening divisions among them. This does not bode well for efforts to address the shared challenge of climate change.