History shows that wounded pride and the perceived weakness of an opponent are both powerful triggers for aggression. This observation is not intended to justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but rather meant to analyze the factors that led to Moscow’s hostile behavior.
Europe is in a peculiar situation. In terms of defense, the continent is extremely weak – not only from a strictly military standpoint, but also when it comes to civil defense (emergency plans for citizens’ protection, reserve stocks of food and medication), as well as cyber and energy security and protection of supply lines. There is no culture of defense. The military situation is inadequate to the point of being absurd.
The most pressing short-term goal is to stop the war without showing weakness.
Together, the European Union and the United Kingdom are home to more than 500 million inhabitants. Some 330 million people live in the United States, and 150 million in Russia. These 515 million Europeans, with a massive defense budget of roughly $260 billion dollars (EU countries plus UK) for 2021, need 330 million Americans (with a defense budget of some $780 billion) to defend them against 150 million Russians with a defense budget of less than $70 billion. Europe’s problem is a lack of willingness and strength. Defense and deterrence require determination.
With the U.S. having turned away from Europe and Washington’s leadership looking weak, it was enough to tempt the Kremlin into adventurism. But the West’s second mistake toward Russia was a lack of respect. Russians were considered backward, and accused of not living up to the European “value standards” – even if it is unclear what these standards are and doubtful whether the people of Russia are even interested in adopting them. For many Russians, this state of affairs reinforced the opinion that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.
This was where things stood when Russia invaded Ukraine. The Kremlin was taken aback by the effective defense readiness of the Ukrainian population. Moscow may have also underestimated the solidarity of the international community. Many fear escalation. Nuclear warfare is possible, even though it is unlikely since it would mean the destruction of the Russian leadership. This unfortunately does not necessarily exclude a focused nuclear attack on military targets in sparsely populated areas. It is more probable that other tools could be used for escalation, such as heavy cyberattacks against Europe – which is not well prepared for this threat. The Kremlin could also restrict exports, especially of gas to Germany, or worse, food. Many countries depend heavily on Russian and Ukrainian grain as well as edible oils.
African and Middle Eastern countries could face food price inflation and shortages. The resulting food scarcity would trigger heavy migration toward Europe. And Russia has already declared that it would reduce its exports because it needs its food reserves to feed its own population.
Possible solutions
Russia still has the means to do a lot of damage and could keep on destroying Ukraine and threatening the West. The most pressing short-term goal is to stop the war without showing weakness. This also means that Russia must not be put through unnecessary humiliation. However, the West must clearly show that further military aggression will be met with determination. It is a good sign that European countries, especially Germany, have realized the need to strengthen their defense efforts.
It is also encouraging that direct talks between Kyiv and Moscow have begun. Turkey played an essential role in achieving this diplomatic success. That the Czech, Polish and Slovenian heads of governments made a trip to besieged Kyiv also sent a clear signal. But now a cease-fire must come first, and then a solution can be found.
It would be optimal for Kyiv to have access to the four freedoms of the European Union’s internal market without necessarily becoming a full member.
With such a large landmass, the Russian Empire ran into trouble as soon as it showed military weakness. The decline of the tsars started when Russia lost the war against Japan in 1904-1905. It was the first time that a European nation was defeated by a non-European adversary in two centuries. The authority of the tsarist government was heavily compromised. Today’s Russia cannot risk going down the same path. An abrupt regime change in Moscow would only lead to further radicalization. The West has to realize that trying to change the governance of a country as large as Russia from outside will inevitably fail. A possible first step toward resolving the conflict could be agreeing to a cease-fire while Kyiv consents not to join NATO.
Then, other points will have to be negotiated, namely Crimea and Donbas and Ukraine’s relationship with the European Union. For the debated territories, there could be referendums under international supervision, possibly two separate ones. We must not forget that Donbas and Crimea do not belong to either Russia or Ukraine, but to their respective populations. They should be able to choose between different possibilities: autonomy, independence or remaining. The principle of self-determination should come before maintaining national borders.
Concerning EU membership, Ukraine could be given applicant status. It would be optimal for Kyiv to have access to the four freedoms of the European Union’s internal market without necessarily becoming a full member. At the same time, Ukraine could have a similar agreement with the Eurasian Union. This neutrality between NATO, the EU and the Russian Federation would need to be guaranteed. This would be the ideal outcome – we can only hope that it will be at least partly achieved.
Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd issues chilling warning over China’s plans to invade Taiwan – as he reveals crucial way to avoid ‘sleepwalking into war’
Chinese pre-emptive strike would try to take out US forces in Guam and Japan
Few in the West realise how much Xi Jinping wants the return of Taiwan to China
Mr Rudd warned ‘the balance of power continues to change in China’s favour’
By PADRAIG COLLINS FOR DAILY MAIL AUSTRALIA
Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has issued a stark warning over the prospect of China invading Taiwan and said the West could be ‘sleepwalking into war’ with the communist state.
Mr Rudd said few in the West realise how much Chinese leader Xi Jinping covets the return of the island nation of Taiwan to mainland control.
‘It’s right up there next to Xi Jinping’s desire for the party to remain in power and for him to be the predominant leader within the Communist Party of China,’ Mr Rudd told ABC’s 7.30 program on Wednesday.
He also said that in the event of a war with the West, a Chinese pre-emptive strike would try to take out American forces in the US-controlled island of Guam and in Japan.
Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (pictured) has given a stark warning about the power of Chine and its plans for Taiwan
Mr Rudd said the only things stopping China from invading Taiwan are questions of militaristic dominance and avoiding the crippling sanctions that have been imposed on Russia following the invasion of Ukraine.
‘There has been a little too much excited commentary in the West about how China will seize on this strategic opportunity to move on Taiwan. I don’t think that’s the case,’ he said.
But Mr Rudd warned that ‘the balance of power continues to change in China’s favour, both militarily and economically, so that shifts this dynamic.’
The former Prime Minister said the US military has done extensive war game modelling on how a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would turn, and it shows China would come out on top, but barely.
‘In most of the war gaming which has been done so far – and these are desktop exercises by and large – if you look at what various US officials have said off the record and partly reported in the American media, the Chinese at this stage win most of the time,’ he said.
Mr Rudd added that all parties are closely watching what is happening in Ukraine.
‘Taiwanese, for the first time in a very long time, I think, are now readdressing their national defence idea needs and I think they will be looking very carefully at the fight which the Ukrainians have put up against Russia,’ he said.
He added that Russia’s ‘blitzkrieg’ invasion of Ukraine by land had stalled. In comparison, he said an invasion of Taiwan would be largely conducted by sea.
China’s President Xi Jinping (pictured) inspects People’s Liberation Army soldiers at a barracks in Hong Kong
Mr Rudd said Australia’s role should be to encourage the US and other allies towards deterrence of any military conflict.
‘Australia is a treaty ally of the United States. So our job as a treaty ally, in my judgement, is to argue strongly and effectively with the United States, two things.
‘One is how to maximise the deterrent effect of US military posture, but also the pan-allied military posture as well. The Japanese, the Republic of Korea, Australia, together with our new quad partner in India.
A Lafayette-class frigate of the Taiwanese navy takes part in an exercise in waters off the southern naval base of Tsoying
‘And I think the second is this, to urge upon the Americans a stabilising mechanism for the bilateral US-China relationship … to prevent what I would describe as « sleepwalking into war ».’
Mr Rudd also warned that any war between the US and China would also result in a direct Chinese attack on Japan.
‘A Chinese pre-emptive strike would try to take out American forces, probably in Guam (a US overseas territory in the Western Pacific), but also in Okinawa (Japan, where the US has a huge military base), and that brings Japan in.’
Kevin Rudd said Taiwan is looking very carefully at the fight which the Ukrainians have put up against Russia. Pictured is smoke billowing after a Russian attack on Kyiv on March 21, 2022
Read the original article on the site of the Daily Mail.
La guerre contre l’Ukraine prouve que l’Europe est encore plus en danger que nous le pensions il y a seulement quelques mois. L’invasion brutale de l’Ukraine par la Russie n’est pas seulement une attaque non provoquée contre un pays souverain qui défend ses droits et sa démocratie, c’est aussi le plus grand défi à l’ordre européen de sécurité depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Ce sont les principes mêmes sur lesquels reposent les relations internationales qui sont en jeu, notamment ceux de la Charte des Nations unies et de l’Acte final d’Helsinki.
Si les crises ont tendance à cristalliser les évolutions, celle-ci a montré encore plus clairement que nous vivions dans un monde façonné par une politique de puissance brutale, où tout est militarisé et où nous sommes confrontés à une bataille féroce de récits. Toutes ces tendances se manifestaient déjà avant la guerre en Ukraine ; elles s’accélèrent aujourd’hui.
Cela signifie que notre réponse doit également s’accélérer – et c’est ce que nous avons fait. Nous avons pris des mesures rapides sur l’ensemble du spectre politique et brisé plusieurs tabous en cours de route : des sanctions sans précédent et soutien massif à l’Ukraine y compris, pour la toute première fois, par l’intermédiaire d’un financement de la livraison d’équipements militaires à un pays attaqué. Nous avons également mis en place une vaste coalition internationale pour soutenir l’Ukraine, isoler la Russie et rétablir le droit international. À tous égards, la réponse de l’UE a été impressionnante – même si, la guerre se poursuivant, elle n’est pas encore suffisante.
Nous ne savons pas comment et quand cette guerre va se terminer. Comme le souligne le Grand Continent dans son premier numéro imprimé, nous naviguons toujours dans l’interrègne1. Mais nous pouvons déjà dire que la guerre d’Ukraine de 2022 a vu la naissance tardive d’une Union géopolitique. Pendant des années, les Européens ont débattu de la manière de rendre l’Union plus consciente de sa propre sécurité, avec une unité d’objectifs et de capacités pour poursuivre ses objectifs politiques sur la scène mondiale. Nous sommes allés plus loin sur cette voie au cours des dernières semaines qu’au cours de la décennie précédente. Nous nous en réjouissons, mais nous devons veiller à ce que le réveil géopolitique de l’Union devienne une permanence stratégique. Il reste encore beaucoup à faire, en Ukraine et ailleurs.
Nous naviguons toujours dans l’interrègne.
JOSEP BORRELL
Faire de l’Europe un hard power
Je suis convaincu que l’Union doit être plus qu’un soft power : nous avons également besoin de hard power. Toutefois, nous devons prendre conscience que le concept de hard power ne peut être réduit aux moyens militaires : il s’agit d’utiliser toute la gamme de nos instruments pour atteindre nos objectifs. Il s’agit de penser et d’agir comme une puissance. Petit à petit, les conditions pour que cela se produise sont en train d’être remplies.
Premièrement, les Européens sont de plus en plus conscients qu’ils sont confrontés ensemble aux menances. Ils prennent également conscience d’à quel point leurs destins sont liés. Aujourd’hui, personne en Europe ne peut croire ou penser que ce qui se passe en Ukraine ne le concerne pas, quelle que soit la distance qui nous sépare du drame. Notre soutien à l’Ukraine n’est donc pas seulement un acte de solidarité, c’est aussi une manière de défendre nos intérêts communs et de se défendre contre un agresseur impitoyable et lourdement armé.
Deuxièmement, les peuples d’Europe ont atteint un niveau de prospérité et de bien-être social sans précédent, que l’adhésion à l’Union a encore accru. Cela fait de l’Europe une zone fondamentalement pacifique, construite autour de l’idée que l’interdépendance génère la prospérité et la paix. Toutefois, l’une des leçons de la guerre en Ukraine est que l’interdépendance économique ne peut à elle seule garantir notre sécurité. Au contraire, elle peut être instrumentalisée contre nous. Nous devons donc être prêts à agir contre ceux qui veulent utiliser les avantages de l’interdépendance pour nous nuire ou faire la guerre.
C’est ce qui se passe aujourd’hui. En prenant des sanctions sans précédent contre l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie, nous rendons le coût de l’agression de plus en plus prohibitif. Dans le même temps, nous devons encore davantage renforcer notre résilience et réduire nos vulnérabilités stratégiques, que ce soit sur les infrastructures critiques, les matières premières, les produits de santé ou dans d’autres domaines.
L’une des leçons de la guerre en Ukraine est que l’interdépendance économique ne peut à elle seule garantir notre sécurité. Au contraire, elle peut être instrumentalisée contre nous.
JOSEP BORRELL
Dans toute l’Union, il existe une volonté claire de tirer les bonnes leçons de cette crise. Cela implique que nous prenions enfin au sérieux les menaces qui pèsent sur nos intérêts stratégiques et dont nous étions conscients mais auxquelles nous n’avons pas toujours donné suite dans nos actes. Qu’on pense par exemple au secteur énergétique. Nous savons depuis des années que l’énergie joue un rôle disproportionné dans les relations entre l’Union et la Russie et que cette dernière l’utilise comme une arme politique. Nous sommes désormais pleinement mobilisés pour réduire notre dépendance excessive à l’égard des importations énergétiques russes (pétrole, gaz et charbon).
De la même manière, la guerre en Ukraine rend plus urgente la réalisation d’un bond en avant en matière de sécurité et de défense de l’Union. Il s’agit ici de souligner que les investissements supplémentaires que les États membres de l’Union réalisent actuellement – et qui sont les bienvenus – devraient impliquer une plus grande coordination au sein de l’Union et de l’OTAN. Il ne s’agit pas seulement de dire que chacun d’entre nous doit dépenser plus. Nous devons tous, collectivement, dépenser plus.
Un nouveau monde de menaces
La guerre en Ukraine est la crise de sécurité la plus grave que l’Europe ait connue depuis des décennies, mais les menaces pour la sécurité européenne ont des sources bien plus diverses, tant en Europe qu’au-delà. Nos intérêts de sécurité sont en jeu dans les Balkans occidentaux, au Sahel, au Moyen-Orient élargi, dans la région indo-pacifique, etc.
Alors que la guerre en Ukraine fait rage et fait payer un terrible tribut, nous ne devons pas oublier que le monde est plein de ces situations où nous sommes confrontés à des tactiques hybrides et à des dynamiques de concurrence, d’intimidation et de coercition. En effet, en Ukraine comme ailleurs, les outils de la puissance ne sont pas seulement les soldats, les chars et les avions, mais aussi les sanctions financières ou les interdictions d’importation et d’exportation, ainsi que les flux énergétiques, et les opérations de désinformation et d’ingérence étrangère.
En outre, nous avons assisté ces dernières années à l’instrumentalisation des flux migratoires, à la privatisation des armées et à la politisation du contrôle des technologies sensibles. Si l’on ajoute à cela la dynamique des États faillis, le recul des libertés démocratiques, ainsi que les attaques contre les « biens communs mondiaux » que sont le cyberespace, la haute mer et l’espace extra-atmosphérique, la conclusion est claire : la défense de l’Europe a besoin d’un concept global de sécurité.
En Ukraine comme ailleurs, les outils du puissance ne sont pas seulement les soldats, les chars et les avions, mais aussi les sanctions financières ou les interdictions d’importation et d’exportation, ainsi que les flux énergétiques, et les opérations de désinformation et d’ingérence étrangère.
JOSEP BORRELL
La boussole stratégique : un bond en avant pour la sécurité et la défense européennes
Si nous voulons éviter d’être les spectateurs d’un monde façonné par et pour les autres, nous devons agir – ensemble. Telle est la philosophie de la boussole stratégique que j’ai présentée en novembre dernier et qui a été finalisée par les ministres des affaires étrangères et de la défense de l’Union le 21 mars2. La boussole est très détaillée et compte 47 pages, regroupées en quatre axes de travail (Agir, Sécuriser, Investir et Créer des partenariats). Je soulignerai quelques-unes des idées principales.
Pour renforcer notre capacité d’action, nous nous efforcerons de consolider nos missions et opérations de gestion de crise et nous développerons une capacité de l’Union qui nous permettra de déployer rapidement jusqu’à 5 000 hommes pour différents types de crises. Nous améliorerons l’état de préparation de nos forces en organisant régulièrement des exercices réels – ce qui n’a jamais été fait auparavant au niveau de l’Union –, nous renforcerons nos dispositifs de commandement et de contrôle et nous favoriserons une prise de décision plus rapide et plus souple. Nous développerons notre capacité à lutter contre les cybermenaces, la désinformation et l’ingérence étrangère. Et nous approfondirons les investissements dans les catalyseurs stratégiques nécessaires et les capacités de nouvelle génération. L’Union deviendra ainsi un fournisseur de sécurité plus performant pour ses citoyens, mais aussi un partenaire mondial plus fort, œuvrant pour la paix et la sécurité internationales.
Bien davantage que les papiers que nous produisons habituellement à Bruxelles, la boussole stratégique définit des actions concrètes, assorties d’échéances précises pour mesurer les progrès accomplis. C’est un document qui appartient aux États membres et qui est maintenant adopté par le Conseil. Tout au long du processus, les États membres ont été aux commandes. En le signant, ils s’engagent à le mettre en œuvre. Et un solide processus de suivi sera mis en place pour garantir cette mise en œuvre. Il s’agit de différences majeures avec la stratégie de sécurité de l’Union européenne de 2003 et la stratégie globale de 2016.
Une Union plus forte signifie aussi un partenariat transatlantique plus fort
À ce moment du raisonnement, les gens ont tendance à dire : « tout cela est très bien, mais qu’en est-il de l’OTAN ? » L’OTAN reste au cœur de la défense territoriale de l’Europe. Personne ne le remet en question. Toutefois, cela ne doit pas empêcher les pays européens de développer leurs capacités et de mener des opérations dans notre voisinage et au-delà. Nous devrions être en mesure d’agir en tant qu’Union européenne dans des scénarios celui de l’année dernière en Afghanistan – sécuriser un aéroport pour une évacuation d’urgence – ou d’intervenir rapidement dans une crise où la violence menace la vie des civils.
Je suis convaincu qu’une plus grande responsabilité stratégique européenne est le meilleur moyen de renforcer la solidarité transatlantique. Il ne s’agit pas soit de l’Union, soit de l’OTAN : il s’agit à la fois de l’Union et de l’OTAN. J’ajoute que les hésitations à avancer sur cet agenda « à cause de l’OTAN » viennent de l’intérieur de l’Union, pas des États-Unis. La déclaration commune que le Secrétaire Blinken et moi-même avons publiée en décembre dernier était très claire. Elle spécifiait que les États-Unis souhaitaient : « une défense européenne plus forte et plus compétente qui contribue à la sécurité mondiale et transatlantique ». Les États-Unis disent essentiellement : « Ne parlez pas, agissez. Mettez-vous au travail et aidez-nous à partager le fardeau de la sécurité ».
Il ne s’agit pas soit de l’Union, soit de l’OTAN : il s’agit à la fois de l’Union et de l’OTAN.
JOSEP BORRELL
Si ce n’est pas maintenant, alors quand ?
Ceux qui, comme moi, souhaitent un changement radical en matière de sécurité et de défense doivent expliquer pourquoi ils pensent que « cette fois-ci, ce sera différent ». Nous devrions reconnaître que, dans l’histoire de la défense européenne, de nombreux plans et initiatives, pleins d’acronymes, allant du plan Pleven à la Communauté européenne de défense ; au début de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune après Maastricht ; aux guerres en ex-Yougoslavie et à « l’heure de l’Europe », à Saint-Malo, au début de la PESD, puis de la PSDC, de l’objectif global d’Helsinki, de la PESCO, du Fonds européen de défense et de la Facilité européenne de paix, etc.
Il n’en reste pas moins que la sécurité et la défense sont probablement le domaine de l’intégration européenne qui présente le plus grand écart entre les attentes et les résultats. Entre ce que nous pourrions être et ce que les citoyens exigent – et ce que nous réalisons réellement.
Il est donc temps d’essayer à nouveau. Et la raison pour laquelle je pense que la boussole stratégique pourrait avoir plus d’impact que les plans précédents réside dans la vitesse à laquelle les tendances mondiales et le contexte géopolitique évoluent et s’aggravent. Cela rend la nécessité d’agir urgente, impérieuse. C’est particulièrement vrai pour la guerre en Ukraine et les implications plus larges d’une Russie révisionniste pour la sécurité européenne.
Mais cela va plus loin : toutes les menaces auxquelles nous sommes confrontés s’intensifient. La capacité des différents États membres à y faire face est à la fois insuffisante et en déclin. L’écart se creuse et cela ne peut plus durer.
Mon travail a consisté à esquisser une issue. Or je ne sais que trop bien que les résultats ne dépendent pas des documents stratégiques mais des actions. Celles-ci appartiennent aux États membres : ils détiennent les prérogatives et les atouts.
La bonne nouvelle est que, chaque jour, nous constatons que davantage d’États membres sont prêts à investir davantage dans la sécurité et la défense. Nous devons veiller à ce que ces investissements supplémentaires bienvenus soient réalisés dans un esprit de collaboration et non de manière fragmentée et nationale. Nous devons profiter de ce nouvel élan pour nous assurer que nous nous dotons enfin de l’état d’esprit, des moyens et des mécanismes nécessaires pour défendre notre Union, nos citoyens et nos partenaires.
Politiquement, je considère que le choix auquel nous sommes confrontés est similaire à celui du lancement de l’euro ou du plan de relance. Ces moments ont été ceux où les coûts de la « non-Europe » sont devenus si élevés que les gens étaient prêts à repenser leurs lignes rouges et à investir dans des solutions véritablement européennes. Nous avons sauté le pas, pour ainsi dire, ensemble, et, dans les deux cas, les résultats sont clairs et positifs. Faisons un saut similaire en matière de sécurité et de défense européennes, comme l’attendent nos citoyens. Si ce n’est pas maintenant, alors quand ?
Repenser le langage de la puissance
Pour le meilleur ou pour le pire, je soupçonne que mon mandat de Haut représentant de l’Union européenne sera associé à une phrase que j’ai utilisée lors de mon audition en octobre 2019 au Parlement européen, à savoir que les Européens devaient « apprendre à parler le langage de la puissance ».
Je soutenais que l’intégration européenne avait puisé son impulsion originelle d’un rejet de la puissance chez les États qui participèrent à ce projet à ses débuts. Le projet européen avait réussi à transformer les problèmes politiques en problèmes technocratiques et à remplacer les calculs de puissance par des procédures juridiques. Dans l’histoire des relations internationales et de notre continent déchiré par la guerre, il s’agissait d’une révolution copernicienne. Elle a également connu un succès spectaculaire, cimentant la paix et la coopération entre des parties auparavant en guerre, créant des institutions, des cartes mentales et un vocabulaire uniques.
Mais ce chapitre historique s’est terminé. L’Union a été aux prises avec différentes crises, elle a dû absorber différents chocs : la crise financière, la crise de l’euro, la crise migratoire3, le Brexit… Tout cela a déclenché des débats intensément politiques sur la nature de notre Union et les sources de solidarité et de légitimité. Ces questions n’ont pas pu être résolues par la tactique habituelle de l’Union européenne, à savoir la dépolitisation, les solutions techniques et les solutions fondées sur le marché.
Depuis plusieurs années, nous vivons une nouvelle phase de l’histoire européenne qui ne concerne pas tant les espaces – ceux, qu’affectionne Bruxelles, des frontières ouvertes et de la libre circulation – que les lieux – l’origine et l’appartenance des personnes, leur identité. Nous semblons moins concentrés sur les tendances – mondialisation, progrès technologique – que sur les événements historiques et la façon dont nous y réagissons4. La pandémie et l’attaque de la Russie contre l’Ukraine sont de ceux-là.
Le succès de l’intégration européenne et la méthode choisie de dépolitisation ont également eu un prix : une réticence et une incapacité à accepter le fait que, en dehors de notre jardin post-moderne, « la jungle repoussait ».
JOSEP BORRELL
À cela s’ajoute un facteur externe majeur. Le succès de l’intégration européenne et la méthode choisie de dépolitisation ont également eu un prix : une réticence et une incapacité à accepter le fait que, en dehors de notre jardin post-moderne, « la jungle repoussait » pour reprendre l’expression du néoconservateur Robert Kagan5. Il y a trente ans, de nombreuses discussions et de nombreux livres faisaient le pari que le monde était plat, que l’histoire était terminée et que l’Europe et son modèle allaient diriger le XXIe siècle. Aujourd’hui, les mêmes auteurs montre comment cette interdépendance s’est transformée en arme, et comment l’Europe serait naïve et mal adaptée à l’ère du retour de la puissance6.
Pendant tout ce temps, j’ai été convaincu de deux points essentiels :
Premièrement, nous devons être réalistes et reconnaître que la phase actuelle de l’histoire et de la politique mondiale nous oblige à penser et à agir en termes de puissance – d’où l’expression « le langage de la puissance ». La guerre contre l’Ukraine en est la dernière et la plus dramatique illustration.
Deuxièmement, la meilleure façon de peser sur les événements, de les façonner et de ne pas les subir, se situe à l’échelle de l’Union : elle passe par un meilleure investissement dans notre capacité d’action collective7.
Tout le reste n’est que fioriture.
Par conséquent, nous devons nous doter de l’état d’esprit et des moyens nécessaires pour faire face à l’ère de la puissance et nous devons le faire à grande échelle. Cela ne se fera pas du jour au lendemain, compte tenu de qui nous sommes et d’où nous venons. Toutefois, je pense que nous sommes en train de mettre en place certains des éléments constitutifs et que la crise ukrainienne a accéléré cette tendance.
Dès 2021, nous avons montré que nous étions prêts à adopter une position forte pour contrer les démonstrations ouvertes de politique de puissance à nos frontières orientales. Outre notre soutien à l’Ukraine, on peut citer ce que nous avons fait pour le Belarus, où nous avons tenu bon, y compris sur l’instrumentalisation des migrants, ou pour la Moldavie, auprès de qui nous avons élargi notre soutien.
En outre, nous avons renforcé notre approche vis-à-vis de la Chine et exposé la manière dont l’Union pouvait renforcer son engagement dans et avec la région indo-pacifique. En ce qui concerne la Chine, nous sommes devenus moins naïfs et avons fait nos devoirs pour contrer le défi de l’ouverture asymétrique en mettant en place des politiques sur le filtrage des investissements, la 5G, les marchés publics et l’instrument anti-coercition, comme l’a également exposé Sabine Weyand dans ces colonnes.
Avec notre stratégie indo-pacifique, nous sommes de plus engagés dans un processus de diversification politique, en investissant dans nos liens avec l’Asie démocratique. Au cœur de cet effort se trouve notre travail sur la stratégie Global Gateway, qui vise à préciser notre offre et la manière dont elle diffère de celle des autres acteurs. L’objectif de cette stratégie est de créer des liens et non des dépendances. De nombreux partenaires africains et asiatiques saluent de fait cette approche européenne de la connectivité, qui met l’accent sur des règles décidées en commun, la durabilité et l’appropriation locale. Mais il s’agit d’un domaine concurrentiel. Une bataille de normes est en cours. C’est pourquoi nous devons être concrets et ne pas limiter notre position à des déclarations générales de principes et d’intentions. C’est pourquoi nous envisageons de mobiliser jusqu’à 300 milliards d’euros dans le cadre de la stratégie Global Gateway, dont 150 milliards spécialement pour l’Afrique, ainsi que plusieurs programmes phares, afin de rendre la coopération aussi concrète et tangible que possible.
Nous pourrions continuer, mais l’essentiel est de souligner que, petit à petit, la notion d’une Union à la conscience géopolitique éveillée prenait déjà forme avant la guerre contre l’Ukraine. La tâche qui nous attend est d’inscrire ce réveil géopolitique de l’Europe dans le temps et de le rendre plus consistant. Pour cela, nous devons non seulement apprendre le langage de la puissance, mais aussi le parler.
Petit à petit, la notion d’une Union à la conscience géopolitique éveillée prenait déjà forme avant la guerre contre l’Ukraine. La tâche qui nous attend est d’inscrire ce réveil géopolitique de l’Europe dans le temps et de le rendre plus consistant.
JOSEP BORRELL
À mi-mandat : que faire différemment et mieux ?
Cette Commission européenne a débuté en décembre 2019. Plus de deux ans après et après avoir analysé la façon dont nous élaborons la politique étrangère de l’Union, ma principale inquiétude est que nous ne parvenions pas à suivre le rythme. Comme le dit mon ami et premier Haut représentant de l’Union Javier Solana, le temps en politique, comme en physique, est relatif : si la vitesse à laquelle vous changez est inférieure à la vitesse du changement autour de vous, vous reculez. Et cela, nous ne pouvons pas nous le permettre. Notre réponse à la crise ukrainienne montre ce qui peut être fait si la pression en cas de pression extrême. Toutefois, il est trop tôt pour conclure que cela serait devenu le mode de fonctionnement général de la politique étrangère de l’Union.
Je ferai donc part de quelques idées sur quels pourraient être les quatre ingrédients clés du succès et d’un plus grand impact de l’Union dans un monde agité :
1 — Penser et agir comme une puissance
Les Européens, à juste titre, continuent de privilégier le dialogue à la confrontation, la diplomatie à la force, le multilatéralisme à l’unilatéralisme. Mais si l’on veut que le dialogue, la diplomatie et le multilatéralisme réussissent, il faut y mettre de la puissance et des ressources. Chaque fois que nous l’avons fait – en Ukraine, au Belarus ou avec notre diplomatie climatique – nous avons eu un impact. Lorsque nous avons opté pour l’énoncé de positions de principe sans préciser les moyens de les mettre en œuvre, les résultats ont été moins impressionnants.
J’ai le sentiment que le diagnostic concernant le langage de la puissance ou la militarisation de l’interdépendance sont désormais largement acceptées. Cependant, la mise en œuvre et les ressources et engagements nécessaires restent un défi.
J’ai le sentiment que le diagnostic concernant le langage de la puissance ou la militarisation de l’interdépendance sont désormais largement acceptées. Cependant, la mise en œuvre et les ressources et engagements nécessaires restent un défi.
2 — Prendre l’initiative et être prêt à expérimenter
Dans l’ensemble, nous sommes trop souvent en mode réactif, réagissant aux plans et aux décisions des autres. Je pense également que nous devons éviter une certaine routine bureaucratique (« qu’avons-nous fait la dernière fois ? ») et retrouver un sens de l’initiative.
En outre, nous devons être prêts à expérimenter davantage. Il est souvent plus sûr de s’en tenir à ce que l’on connaît et à ce que l’on a toujours fait. Mais ce n’est pas toujours la meilleure façon d’obtenir des résultats.
3 — Créer des coalitions diverses et prendre des décisions plus rapidement
Nous devons davantage nous les objectifs et réfléchir à la manière dont nous pouvons mobiliser les partenaires autour de nos priorités, point par point. Nous devons reconnaître qu’à côté des coalitions de partenaires partageant les mêmes idées, nous avons aussi des pays qui travaillent avec nous sur certaines questions et qui s’opposent à nous sur d’autres. Et si le gouvernement central de ces pays ne nous aide pas, nous devons travailler davantage avec les forces locales ou les groupes de la société civile.
Au sein de l’Union, nous sommes très occupés par nous-mêmes et il faut beaucoup de temps pour établir des positions communes. Lorsque les États membres sont divisés, la règle de l’unanimité en matière de politique étrangère et de sécurité est une recette pour la paralysie et les retards. C’est pourquoi je suis favorable à l’utilisation de l’abstention constructive et d’autres options prévues par les traités, comme le recours au vote à la majorité qualifiée (VMQ) dans certains domaines, pour faciliter une prise de décision plus rapide8.
Le risque existe que nous donnions la priorité à la recherche de l’unité interne plutôt qu’à la maximisation de notre efficacité externe. Lorsque nous parvenons enfin à une position commune – souvent en ajoutant beaucoup d’eau au vin – le reste du monde est passé à autre chose.
J’ai souligné l’importance d’investir dans une culture stratégique commune, qui nécessite un débat européen, un espace pour discuter de ce que nous pouvons et ne pouvons pas faire en matière de politique étrangère de l’Union et pourquoi. C’est pourquoi je contribue régulièrement à cette revue, que je considère comme un exemple tangible de l’émergence d’un débat stratégique, politique et intellectuel à l’échelle continentale.
JOSEP BORRELL
4 — Donner forme au récit
Après avoir passé des décennies en politique, je suis convaincu que l’ingrédient le plus important pour réussir est probablement de façonner le récit. C’est la devise avec laquelle se monnaye la puissance au niveau mondial9.
C’est pourquoi, au début de la pandémie, j’ai parlé de l’existence d’une « bataille des récits »10 et souligné l’importance d’investir dans une culture stratégique commune, qui nécessite un débat européen, un espace pour discuter de ce que nous pouvons et ne pouvons pas faire en matière de politique étrangère de l’Union et pourquoi. En conséquence, je contribue régulièrement à cette revue et aux séminaires du Groupe d’études géopolitiques, que je considère comme un exemple tangible de l’émergence d’un débat stratégique, politique et intellectuel à l’échelle continentale11.
Les citoyens de l’Union ne se soucient guère de savoir qui fait quoi à Bruxelles, ni des discussions abstraites. Ils ne s’inquiètent pas du nombre de déclarations que nous faisons, ni des sanctions que nous adoptons. Ils nous jugent sur les résultats et non sur les moyens mis en œuvre. En d’autres termes, sur les résultats : sont-ils plus sûrs ou plus prospères grâce à l’action de l’Union ? L’Union est-elle plus ou moins influente, y compris en termes de défense de nos valeurs, qu’il y a un an ? Avons-nous plus ou moins la confiance des autres ? Avons-nous obtenu plus ou moins de résultats en matière de soutien à nos partenaires ? Ce sont les indicateurs qui comptent.
La guerre contre l’Ukraine a montré clairement que, dans un monde de politique de puissance, nous devons renforcer notre capacité à nous défendre. Oui, cela inclut les moyens militaires, et nous devons les développer davantage. Mais l’essence de ce que l’UE a fait dans cette crise a été d’utiliser toutes les politiques et tous les leviers – qui restent principalement de nature économique et réglementaire – comme des instruments de puissance.
Nous devrions nous appuyer sur cette approche, en Ukraine mais aussi ailleurs. La tâche principale de l’ »Europe géopolitique » est simple : utiliser notre nouveau sens de l’objectif et en faire la « nouvelle norme » de la politique étrangère de l’Union. Pour protéger nos citoyens, soutenir nos partenaires et faire face à nos responsabilités en matière de sécurité mondiale.
SOURCES
Le Grand Continent, « Politiques de l’interrègne », Gallimard, 2022
Ivan Krastev, “Angoisse écologique contre crise démographique : le clivage européen de deux imaginaires apocalyptiques” in le Grand Continent, “Politiques de l’interrègne”, Gallimard, March 2022. Voir aussi : Hugo Brady, Openness versus helplessness : Europe’s 2015-2017 border crisis, Groupe d’études géopolitiques, June 2021.
Mark Leonard, “L’ère de l’a-paix”, Le Grand Continent, 18 février 2022
Luiza Bialasiewicz, “Le moment géopolitique européen : penser la souveraineté stratégique” in le Grand Continent, “Politiques de l’interrègne”, March 2022, Gallimard
Revolutionary Guard Corps members during a parade to commemorate the anniversary of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, Tehran, Sept. 22, 2011. (Reuters)
The US is reportedly considering removing Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from its terrorist blacklist. In return, Tehran has promised that it will not harm Americans. However, this step would greatly upset America’s allies in the region, which are already drifting away from Washington. The question is would this move bring stability to the Middle East, especially in the wake of President Ebrahim Raisi making it clear that Iran would not give up its “regional presence?” Another question is will Iran finally become a friend to the US? This is very unlikely.
To start with, removing the IRGC’s terror designation would be in line with President Joe Biden’s campaign promises to roll back decisions made by Donald Trump. It was Trump who designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization in 2019 in response to Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region. Since then, Tehran’s malicious behavior has only increased. Only last week, it fired missiles at a target near the American Consulate in Irbil. That does not give any signal of de-escalation. The fact that Iran attacked the Iraqi city directly was a show of confidence. The US responded with evasion, shifting the issue to the Iraqis by saying it was an attack on Iraqi sovereignty, since the missiles did not directly hit the consulate.
While Iran is growing increasingly confrontational, the US is becoming increasingly submissive. Despite being endowed with the most powerful military in the world, America’s lack of resolve puts it in a weak position. Its adversaries know that the US can be easily deterred as it wants to avoid confrontation and risk at any cost. However, very little in life can be won without taking any risks. For sure, Washington does not want a military confrontation with Iran. That was also the direction Trump took.
However, the US is not using any pressure to improve its bargaining power with Iran. Instead, it is accommodating Iran and hoping that Tehran will, out of the goodness of its heart, change its behavior and transform from an aggressive state that seeks to destabilize its neighbors to a country that wants peace and economic prosperity. I doubt this will happen. On the contrary, the Iranians will increase their regional efforts, as was clearly stated by Raisi. Iran will not give up on its regional policy and will use all means possible to blackmail its neighbors.
The next question we need to ask is what will Iran’s neighbors and US allies do? Will the UAE and Saudi Arabia sit idly by and just accept Iranian hegemony? I doubt this too. They will devise their own plans and craft their own alliances to counter Iran. We have already seen the UAE-Israeli partnership strengthened to fend off Iranian threats. On the other hand, this rapprochement seems to give Iran an excuse to pursue its aggressive behavior. In January, Tehran made sure its Houthi proxy in Yemen launched an attack on the UAE while the Israeli president was visiting. Hence, the entire dynamic triggered by US action will only breed greater regional turbulence.
The lifting of the IRGC’s terrorist designation would push the Arab Gulf states to distance themselves from the US and seek new global allies. Are we surprised that the Saudis are reluctant to cater to the US demand to increase oil production in order to keep global energy prices down? Not really. It is a zero-sum game and any American rapprochement with Iran will cause tensions with the Arab Gulf states.
But is it worth it? The Gulf states have, for decades, proven to be reliable allies to the US. They supported Washington during its Cold War with the Soviet Union and have coordinated their oil production policy with their American ally. This alliance continued after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, under Barack Obama, the American policy started taking a turn. This was in great part due to the perception that the US and the West do not need Gulf oil as much as before. The revolution in shale oil production and technological innovations in terms of alternative energy sources drove this perception. However, today we see that the world and the US do need the Gulf to keep a stable flow of energy.
While Iran is growing increasingly confrontational, the US is becoming increasingly submissive.
Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib
Saudi Arabia is the country that has the most capability to increase production. So, unlike what the Obama administration wished for, the Arab Gulf is still important, especially now that the US is trying to pressure Russia to agree to a negotiated solution over Ukraine. If Washington wants to even partially sanction the Russian energy sector, which is critical to the country’s economy, it cannot do so without liaising with Saudi Arabia. Instead, the US is courting Iran. What is the American administration thinking? That it will replace Saudi Arabia with Iran? And what is the logic behind replacing a trusted and tried ally with an enemy whose ideology is based on hatred for the US — an enemy that wishes death for America in its Friday prayers?
The Iranian government could not change its attitude toward the US even if it wanted to. If it did so, the regime would lose any credibility it had with its constituency. It would be signing its own death warrant. Iran’s leaders need this animosity toward the US to stay alive to prove they are true to the Islamic revolution’s ideals.
In a nutshell, there is no logic behind the step that the US is considering taking — it is simply acute risk aversion that is driving policy alternatives, and that is why we end up with ideas like this.
Read the original article on the site of Arab News.
In the 1970s Austria used its neutrality to be a conduit between East and West, but there’s little sign of that now.
By Liam Hoare
Protesters against the war in Ukraine outside the Russian embassy in Vienna. Photo by Thomas Kronsteiner/Getty Images
Russia has proposed during peace negotiations that Ukraine commit to neutrality, just as the war has led other European states to question its merits. Majorities in Finland and in Sweden now support Nato membership. “There is no way back to a past of illusory neutrality,” the former Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt has argued. “The choice now is between remaining in a slightly uncertain in-between or recognising a new reality and taking the step into full [Nato] membership.” Austrians too are thinking about their neutrality in a Europe forever changed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Austrian neutrality, like Finland’s, is a product of the Cold War. When, in April 1955, a delegation led by the chancellor, Julius Raab, flew to Moscow to negotiate an end to the Allied occupation of Austria, neutrality was the price his government had to pay. On 25 October 1955 the last Allied troops left Austrian soil; a day later the country’s parliament enacted the Declaration of Neutrality, committing Austria to “perpetual neutrality” and preventing the country from joining “military alliances”. Ten years later 26 October was declared Austria’s national day. Neutrality became integral to Austria’s perception of itself as an “island of bliss” — as Pope Paul VI described it to the Austrian president, Franz Jonas, in 1971 — and a bridge between East and West. After the Cold War Austria joined the EU along with Sweden and Finland in 1995. While those two countries are now Nato “enhanced opportunity partners” — the closest relationship short of membership — Austria remains on the periphery of the alliance as part of the larger, looser Partnership for Peace. Austrian military operations abroad have been limited to peacekeeping missions in the Golan Heights, Lebanon and the Balkans.
Nato membership does have its supporters in Austria, in particular on the centre-right, and their position has been invigorated by Russia’s war against Ukraine. Andreas Khol, a grandee of the conservative People’s Party and its presidential candidate in 2016, argued in a recent op-ed that the Ukrainian case showed how “a neutral or non-aligned state stands alone when it is attacked. No one would rush to its aid”. Only those who are part of a military alliance would be protected in the end, he said. Austria “must choose between Nato membership or co-operation with an EU army”.Yet even in a changing Europe, Khol’s support for Nato membership remains a niche opinion. Three quarters of Austrians support neutrality, and over 80 per cent are opposed to Nato membership. Austria has come out firmly in support of Ukraine and against the Russian invasion, but in contrast to Sweden and Finland its leadership has been quick to shut down any discussion of abandoning neutrality. The chancellor, Karl Nehammer, of the People’s Party, recently put it like this: “Austria was neutral, Austria is neutral and Austria will also remain neutral.”
Support for neutrality spans the political spectrum. “Neutrality has no expiration date,” Pamela Rendi-Wagner, leader of the Social Democratic Party, wrote in response to Khol, “and it has offered Austria security for 67 years.” Challenging Khol’s view that staying out of Nato leaves neutral states exposed, Rendi-Wagner argued that neutrality prevented countries like Austria from being sucked into conflicts between military alliances as the United States, Russia and China compete to preserve or expand their spheres of influence. “Neutral states do not represent a threat to great powers,” she concluded, “and that strengthens our security.”
Read the original article on the site of the New Statesman.
Le secteur financier a un rôle crucial à jouer dans la transition énergétique car il peut la conduire sur une trajectoire optimale, expliquent Marie Brière et André Lévy-Lang. Mais il peut aussi avoir un effet déstabilisateur si l’impact des risques climatiques sur les entreprises et l’économie en général est mal évalué.
Un parc photovoltaique en France. (iStock)
Par André Levy-Lang
Publié le 22 mars 2022
Les entreprises financières, banques, assurances et gérants d’actifs, jouent un rôle central dans l’économie et devront contribuer à la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique. Pour le moment, la principale prescription des médias semble être négative : freiner le financement des producteurs d’énergies fossiles, charbon et hydrocarbures. Restreindre ces financements paraît plus urgent que des mesures utilisant les mécanismes de marché.
CHRONIQUE. La supposée supériorité de l’alimentation bio, y compris en termes de santé, est de plus en plus sujette à caution. La promouvoir est un non-sens.
Comme nous l’analysions dans notre dernière chronique, la guerre en Ukraine bouleverse les marchés agricoles et l’on peut craindre, dès l’automne prochain, dans plusieurs pays d’Afrique et du Moyen-Orient, des émeutes de la faim et, sans trop de risque, on peut aussi annoncer une croissance mondiale du prix des denrées alimentaires. Cela conduit à poser une nouvelle fois la question des bienfaits de l’agriculture biologique, notoirement mangeuse d’espace et onéreuse pour les consommateurs.
A 35 ans, à la fois ministre des technologies avancées et présidente de l’agence spatiale émiratie, la jeune femme a contribué au succès de la mise en orbite autour de Mars d’une sonde qui doit en étudier le climat.
Par Pierre Barthélémy
Publié le 12 mars 2022Sarah Al-Amiri, ministre des technologies avancées et présidente de l’Agence spatiale des Emirats arabes unis, à Dubaï, le 23 février 2022. CHRISTOPHER PIKE / REUTERS
A ce jour, aucune femme n’a dirigé la NASA. Ou l’Agence spatiale européenne (ESA). Ou le Centre national d’études spatiales (CNES) en France. Ou Roscosmos en Russie. A croiser depuis plus de deux décennies les patrons de ces agences, on a dessiné le portrait-robot d’un homme en costume-cravate, parfois quadragénaire mais le plus souvent quinqua ou sexagénaire, et pour ainsi dire toujours blanc (à l’exception notable de Charles Bolden, seul Afro-Américain à avoir occupé le poste d’administrateur de la NASA, sous les mandats de Barack Obama). Alors, quand l’occasion est donnée de rencontrer Sarah Al-Amiri, 35 ans, à la fois présidente de la toute jeune Agence spatiale des Emirats arabes unis et ministre des technologies avancées, on ne la rate pas, on veut savoir qui est cette jeune femme qui détonne dans le monde de l’espace.
Oubliés, évidemment, le costume et la cravate. Sans garde du corps, la ministre arrive au rendez-vous portant hidjab noir et abaya assortie – la longue tunique des Emiraties –, un grand sourire barrant son visage. Peut-être parce que la mise en avant personnelle n’est pas vraiment encouragée dans une fédération d’émirats où les cheikhs sont glorifiés, cette native d’Abou Dhabi reste discrète, voire modeste, au sujet de son parcours. Dans son anglais parfait teinté d’accent américain, elle ne répugne cependant pas à parler du début, de son enfance. Famille où le père est homme d’affaires et la mère enseignante, école internationale qui l’ouvre à d’autres cultures. « J’ai grandi en parlant de politique, de changements économiques, des développements du monde. Je pense que, petite, j’ai plus regardé les informations que les dessins animés, se remémore-t-elle en pouffant presque. J’ai compris que nous avions tous un rôle dans la société. Pas seulement dans notre quartier, dans notre ville ou notre pays, mais en tant que citoyens du monde. »
Son rôle, dans un pays qui se modernise à un rythme effréné permis par les pétrodollars, Sarah Al-Amiri le voit d’abord dans l’informatique : « J’ai toujours aimé les maths et les chiffres, dit-elle. J’ai commencé à programmer vers 11 ou 12 ans. Même si c’étaient alors des programmes très simples, j’ai vite su que je voulais devenir ingénieure en informatique. » S’ensuit donc un diplôme à l’Université américaine de l’émirat de Chardja. Peu après son obtention, elle atterrit rapidementdans le secteur de l’espace, qui l’a toujours fascinée.On est en 2009, elle a 22 ans. Les Emirats arabes unis (EAU) n’ont pas encore d’agence spatiale (elle naîtra officiellement en 2014). Eux, qui exploitent déjà quelques satellites mais n’en ont jamais conçu, s’apprêtent à lancer leur premier engin d’observation de la Terre, DubaiSat-1. « Les gens qui travaillaient avec moi avaient 26 ans ou moins. Presque tous avaient été engagés à la fin de leurs études. »
I want to congratulate the Cairo Review of Global Affairs’s writing and editorial family for our team’s outstanding achievements and stellar performance over the last decade. When I asked former Time Magazine Cairo Bureau Chief and professor of Journalism Scott MacLeod to join me in creating the Cairo Review in 2011, the objective of the journal was to bring a discussion on global affairs to Cairo while ensuring that an international audience could read a vibrant Arab Middle Eastern voice on these issues. I dare say the Cairo Review has succeeded far beyond our expectations. The publication has gained supporters even among skeptics who at the inception of our magazine were doubtful that an English language quarterly from Cairo with a Middle East accent could succeed.
Needless to say, transformative events over the last decade have made discussions on global affairs increasingly topical to our audience and provided much food for thought on how international, regional, and domestic communities engage with each other. Since the early 1990s, some pundits and leaders have questioned the validity and relevance of the post-World War II world order following the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new centers of power. Also, the efficacy of the nation-state system has been critiqued following the emergence of legitimate and illegitimate non-state actors. The forces of globalization have brought tremendous opportunities as well as diverse and complex challenges for individuals, communities, and state institutions. In the past decade, communities have faced the illusive paradox of meeting immediate demands, fulfilling ever-expansive dreams and ambitions, preserving security and stability, and at the same time ensuring good governance. The people of our global village have also had to start learning how to live on finite resources which must be shared and used wisely.
In essence, the paramount challenge of this time is to simultaneously determine our respective identities and embrace a balance of interests which provide the most efficient use of resources without irrevocable ramifications on the quality of life for future generations. Finding a collective response to climate change is one example of this paramount challenge that we as a world society must face.
This search for balance between group/national identity and international interests has found expression in the Middle East in the proliferation of political conflicts, inefficient and unresponsive governance, and huge income discrepancies. Additionally, a substantial Middle Eastern youth bulge has increasingly heightened expectations and shortened the patience of the body politic. The Cairo Review of Global Affairs has covered many of these issues both from a broad public policy perspective and a micro-current events lens. Among the journal’s iconic issues were those published in 2011 which vividly described the yearnings of the Arab street. Our first issue was on the Arab uprisings and was soon followed by an issue on the new world order. Other issues discussed the successes and failures of peacemaking efforts between Arabs and Israelis, including a review of the 1978 Egyptian Israeli Camp David Accords and the Madrid Conference in 1991 on Arab-Israeli peace. Issues on a nuclearized Middle East, the politics of water, energy, and food, and post-conflict reconstruction were rich in helping public policy reflection.
Every country in the Middle East is still searching for its 21st century identity. Many states seem to be torn between the past and the future, but this is not unexpected, especially among communities with long histories.
The non-Arab states in the region remain cognizant of the fact that the Middle East and North Africa is mostly an Arab region. Thus, irrespective of their military power or economic wealth, many of these non-Arab nations are constantly attempting to assert themselves. Meanwhile, the Arab World has been resistant to incremental change. Ironically, change is the only inevitability, if not incremental, then through abrupt disruptions.
Equally challenging is the imbalance of influence and power in the region. Such imbalances have resulted in prolonged political conflict in complete disregard of international law and have fueled adventurous regional policies with hegemonic tendencies, further inciting adversarial attitudes between a significant number of regional players.
It is time, then, for the Middle East to become cognizant that just as markets are more globalized, conflicts have become regionalized. Both of these trends make efficient management and governance imperative. States in the region must take economic change seriously. These same states need to enhance their national security. Active diplomacy, with an unwavering commitment to international law, coupled with creative, future-oriented perspectives, is imperative. A new Middle Eastern political, economic, and security architecture is a project that we all must embark upon with a sense of urgency, but equally with the wise realization that this process will be incremental and slow.
Publications of thoughtful public discourse on the issues of today, such as the Cairo Review of Global Affairs, are invaluable in highlighting important topics, ideas, challenges, and solutions from both global and local perspectives. Congratulations to our whole editorial family and authors as we look forward to another great decade!
For the purpose of understanding what the Iran deal means in regional terms, one must consider first the dynamics of hostile relations among tribes.
By David Wurmser
Published on 03-21-2022
IAEA Director Rafael Mariano Grossi speaks with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian in Tehran, March 5, 2022 (AP/File) | Photo: AP
Much ink will be consumed in the coming days and weeks analyzing the terms of the new deal over Iran’s nuclear program brokered by Russia. As dispiriting as these valuable analyses will be – and they will be, if they are accurate – it is important to understand in regional terms the magnitude of the geostrategic collapse that our acceptance of this deal in the Middle East will cause.
We Americans profoundly believe in the universal nature of our concept of freedom, and thus tend to give short shrift to the influence of culture and civilization on the political mentality of states. In the Middle East, alongside the physical remains of ancient civilizations, are the remains of their cultures underlying the region’s politics.
The political imagery of many Islamic cultures emanates from their nomadic, tribal and clan origins. While that may, in some cases, overlay an older urban culture, the penetration of Arab influence via Islam still shapes their politics.
Even in ancient times, the greatest Arab tribes filled the lattices of power between the great urban civilizations, rather than function as an empire in themselves. Indeed, the rise of the Umayyads and the Abbasids as independent Arab empires actually was a rather short-lived ahistorical anomaly. Baghdad fell by 965 to the Persians Buyids. As such, this tribal soul, rather than the ethos of urban empire and the strategic behavior that this soul engenders, is easily visible in current Arab politics.
To understand the current situation, it helps to consider the case of revenge-killing in tribal and clan dynamics. Americans whose descent originated north of Hadrian’s Wall and who study their heritage are more familiar with this, and are indeed quite proud of their history and the values it implies.
But, for the purpose of understanding what the Iran deal means in regional terms, one must consider first the dynamics of hostile relations among tribes. Specifically, a cycle of revenge and counter-revenge among tribes for a murder ends when a tribe signals that it lifting its protective status over one of its members. This means that he is fair game and can be murdered with impunity – and the cycle is thus broken.
This tribal essence is intertwined with early Islamic history and ties directly to the Prophet Muhammad. One cannot dissociate Islam from its historical origins or Arab roots. Muhammad, whose message threatened the powerful tribal aristocracy of Mecca, could live in Mecca safely, as long as his powerful uncle, Abu Talib, the leader of the immensely powerful Banu Hashim clan, extended his protection over him after his parents died. However, the moment that Abu Talib lifted that protection, Muhammad was essentially served a death warrant. He was fair game; his life was forfeited; and he had to flee to Medina.
In this context, the United States is not really understood as a nation, but more as the most powerful clan on earth, the clan of clans. Think of us in that context as being the Banu Amrika, the « children » or tribe of Americans.
We, the Banu Amrika, are seen by other weaker clans as the patron of an allied league. The region’s clans and tribes align with us and pledge their fealty in exchange for enjoying our power and the umbrella of protection that comes with it.
Similarly, the Israelis are not seen in Western terms of parliamentary democracy, but as the Banu Israil, and Prime Minister Bennett is viewed as the tribal leader of the Jews.
As such, in tribal terms, our concessions to and agreement with Iran, whose open goal is the annihilation of our local allied tribes – the Banu Saud (Saudi Arabia), Banu Maktoum (United Arab Emirates), Banu al-Khalifa (Bahrain) and the Banu Israil (Israel) – means that we lift our umbrella of protection over them.
Their lives are forfeited, and anyone, internal or external, who wants to kill them is now released to do so without fear of revenge. The Saudis, Emiratis and Israelis are now alone and marked with a death warrant issued by their own strong horse. Worse, we have essentially anointed Iran as the new regional power to which all must bend the knee.
As such, the Arabs in the region are reacting uncharacteristically bluntly, sharply and acerbically, not out of pique, but out of survival. They must immediately find a new strong horse, a new patron, or they are dead. China stands out, and making peace with Russia to call off its dogs is essential. But they must first scramble, follow the American precedent and bend their knees to Tehran, as well. They have no choice but to grovel to their enemies or die because to continue to hope for the United States is the path of certain death.
Israel, of course, is a Western country, and such a construct is not inherent to its understanding of itself. This may work internally (though it’s dubious since it implies a different political framework with its own Arabs), but it cannot work strategically in its position and relations with the region. Israel may have an urban soul and a Western outlook, but it lives in the region and must understand that it, too, now is seen as a tribe marked for death by its patron.
So Israel is at a crossroads. It has three paths: It can accept its elimination; it can scramble like its Arab kin to grovel in front of Russia and China; or it can leverage its raw power to emerge as the region’s strongest tribe to become a strong horse itself. The second path will fail in violence – Israel’s fate is tied to the West inherently – leaving Israel only the choice of the first (accept death) or third (establish itself as a great regional power) paths.
For the moment, Arab tribes have only the choice of the first or second paths, which means that they face death, since, as in the case of Israel, the second path will eventually fail and leave only the other path.
But if Israel chooses the third path and emerges as the strong horse, then it opens for the Arabs a new path for survival with Israel’s becoming their new protective strong horse – but only if Israel chooses the third path. It can only get close to its Arab neighbors if it is useful for their survival. This means that Israel must act to prove it is the strong horse.
It is tempting to compare the faltering of the United States’s regional stature to the collapse of the British and French positions in the late 1950s and 1960s. That collapse indeed was catastrophic. It exposed the region to Soviet penetration and triggered a new age of indigenously inspired radical challenges to traditional leaderships (the long-term effects of which we continue to suffer).
And yet, even that cataclysm will pale in comparison to the current collapse of the U.S.’s position, since the British and French retreat six decades ago seamlessly transitioned into the parallel rise of American power, which, to a large extent, compensated for its negative effects.
The American retreat has no global force to replace it, other than our adversaries, China or Russia. Regionally, perhaps Israel can fill the void left by the U.S. and buffer the impending collapse of American power. Hopefully, it can help our jilted allies survive, preserve some of our regional interests, check our regional adversaries and prevent our global opponents from seizing full control of the region.
But while Israel is powerful, it is not a global superpower. It cannot replace the regaining of our senses. But the damage now being done will be the work of generations to repair. Let’s hope that the enterprise soon begins.
L’Europe a les moyens de prouver que les représailles économiques peuvent faire reculer l’agresseur russe, analyse l’économiste dans sa chronique.
Publié le 19 mars 2022
Provocante, certainement, la formule du ministre de l’économie, Bruno Le Maire, n’en était pas moins juste : c’est bien une « guerre économique et financière totale » qui s’est engagée contre la Russie. Son enjeu dépasse l’Ukraine : il s’agit de savoir si les représailles économiques peuvent faire reculer un agresseur, ou bien si seule la force armée peut arrêter la force armée.
Ce qui se joue aujourd’hui, c’est d’abord l’existence d’un pays. Mais ce qui se teste, c’est notre capacité à faire levier de la puissance économique. Si nous parvenons à faire plier Poutine, la leçon sera claire : entre prédation et prospérité, il faut choisir. Si nous échouons, la volonté de puissance aura le champ libre.
Nous avons des atouts pour cette confrontation. Comme l’a dit Jason Furman, l’ancien conseiller économique de Barack Obama, la Russie n’est, pour l’économie mondiale, qu’une « grande station-service ». Elle est, en revanche, tributaire de l’extérieur pour la technologie, la finance, les biens d’équipement et les biens de consommation. La sanctionner lui fait beaucoup plus mal que cela ne nous coûte.
Les Etats-Unis et l’Europe ont instantanément mobilisé tous les moyens que leur donnent un quasi-monopole sur les monnaies de réserve, le contrôle des infrastructures financières internationales (dont la messagerie Swift n’est qu’un élément) et la suprématie technologique. L’effet de souffle des sanctions illustre une thèse formulée en 2019 par les politistes Henry Farrell et Abraham Newman sous le nom de « weaponized interdependence » (« l’interdépendance comme arme »). Les structures en réseau, disaient-ils, se sont développées pour des raisons économiques, mais elles confèrent un énorme pouvoir aux pays qui les contrôlent.
Ombre portée des sanctions
Ce n’était cependant que la première manche. Certes, la Russie est devenue un Etat paria, les oligarques sont privés de Riviera et la classe moyenne de meubles Ikea. Mais la dépendance énergétique de l’Europe l’a conduite à limiter le champ des sanctions. Seules certaines banques ont été mises au ban ; seules certaines technologies sont interdites d’exportation ; seules certaines entreprises ont définitivement choisi de plier bagage. Chaque jour, la Russie engrange près d’un milliard de dollars de recettes d’exportations énergétiques. Elle va rapidement retrouver les moyens d’importer.
Moscou subit déjà, en partie, l’ombre portée de sanctions pas encore arrêtées. Il n’est pas interdit d’acheter du pétrole russe. Mais, par crainte de mesures à venir, armateurs, banquiers et assureurs hésitent à participer à ce commerce. L’expérience des sanctions secondaires américaines de 2018, qui avaient banni toutes les entreprises en relation avec l’Iran, reste dans les mémoires. Résultat : le pétrole de l’Oural subit une décote importante, de 25 dollars par baril.
Mais ceci ne durera pas. Il faudra bien, rapidement, être clair. Soit l’achat d’énergie russe est licite, soit il ne l’est pas. Et s’il l’est, il faudra bien laisser le pouvoir russe disposer des recettes en devises sans lesquelles il n’aura aucune raison de ne pas laisser ses hydrocarbures sous terre. Les Etats-Unis ont déjà choisi : ils se passeront du pétrole russe, dont ils n’ont d’ailleurs pas besoin. L’Allemagne tergiverse, l’Europe n’a rien décidé. Mais si elle n’agit pas, M. Poutine ne tardera pas à conclure que,
pour lui, le pire est passé. Déjà, le rouble s’est un peu redressé. Il n’y a pas le choix : il faut resserrer le nœud coulant.
Il importe, à ce stade, de distinguer pétrole et gaz. Le marché du premier est mondial, parce qu’un tanker de brut est essentiellement substituable à un autre. Un arrêt des exportations russes aurait pour principale conséquence une hausse du prix, que les Etats-Unis s’emploient à prévenir en reprenant langue avec le Venezuela et l’Iran. Cet arrêt est peu probable, car il se trouvera toujours preneur (l’Inde, par exemple) pour du pétrole décoté. Mais en créant toute sorte de complications pour les acheteurs, un embargo sur le brut russe accentuerait sa décote et réduirait les recettes de son exportation. Ces recettes diminueraient encore en cas de sanctions secondaires : en 2019, le volume des livraisons iraniennes avait été divisé par deux.
Solidarité européenne
Les choses sont plus compliquées pour le gaz, dont le commerce suppose des infrastructures et qui est aujourd’hui essentiellement exporté vers l’Europe. Arrêter les importations affaiblirait beaucoup
la Russie, qui ne dispose pratiquement pas d’autres canaux d’exportation. Mais même si son gaz ne représente que 8,4 % de l’énergie primaire consommée par l’Union européenne (UE), ce ne serait pas sans effet sur nous. Et, bien évidemment, cette dépendance varie énormément d’un pays à l’autre.
Un arrêt total n’est pas envisageable, dans l’immédiat. L’UE doit cependant commencer à réduire ses importations de gaz, diversifier ses approvisionnements et, pour cela, réformer un système énergétique insuffisamment intégré pour garantir la sécurité collective d’approvisionnement. Une bonne manière d’y inciter serait, comme le proposent les économistes Eric Charney, Christian Gollier et Thomas Philippon, d’appliquer un tarif douanier au gaz russe et de le relever progressivement. Ce serait le signal que nous sommes décidés à nous en passer, en même temps qu’une incitation à recourir à d’autres fournisseurs. Evidemment, cela ne se conçoit pas sans une forte solidarité envers les pays qui seraient les plus directement frappés par la baisse des importations de gaz russe.
Notre poids économique, notre technologie, la prépondérance de nos multinationales, notre contrôle des infrastructures de la mondialisation, l’asymétrie de nos échanges énergétiques avec la Russie nous donnent les moyens de l’emporter dans un affrontement décisif. A condition seulement que nous ne demandions pas, en plus, que ce soit parfaitement indolore.
L’Union européenne rassemble 27 nations, depuis le Brexit et le départ de la Grand Bretagne. En près de ¾ de siècle, l’élargissement s’est fait sans discontinuer, il semble interrompu à l’est comme au sud avec le conflit en Ukraine et les déconvenues avec la Turquie; le contenu politique et économique s’est aussi approfondi à coup de traités mais avec des butées : sociale, citoyenne, fiscale, environnementale, institutionnelle, également au regard des ajustements politiques à trouver. Et l’Union européenne n’est toujours pas une puissance en mesure de rivaliser avec les Etats-Unis et le continent émergent asiatique. Sur un plan idéologique, le clivage entre l’européisme fédéral et le souverainisme des Etats-nations rend aléatoire tout identité européenne à même de forger un véritable sentiment d’adhésion européen. « Et l’homme y est devenu l’Européen » selon Paul Valery. On en est loin.
Pour en débattre Emile Malet reçoit :
-Jean-Louis Bourlanges, président de la commission des affaires étrangères de l’Assemblée nationale
-Céline Spector, universitaire, essayiste
-Hans-Dieter Lucas, Ambassadeur de la République Fédérale d’Allemagne en France
-Gérard Araud, diplomate, essayiste
L’actualité dévoile chaque jour un monde qui s’agite, se déchire, s’attire, se confronte… Loin de l’enchevêtrement de ces images en continu, Emile Malet invite à regarder l’actualité autrement… avec le concours d’esprits éclectiques, sans ornières idéologiques pour mieux appréhender ces idées qui gouvernent le monde.
It has become increasingly evident that South Korea’s public perception of China has cooled considerably in recent years. There are several reasons behind this development, including bilateral cultural spats, the dispute over Seoul’s procurement of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, and China’s close ties with North Korea.
Despite the adverse circumstances, bilateral ties between China and South Korea have not reached the point of no return. Although China and South Korea have distinct political, social and cultural systems, neither Beijing nor Seoul can afford to ignore the potential geoeconomic and geopolitical value of a strong China–South Korea relationship. As well as being a major South Korean trading partner, China’s support is crucial for maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula.
China should be wary of the growing confidence among its increasingly nationalist populace about its international status. There are increasing signs that Chinese diplomatic circles have become concerned about the international reception of China’s foreign policy.
The commentary by former Chinese ambassador to Britain, Fu Ying, in the People’s Daily illustrates the belated recognition by Chinese policymakers that Beijing needs to rein in the so-called ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy increasingly adopted by Chinese diplomats. As a highly-experienced ex-diplomat, Fu recognises that the image of a country is judged in the court of international opinion.
Tsinghua University Professor Yan Xuetong similarly recognises the need to avoid the pitfalls of overconfidence, taking issue with ‘[China’s] strong sense of superiority and self-confidence’ — a phenomenon found among many young Chinese students. The President of International Studies at Peking University, Wang Jisi, likewise adopts a cautious tone, predicting a protracted ‘hot peace’ — rather than Cold War — between China and the United States.
These timely comments by prominent Chinese intellectuals lay bare the concerns that Chinese elites have about the deteriorating international perceptions of their country. Beijing cannot successfully implement major policies like the Belt and Road Initiative unless its leadership regains some form of international goodwill.
South Korean foreign policy traditionally relies on its military alliance with the United States. This is unlikely to change as long as the North Korea threat remains. But as the new world order shapes up, South Korea should strive for relatively more balanced diplomacy with both superpowers, helping to maintain at least some semblance of geopolitical balance in the Asia-Pacific.
Given the high-level of hostility among large sections of the South Korean public towards China, pursuing practical interest-based diplomacy with Beijing risks intense backlash. Still, decoupling economically from China is not a viable option for South Korea’s export-oriented economy. Despite having some success in diversifying its exports away from the highly coveted Chinese market towards the rapidly growing ASEAN market, China remains the most important market for South Korean goods in the foreseeable future.
Beijing has, from its perspective, repeatedly demonstrated the desire to improve bilateral ties with South Korea. The December 2021 talks between China’s Vice Foreign Minister, Le Yucheng, and his South Korean counterpart, Choi Jong-kun, are ostensibly evidence of China’s desire to enhance communication between the two countries.
Although a single meeting cannot be assigned too much importance, China’s deteriorating relations with Washington and its allies mean that such talks could enable Seoul to leverage its amicable ties with Beijing to advance mutual interests. Indeed, an advisor to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Jia Qingguo, coincidentally urged China to ‘make more friends and fewer enemies’ and improve its ties with major powers and neighbours.
Under these circumstances, Beijing would welcome a ‘reset’ between China and South Korea, lest the focus of the US-South Korea alliance is broadened beyond North Korea to China. While it might be unrealistic for Seoul to completely sever itself from Washington’s global geostrategy, Beijing and Seoul could still reach a modus vivendi on South Korea’s contribution to the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy and its future relationship with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
Seoul should also review the wisdom of embedding itself too firmly in the US alliance system. South Korea is a quintessential middle power, playing an important role in securing international trade and supplying high-tech goods like semiconductors. But it will only gain more autonomy in international relations when it learns to abandon its one-dimensional outlook on China and embrace a more multidimensional type of diplomacy.
Whether policymakers in South Korea can play a deft hand in maximising Seoul’s bargaining power in relations with both Beijing and Washington remains unclear. Keen to loosen Washington’s hegemonic grip over the Asia-Pacific, Beijing would most certainly welcome any South Korean actions that put a dent in the containment strategy led by the United States.
Read the original article on the site of the East Asia Forum.
TOKYO — Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is graphic and brutal evidence of the international community’s inability to effectively respond to events that disrupt peace. The U.N. Security Council is a distressing symbol of this paralysis.
The Security Council is supposed to play the role of « the guardian of peace » and has the authority to do so. It can decide to slap sanctions on countries threatening peace, and U.N. member countries are required to comply with its decisions.
In response to Russia’s military action against its neighbor, the Security Council held an emergency meeting on Feb. 25 but could not even adopt a resolution to condemn the act, let alone sanctions against Moscow.
Russia, which vetoed the resolution, presided over the meeting as the rotating president of the council, an almost comical situation that showed the limits of the body’s effectiveness.
The five permanent members of the council — the U.S., Britain, France, China and Russia — have veto power to kill any resolution. There is no doubt that Moscow will keep using this privilege to torpedo any draft resolution to punish it for the invasion.
In this image made from video released by the Russian Presidential Press Service, President Vladimir Putin addressees the nation from Moscow on Feb. 24 after authorizing military action against Ukraine. (Russian Presidential Press Service via AP)
The impotence of the key U.N. body in the face of such a full-blown security crisis bodes ill for stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Consider the possibility of China invading Taiwan. It is all too clear that Beijing would use its veto power to prevent the council from taking any effective step to stop it.
North Korea fired missiles as many as nine times in 2022 alone. Pyongyang has also violated U.N. resolutions by firing ballistic missiles. So far this year, however, the Security Council has failed to adopt a resolution to condemn North Korea due to opposition from China and Russia.
These facts eloquently testify to the gloomy reality that the Security Council has lost its relevance. The council’s structure was created in October 1945, immediately after the end of World War II, under the leadership of the victorious U.S., Britain and the Soviet Union. China and France were also invited to join the exclusive club.
At that time, these five powers were expected to support the postwar world order. But this assumption has now collapsed completely. Russia has become a clear invader and China is more interested in bending the current order in its favor than protecting it.
The Security Council’s problem is nothing new. It did not work well during the Cold War. In 2003, the U.S., which many saw as the leader in maintaining the world order, opened a war against Iraq without a clear U.N. resolution to fully justify its action.
But the dismal performance of the council should not be used as an excuse for allowing the status quo to continue. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the most egregious act committed by a major power in the postwar period, should prod the world into a long-overdue move to fix the situation.
What should be done? Theoretically, there are two approaches — radical reform of the council’s structure or finding an alternative.
The former would be the orthodox way. The most desirable option is to establish certain limits to the veto power of the permanent members to prevent abuse by China or Russia.
But this would require amending the U.N. Charter, a step that must be approved by a vote of two-thirds of the U.N. General Assembly and all the permanent members of the Security Council. That means it is a tall order.
Besides China and Russia, the U.S., Britain and France are also against limiting their veto power, a highly valued privilege, though they do not say so openly, said a senior U.N. bureaucrat.
The next best option would be to increase both the permanent and nonpermanent members of the Security Council without touching the veto power of the five nations.
This could involve, for instance, giving permanent seats to some other major powers, such as Japan, Germany and India, or increasing the number of nonpermanent seats from the current 10. Advocates say this would increase pressure on China, Russia and other permanent members to refrain from abusing their power to shoot down resolutions.
The catch is that this step too would require revision of the U.N. Charter. Some countries have been calling for a major reform of the body, but Beijing and Moscow have balked even at including such calls and related discussions in official records, according to diplomatic sources at the Security Council.
A more plausible idea would be to strip Russia of its permanent member status as a way to punish it for the attack on Ukraine. Some Western democracies are moving to explore this option, according to European media.
Russia became a permanent member of the council as the successor to the Soviet Union, which collapsed in 1991. The advocates of Russia’s removal will likely try to find irregularities in the succession process that can be used as a reason to kick it out.
Shinichi Kitaoka, a professor emeritus at the University of Tokyo who served as Japan’s ambassador and deputy permanent representative to the U.N. from 2004 to 2006, calls for the effective use of the General Assembly to put diplomatic pressure on the permanent members of the Security Council. « U.N. resolutions, even if they cannot produce immediate effects, can serve as a tool to demonstrate legitimacy to the international community, » he said. « In 2005, Japan, Germany, India and Brazil worked together to submit to the General Assembly a proposal to reform the Security Council to increase its membership. This is an example of how countries can use the assembly to promote changes to make it easier to put pressure on permanent members that have done something wrong. »
In addition to trying to revamp the Security Council itself, it is also vital to step up efforts to create a new system to do what the present structure cannot do. One specific idea that merits consideration is for countries that share the same values and views of freedom and the world order to forge a « coalition » to complement the functions of the council. Ryozo Kato, a former Japanese ambassador to the U.S., proposes to institutionalize the Group of Seven to ensure more solid and effective cooperation among the leading democracies to promote peace and stability.
In response to violations of international rules, the G-7 has taken joint actions such as issuing statements and imposing sanctions against the violators. However, it is only a voluntary grouping that lacks any institutional foundation.
It is crucial to « enable the G-7 to take stronger and more effective actions by establishing new principles and goals for cooperation and creating a permanent organization for its activity, » Kato said. « It would also be a good idea to expand the group by inviting other major democracies like Australia and India. Through such steps, the G-7 should become an organization that can support the proper functions of the Security Council. »
The U.N., of course, has many agencies and organizations that make important daily contributions to tackling such global challenges as sustainable development and humanitarian assistance as well as food, energy and environmental crises. But if the Security Council, which has enforcement powers, remains in tatters, there can never be stability in the world order. If Russia’s barbaric act does not lead to an overhaul of the body, the Security Council will never be able to change to become a true guardian of peace and order.
NATO headquarters in Brussels on Feb. 7. (Olivier Matthys/AP)
Are Finland and Sweden moving toward applying for membership in NATO after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression against Ukraine?
There is no clear answer yet. NATO membership would be a fundamental change for both countries and must be carefully considered. ”Not hesitating, but with care,” as Finnish President Sauli Niinisto has said. Public opinion in both countries has swung heavily in favor of applying for membership of NATO, and the situation in the respective parliaments seems to be moving in the same direction.
The question is tied to a lengthy history. For Finland, which came out of World War II under the heavy shadow of Stalin’s Soviet Union, NATO membership was never an option during the decades of the Cold War. Sweden, meanwhile, feared that a move into NATO would result in Stalin grabbing complete control of Finland.
But after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Sweden took the lead in applying for membership in the European Union. When I took over as Swedish prime minister after the 1991 election, seeking partnership with Finland in search of E.U. membership was a key objective, and soon thereafter Finland under then-Prime Minister Esko Aho followed.
Together, our two countries entered the European Union in 1995. The age of so-called neutrality — slightly superficial in the Swedish case and severely compromised in the Finnish case — came to an end.
Our countries subsequently entered NATO’s Partnership for Peace, along with Russia. With the three Baltic countries — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — regaining their independence, and Poland gradually moving toward membership of both E.U. and NATO, the situation in the entire region looked very different than during the Cold War.
It was only when Russia under Putin started to demonstrate that its threshold for using military force was lower than many had hoped — first with the war with Georgia in 2008 and then the invasions of Ukraine beginning in 2014 — that a debate on possible NATO membership started.
In both Finland and Sweden, governments set up independent assessments of NATO membership. These reports carefully noted the advantages that membership would bring for the security of the entire region. Both countries also took steps to upgrade their relationship with NATO to the maximum extent that was possible short of membership, and initiated far-reaching bilateral defense cooperation, later extended to NATO member Norway.
Now, Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has created a very new security situation. After initially hesitating, both Sweden and Finland decided on arms shipments to Ukraine, recognizing that the security of all of Europe is at stake. Of the at least 17,000 antitank weapons reportedly delivered to Ukraine, 5,000 are directly from Swedish army stocks. As a result, the relationship with the regime in Moscow will almost certainly be one of deep adversity as long as Putin remains in power.
There is no way back to a past of illusionary neutrality. The choice now is between remaining in a slightly uncertain in-between or recognizing a new reality and taking the step into full membership. It has not gone unnoticed that, in this crisis, the United States has drawn a firm line between the countries covered by NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense commitments and those that are not. Governments come and go, while treaty commitments endure.
It will boil down to politics and leadership. In Finland, the voice of President Niinisto will be decisive. In Sweden, the eyes are primarily on the Social Democrats ruling in a weak minority government. Having been firmly opposed to any NATO move only weeks ago, the party will now face a contest between an older generation and younger ones looking at the world with fresh eyes. That could well result in a U-turn of the sort that contributed to our E.U. membership nearly three decades ago.
There are separate processes in Finland and Sweden, but, in strategic as well as political terms, the countries firmly belong together.
Many factors have to be taken into account. NATO membership for Sweden and Finland would open up the potential of close defense integration with Norway and Denmark, with obvious benefits for all. Sweden and Denmark have declared their ambition to move toward a defense spending target of 2 percent target of GDP, and Norway and Finland are nearly there. This would create a more powerful deterrent against any revanchist Russian moves against the Baltic countries, thus making an important contribution to wider European and Atlantic security.
The long-term relationship with Russia must also be a key consideration. No Nordic country seeks to become a spearhead directed against Russia. In the years to come, we will probably see a Russia significantly weakened by the consequences of the insanity of the Putin aggression. But as long as Putin is in power, we will also see an increasingly despotic, desperate and accordingly dangerous regime.
E.U. defense options must also be on the table. These will take time to create and, with neither the United States nor Britain taking part, will involve limitations.
The road ahead must include strengthened European and Atlantic security structures, while also taking wider global challenges into consideration. A stronger European pillar within NATO, with an enhanced role for the E.U., is likely to emerge. For Finland and Sweden, the question over the next few months is how they will seek to contribute to the building of these new and necessary security arrangements.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi inspects the site of a damaged building, a day after a missile attack, in Erbil, Iraq, Mar. 14, 2022. (Reuters)
Iran’s direct attack on an area near the US Consulate in Irbil on Sunday — which it claimed targeted a “strategic center for Zionist conspiracies” — sets a precedent. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards were directly involved, unlike the previous attacks on Iraq and Saudi Arabia or the more recent attacks on the UAE, for which Tehran’s proxies claimed responsibility. Does this mean that Iran is ready for a direct confrontation?
The last time Iran directly attacked a neighboring Arab country and assumed responsibility was when it retaliated for the killing of Qassem Soleimani in early 2020. It claimed that this week’s strike was a response to the deaths of two Revolutionary Guards following an Israeli strike in Syria. It also said that Iraq must not allow “third parties” to use its territory as a base to launch attacks against Iran.
Iran used to prefer making its attacks via proxies in order to escape a direct confrontation. So why carry out this act just as we are supposedly approaching the signing of a new nuclear deal? It is important to put everything in perspective. Russia has made last-minute demands that risk sabotaging the nuclear deal. Moscow can use its power to block the revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in order to pressure the US. Hence, though America’s reentry to the JCPOA looks imminent, it might be blocked at the last minute.
Looking at the issue from the other side, the Iranians now have stronger bargaining power as the US needs their oil to make up for any potential cut on the Russian side. And, in this time of polarization between Russia and the US, Iran definitely wants to reassert its animosity toward the “Great Satan.” Despite the fact Washington is now busy with Ukraine and has less attention focused on Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region, Tehran is losing regionally and is under pressure. In Iraq, its supporters lost elections — and not because of any action or interference by the US or the Arab Gulf countries.
Iran has been its own worst enemy. It lost out in the Iraqi elections because people, particularly Shiites, realized the futility of Iran’s narrative and the fact that the Iranian project for their country and the region is utterly destructive. This means Tehran is unable to impose a new puppet prime minister on the country. While the Iranians thought Muqtada Al-Sadr would support them, they actually seem incapable of influencing him. The Iran-affiliated factions have threatened that they will resort to violence if they are not included in the ruling coalition — meaning that, if they lose control of Iraq, they will destroy what is left of the country.
Is this deja vu? In Lebanon in May 2008, after being unable to garner a parliamentary majority and hence control the government, the Iran-aligned Hezbollah took Beirut by force and imposed a new government. It worked for them then, in Lebanon, but now things are different. The entire popular mood in Iraq is against them. The strike on Irbil was a sign of Iran’s defiance and denial. Such a show of force when they are losing on the ground was nothing but a desperate attempt to prove themselves. However, this time they are not facing the “Great Satan,” the “Zionist enemy” or some imaginary scheme by Saudi Arabia, they have simply lost their grassroots base due to their own incompetence, corruption and brutality.
Meanwhile, the Iranians’ plans to intimidate neighboring countries by pushing the Houthis to target Saudi Arabia and the UAE do not seem to have been successful. Both countries have good defense systems and are able to intercept most rockets and protect themselves and their inhabitants.
Tehran has lost popular support and is frantically trying to safeguard whatever influence it can.
Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib
In Lebanon, though the elections have not yet taken place, any observer of Lebanese politics can notice the increasing opposition to the “resistance.” In Yemen, they have lost on the ground and their mostly unsuccessful strikes on the UAE are the clearest signs yet of their frustration.
Iran is acting like a wounded animal. It has lost popular support and is frantically trying to safeguard whatever influence it can. Dr. Zafer Al-Ajmi, an expert on Gulf issues, asked in his weekly podcast whether the Revolutionary Guards will attack the Gulf after Irbil. It is difficult to predict, but we cannot rule out this possibility.
One thing that is for sure is that signs of weakness coming from the US and its apparent desperation to rejoin the JCPOA will encourage Iran to pursue its destabilizing activities. The Biden administration is entirely focused on reviving the nuclear deal, while Iran has made it clear that it will not give up its “regional presence.” Hence, Iran faces minimal repercussions from the US side for its destabilizing activities, meaning it will use violence to keep whatever influence it can.
Those who rejoice that Iran’s proxies are losing across the region and are happy to see a possible obstruction to the nuclear deal should curb their enthusiasm, as the drama is not over yet. And they have to remember that an animal is most dangerous when it is wounded.
Read the original article on the site of Arab News.
When on February 24, 2022, the Russian military started to invade Ukraine, a movement of solidarity could be observed all over Europe. Sanctions were swift and coordinated. Weapons were promised and also promptly delivered.
Germany, however, was hesitant at first to deliver weapons, then changed course. Unfortunately, much of the materiel came from arsenals of the old East German army and was no longer functioning.
Germany and Austria are highly dependent on Russian gas and coal. They, therefore, opposed proposals on the European Union level to extend the sanctions to these sectors.
Ukrainians are defending themselves with amazing bravery. Men by the thousands have volunteered to join the army. However, more than 3 million refugees have also fled to neighboring EU countries. These are mostly women and children. Most arrived in Poland (some 1.8 million) and Hungary. These countries have started to welcome, house, nourish and start schooling children of the refugees with extreme generosity.
Now is the time to show unity and determination to the world, not internal quarrels.
Yet the two most welcoming countries, Poland and Hungary, have been on the Brussels “bash list” for a long time. They are blamed for curtailing the independence of their judiciaries, among other accusations that are more than debatable about whether these should be EU matters.
Independent justice is important. But violations are issues not only in these two Central European countries. Even in Germany, there are political appointments and a strange “informal” coordination among the judges of the supreme court, the Bundesgerichtshof, and the Federal Government.
At a time when European cohesion is of the utmost importance given the attack on a neighboring country, the EU Parliament had nothing better to do than pass a resolution to force the European Commission to cut EU funds to Poland and Hungary.
In such an institution as the 27-member EU, there will always be differences. They have to be addressed. But everything in time. Today, however, is the wrong moment to punish severely the two members who are generously accepting the bulk of the fleeing Ukrainians, who are true refugees and not economic migrants.
These acts are certainly damaging to the cohesion of the Union, which is so important now. Now is the time to show unity and determination to the world, not internal quarrels.
Expert warns of deliberate or ‘accidental’ leakage of tech information to Beijing
Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan of the United Arab Emirates meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping in China on Feb. 5. (Shen Hong/Xinhua via Getty Images)
By Gopal Ratnam
Posted March 15, 2022
Congress has directed U.S. intelligence agencies to take a closer look at the growing relationship between China and the United Arab Emirates, raising questions about American military technology leaking to Beijing via a close ally.
In a fiscal 2022 intelligence authorization bill that was tucked into an omnibus spending measure passed last week, lawmakers asked U.S. spy agencies to assess and provide details on the “cooperation between China and the United Arab Emirates regarding defense, security, technology, and other strategically sensitive matters that implicate the national security interests of the United States.”
Lawmakers directed the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to reexamine earlier assurances from the office that the UAE had implemented safeguards to protect U.S. military technology.
Congress asked the ODNI whether such steps by the UAE “are viable and sufficient to protect technology of the United States from being transferred to China or other third parties.”
The congressional focus on the China-UAE ties comes after The Wall Street Journal late last year reported satellite imagery showing significant construction at Abu Dhabi’s Khalifa port, which is operated by the Chinese company Cosco. The report said U.S. officials suspected the construction could be a secret military base, and top White House officials including national security adviser Jake Sullivan visited the UAE.
The construction was suspended after U.S. officials visited the UAE, the Journal reported. UAE officials told the newspaper it had no agreement or intentions to host a Chinese military base in the country.
The growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China has migrated to different geographic theaters and has implications for U.S. allies, said John Calabrese, director of the Middle East-Asia Project at the Middle East Institute.
“Technology transfer to any partner, not necessarily the UAE, could be another candidate” that bears greater scrutiny as a result of the U.S.-China rivalry, Calabrese said.
“The United States is going to be that much more sensitive because of the risk of deliberate transfer or accidental [leakage] of technology to the Chinese,” Calabrese said.
While U.S. officials were raising concerns about the China-UAE ties, the Emiratis also were in discussions to buy dozens of F-35 jet fighters, surveillance drones and other weapons from the United States, a possible transaction valued at more than $20 billion.
In the late 1990s, the United States courted the UAE and sold it a batch of F-16 jets that were even more advanced than what the U.S. Air Force flew at the time. The deal, valued at about $7 billion in 1998, was one of the largest such arms sales at the time.
The Trump administration promoted the UAE to among the closest of U.S. allies in the Middle East, a small but influential country sometimes referred to as “Little Sparta.” Emiratis flew U.S.-made F-16 jets in the fight against the Islamic State.
UAE leaders also had backed the ongoing Saudi-led military conflict in Yemen, which triggered a widespread humanitarian crisis. In retaliation, Yemen-based Houthi rebels fired missiles and launched drone strikes against the UAE’s capital city of Abu Dhabi.
Nevertheless, the potential sale of F-35 jets was met with bipartisan opposition in Congress. A Senate vote to block the sale of the jets to the UAE failed narrowly in December 2020.
At the same time, the United States also was pressing the UAE and several other U.S. allies around the world to not buy 5G telecom equipment from China’s Huawei.
In December 2021, UAE officials decided to abandon the U.S. weapons deal, the Journal and other news outlets reported. Biden administration officials insisted they were still in talks.
Pentagon spokesman John Kirby late last year said the United States was willing to work with the UAE to address both countries’ concerns.
“The U.S. partnership with the UAE is more strategic and more complex than any one weapons sale, » Kirby told reporters in December 2021. « We will always insist, as a matter of statutory requirements and policy, on a variety of end-user requirements. That’s typical.”
A top UAE adviser visiting Washington in December said his country was concerned about getting caught up in the “new Cold War” between the United States and China.
“What we are worried about is this fine line between acute competition and a new Cold War, » Anwar Gargash, a diplomatic adviser to the UAE government, said at an event hosted by the Arab Gulf States Institute. “Because I think we, as a small state, will be affected negatively by this, but will not have the ability in any way to affect this competition even positively really.”
In February, the defense publication Janes reported that the UAE had struck a deal with China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corp. to buy 12 of the state-owned company’s L-15 jet aircraft, with options to buy another 36.
Read the original article on the site of Roll Call.
Côte d’Ivoire’s prime minister Patrick Achi is in Washington, D.C to see US secretary of state Antony Blinken. On the agenda: cocoa, anti-terrorism and AGOA.
On 13 March, Côte d’Ivoire’s prime minister Patrick Achi was in the US, following an invitation from the Atlantic Council think tank, which advocates US leadership in the world. According to our information, US secretary of state Antony Blinken met with him on the 14th. One of their main topics of conversation was the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a programme that should enable Côte d’Ivoire to receive a $524.7m grant – which was accorded in 2019, but still has not been disbursed.
Threat of embargo
Achi managed the MCC project when he was the presidency’s secretary-general. This meeting was expected to revive the programme, which has been slowed down by the global Covid-19 pandemic. However, Washington also believes that Abidjan still needs to improve its performance regarding certain governance indicators.
Another topic of discussion was the threat of an embargo on Ivorian cocoa beans, the leading import to the US.
US NGOs have documented that multinationals operating in the country did not comply with certain standards, particularly with regard to child labour and forest protection.
Abidjan wants to attract more US investment to the country, with the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) also part of discussions.
Monitoring and information gathering
Côte d’Ivoire, which voted for the UN resolution condemning Russian aggression against Ukraine, will also negotiate US support for the fight against terrorism in the northern part of the country. Although Washington is already involved in this effort, training Ivorian forces, Abidjan wants logistical support in surveillance and information gathering, as the US provides for Operation Barkhane.
The US expects more transparency when it comes to business, reforming the justice system and promoting human rights, particularly for LGBT people.
The US visit of Achi and his delegation – composed of Mamadou Haidara, diplomatic adviser to Alassane Ouattara and former ambassador of Côte d’Ivoire, ministers Souleymane Diarrassouba (trade and industry) and Emmanuel Esmel Essis (investments) – will also involve meetings with US businessmen.
Russia’s aggression has caused anxiety in Beijing, but Xi Jinping has staked too much on his ‘best friend,’ Vladimir Putin.
By Kevin Rudd
Before White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan and top Chinese diplomat Yang Jiechi met in Rome on Monday, many in the West hoped that Beijing might limit its support for Russia following its invasion of Ukraine or even help end the conflict, having recently talked up its wish to see a cease-fire and its potential interest in a mediating role.
After the seven-hour meeting, the U.S. issued a three-sentence summary noting that the talks were intense and covered a range of concerns including Ukraine.
L’invasion de l’Ukraine a rompu la sécurité d’approvisionnement de l’Europe, mais elle n’est pas le seul facteur d’augmentation des prix, explique l’expert de l’énergie Olivier Appert dans une tribune au « Monde ».
Publié le 04 mars 2022
Tribune. L’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie, le 24 février, est un défi énergétique majeur, en particulier pour les pays européens. Les marchés ont immédiatement réagi : le prix du pétrole a dépassé la barre symbolique des 100 dollars (90 euros) le baril, alors que le prix du gaz en Europe a augmenté de 30 %.
La Russie possède 6,4 % des réserves mondiales de pétrole et 17,3 % des réserves de gaz. Elle est le troisième producteur de pétrole et le premier exportateur de gaz. Elle fournit 23 % des importations européennes de pétrole, 46 % des importations de gaz et 60 % des importations de charbon. Certains pays dépendent entièrement de la Russie, comme la Lettonie ou la République tchèque. L’Allemagne, premier pays consommateur de gaz en Europe, en importe 50 % de Russie et mise sur le gaz naturel pour assurer sa transition énergétique. La France est moins dépendante (17 %), grâce à une politique de diversification des approvisionnements, notamment avec le gaz naturel liquéfié (GNL).
En retour, la Russie est très dépendante de ses exportations vers l’Europe. Celle-ci absorbe environ 90 % de ses exportations de gaz. Les exportations d’hydrocarbures ont une importance majeure pour l’économie russe : elles représentent 25 % du produit intérieur brut du pays, 40 % de ses recettes budgétaires et 57 % de ses exportations.
Cette dépendance réciproque entre la Russie et l’Europe a contribué, pendant des décennies, à la sécurité de l’approvisionnement européen. La seule rupture à déplorer, en 2006, était due à un conflit commercial sur le transit du gaz russe en Ukraine.
Incertitude majeure
Le contexte actuel change radicalement la donne. L’invasion de l’Ukraine intervient à un moment où les marchés pétroliers et gaziers sont déjà en tension. La flambée des prix du gaz et de l’électricité en Europe est liée d’abord à des facteurs conjoncturels, mais aussi à la politique de libéralisation des marchés gaziers, qui accorde une primauté au court terme. Par ailleurs, les investissements ont été limités par le manque d’incitation du cadre réglementaire et par le message politique négatif sur les énergies fossiles.
Le marché pétrolier va connaître une tension croissante dans les toutes prochaines années non en raison de l’absence de ressources, mais de l’insuffisance des investissements alors que la demande mondiale continue toujours de croître. Il s’ensuit une montée en puissance du contrôle du marché par les pays producteurs, dont la Russie, avec les enjeux géopolitiques afférents. La hausse des prix du pétrole devrait se poursuivre dans le cadre d’un choc pétrolier rampant. On ne peut pas exclure non plus un choc violent lié aux tensions au Moyen-Orient ou en Ukraine.
L’économie de l’Europe serait particulièrement impactée par une tension durable des marchés, compte tenu de sa dépendance croissante vis-à-vis des importations. Il n’en est pas de même des Etats-Unis, maintenant autosuffisants grâce notamment à leurs ressources en hydrocarbures non conventionnels. La Chine dispose, elle, de moyens financiers importants et de ressources en charbon qu’elle n’hésiterait pas à mobiliser si nécessaire.
Compte tenu de l’incertitude majeure sur le déroulement du conflit entre la Russie et l’Ukraine, il est hasardeux d’élaborer des scénarios. Il y a cependant une certitude : l’Europe ne pourra plus compter durablement sur la Russie pour assurer la sécurité de ses approvisionnements, comme cela a été le cas depuis cinquante ans. Sur le plan pétrolier, il est vraisemblable que la Russie va jouer pleinement le jeu de l’OPEP + pour maintenir des prix élevés. Sur le plan gazier, la Russie continuera à faire le service minimum, comme elle l’a fait en 2021 ; elle accordera une priorité à sa consommation intérieure. En outre, les livraisons à l’Europe pourraient être réduites par des destructions sur la chaîne logistique gazière en Ukraine.
Rupture de confiance
On ne peut pas exclure un scénario catastrophe de rupture totale des livraisons de pétrole et de gaz russe à l’Europe, qu’elle résulte d’une décision unilatérale de la Russie ou d’un embargo décidé par les pays occidentaux. Une telle mesure aurait un impact minime sur les Etats-Unis, mais serait dramatique pour l’Europe. Les conséquences sur l’économie russe seraient limitées par la flambée des prix qui interviendrait immédiatement. Le marché pétrolier présente assez de souplesses pour pouvoir s’adapter à cette situation, mais cela prendrait quelques mois.
Il n’en est pas de même pour le gaz. En effet, l’Europe n’a actuellement aucune solution de remplacement immédiate si les importations de gaz russe devaient cesser. Le 1er février, le Qatar, en réponse à une demande pressante de Joe Biden d’aider l’Europe, avait expliqué qu’il ne pourrait pas compenser à lui seul un volume d’approvisionnement suffisant. Pour renforcer les importations de gaz liquéfié américain, il faudrait construire de nombreux terminaux de regazéification, ce qui prendrait au minimum deux à trois ans. La seule solution envisageable serait de faire fonctionner la solidarité entre consommateurs de GNL mondiaux, comme cela a été le cas après l’accident de Fukushima. Mais même si cette solidarité fonctionnait à plein, elle serait insuffisante pour compenser le gaz russe.
En tout état de cause, la confiance entre l’Europe et la Russie est durablement rompue. Il est impératif que les pays européens, et en particulier l’Allemagne, se livrent à une remise en cause en profondeur de leurs politiques énergétiques afin de garantir au mieux la sécurité des approvisionnements et la résilience de notre économie dans ce nouveau contexte géopolitique. Cela implique une stratégie claire de limitation de la demande et de sensibilisation des consommateurs sur les économies d’énergie, mais aussi de développement du nucléaire et des énergies renouvelables (en particulier le gaz vert), et vraisemblablement de maintien du charbon. Les Européens vont devoir s’adapter à des prix plus élevés de l’énergie.
La guerre entre l’Ukraine et la Russie est loin d’être qu’une crise européenne.
La crise financière mondiale de 2008 avait entraîné des émeutes de la faim dans toute l’Afrique. On l’a oublié. C ‘est ce que rappelait Lionel Zinsou, ancien Premier Ministre du Bénin et éminent expert (et acteur !) financier international franco-béninois, devant le Cercle des nouveaux mondes, dirigé par Jean-Pierre Loubinoux, Fadila Palmer et Jean-Pierre Maureau , et composé d’éminentes personnalités comme, entre autres, Ghislaine Alajouanine, familière des lecteurs d’Opinion Internationale, et Christian de Boissieu.
Ajoutons-y notre conviction que les printemps et séismes que le monde arabe a connus deux ans plus tard doivent peut-être beaucoup à l’affaiblissement de régimes frappés par les dommages collatéraux de cette même crise de 2008.
Or, ajoutait Lionel Zinsou sous les dorures apaisantes du Cercle de l’Union Interalliée, si le conflit qui oppose aujourd’hui la Russie à l’Ukraine, deux greniers à grains de l’Afrique et de l’Europe, se prolonge au-delà d’un mois, ses effets seront dévastateurs pour toute l’Afrique, déjà fragilisée (malgré sa résilience remarquable) par la crise de la Covid.
Explosion des prix des matières premières, rupture des sources d’approvisionnement en produits alimentaires de base, détournement de l’attention portée aux enjeux africains… C’est un cocktail explosif qui s’annonce si les grands de ce monde ne parviennent pas rapidement à un accord diplomatique.
By launching its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and threatening the West with nuclear escalation, Russia has shaken the very foundations of the postwar order – and jolted Germany from its dream of effecting change through trade. But can Germany’s resolve withstand the economic pain to come?
MADRID – Russian President Vladimir Putin’s barbaric war on Ukraine seems to have awakened Germany from its post-Cold War slumber, with a dramatic shift in foreign and defense policy indicating a newfound recognition of Russia’s unreliability as a partner and the broader security challenges Europe faces. But can Germany’s tougher approach withstand a painful and protracted crisis, or will accommodationist voices regain traction, urging acceptance of the realities on the ground?
There is no doubting the resoluteness of Germany’s response to the Russian invasion. Beyond halting the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has announced a €100 billion ($109 billion) increase in defense spending this year and agreed to send weapons – not just helmets – to Ukrainian fighters.
Moreover, Germany has participated in the imposition of sweeping Western sanctions aimed at isolating Russia and inflicting maximum economic pain. More fundamentally, Germany seems finally to have abandoned its long-held belief that dialogue is the only way to deal with the Kremlin.
Germany’s newfound mettle, which has been welcomed across Europe, was by no means guaranteed. For decades, Germany’s approach to geopolitics had emphasized rapprochement and economic engagement, with its Russia policy representing a kind of misguided continuation of the Federal Republic’s Cold War-era Ostpolitik. This persisted through Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, its downing in 2014 of MH-17, a passenger flight passing over eastern Ukraine, and the Kremlin’s poisoning of political opponents like Alexei Navalny, who recovered from a nerve-agent attack in a German hospital.
Germany was not alone in taking a soft-handed approach to Russia. The United Kingdom has continually – and willingly – attracted Russian oligarchs’ dark money. In this sense, Britain’s sanctioning of oligarchs like Roman Abramovich also represents a notable shift.
But, historically, Germany has been at the center of Europe’s political tangles. This was often for the worse: Germany repeatedly disrupted Europe’s balance of power, leading to conflict and unparalleled bloodshed, culminating in World War II. But with the 1951 creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, which bound together Germany and France, the country’s role was transformed.
From Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s tenure in the 1950s and early 1960s through Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s in the 1980s and 1990s, it was said that Germany would find its interests in the interests of the European project. Integration was the only conceivable path to a sustainable and lasting European peace, and Germany was essential to achieving that goal.
After reunification in 1990, Germany leveraged its economic strength and prowess to assume a unique convening power in Europe, which enabled it to define the EU’s agenda – and, thus, trajectory – for decades.
But Germany’s leadership was always selective. It used its influence – enhanced by an EU presidency – to press for the completion of an EU-China investment agreement just a month ahead of US President Joe Biden’s inauguration last year. (That deal is now in limbo, unlikely to be ratified by the European Parliament any time soon.) Germany also pushed forward Nord Stream 2, despite its allies’ concerns.
However, in areas that drew less German interest, such as banking union, the EU was left largely directionless. This dynamic is what prompted former Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski to declare in 2011 that he feared Germany’s power less than its inactivity. In fact, Germany’s selective leadership prevented the EU from forging ahead strategically and left it reliant on former Chancellor Angela Merkel’s personal mediation, which ended when her 16-year tenure did.
In this sense, Putin has done the West a favor. By launching a brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and threatening the West with nuclear escalation, he has shaken the very foundations of the postwar order – and jolted Germany out of its dream of Wandel durch Handel (change through commerce). If recent policy changes are any indication, a more comprehensive and strategic form of German leadership could emerge.
But the Western countries imposing costs on Russia will also face high costs, from low growth to skyrocketing energy bills. The post-pandemic recovery could be all but wiped out in much of Europe. Over time, this – together with the existential dread generated by Putin’s wanton nuclear threats – could generate significant pressure on European leaders to pursue normalization of relations with Russia and even greater accommodation of it. Germany’s coalition government will be no exception.
Putin would view any such shift as yet another demonstration of Western weakness, all but inviting him to pursue ever-bolder gambits. That is why the West, with Germany as a central player, must stand firm in defending its values and opposing Russia’s illegal aggression, despite the costs. Otherwise, sooner or later, we will find ourselves once again living in a world where, as the Athenian historian Thucydides famously put it, “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”
By Steven Erlanger New York Times, Updated March 11, 2022
Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian told Iranian media Monday that Iran “will not allow any external factor to impact the national interests for removal of the sanctions.”ATTA KENARE/PHOTOGRAPHER: ATTA KENARE/AFP
BRUSSELS — Russian demands that a revised nuclear agreement with Iran shield it from sanctions halted efforts to revive the deal Friday, just as negotiators said they had all but finalized it.
Russia, facing a barrage of economic sanctions in response to its invasion of Ukraine, has taken its fight against those sanctions into the nuclear talks with Iran, effectively holding up the nuclear agreement as leverage.
The Russian demands have now severely complicated efforts to revive the nuclear deal, which places limits on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions against Iran.
At the least, the breakdown in talks Friday delays any prospect of a deal, as well as the possible resumption of Iran’s ability to sell oil on the world market.
The current US sanctions against Iran strictly limit its ability to sell oil, and Western countries had hoped that an agreement to lift those sanctions would ease the pressure on soaring energy prices as many countries have cut off imports of Russian energy.
European officials also worried that the Russian move would scuttle prospects for the deal entirely, allowing Iran to continue to enrich uranium and move closer to the ability to build a nuclear bomb.
Josep Borrell Fontelles, foreign policy chief of the European Union, which chairs the talks in Vienna, confirmed what he described as a “pause” in the talks “due to external factors.”
“A final text is essentially ready and on the table,” he said in a Twitter message, adding that he would continue to work with negotiators to “overcome the current situation and to close the agreement.”
But Russia, as a signatory to the 2015 nuclear agreement, has tried to use its final approval of the revived Iran deal to open a loophole in the sanctions levied against it since it invaded Ukraine last month.
Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, said Saturday that he wanted a written guarantee that sanctions “launched by the US will not in any way harm our right to free, fully fledged trade and economic and investment cooperation and military-technical cooperation with Iran.”
After a call between Lavrov and his Iranian counterpart, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Russia said a restored nuclear deal must “ensure that all its participants have equal rights” to develop “cooperation in all areas” with Iran.
The demand has tangled the Ukraine war with the Iran nuclear talks, two pressing issues that American officials insist are separate.
The sanctions imposed on Russia after the invasion, said Secretary of State Antony Blinken, “have nothing to do with the Iran nuclear deal.” He said they “just are not in any way linked together, so I think that’s irrelevant.”
American and Iranian officials are both eager to renew the deal: Iran desperately needs the lifting of sanctions that have crippled its economy, while the United States wants to restore the original deal’s limits on Iran’s ability to enrich uranium.
The parties have been negotiating for 11 months to try to restore the deal, which broke down when the Trump administration withdrew from the agreement in 2018. The Trump administration then applied a raft of new sanctions against Iran, and Iran began increasing its enrichment of uranium.
Iran has always denied it intends to build a nuclear weapon, but it is now considered to be within just several weeks of creating enough highly enriched uranium to create a bomb, even though it would take many more months to weaponize it.
Iran has criticized the new Russian demands. Amir-Abdollahian told Iranian media Monday that Iran “will not allow any external factor to impact the national interests for removal of the sanctions.”
The spokesman for Iran’s Foreign Ministry, Saeed Khatibzadeh, insisted Friday that “no external factor will affect our joint will to go forward for a collective agreement.” He expressed the hope that the pause could provide “momentum for resolving any remaining issues and a final return” to the deal.
On Tuesday, Britain, France, and Germany urged the completion of the deal. “The window of opportunity is closing,” they said in a statement. “We call on all sides to make the decisions necessary to close this deal now, and on Russia not to add extraneous conditions to its conclusion.’’
But Russia’s intentions are not yet entirely clear.
If Moscow wants guarantees limited to its obligations under the nuclear deal, that can be managed, officials say. If the Russian demand is broader, and includes exemptions from Western financial and trade sanctions, the deal could die.
While Russia is a member of the pact, its approval of a restored deal may not be legally necessary. But China and Iran may not want to proceed without it, and Russia remains a member of the commission that oversees compliance.
Though the deal is not dead yet, Iran analyst Trita Parsi wrote in the journal Responsible Statecraft, “Moscow does have the ability to harm the United States by delaying the agreement at a crucial point of Washington’s vulnerability to high oil prices. It may also have the ability to pull the plug on the agreement.
“It remains unclear, however,” he added, “if the Russian objective is to delay the deal to undermine the West’s efforts to pressure Russia over Ukraine or to completely scuttle the deal.”
Read the original article on the site of the Boston Globe.
What could make the situation in Ukraine more ripe for a peaceful resolution? There are three potential sources of pressure that could be brought to bear on Russian President Vladimir Putin, but none is likely to induce him to negotiate seriously.
NEW YORK – “Ripeness is all,” noted Edgar in Shakespeare’s King Lear. When it comes to negotiations to limit or end international conflicts, he is right: agreements emerge only when the leading protagonists are willing to compromise and are then able to commit their respective governments to implement the accord.
This truth is highly relevant to any attempt to end the war between Russia and Ukraine through diplomacy. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has any number of reasons to end a conflict that has already killed thousands of his citizens, destroyed large parts of several major cities, rendered millions homeless, and devastated Ukraine’s economy. And his standing has grown by the hour, giving him the political strength to make peace – not at any price, but at some price.
Already, there are signs he might be willing to compromise on NATO membership. He would not recognize Crimea as being part of Russia, but it might be possible for him to accept that the two governments agree to disagree on its status, much as the United States and China have done for a half-century concerning Taiwan. Similarly, he would not recognize the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics,” but he could sign on to their being given significant autonomy.
The question is whether even this would be enough for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has demanded the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine, a phrase that seems to call for regime change, as well as the country’s total demilitarization. Given that he has questioned whether Ukraine is a “real” country, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that he remains uninterested in coexisting with a legitimate government of a sovereign, independent state. So far, Putin has demonstrated he is more interested in making a point than in making a deal.
What could change this? What could make the situation riper for a negotiated solution? That is actually the purpose of the West’s policy: to raise the military and economic costs of prosecuting the war so high that Putin will decide that it is in his interest (he clearly cares little about the interests of Russia) to negotiate a ceasefire and accept terms that would bring peace. Again, this seems unlikely, if only because Putin almost certainly fears it would be interpreted as a sign of weakness, encouraging resistance to his continued rule.
Alternatively, he could be pressured to negotiate. In principle such pressure could come from below – a Russian version of “people power” in which the security services are overwhelmed, much as they were in Iran in the late 1970s. Or pressure could come from the side, from the few others who wield power in today’s Russia and could decide that they must act before Putin destroys more of Russia’s future than he already has. The former does not seem to be in the offing, given mass arrests and control of information, and there is simply no way of knowing if the latter might happen until it does.
The one other party that could put pressure on Putin to compromise is China and its president, Xi Jinping. True, China has publicly cast its lot with Putin, blaming the US for the crisis and even amplifying Russian conspiracy theories. Xi might have calculated that it is good for China to have the US preoccupied with the threat from Russia rather than focused on Asia. Xi also likely sees little or no upside in edging toward the US position, given bipartisan support in the US for a tough policy toward his country.
At the same time, Xi cannot be happy that Putin’s invasion violates a basic tenet of Chinese foreign policy, namely, to view sovereignty as absolute and not to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs. Instead of dividing the West, Putin has united it to an extent unseen since the collapse of the Soviet Union, while simultaneously contributing to worsening views of China in Europe. Nor can Xi welcome the risks the Ukraine crisis poses at a time when China’s post-pandemic economic recovery remains fragile and he is seeking an unprecedented third term in power.
While the chances of changing China’s calculus are low, efforts to do so should nonetheless be explored. As a first step, the US should reassure China that it stands by its one-China policy. US President Joe Biden’s administration could rescind the Trump-era tariffs, which have failed to induce any change in Chinese economic practices and have contributed to inflation at home. It could also signal its willingness to restart a regular strategic dialogue.
Most important, Chinese leaders should be made to understand that this is a defining moment for their country and its relationship with the US. If China continues to side with Putin, if it provides military, economic, or diplomatic support to Russia, it will face the prospect of economic sanctions and stricter technology controls in the short run and deep American enmity in the long run. In short, the US should make clear that the strategic costs for China of its alignment with Russia will far outweigh any benefits.
There is no way of knowing whether Xi will elect to reorient his stance, and if he did, whether it would cause Putin to approach negotiations in good faith. Without China’s support, though, Putin would be even more vulnerable that he already is.
For now, a negotiated peace remains a long shot. There is no evidence that battlefield losses, the costs of sanctions, or internal protest will deter Putin from continuing his efforts to raze Ukraine’s cities, crush its spirit, and oust its government. Meanwhile, the people, army, and leadership of Ukraine, backed by the West, continue to demonstrate extraordinary resilience. An unwarranted war of choice is morphing into an open-ended war of perseverance.
Former European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet reacts to the ECB’s decision to accelerate its wind-down of monetary stimulus. He speaks with Bloomberg’s Guy Johnson and Kailey Leinz on “BloombergMarkets: European Close.”
By William Horobin and Alonso Soto
Two top former European Central Bank officials disagreed on whether the institution was right to unveil a speedier withdrawal of monetary stimulus as war rages across the currency bloc’s border.
Speaking on Bloomberg Television after Thursday’s ECB meeting, former chief economist Peter Praet said accelerating the reduction in net asset purchases amounted to “fine tuning” that was misinterpreted as a stronger message.
“I personally would not have given that signal,” Praet said.
Ex-ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet, meanwhile, said the sharp upward revision to inflation forecasts that accompanied the policy announcement meant officials had to do something to anchor price expectations.
“You cannot have a central bank immobile when you have a level of core inflation at 2.7%,” he said. “If they had done nothing, it seems to me that they would have taken some risks.”
The difference of opinion mirrored tensions between current Governing Council members as they grapple with the need to protect the euro-area economy from the impact of Russia’s invasion while containing the quickest inflation since the common currency’s creation.
ECB President Christine Lagarde said some of her colleagues wanted to keep all policy settings on hold, given the heightened uncertainty. Others, she said, called for a more forceful commitment to end stimulus.
While Lagarde described the outcome as “balanced,” it still caught markets off-guard, sparking a selloff in bonds and volatility for the euro.
“It was naive to think that the ECB would do nothing when the inflation projections were augmenting quite considerably,” Trichet said.
Read the original article on the site of Bloomberg.
The war in Ukraine has once again shown that the veto power wielded by the United Nations Security Council’s five permanent members is a major obstacle to peace. Introducing a mechanism for overturning permanent members’ vetoes would make the body much more legitimate and effective.
WASHINGTON, DC – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed many grave weaknesses in the international order. One prominent flaw that needs addressing concerns the United Nations Security Council and its role in overseeing the multilateral system. Specifically, and underscoring a point we highlighted in our essay in a recent Brookings Institution report, the war in Ukraine has once again shown the veto power of the Security Council’s five permanent members to be a major stumbling block to peace.
Chapter I, Article 1 of the UN Charter, which was drafted following the devastation of World War II, states that the UN’s first purpose is to maintain international peace and security. To that end, the organization aims to prevent threats to peace, suppress acts of aggression, and bring about peaceful settlement of international disputes. Chapters VI and VII of the Charter entrust this core mission to the Security Council.
But the absolute veto power granted by Article 27 to each of the Council’s permanent members (the P5, comprising China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) has from the beginning been a key obstacle to the body’s fulfillment of its mission. That is because the P5 have almost always been divided into rival geopolitical blocs, with a member of one bloc – mostly either the Soviet Union (and now its heir, Russia) or the US – exercising its veto on many crucial decisions.
Russia’s savage blitz on Ukraine is a stark reminder of the Security Council’s impotence when the interests of one or more of the P5 conflict with those of the other members. After WWII, optimists hoped that a threat to security would lead the Security Council initially to impose comprehensive binding economic sanctions in order to deter aggression and encourage peaceful conflict resolution.
But in the current Ukraine conflict, Russia’s Security Council veto means that the US and its allies can impose sanctions only through a “coalition of the willing.” True, the large number of countries and the extraterritorial reach of the dollar-based payments system gives US-imposed sanctions tremendous clout. Yet, in this case as in others, a Security Council-enforced system of global sanctions would be even more debilitating to the sanctioned economy.
Moreover, the emerging role of digital money and changes in the international monetary system that it might bring about could soon diminish the dollar’s role and reduce what a US-led coalition of the willing can achieve. And in other cases, such as former US President Donald Trump’s 2018 decision to reimpose harsh economic sanctions against Iran, the dollar’s extraterritorial reach has generated considerable resentment even among US allies.
Finally, while much of the world is currently rallying around the US-led coalition of democracies in the face of blatant Russian aggression against Ukraine, unfortunately we cannot rule out the possibility that a future Trump or Trump-like administration in the US does something that could potentially make its Security Council veto a problem for much of the democratic world.
The fact that an increasingly illegitimate and ineffective Security Council lies at the heart of today’s multilateral system is all the more unfortunate given the growing range of threats to peace and security. These include not only conventional acts of aggression of the sort the world is witnessing in Ukraine – and which could yet escalate to nuclear exchanges – but also other security threats posed by new technologies.
For example, state or non-state actors could cause havoc through devastating cyberattacks or the abuse of artificial intelligence. Synthetic viruses even more deadly than the coronavirus that caused COVID-19 could inflict unspeakable harm, whether through bioterror or bio-error. And climate change is a threat to all of humanity that must be on a reformed Security Council’s radar screen. Tight and universally binding regulations are urgently needed in all of these domains.
We therefore advocate radically changing the way the Security Council operates, by introducing the possibility of overturning a permanent member’s veto. This could be done by adding a clause to Article 27 that would allow a large double majority – representing, for example, at least two-thirds of member countries and two-thirds of the world’s population – to override a veto.
Our proposal would be vetoed today by Russia and probably China – and perhaps also by the three democracies among the P5, including the US. But a large majority of countries would likely support it. In fact, this is an ideal time for the world’s democracies, including the US, to propose such a change. By backing it, President Joe Biden’s administration could seize the moment and show its determination to create a more equitable and inclusive multilateral system. This would send a powerful – and widely welcomed – message that the US is confident that its enlightened national self-interest will be in accord with the interests of a large majority of the world’s countries and people.
At first, such a proposal would be unlikely to get sufficient backing in the US Congress. But every crisis contains an opportunity. A scheme as outlined above could spur support for reform in the US and other democracies among all who are concerned about old and new threats to human security.
With peace increasingly at risk, the Security Council could play a much greater role in mitigating dangers. Let us hope that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine triggers a radical change that makes the body more legitimate and effective.
Whatever the outcome of the war in Ukraine, eventually the West, and especially Europe, will have to learn to live with Russia, finding a path forward based on mutual respect.
An unfortunate fate has befallen Ukraine. On one hand, it has become a bargaining chip in a larger security confrontation between Russia and NATO. On the other, the Kremlin considers the country an essential part of Russian identity.
Now, Russian troops have invaded Ukraine. The outcome of this conflict remains uncertain. The Ukrainians’ bravery in their resistance deserves our admiration and support, and we must acknowledge that Russia’s aggression has had a unifying effect on Western and Central Europe. Still, it is necessary to analyze the situation with a cool head and look beyond the war.
Misconceptions abound
The dominant view in the West is that the blame lies with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s megalomania and hunger for power. There is even widespread speculation that he has gone mad. But this may not be the case, since it appears that the broader Russian public still shares President Putin’s views.
Some in the West think the best way to live with Russia is to change it. This is arrogant and strengthens Russian assertiveness.
In Russia, the official narrative is that NATO – in reality, a defensive alliance – is acting aggressively. The regime offers the bombing of Belgrade in the 1990s as an example that the North Atlantic alliance frequently behaves this way. Russia worries about the security of its long borders, which stretch thousands of miles, as well as about foreign intervention in its internal affairs. In Russia, Western culture and some of its values are widely considered decadent. Russia wants to avoid being forced to apply the West’s systems.
This is important to understand. There is an attitude in the West that the best way to live with Russia is to change it, to have it implement Western standards of governance and values. This is a dangerous preconception: it is arrogant and strengthens Russian assertiveness. Another view is that a change in Russian leadership would be advantageous and allow for a better relationship. This may also be a shortsighted misconception.
Living with Russia
Taking a neutral view, we can see revisionist behavior on the Russian side, justified by the pretext of national security. On the Western side, we can see a missionary-like drive to enforce certain “values” that might not be accepted by the Russian people.
What can be done in the short and long term? Certainly, the bloodshed in Ukraine has to be stopped without Ukrainian capitulation. Terms need to be carved out. Most European countries have acted decisively, although some, such as Germany, were very late in doing so. They are supporting Kyiv’s defense and President Zelenskiy, and putting pressure on Russia. Finally, the long-ignored need to improve European defense has become obvious.
We hope that Europe’s new assertiveness will prevail, allowing it to negotiate with Russia as an equal. This could also help Ukraine.
It is not certain that Russians are ready or willing to adopt what Europe claims are its values.
European countries need to live with Russia, which used to consider itself European. This history can be an advantage. However, it is not certain that Russians are ready or willing to adopt what Europe claims are its values. Their refusal to do so will need to be respected, and this understanding could, hopefully, be used as a foundation for forming a peaceful neighborhood and engaging in economic cooperation.
The North Atlantic partnership with the United States is crucial for Europe. It has protected European countries for close to 80 years. However Russia, a European and Asian power, is the Old Continent’s closest neighbor. The long-term objective must be an equitable relationship, ideally based on mutual respect.
Nevertheless, European countries need the means to ensure peace and the sovereignty of Russia’s neighbors. Respect also means that the West should not try to intervene in Russia’s internal matters. Yet Western and Central European countries also require a strong defense, to act as a deterrent against incursion.
Finding a deal
For now, Ukraine needs immediate help. Turkey is one country for which Ukraine’s independence is of utmost importance. Moscow is Ankara’s main rival in regional geopolitics and security. Ideally, Turkey would mediate discussions and help find an agreement on a new framework for security in Europe and the Black Sea. Creating such a framework is in the interest of all sides. The sole precondition should be an immediate cease-fire. (While demands for Russia to retreat are justified, they are also unrealistic.) The objective would be to protect the sovereignty of the countries from the Baltic Sea, through Ukraine to Georgia.
Such an agreement should not leave room for interpretation and guarantee Russia’s neighbors’ full sovereignty and their right to self-determination.
Investing in defense protects peace – it is not warmongering.
To ensure compliance, European countries would have to increase the size and effectiveness of their militaries. Germany, which over the past 20 years has irresponsibly neglected its defense, has begun to make up for lost time.
Like some before him, former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski saw Eurasia as the great prize in geopolitics. He expounded upon this point in his 1997 book “The Grand Chessboard.” He argued that without Ukraine, Russia would cease to be a Eurasian empire. He pleaded for Ukraine to be admitted to NATO, but also appealed for the West not to corner Moscow. He excluded any possibility for Russia to join NATO, since it would shift the balance of power within the alliance, but he did propose a special partnership.
These are interesting proposals, especially from an American point of view. However, it also shows that Brzezinski, a visionary, saw ways to achieve a close, fruitful coexistence. On the other hand, he argued that to protect U.S. interests, Washington should not allow Western European countries’ relations with Russia to become too close. This position does not contradict the above vision for a Russia-West relationship that benefits both sides.
Now, determination and efforts to improve defense will be key for Europe. The Romans used to say that if you want peace, prepare for war. Switzerland and Sweden were the only two European countries to avoid major conflict in the 20th century, which saw both World Wars break out. These countries both had strong defenses, making it too costly to attack them.
Investing in defense protects peace – it is not warmongering, to the contrary of various political groups’ claims. Investing in a fire brigade does not mean you want a fire to break out.
L’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie va profondément affecter les économies européennes. Dans une tribune à « l’Obs », Jean Pisani-Ferry, professeur de politique économique à Sciences-Po et chercheur du think tank européen Bruegel, analyse cet impact budgétaire en dix points.
Publié le
1. La guerre [en Ukraine, NDLR] aggrave le choc d’offre auquel nos économies étaient déjà confrontées du fait de la hausse des prix de l’énergie. Pour la BCE [Banque centrale européenne], elle accentue le dilemme entre maîtrise de l’inflation et soutien de l’activité. Au-delà du soutien ciblé aux ménages vulnérables, cela justifie temporairement des mesures hétérodoxes de limitation de l’impact inflationniste de la hausse des prix des combustibles (fiscalité, suspension de la fixation du prix de l’électricité sur la base du prix de l’énergie marginale, contrôles des prix).
2. L’efficacité du blocage des réserves de change est aujourd’hui très grande (plus que celle de l’exclusion de Swift, qui touche moins de la moitié du système bancaire). Mais si la Russie continue d’exporter du pétrole et du gaz aux prix actuels, elle va rapidement reconstituer ses avoirs. Il ne sert à rien de s’attaquer au stock (les réserves) si l’on ne touche pas aux flux (les revenus d’exportation).
3. La question touche en particulier au gaz, dont l’exportation requiert des infrastructures. L’Union européenne et la Russie ont l’une et l’autre les moyens d’un chantage économique réciproque, mais l’UE peut plus facilement diversifier ses imports, tandis que la Russie ne peut pas diversifier ses exports.
4. L’Union doit préparer une réduction de ses importations de gaz russe. Il faudra, d’une part, limiter la demande de gaz (en retardant la fermeture de centrales, en freinant la consommation des ménages) et, d’autre part, organiser les approvisionnements alternatifs, leur stockage et leur acheminement. Il faut engager rapidement une initiative d’ampleur, étroitement coordonnée, et annoncer une réduction par étapes des importations de gaz russe. Cela demandera une forte prise en charge publique du coût de l’opération (pour quelque 75 milliards d’euros en 2022), et un effort de solidarité important entre pays européens.
5. A plus long terme, il faut repenser l’architecture d’un système énergétique européen qui a largement préservé les préférences nationales mais ne sert ni l’efficacité ni la sécurité collective. Cela suppose des investissements d’interconnexion, des surcapacités et la définition de plans de crise.
6. L’afflux de réfugiés n’est pas un problème pour le moyen terme (s’ils ne rentrent pas en Ukraine, ils s’intégreront rapidement au marché du travail) mais, à court terme, il faut s’attendre à plusieurs millions de réfugiés, avec un coût qui pourrait atteindre une trentaine de milliards d’euros en 2022.
7. L’annonce par l’Allemagne d’une augmentation du budget de la défense sera suivie par des initiatives parallèles dans les autres pays. Dans le périmètre de l’UE, il faudra sans doute 20 milliards d’euros de dépenses supplémentaires à court terme (cette année), et au bas mot 70 milliards d’euros (un demi-point de PIB) à moyen terme.
8. Au total, le coût budgétaire de ces mesures pourrait dépasser un point de PIB en 2022 (175 milliards d’euros dans le périmètre de l’Union européenne), réparti entre budgets nationaux et financement conjoint. L’UE va être contrainte de retarder la désactivation de la clause d’exemption du Pacte de stabilité.
9. A moyen terme, à l’investissement additionnel dans la dépense (au minimum un demi-point de PIB) va s’ajouter l’investissement vert (un demi-point de PIB aussi) et compliquer le rééquilibrage des finances publiques, dans un contexte où les marchés seront plus frileux, plus méfiants à l’égard des actifs européens, et plus inquiets sur les risques de solvabilité.
10. L’Union engage, dans la crise, sa réorientation vers la fourniture de biens publics européens. Dans l’immédiat, des flexibilités peuvent être trouvées. Cependant, il faudra très vite mettre en place un nouveau budget et un nouvel instrument inspiré de l’emprunt commun Next Generation EU (mais certainement moins redistributif).
Protesters against the war in Ukraine outside the Russian embassy in Vienna. Photo by Thomas Kronsteiner/Getty Images
MADRID – Russian President Vladimir Putin’s barbaric war on Ukraine seems to have awakened Germany from its post-Cold War slumber, with a dramatic shift in foreign and defense policy indicating a newfound recognition of Russia’s unreliability as a partner and the broader security challenges Europe faces. But can Germany’s tougher approach withstand a painful and protracted crisis, or will accommodationist voices regain traction, urging acceptance of the realities on the ground?
There is no doubting the resoluteness of Germany’s response to the Russian invasion. Beyond halting the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has announced a €100 billion ($109 billion) increase in defense spending this year and agreed to send weapons – not just helmets – to Ukrainian fighters.
Moreover, Germany has participated in the imposition of sweeping Western sanctions aimed at isolating Russia and inflicting maximum economic pain. More fundamentally, Germany seems finally to have abandoned its long-held belief that dialogue is the only way to deal with the Kremlin.
Germany’s newfound mettle, which has been welcomed across Europe, was by no means guaranteed. For decades, Germany’s approach to geopolitics had emphasized rapprochement and economic engagement, with its Russia policy representing a kind of misguided continuation of the Federal Republic’s Cold War-era Ostpolitik. This persisted through Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, its downing in 2014 of MH-17, a passenger flight passing over eastern Ukraine, and the Kremlin’s poisoning of political opponents like Alexei Navalny, who recovered from a nerve-agent attack in a German hospital.
Germany was not alone in taking a soft-handed approach to Russia. The United Kingdom has continually – and willingly – attracted Russian oligarchs’ dark money. In this sense, Britain’s sanctioning of oligarchs like Roman Abramovich also represents a notable shift.
But, historically, Germany has been at the center of Europe’s political tangles. This was often for the worse: Germany repeatedly disrupted Europe’s balance of power, leading to conflict and unparalleled bloodshed, culminating in World War II. But with the 1951 creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, which bound together Germany and France, the country’s role was transformed.
From Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s tenure in the 1950s and early 1960s through Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s in the 1980s and 1990s, it was said that Germany would find its interests in the interests of the European project. Integration was the only conceivable path to a sustainable and lasting European peace, and Germany was essential to achieving that goal.
After reunification in 1990, Germany leveraged its economic strength and prowess to assume a unique convening power in Europe, which enabled it to define the EU’s agenda – and, thus, trajectory – for decades.
But Germany’s leadership was always selective. It used its influence – enhanced by an EU presidency – to press for the completion of an EU-China investment agreement just a month ahead of US President Joe Biden’s inauguration last year. (That deal is now in limbo, unlikely to be ratified by the European Parliament any time soon.) Germany also pushed forward Nord Stream 2, despite its allies’ concerns.
However, in areas that drew less German interest, such as banking union, the EU was left largely directionless. This dynamic is what prompted former Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski to declare in 2011 that he feared Germany’s power less than its inactivity. In fact, Germany’s selective leadership prevented the EU from forging ahead strategically and left it reliant on former Chancellor Angela Merkel’s personal mediation, which ended when her 16-year tenure did.
In this sense, Putin has done the West a favor. By launching a brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and threatening the West with nuclear escalation, he has shaken the very foundations of the postwar order – and jolted Germany out of its dream of Wandel durch Handel (change through commerce). If recent policy changes are any indication, a more comprehensive and strategic form of German leadership could emerge.
But the Western countries imposing costs on Russia will also face high costs, from low growth to skyrocketing energy bills. The post-pandemic recovery could be all but wiped out in much of Europe. Over time, this – together with the existential dread generated by Putin’s wanton nuclear threats – could generate significant pressure on European leaders to pursue normalization of relations with Russia and even greater accommodation of it. Germany’s coalition government will be no exception.
Putin would view any such shift as yet another demonstration of Western weakness, all but inviting him to pursue ever-bolder gambits. That is why the West, with Germany as a central player, must stand firm in defending its values and opposing Russia’s illegal aggression, despite the costs. Otherwise, sooner or later, we will find ourselves once again living in a world where, as the Athenian historian Thucydides famously put it, “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”
Read the original article on the site of Project Syndicate.