Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Moldova to the French Republic, a position she has held since April 2026. She began her professional career as an editor for cultural publications in the Republic of Moldova. From 1992 to 1998, she served as Director of the Soros Foundation Moldova. In 1998, she was appointed Director of the Medialog Media Group. Since 2000, she has been based in Paris, where she has pursued professional activities in interior design and founded her own jewellery brand. She is the author of several volumes of poetry, translated into multiple languages. In 2023, she published the novel Legată cu funia de pământ (Bound to the Earth by a Rope), subsequently translated into French and German. She is a graduate of the Maxim Gorky Institute of Literature in Moscow and of the University of Dijon (France).
Thomson Pauline
Head of Data Science and Managing Director in Ardian’s Infrastructure Team at Ardian. Since joining Ardian in 2011, Pauline has been a leader in innovation. She spearheaded the launch of data science to support value creation within investment teams and more recently of Gaia, Ardian’s firm-wide, in-house generative AI platform. She was at the forefront of creating Ardian Opta platform supporting investment in renewable energy as well as Ardian AirCarbon, Ardian’s proprietary software platform for measuring airports’ Scope 3 emissions. She has consistently pushed the boundaries of how technology can enhance investment practices, contribute to value creation and drive decarbonisation. Pauline Thomson is also Board member of Mila, a leading telecom operator in Iceland and Verne, a pan European data center platform, headquartered in the UK. Her ability to balance rigorous deal execution with long-term value creation embedded in data science as well as her expertise in applying cutting-edge data science, ability to deliver on transformative transactions, and climate-first approach, demonstrates her leadership in infrastructure investing.
Arman Khachatryan
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Armenia to France since 2024. A career diplomat, he previously served as Permanent Representative of Armenia to the Council of Europe from 2021 to 2024. He has held several senior roles at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Director of the Department for Multilateral Policy and Development Cooperation and Secretary General of the National Commission for UNESCO. Earlier in his career, he served at Armenia’s missions to the European Union and the Council of Europe, and within the central administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has also lectured at Yerevan State University and authored publications on diplomacy and international negotiations. He graduated from Yerevan State University and completed executive training at the College of Europe, the NATO Defense College, and the Clingendael Institute. He speaks Armenian, English, French, and Russian.
Vahan Kostanyan
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia since January 2023. He previously held several senior advisory roles within Armenia’s National Assembly and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Adviser to the Foreign Minister and to the President of the National Assembly. He also served as spokesperson of the Civil Contract Party and headed the Office of the First Deputy Prime Minister. He studied at the Faculty of Oriental Studies at Yerevan State University and completed additional training in public administration, conflictology, and human rights. His career has focused on foreign policy, parliamentary affairs, and strategic communications. He speaks English, Russian, and Persian.
Ian Sielecki
Ambassador of the Argentine Republic to France since May 2024, Ian Sielecki is a diplomat whose career has focused on fostering transatlantic dialogue and promoting high-level international debates among policymakers, academics, and leading public intellectuals. Prior to his appointment, he co-founded and chaired Polemix (2020–2023), a platform dedicated to generating discussions between prominent global thinkers and their communities, bringing together distinguished intellectual and political figures. He previously served as Head of Speechwriting and Strategy for Argentina’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, contributing to the conceptualization of foreign policy and to the development of the bilateral relationship with France. Earlier, he advised the President of Argentina on international speeches and strategic messaging. He also collaborated on Emmanuel Macron’s presidential campaign in 2016–2017 and co-organized The New York Times Athens Democracy Forum, where he led the Debate and Youth divisions. As founder of the Transatlantic Debating Association, he organized exchanges among leading Western universities on transatlantic issues. A graduate of Sciences Po Paris and the University of Cambridge, he regularly publishes on Franco-Argentine relations and is fluent in Spanish and French, and speaks English, Italian, and Portuguese.
Gulsara Arystankulova
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the French Republic since July 2022. She has over twenty years of experience in international affairs and public policy. Throughout her career, she has served in Kazakhstan’s embassies in Belgium and France, as well as within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She has also held several strategic positions within the Presidential Administration, particularly in the fields of foreign policy and international relations. In this capacity, she contributed to shaping and implementing Kazakhstan’s diplomatic strategy. In parallel with her duties in France, she also serves as Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to UNESCO. She graduated from the Kazakh State University of World Languages and from the Université des sciences humaines de Strasbourg, where she obtained a postgraduate degree in international relations. She also holds a PhD in international relations from the Academy of Public Administration under the President of Kazakhstan.
Paul Maurice
Secretary General of The Study Committee on Franco-German Relations (Cerfa) since September 2024. He was Head of the Unit for Germany, Alpine and Adriatic Europe at the European Union Direction of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs from September 2022 to August 2024. He was previously a Research Fellow at Cerfa at the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri) from March 2020 to August 2022, where he worked particularly on issues of German domestic policy and Franco-German relations within the framework of European integration. Paul Maurice holds a PhD in Contemporary History and German Studies from Sorbonne University, conducted under a Franco-German joint supervision agreement with Saarland University (Germany) and within the framework of the research unit UMR Sirice (Sorbonne, Identities, International Relations and Civilizations of Europe). He studied contemporary history and international relations at Paris-Sorbonne University and Freie Universität Berlin. He also teaches at Sciences Po as part of the Master of the School of Public Affairs. He is a member of the editorial board of the journal Allemagne d’aujourd’hui.
Thomas Courbe
Director General for Enterprise at the French Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty. He began his career in 1995 at the Ministry of Defence as head of fighter aircraft programmes, before serving as Chief of Staff to the Director of Aircraft Programmes. In 2002, he joined the Directorate General of the Treasury, where he held several positions, including Deputy Head of the Asia Office, Head of the Africa-Maghreb Office, Head of the Aeronautical, Military and Naval Affairs Office, Secretary General of the Paris Club, and Deputy Director for Bilateral Economic Relations. In 2010, he was appointed Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State for Foreign Trade (Pierre Lellouche), and subsequently Deputy Chief of Staff to the Ministers of Economy, Finance and Industry (Christine Lagarde and François Baroin). In 2012, he returned to the Treasury as Secretary General, before becoming Deputy Director General from 2015 to 2018. In August 2018, he was appointed Director General for Enterprise. An Ingénieur général de l’Armement, he is a graduate of the École supérieure de l’aéronautique et de l’espace (SUPAERO). He is a Knight of the Legion of Honour and a Commander of the National Order of Merit.
Balabanova-Ruleva Radka
Ambassador of Bulgaria to France since February 2024 and Permanent Delegate of Bulgaria to UNESCO. She joined the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1997. She has held numerous positions related to European affairs, including at the Permanent Mission of Bulgaria to the European Union in Brussels and within departments responsible for European integration and EU policies. She also served at the Bulgarian Embassy in Paris as First Secretary. She has held senior leadership roles at the Ministry, including Director of External Economic Relations and Development Cooperation, as well as Special Coordinator for cooperation with the OECD. She also served as Deputy Head of Mission in Brussels. She holds a Master’s degree in International Economic Relations from the University of National and World Economy in Sofia and a Master’s degree in European Integration from Sofia University.
Nkulikiyimfura François
Ambassador of the Republic of Rwanda to France since 2022, with accreditation to Spain and Portugal, and designated Ambassador to Italy and Monaco, he also serves as Permanent Delegate to several international organizations, including UNESCO, OIF and OECD. With a background in economics, he has 18 years of experience in development economics and public finance management. He notably served at Rwanda’s Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning as Director of the Treasury and later Director General of Corporate Services. He then joined the African Development Bank, where he worked as an expert in governance and public financial management for several East African countries, overseeing major economic reforms. He also served as Ambassador of Rwanda to Qatar. He holds a degree in industrial economics from Université Paris XIII.
Miklós Tromler
Accredited Ambassador of Hungary to France since December 2025, he has extensive diplomatic experience, notably in Morocco where he served as Ambassador to the Kingdom of Morocco and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. He also held the position of Dean of the European Diplomatic Corps in Morocco. He previously served in various roles at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, including in protocol and Asia-Pacific affairs. He began his professional career in international congress management. Alongside his diplomatic career, he has a distinguished background in elite sports. A former professional water polo player, he competed in France, Italy, and Hungary, winning a LEN European Cup and seven French championship titles. He holds an Executive MBA from Corvinus University of Budapest, as well as degrees in management, and is certified as an occupational health and safety expert. He is fluent in Hungarian, French, Italian, and English.
Brian Kingston
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association (CVMA). The CVMA represents Canada’s leading manufacturers of light and heavy duty motor vehicles. Its membership includes Ford Motor Company of Canada, Limited, General Motors of Canada Company, and Stellantis (FCA Canada). Prior to joining the CVMA, Brian was Vice President of Policy, Fiscal and International, at the Business Council of Canada where he led the Council’s economic policy priorities and global engagement. From 2009 to 2012 he served in the federal government with positions at the Department of Finance, Global Affairs Canada, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, the Treasury Board Secretariat, and the Privy Council Office. Brian is active in the non-profit sector including as past president of the Ottawa Economics Association and past chair of the Banff Forum. Brian holds a bachelor’s degree in economics from Carleton University, a master’s degree in international affairs from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs and an MBA from Ivey Business School.
How Trump’s war with Iran is alienating the Global South
Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
March 19, 2026
US must not let Iran distract it from China
Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
March 8, 2026
Yunus Demirer
Ambassador of the Republic of Türkiye to France, since September 2023. A career diplomat, he has held numerous senior positions within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He served as Ambassador to Iraq (2011–2013), Saudi Arabia (2013–2018), and Slovakia (2021–2023). He also held key leadership roles in Ankara, including Director General for the Middle East and North Africa and Deputy Director General for relations with Iraq, where he played an active role in shaping Türkiye’s regional policy. Earlier in his career, he was posted to several major diplomatic missions, including Baghdad, Brussels (NATO), Bucharest, Washington, and Beirut. He also served as Chief of Staff to both the Undersecretary of State and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, gaining extensive experience in high-level diplomatic coordination and strategic decision-making. He began his career in 1989 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, initially working on maritime affairs and later on Caucasus-related issues. He is a graduate of the Faculty of Political Sciences at Ankara University. He speaks French and English.
Wiesław Tarka
Wiesław Tarka is Chargé d’affaires a.i. and Titular Ambassador of the Republic of Poland in France. A career diplomat, he has held senior positions within the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and abroad. He served as Ambassador of Poland to Croatia (2008–2012) and to Sweden (2015–2018). He also held key responsibilities as Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, overseeing European and international cooperation, migration policy, and cross-border affairs. Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he has served as Director of the Foreign Service Inspectorate and Deputy Director of the European Policy Department, contributing to regional initiatives such as the Visegrad Group and the Central European Initiative, as well as the coordination of the Western Balkans Summit. Earlier in his career, he was posted to the Polish Embassy in Stockholm and worked in cultural administration in Warsaw. Mr. Tarka holds a degree in Modern Philology from the University of Warsaw and has an academic background in linguistics. He speaks several languages, including English, German, Swedish, Croatian, French, Ukrainian, and Russian. He has been awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta and the Order of Prince Branimir of Croatia.
Andrew Haines
Professor of Environmental Change and Public Health at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine and a leading expert on climate change and health. He is co-principal investigator of the Pathfinder Initiative on a healthy net-zero future, funded by the Wellcome Trust, senior scientific adviser to the Pan-European Commission on Climate Change and Health, and Vice-Chair of the United Nations Independent Panel on the Effects of Nuclear War. He previously served as Director of the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (2001–2010). Earlier in his career, he was Professor of Primary Health Care at University College London, a general practitioner in inner London, and a consultant epidemiologist at the Medical Research Council. He has also held advisory roles with the World Health Organization, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and numerous national and international research bodies. Professor Haines has published extensively on public health, climate change and planetary health. He qualified in medicine at King’s College London and holds an MD in Epidemiology from the University of London.
Jean-Paul Bouttes
Jean-Paul Bouttes, an engineer and economist, is a member of the Scientific Council of the French High Commission for Strategy and Planning. He previously served as Chief Economist and Executive Vice President of Strategy, Prospective and International Relations at EDF (Électricité de France), following his role as Senior Vice President for Industrial Strategy within the Generation Division and several positions in the Group’s General Economic Studies. He has held responsibilities within international energy organizations, notably as a member of the Studies Committee of the World Energy Council and within the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). He has also taught economics at École Polytechnique, where he contributed to the creation and leadership of the Sustainable Development Chair, and at North China Electric Power University in Beijing. Jean-Paul Bouttes is the author of several books, including Energie (PUF 2023), Souveraineté, maîtrise industrielle et transition énergétique (Fondapol 2023) and Nuclear Waste: A Comprehensive Approach (2022). He is a graduate of École Polytechnique and ENSAE.
Étienne Grass
Global Chief AI Officer at Capgemini Invent, author, columnist for Les Echos, and former senior French civil servant. As a recognized expert in healthcare policy and AI‑driven organizational transformation, he teaches at Sciences Po Paris. As graduate of the École nationale d’administration (ENA) and a member of the Inspectorate General of Social Affairs, he previously served as Deputy Chief of Staff to the High Commissioner for Active Solidarity Against Poverty (2007–2009) and as Chief of Staff to the French Minister for Women’s Rights, Urban Affairs, Youth, and Sports (2012–2014). Étienne Grass joined the Capgemini Group in November 2017. He led the Citizen Services teams before overseeing the Group’s sovereign cloud initiative (“BLEU”). He served as CEO of Capgemini Invent France from 2023 to 2025. Since July 1, 2025, he has been leading the Group’s global AI activities. He is the author of several publications, including L’Europe sociale (La Documentation française, 2013), Les Inégalités de santé (Presses de Sciences Po, 2016), and Génération réenchantée (Calmann‑Lévy, 2016).
Margaret Chan
Emeritus Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), Dr. Margaret Chan is Dean of the Vanke School of Public Health at Tsinghua University. She began her career in public health in 1978 at the Hong Kong Department of Health, where she became Director in 1994, the first woman to hold this position. During her tenure, she strengthened disease prevention, surveillance, and response systems, and notably managed outbreaks of avian influenza and SARS. Dr. Chan joined WHO in 2003 and was elected Director-General in 2006, serving two terms until 2017. She holds a medical degree from the University of Western Ontario, Canada.
Andreas Schaal
Director for OECD Global Relations and Co-operation, as well as the OECD Sherpa to the G7, the G20 and APEC. He supports and co-ordinates the OECD’s contributions to global governance under the leadership of OECD Secretary-General Mathias Cormann. He and his team implement the OECD Global Relations Strategy, engaging with over 100 partner countries aound the globe at the ministerial level and building a global level playing field by increasing adherence to OECD standards and policies. Andreas’ expertise includes two decades of conceptional and strategic work on foreign affairs, national, international and global economic policy, and global governance. Prior to joining the OECD, Mr Schaal held various positions during his work for the German Federal Government, including: Deputy Director G8 Summit/German Sherpa Office, Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Technology; Economic Counsellor, German Permanent Delegation to the OECD, Paris; Vice Chair (elected 2005-2006) of the OECD’s Economic and Development Review Committee (EDRC); and Policy Advisor and Chief of Staff to Parliamentary Secretary of State Siegmar Mosdorf, MP, Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Technology.Andreas Schaal is a non-Resident Senior Fellow of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China (RDCY). He holds a Masters in Public Policy and Public Management from the University of Konstanz, Germany .
Angel Prieto
Head of the Industrial Decarbonization Unit at the French Ministry for the Economy. He oversees the design and implementation of public policies aimed at decarbonizing French industry, including sectoral and technology roadmaps, the design of support schemes, budget negotiations, and European policy engagement. Previously, he served as Head of the State Economic Service for the Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes region and as economic adviser to the Regional Prefect, contributing to regional economic development and supporting the decarbonization of companies. He also worked at McKinsey & Company, where he advised African governments and development banks on energy transition and industrial decarbonization, and at ENGIE, where he contributed to the Group’s climate strategy. Long committed to environmental issues, Angel Prieto is a co-founder of the movement Pour un réveil écologique and led the French delegation to the G7 Youth Summit in 2024, where he was in charge of negotiations on environmental matters. Angel Prieto is a member of the French Corps des Mines and a graduate of École polytechnique.
Hugo Pouzet
French senior civil servant, Hugo Pouzet serves as Deputy Head of the Sustainable Finance, Corporate Law, Accounting and Corporate Governance Unit at the Direction générale du Trésor, within the French Ministry for the Economy, Finance and Industrial, Energy and Digital Sovereignty. A Mining Corps engineer, he held positions during his training across both the public and private sectors, in France and internationally. He notably served as Transformation Project Manager at L’Oréal in Tokyo, and as Decarbonization Engineer at Orano Mining. A graduate of the École normale supérieure and of Mines Paris – PSL, he is also the co-author of a study on drug shortages, analyzing structural vulnerabilities in pharmaceutical supply chains.
Baptiste Poterszman
Deputy Head of the Risk Prevention Division at the Regional Directorate for the Environment of Île-de-France. His role revolves around the implementation of public policies to prevent industrial pollution and risks. Before joining the French civil service, he worked for Neoen, a renewable energy producer, in Sweden, and for the rail company Eurostar in London. He also had the opportunity to work on the issue of drug shortages, with a focus on public policy and supply-chain resilience. He is a graduate of École polytechnique and a member of the Corps des mines.
Mark Malloch-Brown
Mark Malloch-Brown is a Visiting Professor in Practice at the London School of Economics (LSE), a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. He was knighted for his contributions to international affairs, and is currently on leave from the British House of Lords. Mark Malloch-Brown has had a long career in international affairs, development, business, and communications. At the United Nations, Mark Malloch-Brown led the global promotion of the UN Millennium Development Goals as head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). At the UNDP, and previously as vice president of external affairs at the World Bank, he led reform efforts to increase the impact of both organisations. He later served as Kofi Annan’s chief of staff, and then as UN Deputy Secretary General, before joining the British government of Prime Minister Gordon Brown, as minister responsible for Africa and Asia from 2007 to 2009. Most recently, he was president of the Open Society Foundations, the world’s largest private funder of independent groups working for justice, democratic governance, and human rights.
Integrated Water Resource Management is Key to 21st Century Climate Resilience
Integrated Water Resource Management is Key to 21st Century Climate Resilience
Jeremy FAIN, CEO of BWI.
March 2, 2026
PARIS – Since mid-2022, I have had the privilege of leading Blue Water Intelligence, a newspace technology company that designs, develops, and markets a river behavior forecasting service powered by proprietary artificial intelligence technology, operating across four continents. This vantage point offers a unique observatory on the water crises punctuating river basins worldwide. Basin by basin, my journey accross continents has forged a core conviction that shapes our client vision: low-flow tensions are not the root cause of these crises but their stark revealer. In this era of accelerating climate change, such strains stem from a triple dynamic—demographic, economic, and agricultural—resting on a freshwater resource long deemed infinite, now proven finite.
Population Growth and Water Volatility
The paradox is stark: regions with the fastest population growth—especially South Asia and Africa—face the most unpredictable water availability. Megacities sprawl, secondary urban centers boom, and essential needs (drinking, hygiene, mobility, production) cluster in already climate-stressed basins.
In these areas, the dry season has evolved from a mere cyclical low to a moment of reckoning. Falling river flows threaten not just ecosystems but social cohesion, institutional strength, governance quality, and anticipatory capacity. With millions more relying on the same hydro-meteorological uncertainties, even minor supply disruptions risk escalating into major local social and political crises.
Surging Demands in Food and Energy
Demographic shocks extend beyond potable water to fuel consumption economies: essentials, durables, services (health, logistics, digital). Every value chain hinges, directly or indirectly, on water availability—often globally sourced.
Agriculture dominates, claiming nearly 70% of global freshwater withdrawals. Feeding growing urban populations demands higher yields, harvest security, and agro-industries that both consume and pollute water. Meanwhile, energy thirst rises: thermal and nuclear plants require cooling water, hydrocarbon extraction and refining vast volumes, and hydropower ties directly to flows.
This reveals systemic strain: food and energy decisions ripple through water balances, often unaccounted for. Growth and infrastructure carry an implicit “water budget” we have yet to tally. Crises arise not from isolated “water wars” but from development models treating water as a mere input, not the structuring variable.
Irrigation as Demographic Shadow
Facing erratic rainfall from climate disruption, the instinctive response to feeding more mouths is expanded irrigation. States, driven by fiscal urgency, import risks, and food sovereignty, promote irrigated perimeters—via grand hydraulic works (canals supporting arable expansion) or private aquifer drilling. Irrigation peaks in dry seasons, when rivers and groundwater are scarcest.
Each additional irrigated hectare mortgages future river flows or aquifer volumes. Upstream withdrawals starve downstream cities, biodiversity, and energy in low-flow periods. In transboundary basins, this breeds resentment—flow drops seen as upstream hoarding, often from uncoordinated decisions.
Visible disputes over dams, canals, or quotas are late symptoms of unmanaged trajectories. The question shifts: not whether to over-irrigate, but whether irrigation aligns with current and future resource realities.
Water Governance as Resilience Pillar
Positioning freshwater as the 21st century’s most strategic resource is no slogan; it is a clear-eyed assessment of this triple pressure. Demographics, food, energy—legitimate progress drivers—converge on one bottleneck.
Sharing scarcity is insufficient. Freshwater must anchor basin-level arbitrages, transcending administrative borders (that water beautifully ignores) and sectoral silos (water serves all). Practically, basin authorities must balance cities, agriculture, energy, and ecosystems via robust hydrological scenarios, not crisis firefighting.
This demands two quiet revolutions: long-term water governance as systemic regulator, and fine-grained basin digitalization turning uncertainty into manageable risk. Rive basin digitization enables hydrological forecasting to pre-discuss dry-season impacts—days or weeks ahead—for critical uses: potable water, irrigation, energy, ecosystems. Innovative forecasting services emerged precisely from this digitization gap.
From Endurance to Agency
Many basins view low flows as fate—a recurring “crisis season.” Tomorrow’s resilient basins will treat water as strategically as energy or digital infrastructure, aligning demographics, land use, food systems, and energy matrices to realistic water budgets.
Dry-season tensions are neither surprises nor curses, but outcomes of underestimating water’s role in socioeconomic stability. Elevating water as a public policy and investment cornerstone is essential—not to defy low flows, but to avert the chaos they unleash absent root-cause action.
The true divide will pit nations steering freshwater as a long-term strategic asset against those enduring it seasonally, lacking integrated resource governance and basin digitalization.
Why Trump’s solo Yalta is so sinister
Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
February 7, 2026

Is this the end of the Western-led world order?
Is this the end of the Western-led world order?
Widening transatlantic rift benefits Russia and China in Asia
Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
January 31, 2026
TOKYO — The first anniversary of U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term unfolded under the shadow of sharply escalating transatlantic discord, exacerbated by his hard-edged campaign to bring Greenland, a Danish territory, into the American fold.
At this year’s World Economic Forum, held from Jan. 19 to Jan. 23 in Davos, Switzerland, Trump effectively climbed down from his earlier threats of using military force to acquire Greenland, yet he remained adamant about securing control of the world’s largest island, most of it buried beneath an ice sheet.
Seeking to curb Washington’s ambitions, major European countries, including the U.K., France and Germany, sent personnel to Greenland for joint military exercises, further inflaming tensions. Instead of behaving like long-standing partners, the U.S. and Europe are drifting into a semi-adversarial posture.
A “world without the West” is taking shape. That may sound like hyperbole, but the era in which the U.S.-European partnership sets the rules and others simply follow them has receded into history. After consecutive trips to Europe and the U.S. last December, I came away convinced the world is undergoing a drastic shift.
Since the end of World War II, the U.S. and Europe have worked in lockstep to build and steward the global order. The unraveling of that system marks a profound turning point in the postwar era.
Today’s transatlantic rift goes far beyond territorial disputes or strategic disagreements; it cuts to the heart of how each side sees the nation and the world itself.
If this were a human relationship, it would resemble a partnership in which differences in values have grown so deep that trust no longer binds the two sides. Conflicts of interest can be negotiated, but a clash of values is far harder to bridge. As a world sans the West takes shape, the resulting shockwaves could spread, leaving international politics even more unmoored. It is a trajectory that casts a long, unsettling shadow over the global future.
The National Security Strategy, released by the Trump administration on Dec. 5 to guide Pentagon policy, crystallized this divide. Its language toward Europe was so caustic that it no longer sounded as if Washington were addressing an ally.
The document argued, for example, that Europe’s traditional communities and values are being eroded by a rapid influx of immigrants. “Should present trends continue, the continent will be unrecognizable in 20 years or less,” it warned. It also cast doubt on the future of the alliance, asserting that “it is far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.”
With far-right and right-wing populist parties clearly in mind, the strategy went on to praise “the growing influence of patriotic European parties,” which it said “gives cause for great optimism” — a thinly veiled signal of Washington’s support.
Why does Trump harbor such deep hostility toward Europe today and attack it so relentlessly? According to foreign-policy experts and former U.S. officials familiar with the administration’s internal thinking, three primary factors are driving this stance.
First, the administration’s strategy aims to bring a swift end to Europe’s dependence on U.S. military power. The goal is to jolt Europe into accelerating its own defense self-reliance.
The second reason runs deeper. The Trump administration is fortifying U.S. borders through tighter immigration controls and higher tariffs, an effort to reinforce the basic architecture of the sovereign state. From Washington’s viewpoint, Europe is moving in the opposite direction, with individual nations weakening the very concept of sovereignty. The administration fears that continued immigration from the Middle East and Africa into Europe, and the resulting dilution of what they view as Europe’s Western civilizational core, will ultimately erode U.S. interests with serious consequences.
Third, Trump and his inner circle nurse a deep resentment of the European elites who, in their view, treated them with condescension during the first Trump term.
Viewed in this light, far-right and other parties advocating anti-immigration policies and fortified borders are natural allies.
“Trump’s team views the essence of a nation as its borders and sovereignty,” said Walter Russell Mead, a distinguished fellow at the Hudson Institute, a Washington-based think tank. “From this perspective, the European Union, an entity that blurs national borders and pushes political integration, appears to him as a project that dissolves real statehood.”
In the postwar era, shaped in part by the lessons of devastation, the EU pursued integration by lowering borders and enabling the free movement of people and goods. Successive U.S. administrations broadly endorsed this direction.
Trump’s team has upended that consensus, however, moving in a direction that directly repudiates the European model. Predictably, this has triggered fierce backlash across the continent. What angers European politicians and pundits most is Washington’s open encouragement of far-right and right-wing populist parties — forces they regard as existential threats to Europe’s values and political foundations. These parties typically champion anti-immigration and anti-EU agendas, and some carry a noticeable pro-Russian tilt.
“Trump sees Europe’s large-scale acceptance of migrants from the Islamic world as eroding the cultural foundations of Western civilization,” Mead said.
The rise of far-right populist movements across Europe has been striking. In Germany, Alternative for Germany, or AfD, surged to become the second-largest party in the February 2025 general election. In France, Jordan Bardella of the National Rally party now leads polling for the 2027 presidential race, while in the U.K., the hard-right Reform UK is posting record support, outpacing both the Conservative and Labour parties in many surveys.
For leaders in London, Berlin and Paris, a Trump administration that openly bolsters such forces looks less like an ally than a potential adversary. A Labour member of the British Parliament long known for his pro-American stance, captured this sentiment when he told me that, under Trump, the U.S. has shifted from an ally to a hostile nation.
As the Hudson Institute’s Mead said: “In Trump’s view, a Europe that weakens itself both politically and culturally becomes a less valuable ally and increases America’s strategic burden.”
For two days, ending Dec. 12, senior officials and policy experts from the U.S., Europe and other regions convened in the Romanian capital of Bucharest to discuss Ukraine’s future in a forum titled “Rebuilding Ukraine: Security, Opportunities, Investments,” organized by Romania’s New Strategy Center. Several European participants voiced serious concern about the implications of Washington’s changing strategic posture, with one remarking that the newly released National Security Strategy makes clear that Europe must speed up its drive for strategic self-reliance.
With Washington and Europe now embracing national and global worldviews as incompatible as oil and water, the transatlantic fissure is poised to widen this year. In the run-up to this autumn’s midterm elections, the Trump administration is expected to raise its border “walls” even higher and impose still stricter immigration controls.
Meanwhile, Britain, Germany, France and other major European nations face a series of pivotal elections between now and 2029. As far-right and right-wing populist parties continue to expand their influence, Europe’s sense of alarm over the Trump administration is almost certain to intensify.
Compounding the strain on U.S.-Europe relations is a growing divergence in their approaches to Russia. While European governments remain acutely aware that their security is at risk unless Russia’s invasion of Ukraine ends in failure, Trump views China — not Russia — as the primary geopolitical threat. Consequently, the White House has been advocating for a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine and is considering the possibility of improving ties with Moscow. The strategic trajectories of the U.S. and Europe are, in effect, moving in opposite directions.
If this schism continues to deepen, the consequences for Asia will be profound. Japan, Australia and South Korea have been pushing for closer alignment with NATO in response to the security challenges posed by China and Russia. Their strategy rests on the assumption that China and Russia’s accelerating military cooperation requires deeper, globe-spanning coordination with NATO to contain Beijing and Moscow and reinforce deterrence.
But if the divide widens, cooperation between NATO and the three U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific could begin to deteriorate. Russia and China, long wary of growing NATO-Asia coordination, would feel emboldened and act more aggressively, further destabilizing the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Strains in U.S.-India ties, caused by the Trump administration’s stance on Pakistan and tariff disputes, come as welcome news to China and Russia, which have been uneasy about the deepening partnership between Washington and New Delhi.
Preventing such an outcome makes it all the more urgent for Japan and other U.S. allies in Asia to sustain close coordination with both the U.S. and Europe.
America’s backyard war: Global lawlessness looms, aiding rival powers
America’s backyard war: Global lawlessness looms, aiding rival powers
Trump’s Venezuela strike may signal to Moscow and Beijing that force pays
Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
January 10, 2026
TOKYO — At first, U.S. President Donald Trump seemed genuinely intent on securing a place in history as a formidable peacemaker, remembered for a remarkable record of conflict resolution. Yet his Jan. 3 strike on Venezuela and the ensuing capture of its leader, Nicolas Maduro, leave little doubt that Trump can no longer restrain his contrary impulses and is veering toward a far more radical course.
For years, Maduro has suppressed human rights and dismantled democratic institutions under his authoritarian rule, triggering the exodus of millions of Venezuelans. Even within Western democracies, some voices have expressed tacit support for regime change in the South American nation. Still, it is unclear if Trump has a coherent strategy for how events should unfold in the months ahead.
Last December, I met with U.S. foreign policy and security experts familiar with the inner workings of the Trump administration to inquire about the objectives behind its escalating military pressure on Venezuela. Based on those discussions, Trump’s strategy appears set to unfold in two stages.
The first stage aims to expel “hostile forces,” perceived as threats to the U.S. mainland, from strategic locations such as Venezuela. This vision extends beyond the Maduro regime and criminal networks.
“Trump also sees China’s growing presence in Venezuela, which possesses the world’s largest proven oil reserves, as a serious concern,” said a security expert, speaking on condition of anonymity. China is already Venezuela’s largest purchaser of crude oil.
The second stage, as envisioned by the Trump White House, is to significantly weaken the regime in Cuba, which has long been defiant toward Washington. The administration believes that toppling the Maduro government, which maintains close ties with Havana and supplies it with heavily subsidized oil, would effectively isolate Cuba and erode its resilience.
China’s shadow also looms over Washington’s intensified pressure on Cuba. Intelligence suggests that Beijing has established surveillance facilities on the island, a concern that first gained traction during the previous Joe Biden administration and has since grown more acute.
At the same time, Trump is seeking to curb Chinese influence in other strategic zones, including the Panama Canal and Greenland, as part of a broader effort to assert U.S. dominance across the Western Hemisphere.
These strategic imperatives did not emerge in a vacuum; they were already articulated in the U.S. National Security Strategy released last December. Nevertheless, seizing a sovereign nation’s leader by force, along with the potential installation of a U.S.-backed interim administration, defies the imagination of any reasonable observer.
Trump has justified the operation by citing Maduro’s alleged role in trafficking narcotics into the U.S. But that rationale appears tenuous.
“Venezuela is not a major drug-producing country, and much of the narcotics transiting through its territory are bound for Europe,” said another security expert.
The U.S. intervention in Venezuela carries a profound risk: It may accelerate the erosion of international legal norms and push the world closer to a state of lawlessness. At least two dangers stand out.
First, it lends dangerous momentum to the notion that the world’s great powers are entitled to intervene militarily in other sovereign states. Many observers argue that Trump’s action constitutes a clear violation of international law and the United Nations Charter, which forbids the use of force without Security Council authorization or a legitimate self-defense justification. Though Trump asserts he is acting to avert a third world war, his moves might instead be hastening it.
Of particular concern is how this precedent may shape the behavior of China and Russia, both of which have reacted sharply to the U.S. assault on their ally Venezuela. The overthrow of the Maduro regime would entail significant practical losses for China and Russia, which have security and economic interests in the country. While their outrage seems genuine, it also likely masks a calculated expectation of medium-term strategic benefits.
If the U.S. claims the right to intervene militarily in its “backyard” to defend national interests, then Beijing and Moscow may feel emboldened to assert the same prerogative in their respective spheres of influence. It is not hard to imagine Russian President Vladimir Putin seizing on Washington’s actions as propaganda fodder, justifying the invasion of Ukraine with the same rhetoric of national interest and historical precedent.
Beijing could similarly rely on this logic to justify its aggression. China asserts sweeping claims over the South China Sea and regards the Taiwan Strait as part of its “backyard”. There is growing concern that it could escalate its use of force to obstruct the passage of foreign naval vessels in these contested waters.
The second concern is that the recent strategic tilt toward the Americas could dilute U.S. strategic focus and overstretch its defense commitments in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.
Over the past two decades, the U.S. has failed in its attempts to build pro-American regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq following its invasions. This failure has severely eroded U.S. credibility, leaving both Afghanistan and much of the Middle East mired in instability and conflict.
To avoid this failure, the Trump administration intends not to be directly involved in Venezuela’s national reconstruction, but rather to remotely control it by using the remaining forces. But, key figures in the pro-Maduro government and military remain entrenched, and the country harbors numerous anti-American guerrilla groups. Dismantling the Maduro regime may prove far easier than establishing a stable successor government.
For 20 years, as Washington was absorbed by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it failed to craft a coherent strategy to counter China’s rise. In that vacuum, Beijing accelerated its military modernization, and the strategic balance in Asia has shifted decisively in its favor.
Against this backdrop, Trump condemned the Iraq invasion in February 2016. “Going into Iraq, it may have been the worst decision anybody has made, any president has made, in the history of this country,” said the then-Republican presidential candidate at a CNN town hall event. Although the situation differs from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, if the Trump administration’s security and diplomatic energy is consumed by the Americas, it will be unable to devote sufficient focus to its China strategy, ultimately risking a “new lost era” for that strategy.
How, then, should responsible powers respond to rising geopolitical risks? The most urgent task is for key U.S. allies, including Japan, European partners, South Korea and Australia, to coordinate their efforts to contain the spread of global disorder.
First, these nations must work to prevent emerging and developing countries from drifting en masse toward blocs led by China and Russia, such as BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. To do so, Western democracies must offer compelling alternatives — trade frameworks, technology and climate policy that deliver tangible benefits to the countries of the Global South.
“Japan and other U.S. allies should lessen strategic reliance on Washington by prioritizing intelligence sharing and defense-industrial cooperation, while building stronger regional partnerships and sustaining support for Ukraine,” said Giulio Pugliese, director of the EU-Asia Project at the European University Institute. “Even as these allies shift their strategic focus to their own theaters, coordinated action — including in diplomacy — among like-minded partners will be an important factor to preserving a rules-based order despite U.S. structural power.”
Moreover, to safeguard stability in both the Indo-Pacific and Europe, U.S. allies and like-minded nations must deepen security and economic ties. Expanding joint military exercises and interoperability will be essential to strengthening broad-based cooperation and partnership as well as promoting free trade. Emma Chanlett-Avery, deputy director of the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Washington, D.C. office and the director for political-security affairs told Nikkei, “Japan should deepen bilateral ties with partners like South Korea, Australia and Europe, while taking a more proactive role in multilateral frameworks such as the Quad, G7 and G20. Priorities include advancing security agreements, strengthening defense collaboration, and expanding trade networks through CPTPP and RCEP.”
In the 1930s, the collapse of the rules-based international order had catastrophic consequences, culminating in World War II. We cannot afford to repeat the same mistake.
How a US war in its ‘backyard’ could unsettle Asian security
How a US war in its ‘backyard’ could unsettle Asian security
As priorities shift, Washington may struggle to contain China
Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
November 8, 2025

U.S. President Donald Trump’s shift in defense focus to the country’s “backyard,” particularly the Caribbean, could potentially upend Asia’s security order. (Nikkei montage/Source photos by Reuters)
TOKYO — Rarely do events in the faraway Caribbean send ripples across Asia’s security landscape. Yet beneath those turquoise waters, an unlikely development is unfolding — one that demands serious attention.
Late last month, U.S. President Donald Trump visited Japan and South Korea on an Asian tour, reaffirming the strength of the alliances with the key partners in the region. A sense of relief spread through Tokyo and Seoul, but the future of U.S. military engagement in Asia remains uncertain. Optimism would be premature.
Meanwhile, in what Washington has long regarded as its own “backyard,” the Caribbean — and even parts of the Pacific — the Trump administration is militarizing its counter-narcotics policy like never before. Targeting Latin American drug cartels accused of funneling narcotics into the U.S., it has deployed military assets and conducted more than 10 airstrikes on vessels suspected of trafficking drugs, reportedly killing dozens.
To justify its “war on drugs,” the U.S. government has claimed the targeted vessels were transporting illegal narcotics, yet it has provided no clear evidence to support the allegation. Several American experts in international law have warned that such strikes may violate established legal norms.
Cracking down on drug smuggling is the sovereign right of any nation. What makes Trump’s approach perilous is his shift from law enforcement to a military campaign, one that could escalate into open conflict with Venezuela’s anti-U.S. government under President Nicolas Maduro, all under the pretext of narcotics control.
Trump has already authorized the CIA to conduct covert operations inside Venezuela, and on two occasions in October publicly declared that he might even launch a ground assault on the country.
This may not be mere bluster. According to the Washington think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, by Oct. 27, the U.S. military had moved five surface combat ships, three amphibious assault vessels and one submarine into the Caribbean.
Some analysts estimate that more than 10% of the U.S. Navy’s globally deployed forces are now concentrated in the region. The Trump administration has also announced that the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group will deploy to the Caribbean. The cutting-edge flattop, previously active in the Mediterranean, is expected to arrive off the coasts of Central and South America this month.
Military experts in the U.S. point out Washington has not dispatched such a large force to the area since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the tense 13-day standoff between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. The current buildup even surpasses the U.S. deployment during the 1983 invasion of Grenada.
For U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia, there is growing anxiety that a U.S. military entanglement in a “backyard war” with Venezuela could carry serious security repercussions for Asia.

Even as the world’s preeminent naval power, the U.S. faces clear limits. Of its 11 prized aircraft carriers, roughly two-thirds are typically tied up in training or maintenance, leaving only about three available for deployment at any given time.
The military balance in Asia, meanwhile, is already tilting toward China. The Chinese navy now fields more than 370 surface combatant ships and submarines, outnumbering the U.S. Navy in sheer vessel count.
Elbridge Colby, U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy and one of the principal architects of Washington’s defense strategy, has long contended that countering China’s expanding power will require scaling back America’s military commitments in Europe. If that proves true, Washington would have limited capacity to deepen its engagement in the Caribbean while preserving deterrence against China.
For Japan and South Korea, which are both confronting nuclear threats from China and North Korea, this prospect is nothing short of alarming. During a closed-door Japan-South Korea dialogue held in Seoul on Oct. 22 and 23 by the Japan Institute of International Affairs and a South Korean government-affiliated think tank, participants discussed the risks posed by a diminishing U.S. military presence in Asia.
How far does the Trump administration intend to maintain its defensive line in Asia? And what options would Japan and South Korea have if U.S. forces were to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula? Such questions surfaced during the discussions, even extending to the sensitive issue of whether nuclear options should be considered.
Ultimately, the U.S. and Venezuela may avoid a full-scale war, reaching a settlement in which the Maduro regime pledges to strengthen anti-narcotics measures. Alternatively, a political change in Venezuela that replaces the Maduro administration might help avoid war. Even if that is the case, Trump’s extensive naval deployment to the Caribbean would send a stark warning to U.S. allies: Trump’s fixation on “American First” extends beyond trade to the very core of U.S. military strategy.
In the early 19th century, President James Monroe declared the U.S. would steer clear of global entanglements, focusing on its backyard in the Western Hemisphere. This policy became known as the Monroe Doctrine. Some analysts have described Trump’s approach as a “new Monroeism,” though it remains unclear whether it rests on any coherent strategic framework.
Even so, there is little doubt that Trump’s instincts echo elements of Monroeism. In that sense, Washington’s aggressive posture in the Caribbean is both a source of the problem and, arguably, an inevitable consequence of those very instincts. U.S. allies in Europe and Asia should prepare for the possibility that American military presence in their regions could wane.
According to Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington appears to be pursuing three separate security strategies at once.
“The Trump administration is following three strategies simultaneously: a spheres of influence approach, prioritization of the China challenge, and retrenchment to the Americas,” Cooper said. “These do not meld together easily.”
Cooper observes that reconciling these conflicting directions is inherently difficult and could destabilize U.S. military engagement worldwide.
“As the military balance shifts towards China, the cost of defending Taiwan is rising,” Cooper said. “I worry that some Americans are rethinking whether defending Taiwan is worth the risk, and increasingly considering an offshore balancing strategy.”
Trump’s Asian tour wrapped up without incident. But for U.S. allies, the moment for vigilance is far from over.
