Category: News Room

Carl Bildt adds that Ukraine accession to alliance is a question of ‘when, not if’.

TOKYO — Sweden’s successful bid to join NATO will increase cooperation between the EU and the military alliance, the country’s former Prime Minister Carl Bildt said in an interview during a trip to Tokyo.

Bildt spoke to Nikkei while he was in Japan after visiting Kyiv in late February to mark the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

“They are very determined to continue to fight,” he said of the political leaders and soldiers he met in the Ukrainian capital.

While some analysts have pointed to “Ukraine fatigue” growing in some Western countries over the prolonged conflict, Bildt said, “I don’t see any Ukraine fatigue in Europe, really.”

“There’s a lot of determination to do whatever we can in order to support Ukraine,” he said.

Sweden’s NATO membership was approved by Hungary’s parliament on Monday, the last hurdle to membership. With the addition of Finland, which had also maintained a neutral stance, security cooperation between the West and the Baltic Sea area will be strengthened.

The joining of Sweden and Finland “gives a new strategic depth to the north of Europe and increases the defense potential of the three Baltic States,” Bildt said.

Bildt commented on Sweden’s ability to help deter Russia, including plans to send a battalion to Latvia. “While Sweden in the past, our defense has been sort of purely national within our borders…now it’s going to be within a broader framework,” he said.

In his annual address to the Federal Assembly on Thursday, Russian President Vladimir Putin said, “We need to shore up the forces in the western strategic theatre in order to counteract the threats posed by NATO’s further eastward expansion, with Sweden and Finland joining the alliance.”

Some analysts have warned that expanding NATO could provoke Russia. Bildt rejected this, saying, “This war is also going to weaken Russia for quite some time to come.”

“Their army has taken a lot of casualties and a lot of losses,” he added. “So, we are going to deal with a militarily significantly weaker Russia for quite some time to come.”

He said Sweden and Finland joining NATO was “a significant strategic setback” for Putin.

French President Emmanuel Macron said on Monday that nothing should be ruled out concerning a future deployment of troops to Ukraine.

“I don’t know what happened,” Bildt said of Macron’s comments. “I think that was profound misunderstanding and miscommunication on that issue, because I mean, that issue has never been on the agenda,” he added, indicating that mobilizing troops was not Europe’s consensus.

Regarding Ukraine’s potential addition to NATO, Bildt acknowledged some hesitation in the U.S. as the November election approaches, but said Ukraine’s accession was “a question of when, not if.”

Ukraine has also applied to join the European Union. Concerning the timing, Bildt said that if the political will is there, “within five years should be possible.”

He also spoke about the challenges that would come should Donald Trump win a second presidential term in the U.S.

“I think the biggest danger is to the Americans themselves, that they will have a presidency concentrated on domestic revenge,” he said.

Pointing specifically to Trump’s efforts to overturn the results of the 2020 election, Bildt said, “If you listen to what he says in his speeches and his interviews, it’s all about backward-looking things.”

Regarding a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Bildt said that while he doesn’t see any big risk for now, “things could change.”

“We will see what the new president [of Taiwan Lai Ching-te] says when he has his inauguration speech in May,” he said, adding that “Beijing’s reaction in this election has been fairly muted, which is a good sign.”

While Europe faces challenges regarding relations with China in areas like economic and trade competition, as well as human rights in Hong Kong, Bildt said there is a need to build a constructive relationship with China on things like climate change and artificial intelligence.

Read the article on the website of NIkkei Asia

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Sweden-joining-NATO-bolsters-Northern-Europe-s-defense-ex-PM-says

Politics is often messy, but it’s how society puts a value on things economists can’t measure

Even as the United States took its place as the world’s preeminent economic power after World War II, manufacturing firms fled towns in the Northeast and Midwest, leaving behind rusting steel mills and scarred communities. Society as a whole became richer as new industries sprang up elsewhere, but many rust belt communities are still dealing with the consequences of deindustrialization.

The US postwar economic transformation is one example of how policies and trends that increase aggregate social welfare can have painful distributional effects: they beget winners and losers. This makes them controversial. Controversy is no reason to avoid an economic policy, especially if the policy makes society substantially better-off. Policymakers often struggle to persuade the public to accept economic policies that improve well-being. To make them more palatable to the public, policymakers must recognize that policies and trends take place in a broader social and political environment. It is vital that policies gain the acceptance of important social and political actors.

Economics is good at identifying policies that could raise aggregate social welfare. One such policy is free trade. Virtually all economists believe that most economies could be improved by removing barriers to trade. No sensible economist or policymaker pretends that this is costless: while consumers and exporters may benefit, firms and industries that have trouble competing with imports are likely to suffer.

There is a simple economic solution. If a social-welfare-improving policy creates losers, the benefits it generates for society can be used to compensate those harmed. The government can tax those advantaged by trade liberalization—exporters, consumers—to help those disadvantaged, autoworkers for instance. Since by definition the policy increases social welfare, spreading the gains will still leave society better-off, only in a more equitable fashion than if we simply left newly unemployed autoworkers to fend for themselves.

Compensation’s problems

Compensation may be simple and powerful in theory, but it’s not easy in practice. Those who gain from a new policy—such as consumers and exporters when trade is liberalized—are rarely enthusiastic about having some of their gains taxed away. Compensation can be costly and politically difficult, which is why it happens far less frequently than economists would recommend.

Compensation can be difficult for other, more complex, reasons. One is timing: in some cases the appropriate measure would be for one generation to compensate another. For instance, there might be a certain equity, as well as mutual benefit, in asking future generations to contribute to the society of 2024 if the latter bore the cost of tackling climate change—for example, to address jobs lost to the green transition. But how do we get “the future” to pay up? One way would be for the government to borrow and let the debt-service payments fall on future generations. Sensible as this may be in practice, it risks the prospect of debt burdens that are not sustainable. Indeed, it is hardly in a country’s long-term interest to tempt current legislatures to bankrupt governments of the future, and financial markets may not let them—they may be unwilling to fund debts they consider excessive.

Another problem with compensation is that it’s often unclear exactly who will be helped and harmed by a policy. There is almost always uncertainty about how a complex economy will react to change. Economists may have faith in their models, but workers and managers may be less confident in their predictions. The danger of subjecting constituents to unknown risks can make legislators wary of battling for one policy or another.

A related obstacle to compensation is lack of credibility. Governments can promise to make things right for those who may be harmed by, say, freer trade or climate policy. But, at least in democratic countries, governments change. Newly elected officials, often having attained office by criticizing their predecessors, are not always keen to maintain their predecessors’ policies. Many administrations don’t even keep their own promises, let alone those of others. In a world where both outcomes and government policies can vary, those who think they might be affected have plenty of reasons to be cautious.

The most serious reservations about compensation may be noneconomic. Economic analysis focuses on the purely material or pecuniary impact of policies and trends, and of eventual compensation. People, though, may be concerned about less clearly material impacts that are hard to put a price on.

For instance, trade liberalization has contributed to the decline of traditional manufacturing in the US industrial belt—as well as in the north of England, northern France, eastern Germany, and other formerly industrial areas. When the jobs go, there is clearly an economic cost, in lost jobs, wages, tax revenue, and general economic activity.

Distressed regions

But distressed regions may lose something just as real, though less tangible, as well-paying jobs. A small city or town whose factories close can enter a downward socioeconomic spiral: incomes decline, property values and property taxes plummet, local services suffer, and the community’s social fabric unravels. This was the prelude to an epidemic of “deaths of despair” by alcoholism, drug abuse, and suicide (Case and Deaton 2020). Even when the impact is not so acute, when Main Street goes dark, the quality of life—for everyone in town—suffers. The collapse of a stable economic base undermines the foundations of the community (Broz, Frieden, and Weymouth 2021).

A common remedy is to encourage those left without work to move to places where jobs are available. This can be difficult or impossible for economic reasons, since those wanting to move from depressed areas are often saddled with plummeting home values. Residents may be reluctant to move for nonpecuniary reasons, too. They may have family and extended family in the area, decades of friends and neighbors, and attachments to local traditions. Depressed or not, it’s what they know, and it’s home.

The deterioration of coal mining regions illustrates the problem. The coal industry has been declining for years because of both environmental concerns and technological change—and more recently, of course, climate policies. Its decline has devastated entire areas—and not just the coal miners (Blonz, Tran, and Troland 2023). Many coal mining communities were isolated, and few were economically diversified, so once the decline set in there was little to break their fall. One World Bank study found that of 222 Appalachian coal counties, only four had managed to remain “economically viable” (Lobao and others 2021). East and West coast city dwellers may be scarcely aware of them, yet millions of people lived in coal counties, often in tight-knit towns where families had lived for generations bound by social, cultural, and religious ties.

The cost of leaving your family’s historical community is not solely monetary—it means giving up all those personal ties. And there’s no point in asking people what it would take for them to leave: each person’s decision depends on the decisions of others. Why stay if everyone is leaving? Why leave if everyone is staying? And the future of the community may depend on whether its members stay together—and at least preserve the hope of forging a more promising future.

In this context, how can society weigh the consumer benefits of cheaper clothing or cars against the human costs of the collapse of cities and towns in Ohio, the Meuse Valley, or south Yorkshire? Some of these costs are certainly economic and might be suitable for monetary compensation. But some are noneconomic, with a value impossible to establish with any precision. How do you put a price on membership in a close-knit multigenerational community?

Politics as a measure

Society does, in fact, have a way to try to establish the relative importance of these difficult-to-measure values: politics. When we debate the merits of free trade versus local factories, or of coal and oil versus wind and sun, we are implicitly or explicitly discussing how heavily to weight the interests of consumers and producers, the harmed and the helped, current and future generations.

Most studies of trade politics, for example, show that elected officials are more likely to protect (with tariffs and other trade barriers) industries with low-wage workers than industries dominated by high-wage workers. There may be many reasons for this tendency; one reason is almost certainly that people have more sympathy for displaced low-wage workers. In another context, city dwellers who have never lived on a farm appear willing to pay more for their food in order to help sustain family farmers, largely out of a wistful attachment to and sympathy for the rural way of life.

Trade protection or farm subsidies may make political, if not economic, sense—and thus be entirely defensible. The political process weighs people’s values, including those that are hard to price. In this balance, caring deeply about something counts more than caring only a little—so it matters that consumers may care only a little about the price of toys, whereas the residents of a factory town may care a great deal about the cohesion of their community. In the political arena, intensely held views matter more than those that are held only lightly—and that is probably as it should be.

Politics is the mechanism by which societies make difficult choices among things that are often hard to compare. The choices are rarely perfect, and they are usually contentious. But this is how modern societies assess the value citizens place on their own values. It is in the political arena that people get to balance, say, the viability of a small town against the benefits to shoppers of cheaper clothing. Economic growth and progress matter a lot, but people care about other things too, and those other cares deserve consideration.

Oscar Wilde wrote of those who know the price of everything but the value of nothing. It would be fairer and more accurate—and more useful—to note that economists are able to put a price on many things, but not on everything of value. Democratic politics may not give us a universally accepted sense of the value of priceless things—such as community, culture, and family. But it can tell us something about how members of society feel about these things and how they weigh them against each other.

Read this article on the website of the IMF

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2024/03/A-Place-for-Politics-Jeffry-Frieden

Investopia conference draws thousands to Abu Dhabi’s Saadiyat Island, including fund managers who handle more than $500 billion in assets.

ABU DHABI, United Arab Emirates – Kicking off the UAE’s annual Investopia conference on Wednesday, Mubadala chief Khaldoon Al Mubarak pointed to the more active stance that the country’s sovereign wealth funds are taking in the global investment landscape.

“Sovereign funds now have the responsibility and opportunity to go from asset allocators to enablers of global progress,” the Managing Director and Group CEO of Abu Dhabi’s second-largest sovereign wealth fund said. Al Mubarak noted that the emirate’s sovereign funds — Mubadala, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and ADQ — are among the world’s top 10 most active sovereign investors in 2023, which he said, “speaks to the momentum that is building over here.”

Mubadala plans to invest more in the U.S. and has increased its long-term allocations for Asia “in line with megatrends and demographics, including “Japan, China, Korea and, of course, India,” Al Mubarak said.

On the domestic front, UAE Minister of Economy Abdulla bin Touq said in his opening remarks that the ministry is working to better integrate the seven disparate emirates that make up the country. “In the UAE, each emirate has its own strength. We’re now working to enable those emirates to integrate and complement each other to build economic clusters that supercharge the whole economy.”

Thousands of investors have flocked to the third edition of Investopia, a marquee event for the government’s “Projects of the 50” initiative, first announced in 2021. The UAE aims to build the world’s most innovative economy in collaboration with the global investment community. Funds that manage a total of more than $500 billion in assets are attending, according to organizers.

Slated to speak during the two-day conference are Adam Goldstein, Founder and CEO of aviation startup Archer; Eric Cantor, General Manager and Vice Chairman of Moelis; Antonio González, Founder and CEO of Sunset Hospitality Group; Nathan Sheets, Global Chief Economist at Citi; Giorgio Furlani, CEO of AC Milan; Ulrike Hoffmann-Burchardi, Head of CIO Equities at UBS and Gabrielle Rubenstein, Co-Founder and Managing Partner of Manna Tree.

Read this article on the website of The Circuit

https://circuit.news/2024/02/28/mubadalas-al-mubarak-says-sovereign-funds-taking-the-lead/

The alliance’s expansion, with Finland last year and soon Sweden, was a consequence from the invasion of Ukraine that Russia’s president may not have calculated.

BERLIN — Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine two years ago was an enormous shock to Europeans. Used to 30 years of post-Cold War peace, they had imagined European security would be built alongside a more democratic Russia, not reconstructed against a revisionist imperial war machine.

There was no bigger shock than in Finland, with its long border and historical tension with Russia, and in Sweden, which had dismantled 90 percent of its army and 70 percent of its air force and navy in the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

After the decision by Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin, to try to destroy a sovereign neighbor, both Finland and Sweden rapidly decided to apply to join the NATO alliance, the only clear guarantee of collective defense against a newly aggressive and reckless Russia.

With Finland having joined last year, and the Hungarian Parliament finally approving Sweden’s application on Monday, Mr. Putin now finds himself faced with an enlarged and motivated NATO, one that is no longer dreaming of a permanent peace.

As NATO countries look with some trepidation at the possibility that the unpredictable Donald J. Trump, no fan of the alliance, may become U.S. president again, its European members are taking measures to ensure their own defenses regardless.

Critics consider their actions to be too slow and too small, but NATO is spending more money on defense, making more tanks, artillery shells, drones and jet fighters, putting more troops on Russia’s borders and approving more serious military plans for any potential war — while funneling billions of dollars into Ukraine’s efforts to blunt Russia’s ambitions.

The reason is sheer deterrence. Some member states already suggest that if Mr. Putin succeeds in Ukraine, he will test NATO’s collective will in the next three to five years.

If Mr. Trump is elected and casts serious doubt on the commitment of the United States to come to the defense of NATO allies, “that might tip the scales for Putin to test NATO’s resolve,” said Robert Dalsjo, director of studies at the Swedish Defense Research Agency.

Even now, Mr. Dalsjo said, Mr. Trump or not, Europe must prepare for at least a generation of heightened European containment and deterrence of a Russia becoming militarized, and where Mr. Putin clearly “has considerable public support for his aggressive revanchism.”

Still, with Hungary finally voting for Sweden’s accession to NATO, at last the pieces are falling into place for a sharply enhanced NATO deterrent in the Baltic and North Seas, with greater protection for the frontline states of Finland, Norway and the Baltic nations, which border Russia.

Once Hungary hands in a letter certifying parliamentary approval to the U.S. State Department, Sweden will become the 32nd member of NATO, and all the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea, with the exception of Russia, will be part of the alliance.

“Sweden brings predictability, removing any uncertainty about how we would act in a crisis or a war,” Mr. Dalsjo said. Given Sweden’s geography, including Gotland, the island that helps control the entrance to the Baltic Sea, membership “will make defense and deterrence much easier to accomplish,” he said.

It was Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine two years ago that pushed Finland into deciding to join NATO, and Helsinki pulled a somewhat more reluctant Sweden into applying to join as well.

Finland, with its long border with Russia, saw the most imminent danger; the Swedes did too, but were also convinced, especially on the political left, by a sense of moral outrage that Russia, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, would seek to destroy a peaceful, sovereign neighbor.

“Overall the feeling is that we’ll be safer,” said Anna Wieslander, a Swede who is director for northern Europe for the Atlantic Council.

History mattered, too, said Mr. Dalsjo. “If Finland joined we had to — we could not be a wall between Finland and its helpers in the West one more time,” as neutral Sweden had been during Finland’s brave but losing “Winter War” against the Soviet Union in 1939, when Finland had to cede some 11 percent of its territory to Moscow.

With Sweden and Finland together in NATO, it will be much easier to bottle up the Russian surface navy in the Baltic Sea and to monitor the High North. Russia still has up to two-thirds of its second-strike nuclear weapons there, based on the Kola Peninsula.

So the new members will help provide enhanced monitoring of a crucial part of Russia’s military, said Niklas Granholm, the deputy director of studies at the Defense Research Agency.

Russia’s fleet in Kaliningrad, on the Baltic Sea between Poland and Lithuania, is only 200 miles away, and so are its Iskander nuclear-capable missiles. NATO planners have long worried about how to support the Baltic nations if Russia seized the 40-mile “Suwalki Gap” between Kaliningrad and Belarus, but Sweden’s position straddling both the North and Baltic Seas would make it much easier to send NATO reinforcements.

Russia will still retain its land-based missiles, of course, but its nuclear-armed submarines may find it more difficult to maneuver out into the open sea without detection.

Sweden, with its own advanced high-tech defense industry, makes its own excellent fighter planes, naval corvettes and submarines, designed to operate in the difficult environment of the Baltic Sea. It has already begun to develop and build a new class of modern submarines and larger corvettes for coastal and air defense.

With NATO membership, it will be easier now to coordinate with Finland and Denmark, which also have key islands in the Baltic Sea, and with Norway.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Stockholm decided that war was a thing of the past. It removed nearly all of its forces from Gotland, and reduced the national army by around 90 percent and the navy and air force by about 70 percent.

The forces are slowly being restored, and spending on the military, which was close to 3 percent of gross domestic product during the Cold War but sank to about 1 percent, this year will reach 2 percent, the current NATO standard. “These investments will take time, and we need to move faster,” Mr. Granholm said.

Sweden may also join NATO’s multinational enhanced forward brigade in Latvia, intended to put allied troops in all the alliance countries bordering Russia.

Sweden’s main tasks, Ms. Wieslander said, will be to help guard the Baltic Sea and the airspace over Kaliningrad; to ensure the security of Gothenburg, which is key for resupply and reinforcements; and to serve as a staging area for American and NATO troops, with agreements for the advance positioning of equipment, ammunition, supplies and field hospitals.

For both Finland and Sweden, membership is the end of a long 30-year process of what Mr. Dalsjo called “our long goodbye to neutrality.” First came the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decision to join the European Union, which meant dropping neutrality for what both countries called “military nonalignment.”

Sweden, which had quiet defense guarantees from the United States, gradually became more explicitly Atlanticist and integrated more and more with NATO, he said. “And now we take the final step.”

Sweden will need to adapt its strategic culture to working within an alliance, Ms. Wieslander said. “It will be a big difference for us, and allies will expect Sweden to show some leadership.”

Like Finland, Sweden will need to integrate its forces into NATO and develop new capabilities for collective defense rather than concentrating solely on defending the homeland.

“It’s a steep learning curve,” said Mr. Granholm. “We don’t yet have the full picture of NATO’s regional plans,” but will now as a full member. “Then we need to sink our teeth into what NATO wants us to do, and what we want to do. We are doing this to protect ourselves, after all.”

Read the article on the website of The New York Times

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/26/world/europe/nato-sweden-ukraine-russia.html

Devant la crise politique et institutionnelle que traverse son pays, l’ancienne première ministre de Macky Sall en 2013, Aminata Touré, revient sur une société prête à résister malgré les arrestations arbitraires. Elle appelle la France à bien réfléchir aux conséquences de ses actes.

Le 2 avril, le mandat de Macky Sall se terminera. Le Conseil constitutionnel lui impose d’organiser le scrutin présidentiel « dans les meilleurs délais ». Le chef de l’État devait prendre la parole ce jeudi soir lors d’un entretien accordé à trois médias sénégalais, dont la Radio Télévision sénégalaise (RTS, publique). L’occasion de dire quels sont ses plans après avoir repoussé l’élection présidentielle prévue le 25 février. Les Sénégalais attendent de pouvoir « tourner la page », comme l’affirme l’ancienne première ministre Aminata Touré.

Un quatrième étudiant est mort à la suite des manifestations du 10 février contre le report de l’élection. Que cela révèle-t-il de la situation du pays ?

C’est d’abord un sentiment profond de tristesse, doublé d’indignation. Cela résume l’état du pays depuis environ deux ans : une violence exercée sur les Sénégalais dans beaucoup de domaines. J’ai moi-même été expulsée de l’Assemblée nationale sur son ordre. Ousmane Sonko (leader du Pastef, les Patriotes africains du Sénégal pour le travail, l’éthique et la fraternité, opposant à Macky Sall – NDLR) est en prison et interdit de participer aux élections. Le candidat que je soutiens aujourd’hui, Bassirou Diomaye Faye, est lui aussi en prison. Ma candidature a été écartée sous un prétexte fallacieux. Le Sénégal est une démocratie que Macky Sall a fait dérailler de son seul fait, car les forces démocratiques se battent.

The writer is co-founder of GlassView and co-author of ‘Le Capitalisme contre les inégalités’

In its latest annual report, Nvidia, the main provider of semiconductors for artificial intelligence, did not even bother reporting its revenues in Europe. This is suggestive of a wider trend. Today, investment in tech research and development in Europe is only one-fifth of what it is in the US, and half that in China. Investment in AI is around 50 times higher in the US than in Europe. European tech is falling behind its competitors at an alarming rate. How did we get here? The recent wave of tech lay-offs offers insights into some of the key structural weaknesses of the European model. Restructuring in Europe takes much longer and costs much more than in the US, which impedes investment in AI. In the US, Microsoft laid off 10,000 employees in January 2023, and reported severance costs of $800mn, or $80,000 a head. The restructuring costs amount to 5.9 months of the median pay. Oliver Coste, a tech entrepreneur, and I found that the corresponding figures were 4.2 months for Meta, 7.5 months for Google and only three months for Twitter. Powerful brakes facilitate powerful re-acceleration. The groundbreaking success of ChatGPT triggered immediate reactions. Microsoft streamlined its workforce and invested $10bn in OpenAI and more in its own AI infrastructure. Meta paused its efforts on the metaverse, laid off 20,000 employees within a few months and boosted its investments in AI to $37bn this year. Challenged in its dominance in search, Google stopped major projects, laid off 12,000 employees and accelerated on AI by ramping up its R&D investments to $45bn in 2023. In Europe, the three tech leaders — Nokia, SAP and Ericsson — also announced restructuring plans. While a sharp decline in sales last year for Nokia, the largest European investor in tech, required immediate action, it will take the company until 2026 to implement its plan due to labour regulations in Germany, France and Finland. SAP, Europe’s software leader, cannot react much faster and, at the same time, can only invest in AI at a rate of €500mn a year, compared with the tens of billions being invested by each of the so-called Magnificent Seven. The complexity of restructuring in Germany, for instance, can be illustrated by the two-year plan announced in October by Volkswagen. The carmaker said the plan still requires approval from its works council, which has guaranteed jobs for workers until the middle of 2025. Restructuring matters more in tech than in any other sector. Why? Simply because frontier-tech investments are riskier. It is not uncommon to see failure rates of 80 per cent. The consequences are profound. As Coste shows in his book Europe, Tech and War, investments that are deemed profitable in the US don’t make the cut in Europe, precisely because of the lack of cheap and swift restructuring capabilities at large companies. At a more macro level, this diagnosis is confirmed by a McKinsey study which shows that large European companies are much less profitable than their American counterparts, and that 90 per cent of that gap can be attributed to technology-creating industries. Tech is unpredictable, disruptive and volatile. With higher severance costs and longer delays, the costs of adaptation in Europe are about 10 times higher than in the US. After decades of greater agility, American companies have the financial means to invest in AI; European companies simply can’t compare. AI is powering the current industrial revolution, just like the steam engine in the 19th century and the internal combustion engine in the 20th. Global investment in AI infrastructure is forecast to reach around $150bn in 2024, primarily driven by the US and China. In Europe, by contrast, we have been able to identify just a couple of billion dollars-worth of investment, by both tech leaders and start-ups. This shortfall cannot be allowed to continue. Other factors can explain European difficulties in tech — market integration, market size, funding, regulation and even culture. Yet none of these factors seems to have prevented the emergence of European leaders in mature, lower-risk industries such as automobiles or aeronautics. We are facing a tech-specific problem that will quickly permeate all sectors if we are not careful. A solution that does not threaten the European social model, and which could be highly effective, would be to reform employment protection laws for salaries above a high threshold. That, more than anything else, could help bring Europe back to the forefront of innovation.

Read the article on the website of the Financial Times

https://www.ft.com/content/d4fda2ec-91cd-4a13-a058-e6718ec38dd1

The head of the government, Edi Rama, has started an official visit to Ankara, where he was welcomed  with a state ceremony by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

During his stay, Rama signed several agreements with the Turkish president, Erdogan.

Agreements and Memorandums signed today within the framework of further strengthening of cooperation between Albania and Turkey:

1. Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Tourism and Environment of the Republic of Albania and the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change of the Republic of Turkey for cooperation in the field of environment.
2. Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Tourism and Environment of the Republic of Albania and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of the Republic of Turkey for the sustainable management of forests and protected areas.
3. Agreement between the Prime Minister of Republic of Albania and the Government of the Republic of Turkey on the status of the coordination office of the TIKA Tirana program.
4. Agreement within the military framework between the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania and the Government of the Republic of Turkey.
5. Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Republic of Albania and the Government of the Republic of Turkey in the Media and Communication Fields for communication and public information.
6. Cooperation Protocol between the Turkish Radio Television Corporation and Albanian Radio Television.

Read the article originally published by Euronews

Edi Rama in Turkey, signs several agreements with Erdogan

WARSAW — 

The European Union on Tuesday welcomed Poland’s plan to “restore the rule of law” and dismantle policies by the former nationalist government which led to the freezing of billions of euros in EU funds due to concerns over judicial independence.

Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, which ruled for eight years, carried out a deep overhaul of the judiciary which the EU said damaged democratic checks and balances and brought courts under political influence.

As a result, the European Commission held back billions of euros in funds earmarked for Poland.

EU commissioners said the plan by the new pro-EU government, in power since last December, and which involves several bills rolling back PiS reforms, was well received.

“This was very impressive for the Commission to listen to so many positive comments around the table… the reactions are very positive,” European Union Justice Commissioner Didier Reynders told reporters.

The deputy head of the European Commission, Vera Jourova, called the action plan “realistic”.

Poland’s new prime minister, Donald Tusk, has vowed to restore judicial independence and get the funds released. But he faces resistance from PiS supporters and allies, who include President Andrzej Duda and some high-profile judges.

“I think that the very positive reaction from the member states is also associated with a certain level of trust that we will do it in a way that is predictable and consistent with the rule of law,” Polish Justice Minister Adam Bodnar said after presenting the plan in Brussels.

Bodnar said earlier the plan includes changes to the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ), which appoints judges, and the Constitutional Tribunal which critics say has been politicized under PiS.

In a sign that the government is committed to implementing the changes soon, Tusk’s cabinet approved on Tuesday a bill on the NCJ proposed by Bodnar, which will now go to parliament.

The bill assumes members of the Council would be chosen by judges, not politicians as they were under changes introduced under PiS. The European Court of Human Rights and Court of Justice of the EU had pointed to irregularities in the procedure.

“On the day of announcing the results of the new election to the NCJ, those judges in the Council who were elected in an unconstitutional manner by the (parliament), on the basis of provisions adopted in December 2017, will cease to function in the Council,” the government said.

Read the article originally published on the website of VOA

https://www.voanews.com/a/eu-welcomes-new-polish-government-s-plan-to-restore-rule-of-law-/7495000.html

It is time for Europe to finally take its own defense seriously.

At a rally in South Carolina on February 10, former United States President Donald Trump shocked many as he recalled a discussion he had with a European NATO ally when he was president. In response to a question about whether the U.S. would come to a country’s aid even if it had not spent the NATO target commitment of 2 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, he told the crowd: “I said, ‘You didn’t pay, you’re delinquent? No, I would not protect you. In fact, I would encourage [Russia] to do whatever the hell they want.’ ”

This statement elicited strong reactions, especially in Europe, where many NATO countries still do not spend 2 percent of GDP on defense. Some have also claimed that the statements undermine NATO’s principle of solidarity.

Although Mr. Trump used his customary aggressive tone, and the suggestion that a U.S. president would invite Russia to attack an ally is grotesque, the essence of his message has merit. After nearly 80 years of peace due to U.S. protection, European countries should be able to shoulder responsibility for their security.

Europe is in a tough spot. The war in Ukraine has turned into a war of attrition. Kyiv is fully dependent on support from the West, especially Washington. Ukraine-fatigue is setting in with the American populace, and not only among Republicans. The Biden administration will not be able to indefinitely sustain support for Ukraine.

Unfortunately, it is increasingly likely that a cease-fire compromise will be reached, resulting in territorial gains for Russia. This might encourage the Kremlin to continue its policy of reconstituting the old Soviet Union borders and neutralizing Central Europe. Hanno Pevkur, the Estonian minister of defense, recently said that a Russian attack on his country could be a realistic scenario in three or four years. Similar concerns exist in the other Baltic states.

America might not always be there

Regardless of American politics, Europe’s sovereignty in defense will be crucial, not just when it comes to its relationship with Russia. France has been a leader in this regard since General Charles de Gaulle was at the helm in the 1960s.

In this spirit, President Emmanuel Macron made a statement in a 2019 interview with The Economist that was heavily criticized – just as Mr. Trump’s was: “What we are currently experiencing is the brain death of NATO,” he said, adding that Europe was on “the edge of a precipice” and needed to start thinking of itself strategically as a geopolitical power. Without such thinking, Europe would “no longer be in control of [its] destiny.” While this made sense at the time, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has led to a reinvigoration of NATO.

Given the possibility of a new Trump presidency, Europe’s political establishment is worried, particularly regarding issues of trade, Ukraine and defense. These concerns are justified – but not because Mr. Trump could end up back in the White House. Politics in Washington depends on a wide array of factors, most of which the president has little to no influence upon. U.S. politics simply may not always go Europe’s way.

Yet instead of coming up with realistic ways to increase military readiness in three aspects – willingness to defend, sufficient trained soldiers and effective weapons – Europe’s leaders are dithering, lamenting the possibility of Mr. Trump becoming president again.

Europe needs to achieve military sovereignty. Recently, some prominent politicians have begun discussing whether the European Union should build its own nuclear deterrent. Doing so makes little sense given the risk scenario. Responsible actors will only escalate if the threat from an aggressor is existential. Conflicts in Central Europe will not suffice to trigger this escalation.

Furthermore, a nuclear deterrent does nothing to address some of Europe’s other security challenges, including those beyond its southern borders, in Africa and the Middle East. Houthi attacks on ships traveling through the Red Sea, for example, present a clear economic threat that nuclear weapons cannot solve. Russia cannot be the sole focus of Europe’s military rebuild.

Eyes wide open

Nor will it help to whine about former President Trump’s words potentially splitting NATO. Instead, his harangue could benefit Europe, serving as a wake-up call to countries that until now have been snuggling comfortably under the U.S. security blanket.

There are already signs that some European countries are opening their eyes. France, Germany and Poland are revitalizing the Weimar Triangle alliance format, where discussions will hopefully include defense issues. But whatever happens, reinvigorating Europe’s defense capabilities will require close cooperation with the United Kingdom.

Germany appears to support France’s “force de dissuasion” – formerly known as “force de frappe” – the country’s nuclear deterrence force. That, plus the UK’s own nuclear deterrence, should suffice for Europe. EU-wide nuclear weapons are not necessary.

What will be necessary are sufficient budgets with less bureaucracy. The funds must be spent efficiently, and the popular mood and political attitudes must change (this latter concern is the biggest challenge). For this, we might again thank individuals like Donald Trump.

There is another aspect to consider: European countries should be equal partners with the U.S., not just profiteers. This would allow for a more independent European geopolitics in the troubled decades to come and would also alleviate pressure on the U.S., whose main challenge lies in the Pacific.

Regardless of who is elected president, it is unlikely that the U.S. will become isolationist in terms of security – the challenge in the Pacific is too great. However, the mood in Washington could turn to consider conflicts in Europe’s east as primarily a European affair.

The Munich Security Conference just wrapped up a few days ago. In a recent interview, Christoph Heusgen, the seasoned German diplomat and head of the conference, aptly described how Europe should move forward:

“Trump is erratic. We have to adapt to that. If he becomes president, we have to be able to stand up to him and say, ‘We’ll do what you asked. Now let us continue to work together in this alliance that has brought us peace in the transatlantic region over the past decades.’ ”

Read the article, originally published by GIS

Europe should focus on its own defense readiness, not on Trump

President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine said that Aleksei Navalny, the Russian dissident, “was killed by Putin, like thousands of others.”

Read the entire article on the website of The New York Times

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/16/world/europe/aleksei-navalny-reactions-eu.html

TRIBUNE. Pour le chercheur Jean de Kervasdoué, il faut rappeler quelques faits à propos de l’agriculture et des risques auxquels font face les agriculteurs.

Le week-end passé, j’écoutais les commentateurs politiques s’exprimer sur les ondes. Les débats étaient, pour l’essentiel, consacrés à la crise de l’agriculture. Il m’a alors semblé urgent de rappeler quelques particularités de cet ensemble de métiers et de donner de rudimentaires notions d’agronomie et de nutrition à l’élite parisienne imbibée d’idées fausses, diffusées par les associations militantes de l’écologie politique qui s’embarrassent rarement de rigueur scientifique et qui deviennent d’évidentes « vérités ». Une fois encore, il faut insister, car dans ce domaine comme dans celui de l’énergie, tout n’est pas affaire d’opinion et certains faits sont bien établis.

Read the entire article, originally published by Le Point

https://www.lepoint.fr/invites-du-point/modeste-initiation-a-l-agronomie-a-l-usage-des-faiseurs-d-opinion-13-02-2024-2552247_420.php#11

UK Foreign Minister David Cameron last month announced that his country was considering recognizing a Palestinian state. The US State Department has put out a similar message. This is being touted as Israel faces an ongoing genocide case in front of the International Court of Justice.

Israel is supposed to present a report to the court by Feb. 23 showing the measures it has taken to prevent genocide in Gaza. Any observer can see that the killing of innocent civilians has not stopped; in fact, it has only accelerated. The International Court of Justice will take the issue to the UN Security Council. But any resolution that is not in favor of Israel will likely be vetoed by the US. What could happen next is a vote in the UN General Assembly on giving Palestine full membership. This would be the right course of action.

Israel has been dragging out this issue since the time of Oslo, when it got from the Palestinians a recognition of Israel but it never recognized a state of Palestine in return. All the Palestinians got was Israeli recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Israelis kept finding reasons to avoid having to recognize a state. They claimed that the Palestinians should recognize Israel as a Jewish state. However, when Egypt and Jordan established diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv and recognized the state of Israel, they were not asked to do the same. Why are the Palestinians only offered this specific type of recognition and what does it mean?

Israel has used all means possible to avoid talking about a Palestinian state. It first used divide and conquer, so it propped up Hamas to have the excuse that Palestinians are not united and it cannot have a discussion with a party that is committed to the destruction of the state of Israel. The other excuse Israelis give is that the Palestinian Authority is inept and hence Palestinians are unable to govern themselves.

Anyone who observes the Palestinian issue closely can easily conclude that Israelis do not want a Palestinian state. Now, they are finally spelling it out. In December, the Israeli ambassador to the UK said it bluntly during a TV interview. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu bragged to Likud party lawmakers that he was the “only one” who could prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. Of course, the Likud is committed to settlements, which means it is opposed to the concept of a Palestinian state on what it considers to be the land of Israel.

Recently, Israeli officials have found another way to push back against the idea of a Palestinian state. They say it would be “rewarding terrorism.” This way, the “terrorists” would have achieved their goal. However, Israelis have resorted to terrorism throughout their history. Menachem Begin killed innocent people and so did Yitzhak Shamir, but Israel was still founded. In fact, both Begin and Shamir went on to become prime minister.

The international community today recognizes that the occupation is no longer sustainable. Regional stability requires a Palestinian state. However, the world should also recognize that, if the issue is left to the Israelis, it will never happen. A Palestinian state with well-defined borders should be imposed on Israel. This would push Tel Aviv to discuss the other details, such as the shape of the state, the settlements, the issue of refugees’ right of return, the security arrangements, etc. However, without a solid starting point, which is the recognition of a Palestinian state along the borders of 1967, the negotiations will be as futile as they have been in the 30 years since the Oslo Accords.

The mistake that the Arab world committed in 2002 was that it offered an initiative to Israel but did not push for it. The Arab Peace Initiative offers Israel unanimous recognition and normalization in return for a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. The Israelis did not even accept discussing it.

To be fair, even if today Israel had a prime minister who believed in the two-state solution, it is very unlikely he would be able to deliver on that. The reason is that the settler movement would be able to block it. Today, the mood in Israel is not in favor of giving the Palestinians a state. The thinking is that the Gazans were under blockade for 17 years and yet were still able to carry out the Oct. 7 attacks. What would happen if they had a state of their own and were positioned strategically on the hills overlooking Tel Aviv? So, a Palestinian state should be imposed on Israel.

This is the time for the Arab world to rectify the mistake it made in 2002. Today, Arab countries should push and use all the leverage they have with the US to pressure it into recognizing the state of Palestine. This would facilitate an international recognition of Palestine. Once a Palestinian state is a fait accompli, the Israelis will have no choice but to seal a deal.

A Palestinian state not only involves the fate of the Palestinians, but also the stability of the region. Palestine has long been a central cause for the Arab and Muslim worlds. It has also been a cause that all radical movements across the region have used to gain legitimacy. It is now time to pressure Israel into peace and the first step toward achieving that is through international recognition of the state of Palestine.

Read the article, originally published by Arab News

https://www.arabnews.com/node/2459801

The group claimed the attack as it considers the UAE an ‘enemy’ for backing the Somali government.

At least five people, including four Emirati troops and a Bahraini military officer, have been killed in an attack in Somalia.

Al-Qaeda-linked armed group Al-Shabab has claimed responsibility for the attack on a training mission at a military base in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) authorities said on Sunday.

The attack on Saturday targeted troops at the General Gordon military base. Details, including the number of casualties, remain scarce. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud offered his condolences to the UAE.

The UAE’s Ministry of Defence initially announced the death of three of its troops and a Bahraini soldier in a “terrorist act,” adding only that two others were wounded.

It added that one of the injured had died on arrival in Abu Dhabi on Sunday.

Anwar Gargash, a senior Emirati diplomat, offered condolences to those killed and a quick recovery for those wounded.

“No treacherous act will prevent us from continuing the message of security and safety and combating extremism and terrorism in all its forms,” Gargash wrote on X.

Bahrain, an island nation in the Gulf off the coast of Saudi Arabia, did not immediately acknowledge the attack.

Al-Shabab claimed the attack in a statement online, alleging it killed multiple people involved in the Emirati military effort. It described the UAE, a federation of seven sheikhdoms on the Arabian Peninsula, as an “enemy” of Islamic law for its backing of the Somali government in battling the armed group.

Al-Shabab, or “the youth” in Arabic, was born out of Somalia’s many years of anarchy following a 1991 civil war. The affiliate of al-Qaeda once held Mogadishu. Over time, an African Union (AU)-led force, with the backing of the United States and other countries, pushed the group out of the capital.

Since then, al-Shabab has been battling the country’s federal government and the AU-mandated peacekeeping mission as it seeks to establish a new government based on its interpretation of Islamic law.

The group routinely carries out bombings in highly densely populated areas across the country.

On Tuesday, at least 10 people were killed and about 20 were injured in multiple attacks in a crowded market in Mogadishu.

Al-Shabab has carried out attacks in neighbouring Kenya as well since Nairobi provides troops and materiel to the AU force in the country.

The UAE in recent years has increasingly invested in ports in East Africa, including in Somalia’s breakaway Somaliland region.

Securing Somalia fits into the Emirates’ wider concerns about security in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. Somali piracy has recently resumed after several years amid the attacks by Yemen’s Houthi rebels on shipping in the Red Sea.

In 2019, al-Shabab claimed an attack that killed a man working for Dubai’s P&O Ports.

Read the article, originally published by Al-Jazeera

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/11/al-shabab-kills-three-emirati-troops-one-bahraini-officer-in-somalia

L’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique Nord (Otan) ne peut-être « une alliance à la carte », a affirmé ce lundi le chef de la diplomatie européenne. Josep Borrell a réagi aux propos tenus ce week-end par Donald Trump, qui a évoqué la possibilité de ne plus défendre les pays de l’Alliance dont la contribution financière est insuffisante.

Deux jours après les propos chocs de Donald Trump sur l’arrêt de la protection américaine aux pays de l’Otan qui ne payaient pas leur part, s’il était réélu à la Maison Blanche, les réactions se poursuivent. Ce lundi, c’est le chef de la diplomatie européenne qui s’est exprimé avant une réunion ministérielle de l’UE à Bruxelles.

« Soyons sérieux ! Soyons sérieux ! L’Otan ne peut être une alliance à la carte », a lancé Josep Borrell.

« À l’époque où nous vivons, une alliance militaire ne peut fonctionner au gré de l’humeur du président des États-Unis, ce n’est pas : “Oui, non, demain, non, ça dépend”. Allons ! l’Otan existe ou bien n’existe pas », s’est-il agacé.

Pour rappel, lors d’un meeting en Caroline du Sud samedi dernier, Donald Trump a rapporté une conversation qu’il aurait eue avec un des chefs d’État de l’Otan, (sans le nommer). « Un des présidents d’un gros pays s’est levé et a dit : “Et bien, monsieur, si on ne paie pas et qu’on est attaqué par la Russie, est-ce que vous nous protégerez ?” », a raconté le milliardaire, avant de révéler sa réponse : « Non, je ne vous protégerais pas. En fait je les encouragerais à vous faire ce qu’ils veulent. Vous devez payer vos dettes ».

Or, selon l’article 5 de l’Alliance, si un pays de l’Otan est victime d’une attaque armée, chaque membre considérera cet acte de violence comme une attaque armée dirigée contre l’ensemble des membres et prendra les mesures qu’il jugera nécessaires pour venir en aide au pays attaqué.

Vraie menace ou simple provocation de la part de l’ex-président, habitué aux sorties tonitruantes ? Le fait est que, pour Josep Borrell, il ne vaut pas la peine de s’y attarder.

« Durant cette campagne (électorale américaine), nous allons voir et entendre beaucoup de choses (…). Ne comptez pas sur moi pour commenter toutes les idées stupides qui s’exprimeront lors d’une campagne nationale aux États-Unis », a-t-il averti.

Indignation de Biden, mais aussi de certains républicains

Reste que les propos de l’ancien président n’ont pas manqué de faire réagir, à commencer dans son propre pays. La Maison Blanche avait répliqué dès samedi en vantant les efforts déployés par Joe Biden pour renforcer les alliances dans le monde entier. « Encourager l’invasion de nos alliés les plus proches par des régimes meurtriers est consternant et insensé », avait déclaré samedi soir Andrew Bates, un porte-parole de la Maison Blanche.

Le président américain a ensuite lui-même pris la parole dimanche. Pour le démocrate, les propos de l’ex-président républicain ont signifié clairement « sa volonté d’abandonner les alliés de l’Amérique membres de l’Otan en cas d’attaque russe ».

« Le fait que Donald Trump avoue qu’il compte donner le feu vert à Poutine pour davantage de guerre et de violence, pour continuer son assaut brutal contre une Ukraine libre et pour étendre son agression aux peuples de Pologne et des États baltes est affligeant et dangereux », a affirmé Joe Biden dans un communiqué.

Le président américain n’est cependant pas totalement surpris. « Malheureusement », ces propos « sont prévisibles venant d’un homme qui a promis de gouverner comme un dictateur, comme ceux dont il fait l’éloge, dès le premier jour de son retour dans le Bureau ovale », a regretté Joe Biden.

Les propos de Donald Trump ont même indigné dans son propre camp. Sa dernière rivale aux primaires républicaines, Nikki Haley, a ainsi dénoncé la rhétorique de l’ex-président.

« Nous voulons que les alliés de l’Otan paient leur part, mais il y a des moyens d’obtenir cela sans (…) dire à la Russie : “Faites ce que vous voulez avec ces pays-là” », a-t-elle déclaré.

Le sénateur républicain Marco Rubio a, de son côté, tenté de minimiser les déclarations de Donald Trump, arguant qu’il ne parlait jamais « comme un politicien traditionnel ». « Je n’ai aucune inquiétude », a ajouté l’élu de Floride à propos de l’avenir de l’Alliance en cas de victoire de Donald Trump à la présidentielle.

Réactions en chaîne aussi côté européen

Outre Josep Borrell, les propos de Donald Trump ont bien évidemment provoqué aussi l’indignation et la consternation d’autres hauts responsables en Europe et au sein de l’organisation.

Pour le président du Conseil européen Charles Michel, « des déclarations imprudentes sur la sécurité de l’Otan et la solidarité de l’article 5 ne servent que les intérêts de Poutine » et « n’apportent ni plus de sécurité ni plus de paix dans le monde ».

De son côté, le secrétaire général de l’Otan, Jens Stoltenberg, a lui mis en garde contre des propos qui « sapent notre sécurité ». « Toute suggestion selon laquelle les Alliés ne se défendront pas les uns les autres sape notre sécurité à tous, y compris celle des États-Unis, et expose les soldats américains et européens à un risque accru », a-t-il déclaré.

Read the article, originally published by La Tribune

https://www.latribune.fr/economie/international/josep-borrell-repond-a-donald-trump-l-otan-ne-peut-etre-une-alliance-a-la-carte-990318.html#:~:text=L’Otan%20ne%20peut%20%C3%AAtre%20une%20alliance%20%C3%A0%20la%20carte,s’est%2Dil%20agac%C3%A9.

La Secrétaire générale de la Francophonie, Madame Louise Mushikiwabo, a noté avec préoccupation le report sine die de l’élection présidentielle au Sénégal, dont le premier tour était prévu le 25 février 2024.

Cette décision a suscité des contestations et manifestations, qui ont occasionné des débordements. Elle déclare : « Je déplore les violences et invite tous les acteurs à la retenue, à la concertation et en tant que de besoin le recours par les voies légales. Seule l’unité des forces politiques en réponse aux enjeux actuels garantira aux citoyens sénégalais la stabilité et la sécurité ! »

Aussi la Secrétaire générale appelle les autorités nationales à respecter les dispositions constitutionnelles en ce qui concerne le calendrier électoral.

L’Organisation internationale de la Francophonie est disposée à apporter son concours aux parties prenantes pour contribuer à la préparation et à la tenue d’élections inclusives, transparentes et crédibles.

L’OIF compte 88 États et gouvernements : 54 membres, 7 membres associés et 27 observateurs.

Read the article on the website of FinancialAfrik

Louise Mushikiwabo exprime sa préoccupation sur la situation au Sénégal

CHRONIQUE – La distance que nous prenons face à la gérontocratie, la judiciarisation et l’argent-roi dans la politique américaine, ne doit pas nous cacher une réalité : depuis une génération, les Américains réussissent mieux que nous.

Leaders are sounding alarms about growing threats, but Chancellor Olaf Scholz is wary of pushing the Kremlin, and his own ambivalent public, too far.

Read the entire article on the website on The New York Times

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/03/world/europe/germany-russia.html

Stealth campaigns seek to manipulate public opinion in Taiwan and Ukraine.

La guerre qui n’aurait pas dû avoir lieu a déjà des conséquences mondiales : loin des illusions entretenues par les premiers échecs russes, elle menace de se solder par une crise profonde de l’Union européenne.

Alors que commence la troisième année de la guerre d’Ukraine, il est clair, depuis déjà un certain temps, qu’elle contribue à accélérer la transformation du système international dans son ensemble. Le trait émergeant de la nouvelle configuration est la tendance des pays occidentaux (États-Unis et membres de l’Union européenne) et, dans une moindre mesure, de certains États d’Asie-Pacifique à se définir comme les modèles pour les peuples supposés aspirer à la démocratie, et les garants des États constitués qui se considèrent comme y étant parvenus. C’est dans cet esprit que l’agression russe du 24 février 2022 a provoqué la renaissance de l’Alliance atlantique qu’en 2019 Emmanuel Macron déclarait en état de « mort cérébrale », et l’ouverture précipitée de la perspective d’un nouvel élargissement massif de l’Union européenne. Le choc suscité a également balayé les scrupules qui poussaient la Finlande ou la Suède à préserver leur statut de neutralité. Seules l’Autriche, l’Irlande et Malte y restent désormais attachées.

Croisade pour la démocratie

Du point de vue géopolitique, le concept d’Occident est inséparable de la pax americana qui en est le fondement depuis le début de la guerre froide, et cette pax americana étend ses effets bien au-delà du couple euroaméricain. Le président Joe Biden présente les États-Unis comme le chef de file du camp démocratique. Mais en réalité, aux États-Unis, même les démocrates ont toujours su trouver un équilibre entre « la puissance et les principes », pour reprendre le titre des Mémoires de Zbigniew Brzezinski, le célèbre conseiller à la sécurité nationale du président Carter. Ainsi le retrait de l’Afghanistan décidé par Joe Biden à l’été 2021 n’a-t-il pas été moins immoral que celui du Vietnam sous Gérald Ford et Henry Kissinger en 1975. De même, la lassitude qui commence à se manifester aux États-Unis pour un soutien illimité des objectifs affichés par le président Zelensky est-il un fait politique prévisible qu’on ne saurait qualifier ni de moral ni d’immoral. Même si les lobbies favorables au nationalisme ukrainien sont implantés aux États-Unis (et au Canada) depuis fort longtemps, la guerre d’Ukraine n’est pas un sujet majeur pour l’opinion publique américaine.

La situation est plus tranchée en Europe pour deux raisons évidentes : la proximité géographique et le fait que l’Union européenne est extrêmement loin de constituer une unité politique. On comprend qu’à cause de leur histoire, les États baltes ou même la Pologne, pourtant protégés par l’Alliance atlantique, ont ressenti l’agression russe du 24 février comme une menacecontre eux-mêmes. On peut s’expliquer même les craintes de la Roumanie, parce que la Moldavie voisine occupe un angle mort du point de vue de la sécurité de la région. La mobilisation de ces pays a beaucoup contribué à la propagation d’un sentiment de peur dans l’ensemble de l’Union, sans compter la remontée d’une impression de culpabilité dans un pays comme l’Allemagne, du fait des exactions des armées nazies pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale en Ukraine.

Mais, pour comprendre la réaction globale de l’Union européenne qui est restée jusqu’ici d’une grande cohérence face à la guerre, il faut aussi prendre conscience de ce qu’en raison de son impuissance (au sens fondamental de ce terme), elle n’avait pas de marge de manœuvre. Cette réaction peut se caricaturer comme suit : Poutine est un dictateur, qui a sapé les chances de la démocratie en Russie ; son but est de reconstituer l’Empire russe voire de conquérir l’Europe ; en conséquence, il faut tout faire (en livrant des armes par exemple) pour qu’il perde cette guerre, et d’abord que l’Ukraine recouvre sa pleine souveraineté sur ses frontières de 1991.

La posture des Européens, plus encore que celle des Américains, se présente donc comme une croisade pour la démocratie à l’ombre de la protection américaine, en jouant en pratique des quatre seuls instruments à leur disposition : empilement des « paquets » de sanctions contre la Russie ; livraison d’armes quitte à épuiser leurs propres stocks ; plus généralement aide financière à l’Ukraine ; enfin promesses d’élargissement de l’Union.

La leçon de Soljenitsyne

Avant d’aller plus loin, il faut s’interroger sur le regard que, dans l’ensemble, les Occidentaux portent sur la Russie. Ce regard relève de la philosophie de la fin de l’Histoire popularisée en 1992 par Francis Fukuyama, avec l’arrière-pensée de la victoire inéluctable de la démocratie sur toutes les autres formes de régime politique. Pareille affirmation, dont les termes sont d’ailleurs imprécis, restera longtemps infalsifiable au sens de Karl Popper (c’est-à-dire qu’aucun test expérimental ne peut la réfuter). La démocratie est un concept et plus encore une réalité complexe. Déjà, en 1989, au moment des manifestations de la place Tiananmen, que n’a-t-on vu ou entendu d’intellectuels (parmi lesquels nombre d’anciens « maoïstes » !), d’hommes politiques ou de militants occidentaux persuadés qu’une démocratie à l’occidentale allait bientôt pouvoir s’instaurer en Chine. Toute l’idéologie de la mondialisation heureuse, jusqu’à au moins la crise financière des subprimes en 2007-2008, a reposé sur l’hypothèse implicite selon laquelle « les autres » deviendraient bientôt « comme nous ».

Dans cette perspective, l’individu Vladimir Poutine est donc désigné comme le grand responsable des nouveaux malheurs des Russes. On tentera ici une interprétation un peu plus subtile, en s’appuyant sur le géant que fut Alexandre Soljenitsyne, et en cherchant à comprendre pourquoi celui-ci a été adulé puis rejeté par les Occidentaux. Cette référence fait écho à la commémoration du cinquantième anniversaire de la publication du livre qui a tant fait pour affaiblir l’image de l’URSS dans les années 1970, L’Archipel du goulag. Il faut préciser que, pour approfondir sa vision de la Russie et sa compréhension de l’histoire de l’Union soviétique, on doit se tourner vers les 6000 pages de La Roue rouge. Sa grande œuvre à ses propres yeux.

Dans ce qui suit, je m’appuie en particulier sur un long article de Gary Saul Morson, éminent spécialiste américain de la littérature russe, paru dans la New York Review of Books du 12 mai 2022. Morson a sur la plupart des commentateurs l’avantage d’avoir lu et médité la totalité des écrits de l’écrivain. Son article est intitulé « What Solzhenitsyn Understood ». Mais comme on va parler de révolution, on mentionnera d’abord le plus grand expert en la matière, qui avait beaucoup médité, en homme d’action, sur la Révolution française. Pour Lénine, en substance, les deux conditions préalables à toute révolution se résument ainsi : « Le haut ne peut plus, le bas ne veut plus. »

Autrement dit, la classe dirigeante n’est plus capable de maintenir sa domination inchangée, tandis que les classes inférieures ne veulent plus vivre à l’ancienne. Derrière celles-ci se cachent des groupes organisés prêts à tirer parti de la situation. En conséquence de quoi, « le haut » ne peut survivre qu’en réformant quand il en est encore temps ; c’est-à-dire – et ici, on pense à Tocqueville – sur la base d’une analyse pertinente de la situation, et dans une position de force. Soljenitsyne, qui ne se faisait pas une haute idée de Nicolas II, estimait toutefois que son ministre Piotr Stolypine avait entrepris les bonnes réformes, qui auraient permis d’éviter la révolution s’il n’avait été assassiné en 1911. Pour l’auteur de La Roue rouge, la mise en œuvre des réformes de Stolypine aurait, certes très progressivement, engagé le pays dans la voie des libertés individuelles et de l’État de droit. Soljenitsyne abhorrait la violence et fondait ses espoirs sur le changement graduel grâce à la réforme.

Près de sept décennies après la révolution d’Octobre, Gorbatchev puis Eltsine n’ont réuni aucune des conditions qui auraient permis de réformer l’Union soviétique. Des réformes qui auraient certainement eu un volet territorial. Pour Soljenitsyne, la Russie devait se séparer des républiques non slaves et essayer de préserver l’union avec les républiques slaves : Ukraine et Biélorussie. Il n’était pas le seul à pressentir les malheurs d’une sécession ratée avec l’Ukraine. Son nationalisme, cependant, n’était pas un impérialisme. Il était fondé sur la conviction de la nécessité d’une restauration spirituelle comme préalable à toute véritable renaissance de la Russie. Pour lui, tant le versant national que le versant personnel de l’« âme russe » ressentent au-dessus d’eux « ce qui relève du Ciel ».

Gary Saul Morson insiste sur l’importance du langage de la spiritualité dans la culture russe. Ce langage n’est pas spécifiquement orthodoxe. Il nous dit que les Occidentaux qui le confondent avec une aspiration théocratique passent à côté de l’essentiel. C’est tout le sens en effet du fameux discours de Harvard de Soljenitsyne (1978), qui renvoie dos à dos les Américains (ou les Occidentaux) et ses compatriotes russes. Selon Morson, le grand homme trouvait dans les milieux intellectuels occidentaux marqués par leur matérialisme la même étroitesse d’esprit que chez les intellectuels libéraux russes d’avant la révolution. Plus profondément, il ne suffit pas de chanter les louanges de la « démocratie libérale » (les principes de 1789) pour être du bon côté, celles de la « démocratie illibérale » (le jacobinisme) pour être du mauvais. Finalement, entre son expulsion de l’URSS en 1974 et son retour en Russie vingt ans après, l’auteur de L’Archipel du goulag, selon ses propres termes, s’est trouvé coincé entre deux « meules ». Il fut donc un grand incompris, comme souvent, il est vrai, les personnalités originales, qui ne se satisfont pas des discours simplistes sur le bien et le mal en politique internationale.

Ce qui a radicalement manqué aux relations entre les pays occidentaux et la Russie après la chute de l’URSS, c’est la volonté partagée de rechercher de bonne foi une forme d’adaptation du système de sécurité collective dans le sens le plus profond du terme, pour permettre une vraie « détente, entente et coopération » entre les anciens adversaires. La faute n’est pas du seul côté de la Russie et plus précisément de Vladimir Poutine. Elle est aussi du côté des Occidentaux, prisonniers d’une conception étroite de leurs intérêts et de leur idéologie politique.

Le calcul de Vladimir Poutine

Après le retour de la « verticale du pouvoir » avec Poutine, le Kremlin s’est de plus en plus fortement cabré face aux Occidentaux, accusés de vouloir installer l’Otan à la porte de la Russie et perçus comme prétendant imposer partout leur manière de voir le monde, en réalité leur volonté de domination économique et une interprétation sélective du droit international. En décidant de lancer son « opération militaire spéciale » le 24 février 2022, Vladimir Poutine a brisé le tabou – récent à l’échelle de l’Histoire – de l’inviolabilité des frontières. Il s’est trompé dans les calculs qui lui faisaient espérer une victoire éclair sur l’Ukraine, mais, deux ans après, la balance semble désormais se redresser en sa faveur. C’est l’occasion de rappeler un mot célèbre de Bismarck : « La Russie n’est jamais aussi forte ni aussi faible qu’on le croit. » Dans l’histoire militaire de la Russie, les exemples de débuts difficiles suivis de retournements de situation ne sont pas rares.

Un tabou a été brisé. C’est un fait. Après l’épisode de Stolypine et celui de Gorbatchev-Eltsine, la Russie a certes encore manqué une chance de se réformer en profondeur. Mais la suite a creusé le fossé, et la responsabilité de cet échec-là est partagée. Et la dimension spirituelle transcende en Russie les épreuves de la vie ordinaire. Le pays continue d’exister et de peser sur les affaires du monde. En son temps, Barack Obama a manqué une occasion de se taire en le reléguant au rang de puissance régionale.

Si maintenant la question est, comme beaucoup le pensent ou l’espèrent depuis le début de la guerre d’Ukraine, de savoir si le régime de Vladimir Poutine est sur le point de s’effondrer, il faut pour se risquer à une réponse revenir à la remarque de Lénine sur les révolutions : aujourd’hui, en Russie, le haut peut toujours, et le bas n’en est pas au point de ne plus vouloir. La drôle de tentative de Prigojine, en juin 2023, a échoué. Un coup d’État pacifiste est peu probable.

La Russie est-elle sur le point de perdre la guerre ? Après l’échec de la contre-offensive ukrainienne de 2023 et la mise en place d’une économie de guerre, du fait aussi des capacités d’adaptation de l’économie russe et de l’échec des sanctions occidentales, la réponse paraît plutôt négative. La Russie s’installe dans la perspective d’une guerre prolongée que le pouvoir croit tenable, et joue sur une usure plus rapide des Ukrainiens et la lassitude de leurs alliés. Le Kremlin ne manque pas non plus de moyens pour s’en prendre aux intérêts de ses adversaires, comme ceux de la France en Afrique ou ailleurs.

Si l’on regarde où en sont les choses aujourd’hui, avec un club d’États autoritaires (comme la Chine, la Corée du Nord ou l’Iran) plus resserré, et un « Sud global » de plus en plus « multi-aligné » – où l’on trouve même la Turquie, membre de l’Otan – on sent bien qu’un nombre important d’États seraient disposés à accueillir favorablement l’idée d’un compromis entre la Russie et l’Ukraine.

Le prix à payer

Peut-être la guerre d’Ukraine durera-t-elle longtemps. Peut-être un jour le temps sera-t-il suspendu comme le 27 juillet 1953 avec l’armistice de Panmunjeom, qui mit fin à la guerre de Corée. Beaucoup dépendra de l’évolution du soutien des États-Unis à l’Ukraine, après l’élection de novembre 2024. Quoi qu’il advienne, en plus du renforcement de l’Alliance atlantique sous leur direction (plus ou moins ferme, c’est une autre question), les Américains paraissent déjà comme les grands bénéficiaires économiques de la crise, en raison d’abord de l’accroissement massif de leur avantage comparatif dans le domaine de l’énergie, après que les Européens ont cessé d’importer ouvertement leur pétrole et leur gaz de Russie. Le coût de l’énergie est aujourd’hui trois fois moins élevé aux États-Unis qu’en Europe. Et, malgré les efforts des Européens pour se réindustrialiser, les Américains jouent largement la course en tête dans ce domaine aussi, grâce à l’Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) et à une culture économique et financière largement supérieure. Mais, surtout, les 27 membres actuels de l’Union européenne forment un ensemble culturellement et économiquement disparate, qui n’a toujours pas digéré le grand élargissement consécutif à la chute de l’URSS.

La référence à la démocratie ne suffit pas à asseoir une identité. L’hétérogénéité politique de cet ensemble rend peu probable, de la part des États membres, les nouveaux abandons de souveraineté qui seraient nécessaires, par exemple, pour doter l’Union d’une politique budgétaire commune compatible à long terme avec les missions de la Banque centrale européenne, et plus encore d’une véritable politique étrangère, inséparable d’une politique de défense réellement commune. Que représente dès lors dans ce dernier domaine la parole respective de la présidente de la Commission, du président du Conseil européen et du haut représentant pour les Affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité, d’une part ; des chefs d’État et de gouvernement des États membres, d’autre part, quand ils s’éloignent des généralités convenues sur la démocratie et les droits humains ? Dès qu’on entre dans le détail des intérêts nationaux des pays membres, façonnés en grande partie par l’Histoire, on comprend la difficulté de toute notion de politique étrangère réellement commune vis-à-vis aussi bien de la Russie et de la Chine que de la Turquie, de l’Algérie ou des États du Golfe, par exemple.

Il y a plus. On se souvient de la distinction qu’établissait au XIX^e siècle le politologue et économiste britannique Walter Bagehot et de sa thèse, adoptée par Churchill, selon laquelle la légitimité de toute constitution, écrite ou pas, repose sur deux piliers : la dignité (aspect symbolique et sacré) et l’efficacité (aspect du travail gouvernemental). Dans le système anglais, la monarchie incarne la dignité, et le gouvernement l’efficacité. La légitimité ne peut pas survivre indéfiniment aux ruptures de fatigue susceptibles de se produire sur l’un ou l’autre de ses piliers. On en revient aux causes des révolutions. Le problème de l’Union européenne depuis qu’elle a renoncé à la règle de bon sens selon laquelle tout nouvel élargissement devait être précédé de l’approfondissement du précédent, c’est-à-dire depuis la chute de l’Union soviétique, tient à ce que, par rapport aux ambitions affichées (sur Schengen, par exemple), la gouvernance s’est progressivement affaiblie tant du point de vue de la dignité (une dimension qu’en fait l’Union européenne n’a jamais incarnée) que de l’efficacité.

Or, face à la guerre d’Ukraine, les chefs d’État et de gouvernement ont suivi la solution de facilité en ouvrant grand la perspective d’une nouvelle vague d’élargissement, incluant l’Ukraine – dont la Pologne elle-même redoute désormais ouvertement la concurrence (sur l’agriculture, par exemple) –, sans avoir la moindre idée de la manière de s’y prendre autrement qu’en faisant confiance au destin. Politiquement, il sera impossible de faire complètement marche arrière (il y a des limites, même à l’hypocrisie) et la perspective ouverte par le Conseil européen de décembre 2023, qui a décidé d’entamer des négociations d’adhésion à l’Union européenne avec l’Ukraine et la Moldavie, d’accorder le statut de pays candidat à la Géorgie et d’accélérer le processus d’adhésion des Balkans occidentaux, mobilisera pour longtemps les forces vives de toutes les instances communautaires au détriment des autres priorités. Il en coûtera extrêmement cher aux actuels pays membres, dont les budgets sont et seront de plus en plus sous pression. Ajoutons qu’avec le nouvel élargissement qui s’annonce, la question de la supériorité du droit européen sur le droit national deviendra de plus en plus sensible.

Parmi les conséquences déjà clairement identifiables de la guerre d’Ukraine, on peut donc annoncer une révolution profonde à l’intérieur de l’Union européenne. La vision des pères fondateurs est morte. Et d’ailleurs, pourquoi l’Europe échapperait-elle à la tendance à l’accroissement du nationalisme que l’on observe partout ailleurs ? Si, depuis le Brexit, d’autres États membres n’ont pas fait sécession, c’est d’abord en raison d’un calcul coûts-avantages à court-moyen terme. C’est aussi à cause de la contre-performance des Britanniques.

Le retour du tragique

Tout peut donc se produire à l’horizon de dix ou vingt ans. En fin de compte, ce que l’Histoire pourrait retenir avant tout de la guerre d’Ukraine, c’est qu’en osant briser un tabou, Poutine a réactivé le principe de Clausewitz selon lequel « la guerre est la continuation de la politique par d’autres moyens ». À force d’avoir été violé, pas seulement par les Russes (par exemple, en 1999, avec les bombardements de l’Otan en Serbie, et surtout, en 2003, le renversement de Saddam Hussein – de surcroît sur la base d’un mensonge), le droit international a plus de risques qu’avant le 24 février de se trouver davantage encore bafoué dans les prochaines années, et ce d’autant plus que l’équilibre des pouvoirs au sein de la charte de l’ONU est de plus en plus contesté.

Reste un tabou encore inviolé : le recours en premier à l’arme nucléaire. Sans doute Poutine a-t-il été tenté de le faire quand les choses semblaient mal tourner pour la Russie, mais son principal soutien, la Chine (par ailleurs l’un des gagnants globaux à court-moyen terme de cette guerre), l’en a dissuadé. Mais on peut craindre qu’un jour plus ou moins proche ce tabou-là lui aussi sera brisé, et pas forcément par les Russes.

Les grandes puissances du XXI^e siècle, à commencer par les États-Unis et la Chine, sont conscientes de ces réalités, sur fond d’accélération de la révolution technologique. Les membres de l’Union européenne, assoupis depuis 1945 et la décolonisation, ont perdu le sens du tragique. Dans leur recherche d’un nouveau paradigme pour l’Union, sans renoncer à l’idéal démocratique, ils devront refaire l’apprentissage du réalisme dans la politique internationale. Quelles épreuves devront-ils traverser avant d’y parvenir ?

Read the article on the website of Le Figaro

https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/deux-ans-apres-les-mauvais-comptes-de-la-guerre-d-ukraine-20240203

Candidates’ moves to attract voters at home could have enormous ripple effects abroad.

Election campaigns in the United States can often have a more disruptive impact on foreign policy than the candidate who wins. The president’s discretion in international relations is constrained by political realities. Yet, during the race, incumbents make decisions deemed necessary in case of defeat and take actions aimed at swaying voters.

The ongoing U.S. presidential campaign may seem like a replay of the last election, with the exception that the contenders, already seniors in 2020, have aged an additional four years. While a rematch appears likely, surprises cannot be ruled out, and the present situation itself carries significant consequences.

On the Democratic side, President Joe Biden seems to be the only viable option, revealing a weakness in a party that should be able to present a younger, similarly qualified candidate that appeals to both progressives and moderates.

Among Republicans, former President Donald Trump has faced competition primarily from Florida Governor Ron DeSantis and Nikki Haley, formerly governor of South Carolina and Ambassador to the United Nations. So far, Mr. Trump has handily won the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary, leading Mr. DeSantis to withdraw from the race.

It seems entirely plausible that Mr. Trump could win in November. He remains unfazed by legal challenges, and his voters are undeterred. The Democrats’ support for the proceedings against him appears clumsy and politically motivated.

While President Biden is considered more seasoned and even attracts support from some of the old Republican establishment, major concerns about him remain – notably, his age. He is likely to retain Kamala Harris as his running mate, whose performance as vice president so far has been underwhelming. But with a president so long in the tooth, the choice of vice president is exceedingly important.

Unpopular conflicts

Especially among young voters, the wars in Ukraine and Gaza are unpopular. Young Americans cast their ballots overwhelmingly for Mr. Biden in 2020, but may swing to the Republican candidate or decide to stay home this year.

The White House now faces a new challenge, following an Iran-backed assault that resulted in the death of three American soldiers in Jordan on January 28. The outcome of how decisively and effectively the Biden administration addresses this situation could impact President Biden’s standing in the upcoming elections, either bolstering his candidacy or potentially causing damage.

If the White House wins some economic or foreign policy successes that increase support for the Democratic party, President Biden could step aside for a younger candidate. This would need to happen well before the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August – meaning there is little time left to make such a change.

The question then would be whether the White House, particularly President Biden’s advisors, would remain steadfast in supporting Ukraine and Israel in their respective wars, which are so unpopular among the young voters. The administration could start to back away from these conflicts while trying to save face by blaming Republican opposition in Congress as its reason for doing so.

Europe and Israel must prepare for that eventuality. Regarding Ukraine, a reduction in U.S. support could be disastrous unless European countries step in, though this seems unlikely. Any resulting “compromise” in Ukraine would likely fail to halt Russian ambitions.

Regardless of the election outcome, Europe must ready itself to assume responsibility for its own defense.

Read the article, originally published by GIS

How the 2024 race could affect foreign policy

The new head of the Federal Competition Authority (BWB), Natalie Harsdorf-Borsch, has set herself the goal of taking stronger action against companies that abuse their market power. This focus marks a strategic reorientation of the BWB, which previously dealt primarily with price agreements and investigated fewer cases of abuse of market power.

The new strategic direction and the associated challenges that Harsdorf-Borsch and BWB are facing could have a significant impact on the competitive landscape in Austria.

Harsdorf-Borsch emphasizes the complexity of such proceedings, as the market power of a company must first be proven before the abuse of this power can be established. The head of the authority points out that these proceedings can take longer in international comparison, but are essential for protecting the economy and in particular small and medium-sized enterprises from anti-competitive behavior.

Already debated for some time

In the run-up to the new plans, an important expert event was held in Vienna, organized by the Federal Competition Authority (BWB), the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), and the Austrian National Bank (OeNB). The topic of the conference was the current competition and economic challenges in Europe, with a special focus on the situation in Austria.

High-profile experts from academia and competition enforcement, including WIFO Director Gabriel Felbermayr and BWB Director General Natalie Harsdorf-Borsch, exchanged views on “Strengthening competition in the face of current challenges”. A key topic of the discussions was the relationship between theory and practice in competition law.

The expert panel included renowned personalities such as Prof. Dr. Justus Haucap, Prof. Dr. Viktoria Robertson, Senate President Prof. Dr. Georg Kodek, Prof. Dr. Tomaso Duso, and Prof. Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, who dealt intensively with competition and market concentration.

Harsdorf-Borsch emphasized the need to focus in particular on the challenges of digitalization, open market access, and effective merger control to ensure sustainable competition. Given the inflation crisis, Felbermayr spoke out in favor of further competition reforms to learn from successful international examples.

Minister of Labor and Economic Affairs Martin Kocher and OeNB Governor Prof. Robert Holzmann underlined the essential importance of competition for jobs, prosperity, innovation, and quality. Fiona M. Scott Morton from Yale University highlighted the benefits of increased competition enforcement, including higher productivity, wage increases, open digital markets, lower prices, and more innovation.

The event provided an in-depth look at the current state and prospects of competition in Austria and Europe, emphasizing the importance of international competition rules for a fair and sustainable global economy.

New head of the Federal Competition Authority

As the new head, Natalie Harsdorf-Borsch brings with her extensive expertise in the field of competition law. She has been working for BWB since 2009 and has held various positions, including as a consultant in the food and luxury food sector and as head of the legal department. Her international experience includes working at the Directorate-General for Competition in Brussels and at the Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxembourg. Since 2019, she has also been the elected Coordinator of the OECD Competition Committee vis-à-vis UNCTAD. Her appointment as Director General in October 2023 makes her the first woman to head the Austrian competition authority. Harsdorf-Borsch has authored numerous specialist publications in the field of antitrust law and has received awards for her achievements in the field of competition law.

Read the article, originally published on the website of Vindobona

https://www.vindobona.org/article/realignment-and-expert-dialog-austrias-path-to-fair-competition

On the extreme ends of both the Israeli and Palestinian political spectrum, the preferred option is to create one state ‘from the river to the sea’.

The reported death toll among Palestinians in Gaza now exceeds 25,000, and still there is no end in sight for the fighting, nor any clarity on Israel’s strategic objectives. Debates about what should eventually follow the war are intensifying.

The US has been increasingly vocal in its call for renewed efforts towards a two-state solution, which has been the policy of the European Union and most of the international community for years. The Arab Peace Initiative also aims to establish two states for those who reside between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River.

But Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has once again explicitly declared his opposition: “I will not compromise on full Israeli security control over all the territory west of Jordan – and this is contrary to a Palestinian state.”

That confirms what many had long suspected: for years, his policies have sought to block all movement towards a two-state solution, and they have largely succeeded.

Unfortunately, proponents of a two-state solution do not hold a dominant position in the current public discourse, either in Israel or in the Palestinian territories. With the war raging, emotions are high, and extremists on both sides have benefitted politically.

There is a deepening sense of mutual enmity, and scant attention has been paid to the long-term possibilities for peace. But that eventually will change, potentially allowing for more constructive forms of discourse.

To be sure, moving from the current war towards a two-state future will not be easy. Border issues must be sorted out, along with the status of Jerusalem (perhaps the most sensitive aspect of the dispute for both sides). The extensive illegal Jewish settlements on occupied territory remain one of the largest and most obvious impediments to progress.

But an eventual two-state solution is not as unimaginable or as inconceivable as critics suggest. On the contrary, numerous blueprints are available. Some years ago, the US think tank RAND published a visionary research brief featuring “an arc” of Palestinian cities linked by modern rail to both Gaza in the south and the port of Haifa in the north.

The problem, of course, is that the two-state solution is not the only game in town. On the extreme ends of both the Israeli and Palestinian political spectrum, the preferred option is to create one state “from the river to the sea”.

Depending on which side prevails, this would either be a Palestinian state that replaces (and thus extinguishes) the state of Israel, or it would be a Jewish state that has rejected the very idea of Palestinian statehood in the area.

Yes, in theory, one also could envisage a single state of Jews and Palestinians living peacefully together under a democratic political system that guarantees equal rights for everyone. In practice, however, that outcome would probably take centuries to achieve. Since we don’t have that kind of time, it really isn’t relevant.

Hamas’s version of “from the river to the sea” is also a non-starter. Not only does Israel have a right to defend itself, but its existence is firmly supported by the international community, as well as much of the Arab world.

While Hamas’s military wing continues to advocate its fanciful option, its political leaders have sometimes spoken of accepting a long-term ceasefire (“hudna”), implying de facto recognition of the “Zionist entity”.

The extreme Israeli version of “from the river to the sea,” now explicitly favoured by elements of Netanyahu’s government, calls for measures to “encourage” the more than five million Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank to leave.

With the few who remain being deprived of political rights, the result would be a state built on a combination of ethnic cleansing and explicit apartheid. But this path most likely would lead to renewed outbursts of violence and conflict, plunging the region into even more chaos.

While Netanyahu has voiced his opposition to a two-state solution, he has not made it even remotely clear what outcome he would favour. Lacking direction and stumbling from one crisis to the next, he – deliberately or not – is taking Israel down the one-state road favoured by his most extreme allies, and thus ever further away from a possible peace.

Given the alternatives – which cannot even be called “solutions” – a two-state outcome remains the only viable option for peace. Once the current fighting ends (the sooner the better), all diplomatic and reconstruction efforts must concentrate on putting the region back on the two-state path.

There will be resistance from the respective extremists chanting “from the river to the sea,” but one hopes that moderates on each side can eventually prevail with support from key players like the US, the EU, and the Arab states. They, and they alone, can credibly claim to know which path will lead to peace.

Read the article, originally published on the website of Free Malaysia Today

https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/opinion/2024/01/30/extremism-from-the-river-to-the-sea/

Cette semaine marque le 60e anniversaire de l’établissement de relations diplomatiques entre Paris et la République populaire de Chine, une décision qui a fait de la France le premier grand pays occidental à reconnaître formellement le régime communiste. Mais même si la France a reconnu Pékin très tôt, la relation n’a jamais été très stable.

Les bonnes performances sur l’emploi atteintes en sept ans de mandat sont en partie dues à des circonstances qui ne se renouvelleront pas dans les trois ans qui viennent, prévient l’économiste dans sa chronique.

S’il y a un point sur lequel Emmanuel Macron a tenu ses promesses, c’est celui de l’emploi. Au cours de la campagne présidentielle de 2017, son ambition de ramener le taux de chômage à 7 % de la population active et de créer 1,3 million d’emplois avait été accueillie avec scepticisme. A l’arrivée, au moment de la présidentielle de 2022, le taux de chômage dépassait d’un cheveu ce niveau, et 1,5 million d’emplois avaient été créés, malgré la pandémie de Covid-19 et la crise énergétique. Aujourd’hui encore, les chiffres de l’emploi restent bons.

Comment expliquer cette performance ? En 2017, l’équipe du candidat attendait que les créations d’emplois résultent en partie du redressement de l’activité économique (550 000 prévues), mais surtout, pour la plus grande part, de mesures structurelles en faveur de la formation (550 000) et de l’abaissement du coût du travail (200 000). Evidemment, elle n’anticipait ni la crise sanitaire ni le choc énergétique consécutif à l’agression russe contre l’Ukraine.

Dans les faits, la croissance a été moins bonne que prévu, ce qui n’est pas difficile à comprendre, mais les créations d’emplois ont, paradoxalement, été plus fortes qu’attendu. C’est en fait la productivité qui a encaissé le différentiel, avec une baisse de 0,4 % par an depuis la mi-2017, ce qui ne s’était jamais vu, en raison des mesures en faveur des personnes éloignées de l’emploi, dont la contribution à la production est plus faible que celle des salariés en place. Quand un jeune désœuvré ou un senior fatigué retrouve un emploi, la productivité moyenne baisse, mais c’est quand même une bonne nouvelle.

Mais cette explication n’épuise pas la totalité du paradoxe. Eric Heyer et ses collègues de l’Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (OFCE) ont mis effectivement en évidence un impact du coût du travail (+ 130 000 emplois) et un effet de la formation (+ 250 000 apprentis), mais qui ne suffisent pas à expliquer les résultats observés (« Sous la menace du chômage », Policy Brief, n^o 121, octobre 2023).

Read the entire article on the website of Le Monde

https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2024/01/27/jean-pisani-ferry-evitons-de-destabiliser-encore-plus-le-marche-du-travail-et-d-ajouter-ainsi-la-fureur-au-bruit_6213353_3232.html

Le secrétaire d’État américain Antony Blinken a rencontré le président rwandais Paul Kagame en marge du Forum économique mondial de Davos.

Blinken a déclaré que les États-Unis s’engageaient à améliorer les relations diplomatiques entre le Rwanda et le Congo. Cette rencontre symbolise la volonté de Washington de pouvoir gérer les conflits, notamment en RDC, en travaillant avec Kagame, malgré les critiques américaines qui visaient le dirigeant Rwandais.

“Pour répondre à votre question, nous sommes déterminés à faire tout ce qui est en notre pouvoir en vue de soutenir les efforts déployés, en particulier par l’Angola et le Kenya, vers une résolution pacifique des désaccords et la prévention des conflits dans l’est de la RDC”, a déclaré le Secrétaire d’Etat américain.

Le président congolais Felix Tshisekedi accuse régulièrement le Rwanda et son président, Paul Kagame, de soutenir militairement les rebelles du M23, qui constituent la dernière génération de combattants tutsis congolais à s’être emparés de plusieurs villes du Nord-Kivu, une région riche en minerais. Les Nations unies et les groupes de défense des droits de l’homme accusent le M23 d’atrocités, notamment de viols et de massacres, et affirment que ce mouvement est soutenu par le Rwanda.

Read the article, originally published on the website of Africa News

https://fr.africanews.com/2024/01/16/davos-2024-blinken-rencontre-kagame-pour-apaiser-les-tensions-avec-la-rdc//

En ce début d’année, le prix a dépassé les 100 dollars la livre, une première depuis 2008.

« A première vue, les prévisions 2023 de CyclOpe ont été quasiment parfaites, 15 % de baisse de notre indice global, et une baisse effective de 14 % (13,87 %), c’est pas mal, notamment grâce au pétrole dont le poids est important pour l’indice », s’est félicité l’économiste Philippe Chalmin, le 23 janvier, lors d’un déjeuner de présentation des prévisions pour cette année.

Read the entire article on the website of L’Opinion

https://www.lopinion.fr/economie/energie-en-2024-il-faudra-surveiller-luranium-comme-le-lait-sur-le-feu