Russia is weaker — but no less dangerous

Russia is weaker — but no less dangerous
Putin steps up cyber and other hybrid attacks against US allies in Europe

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
May 31, 2026

TALLINN, Estonia — Russian President Vladimir Putin must have left Beijing in a sour mood, quietly nursing frustration and disappointment.
During his two-day visit to the Chinese capital through May 20, Putin failed to clinch a final agreement from Chinese President Xi Jinping on Power of Siberia 2, a long-awaited pipeline that would carry Russian natural gas to China through Mongolia.
Xi dashed Putin’s hopes of winning a firm Chinese commitment on the project. For Moscow, the pipeline is central to its effort to redirect gas exports from Europe to Asia after Western sanctions and the war in Ukraine shattered its access to European markets. But Beijing was in no hurry, fully aware of its leverage. It appears to still be pressing for discounted gas supplies.
Putin faces tightening headwinds on several fronts. Russia’s economy is showing signs of strain, while on the battlefield in Ukraine, Russian forces continue to suffer heavy casualties even as the front lines remain deadlocked.
It would be dangerously ill-advised, however, to assume that a weakened Russia is necessarily less dangerous. History offers little comfort on this point: A declining autocrat does not always become more restrained. Russia may grow more reckless, more brutal and more unpredictable precisely because it is under pressure.
That risk was not lost on experts who attended two recent security conferences in Europe in mid-May: PISM Strategic Ark in Warsaw, Poland, and the Lennart Meri Conference in Tallinn, Estonia. At both gatherings, officials, analysts and other security specialists delivered a consistent warning: The Russian threat is growing, not receding.
European and NATO participants particularly emphasized that, despite worsening conditions, Russia is pressing ahead with the reconstitution of its military. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank, Russia’s active-duty troop strength, roughly 900,000 before its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, had grown to about 1.13 million by early 2025. Putin has ordered a further expansion to 1.5 million personnel.
The buildup is not aimed solely at Ukraine. Lithuanian intelligence and other security services report that since the invasion began, Russia has steadily reinforced troop concentrations along the borders of NATO member states.
At PISM Strategic Ark, Lt. Gen. Nicole Schilling, deputy inspector general of the German Armed Forces and the country’s second-highest-ranking military officer, warned that Russia should not be viewed as having exhausted its military capacity in Ukraine. Moscow, she suggested, is maintaining separate forces along the NATO front.
Perhaps most alarming is a recent line of analysis suggesting that Russia may be preparing for a possible attack on U.S. allies in Europe. In December, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte issued a dire warning, saying, “Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO within five years.”
At first glance, the idea may seem implausible. A Russia struggling to subdue a single, smaller country could hardly expect to prevail against NATO, an alliance of more than 30 members.
According to senior European military officers and security experts who attended the conferences in Poland and Estonia, the scenario Russia is most likely to be contemplating is a localized, short operation designed to paralyze the transatlantic alliance.
For example, one gambit Putin may be considering would proceed roughly along the following lines: Russian forces, or proxy troops operating without insignia, suddenly cross into part of the Baltic states or other neighboring territories. They destroy infrastructure, kill or wound civilians, and then withdraw, while leaving Russia in control of a narrow strip of land along the frontier.
NATO would then face an agonizing choice: invoke collective defense and risk full-scale war with Russia, or waver. The alliance would soon splinter, and over time NATO’s unity would begin to unravel.
If Putin is seriously entertaining such a plan, it could prove suicidal for Russia itself. Even if NATO as a whole failed to act, individual member states might retaliate. The result could be an all-out war Moscow neither wanted nor planned for.
Lt. Gen. Andrus Merilo, commander of the Estonian Defence Forces, told me that the danger lies in the way Putin may assess the confluence of factors. Merilo said it is hard to believe such a Russian gambit could succeed, but Putin may not see it that way and that could make the situation very dangerous.
Meanwhile, Russia is already waging war in the gray zone. Across Europe, hybrid operations are intensifying: infrastructure sabotage, arson attacks, drone provocations, cyberattacks and assassination plots.
According to a 2025 paper by Bart Schuurman, a professor of terrorism and political violence at Leiden University’s The Hague campus in the Netherlands, Russian hybrid attacks against Europe reached 44 incidents in 2024, more than seven times the number recorded in 2022.
What could further embolden Moscow is the widening rift between the U.S. and Europe. In May, Washington announced the withdrawal of about 5,000 troops from Germany, while leaving open the possibility of further reductions in Italy and Spain.
Europe has responded to the risk of a declining U.S. presence with a rearmament drive. In 2025, defense spending across Europe and Canada rose roughly 20% from the previous year.
But the picture is murkier than the headline figures suggest. Some of the new military equipment being acquired overlaps with purchases already being made by neighboring countries. Increased defense spending does not automatically result in greater military strength. Europe remains far from capable of mounting a credible defense without American support, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
The pressure and sense of urgency among NATO members were palpable at the Lennart Meri Conference.
Thomas Rowekamp, chairman of the German Bundestag’s defense committee, made the case for reintroducing conscription. He argued that Germany needs to increase its active-duty force from about 180,000 to 260,000 personnel, and said he doubted this could be achieved through a purely voluntary system alone. He called for a national debate on the possible return of conscription.
All that said, the West must also guard against the opposite error: overestimating Russian capabilities and allowing fear to harden into paralysis.
“There is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness,” Winston Churchill said about the Russians in a 1946 speech, offering insight into how to deal with them.
The West must not grow complacent about Russia’s waning power, nor flinch in the face of its provocations. To do so would be to hand Putin what he wants. Intimidation is his preferred instrument, and it works only if the other side allows itself to be intimidated.

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Le Président Paul Kagame appelle à la coopération renforcée face aux fractures mondiales

25.04.2026

Le Président Paul Kagame appelle à la coopération renforcée face aux fractures mondiales

Le président rwandais Paul Kagame a plaidé pour une coopération renforcée entre les nations, face à la montée des divisions dans le monde. Il s’exprimait au premier jour de la World Policy Conference 2026 (WPC 2026), hier, vendredi 24 avril 2026.

Dans son intervention, le chef de l’État a exposé la vision africaine du développement. Il affirme que le continent aspire avant tout à assurer sa propre prise en charge tout en maintenant des relations productives avec ses partenaires. Selon lui. Le contexte international marqué par une fragmentation croissante ne doit pas conduire à davantage d’isolement. Il estime qu’une telle orientation renforcerait les rivalités et accentuerait les divisions.

Le président rwandais défend une approche fondée sur la complémentarité. Il explique que le développement doit être perçu comme un jeu à somme positive, et non comme une compétition entre États. Cette vision, précise-t-il, peut favoriser une meilleure prévisibilité ainsi qu’une plus grande cohérence du système mondial.

Read the article on Kaweru.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki disasters offer lesson for AI governance

Prevention of tech-driven catastrophe requires quicker response than nuclear arms control

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
October 4, 2026

TOKYO — Restricting artificial intelligence while still harnessing it for human prosperity has emerged as one of the 21st century’s greatest challenges. U.S. President Donald Trump and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, agreed at their summit on Sept. 24 to further discuss the issue.
The superpowers have different strategic calculations regarding AI. The U.S., which currently leads the technological race, is cautious about hindering it with regulations, while China hopes to catch up by taking the lead in setting rules that work to its advantage. This is why Xi emphasized the need for AI governance during his visit to the U.S.
Opinions are divided even among Western countries. One camp argues that the pace of AI development should be slowed, with priority placed on creating safety measures to prevent catastrophic outcomes. The other contends that development must accelerate to keep from losing ground to China, a view strongly favored by Trump.
But the West should strive to achieve both goals simultaneously; this is not impossible.
If priorities are set, the top one should be to impede AI from running out of control. Even if the West were to win its competition with China, that victory would be meaningless if AI-driven biological or chemical attacks, or the destruction of critical infrastructure, were to occur.
The history of nuclear weapons demonstrates how difficult it will be to control AI-related risks.
In June 1945, scientists involved in the development of the atomic bomb produced the Franck Report, which argued that an “unannounced attack against Japan” was inadvisable to avoid sacrificing public support for the U.S. throughout the world. Yet in August of that year, bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
After World War II, the U.S. and Soviet Union engaged in a nuclear arms race. Serious efforts at arms control only began after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis that had brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. The following year, the countries established a hotline, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force in 1970.
It took 25 years after the atomic bombings until a global safety framework was established.
That much time is not left in the AI era. AI models can be replicated quickly, and once they spread, recalling them becomes difficult. Their owners are not limited to governments but also include companies, universities and individuals. If abused for military or terrorist purposes, the consequences could be catastrophic.
China is also concerned about uncontrolled AI, as indicated by one of its military officials at the Shangri-La Dialogue security summit in Singapore in late May. The militarization of emerging technologies, including AI, “is challenging traditional rules of engagement and ethics of war, increasing the risk of losing control,” Major General Meng Xiangqing said.
At the U.S.-China “Track 1.5” dialogue of government and industry officials held in Beijing in late August, AI safety was a central topic.
A framework to prevent AI-related disasters would benefit both the U.S. and China. The countries should establish mechanisms to ensure that major accidents and cyberattacks can be reported quickly, and share information on misuse by terrorist and criminal organizations.
Nevertheless, the West cannot afford to lose the AI race to China. Chinese AI systems have been widely criticized for refusing to answer questions about human rights issues or Taiwan, and for echoing Beijing’s official positions.
If such AI systems become deeply embedded in public administrations, schools and media around the world, the Chinese government’s narrative could gain greater acceptance around the world. China is also striving to create an international order for the technology by launching the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization.
Yet it is difficult to exclude Chinese AI entirely. Many AI models from the country are inexpensive and highly customizable, making them increasingly popular, particularly in emerging countries. If the U.S. blocks them from its market and those of its allies, Chinese models would only dominate the remaining nations.
As such, it would be wise for the U.S. and its Western allies to work together to develop AI systems that outperform Chinese alternatives and are easier to use.
The U.S. enjoys a significant lead in cutting-edge AI models and cloud infrastructure. Among its allies, Japan has manufacturing strengths that may prove advantageous in physical AI. Taiwan and South Korea are indispensable for semiconductor production, while Japan and Europe can play key roles in manufacturing equipment.
Maintaining U.S. leadership requires building AI models that its allies can trust.
In June, the U.S. Commerce Department temporarily restricted access to the latest model developed by Anthropic for national security reasons. If Washington is going to step in like this, it would help if it could inform the industry’s customers when access to AI models could be restricted and for how long.
With this kind of transparency, the U.S. could build the confidence it will need as it takes on China in the field. Cooperating with China to prevent AI-related disasters and preventing China from achieving AI hegemony are not mutually exclusive objectives.
In the case of nuclear weapons, the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, followed by the Cuban Missile Crisis, resulted in a globally shared understanding that unchecked escalation could lead to catastrophe.
“As for AI, such a sense of crisis is not yet widely shared, making it difficult [for countries] to agree on a comprehensive regulation,” said Nobumasa Akiyama, a professor at Hitotsubashi University and an expert on nuclear arms control. “For now, practical measures would be to create a system for accident reporting and a framework for crisis management.
“More important than the specific mechanisms, however, is confirming that countries in conflict can cooperate to protect their common interest of avoiding catastrophe.”
Major power rivalries hindered progress toward nuclear disarmament in the quarter century from the atomic bombings of Japan to the ratification of the NPT. Now similar rivalries are getting in the way of safeguarding humanity from the potential risks of AI.
Mechanisms to contain these risks must be established before they bring us to the edge of disaster.

 

Read article on Nikkei‘s website.

A cornered Putin might recklessly provoke NATO

As Russia struggles in Ukraine, its options are narrowing as resources at home dwindle

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
September 19, 2026

TOKYO — Negotiations aimed at ending the war in Ukraine have resumed. But it is difficult to believe that Russian President Vladimir Putin has abandoned his ambition to dominate the neighboring country. Rather, signs of a more dangerous trend are emerging.
CIA Director John Ratcliffe visited Moscow on Aug. 25 amid concerns that Russia could intensify provocations against NATO. According to U.S. media reports, Ratcliffe warned Russian officials against attacking the alliance.
The news reverberated across Europe.
A senior security official from a major European country said that the U.S. has not yet provided any explanation about Ratcliffe’s warning, adding that it is difficult to predict how Putin might act if he feels cornered.
Speculation about possible Russian military action against Europe is nothing new. In a speech made last December, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte warned that Russia could be in a position to launch an attack within five years.
According to the Wall Street Journal, U.S. intelligence reports say Putin could try to test NATO’s resolve with a limited assault on an allied country as early as autumn this year, or if not, at least before 2030.
What worries NATO is not a full-scale invasion of alliance territory but rather limited attacks by special forces or large-scale strikes on infrastructure. European security officials have grown increasingly concerned that Russia could orchestrate actions against NATO member states that stop just short of outright war.
Russia’s military continues to struggle in Ukraine. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank, Russian casualties surpassed 30,000 per month in 2026, with the cumulative number reaching about 1.4 million by June since the invasion began in February 2022. A direct military confrontation with the 32-member NATO alliance would be close to suicidal.
Yet there is no guarantee that Putin sees the situation the same way. Russia’s armed forces are exhausted and lack the capacity for a major offensive on the Ukrainian front. The Russian president may conclude that escalating tensions with Europe offers a better chance of breaking the current stalemate in Ukraine. In that case, Putin would have three options.
The first one is to continue the war of attrition and wait for Ukraine and its Western backers to tire and move toward compromise.
The second is to accept a ceasefire and save time to rebuild Russia’s military strength.
The third is to destabilize NATO through a hybrid campaign combining military provocations and intelligence warfare, thereby undermining the alliance’s unity.
At first glance, Russia would likely choose the first path. But a closer look at conditions inside Russia suggests otherwise. The country’s military and economic resources appear to be under strain, reducing its chances of winning a prolonged war of attrition.
While battlefield casualties continue to rise, recruitment is plateauing. Russia has relied on generous signing bonuses to attract contract soldiers. Compensation has been raised across the country, but the number of new contract recruits in the first half of 2026 totaled about 200,000, down from more than 210,000 a year earlier, according to figures released by Russia.
Ukrainian attacks are also hitting Russian oil refineries and transport infrastructure. Refinery throughput fell to an estimated 3.6 million barrels a day in July, the lowest level since May 2002.
Rising government spending and weaker energy revenues have further strained public finances. Russia’s budget deficit reached roughly $78.5 billion in the first four months of 2026, already exceeding the government’s original full-year target of about $50.6 billion. Liquid assets in the National Wealth Fund, which can be used to cover fiscal shortfalls, had shrunk to 1.5% of gross domestic product as of July 1 from 6.5% before the war.
There are few signs that these trends will reverse anytime soon. The longer Putin waits, the greater the risk that Russia’s position will deteriorate.
Then, a ceasefire, the second option, would look like the most sensible path. But for Putin, it would carry political risks. Once the fighting stops, it would become difficult to justify the extraordinary social controls imposed under wartime conditions.
Critics could also argue that Russia has failed to deliver gains commensurate with the sacrifices made. Returning veterans could become another source of domestic discontent.
Therefore, Putin may find himself drawn toward the third scenario: escalating provocations against NATO. The more pressure he faces, the stronger the temptation to bet on risky gambles.
“Russia has long embraced the concept of using measures short of war to deter an adversary or compel it to take action [in favor of Moscow],” said Yu Koizumi, an associate professor at the University of Tokyo’s Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology.
“If Russia attacks a NATO country, the objective would not be war itself but rather to sow divisions within Europe with the aim of forcing [the alliance] to reduce support for Ukraine and lift sanctions against Moscow,” he added.
This is not simply a European concern. Among Asian nations, Japan is a supporter of Ukraine, and Russia has designated it an “unfriendly country.” On Aug. 13, Putin became the first sitting Russian president to visit Etorofu Island, one of the Russian-controlled islands claimed by Japan as part of the so-called Northern Territories. Further provocations cannot be ruled out.
“Japan, as a supporter of Ukraine, needs to prepare for scenarios similar to those facing Europe,” Koizumi said. One possibility, he said, is that Russia could begin stopping, boarding or even seizing Western vessels operating near the Northern Territories.
Russia is often compared to a giant bear. When cornered, it bares its teeth and becomes more dangerous. Yet that does not mean the West can afford to ease the pressure out of fear of provoking Moscow. The U.S., Europe and Japan should calmly analyze Putin’s next moves, strengthen their coordination and reinforce their defenses accordingly.

 

Read article on Nikkei‘s website.

How China’s Japan-bashing is indirectly targeting Washington

Broad strategy aims to weaken foundations of US-led order in Asia

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
August 9, 2026

TOKYO — China’s Japan-bashing shows no sign of abating, pressuring the two nations’ relationship in areas such as diplomacy, security and trade.
Since spring, diplomats in the U.S. and Europe have often quietly talked about how Chinese President Xi Jinping behaved during meetings with foreign leaders visiting his country.
According to diplomatic sources, Xi on several occasions abruptly shifted the topic to Japan after otherwise friendly conversations. The sources said the Chinese president sternly accused Tokyo of moving toward rearmament and of undermining regional peace and stability, surprising some leaders.
China’s Japan-bashing began last November after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made a remark on a potential Taiwan contingency.
Takaichi told the Japanese parliament that if China were to take military action against Taiwan and U.S. forces responded to such a conflict, Japan could face what is known under its law as a “survival-threatening situation.”
Under such circumstances, Tokyo could exercise the right to collective self-defense and authorize the deployment of the nation’s Self-Defense Forces. While the Japanese government has explained that the remark does not mean Tokyo has changed its long-held position on Taiwan, Beijing interpreted it as signaling the possibility of Japan’s military involvement in a Taiwan conflict.
Even so, Xi appears to have gone too far. Criticizing Japan in multiple meetings with foreign leaders is definitely unusual.
Beijing has stepped up its anti-Japan diplomatic campaign in meetings with foreign leaders and through state media. It has labelled Tokyo’s defense buildup as “new militarism.”
Moreover, China has urged its citizens to refrain from traveling to Japan and tightened restrictions on exports of dual-use products, including rare earths, to Japan. From June to July, Beijing increased military activity around the Japanese archipelago including joint operations involving Chinese and Russian bombers and naval vessels.
Why has Beijing chosen to intensify pressure on Japan?
There are three factors behind the move, based on analysis by Japanese authorities and experts on China.
The first is that Xi’s hostile reaction to Takaichi’s Taiwan remark has prompted Chinese Communist Party officials and government bureaucrats to take an increasingly tough line toward Japan, partly as a way of demonstrating loyalty to the Chinese leader.
One episode illustrates this point. Earlier this year, when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi dined with a senior Southeast Asian leader, he devoted nearly half of the conversation to Japan, according to diplomatic sources in the region.
The second factor is Beijing’s desire to warn other countries over the Taiwan issue by making an example of Japan.
By targeting Japan, China seeks to send a message that countries that challenge Beijing on Taiwan could face serious consequences.
Such “make-an-example” diplomacy has become a familiar feature of China’s foreign policy. In 2018, after Canada detained a senior executive of China’s Huawei Technologies, Beijing restricted imports of Canadian agricultural products. In 2020, Beijing imposed sweeping economic sanctions on Australia after Canberra called for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19, which was first confirmed in the Chinese city of Wuhan.
Yet these factors alone do not fully explain why Beijing has gone so far as to accuse Japan of pursuing “new militarism.”
That leads to the third factor: China’s long-term strategy to compete with the U.S. over the international order.
Xi’s government has openly criticized the U.S.-led international system and has sought to promote an alternative version of global governance. In recent years, Beijing has promoted a concept of a “community with a shared future for mankind” and the Global Security Initiative framework as part of its effort to expand the China-led international system.
One of the biggest obstacles to that strategy, from Beijing’s perspective, is Japan’s deepening alliance with America.
Japan is located along the so-called First Island Chain, which stretches through the Japanese archipelago, Taiwan and the Philippines. Chinese strategists have long regarded the island chain as a geographic barrier that limits China’s ability to project power into the Pacific. From Beijing’s view, Japan represents a key pillar of the regional security architecture that constrains the expansion of its influence.
Against this backdrop came Takaichi’s remark on Taiwan.
Beijing seized on the remark to reinforce its narrative that Japan is returning to militarism. By doing so, Beijing hopes to undermine support for Japan’s efforts to strengthen its security framework.
In other words, China’s pressure against Japan is not aimed solely at Japan. It is part of a broader strategy to weaken the foundations of the U.S.-led order in Asia.
Analysts say Beijing may also believe that U.S. President Donald Trump places less emphasis on alliances, making it easier for China to take a tougher approach toward Japan.
Ryousei Kokubun, professor emeritus at Keio University, said China’s campaign should be viewed in a broader context.
“China has accused Japan of reviving militarism in the past over historical issues and Taiwan-related matters,” Kokubun said. “This time, however, Beijing’s criticism of what it calls Japan’s ‘new militarism’ is directed not only at Japan itself. It is also aimed at the U.S. behind Japan and at the U.S.-Japan alliance.”
China’s strategy nevertheless has its limits.
No major country in North America, Europe or Asia has echoed Beijing’s accusations that Japan is becoming more militaristic. If China continues its coercive action towards Japan, it could instead fuel greater concern among other countries about China’s own behavior.
Akio Takahara, a distinguished visiting professor at Tokyo Woman’s Christian University, argued that China’s gains from the campaign are likely to be limited.
“There is little benefit China can obtain from attacking Japan to this extent,” Takahara said. “Japanese investment in China could decline even further. Even so, it may be difficult for Beijing to lower a fist that it has already raised.”
Japan’s best response is to avoid being drawn into China’s provocations and to continue calling calmly for dialogue. On its side, China would also want to avoid a higher risk of unintentional military collision in the waters around Japan and elsewhere.
At the same time, Tokyo should coordinate more closely with Washington on China strategy while steadily strengthening its defense capabilities and alliance network. It will also become increasingly important for Japan to explain to the international community how such efforts contribute to regional stability.

Read article on Nikkei‘s website.

China and North Korea absorb lessons from Ukraine’s evolving battlefield

Drone production is only part of a broader shift toward networked warfare

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
June 27, 2026

TOKYO — War is humanity’s greatest tragedy, claiming countless lives, fracturing societies and leaving scars that endure for generations. Yet war is also, in its ironic way, a furnace of invention. Technologies forged in conflict spill into civilian life and, over time, reshape the character of conflict itself.
World War I produced the tank, built to claw through trench lines. World War II brought radar and code-breaking to maturity, altering the course of entire campaigns. For better or worse, nations race to absorb each new wave of battlefield innovation, hoping to turn it to their own advantage. In Ukraine today, that cycle is repeating with startling speed.
Cheap, expendable drones have enabled Ukraine to destroy Russian tanks and even warships, overturning decades of conventional military assumptions. As Russia has responded in kind, unmanned combat has rapidly proliferated, a shift many analysts view as a revolution in modern warfare.
Countries around the world, eager to grasp the technological transformation sweeping the battlefield, are closely studying the war unleashed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Nowhere is that attention more intense than in the Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — which lie on Russia’s doorstep and live with an acute sense of peril.
On May 14, I observed Spring Storm, one of Estonia’s largest military exercises. The multinational drill, which runs for about a month from early May, drew forces from more than a dozen nations, including the U.S., Britain and France.
The training grounds lay close to the Russian border, and to guard against hacking we were told to switch off our phones. Before reaching the site, I had expected to see tanks rumbling across fields and fighter jets carving through the sky. Instead, the area reverberated with the metallic whine of drones. The day’s drill focused on unmanned combat, with drones and other systems used for reconnaissance, strikes and electronic disruption.
A British Army soldier monitors the front line using unmanned surveillance equipment during a joint military exercise in Estonia. (Photo by Hiroyuki Akita)
What stood out was the presence of Ukrainian troops, invited so others could learn the latest techniques of drone warfare. “In drones and electronic warfare, we are behind Russia and Ukraine,” said Col. Aron Kalmus of the Estonian Defence Forces, who commanded the exercise. “We have to catch up, and quickly.”
The rapid, radical transformation of front-line combat is visible in a single statistic. Ukraine’s drone production surged from just 1,200 units in 2022 to around 1.7 million in 2024, marking a roughly 1,400-fold increase, according to the Kyiv-based think tank StateWatch. Russia, too, ramped up its production target to 1.4 million units in 2024.
But the deeper transformation lies not in volume alone. A new way of fighting is taking shape, one in which drones are fused into a unified network with ground forces, aircraft and missile units. Electronic warfare, the countermeasure of choice, is advancing just as quickly, creating a relentless contest in which each side races to blind, jam or hijack the other’s unmanned fleets.
One development, however, casts a darker shadow: the role of Pyongyang. North Korea is the only third nation to have sent troops to support Russia on the ground, reportedly more than 10,000 so far, with some analysts warning that another 25,000 to 30,000 could follow.
On Ukraine’s battlefields, North Korean forces are being exposed to some of the most advanced forms of unmanned and electronic warfare currently in use. In return for its troop deployment, Pyongyang is believed to have received Russian assistance in drone and electronic warfare technology, as well as technical support for reconnaissance satellites and missile development, according to assessments by South Korean intelligence and others. North Korea may be honing its ability to control drone swarms and counter enemy drones through sophisticated electronic warfare systems.
North Korea’s support for Russia extends well beyond manpower. It has shipped vast quantities of ammunition and even its KN-23, a short-range ballistic missile closely modeled on Russia’s Iskander system. Ukrainian intelligence now warns that live-fire data from those launches may be shared between Moscow and Pyongyang and used to enhance the missile’s accuracy.
“There is a danger that the North Korean military is absorbing the most advanced ways of fighting from Russia ahead of every other nation,” said Shinae Lee, a researcher at Japan’s Sasakawa Peace Foundation who in late May published an analysis of the risks of the deepening military partnership. “For the security of Asia, that is an extraordinarily grave threat.”
What unsettles the wider world is mounting signs that Russia is also sharing its combat experience in Ukraine with the Chinese military. Moscow relies heavily on China for the semiconductors and machine tools essential to sustaining mass arms production. Training assistance, it seems, is part of the repayment.
In June 2025, the Kyiv Post reported that Russia planned to host and train some 600 Chinese military personnel by year’s end, drawing directly on lessons from real combat to strengthen China’s ability to counter NATO-standard weapons systems. The Chinese military, for its part, secretly invited Russian personnel for training in the latter half of last year, according to Reuters.
China already commands one of the world’s largest shares of drone production and possesses formidable operational know-how. In March, it demonstrated Atlas, a drone swarm system capable of coordinating nearly 100 drones for missions including reconnaissance and attack. Combat data and operational experience gained in Ukraine could help speed China’s military transformation.
Sadly, there is little indication that Russia’s invasion will end soon and peace will return to Ukraine. As military innovation continues to evolve on the battlefield, the U.S., Europe, China and North Korea will likely race to draw lessons from it.
The countries most at risk of falling behind are Japan and South Korea, both situated close to China and North Korea. Tokyo and Seoul have refrained from full-fledged, direct military support for Ukraine, and their security exchanges with Kyiv remain limited compared with those of the U.S. and Europe.
Yet there is still much they can do, including deepening cooperation in civilian drone technology. What is important is to see Ukraine not merely as a recipient of aid, but as a partner whose battlefield experience offers valuable insights into the future of warfare.

Read article on Nikkei‘s website.

Asia shaken as US abandons role as guardian of rules-based order

Japan must step up efforts to safeguard peace in region

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
June 16, 2026

SINGAPORE — Defense ministers and senior military officers from Asia, the U.S. and Europe sparred at the Shangri-La Dialogue security summit in late May amid growing concern that U.S. President Donald Trump’s “peace through strength” approach could come at the expense of the “rules-based order.”
U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth appealed for understanding of Washington’s security strategy at the three-day conference, which concluded on May 31 in Singapore. However, listening to his speech firsthand, I could not help feeling that America’s leadership in upholding order in the Indo-Pacific is likely to erode further.
“We let ourselves get distracted by empty globalist rhetoric about the rules-based international order,” Hegseth said in his speech on May 30, rejecting the position of many European and other countries that place a premium on international law and rules. Instead, he advocated stability through strength, urging U.S. allies in Asia to accelerate efforts to bolster their defense capabilities.
Military buildups by China and North Korea have altered the balance of power in Asia and increased instability across the region. In this new reality, Hegseth’s argument that strength matters more than rules is not without merit. Even so, he went too far by denying the rules-based order, calling it nothing more than empty rhetoric. A world devoid of rules and order would leave major powers largely unchecked, with survival of the fittest becoming the governing principle.
Japan has pursued the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific based on international law and order since it was first championed by the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe about a decade ago. The current U.S. approach points in the opposite direction.
Many Southeast Asian conference participants voiced concern about the current situation.
“Institutions such as the United Nations, established to uphold stability, multilateralism and international law, are becoming increasingly weakened in the face of geopolitical rivalry,” Malaysian Defense Minister Mohamed Khaled Nordin said. “When developing nations violate agreements, they face condemnation and pressure. But when powerful countries or their allies do the same, the international response becomes conspicuously muted.”
Khaled did not mention any country by name but implicitly criticized what he suggested were military actions by the Trump administration of questionable legality under international law, including its strike on Iran.
The U.N. Security Council is responsible for maintaining international peace and order by identifying violations of international law and imposing sanctions on those responsible. But the council’s authority has been undermined since Russia, one of its permanent members, became an aggressor. If the U.S. retreats from its role in maintaining international order and the rule of law, global security will be dealt another blow.
However, this is not the first time the U.S. has scaled back its commitment to the international order. Weary of prolonged “war on terror” operations in Afghanistan and the Middle East, the Barack Obama administration declared in 2013 that America would no longer serve as the world’s policeman. The shift, then, did not begin with the inauguration of the Trump administration; it had been underway for years.
International law and rules are not only needed to prevent maritime and territorial disputes; they are also urgently needed to establish limits on the military use of artificial intelligence.
At a special session of the Shangri-La summit, participants discussed the risks posed by the military application of AI, which could lower the threshold for the outbreak of war. Senior military officials from Pakistan and China, both nuclear-armed states, warned that the use of AI could accelerate the pace of conflict to the point where it becomes difficult to control.
If the international order continues to erode and security tensions keep rising, Asia’s geopolitical landscape could be profoundly affected. There are three possible scenarios.
The first is that Asia splits into three camps as the U.S.-China rivalry intensifies. China’s neighbors, including Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, would deepen their ties with Beijing, while maritime nations such as Japan, Australia and the Philippines would strengthen their alliances with America to counter China’s growing influence. Meanwhile, countries such as Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia would seek a middle ground, avoiding alignment with either side.
The second would see a stronger sense of urgency driving deeper security cooperation among Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and Southeast Asian countries. By fostering regional cohesion, such cooperation could prevent Asia from fragmenting into rival camps and help preserve a certain level of stability.
The third lies somewhere in between. There is little doubt that the first would be the worst outcome and the second the most desirable.
Achieving the best-case scenario will be difficult but not impossible. “If there are concerns that U.S. military engagement in Asia may waver, momentum will grow even further to deepen security cooperation within the Asia region as a hedge against that risk,” said Bilahari Kausikan, former permanent secretary of Singapore’s foreign ministry. “We are already seeing such signs emerging even within ASEAN.”
ASEAN defense ministers in October agreed to conduct joint military exercises and expand cooperation to protect undersea cables and strengthen cybersecurity. However, unity among ASEAN members alone will not be sufficient to counter China’s formidable military power and preserve regional order. Japan’s actions will be crucial.
Japan needs to further strengthen its defense capabilities and support the U.S. to help ensure that it remains engaged in Asia. Tokyo should then expand defense assistance to ASEAN members and other regional partners.
Japan is taking steps in the right direction by drastically increasing defense spending and relaxing restrictions on defense equipment exports. Yet Asia’s geopolitical environment is deteriorating rapidly. The key question is whether Japan can adapt quickly enough to keep pace with the fast-changing situation.

Read article on Nikkei‘s website.

Aleksandar Vučić

President of the Republic of Serbia since 2017, Aleksandar Vučić previously served as Prime Minister of Serbia from 2014 to 2017, following his tenure as First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. A central figure in Serbian politics for more than three decades, he co-founded the Serbian Progressive Party in 2008 and became its President in 2012. Earlier in his career, he served as Minister of Information (1998–2000), Member of the National Assembly of Serbia and of the Federal Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and held various senior political responsibilities within the Serbian political system. As First Deputy Prime Minister, he played a leading role in Serbia’s efforts to combat corruption and contributed to the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, which led to the signing of the Brussels Agreement in 2013. As Prime Minister, he oversaw a programme of economic reforms aimed at restoring fiscal stability, reducing public debt and strengthening Serbia’s economic performance. President Vučić graduated from the Faculty of Law of the University of Belgrade in 1994. He is fluent in English and Russian and has a working knowledge of French and German.

Russia is weaker — but no less dangerous

Russia is weaker — but no less dangerous
Putin steps up cyber and other hybrid attacks against US allies in Europe

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
May 31, 2026

TALLINN, Estonia — Russian President Vladimir Putin must have left Beijing in a sour mood, quietly nursing frustration and disappointment.
During his two-day visit to the Chinese capital through May 20, Putin failed to clinch a final agreement from Chinese President Xi Jinping on Power of Siberia 2, a long-awaited pipeline that would carry Russian natural gas to China through Mongolia.
Xi dashed Putin’s hopes of winning a firm Chinese commitment on the project. For Moscow, the pipeline is central to its effort to redirect gas exports from Europe to Asia after Western sanctions and the war in Ukraine shattered its access to European markets. But Beijing was in no hurry, fully aware of its leverage. It appears to still be pressing for discounted gas supplies.
Putin faces tightening headwinds on several fronts. Russia’s economy is showing signs of strain, while on the battlefield in Ukraine, Russian forces continue to suffer heavy casualties even as the front lines remain deadlocked.
It would be dangerously ill-advised, however, to assume that a weakened Russia is necessarily less dangerous. History offers little comfort on this point: A declining autocrat does not always become more restrained. Russia may grow more reckless, more brutal and more unpredictable precisely because it is under pressure.
That risk was not lost on experts who attended two recent security conferences in Europe in mid-May: PISM Strategic Ark in Warsaw, Poland, and the Lennart Meri Conference in Tallinn, Estonia. At both gatherings, officials, analysts and other security specialists delivered a consistent warning: The Russian threat is growing, not receding.
European and NATO participants particularly emphasized that, despite worsening conditions, Russia is pressing ahead with the reconstitution of its military. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank, Russia’s active-duty troop strength, roughly 900,000 before its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, had grown to about 1.13 million by early 2025. Putin has ordered a further expansion to 1.5 million personnel.
The buildup is not aimed solely at Ukraine. Lithuanian intelligence and other security services report that since the invasion began, Russia has steadily reinforced troop concentrations along the borders of NATO member states.
At PISM Strategic Ark, Lt. Gen. Nicole Schilling, deputy inspector general of the German Armed Forces and the country’s second-highest-ranking military officer, warned that Russia should not be viewed as having exhausted its military capacity in Ukraine. Moscow, she suggested, is maintaining separate forces along the NATO front.
Perhaps most alarming is a recent line of analysis suggesting that Russia may be preparing for a possible attack on U.S. allies in Europe. In December, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte issued a dire warning, saying, “Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO within five years.”
At first glance, the idea may seem implausible. A Russia struggling to subdue a single, smaller country could hardly expect to prevail against NATO, an alliance of more than 30 members.
According to senior European military officers and security experts who attended the conferences in Poland and Estonia, the scenario Russia is most likely to be contemplating is a localized, short operation designed to paralyze the transatlantic alliance.
For example, one gambit Putin may be considering would proceed roughly along the following lines: Russian forces, or proxy troops operating without insignia, suddenly cross into part of the Baltic states or other neighboring territories. They destroy infrastructure, kill or wound civilians, and then withdraw, while leaving Russia in control of a narrow strip of land along the frontier.
NATO would then face an agonizing choice: invoke collective defense and risk full-scale war with Russia, or waver. The alliance would soon splinter, and over time NATO’s unity would begin to unravel.
If Putin is seriously entertaining such a plan, it could prove suicidal for Russia itself. Even if NATO as a whole failed to act, individual member states might retaliate. The result could be an all-out war Moscow neither wanted nor planned for.
Lt. Gen. Andrus Merilo, commander of the Estonian Defence Forces, told me that the danger lies in the way Putin may assess the confluence of factors. Merilo said it is hard to believe such a Russian gambit could succeed, but Putin may not see it that way and that could make the situation very dangerous.
Meanwhile, Russia is already waging war in the gray zone. Across Europe, hybrid operations are intensifying: infrastructure sabotage, arson attacks, drone provocations, cyberattacks and assassination plots.
According to a 2025 paper by Bart Schuurman, a professor of terrorism and political violence at Leiden University’s The Hague campus in the Netherlands, Russian hybrid attacks against Europe reached 44 incidents in 2024, more than seven times the number recorded in 2022.
What could further embolden Moscow is the widening rift between the U.S. and Europe. In May, Washington announced the withdrawal of about 5,000 troops from Germany, while leaving open the possibility of further reductions in Italy and Spain.
Europe has responded to the risk of a declining U.S. presence with a rearmament drive. In 2025, defense spending across Europe and Canada rose roughly 20% from the previous year.
But the picture is murkier than the headline figures suggest. Some of the new military equipment being acquired overlaps with purchases already being made by neighboring countries. Increased defense spending does not automatically result in greater military strength. Europe remains far from capable of mounting a credible defense without American support, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
The pressure and sense of urgency among NATO members were palpable at the Lennart Meri Conference.
Thomas Rowekamp, chairman of the German Bundestag’s defense committee, made the case for reintroducing conscription. He argued that Germany needs to increase its active-duty force from about 180,000 to 260,000 personnel, and said he doubted this could be achieved through a purely voluntary system alone. He called for a national debate on the possible return of conscription.
All that said, the West must also guard against the opposite error: overestimating Russian capabilities and allowing fear to harden into paralysis.
“There is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness,” Winston Churchill said about the Russians in a 1946 speech, offering insight into how to deal with them.
The West must not grow complacent about Russia’s waning power, nor flinch in the face of its provocations. To do so would be to hand Putin what he wants. Intimidation is his preferred instrument, and it works only if the other side allows itself to be intimidated.

Read article on Nikkei‘s website.

Anne-Claire Legendre

President of the Arab World Institute since February 2026, Anne-Claire Legendre previously served as Advisor on North Africa and the Middle East to the President of the French Republic from December 2023 to February 2026. A career diplomat, she was Spokesperson and Director of Communications and Press at the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs from 2021 to 2023. Prior to this appointment, she served as Ambassador of France to the State of Kuwait (2020–2021) and as Consul General of France in New York from 2016 to 2020. Between 2013 and 2016, she served in the office of Laurent Fabius, then Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Development, as Advisor on North Africa and the Middle East. Earlier, she was posted to the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New York (2010–2013), where she was responsible for Middle East affairs at the United Nations Security Council. She also served within the Directorate for North Africa and the Middle East at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, overseeing bilateral relations between France and Algeria (2008–2010), after contributing to the development of European consular cooperation within the Directorate for French Nationals Abroad (2007–2008). She began her diplomatic career at the French Embassy in Yemen as a Communications Advisor (2005–2006). A graduate of Sciences Po, she also studied Arabic at the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales and Modern Literature at Sorbonne Nouvelle University.

Jean-Pierre Landau

Associate Professor of Economics at SciencesPo (Paris). He has worked in the French Government for most of his career. He served
as Deputy Governor of the Banque de France (2006-2011), Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development as well as Undersecretary at the Ministry of Finance. He has been Visiting Lecturer at Princeton University (Woodrow Wilson School) and Visiting professor at SAIS (John Hopkins – Washington DC) and Senior Research Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School. He also was Dean of the School of Public Affairs at SciencesPo in 2014-2015.

Alexandre Musso

VP Sustainability for Europe & North Africa at Accor, a leading hospitality group. He provides support to hotels owners to execute the sustainable transformation among the hospitality industry. Previously, he served since 2021 as a Chief of Staff to the Accor’s Chief Sustainability Officer and as Sustainable Performance Director, within the Sustainability Department at Accor and had also worked in the social economy within the Group SOS, a french association leading the social economy in France and Europe, which he executed and put in place some social innovations. He joined the Fellowship of the Open Diplomacy Institute in 2026 and follows particularly the Sustainable transition topics. He holds two Master’s degrees from ESCP Business School where he studied Economics and from Sciences Po Paris where he studied public policies.

Arthur Rogé

Head of modelling and analysis for energy access at the International Energy Agency (IEA), where he works within the World Energy Outlook team. He has contributed to more than 20 IEA publications and has expertise across a broad range of energy topics, including energy access, CO₂ emissions, demand modelling, and energy affordability. He holds a French degree in mechanical and industrial engineering from Arts et Métiers, a Master of Science in Aerospace Engineering from Imperial College London, and a Master’s degree in International Energy from Sciences Po Paris. He joined the Fellowship of the Open Diplomacy Institute as he was appointed member of the French Delegation to the 2026 G7 Youth Summit (Y7).

Inès Rivoalen

Project Manager at ArianeGroup, where she works on a test bench for a reusable rocket engine. In this role, she contributes to the development and validation of next-generation space propulsion systems. She graduated with a double degree in general and space engineering, a multidisciplinary background that provides her a systems-level approach to complex engineering challenges. Alongside her professional activities, she is actively committed to promoting diversity in STEM fields. As a mentor with Elles Bougent, she works to encourage young women to pursue careers in the industry and research fields. Inès joined the Fellowship of the Open Diplomacy Institute when she was appointed member of the French Delegation to the 2026 G7 Youth Summit (Y7).

Dorian Revillon D’apreval

Advisor in the Environment Director’s Office at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). He provides strategic counsel to executive leadership, coordinates institutional engagement across multilateral fora, and drives transversal cooperation within the Directorate. Previously, as a Policy Officer at the French Ministry of Ecological Transition, he directed the coordination of France’s multilateral environmental negotiating positions (UN, G7, G20, WTO, OECD). During the French Presidency of the EU Council, he represented the EU and its Member States in negotiations of several resolutions at the 5th UN Environment Assembly. Dorian joined the Fellowship of the Open Diplomacy Institute when he was appointed in the French Delegation to the 2025 G7 Youth Summit (Y7) in Ottawa. He leads the training of the 2026 French Delegation to the Y7 and Y20. He grounds his policy expertise in scientific, business and legal frameworks, holding two Master’s from Maastricht University, in Sustainability Science as well as Globalisation and Law, and a Master’s in Business Law from Paris-Saclay University.

Raphaël Martin de Lagarde

Deputy Vice President for International Public Affairs at TotalEnergies since 2015. He held previously several positions at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs focusing on Eastern Europe, Middle East, Central and South Asia.

Amélia Louiba

Marketing Analyst at Thales Cybersecurity & Identity, currently based in Munich as part of a Volontariat International en Entreprise (VIE). In this role, she contributes to the commercial development of biometric and cybersecurity solutions for government customers. This position follows two years of apprenticeship within the same organization, where she worked as a Market Analyst. She graduated from a business school after completing two years of intensive literary preparatory classes, an academic path that fostered her strong interest in historical, geopolitical, and diplomatic issues, interests that continue to shape her professional trajectory and analytical approach.
Amélia joined the Fellowship of the Open Diplomacy Institute when she was appointed member of the French Delegation to the 2025 G7 Youth Summit (Y7) in Ottawa.

Adrien Lehman

Affiliated professor at Sciences Po school of public affairs and vice-president of Institute’s board of directors. Inspector in a French public financial institution, he is the author of three books on monetary and banking economics and on public policies economics. Adrien joined the Fellowship of the Open Diplomacy Institute in 2012 when he was appointed French Delegate to the G8 Youth Summit (Y8) in Washington D.C.

Elias Kassis

Vice President Strategy & Sustainability at TotalEnergies since September 2023. Previously he was President of Total E&P UAE and TotalEnergies Country Chair in the United Arab Emirates. Before that he held various positions in the Exploration & Production division of TotalEnergies, as Vice President North Africa in the MENA division, Managing Director of several affiliates of the Company in the Middle East and Asia, as well as other assignments in Paris, Venezuela and Qatar. He began his career in TotalEnergies in 1991 and held various positions in the Trading and the Gas & Power divisions until 2002. Mr. Kassis holds an Engineering Master’s Degree from the Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble and a Master’s Degree in Finance from ESSEC Business School.

Carla Furlan

Head of International Partnerships and Public Affairs for HDF Energy, a pioneering French company at the forefront of renewable energy and hydrogen innovation. She designs and implements strategic engagement with high-level political stakeholders, bridging corporate vision with institutional action to accelerate the energy transition. By navigating the intersection of policy, regulation, and industry, she secures critical support for transformative projects, ensuring alignment between business objectives and the evolving geopolitical landscape. A graduate of emlyon business school in International Negotiation and Business, Clara brings a sharp understanding of global dynamics to her work. As the Head of the French Delegation to the 2026 G20 Youth Summit (Y20), she drives forward-looking proposals to address the energy and environmental dimensions of today’s polycrisis, advocating for solutions that merge ambition with pragmatism.

Aurélien Duchêne

Fellow of the Open Diplomacy Institute, he was appointed French Delegate to the 2025 G20 Youth Summit (Y20) in Johannesburg and Co-Chair of the 2026 G7 Youth Summit (Y7).Independent consultant on geopolitics and defence, a researcher at the Euro Créative think tank, and a lecturer at the Catholic University of Lyon and ILERI. He regularly appears in the French media, notably as a commentator for the LCI channel, and in international media, to analyse strategic developments. Aurélien Duchêne is the author of Russia: The Next Strategic Surprise? (2021), which notably predicted a Russian invasion of Ukraine, Putin’s Russia versus the West (Eyrolles, 2024), which has been translated into Polish, and Europe and its Armies (Eyrolles, 2026), co-authored with Robin Gastaldi. He also regularly writes for major newspapers (Le Monde, Le Figaro…) or specialist journals.

Fabrice Chevalier

Deputy VP for International Public Affairs at TotalEnergies since December 2022. Before joining the Public Affairs team, he spent his entire career in TotalEnergies’ Exploration and Production branch, first in Finance (as CFO of several subsidiaries) and then in Business: he headed the Economics and Planning division and subsequently moved to New Business and the negotiation of oil and gas contracts in Eastern Europe and Asia.

Raphaël Canonne

Fellow of the Open Diplomacy Institute, French Delegate for Global Health and Food Security to the 2026 G20 Youth Summit (Y20), where he works at the intersection of global health, policy, and advocacy with other delegates and experts. He is a 6th-year medical student at Sorbonne Université, working in global health and international advocacy. He formerly served in the international team of the International Federation of Medical Student (IFMSA) , representing 1.5 million medical students in global health events and negotiations. Raphael also supported the development of the French WHO Youth Delegates Program in collaboration with the Ministry of Health. His work is focused on advancing health diplomacy and empowering the next generation of health leaders.

Pauline Da Cunha

Fellow of the Open Diplomacy Institute, appointed Deputy Secretary-General of the 2026 Y7 Summit. In this capacity, she leads outreach operations of Y7, fostering engagement with civil society and local stakeholders, and strengthening advocacy for the recommendations put forward to the G7. Graduate of the Master’s program in International Security at Sciences Po Paris, she is a policy officer at the Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS) of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces and Veterans, where she works on arms control and non-proliferation issues. Alongside her civilian duties, she serves as an intelligence officer in the operational reserve of the French Navy. She has gained diverse professional experience within the French Armed Forces Headquarters, the National Assembly, the French Embassy in Djibouti, as well as in the private sector and research, providing her with a cross-cutting perspective on defense diplomacy and security issues.

Thomas Chesneau-Daumas

Fellow of the Open Diplomacy Institute, he was appointed as a French delegate to the 2026 G20 Youth Summit (Y20) in Washington. He is a student pursuing a dual degree in Engineering at Mines Nancy and a Master’s in Public Policy at Sciences Po Paris, with a focus on industrial policy, innovation, and international affairs. He has gained experience across both the public and private sectors, notably as a Corporate Strategy Analyst at Bpifrance, the French public investment bank, at Thales in strategy and international business development, and within the French Ministry of the Economy and Finance, where he worked on European industrial policy. Alongside his academic and professional experience, he was elected student representative to the Board of Directors of Mines Nancy and served as President of TEDxMinesNancy, leading initiatives at the intersection of ideas, innovation, and public engagement.

Héloïse Chapuis

Sociologist and Strategist, conducting ethnographic research projects focused on the healthcare and pharmaceutical industry. She holds a MSc in Science and Technology Studies from University College London (UCL) and a BASc in Organismal Biology and Political Science from McGill University. Beyond her professional practice, she serves as a First Responder and Local Director of Solidarity and Social Affairs within the Paris 11 branch of the Protection Civile Association, coordinating outreach patrols towards homeless populations, managing solidarity initiatives, and overseeing the training and progression of first responders in matters relating to social action. She joined the Open Diplomacy Institute as a Fellow in 2025, supervising delegates leading a thorough consultation process with experts, civil society representatives, and academics, in an effort to draft propositions ahead of the G7 and G20 Youth Summits (Y7 and Y20).

Miranda Browne

Head of Development at the ESSEC Institute for Geopolitics & Business, building partnerships and working to help companies anticipate and adapt to geopolitical disruptions in the post-globalization era. Through her work, she contributes to strengthening the dialogue between the worlds of business, policy, and international affairs. Before joining ESSEC, she worked on strategic projects within the marketing and retail teams of leading international brands, including Chanel and Google. Alongside this experience, Miranda has actively led and supported initiatives promoting Diversity and Inclusion, contributing to projects in both French NGOs and the corporate sector. She joined the Open Diplomacy Institute as Fellow in 2025.

Sephora Benmira

Analyst at the Presidency of the French Republic (Élysée), working within the Strategic Monitoring and Analysis Center, where she has contributed for nearly two years. Prior to joining the Élysée, she gained experience through several internships, notably within the office of the President of the French National Assembly, Yaël Braun-Pivet, as well as at the French United Nations Association, where she engaged with international cooperation and multilateral affairs.Sephora holds a degree from ESSEC Business School and a Master of Science from Bocconi University (Milan, Italy) in Management of Governments and International Organizations, equipping her with a strong foundation in public policy and global governance. Alongside her institutional role, she serves as Head of Communications for the 2026 G7 Youth Summit (Y7) organized by the Open Diplomacy Institute.

Thomas Friang

Executive Director of the ESSEC Institute for Geopolitics & Business, fostering research, graduate, and executive education programs at ESSEC Business School exploring how companies can anticipate and adapt to geopolitical disruptions. Before joining ESSEC Business School, he served as Advisor to the French Minister for Development and International Partnerships, contributing to France’s international cooperation agenda. Thomas is also the Founder and CEO of the Open Diplomacy Institute, a non-partisan think tank dedicated to developing policy and leadership solutions to the polycrisis that hinders progress toward the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). He launched and chaired the Y20 Summit in 2011 and the Y7 Summit in 2019, creating global youth engagement platforms, embedded in the G20 and G7 diplomatic processes. His leadership in multilateral diplomacy and sustainable development has been recognized internationally: he was awarded with the Engagement Medal of the French Republic (2021), appointed Laureate of the Giverny Award for Leadership in Sustainability (2022), named as an SDG Goalkeeper by the Gates Foundation (2023) and as an Aspen Young Leader (2024).

Beatrice Drăghiciu

Founder of BFD Private Diplomacy SRL (november 2025), a strategic advisory firm specializing in public policy, governance, negotiation strategy, and high-level institutional engagement. Through this platform, she advises organizations on stakeholder relations and strategic positioning in complex political and regulatory environments. Romanian legal and public affairs expert whose career spans strategic advisory, institutional governance, justice reform, and high-level policy coordination. With extensive experience supporting senior decision-makers across key state institutions, she has established herself as a trusted adviser in the fields of justice, internal affairs, and international cooperation. Between 2018 and 2023, she served as adviser to three successive Romanian Ministers of Justice. In these roles, she provided legal and strategic counsel on institutional reform, judicial policy, and interinstitutional cooperation. She played a central role in facilitating dialogue between the Ministry of Justice, the Romanian Government, Parliament, judicial authorities, and European institutions, including the European Commission. In 2023, she was appointed State Counsellor within the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister of Romania, where she contributed to executive decision-making and coordinated domestic and international initiatives of strategic importance. Concurrently, she served as Honorary Counsellor within the Ministry of Internal Affairs until October 2025, supporting policy coordination and institutional dialogue on matters of national significance. She was directly involved in two major milestones for Romania: the successful conclusion of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) in the field of justice and the negotiations leading to Romania’s accession to the Schengen Area in 2023–2024. Her contributions to public service have been recognized through several high-level distinctions, including the National Order “For Merit” – Rank of Knight (2025), the Honor Emblem of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (2025), and the Distinction of Honour of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (2024). Alongside her professional activities, Drăghiciu has contributed to academia as an Associate Lecturer at the Bucharest University of Economic Studies and as a Research Assistant in Legal Sciences at Titu Maiorescu University. She holds a law degree and a master’s degree in criminal sciences and is currently pursuing doctoral research on the international responsibility of states in environmental law. Fluent in English and Spanish, she combines legal expertise, policy analysis, diplomatic acumen, and executive leadership.