What Asia can learn from European rearmament

What Asia can learn from European rearmament
Europe’s pivot serves as a warning: US military intervention should no longer be taken for granted

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
May 31, 2025

TALLINN, Estonia — Europe is undergoing its most dramatic security realignment since the end of the Cold War, a shift with far-reaching implications for the continent and beyond. At the heart of this transformation is a growing determination to strengthen its own defense capabilities while reducing reliance on the U.S. military.

The impetus for this pivot is twofold: the immediate threat posed by an increasingly belligerent Russia, and growing unease over the unpredictability of U.S. military support under President Donald Trump. But this is not solely Europe’s concern. Asia, despite its geographic distance, cannot afford to see these developments as completely irrelevant.

Estonia, a Baltic nation bordering Russia, stands at the forefront of Europe’s rapidly evolving security landscape. When I returned in mid-May after a year away, the country was in a state of heightened, quasi-war tensions, fueled by Moscow’s relentless assault on Ukraine.

On May 13, the day before my arrival, an unflagged tanker — suspected of being part of the so-called shadow fleet, a secretive network of ships transporting Russian oil around the world — appeared off Estonia’s coast. When the Estonian Navy attempted to inspect the vessel, a Russian fighter jet entered Estonian airspace in what appeared to be an effort to disrupt the operation, the first such intervention by Russia.

Russian cyberattacks and acts of sabotage targeting Estonia’s critical infrastructure have also intensified. In response, NATO conducted a large-scale military exercise in May, code-named Hedgehog, simulating an invasion of Estonia, a member of the alliance.

At Amari Air Base in northern Estonia, the roar of British helicopters and Portuguese F-16s filled the skies as they carried out combat drills.

“In my mind, Europe is already [at] war. … We have to end living in a dream,” Major Gen. Andrus Merilo, commander of the Estonian Defence Forces replied when I asked about Russia’s threat.

“Currently the battlefield is in Ukraine, but [the] war will not end in Ukraine. … [Russia’s] aim is to restore the dominance in the region, including Estonia.

“We would like to live in peace. But unfortunately, peace is temporarily over. Now, it’s in our hands to start not only managing escalation but also building whatever [capabilities] we can to control this [situation].”

Amid rising tensions, ministers, military leaders and policy experts from the U.S., Europe and beyond gathered in Tallinn, Estonia’s capital, from May 16 to 18 for the Lennart Meri Conference, an annual forum on international security and foreign policy.

This year’s gathering differed markedly from previous ones, both in tone and substance. The debates were more urgent, more pointed and more detailed, focusing on Europe’s accelerating shift away from an excessive reliance on a U.S. security umbrella. At the center of the discussions was a pressing question: What must Europe do to build credible defense capabilities? From defense spending and force readiness to the resilience of the arms industry, participants engaged in impassioned exchanges of views.

Europe’s increased sense of vulnerability was most evident in the debate over the continent’s reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Some participants openly questioned whether the U.S. would continue to extend its nuclear deterrent to Europe, prompting discussion over the extent to which France’s nuclear arsenal could serve as a viable alternative.

In addition to the growing threat posed by Russia, urgency was heightened by Trump’s rhetoric and policies, which have raised doubts about the reliability of U.S. commitments to its allies. The Trump administration is now actively weighing a reduction in U.S. troop deployments in Europe.

“It’s more than 30 years of U.S. desire [to reduce troops in Europe], President Trump just said, enough, this is going to happen and it’s going to happen now, this is going to be orderly, but we are not going to have any more patience for foot dragging in this situation,” U.S. Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker said at the conference.

Whitaker indicated that formal negotiations with Europe regarding U.S. troop reductions might commence later this year. While the details remain uncertain, one conclusion was clear: Europe must urgently prepare for a future less reliant on American protection.

The question is how feasible such autonomy truly is. Judging by defense spending alone, Europe’s resolve appears genuine: 22 of NATO’s 30 European members seem to have met the goal of spending 2% of gross domestic product on defense by 2024. Yet the path forward is fraught with challenges, not least because Europe lacks a unified security vision. Perceptions of the Russian threat vary widely, shaped largely by each member state’s geographic proximity to Russia.

According to European security officials, NATO Europe can be broadly divided into three camps. The first mostly consists of northern European countries that view the Russian threat with utmost seriousness — among them the Nordic nations, the Baltic states, the U.K. and Poland.

The second group comprises southern European countries such as Spain, Portugal and Italy. While they acknowledge the threat posed by Russia, their more immediate concerns center on refugees arriving from Africa and other pressing regional issues.

The third group occupies a middle ground, with Germany as a typical example. According to a German ambassador stationed in Europe, Berlin is primarily focused on preventing a war with Russia — a priority that diverges somewhat from the more hardline stance of the Baltic states, among the alliance’s most vocal critics of Moscow.

Ultimately, the future of European defense will likely be shaped by a coalition of willing nations.

“There are differences in position within NATO, making it difficult for all members to act in unison,” said Michael Clarke, an expert on European security and a former director-general of the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based defense think tank. “For example, in the case of the conflict with Russia, it is likely that about a dozen northern European countries, including the U.K., would form a coalition of the willing with NATO’s endorsement and act together.”

Across the Atlantic, Washington now regards China as its foremost threat, while concerns over North Korea continue to intensify. But it would be misguided for countries like Japan and South Korea to assume that Asia will be spared from potential U.S. troop reductions.

Within the Trump administration — particularly among proponents of the “America First” or MAGA (Make America Great Again) policy, such as Vice President JD Vance — there is a belief that responsibility for addressing threats posed by China and North Korea should fall primarily on those most directly affected: Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.

According to U.S. media reports, proposals have already emerged to cut U.S. troop levels in South Korea by around 4,500 personnel, with plans to redeploy them elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. military footprint in Japan may not remain untouched either.

But a former senior U.S. Defense Department official familiar with internal Trump administration deliberations said opinions within the government remain far from unified regarding the future scale of U.S. forces in Asia. While some MAGA-aligned officials question the need to maintain current troop levels, others, particularly within the Pentagon, State Department and military, argue for reinforcing the U.S. presence to better deter China’s growing assertiveness.

The most dangerous near-term scenario would be the simultaneous escalation of crises in Europe and Asia, triggering a scramble for America’s finite military resources. Preventing such a development will require close coordination and strategic alignment among U.S. allies on both sides of the globe.

The need for transatlantic and Indo-Pacific cooperation has never been more urgent.

Read article on Nikkei‘s website.

How eroding public support could make Trump even more aggressive

How eroding public support could make Trump even more aggressive
Recent China tariff deal shows president holds fewer cards to push his trade agenda

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
May 18, 2025

TOKYO — In poker, players who believe they hold a strong hand usually stay quiet and play on, aiming to raise the stakes and extract more money from their opponents.

But U.S. President Donald Trump, who often touts his dealmaking prowess and casts himself as a poker expert, has been acting in ways that defy this logic. His impatience for a quick tariff deal with China is a prime example.

On the surface, the deal announced on Monday appears to be a balanced compromise. In reality, it marks a significant climbdown for Trump, involving sharp reductions to previously imposed tariffs. As part of a 90-day truce, both countries agreed to roll back their respective rates by 115 percentage points: The U.S. will cut duties on Chinese imports from 145% to 30%, while China will reduce tariffs on American goods from 125% to 10%.

Trump had long vowed to exert unparalleled pressure on Beijing to dismantle what he called an “unfair” trade regime. Yet he pulled back his most potent card, even though China offered no written commitment to structural reforms. In poker terms, Trump tipped his weak hand.

He might have had little choice, given the mounting headwinds he faces. According to the polling average compiled by U.S. media company RealClearPolitics, his approval rating stood at just 46% at the 100-day mark of his presidency. Over the nearly half-century, he is the only U.S. president to have fallen below the 50% threshold so early in office. While support among Republican voters remains solid, independents are beginning to drift away.

A major source of the turbulence is his underperforming economic agenda. In early April, Trump announced a sweeping set of “reciprocal” tariffs targeting multiple countries. But the move spooked financial markets, prompting the administration to backtrack 13 hours later by offering a 90-day grace period. Key electronic goods, including smartphones, were also temporarily exempted from the tariffs.

In a separate episode, Trump called for the resignation of Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, frustrated by the Fed’s resistance to lowering interest rates as aggressively as he wanted. But facing a sharp decline in stock prices, Trump ultimately backed down from the demand.

In light of these developments, some policymakers in Europe and Japan have begun to express cautious optimism. The weakening economic sentiment in the U.S., combined with sharp price declines and other warning signs from financial markets, might have heightened Trump’s awareness of the risks associated with a prolonged tariff war. Looking ahead, they hope he will be compelled to gradually moderate both his rhetoric and his actions.

The latest U.S.-China tariff agreement is likely to reinforce optimism that Trump may be shifting toward a more pragmatic approach.

However, the belief that mounting political and economic pressure will temper Trump’s combative style could be misguided. His overriding priority remains rallying his core supporters — fervent backers of his “America First” agenda — and securing a decisive victory in next year’s midterm elections.

If he is forced to scale back his signature tariff offensive, he is likely to double down on his hardline stance in other areas. With the stakes high in the midterm elections, alienating his loyal base is a risk he is unwilling to take.

The central question is whether the U.S. can extract enough concessions from China during the next 90 days of negotiations for Trump to claim a “victory.” But the road ahead is anything but smooth. While the tariff war is certain to take a toll on China’s economy, President Xi Jinping and his administration appear confident that the country is better positioned to endure the pain.

Unlike Trump, Xi faces no electoral pressures, and in China, the government, central bank and state-owned enterprises all operate in lockstep with his directives.

“If the situation remains unchanged, Chinese-made household goods, clothing and toys will start to disappear from U.S. store shelves, fueling consumer frustration,” said a Chinese political analyst familiar with Beijing’s U.S. strategy, speaking before the latest U.S.-China tariff deal was announced. “While the tariff war is undoubtedly challenging for China, it poses greater political risks for Trump.

“The Chinese government believes it holds the upper hand in this game of chicken.”

If a compromise is reached and a full-blown tariff war is averted, it would be a welcome development for the global economy. However, such an outcome is unlikely to soften Trump’s confrontational stance. Should he conclude that the China tariffs have failed to achieve his objectives, it becomes more likely that he will escalate bold and potentially disruptive policies in other areas, domestic and international, to keep his base energized.

At home, Trump is already ramping up pressure on groups and institutions he views as ideological adversaries. A notable example is his targeting of elite universities like Harvard and Columbia, which he considers liberal strongholds. Citing what he calls their failure to adequately address “antisemitic activity” on campus, Trump has taken steps to revoke federal research grants and other funding.

In foreign policy, Trump is expected to intensify his pursuit of high-profile achievements. If successful, these efforts could benefit the broader international community. However, if they fail, his impatience and erratic policymaking may become even more pronounced.

Trump’s top diplomatic priority is brokering a ceasefire in Ukraine, but progress remains stalled due to the wide gulf between Russia and Ukraine. If negotiations fail to yield concrete results, he may opt to publicly criticize both sides and withdraw from the mediation process. Such a move could result in the suspension of U.S. military aid to Ukraine, further destabilizing an already volatile situation.

If Trump abandons his ceasefire efforts, he is likely to shift his focus to other high-stakes issues — most notably, the Iran nuclear talks or the North Korea situation. He may attempt to pressure Tehran into dismantling or halting its nuclear program, and if no concessions are made, he could escalate military threats.

People tend to believe in the outcomes they desire. However, assuming that a desperate Trump will soften his position is a risky bet. A wiser strategy would be to brace for the possibility that, when cornered, he may take unpredictable — and potentially destabilizing — actions.

Read article on Nikkei‘s website.

Joseph Nye: Intellectual giant who saved US-Japan alliance

Joseph Nye: Intellectual giant who saved US-Japan alliance
Foreign policy expert believed Washington’s tilt to isolationism would create instability

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
May 9, 2025

TOKYO — If forced to name just one of Joseph Nye’s many accomplishments, one would typically choose the concept of “soft power” — that countries can pursue diplomacy through ideas and values and not just through military strength.

But from the perspective of the Asia-Pacific, Nye, a former dean of Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government who died Tuesday, made even more significant contributions.

In the early 1990s, calls to drastically reduce the U.S. troop presence in Asia were gaining traction in Washington. The Cold War was over, and the threat of the Soviet Union had vanished.

As the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Bill Clinton administration, Nye was opposed to this idea. He believed that withdrawing the U.S. military would increase the risk of conflict in the region. Working together with then-Defense Secretary William Perry, he redefined the U.S.-Japan alliance as essential to stability in Asia and pushed to maintain the 100,000 U.S. troops deployed in East Asia.

This policy came to be known as the Nye Initiative. Without his work, the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea alliances could have been greatly weakened, and the Korean peninsula and the seas in Asia made much more dangerous. In this sense, Nye was an intellectual giant who saved the U.S.-Japan alliance.

One of Nye’s most striking qualities was his ability to listen. During interviews, he would listen carefully to the question and ensure that he understood what the interviewer wanted to know. When answering, he would get straight to the essence of the matter in a calm, measured tone. His spoken statements conveyed a sharp logic, as though they were beautifully crafted writing.

As the assistant secretary of defense, Nye also worked to engage with the Chinese military. At the time, I was stationed in Beijing, and I distinctly recall Nye repeatedly emphasizing the importance of military dialogue between the U.S. and China at a press conference during a visit there. In more recent years, he would express his concern that such military-to-military talks were disappearing.

Nye also worked together with the late Richard Armitage, a former deputy secretary of defense, to publish six reports aimed at strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. A leading figure in the liberal theory of international relations, Nye was not originally an expert on Japan.

Nye was driven to champion the U.S.-Japan alliance out of his deep insight into and reflection on history. He knew that if the U.S. turned to isolationism, global instability would follow. He shared this concern during the first Donald Trump administration.

In his view, the U.S. has an instinct to turn inward. Before both the first and second World Wars, the U.S. initially turned inward, recoiling from involvement in Europe and elsewhere. It was only when no other option remained that the U.S. finally took action.

When I met Nye in Tokyo in November last year, I asked him if he thought that America could resist the lure of isolationism. He answered vaguely that the U.S. was at a watershed moment. He too was uncertain of the degree to which Trump 2.0 would damage U.S. foreign policy.

In his later years, Nye warned against underestimating China’s power. In Washington and elsewhere, some observes argue that China had peaked, and that it would enter a period of decline because of a shrinking population and other factors.

Nye believed otherwise. China may be plateauing, he said, but it was premature to say that it would decline. It was the analysis of a great scholar who was deeply versed in the rise and fall of great powers.

So, could it be that U.S. leadership as a superpower is merely plateauing, and the country could soon experience a revival? I would have liked to hear his thoughts on the matter one more time.

Read article on Nikkei‘s website.

Trump-driven disorder rattles emerging economies

Trump-driven disorder rattles emerging economies
Countries reel from misjudging risks of new US president

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
May 6, 2025

TOKYO — Until late 2024, many major emerging economies viewed Donald Trump’s impending return to the U.S. presidency favorably. They believed that by accepting economic “deals,” they could foster a strong relationship with a second Trump administration — without facing significant pressure on human rights or other sensitive issues.

A November 2024 poll by the European Council on Foreign Relations, conducted after Trump’s election victory, found that emerging countries broadly welcomed his return.

In India, 84% of respondents described Trump’s election as “a good thing,” while 61% shared that view in Saudi Arabia. Likewise, in Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey and Brazil, positive opinions consistently outnumbered negative ones.

A senior Indian official echoed this sentiment in a conversation with Nikkei in New Delhi in December, saying Trump’s return is advantageous for India because the new president is unlikely to interfere in the country’s domestic affairs over human rights and recognizes its strategic importance.

However, that initial optimism is now fading. The disruption Trump is unleashing on the global stage has far exceeded what emerging economies anticipated, with his “America First” diplomacy proving much more assertive than during his first term.

From March 17 to 19, the Raisina Dialogue, an annual forum on international affairs, was held in New Delhi. At a breakout session featuring prominent thinkers from emerging economies across Asia and the Middle East, concerns about Trump’s return to power surfaced repeatedly.

“There’s a new sheriff in town, and the new sheriff in town wants to do things his way,” said Sunjoy Joshi, chairman of India’s Observer Research Foundation think tank. “Well, [Trump is] trying to do a big reset, and a lot of things which are going to be shaken around in the process of this reset.”

Regarding Trump’s reported interest in acquiring Greenland, a territory of Denmark, and even Canada, a former Indonesian official expressed bewilderment, saying the U.S. now appears to harbor “territorial ambition.” The shift, the official noted, “is different from Trump 1.0, and for us, this is quite, quite puzzling.”

The so-called Global South, a diverse group of emerging and developing countries, varies widely in terms of national power and ambitions and is far from a unified bloc. However, major emerging nations within the Group of 20, such as India, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa, Saudi Arabia and Mexico, broadly share a common aspiration.

Their shared goal is to reshape the international order, which has been dominated by the U.S. and Europe since World War II, and to create a system that more fully reflects their voices. In short, they seek to realize a truly multipolar world.

While dissatisfaction among emerging nations with the U.S.- and Europe-centric system is not new, their growing influence has transformed long-standing frustration into outright anger.

One frequent source of frustration is the composition of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Of the five seats, three are held by leading Western powers — the U.S., the U.K. and France. A South African official voiced indignation, remarking that despite the rising influence of the Global South, this is not reflected in the council’s structure, which he deemed unfair.

From this perspective, many emerging countries initially saw Trump’s return as an opportunity. Unlike his predecessor, Joe Biden, who championed summits for democracy and remained firmly committed to a U.S.-led international order, Trump, with his singular focus on national interests, was seen as more likely to facilitate a shift toward a multipolar world.

However, emerging nations miscalculated, underestimating Trump’s threat to their vision. His extreme actions now threaten to plunge them into chaos, rather than paving the way for multipolarity.

Undoubtedly, their gravest misjudgment has been the U.S. imposition of “reciprocal” tariffs. In early February, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Washington and pledged to increase imports of U.S. energy. Despite this, India was hit with a 26% tariff. Similarly, Indonesia and Vietnam faced crippling levies of 32% and 46%, respectively.

That said, Trump may choose to ease tariff pressures, mindful of the potential impact his policy could have on the financial markets. Some countries might even succeed in negotiating exemptions or reductions with Washington.

However, such moves would not provide a fundamental solution. If a tariff war dampens the global economy, it could significantly affect the prospects of emerging economies. On April 22, the International Monetary Fund lowered its global growth forecast for this year by 0.5 percentage points from its January estimate, bringing it down to 2.8%.

Dino Patti Djalal, former Indonesian ambassador to the U.S., emphasized the potentially severe repercussions of Trump’s tariff agenda on the global economy. “For Indonesia, the biggest threat posed by the Trump administration is high tariffs,” he said. “The worst-case scenario for us is that the tariff war between major countries heats up and the global economy cools down.”

In the medium term, Trump’s security policy could also jeopardize the growth of emerging countries. In his eagerness to secure a ceasefire in Ukraine, Trump may pursue an agreement with terms favorable to Russia. Should that occur, the risk of a renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine would remain high. In the worst-case scenario, food and energy crises could flare up once more, severely impacting emerging and developing countries.

In an effort to mitigate these risks, emerging economies are moving swiftly to strengthen ties with China as well as other major countries. Earlier in April, Indonesia held its first-ever “two-plus-two” dialogue with China, bringing together their foreign and defense ministers. Malaysia and Cambodia also plan to establish similar strategic frameworks for talks with Beijing.

Following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, emerging nations seemed poised to establish themselves as a “third pole,” independent of both the West and the China-Russia bloc. However, the unexpected turbulence caused by Trump’s policies has unsettled these prospects, and emerging countries are likely to remain preoccupied with protecting their own interests rather than building their own “pole” for the time being.

Read article on Nikkei‘s website.

Will AI Bury Future Generations in Cognitive Debt?

Will AI Bury Future Generations in Cognitive Debt?

As companies seek to automate repetitive tasks in the name of cost-cutting, they should consider the longer-term implications. If we transfer all codified knowledge to machines, we will bequeath to future generations a world where it will be ever harder to learn by doing, to achieve mastery, and thus to aspire to creative freedom.

PARIS – The pianist Keith Jarrett’s Köln Concert is one of the greatest pieces of improvisation in the history of jazz – an hour of unrestrained glory, delivered without a score or a plan. But Jarrett’s achievement owed nothing to chance. Rather, it was the outcome of thousands of hours of tedious repetition – endless scales that honed the pianist’s reflexes and muscle memory. Geniuses of improvisation rely on mastery, which itself comes from practice. They are not just winging it. […]

Find the entire article written by Bertrand Badré and Florian Ingen-Housz on Project Syndicate.

Globalization Is Dead, but Planetarization Has Yet to Be Born

Future historians (if there are any) will wonder why, in the mid-2020s, humans poured unprecedented resources into preparing to fight each other, while neglecting collective action against obvious planetary threats. If there is to be any hope of survival, a new mindset must take hold.

Sept. 11, 2025

PARIS – In November 1985, during their first summit in Geneva, US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev slipped away from the official proceedings to speak privately. Only years later did we learn what they discussed. Gorbachev told the broadcaster Charlie Rose that Reagan had asked him a startling question: “What would you do if the United States were suddenly attacked by someone from outer space? Would you help us?” Gorbachev replied, “No doubt about it,” to which Reagan responded: “We, too.” Although the two superpowers were locked in a nuclear arms race and staring each other down across Europe, they could still imagine uniting against a common existential threat.

Four decades later, humanity finds itself locked in another arms race. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reports that global defense spending reached a record $2.7 trillion in 2024 – an inflation-adjusted increase of 9.4% over the previous year. After nine consecutive years of such spending increases, this surge is unprecedented since the end of the Cold War, with little indication that it will slow. Dozens of countries are expanding their militaries, and more governments are making long-term commitments to boost their defense budgets.

The reasons are many, and some are understandable. In addition to Russia’s war in Ukraine, there are rising tensions in East Asia and the Middle East, as well as vulnerabilities in cyberspace and space. But more fundamentally, this escalation reflects the collapse of globalization as we knew it – meaning a rules-based order anchored in multilateralism, open trade, and international cooperation.

It is easy to forget how different the mood was just a decade ago. In 2015 – the high-water mark for the most recent wave of globalization – world leaders delivered three landmark agreements: the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on development financing, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, and the Paris climate agreement. Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Barack Obama shook hands in Washington, signaling – at least to many observers – that a new era of sustainable, inclusive, and resilient globalization was at hand.

[…]

Find the entire article written by Bertrand Badré on Project Syndicate.

European Democracy Needs Its Middle Class Back

European Democracy Needs Its Middle Class Back

PARIS – The middle class has long been the backbone of democratic stability, fueling economic growth, affirming institutional legitimacy, and transmitting civic values. But in recent decades, the middle class has been disintegrating across the West. Many citizens believe that hard work no longer pays off, social mobility is a pipe dream, and governing “elites” are detached from the needs of ordinary people.

[…]

Find the entire article written by Bertrand Badré and  on Project Syndicate.

An Update on Syria

An Update on Syria
If Syria wants to survive, it needs to cut ties with foreign proxies—fast

Faisal Saeed Al Mutar
March 9, 2025

The new Syrian government just failed its first real test. No one expected Iran to sit idly by—it was always going to push sectarian tensions. Those tensions have existed for decades, but the way the new leadership handled this crisis exposed its real problem: a complete lack of strategy. Instead of proving it can lead, it’s already falling into the same traps that have kept Syria weak and divided.

One of the biggest red flags is the presence of foreign fighters in the military. Reports indicate that groups from Central Asia and elsewhere are now part of Syria’s security forces. This isn’t just a minor issue—it’s a direct challenge to Syrian sovereignty. A country trying to rebuild after years of war cannot afford to outsource its security to foreign mercenaries or ideological proxies. This is how Syria turns into a battleground for regional powers instead of reclaiming control over its own future.

We’ve seen this play out before. Iraq’s De-Ba’athification in the early 2000s wiped out experienced military and political officials, creating a vacuum that led to insurgency, civil war, and, eventually, ISIS. The lesson was clear: when you purge an entire system without integrating key figures into the new order, you don’t get stability—you get chaos. Syria is repeating that mistake right now. Instead of ensuring that former military officials—especially top officers—are brought into the fold, they’re being sidelined. That’s a recipe for resentment, fragmentation, and another round of conflict.

If the new leadership wants to govern rather than just survive, it needs to act fast. First, kick out the foreign fighters. The Syrian military should be Syrian, full stop. Second, integrate former regime officials and minority leaders into real positions of power—not just as a token gesture but in ways that actually give them influence. Stability isn’t about empty slogans; it’s about ensuring that everyone with a stake in the country’s future has a seat at the table.

A lot of forces in the region want Syria to fail. The new leadership needs to wake up to that reality. This isn’t the time for self-congratulatory interviews with video bloggers. It’s time to do the hard work—building institutions, securing the country, and preventing the same cycle of disaster that has already played out across the region. If they don’t, they won’t just be another failed government. They’ll be the ones who had a chance to fix Syria and blew it.

Read article on The International Correspondent‘s website.

Trump’s cost-slashing Cultural Revolution risks harming U.S.

Trump’s cost-slashing Cultural Revolution risks harming U.S.
Defense and diplomacy not spared from Elon Musk-led purge of bureaucrats

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
February 25, 2025

TOKYO — U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration is embarking on an unprecedented campaign of cost cuts in the federal government, designed to dramatically weaken the bureaucracy in the name of reform, with potentially global repercussions.
Elon Musk is heading this effort as the head of the Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, a temporary organization created by Trump’s executive order.
There is widespread shock in Washington over the restructuring. Budgets for important projects were abruptly cut, and government workers and employees of nongovernmental organizations worried that they could lose their jobs.
At Trump’s behest, Musk aims to significantly pare down the federal workforce from its current headcount of more than 2 million, and slash federal spending by over $1 trillion. The latter cuts would amount to more than half of all discretionary outlays, including spending on defense and foreign policy.
Musk is taking his task seriously. The administration sent an email to most government employees encouraging them to take “deferred resignations.” The U.S. Agency for International Development, which oversees foreign aid and employed roughly 10,000 people, was temporarily forced to shut down. The Department of Defense is set to lay off 5,400 civilian workers this week.
The Department of Veterans Affairs and the Forest Service have fired more than 1,000 and over 3,000 employees still in their probationary periods, respectively, according to Reuters. The Department of Education, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Office of Personnel Management have also issued layoff notices to probationary workers.
This has already gone beyond streamlining. The effort verges on effectively weakening the U.S. bureaucracy.
In China, between 1966 and 1976, Communist Party leader Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution in a bid to shore up his control over the party, throwing the country into chaos. He stirred up young “Red Guards” through a cult of personality to persecute intellectual elites.
Pragmatist elites such as then-President Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were forced out of power, and government institutions and schools became crippled.
Though the scales involved are very different, some aspects of that time resemble what is happening in Washington now.
Trump perceives bureaucratic elites in the federal government as a potential threat to his grip on power. Many bureaucrats are believed to lean liberal, favoring the Democratic Party. Trump is using Musk as Mao’s Red Guard to purge workers who do not show sufficient loyalty.
The president is especially hostile toward diversity, equity and inclusion efforts in the government, which broadened under previous President Joe Biden.
Many of Trump’s supporters believe members of racial or ethnic minority groups should not receive special consideration in government or corporate hiring. Musk also opposes DEI on the grounds that ability should be the top priority.
There is plenty of waste to be found in the enormous U.S. government, and its efficiency needs to be improved. Going too far with DEI can also cause harm. But drastic steps intended to destroy institutions risk weakening important functions of the government.
The impact on foreign policy is of particular concern. USAID has supported independent media and NGOs in Central and Eastern Europe and emerging countries to promote democracy. It has an annual budget of $40 billion.
Its shutdown was welcome news for China and Russia, which have opposed the agency’s work. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, praised it as a “smart move.”
The cuts extend as far as national security. The offer of deferred resignations went out to the entire Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. media reported.
According to a former senior official who handled national security policy during the first Trump administration, the president considers U.S. intelligence agencies to be political enemies, after he was suspected of colluding with Russia to interfere with the 2016 presidential election. A public investigation into the matter ended after finding no conclusive evidence.
Trump “believes the CIA leaked such information in an attempt to bring him down,” the former official said.
All eyes are on the impact on the Department of Defense and the military. The Washington Post reported Wednesday that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered defense budget cuts of 8% annually over the next five years. He has also dismissed top military officers who had been appointed under Biden.
“The development and procurement of weapons, which involves a huge budget, is expensive, and there is much room for greater efficiency,” a security expert close to Trump said.
But a former senior DoD official warned that “rushing to cut budgets without scrutiny could lead to a decline in deterrence.”
The best-case scenario for the U.S. and its allies would be a restructuring that improves the government’s efficiency and enables it to better compete against China and Russia.
“Mao’s and Trump’s methods are similar in that they both galvanized the masses in an attempt to destroy existing power structures,” said Wu Junhua, research director at Japan Research Institute and an expert in China’s internal affairs. “But the latter aims to streamline a bloated government. If he succeeds, the U.S. is likely to be revived as a superpower. China is probably watching with trepidation.”
China’s Cultural Revolution wasted 10 valuable years. Trump should use its failures as a cautionary tale.

Read article onNikkei‘s website.

Trump must avoid an ‘ugly deal’ with China

Trump must avoid an ‘ugly deal’ with China
Beijing’s bait may be tempting, but he should never trade away security

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
February 15, 2025

TOKYO — Just a few weeks into Donald Trump’s U.S. presidency, diplomatic and economic tensions between the U.S. and China are intensifying. On Feb. 4, Trump imposed an additional 10% tariff on all imports from China, signaling that further increases may follow.
Trump’s strategy to pressure China goes beyond trade disputes. He views China’s growing influence over the Panama Canal as a strategic threat and is poised to take action to remove its involvement there.
During a joint news conference with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba on Feb. 7, Trump announced that the U.S. would strengthen its collaboration with Japan to counter China’s “economic aggression.” He pledged to deploy “the full strength of American deterrence capabilities” to defend Japan “100%” in the years ahead.
On the surface, it appears the U.S. is quickly heading toward a direct confrontation with China. However, Trump’s actions and rhetoric suggest a deeper intention to negotiate with Beijing for a “big, beautiful deal.”
Within the diplomatic circles of the world’s leading powers, two conflicting theories about Trump’s intentions are being discussed. One view holds that Trump sees China as a formidable adversary and is intent on ramping up pressure on both trade and diplomatic fronts. This approach could lead to an even more strained relationship than during his first term in office.
The alternative theory presents a stark contrast: Trump aims to secure favorable concessions from Chinese President Xi Jinping, using his pressure on China as a negotiation tactic.
While it is clear that Trump is concerned by China’s efforts to rival the U.S. in high-tech and economic sectors, his broader approach to China seems to align more with the second theory — seeking advantageous deals rather than engaging in outright strategic confrontations.
One strong argument for this view is Trump’s clear eagerness to engage with Xi. He initially extended an invitation to the Chinese leader for his inauguration in mid-January. When that didn’t materialize, Trump quickly expressed his desire to visit China at the earliest opportunity.
Furthermore, even on the eve of imposing the additional tariffs, Trump signaled plans to engage with the Chinese side “probably within 24 hours.” These actions clearly point to someone not gearing up for a confrontation.
Trump’s desire for direct negotiations with Xi goes beyond trade issues. He is also seeking Xi’s cooperation to help achieve his diplomatic goal of brokering a cease fire in Ukraine.
In a phone call with Xi just before taking office, Trump stressed the urgency of resolving the situation in Ukraine and urged cooperation, saying, “You ought to get it settled.”
The U.S. estimates that China supplies 70% to 90% of the precision electronic components and machine tools essential for Russia’s weapons production. Trump is expected to demand that Beijing halt these supplies.
Despite his harsh criticisms of China, Trump has avoided speaking negatively about Xi, instead praising him as a “great leader.” This suggests that Trump sees Xi as crucial to securing a successful U.S.-China deal through negotiation.
Patrick Cronin, the Asia-Pacific security chair at the Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank in Washington, anticipates an upcoming meeting between Trump and Xi. Speaking at the Tokyo Global Dialogue, a symposium held in Tokyo on Jan. 29, Cronin said the debate about a possible economic deal will unfold “over the next couple of months,” adding, “It will happen as well in a face to face meeting, I believe, in the next month, even between Xi Jinping and President Trump.”
Meanwhile, China is holding a firm stance against yielding to pressure from Washington but appears determined to avoid a full-scale confrontation with the U.S. In light of its sluggish economy, Beijing is prioritizing social stability.
China aims to become a superpower on par with the U.S. by 2050. In pursuit of this goal, escalating unnecessary confrontations with the U.S. is seen as unwise. Chinese diplomatic experts suggest that these considerations shape Beijing’s approach to managing its relationship with the Trump administration.
U.S. hardliners on China, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, are likely uneasy about Trump’s eagerness to strike a deal with China. They regard China as an enemy posing a security threat and are determined to counter it on all fronts.
However, Trump takes a different approach. He seems to believe that international politics are shaped not by rules or ethics, but by negotiations and deals between major powers. In this view, China can be both an adversary and an essential negotiating partner for the U.S.
Yet, Beijing might try to leverage Trump’s love of dealmaking, offering substantial trade concessions in exchange for U.S. compromises on key security issues like Taiwan and the South China Sea. If Trump takes the bait, the outcome could be remembered as an “ugly deal” that destabilizes Asia.
Looking ahead, three potential scenarios emerge. The first involves the U.S. and China reaching a trade agreement, accompanied by diplomatic compromises, possibly including issues like a cease fire in Ukraine. The second sees an initial trade agreement fall apart as compromises fail, leading to heightened conflicts over security issues. The third scenario offers a middle ground between these two outcomes.
Of these, the second scenario — marked by heightened tensions — seems the most likely, as the U.S. and China are not just addressing isolated issues but are moving toward a structural cold war. However, if Trump shows any softness toward China on security issues during this process, it could undermine stability in Asia.
Randall Schriver, a former assistant secretary of defense during Trump’s first term, comments on Trump’s reluctance to accept unfavorable deals. “Trump likes to view himself as a deal maker, however, he doesn’t take bad deals,” Schriver said. “He will be interested in what Xi Jinping has to offer, but I don’t see evidence that he would make undue sacrifices or sacrifice security.”
If Trump wants to prove his negotiating skills, he must resist the temptation to make an easy but ugly deal. Rushed compromises on security issues would only lead people to question his claimed dealmaking prowess.

Read article on Nikkei‘s webiste.

Never take China’s ‘smile diplomacy’ at face value

Never take China’s ‘smile diplomacy’ at face value
Apparent goodwill to nations such as Japan and India expected to fade

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
February 2, 2025 08:41 JST

TOKYO — When Russian President Vladimir Putin’s closest adviser visited Japan more than a decade ago, he secretly whispered this advice to Japanese policymakers.
“In Communist-ruled China, as was once the case in the Soviet Union, its [hard-line] foreign policy could shift suddenly and drastically, so stay alert.”
According to a source familiar with Japan-Russia relations, the advice came from Nikolai Patrushev, then-secretary of Russia’s Security Council.
Patrushev made the remarks in October 2012, the month after Japan nationalized the Senkaku Islands, which China claims as part of its territory. At the time, China responded vehemently to Japan’s actions, and a large fleet of Chinese vessels surged around the Senkaku area, escalating tensions.
Still, China’s policy toward Japan could change suddenly, and it would be wise not to miss that opportunity. That, clearly, was the essence of Patrushev’s advice.
Looking at the present, Beijing may be moving in the opposite direction, but this advice could still hold true. Recently, China has softened its diplomatic stance, ramping up interactions with Japan and India — both of which have territorial and maritime concerns with China — in an apparent attempt to ease tensions.
A symbolic event was the visit to China by Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya at the end of December. According to a Japanese official, Beijing went to great lengths to fill his 18-hour stay with as many meetings and activities as possible.
At a meeting with Iwaya, Chinese Premier Li Qiang said, “China-Japan relations are at an important period of improvement and development.” This was followed by a lunch with Wang Yi, a Politburo member and foreign minister, and dinner with Liu Jianchao, head of the Communist Party’s International Department. During the dinner, Iwaya and Liu discussed measures to promote personnel and economic exchanges between the two countries.
During its mid-January visit to China, a delegation from Japan’s ruling parties received a warm welcome. The group, composed of members from the Liberal Democratic Party and its junior coalition partner, Komeito, met with several high-ranking Communist Party figures, including two of the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee and three of the top 24 Politburo members. According to the Japanese side, this was the first time in the past decade that so many senior Communist Party officials had engaged with a Japanese ruling party delegation in China.
In the meantime, Japan and China took reciprocal actions to improve ties, agreeing to ease visa restrictions. China has also started considering resuming imports of Japanese seafood, which have been halted since the summer of 2023 following the release of treated radioactive wastewater from the damaged Fukushima nuclear power plant.
China’s overtures are clearly tied to a political development in the U.S. — the return of Donald Trump to the presidency. Anticipating an increasingly bitter rivalry with the U.S., China is working to ease tensions with neighboring countries. Beijing is also seeking to boost its faltering economy by attracting more investment and trade.
China is also directing its “smile diplomacy” at India, as relations between the two have been strained in recent years. A June 2020 border clash resulted in over 20 fatalities, prompting India to restrict Chinese investments and visas. As a result, exchanges between the two Asian giants have stagnated.
The tide shifted in October when Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met for the first time in five years. The leaders agreed on the need for stability in the disputed areas and, about two months later, decided on six concrete measures to achieve this goal.
According to a former senior Indian military officer with inside knowledge of his nation’s diplomatic affairs, it was China that first proposed the border stability measures. Regarding Beijing’s intentions, he suggested that the Chinese leadership likely wants to reduce flashpoints with India before a possible confrontation with the Trump administration.
Some U.S. allies, such as Australia and several European countries, were targeted by China’s goodwill gestures before Japan and India. By the end of 2024, Beijing had lifted all punitive tariffs on Australian wine and lobster. In April of the same year, China invited German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to Beijing, and the following month, Xi made his first visit to France in five years.
The key question is how long China’s overtures will last. Historically, China has used diplomatic maneuvers to approach U.S. allies and neighbors whenever tensions with the U.S. rise. However, this posture is often short-lived, as Beijing views it as secondary to addressing issues with Washington.
A typical example is China’s relations with Japan. In 1989, Beijing faced a severe
deterioration in its ties with Western countries after its crackdown on anti-government protests in Tiananmen Square. To avoid international isolation, China turned to Japan and sought to initiate mutual visits among leaders.
However, starting in the mid-1990s, Beijing’s attitude toward Japan cooled as U.S.-China relations began to improve. The government of then-President Jiang Zemin began intensifying criticism of Japan over historical issues, causing relations between the two countries to grow increasingly acrimonious.
The same pattern was repeated in 2018, the year after the first Trump administration came to power. That year, the prime ministers of Japan and China visited each other, hinting at a diplomatic thaw, but this did not result in a substantial change in their relationship.
Sadly, it is likely that Beijing’s current smile diplomacy will eventually fade, just as it has in the past. There will also be limits to the concessions China is willing to make, as its primary motive is to strategize against the U.S.
However, other countries should take advantage of China’s conciliatory gestures while they last and work to resolve difficult issues. At the same time, they should remain vigilant about China’s underlying intentions and prepare for a shift in policy and rising tensions.
Bilahari Kausikan, former permanent secretary of Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cautions against viewing Beijing’s current diplomatic stance as a sign of real change.
“This is a tactical move as China does not want to fight on too many fronts simultaneously, particularly since it has serious economic weaknesses,” Kausikan said. “Once Beijing becomes confident that relations with Trump will not get out of hand, it will revert to its old ways.
“We should enjoy the situation while it lasts, but should not get complacent and mistake a tactical shift for a substantive policy change.”

Read article on Nikkei‘s website.

Trump’s bullying diplomacy harks back to Yalta-era world order

Trump’s bullying diplomacy harks back to Yalta-era world order

Greenland, Panama proposals show incoming leader’s focus on force over norms

Hiroyuki AKITA, Nikkei commentator
January 15, 2025 01:44 JST

TOKYO — With days to go before his inauguration, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump is already causing alarm with proposals to seize control of Greenland and the Panama Canal, as well as his refusal to rule out the use of military or economic force to do so.
The response from international officials can roughly be divided into two.
The first group sees the remarks merely as a bluff and a way to draw out diplomatic concessions. Even Trump would not truly think he can acquire Greenland, which is a Danish territory, or the Panama Canal, they say.
The second group believes Trump may be serious to some extent — that Trump considers international relations as a domain for major powers, where smaller countries should simply do what they are told.
It may be best to assume Trump’s worldview fits the latter. He has previously signaled his willingness to go over the heads of U.S. allies in order to settle international issues between major global powers.
In terms of the Ukraine war, the Biden administration has coordinated closely on its response with European NATO members. In contrast, Trump is looking to negotiate directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the fighting. He has shown no interest so far in coordinating his position beforehand with European allies.
The same applies to North Korea. Rather than working with Japan and South Korea to contain the situation, Trump seems interested in making a breakthrough through direct talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
Trump has said he received “beautiful” love letters from Kim while in office. The warm comments are less about any personal affinity Trump feels toward Kim, and more a sign that he sees North Korea’s autocratic leader as an important negotiation partner.
Under the United Nations Charter created in the aftermath of World War II, every nation regardless of size is expected to abide by international rules. But Trump sees the world as a jungle governed by power, not ethics or rules. This view, which stems from his career in the cutthroat real estate sector, is not expected to change.
Trump has no interest in shaping the world order. However, he could unintentionally usher in the return of great-power diplomacy like the world saw from the Yalta Conference of 1945. From the creation of the U.N. to the occupation of Germany to determining spheres of influence, events after World War II unfolded largely the way U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had agreed during the meeting.
Trump’s aggressive attitude against Denmark and Panama and his disregard for alliances makes sense when considering his interest in Yalta-like great-power dealmaking.
But it is Russian President Vladimir Putin who is most interested in the return of great-power diplomacy. He wants to decide on the future of Ukraine and the power balance in Europe through direct negotiations with Trump, putting the interest of U.S. allies on the back burner.
Concern over Trump’s diplomatic style loomed large over the World Policy Conference in the United Arab Emirates in December.
Trump’s approach “is the worst-case scenario” for Europe because it could result in “a deal between Putin and Trump that would be at the cost of Europe and Ukrainian security interests,” German lawmaker Norbert Roettgen said.
If there is a possibility that Trump will negotiate with the North Korean leader, “we hope that there will be very close consultation with South Korea,” said Hur Kyung-wook, South Korea’s former vice minister of strategy and finance.
In November, Alex Younger, former head of British intelligence service MI6, also expressed concerns over Trump in a podcast with the Financial Times.
“He’s a Yalta man through and through,” Younger said. “It’s all fundamentally inimical to Britain’s interests.”
Trump’s diplomacy could yield surprising results. But there is an even greater chance that he could create lasting problems.
While Putin and Kim essentially have no term limits, Trump has four years in office. If he rushes for a deal on the Ukraine war or North Korea, he would likely be put at a disadvantage.
U.S.-China ties are another thing to watch. Views on China within Trump’s team differ between hawks like Marco Rubio, Trumps choice for secretary of state, wealthy entrepreneurs like Elon Musk, and “America first” devotees like Vice President-elect JD Vance.
It is hard to imagine Musk, who is making big profits in China, taking a hard line against Beijing. While the America First faction is concerned about China, it is reluctant to spend heavily on defense to increase American involvement in Asia.
Trump has chosen to incorporate these varying viewpoints into his incoming administration. By leaving the door open to both hardline and conciliatory policies, he may be trying to keep China on its toes.
While a real estate deal concludes once a contract is signed, diplomacy does not end after one big deal. An impatient Trump could risk failure if he treats the two the same.

Read article on Nikkei‘s website.

Trump’s America

Dans une semaine, le président élu, ou plus exactement réélu après quatre années de mandat Biden, prendra ses fonctions.
Le système constitutionnel américain octroie un délai de plus de deux mois pour une transition ordonnée entre deux administrations.
Le paradoxe cette année est une de facto quasi prise de pouvoir immédiate de la nouvelle équipe pressentie et annoncée bien que non confirmée, du fait du contrôle républicain sur le Congrès, et notamment le Sénat investi d’un “rôle d’avis et de consentement” pour les postes les plus importants soit environ 1400.
De fait instruit par son expérience de 2016, Trump a annoncé à marche forcée nombre de pressentis tant au cabinet, que dans des structures autonomes (Environmental Protection Agency, Securities and Exchange Commission, etc.).
Certaines nominations ont été vivement critiquées, notamment pour des raisons éthiques (par exemple le ministre de la Justice, ou Attorney General, rapidement retiré).
D’autres rencontrent des réserves, tels le secrétaire à la défense, celui à la santé, ou le directeur de la coordination des services de renseignement.
Au delà des situations particulières, qu’ont tous ces pressentis en commun ? Tout d’abord un lien de fidélité, de loyauté avec le Président élu, souvent du fait d’une relation ancienne, personnelle ou d’affaires.
Peu ou pas de membres de la famille proche, si ce n’est par alliance (l’ambassadeur nommé pour la France et Monaco et le responsable des affaires du Moyen Orient). Beaucoup de New Yorkais, ou Floridiens, souvent les mêmes, tels le nouvel AG, le directeur de l’EPA, mon ancien Congressman NYS 1, Suffolk County, Lee Zeldin, l’ambassadrice aux Nations Unies, le secrétaire au trésor. Des milliardaires, à commencer par les co-titulaires du nouveau département dit DOGE, Department of Government Efficiency, Elon Musk et Vivek Ramaswamy. Et bon nombre d’autres personnalités.
Peu de républicains historiques, trop indépendants , à noter l’absence de Mike Pompeo et de Nikki Haley, pour lesquels Trump a pris la plume pour les remercier de leurs bons et loyaux services, mais aussi préciser que leur absence n’était pas un simple oubli.
En revanche, un certain nombre de ralliés démocrates dont quelques-uns très récemment, Robert F. Kennedy Jr, Tulsi Gabbard qui soutenait Bernie Sanders en 2016 contre Hillary Clinton, Musk, etc.
Ce qui les différencie également est le fait que sur les thèmes essentiels de la campagne, il y a des vues diamétralement opposées, et ces oppositions se sont déjà exprimées, en particulier sur un sujet aussi controversé que l’immigration.
Schématiquement, les pressentis venant de la Tech, Musk, Ramaswamy, préconisent l’octroi de visas H1B à des non-nationaux alors que le Deputy Chief of Staff , Stephen Miller, est en faveur d’une réduction des flux migratoires, y compris légaux.
The Economist de cette semaine fait sa première page sur “Donald the Deporter”, pour conclure que Trump, s’il le souhaite, a les cartes en main, pour obtenir et délivrer un projet bipartisan de régularisation des clandestins – 11 à 15 millions – qu’aucun des 5 derniers présidents n’a réalisé. A rappeler qu’Obama, pendant ses 8 années, déportait plus que Trump sur une base annelle, qui pendant la dernière campagne a promis d’octroyer des résidences permanentes – cartes vertes – aux diplômés étrangers des grandes universités américaines.
Marco Rubio, sénateur de Floride, et prochain Secrétaire d’État, fut en 2016 l’un des membres d’une commission bicamérale et bipartisane – dite gang of 8 – qui avait élaboré un tel projet de régularisation des illégaux.
Sur une autre sujet médiatisé, les droits de douane, là aussi pas de consensus, si tous les pressentis annoncés se sont exprimés en leur faveur, certains les conçoivent comme une tactique de négociation bilatérale – Trump ne comprend pas et hait le multiralisme – avec des pays tels le Canada, le Mexique et l’Union européenne – et d’autres comme un dispositif punitif à taux différenciés, ainsi que comme une source de revenus additionnels, pour les adversaires tels la Chine.
Pourtant Trump, décideur ultime, est parfaitement capable de tenter un grand “deal” avec cette dernière, affaiblie sur le plan économique et diplomatique, par son alliance avec l’axe du mal (Russie, Iran, Corée du Nord).
Sur les sujets géostratégiques et de politique étrangère, certains commentateurs avisés s’inquiètent de la supposée intention du couple infernal Musk-Trump de faire basculer l’Europe dans le camp des populismes d’extrême droite. Le Président Macron se préoccupe de la naissance d’une internationale réactionnaire. De fait, la politique étrangère sera gérée au quotidien par Rubio et Waltz, dont le sortant NSA – conseiller de Biden, Jack Sullivan -, soulignait Fareed Zakharia sur CNN la continuité sur le thème essentiel de la relation avec la Chine.

Quant à l’Ukraine, le règlement du conflit prendra plus de 24h sans aucun doute.
Et l’Iran, considérablement affaibli par les échecs successifs dans ses “proxies”, pourrait envisager un nouvel accord se substituant au JCPOA dont Trump était sorti en 2017.
Nous pourrions aborder d’autres thèmes, cette administration a une fenêtre de 2 années pour tenter de régler des dossiers chauds et potentiellement dangereux, y compris sur le plan intérieur, avec un parti démocrate affaibli et sans leadership incontesté.
En novembre 2026, Trump pourrait perdre le contrôle des deux chambres du Congrès, les sièges républicains en contestation étant le double de ceux à renouveler pour les démocrates. Ensuite il sera un “lame duck” non rééligible.
Aura-t-il la discipline et le management d’équipes requis pour son succès partiel sur quelques thèmes majeurs? Sa personnalité permet d’en douter, mais je reste dubitatif. Sa première décision, la nomination de son directeur de cabinet, une femme qui a joué un rôle essentiel dans sa campagne victorieuse , et de plus une Floridienne, est un indice important. Quant à sa relation avec l’Europe, ses menaces sur l’OTAN n’ont toujours pas conduit à une remise en cause effective de cette alliance, mais le nombre de pays consacrant 2 % du PNB à leur défense est passé de 3 à 20, et 3 % est en passe de devenir la nouvelle norme.

Read Jean-Claude Gruffat’s insights on the American elections.

Josep Borrell : “Guerre au Proche-Orient : à Beyrouth, Josep Borrell appelle à « un cessez-le-feu immédiat » entre Israël et le Hezbollah”

Depuis Beyrouth, où il a achevé, dimanche 24 novembre, une tournée moyen-orientale, la dernière avant la fin de son mandat, en décembre, le chef de la diplomatie européenne, Josep Borrell, a appelé à un « cessez-le-feu immédiat » entre Israël et le Hezbollah. « Nous ne voyons qu’une seule voie possible : un cessez-le-feu immédiat et l’application intégrale de la résolution 1701 du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU », a dit M. Borrell après des entretiens avec le premier ministre démissionnaire, Najib Mikati, et le chef du Parlement, Nabih Berri, un allié du Hezbollah qui mène les négociations pour la partie libanaise.

[…]

Read the entire article in Le Monde.

How can Christians help Palestine?

Lebanon’s Maronite patriarchate, in its monthly statement, expressed solidarity with the people of Palestine. The statement mentioned the atrocities that the people in Palestine and in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa are being subjected to and called for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
The Maronite patriarchate has a very special position. It is an institution independent from any political body, yet it is very influential on the Lebanese political scene. Because the Lebanese patriarchate is a very important church in the East, it, along with other Christian churches in the East and the Arab world, can play an important role in resolving this conflict.

[…]

Read the article on the website of Arab News.

Philippe Chalmin : « Cent jours qui ont bouleversé la France… »

Cent jours après les élections européennes, le seul mérite de la « dissolution malvenue » qui les a suivies est d’« obliger les Français à ouvrir les yeux » sur quelques réalités qu’ils ont voulu trop longtemps ignorer, analyse Philippe Chalmin « Mais que de larmes » à venir, prévient-il.

Il y a maintenant près de cent jours que des élections européennes, dont au fond le résultat était parfaitement prévisible, ont déclenché, à partir de la dissolution de l’Assemblée nationale par Emmanuel Macron, un bouleversement dont la France risque de mettre longtemps à mesurer les conséquences. Il y eut donc quatre semaines de campagne électorale, suivies de trois semaines d’incertitude, puis de deux semaines des Jeux Olympiques, rallongées encore de deux semaines de pause estivale… puis encore quelques semaines pour que la France retrouve un gouvernement sur lequel pèsera toutefois l’épée de Damoclès d’une censure parlementaire.

[…]

Lire l’article intégrale sur le site des Echos.

Jean-Pierre Cabestan : « La Chine est en train de perdre de l’argent en Afrique »

Le mercredi 4 septembre, Xi Jinping a reçu 25 dirigeants de pays africains à l’occasion du banquet d’ouverture de la 9e édition du sommet Chine-Afrique, qui se déroule cette semaine à Pékin. L’objectif : penser l’avenir de la coopération sino-africaine. Interrogé par L’Express, Jean-Pierre Cabestan, chercheur à Asia Centre Paris, évoque les réticences chinoises à une hausse de l’aide financière.

Retrouvez l’entretien avec Jean-Pierre Cabestan sur le site de L’EXPRESS.

Richard Haass: “Will the Democrats Win After Biden’s Withdrawal?”

US President Joe Biden’s decision to drop out of the 2024 presidential race has revived the Democrats’ chances of victory. Given the profound differences between the two parties, it is difficult to exaggerate just how much is at stake when Americans vote this November.

NEW YORK – US President Joe Biden’s decision to step aside as the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate this fall has transformed American politics. It caps a historic July in the United States, one defined by far-reaching Supreme Court decisions and the attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump on the eve of the Republican Convention.

Biden’s decision, urged by many Democratic Party officials and donors and favored by many voters, was the right choice. In the wake of a debate widely viewed as a debacle for Biden, his age had made it all but impossible for him to make the case to the American people that he deserved another four years – and was making it impossible for him to make the case that Trump did not.

It is too soon to write about Biden’s legacy, if for no other reason than his presidency still has some six months left. But by stepping aside he has gone a long way toward eliminating the potential critique that by staying in the race he paved the way for a successor who shared little of his commitment to American democracy and the country’s role in the world. Indeed, had Trump defeated Biden in November, as polls were forecasting, this would have largely overshadowed Biden’s accomplishments as president.

[…]

Read the entire article on Project Syndicate.

Away From the War in Gaza, Another Palestinian Economy Is Wrecked

ARTICLE –

Less than three years ago, Wassif Frahat spent $3 million to open a lavish, two-story restaurant, the Ali Baba. With an impressive, pillared entryway, polished stone floors, glittering chandeliers and colorful frescoes on the high ceilings, the restaurant was his commitment to a better future.

The Ali Baba, in Jenin, is just a few minutes’ drive from the Jalameh checkpoint, which in normal times allows Israeli Arab citizens entry to the West Bank. The atmosphere is Palestinian, and the shops, restaurants and services are significantly cheaper than in Israel. The crossing also allows Palestinians with valid entry permits to go to jobs in Israel.

But after Hamas invaded Israel from Gaza on Oct. 7, the checkpoint was closed. Israel withheld most tax revenue from the authorities in the West Bank, in an effort to weaken them and clamp down more broadly on Palestinians. The economy in the territory’s north collapsed, and the better future that Mr. Frahat expected now seems further away than ever.

The war that followed the invasion is devastating Gaza, but it is also impoverishing the West Bank, which has become a kind of second front in Israel’s battle against Palestinian militancy.

[…]

Read the full article written by Steven Erlanger on The New York Times.

Présidentielle au Rwanda: Paul Kagame obtient 99,15% des voix, selon des résultats partiels

Nouveau plébiscite pour le président rwandais Paul Kagame avec des résultats provisoires qui le créditent de plus 99% des suffrages lors de la présidentielle de lundi 15 juillet. Élections dont ont été écartés les opposants les plus critiques.

Selon ces résultats lus à la télévision nationale par la présidente de la commission électorale Oda Gasinzigwa, « le candidat du Front patriotique rwandais, Paul Kagame, a obtenu 99,15% des voix à l’élection présidentielle, le candidat du Parti Démocratique Vert du Rwanda, Frank Habineza, a obtenu 0,53%, le candidat indépendant Philippe Mpayimana a obtenu 0,32% ».

Après l’annonce des résultats provisoires par la commission électorale vers 22h, Paul Kagame a pris la parole en direct du QG de son parti, le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR), devant ses soutiens. « Je sais que tout le monde n’est pas présent ici ce soir, mais je voulais tous vous remercier un par un, pour avoir été à mes côtés jusqu’à la dernière minute, jusqu’à ce que ce soit tranché. Ces résultats sont clairs, il n’y a plus aucun doute maintenant. Est-ce que vous m’avez déjà vu perdre espoir ? Bien sûr que non. Jamais ! Que ce soit dans le passé… ou même à l’avenir ! C’est parce que je sais que j’ai votre soutien et que nous trouverons toujours des solutions ensemble. Quant à ce score de 99%, il est très impressionnant. Et même si j’étais élu à 100%… cela n’est pas qu’une question de chiffre, c’est le reflet de la confiance que vous me portez. Et c’est ça qui compte le plus pour moi. »

Pour ce scrutin, il était opposé aux mêmes adversaires que lors de la dernière présidentielle en 2017, le leader du seul parti d’opposition autorisé Frank Habineza et l’indépendant Philippe Mpayimana, face à qui il avait remporté 98,79% des voix. Des résultats provisoires complets sont attendus le 20 juillet, avant la proclamation des résultats définitifs le 27 juillet.

Dans un bureau de Kigali, où était présente notre envoyée spéciale, Liza Fabbian, un seul nom résonnait dans la salle lors du dépouillement : Paul Kagame. Le président sortant, écrase encore une fois ses opposants, triés sur le volet. Les principales figures de l’opposition, les voix les plus critiques, ont été disqualifiées en amont de l’élection.

« Le résultat, c’est comme s’il était déjà connu »

Pourtant, la jeune Sifa est allée voter avec fierté ce lundi, elle, qui n’a connu qu’un seul dirigeant à la tête de son pays : « J’étais très curieuse de participer à une élection. C’est pour ça que je me suis levée très tôt ce matin. Ça s’est très bien passé, il y a une forte participation. Et le résultat, eh bien, c’est comme s’il était déjà connu, puisque nous savons bien ce que nous voulons. »

Durant sa campagne, Paul Kagame s’est toujours montré confiant, présentant cette nouvelle élection comme une formalité… un plébiscite de son action à la tête du Rwanda. Un message bien reçu par Claude, interrogé à la sortie de son bureau de vote : « Je viens de passer et je rentre pour dire à ma dame et aux enfants de passer aussi. Parce que c’est une obligation, c’est aussi une responsabilité pour faire avancer la société. J’ai constaté qu’il y avait de l’engouement du côté du président sortant. Maintenant, on verra. »

Après une réforme constitutionnelle adoptée en 2015, Paul Kagame peut encore diriger le Rwanda pendant deux mandats de cinq ans, jusqu’en 2034.

Read the article on the website of RFI

https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240716-pr%C3%A9sidentielle-au-rwanda-paul-kagame-en-t%C3%AAte-avec-99-15-des-voix-selon-des-r%C3%A9sultats-partiels

Macron’s pact with the devil

Prince Michael of Liechtenstein at 2015 WPC

Emmanuel Macron’s deal with the far left may end up being far worse for France than if the National Rally had won the parliamentary elections.

Emmanuel Macron is self-confident and ambitious. His focus is not limited to leading France; he also aims to establish himself as the leader of Europe and a major global player. Ideologically, he is very adaptable – like a snake, he does not hesitate to change his skin. He has cunningly succeeded in gaining the label of “liberal,” even though his actions and beliefs do not match that moniker.

A European liberal believes in limited state involvement, a market economy, decentralization, balanced public finances and a high degree of individual responsibility. Mr. Macron’s policies, with his support for European centralization, central economic planning by the state, common European debt, and similar philosophies, are rather closer to socialism.

His adaptable tactics have allowed him to succeed personally and politically. However, a lack of performance and truthfulness has led to a loss of trust and has backfired on him.

Like many other European leaders, most of whom are weak and underperforming, he has championed a hypocritical “defense of democracy.” According to this idea, right-wing parties, created in response to the center’s shift toward socialism, are labeled anti-democratic and must be excluded. Voters, however, do not believe that this stance by itself ought to legitimize political rule.

In the European Parliament elections, President Macron’s party suffered a crushing defeat. Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, considered right-wing, emerged as the strongest party with nearly a third of the vote. President Macron, whose term ends in 2027, decided to test his luck. He dissolved the national parliament, where his party was the strongest, and called for new elections. This was a democratic response to the signal French voters had given.

French parliamentary elections have two rounds. A candidate needs a majority in their constituency. As there are many parties, only a few candidates succeed in the first round. The second round allows only the front-runners of the first round to compete.

In the first round, unsurprisingly, the National Rally garnered about a third of the vote. This is where President Macron’s pact with the devil began. He agreed with the left-wing New Popular Front alliance, whose strongest faction is on the extreme left, that they and his party would support each other. In constituencies where the left’s candidate was stronger than the one from President Macron’s party, the leftist would get the support, and vice versa.

Together with its parliamentary allies, the National Rally’s share of the vote in the second round increased to clearly more than a third. But the leftist plot worked. The socialist – and partially extreme – party won the most seats, even though it was only the second-largest vote-getter. President Macron’s party, despite being very weak, came in second place, and the actual winner – the National Rally – came in third. The biased media and political commentators across Europe lauded this result as a victory for democracy and even framed it as a defeat for the National Rally.

The National Rally is frequently labeled anti-European, which is somewhat misleading. Their platform is not anti-European but rather anti-centralist. And although there are some unpleasant characters in the party, it is no more radical than large parts of the New Popular Front, which now claims the right  to form the government.

What was lauded as a success for democracy in Europe might actually be a dark day. Good luck, Mr. Macron.

Read the article on the website of GIS Reports

https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/macron-france-democracy/

Jean Pisani-Ferry : « Finding a new French majority »

President Emmanuel Macron’s brand of radical centrism was meant to draw on good ideas from both sides of the political spectrum. Seven years later, the outcome of the general election this month indicates that, if anything, France is even more polarised than it was in 2017.

French President Emmanuel Macron was first elected in 2017 on a promise to end the often-artificial divisions between left and right. France had become tired of theatrical posturing between adversaries who overplayed their differences during electoral campaigns, only to end up, once in power, governing in fairly similar ways. Macron’s brand of radical centrism was meant to end the grandstanding, draw on good ideas from both sides of the political spectrum, and govern accordingly. It intended to turn the opposition between left and right into a historical relic.

[…]

Read the interview on Gulf Times.

The Most Incredible Election in French History

With many losers and very few winners, the French election has only added to the confusion, fragmentation, and paralysis that was already afflicting the country and clouding its economic prospects. The situation is unlike anything France has experienced in recent memory.

PARIS – By calling a snap parliamentary election in the wake of his party’s defeat in the June European Parliament election, French President Emmanuel Macron hoped to “clarify” the political situation for his own benefit. Clearly, he failed. The election produced no parliamentary majority, only a great deal more confusion. With many losers and very few winners, it is the most astonishing election in the country’s modern history.

[…]

Read the entire article written by Zaki Laïdi on Project Syndicate.

Netanyahu’s Congress speech may determine Biden’s fate

US President Joe Biden is facing unprecedented challenges. After a disastrous debate night, many are calling for him to end his reelection bid. His wife and son, however, are urging him to stay in the game and to fire his staff. Biden was cowed by Donald Trump in last month’s presidential debate. Despite the numerous calls for him to drop out of the race, he has decided to stay on, saying he will not squander three and a half years of good work because of one bad night. However, to win the race, he needs to prove he is capable. Hence, he cannot afford to be cowed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who will address Congress on July 24.
Although Trump did not provide any clear and convincing answers to any of the questions asked by the presenters, he managed to intimidate Biden. Trump knew very well how to take advantage of Biden, who stumbled several times during the debate. He even mocked him by saying he did not understand what he was saying. Trump said that Biden is like a “Palestinian,” using the word like a slur. He added that Biden was a “weak” Palestinian.
Both candidates are old. However, one came out from the debate as old and strong and the other as old and weak. Following the debate, media pressure started building on Biden to quit the race. However, it is late in the game. Historian Allan Lichtman, who has correctly predicted the winner of nine of the last 10 US presidential elections, said the debate will not be a deciding factor. He used the example of 1984, when Ronald Reagan was relatively old and performed terribly in the presidential debates, yet still won the election. On the other hand, Hillary Clinton, who did well in all her debates, lost to Trump in 2016. A New York Times/Siena poll was conducted after the debate. It found that 74 percent of voters perceived Biden as too old for the job. In order to mitigate the effects of the debate, Biden needs to prove he is effective and capable. He cannot afford to be cowed.
Netanyahu’s address to Congress will be risky for Biden. One has to remember how the Israeli PM insulted Barack Obama in 2015 and received a standing ovation in Congress. Biden cannot afford such a humiliation.
Biden will need to be better prepared for Netanyahu’s speech than he was for the debate with Trump. No one really knows what Netanyahu will say. However, an informed observer can guess. He wants to continue the war on Gaza as it is the only way to ensure his political survival. He also wants to expand Israel’s attacks on Lebanon.
Netanyahu has been very critical of Biden. He has said that it is “inconceivable” for the US to withhold weapons from Israel. Is he going to whine and complain about Biden in front of Congress and get the standing ovation he got for insulting Obama in 2015? This would be a fatal blow to Biden and the Democrats. If Biden wants a second term, he needs to make sure this does not happen.

Netanyahu’s visit has been approved — Biden cannot do anything about it. The only thing Biden can do is fend off its possible repercussions. To start with, he should stand firm and not allow a foreign leader to humiliate him on his own turf. The second thing he and his team should do is to start probing members of Congress to make sure Netanyahu will not get any support for continuing the war or for striking Lebanon. The Biden administration should detail to lawmakers the futility of the Netanyahu policy, which has been unable to clear and hold any area in Gaza. The staggering civilian toll should be highlighted.
Additionally, it should be explained to the members of Congress that a strike on Lebanon might mean a regional war. According to my contacts, Netanyahu is promising a “limited strike.” However, he does not know how his foe will reply. Will its response be limited? We surely do not know. Is there a guarantee that Iran will not become involved? If the Biden team clarifies these issues to Congress, he can at least garner the required support in order to not get humiliated by Netanyahu. Biden needs to make sure Congress will not side with Netanyahu against him.
The time prior to the visit is crucial for Biden. If Netanyahu manages to convince Congress that Biden does not know what he is doing, then he is finished as president. If Netanyahu succeeds in cowing Biden, then Trump will be president again.
Biden has to remember that people are judging him for what is happening in Gaza, they are not judging Trump. This is an advantage for the Republican candidate. Hence, Biden needs to show assertiveness. Already, most Democrats think the US is providing too much military aid to Israel, with 56 percent saying they would be less likely to vote for a president that supports continuing providing Tel Aviv with weapons. Biden can capitalize on this and take a firm stand. He also has a UN Security Council resolution he can bank on.
Biden has always positioned himself as a president who respects alliances and international institutions and agreements, contrary to his opponent. This is the time for Biden to prove that to the American public. Gaza has been a disadvantage for the Biden administration in the election season so far. However, this disadvantage could turn into an advantage if Biden plays it properly. This might be his chance to regain his prestige and perhaps get reelected.

Read the article on the website of Arab News

https://www.arabnews.com/node/2545246

A British foreign policy moment in the making

With plenty of cachet still left, the UK has an opportunity to play a leading western role on the world stage.

The UK stands to regain its role as a leading foreign policy player. Eight years since the Brexit vote and the internal politics that has consumed the UK since, the country has entered a new era. Beginnings often provide a sense of optimism, except for those who lose elections, but that optimism holds for only a short window of time. That limited time must be seized upon, and quickly.

UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has shown he understands the need for swift movement in the first 72 hours in office.

With a new government in Downing Street and the beginning of a new chapter in the country, the UK has an opportunity to play a leading western role on the world stage. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a leading member of Nato, a nuclear power and having the sixth-largest national economy in the world by gross domestic product, in addition to the legacy of the British Empire and the soft power of British culture and heritage, its sources of influence are many.

The opportunity for the UK to be a leading western power is more pronounced as the US becomes ever more consumed by the bizarre election campaign across the Atlantic and France contends with its own political troubles. With both US President Joe Biden and French President Emmanuel Macron appearing increasingly as lame duck presidents, Mr Starmer can fill a void in representing western interests. Many around the world are aware of this opportunity and will be watching Mr Starmer closely.

Undoubtedly, his government will have immediate domestic concerns – from long NHS waiting times to a housing crisis – as its top priority. That means Foreign Secretary David Lammy should be given more autonomy to act on foreign affairs. Mr Lammy will have to forge ahead with policy development and relationship building – or rectifying. While the last foreign secretary, David Cameron, was often well-received globally, he represented a weak prime minister in Rishi Sunak, in addition to the fact that an upcoming electoral deadline meant that whoever he met or negotiated with knew he would only be in office for mere months.

Since 2010, the foreign policy portfolio changed hands nine times, with eight foreign secretaries over 14 turbulent years of Conservative rule before Mr Lammy took office. Often, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office was a holding place for an ambitious Tory MP taking the role as a holding position before elbowing their way into 10 Downing Street.

The Foreign Office itself went through much tumult, when in 2020 Boris Johnson shut down the department dedicated to aid, the Department for International Development, DFID, and merged it with the Foreign and Commonwealth office, to become FCDO. The move created chaos for several months and a survey of civil service leaders found that just 7.5 per cent of respondents believed the creation of FCDO was a success.

While a popular position among many Conservatives, the elimination of DFID has eroded the UK’s influence in global development. Since 2021, UK spending on overseas aid has dropped to 0.5 per cent of gross national income, a reduction from the 0.7 per cent aid target that the UN has set and that the UK hit in 2013 and maintained until three years ago. The UK had been one of the few countries to adhere to the ambition of 0.7 per cent set since 1960. Only 15 countries have ever met the UN target. In 2021, Mr Sunak, as chancellor, published a statement linking overseas aid spending to the ratio of debt in the country, deciding that the 0.7 per cent would not be met, despite being mandated according to the International Development Act 2015. Mr Starmer could immediately reposition its role in the world by restoring the 0.7 per cent target.

To turn the fortunes of British foreign policy around and rebuild influence, particularly in rising centres of power like New Delhi, Abu Dhabi, Brasilia and beyond, Mr Starmer and his team will have to move quickly. Initial signs, with Mr Starmer calling UAE President Sheikh Mohamed, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, while Mr Lammy called UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah on his first day on the job, are promising.

The last time Labour was in power, their foreign policy record got marred by the Iraq war of 2003 and disastrous mishandling of its aftermath. After the party’s dramatic loss of power in 2010, it went through a number of iterations including being led by the left-wing Jeremy Corbyn who is known for his sympathy with questionable armed groups and states such as Iran and Cuba. Today, Mr Starmer and Mr Lammy need to forge their own path – while keeping their constituents happy.

Of course, repairing ties with Europe is a top priority as has been clear this week, but Mr Starmer has already clarified he will not be seeking to open negotiations with the EU to return to the single market, or try to restore the UK’s membership.

In addition to restoring the UK’s reputation as a serious country, the new foreign secretary has four pressing issues to attend to – the war in Gaza and its multi-dimensional fall-out in the Middle East and beyond, the deep crisis in Sudan and ramifications in Africa, and the war in Ukraine that is facing the prospect of ever-increasing western divisions on its end game. The three wars, particularly Palestine and Ukraine, are pushing the so-called rules-based order to its absolute limits. And thus, the fourth issue is the need to bring the rules-based order back from the brink, while some argue the world has already crossed that Rubicon.

As the penholder at the UN Security Council for the “protection of civilians”, meaning it is responsible for discussions and resolution on the issue, the UK must find a way to bring back principles such as the “right to protect”, which no longer hold true. The UK is also the penholder at the UN for a number of other pressing files, including Afghanistan.

While complex issues such as climate change and restoring the “right to protect” are of major importance, the war in Gaza and its ramifications must be a priority. In addition to its devastating human toll, the possibility of it expanding beyond the Lebanon-Israel border increases as each day pass. How Iranian-backed groups, from Yemen to Iraq, respond if the war was to expand, will set the tone for the region for decades to come. While US, Qatari and Egyptian mediation efforts continue, the UK can come in with years of experience – some of it with bitter memories for many in the region, including the Balfour Declaration – and offer its good offices. Further, the UK has its own interests in the region, from protecting maritime security through to ensuring the safety of the millions of Britons living there.

The US has disillusioned many around the world, and in particular Arab and Muslim-majority countries with the position it has taken on the war. And while it took Mr Starmer four months to call for a ceasefire, his election manifesto pledges to recognise the State of Palestine. This would be a significant move but not enough on its own to resolve the decades-old conflict – and end the occupation of Palestine. Setting about a clear and serious path for peace in Palestine and Israel, and the wider region, is necessary.

The UK has an opportunity to come back from its Brexit-era isolationism to playing a role as a middle-sized country, as Mr Lammy likes to describe it. However, its influence, history and potential are much more than those of the average middle-sized country. It just needs a leadership that can think big and seize the opportunity.

Read the article on the website of The National

https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2024/07/08/a-british-foreign-policy-moment-in-the-making/

Is the China-Russia friendship facade set to crumble?

TOKYO — In their highly publicized meeting on Feb. 4, 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin orchestrated a display of unity and camaraderie, declaring that the friendship between the two countries has “no limits.”

Despite these outward demonstrations of solidarity, genuine trust remains elusive between China and Russia, whose shared history is marred by border conflicts stemming from ideological and territorial disputes. The tensions culminated in armed clashes in 1969. Yet this facade of friendship persists due to their shared goal of disrupting the U.S.-led global order.

[…]

Read the entire comment written by Hiroyuki Akita on NikkeiAsia.

‘A Little Scary’: Ukraine Tries to Stay Neutral in U.S. Political Dogfight

ARTICLE –

Ukraine, which depends on American military aid for its survival, has long tried to maintain bipartisan support in the United States. That has never been easy, but it is getting harder, especially with the increased possibility that Donald J. Trump, no great friend of Ukraine, will return to the White House.

Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is asked in nearly every interview what a second Trump administration would mean for Ukraine. While Mr. Zelensky chooses his words carefully, sometimes the emotional weight of the assumption behind the question — that Mr. Trump could end American military assistance, allowing Russia to succeed in destroying the Ukrainian state — spills into view.

[…]

Read the full article written by Steven Erlanger on The New York Times.

UAE Calls for Arab Coalition to Face Threats in Region

UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash stressed the need for a moderate Arab coalition to face the threats in the region. His speech was made during the Abu Dhabi Strategic Debate (ADSD), organized by Emirates Policy Centre.

Building a strong moderate Arab center to address common regional security challenges is already underway, he said, adding that “for this Arab-led approach to be successful, we must continue to develop our own capabilities.”

“It is critical that Saudi Arabia and Egypt play a leading role in helping to steer the region in a more positive direction. Their stability is so important for the future of the whole region, and it is also why we welcome the proposal for a Middle East Strategic Alliance – it will allow countries with moderate agendas to work closely with the United States,” Gargash stated.

He went on to say that the GCC would be an important part of this alliance.

“Iran has been a primary source of sectarianism in the region,” he added. “We believe that Iran is threatening the security of the region’s countries by supporting armed militias and its proxies, like Hizbollah in Lebanon and Houthis in Yemen in addition to its use of cyber attacks and carrying out acts of terror in the region and beyond, like those witnessed in Europe.”

The minister reaffirmed the UAE’s support for the US President Donald Trump’s policy toward Iran and his strategy to stand up to its aggressive and destabilizing conduct.

“Another pillar for stability is for the region’s countries to pursue good governance. Like other peoples of the world, the region’s people seek good health, education and job opportunities; they aspire for prosperity and in case youth in our region have not been promised their dreams will come true, they would opt for extremism,” he said.

Gargash continued: “It is now high time for Houthis to de-escalate the situation and start a fresh round of peace negotiations. The ball is now in their court and the international community has to contribute to reaching a peaceful solution to the conflict by getting the Houthis to the negotiating table and cut off military supplies and funding provided to them by Iran.”

Read the article on the website of Asharq Al-Awsat

https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/1459696/uae-calls-arab-coalition-face-threats-region?_wrapper_format=html&page=2