Author: wpc_editor

CHRONIQUE – L’ambition de Xi Jinping est de rester dans l’histoire comme l’un des trois empereurs contemporains.

Le 1er juillet 1997 la Chine reprenait possession de Hong Kong. Vingt-cinq ans plus tard, Hong Kong connaît une reprise en main par Pékin de plus en plus sévère. Mais tout n’est pas joué, selon le sinologue Jean-Pierre Cabestan, de l’Université Baptiste de Hong Kong.

En seulement vingt-cinq ans, dans un mouvement qui s’est largement accéléré depuis l’arrivée de Xi Jinping à la tête du pouvoir chinois en 2013, Hong Kong a perdu une grande partie des libertés d’expression politique qui la caractérisaient sous le contrôle des Britanniques. Xi Jinping a même tenu à venir, en personne, à l’occasion de cet anniversaire, marquer ce qu’il qualifie de «renaissance» de l’ancienne colonie. Analyse avec Jean-Pierre professeur à l’Université Baptiste de Hong Kong.

Lors de la rétrocession de Hong Kong, le Royaume-Uni et la Chine se sont engagés à respecter le principe : « un pays, deux systèmes ». Que prévoyait ce « deal » ?

La Grande Bretagne exigeait des garanties politiques, institutionnelles et juridiques pour préserver les libertés existantes et la démocratie. La Chine a accepté de préserver l’économie et le mode de vie « capitalistes » de Hong Kong, alors que le reste du pays vivait sous le « socialisme ». Mais c’est la distinction fondamentale faite par le Parti communiste chinois : préserver le « capitalisme », oui, mais il ne parle pas de démocratie.

La promesse a-t-elle été tenue ?

Hong Kong a vécu avec une certaine autonomie politique. La plupart des libertés politiques ont été préservées (presse, association, multipartisme, parole, manifestation) et les élections devaient devenir courantes… Sauf que, dès le départ, le Chef de l’exécutif a été choisi par Pékin, et formellement élu par un comité électoral dominé par ses partisans. On est loin de l’idée de départ qui était d’évoluer progressivement vers une élection du parlement (le Conseil législatif) et du Chef de l’exécutif au suffrage universel direct ; promesse non tenue, d’où la frustration des Hongkongais.

Comment s’est construite la reprise en main chinoise de Hong Kong ?

Elle a pris un virage décisif en août 2014. Pékin annonce une réforme du mode d’élection du chef de l’exécutif, qui peut se résumer ainsi : ok, on introduit le suffrage universel direct mais c’est nous (le PC chinois) qui choisissons les deux ou trois candidats susceptibles de se présenter ». ​Personne d’autre que Pékin ne pouvait proposer des candidats à ce poste, pas même les partis politiques de Hong Kong.

Lire l’entretien dans son intégralité sur le site de Ouest France.

Les cryptomonnaies portent mal leur nom. Leurs cours sont très volatils et les coûts de transactions sont gigantesques, or ce sont deux des principales caractéristiques d’une monnaie, explique Hélène Rey. Leur régulation devient inéluctable, ce qui fera prendre conscience de leurs déficiences.

Lire l’article dans son intégralité sur le site des Echos.

The world is split into three major political blocs, with “neutral” powers like India and Turkey gaining influence by playing the two old camps, Western and Russia-China, off against each other.

HIROYUKI AKITA, Nikkei commentator

July 3, 2022

TOKYO — Japan is one of the major powers that is least sensitive to changes in the world order, thanks to its “privileged” U.S. protection from foreign aggression, and it continues to develop its security policy on the assumption that the U.S.-led global order will continue.

This is by no means misguided, but recent geopolitical developments have made a coolheaded reassessment of the long-term viability of the U.S.-centric order more urgent than ever.

Roughly four months after Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, it has become clear that the postwar order built on Washington’s leadership is on the verge of collapse. There is no dearth of facts to support this view. When the United Nations voted on a resolution to strip Russia of its seat on the Human Rights Council on April 7, 100 countries either voted against, abstained or did not vote, versus 93 nations that voted in favor.

According to the Economist Intelligent Unit, as of March 30, countries that have joined the international sanctions against Russia, or at least criticized it for its aggression against Ukraine, account for just 36% of the world’s population. Most are Western democracies.

Meanwhile, 64% of the world’s people live in countries that are either neutral on the conflict in Ukraine or have expressed “understanding” or “support” for Russia. The neutrals make up 32% of the global population and include India, Brazil and South Africa. The rest, the pro-Russian camp, includes China and Iran.

A tally shows the results of a vote to remove Russia from the United Nations Human Rights Council during an emergency session of the U.N. General Assembly on April 7.    © Reuters

The leaders of major Western democracies, including U.S. President Joe Biden, like to say the world is united in denouncing Russia’s aggression, but that is obviously not the case. This reality was highlighted by the Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s premier defense summit, held on June 10-12 in Singapore.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida denounced Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, as did defense ministers from Japan, the U.S., South Korea and Australia. All of them warned of China’s increasingly assertive military behavior, calling for unity to counter what they see as a Chinese threat.

But their criticism of Moscow and Beijing was not echoed by many countries in Southeast Asia or the South Pacific. Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto said his country has healthy ties with Russia, which he described as “a very good friend.” He also called China its close partner.

Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein made clear his country’s neutral position, while his Fijian counterpart, Inia Seruiratu, said the island nation will try to reap benefits from its relations with all countries, including China.

Indonesia’s Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto speaks at the second plenary session of the 19th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 11.    © Reuters

Such remarks would have been unthinkable in a world where the U.S. was securely in charge. Many participants from Southeast Asia and India at the conference said U.S. leadership has been in steady decline for around 10 years, with many citing the following events:

In August 2012, then-U.S. President Barack Obama warned his Syrian counterpart, Bashar al-Assad, that the use of chemical weapons would cross a “red line” and invite U.S. intervention. Undeterred, Syrian forces killed hundreds of people with sarin gas the following year. Obama did not respond. Also in 2013, Obama declared the U.S. would no longer act as “the world’s policeman.” He took no action to stop the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 or to prevent China from building military bases in the South China Sea.

His successor, Donald Trump, adopted an “America First” policy, in effect ceding U.S. leadership in world affairs. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is taking place against this geopolitical backdrop.

In hopes of further undermining U.S. influence, Moscow has been stepping up its pressure on Asia. For example, it has threatened to halt shipments of arms components to Southeast Asian nations if they back the Western condemnation of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, according to one diplomatic source in the region.

Russia is Southeast Asia’s largest arms supplier. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia sold some $10.9 billion of weapons to countries in the region between 2000 and 2021, more than the U.S. did.

Big buyers of Russian arms, especially Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia, would have trouble operating their militaries if Russia were to cut them off. It is safe to assume that Moscow is applying similar pressure to countries in the Middle East and Africa that rely on Russian military equipment.

China is using not just diplomatic pressure but also economic aid and investment to win over developing countries.

These development point to the end of the U.S.-led world order and its replacement not by a world without poles, or “G-zero,” as some experts have predicted, but by a tripolar world where three blocs of nations compete for global influence.

The first group consists of Western and Asian democracies, such as the U.S., the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Britain and Canada. The second bloc comprises China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and other authoritarian countries. The third is a loose coalition of “neutral” nations not allied with either the West or the China-Russia bloc. This camp includes India, South Africa, Indonesia, Turkey and Brazil.

As the confrontation between the “West” — including its Asian members — and the China-Russia bloc intensifies, the neutrals sense an opportunity to expand their influence through a careful balancing act. Encouraged by their success, large countries in this third group, such as India and Turkey, are now more actively pursuing their own agendas.

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, right, meets British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss in Ankara, Turkey on June 23.    © Reuters

Turkey, for instance, brokered peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, then held a foreign ministers meeting with Britain on June 23 to explore ways of ending Russia’s blockade of Black Sea ports.

India, for its part, has stepped up its imports of Russian oil since March, but at the same time is working with Japan, the U.S. and Australia as part of the Quad group to counter China’s expansion.

As many of these “neutral” nations do not rely on a security alliance with any leading power, they eschew grand statements of principle, tending to focus on narrower interests. This makes it harder for them to stay as united on any given issue as either the Western democracies or the China-Russia alliance.

Leading Western powers need to bring these fence-sitters to their side and restore the status quo. But doing so will not be easy. To have a hope of success, Western countries must identify the needs of these nations and patiently build relationships with them based on mutual interest. The West may not have much choice: China is set to engage in diplomatic efforts with the same goal in mind.

Read the original article on the Nikkei website.

L’économiste liste, dans sa chronique, les sujets sur lesquels le gouvernement et les différentes oppositions pourraient trouver un accord au cas par cas.

Emmanuel Macron a clairement annoncé que seuls les partis ayant déjà gouverné, ensemble ou séparément – Parti communiste (PC), Europe Ecologie-Les Verts (EELV), Parti socialiste (PS), Ensemble ! et Les Républicains (LR) –, pourront faire partie d’une possible « coalition d’action », tandis qu’en seraient exclus La France insoumise (LFI) et le Rassemblement national (RN), qui n’ont jamais gouverné. Le programme de gouvernement va devoir faire rapidement se confronter les protagonistes de la campagne électorale à la réalité. Il va falloir, en effet, prendre la mesure des investissements indispensables à brève échéance, que ce soit en matière de transition écologique, de résilience économique, de restructuration du système énergétique, d’éducation, de santé ou de défense. Dans l’immédiat, il va falloir, en outre, accepter qu’on ne pourra pas faire entendre raison à un agresseur – la Russie –, prêt à réduire ses revenus de 20 %, si on ne peut pas supporter que les nôtres baissent de 2 %. Ainsi, tout cela impliquera une ponction notable sur le pouvoir d’achat.

C’est au gouvernement bientôt remanié qu’il appartiendra de fixer l’addition. Et il devra compter juste. La soudaine remontée des alarmes sur les taux d’intérêt publics est sans nul doute excessive, mais elle signale un risque de panique qu’il faut endiguer. La France, dans ce contexte, doit trouver le bon équilibre budgétaire : certainement pas replier bagage de manière précipitée, comme en 2011-2014. Pas non plus, cependant, oublier toute discipline, à la manière du « quoi qu’il en coûte » de la période 2020-2022, qui n’a en fait pas été si onéreux, mais qui a laissé une trace politique impérissable. La première ministre ne peut pas décemment exiger des partenaires potentiels de la « coalition d’action » de s’inscrire dans la seule logique du projet présidentiel, mais M. Macron a cependant fixé certaines limites à la possibilité de s’en affranchir.

Terrains de compromis

Quels sont alors les terrains du compromis ? Les écologistes seront jugés sur un seul sujet : l’ambition climatique et, au-delà, l’ambition écologique du programme. La France est gravement en retard sur l’horizon d’une réduction de 50 % des émissions de gaz à effet de serre d’ici à 2030, et elle ne peut rattraper ce retard qu’en accélérant le déploiement des renouvelables et en misant sur la sobriété.

Lire la chronique dans son intégralité sur le site du Monde.

Black Sea Oil and Gas (BSOG) does not have war risk insurance for the Ana and Doina natural gas fields, which have recently started production, but the project moves forward, BSOG CEO Mark Beacom said on Tuesday.

He participated in a ceremony at Vadu, Constanta County, to mark the start of natural gas exploitation under the Midia project operated by BSOG. The first gas from these blocks entered the national grid on June 15.

According to Beacom, there is no war in Romania’s economic zone, but there is an impact. Mines have been detected near the platform, there were warships around, planes flying over the platform. Serpent Island, he said, is not far away, and they have witnessed Crimean platforms being bombed and everything is so close. But he added the company will carry through its project.

Asked if the project is insured against such events, he said no. He said you can’t have insurance when you’re operating near a war, so the company has to take up the risks.

Asked if BSOG will drop the lawsuit filed against Romania over some provisions in the Offshore Drilling Law that are still in force, he replied that he has not yet made a decision.

In his turn, Gabriel Comanescu, CEO of Grup Servicii Petroliere (GSP), the company that built the project, pointed out that this is the largest infrastructure project carried out in Romania in the last 30 years.

“It was a complicated project. The first engineering works started in 2019, laying the pipeline on land and under the sea took 90 days, and training started a year before. The offshore platform has no human operators, there is only maintenance and emergency response,” Comanescu said.

According to him, the BSOG project is a huge step forward towards reducing Romania’s dependence on natural gas imports.

“It is a project made 95% by GSP. From my point of view, it is the largest infrastructure project of the last 30 years, a brand new, tailor-made one. It is made by our strength, made by a Romanian company. It’s like we started with a Trabant and ended with a Mercedes S Class,” added Comanescu.

Read the original article on the website Act News

https://www.actmedia.eu/energy-and-environment/bsog-s-beacom-says-company-has-no-war-risk-insurance-for-black-sea-gas-projects/98413

Lebanon’s parliament speaker is calling for a unity government that will rescue the country from its calamities. However, the reasons for these calamities and for Lebanon’s failure to have proper governance are mutilated concepts like unity government, “mithakia,” which means proper representation among all sects, and “consensual democracy,” which means all the different parties should be included in policymaking.
Lebanon has always had unity governments and none have been able to put forward any real program for the country. The concept of unity government came about after the death of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and was enforced after the Doha Agreement. During the time of Hariri, which extended from 1992, shortly after the end of the civil war, until 2005, the government was one of technocrats.
When Hariri took power after the Taif Agreement, the two main Christian parties were put out of power. Michel Aoun was in exile and Samir Geagea was in prison. Other politicians who kept their places under Taif, like Nabih Berri, the speaker of the parliament, and Walid Jumblatt, benefited from inflated government contracts in return for their acquiescence.
Many say the Hariri years institutionalized corruption. However, during the Hariri years, there was a business plan driving the country. After his death in 2005 came the concept of unity government. This was enforced after the 2008 Doha Agreement, which gave Hezbollah and Amal a third of the Cabinet and the power to veto government decisions.
Lebanon also has the mutilated concept of mithakia, or the fallacy of representation among the sects, which was reinforced after the Doha Agreement, i.e., each one that is strongest in his denomination should be assigned a position for that denomination. So, the Sunni party that gets most of the Sunni seats in parliament should have the premiership, the Shiite party that has most of the Shiite seats should have the speaker’s position, and similarly for the Christians and the presidential role.
The political class has no plan for the country, just a power-sharing scheme that ultimately shares the spoils of the state and through which each party uses some government facility or department as its fief, from which to extract as much money as possible. Former foreign minister and the president’s son-in-law, Gebran Bassil, who is a main pillar of corruption in the country, spelled it out on the sidelines of the 2019 World Economic Forum at Davos. He said that Lebanon could teach London and Washington how to manage a country without a budget.
Thus, the country was turned into a “farm,” as one of my Gulf colleagues described it. Although he added that even a farm has more order than Lebanon. There is no order to anything, just a corrupt class of elites agreeing among themselves to pillage the country. They fight over the ministerial quotas for each party and compete over the most lucrative ministries, like the Ministry of Energy and Water, where all the fatty fuel contracts go. No one can be held accountable as they are all part of the government. This was the motivation for the memorable slogan of the protest groups, “killun yaani killun” (all means all).

The political class has been very clever in benefiting the most from power while holding no responsibility for what has happened. This is mostly represented by Bassil’s famous line, “ma khalouna,” meaning “they did not let us,” blaming the failure on others.
A unity government is not really a democratic practice. Democracy means the minority follows the majority, which rules while the minority is in opposition and keeps a check on those who rule. Today, in the US, the administration is a Democratic one and not a hybrid between Democrats and Republicans. Similarly, in the UK, the government is a Conservative one headed by Boris Johnson, while the Labour Party is in opposition. The party that wins an election puts together a comprehensive political, economic and security strategy for the country and is held responsible for its success or failure.
One might say that, in the US, the people directly elect the head of state, while in Lebanon the parliament elects the president. Others might say that, unlike the US and UK, where there are dual-party systems and where the political scenes are divided between the liberal left and conservative right, Lebanon is a country where the political configuration is divided along sectarian lines.
Still, in the elections they are standing as blocks. For example, Hezbollah, Amal and the Free Patriotic Movement formed one block in the parliamentary elections. They represent the so-called resistance block. In the case of Lebanon, parties of similar thinking should form a coalition, with the coalition that has the majority of seats in parliament forming a government to put together a comprehensive plan and be held accountable for its execution and success. However, the leaders of the political class do not want any accountability. They know that, despite their differences on policy issues, they are “brothers” in corruption. They want to stay together and keep the status quo.
Today, Lebanon is collapsing and is in dire need of an International Monetary Fund bailout package. The Najib Mikati government, which is a unity government that took office from September 2021 to May 2022 and is now in caretaker status, was not able to seal a deal with the IMF. This was also the case of the government of Hassan Diab, which was in power from January 2020 until August 2021, when its members resigned en masse following the Beirut blast and it became a caretaker government. In total, two-and-a-half years of governments and caretaker governments have been unable to reach a deal with the IMF, which Lebanon badly needs because of this consensual democracy.
The mutilated concept of unity government and mithakia are driving political paralysis. It is giving an escape route to the different political parties, allowing them to blame the situation on others. The solution is to have one block form a government, put a comprehensive plan in place and be responsible in front of the Lebanese people and the international community.

Read the original article on the website Arab News

https://www.arabnews.com/node/2113571

Postwar relations between China and Japan have seen a number of epoch-making occasions, and one of the most important events in recent years was the November 2014 summit meeting between then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

The meeting became an opportunity for the two countries, which had been experiencing increased friction and tensions over the Senkaku Islands, to ease and stabilize strained relations.

Prior to the Abe-Xi meeting on Nov. 10, 2014, the governments of the two countries released a four-point statement titled “Regarding Discussions toward Improving Japan-China Relations.”

The statement said, “Both sides confirmed that they would observe the principles and spirit of the four basic documents between Japan and China and that they would continue to develop a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.”

The four documents are the joint communique released on Sept. 29, 1972; the peace and friendship treaty issued on Aug. 12, 1978; the joint declaration released on Nov. 26, 1998; and the joint statement issued on May 7, 2008.

We can say that both countries share the common view that the documents serve as the basis of today’s China-Japan relations, although there are difficulties and uncertainties existing between them.

Nevertheless, Japan’s China policy fluctuated largely in the 30 years after the end of the Cold War and as a result it has been difficult for Tokyo to plan long-term policies.

But what constitutes a favorable Japan-China relationship from Tokyo’s viewpoint, and what kind of approach is Japan trying to take?

Several other questions also arise when trying to understand the ties between Beijing and Tokyo.

How should Japan regard China’s economic growth?

How does establishing favorable China-Japan ties comply with the U.S.-Japan alliance?

And how will Japan achieve a balance between the national interests of maintaining economic ties with China and the threats posed by Beijing from national security perspectives?

Japan’s basic stance on China seems to have been not having a China strategy.

In other words, it is difficult to show any documents that clearly describe Japan’s strategy on China.

Complexity

So why did Japan lack a China strategy until now? There are three main reasons.

First is the complexity of Japan’s relationship with Taiwan.

The postwar China-Japan relationship had been based on ties with the “two Chinas” — the relations with Taiwan defined by the peace treaty signed by Tokyo and Taipei on April 28, 1952, the same day that the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force, and relations with China defined by the 1972 China-Japan joint communique and the 1978 peace and friendship treaty signed by Beijing and Tokyo.

And the outline of these relations was not built by Japan on its own initiative but rather was largely determined by the U.S.-China relationship of the times.

At the time of signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in September 1951, how to handle the two Chinas had been a difficult diplomatic issue between the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as between the U.S. and Japan. But the policy had been established for Japan to choose to side with the government in Taiwan.

After Japan normalized diplomatic ties with China in 1972, it became difficult for Tokyo to come up with a proactive strategy that would respond to the sensitive question of how to balance between China and Taiwan while respecting Beijing’s “one China” position.

Second is the issue of postwar settlements and perceptions of history.

Unlike other developed countries such as the U.S., the U.K. or France, Japan had to handle postwar settlements as a top diplomatic agenda in its relations with the governments of both Taiwan and China.

In other words, building a foundation for a diplomatic relationship with Beijing was postwar Japan’s one and only China policy goal, and Tokyo put in a great amount of effort to achieve it.

It was not the kind of goal that could simply be achieved with the conclusion of a peace treaty.

Third, in providing official development assistance (ODA) to China, Japan regarded it as an alternative to war reparations and, at the same time, tended to prioritize pursuing mutual economic benefits rather than political strategies.

Moreover, it is widely recognized in Japan that its ODA supported China’s modernization and economic growth. And it is true that such assistance strengthened economic ties between the two countries and nurtured mutual benefits.

The Foreign Ministry’s review of Japan’s ODA to China says: “Since 1979, ODA to China has contributed to maintaining and promoting the Reform and Opening Up Policy of China, and at the same time, it has formed a strong foundation to support Japan-China relations.”

Japan’s cooperation toward boosting the Chinese economy was inseparably interlocked with the issue of wartime settlements and perceptions of history.

The Foreign Ministry also said in 2018 that new ODA projects would be terminated in fiscal 2018 and all multiyear projects would be concluded by the end of fiscal 2021. This means that the end of fiscal 2021 in March this year represented the completion of a period in the postwar history of Japan-China relations.

Because of these reasons, it has been difficult for Japan to proactively plan a China strategy from long-term perspectives.

Japan’s China policy has so far been focused on short-term efforts to repair the relationship when it deteriorated, as well as on strengthening economic cooperation and friendship.

However, such times are coming to an end. We are now facing an era in which Japan needs to create a desirable China strategy on its own initiative, taking into account its long-term national interests.

Establishing ties

Then what is a desirable China strategy for Japan?

Japan’s China policy has been based on supporting China’s economic growth through ODA, regarding it as being in Japan’s national interests and hoping Beijing will play a constructive role in the Asia-Pacific region. But this is being forced to change.

Japan and China normalized diplomatic ties in 1972, thanks to great contributions by Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, who headed the Liberal Democratic Party’s middle-of-the-road Keiseikai faction, and Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, who headed the party’s liberal Kochikai faction.

Meanwhile, the party’s conservative Fukuda faction headed by Takeo Fukuda had many pro-Taiwan lawmakers who were cautious about cutting ties with Taiwan and establishing diplomatic ties with the communist regime in Beijing.

The 1972 system stepped up further in 1978 when the Fukuda administration signed a peace and friendship treaty with China. This was a major step in that support for boosting economic ties and friendly relations with China had been established within the LDP regardless of factions.

The largest opposition Japan Socialist Party had been even more active than the LDP in developing ties with Beijing, and the Foreign Ministry’s China school had also been backing such efforts behind the scenes.

Such a consensus eroded gradually with the end of the Cold War and due to change in the power balance between Tokyo and Beijing brought about by Japan’s economic slowdown.

Furthermore, the current international environment largely differs from the Cold War era when the 1972 system was established.

China and Russia are now demonstrating a cooperative relationship, effectively working together like allies. A joint statement issued following a meeting between Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin on Feb. 4 said, “Friendship between the two states has no limits, there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation, strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries.”

As two authoritarian regimes — China and Russia — deepen cooperation while democracies including Japan and Western countries enhance their partnerships, the international society is being increasingly divided into two camps, centered around the two sides of U.S.-China confrontations.

Japan must consider a China strategy by setting the framework for future China-Japan relations in a broader context of the changing global balance of power.

Japan’s diplomacy

Taking into account such changes in the global community, the government should make use of the meeting of the four ministers — the prime minister, the foreign minister, the defense minister and the chief Cabinet secretary — within the National Security Council and come up with a long-term basic policy to place the China strategy at the core of the nation’s security strategy.

Amid increasing tensions between Washington and Beijing, Japan needs to strengthen deterrence against China based on the U.S.-Japan alliance and at the same time maintain and boost multilayered communications with China, making diplomatic efforts to stably develop China-Japan ties to a certain extent.

On top of this, unlike the U.S., it is also important for Tokyo to take part in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership free trade agreement to proactively facilitate regional economic cooperation in East Asia in view of Japan’s national interests.

It is possible to advance cooperation with China for regional economic development while stepping up deterrence against Beijing and restricting economic relations with the country in certain economic areas from the perspective of economic security.

Completion of all ODA projects in China at the end of fiscal 2021 in March indicates an end to one era after World War II.

This means it is important for Japan to plan a long-term China strategy for the next 50 years within this year — the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties with Beijing — and share it within the government and also with the Japanese people.

Find the original article on the website The Japan Times

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2022/06/30/commentary/japan-commentary/japan-china-strategy/

Ce mardi 28 juin, Nathalie Collin, directrice générale adjointe du Groupe La Poste, Patrice Geoffron, directeur du Centre de géopolitique de l’énergie et des matières premières (CGEMP Paris Dauphine), ainsi que Philippe Chalmin, fondateur du Cercle Cyclope et spécialiste des matières premières, étaient les invités dans la deuxième partie de l’émission Le Grand Journal de l’Éco présentée par Hedwige Chevriillon. Le Grand Journal de l’Éco est à voir ou écouter du lundi au vendredi sur BFM Business.

Regarder son intervention sur le site de BFM.

Seules les décisions portées par Bruxelles et les poussées écologistes contre le nucléaire depuis vingt-cinq ans expliquent la situation actuelle.

Par Jean de Kervasdoué

La crise de l’énergie, dont on n’a pas fini de payer les conséquences, ne doit à la guerre en Ukraine que d’en être la brutale révélatrice, car elle trouve son origine dans les politiques allemande, européenne et française menées depuis un quart de siècle.

Sa première source figure dans l’idéologie libérale qui a inspiré la folle régulation du marché européen de l’énergie en général, celui de l’électricité en particulier. La seconde est à rechercher dans l’idéologie écologique qui a combattu avec succès en France, mais surtout en Allemagne, tout développement de l’énergie nucléaire en laissant penser que le robinet du gaz russe serait toujours ouvert et que le vent, le soleil, et même la mer et la biomasse, suffiraient à le compléter.

Lire l’article intégral sur le site du Point.

Alors que se tient à Kigali la réunion des chefs d’État et de gouvernement du Commonwealth, la Rwandaise Louise Mushikiwabo revient sur les liens compliqués entre l’OIF, qu’elle dirige, et son pendant anglo-saxon.

CHRONIQUE – Les États occidentaux ont mis en place des sanctions économiques pour punir la Russie de son invasion en Ukraine. Une véritable balle dans le pied des Européens.

Sorry, this entry is only available in French. For the sake of viewer convenience, the content is shown below in the alternative language. You may click the link to switch the active language.

From Covid-19 to the war in Ukraine, external crises have put pressure on African economies, but many on the continent see opportunities to undertake radical reforms.

Africa already showed some resilience during the pandemic as its economic contraction was less severe than in the rest of the world, shrinking by two percent compared to 3.3 percent globally in 2020.

While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is weighing on the world economy, Africa faces a better outlook again in 2022.

“Africa is headed towards growth of around 3.7 percent, while in North America and Europe there is a real risk of recession”, said economist Lionel Zinsou, formerly prime minister of Benin.

“We haven’t been the biggest victims of the pandemic, and we won’t be the biggest victims of the collateral consequences of the war in Ukraine”, added Zinsou.

The conflict in Europe has fuelled a surge in global inflation, but Zinsou said growing prices for raw materials will compensate for the higher costs of imports in Africa.

Another positive signal is that investor confidence in Africa is up to a higher level than that before the pandemic.

Of 190 business owners in Africa who were questioned, 78 percent voiced confidence about their development prospects — compared to 61 percent before the Covid crisis, according to a report by the Deloitte accountancy firm.

‘Opportunity to transform’

The fallout from the war in Ukraine, however, remains a threat as it has driven up prices for wheat and other key agricultural products, sparking fears of famine in some countries.

“We are concerned about the slowdown in global growth and the availability for Africa of certain products such as wheat or fertilisers”, Ivory Coast President Alassane Ouattara said during the Africa CEO Forum in Abidjan this month.

Makhtar Diop, general director of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a branch of the World Bank, said African economies “have taken a hit and haven’t regained their pre-2019 growth rates”.

“The situation remains particularly difficult with inflation which disproportionally affects the poorest populations,” he added.

But some see the situation as a chance for African countries to map out new strategies.

“We lose a good part of our crops each year due to lack of electricity and cold chain,” said Zinsou, referring to the transport of goods that need to be kept cool across the supply chain.

These losses could be reduced through infrastructure investment, he added.

For Diop, “every crisis is an opportunity to transform the situation structurally. There is potential for the economic transformation of African countries by increasing the added value created on the continent.”

‘Gain independence’

Some countries have stepped up the pace in recent years. Ivory Coast has built new cashew processing plants, while Nigeria is building a major oil refinery in Lagos.

In Guinea, foreign companies have recently been tasked with building bauxite processing plants.

“One of the consequences of the pandemic is that many groups wanted to depend less on foreign imports,” said Emmanuel Gadret, head of Deloitte in francophone Africa.

Georges Wega, deputy director of international banking networks for the Africa region at France’s Societe Generale financial group, believes that Africa has “a lot of potential” to finance its essential projects.

“This is the time for Africa to gain its independence in many aspects. We need to rely more on funds raised on the continent versus external debt,” he said.

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which aims to harmonise customs tariffs across the continent, which is gradually happening, holds out hopes of boosting intra-African trade.

“Africa has been extraordinarily responsive (to the pandemic), financially and technically, and it will be again,” said Zinsou.

Read the article on RFI.

Le gouvernement allemand organise ce vendredi 24 juin à Berlin une conférence internationale sur la crise alimentaire liée à la guerre en Ukraine. Depuis son déplacement à Sotchi, le président sénégalais Macky Sall, président en exercice de l’Union africaine, le répète : « Il faut faciliter l’exportation du blé ukrainien à partir du port d’Odessa parce que l’Afrique est véritablement menacée de famine ». Philippe Chalmin, spécialiste des marchés de matières premières, se déclare quant à lui surpris de ce qu’il appelle une « dramatisation » de la part de la communauté internationale. « Il n’y a, selon lui, aucune raison de supplier Moscou et de donner à Poutine une arme du blé ».

Carine Frenk : Quel est selon vous l’impact du quasi-blocage de l’Ukraine sur la situation alimentaire de l’Afrique aujourd’hui ?

Pour l’instant il est faible dans la mesure où certes il y a peu de céréales qui sortent aujourd’hui d’Ukraine, mais je rappelle que l’Afrique est surtout concernée par le blé et l’Ukraine avait presque terminé sa campagne d’exportation de blé. Il reste dans les silos ukrainiens, avant la nouvelle campagne, il reste peut-être 4 à 5 millions de tonnes de blé. Mais en réalité, le véritable impact de la guerre en Ukraine sur les importations africaines de blé, c’est par le biais le prix. Il faut bien reconnaître que depuis le déclenchement de la guerre, les prix mondiaux du blé ont bien pris quand même une centaine de dollars la tonne de plus.

Mais quand on parle des exportations céréalières de l’Ukraine et qu’on en fait la cause majeure du problème alimentaire mondial, c’est une erreur d’appréciation, un raccourci de journalistes ?

Je laisse les journalistes parler de raccourci de journalistes, mais je pense que c’est un peu beaucoup de cela. Ce qui est clair, c’est que la vraie raison des tensions sur les marchés agricoles mondiaux, et qui est antérieure à la crise ukrainienne puisqu’elle remonte à 2021, c’est l’importance des achats chinois en 2021. Il est clair qu’ensuite nous avons eu une augmentation des tensions liées à la guerre en Ukraine. Donc la crise ukrainienne a amplifié un problème qui d’abord existait déjà, qui était la dépendance alimentaire excessive de nombre de pays africains qui n’ont pas fait les efforts de politique agricole suffisante. Et d’autre part, les tensions, on les avait déjà en 2021 du fait notamment de l’importance des achats chinois. Dire que c’est l’Ukraine qui provoque une crise alimentaire mondiale, c’est une exagération.

Et donc ça veut dire que vous remettez en question les analyses que font les instances européennes onusiennes ou africaines, quand elles évoquent l’urgence d’ouvrir des corridors en mer Noire pour laisser passer le blé.

Le problème, c’est que pour l’instant ces corridors laisseraient plus se passer du maïs que du blé, il faut en être honnête. Ensuite va se poser le problème de l’arrivée de la nouvelle campagne, donc de la nouvelle récolte ukrainienne. Celle-ci effectivement aura du mal à sortir. Mais je pense que plutôt que d’imaginer des corridors maritimes qui seront extrêmement difficiles à mettre en place dans la mesure où une partie de la mer est minée, et que la fiabilité du partenaire turc peut-être quand même assez facilement mis en doute, il vaut probablement mieux faire tous les efforts possibles pour essayer de développer des corridors terrestres par la route et le rail pour arriver sur le Danube et sortir par les ports roumains par exemple. On n’arrivera pas à tout sortir, mais si je me cantonne au blé, on arriverait probablement à sortir une bonne part du blé ukrainien.

Autre facteur inquiétant pour l’Afrique, c’est la pénurie d’engrais. Le président Macky Sall a évoqué à son retour de Sotchi le risque d’un effondrement de 20 à 50% des rendements céréaliers en Afrique si l’approvisionnement en engrais n’est pas assuré sur le continent. Partagez-vous ces inquiétudes ?

Alors là je crois qu’il a parfaitement raison. Le président Macky Sall touche probablement ce qui est le talon d’Achille, à l’heure actuelle, de l’agriculture africaine. Je crois qu’il faut appeler un chat un chat : la crise alimentaire africaine, elle est avant tout une crise de la pauvreté, une crise de la mal gouvernance, une crise de la mauvaise gestion des politiques agricoles et pour certaines régions, mais aussi une crise climatique, je pense à la sécheresse qui touche la corne de l’Afrique.

Lire l’interview sur le site de RFI.

La remontée des taux d’intérêt – et la fuite de capitaux qui en découle – associée à la sous-estimation par le système financier des risques climatique, « cyber » et géopolitique fait peser de graves menaces sur l’économie mondiale, alerte, dans une tribune au « Monde », l’économiste Hélène Rey.

Au moment où presque toutes les banques centrales retirent des liquidités de l’économie pour combattre l’inflation, la crainte de crises financières ressurgit avec force. Dans un environnement où les Etats et les secteurs privés sont très endettés et où les prix des actifs sont souvent surévalués, le retournement du cycle financier global est à craindre. Car, plus le resserrement des politiques monétaires est important, plus la création de crédit ralentit, et plus les flux de capitaux se tarissent et les primes de risque augmentent, parfois de façon excessive. La Réserve fédérale américaine joue un rôle particulièrement important pour le cycle financier mondial et donne le ton sur les marchés financiers internationaux : lorsqu’elle coupe les liquidités, l’aversion au risque augmente et la valeur des actifs risqués (bitcoin, actions, etc.) chute.

La situation actuelle rappelle dans une certaine mesure la période précédant la crise de la dette de l’Amérique latine des années 1980, soulignait Richard Portes, professeur à la London Business School et fondateur du Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), lors du premier symposium du CEPR à Paris, le 2 juin, où ce réseau européen de 1 600 chercheurs vient d’installer son siège, auparavant situé à Londres. La montée des taux et l’augmentation des primes de risque pourraient déstabiliser les pays émergents en raison des fuites de capitaux et des crises de change. On peut ajouter que les restructurations de dette qui seront probablement nécessaires seront bien plus difficiles à gérer dans un monde où le multilatéralisme est moribond et où la Chine est un créditeur important mais n’est pas membre du Club de Paris, l’institution réunissant les créanciers publics où se négocient lesdites restructurations.

CHRONIQUE. Un rapport de l’OMS pointe la progression du surpoids en Europe. Or notre pays est à la traîne face à ce fléau contre lequel il faut agir tôt.

Par Jean de Kervasdoué

La branche européenne de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS Europe) vient de publier un rapport aussi documenté qu’inquiétant. Il traite de l’évolution croissante du surpoids et de l’obésité dans les pays européens et en souligne les très fâcheuses conséquences. En la matière, l’idée que la France se faisait jusque-là d’elle-même n’est plus fondée, tant l’épidémie se développe à tous les âges, et notamment chez les jeunes. Pour le constater, il suffit d’ailleurs d’ouvrir les yeux, notamment dans les quartiers pauvres de nos grandes villes.

L’obésité est à la fois une maladie et un facteur d’aggravation de nombreuses autres affections.

Patrick Achi a posé la première pierre du Centre de formation aux métiers des énergies renouvelables de Yopougon le vendredi 17 juin 2022. Photo : AfrikiPresse

Le Premier ministre Patrick Achi a posé la première pierre du Centre de formation aux métiers des énergies renouvelables de Yopougon le vendredi 17 juin 2022. À cette occasion, le chef du gouvernement s’est prononcé sur l’importance pour la Côte d’Ivoire de former des jeunes sur les énergies renouvelables à une ère où la question du réchauffement climatique intéresse tous les États.

« Ces énergies renouvelables, ici comme ailleurs dans le monde, sont au cœur de la stratégie de transition énergétique que l’accélération du réchauffement du climat nous impose d’amplifier. Ces métiers seront donc clés pour l’avenir, celui de notre pays comme de notre continent, et favoriseront ainsi une très bonne et très durable insertion de notre jeunesse, dans la vie active et dans la vie tout court », a déclaré Patrick Achi à cette occasion.

La formation professionnelle comme une option prioritaire, et non secondaire

À en croire le chef du gouvernement, la formation professionnelle est un segment important pour l’État ivoirien dans le cadre de la vision Côte d’Ivoire 2030 du Président de la République Alassane Ouattara. Il a dans ce sens, invité les parents d’élèves à ne plus voir l’enseignement professionnel comme la solution après avoir échoué partout, mais plutôt, comme une option prioritaire.

« Avec la création du ministère dédié en avril 2021, la volonté du Gouvernement est de faire passer le taux de scolarisation dans ce secteur à 15% en 2025 », a expliqué le chef du gouvernement qui a précisé : « Ce centre de formation novateur qui sera construit ici et dans lequel vous pourrez inscrire vos enfants dans quelques mois, illustre la volonté claire du gouvernement de faire de l’Enseignement Technique et de la Formation professionnelle une vraie alternative à l’enseignement général, mais surtout une passerelle très forte vers l’emploi durable ».

Le futur centre de formation qui doit être inauguré dans 9 mois, est le fruit de la coopération entre la Côte d’Ivoire et le Royaume d’Espagne. Le Premier ministre a dans ce sens salué les relations entre les deux pays.

De son côté Rafael Soriano Ortiz, Ambassadeur d’Espagne en Côte d’Ivoire a indiqué que ce projet permettra d’avoir une infrastructure fondamentale dans la stratégie du ministère de l’Enseignement technique mais aussi permettra d’assurer une formation d’excellence aux métiers des énergies renouvelables.

[Un coût de 6,5 milliards Fcfa, 500 apprenants]

Avant le Premier ministre Patrick Achi, c’est Koffi N’Guessan, Ministre de l’Enseignement Technique, de la Formation Professionnelle qui a souligné l’importance de cet établissement. Ce lycée professionnel, faut-il le savoir sera construit pour un montant total de 6,5 milliards de Francs CFA dont 5,5 milliards apportés par la Coopération espagnole et 1 milliard décaissé par le gouvernement ivoirien.

500 apprenants pourront assister aux cours de façon simultanée dans ce lycée qui offre plusieurs commodités dont des espaces aménagés pour les handicapés ou des installations alimentées par l’énergie solaire.

Yaya Kanté avec Sercom

Lire l’article sur le site de AfrikiPresse.

Le PDG du Cnes, Philippe Baptiste, milite pour une démocratisation des données spatiales, dont une grande partie est accessible gratuitement. Selon lui, l’espace est une opportunité pour l’Europe de reprendre pied dans le numérique.

© Dahmane

VU D’AILLEURS – Selon l’ancien président de la Banque centrale européenne, «les mesures réactives prises par les pays les plus dépendants de la Russie, comme l’Italie et l’Allemagne, ne suffisent pas».

Ce mardi matin, Christian Bréchot, ancien directeur de l’Institut Pasteur, alertait face à la hausse des cas de contaminations au variant BA5.

Regarder son intervention sur la chaîne youtube d’Europe 1.

PUBLISHED SUN, JUN 19 2022

Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks during the unveiling of the Communist Party’s new Politburo Standing Committee on October 25, 2017 in Beijing, China.

Lintao Zhang | Getty Images News | Getty Images

For President Xi Jinping, dispatching his special envoy to Europe for a three-week charm tour was just one of many acts of high-stakes damage control ahead of the 20^th Chinese Communist Party Congress this autumn.

Xi’s economy is dangerously slowing, financing for his Belt and Road Initiative has tanked, his Zero Covid policy is flailing, and his continued support of Russian President Vladimir Putin hangs like a cloud over his claim of being the world’s premier national sovereignty champion as Russia’s war on Ukraine grinds on.

Few China watchers believe Xi’s hold on power faces any serious challenge, but that’s hard to rule out entirely given how many recent mistakes he’s made. So, Xi’s taking no chances ahead of one of his party’s most important gatherings, a meeting designed to assure his continued rule and his place in history.

European business leaders understood that as the context for their recent meetings with Wu Hongbo, the special representative of the Chinese government for European affairs and former UN Undersecretary General. His message was a similar one at every stop: Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Germany, and Italy.

“The Chinese want to change the tone of the story, to control the damage,” said one European business leader who asked to remain anonymous due to his Chinese business interests. “They understand they have gone too far.”

The businessman described Wu, with his fluent and fluid English, as one of the smoothest, most open, and intellectually nimble Chinese officials he’s met. At every stop, Wu conceded China had “made mistakes,” from its handling of Covid-19, to its “wolf warrior” diplomacy, to its economic mismanagement.

His trip came as concerns in China have grown about “losing Europe” in the wake of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

The public mood has shifted sufficiently to have Finland and Sweden knocking on NATO’s door, and the European Union this week embracing the prospect of Ukraine’s membership candidacy. Wu’s visit was also something of a mop-up operation following a failed visit by Chinese official Huo Yuzhen to eight central and east European countries. In Poland, he was refused a meeting with government officials.

Germans and their political leaders — Europe’s most significant target for Chinese diplomats and business — are raising new questions about everything from investment guarantees for German business in China to specific projects like VW’s factory in Xinjian province, home of human rights abuses against the primarily Muslim Uyghur population.

Though Wu addressed Putin’s war in Ukraine only indirectly, his message was designed to reassure Europeans that they are preferred partners, as opposed to the United States. His bottom line: China will always be China, a country of growing significance and economic opportunities for Europe.

Yet lost ground in Europe is just one of many gathering problems President Xi faces ahead of his party congress, which will determine the country’s economic, foreign policy and domestic agenda for years to come.

The party congress is likely to provide Xi a third term, a move that follows a 2018 decision to scrap term limits. What’s more likely to reveal the extent of Xi’s power, writes Michael Cunningham of the Heritage Foundation, is whether he can put his allies in key central bodies, primarily the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee, as retirement norms ensure considerable turnover.

However the Congress turns out, there is growing talk among China experts about whether we are entering a period of “Peak Xi” or even “Peak China.” There’s growing evidence that he and the country he represents (and his approach has been to make the two inseparable) have reached the height of their influence and reputation.

Nothing will determine the outcome more than how Xi manages China’s economy, which is the foundation for the country’s far-reaching global influence as well as the Communist party’s domestic legitimacy.

Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, one of the keenest China-watchers anywhere, sees China’s economic prospects weakening due to a chain of factors. They include at least 10 Chinese property developer defaults, and Xi’s crackdown on China’s technology sector, which has cost it $2 trillion in market capitalization of its 10 biggest tech companies over the past year.

Moreover, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has sent energy and commodity prices soaring and has snarled supply chains, “terrible news for the world’s largest manufacturer, exporter and energy-consuming economy,” Rudd wrote recently in The Wall Street Journal. Add to this Xi’s insistence on China’s Zero Covid strategy, which led to mass lockdowns.

Rudd concludes that this combination of factors is enough to make Xi miss his 5.5% growth target and perhaps even grow more slowly this year than the United States. “For Mr. Xi, failing to reach the target would be politically disastrous,” writes Rudd.

Xi’s damage control on the economic front has included fiscal and monetary stimulus and infrastructure spending to grow domestic demand. A recent meeting of the Politburo also suggested some coming relief from the regulatory crackdown on China’s tech sector.

Yet none of that will be enough to reverse Xi’s cardinal sin, and that was his dramatic pivot to stronger state and party controls.

Writing in Foreign Affairs, the Atlantic Council’s Daniel H. Rosen, who is a founding partner of Rhodium Group, argues, “China cannot have both today’s statism and yesterday’s strong growth rates. It will have to choose.”

Adds Craig Singleton this week in Foreign Policy, “China’s fizzling economic miracle may soon undercut the (Communist party’s) ability to wage a sustained struggle for geostrategic dominance.”

There’s not much time left for damage control before Xi opens his party Congress in the Great Hall of the People. He’s likely to get the vote he wants, but that won’t solve the larger problem. It has been his leadership and decision-making that have generated China’s challenges, and he’ll have to correct course if he is to restore economic growth at home, revive his international momentum and avoid “Peak Xi.”

Read the original article on the CNBC‘s website.

États-Unis et Union européenne ont appelé jeudi la Russie à accepter rapidement une ouverture des ports ukrainiens afin de permettre aux millions de tonnes de céréales qui y sont stockées d’être exportées, permettant d’atténuer la crise alimentaire mondiale.

Moscou «devrait agir immédiatement pour ouvrir ces ports et mettre fin à cette guerre», a souligné le ministre américain de l’Agriculture, Tom Vilsack, lors d’une conférence de presse après des discussions à l’ONU. «C’est une chose sérieuse, nous ne devrions pas utiliser la nourriture comme une arme», a-t-il insisté.

L’ONU négocie depuis plusieurs semaines avec Moscou, Kiev et Ankara, caution militaire d’une utilisation de la mer Noire pour des navires civils, un accord qui permettrait aux céréales ukrainiennes de sortir du pays en sécurité et aux engrais produits par la Russie de revenir sur le marché international.

Moscou se plaint d’entraves à ses exportations à cause de sanctions économiques.

Si un accord était trouvé, il ferait baisser les prix des denrées et atténuerait la crise alimentaire dans le monde, qui s’aggrave du fait de l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine.

Tom Vilsack a réaffirmé que les sanctions américaines ne visaient pas la nourriture et les engrais. Pas plus que les sanctions européennes, a renchéri le chef de la diplomatie de l’Union européenne, Josep Borrell, lors d’une réunion du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU sur la coopération avec l’UE.

«Les sanctions de l’UE ne sont pas la cause des pénuries alimentaires» car «elles visent la capacité du Kremlin à financer l’agression militaire – et non la conduite d’un commerce légitime», a déclaré le responsable européen.

«Les sanctions de l’UE n’interdisent pas l’importation et le transport de produits agricoles russes, ni d’engrais, ni de paiement pour ces exportations russes» et «nos mesures n’affectent pas la capacité des pays tiers à acheter à la Russie», a précisé Josep Borrell.

«Besoin immédiat»

À propos des discussions en cours, le ministre américain a indiqué espérer que les Russes négocient «de bonne foi», «sérieusement et qu’ils ne fassent pas cela uniquement pour créer une image» destinée à faire croire à leur bonne volonté. «J’encourage la Russie» à contribuer à «la réouverture des ports et qu’elle le fasse rapidement. Car le besoin est immédiat», a-t-il dit.

Actuellement, «la Russie bloque au moins 20 millions de tonnes de céréales ukrainiennes qui ne peuvent pas atteindre les marchés mondiaux», a dénoncé de son côté Josep Borrell, en appelant aussi Moscou à permettre la réouverture des ports sous blocus russe.

«C’est l’équivalent de 300 énormes navires qui devraient accoster dans des ports du monde entier. Au lieu de cela, la Russie bombarde les ports, les infrastructures et les terres agricoles de l’Ukraine», a-t-il lancé.

Ambassadeur russe à l’ONU, Vassily Nebenzia a balayé ces accusations. «On essaie de rejeter la faute sur la Russie, avec des allégations infondées de bombardements d’entrepôts de céréales, de blocages de céréales. Il n’y a aucun obstacle à cet égard», a-t-il affirmé.

Interrogé sur un projet du président américain Joe Biden d’établir des silos en Pologne pour accueillir du grain ukrainien, Tom Vilsack a expliqué qu’il s’agissait de «réduire le risque de perte» des céréales, éviter leur vol et préserver leur qualité.

Mercredi, la Turquie a annoncé être prête à accueillir «une réunion à quatre», avec l’ONU, la Russie et l’Ukraine, en vue d’organiser la sortie des céréales ukrainiennes via la mer Noire.

«La Turquie soutient» le plan proposé par l’ONU «et attend le retour de la Russie», a indiqué le ministre des Affaires étrangères Mevlüt Cavusoglu, en précisant que des rencontres techniques entre militaires se poursuivaient.

«Il faut répondre aux inquiétudes de tout le monde», a précisé le ministre . «La Russie veut être sûre que les bateaux ne transportent pas d’armes et l’Ukraine veut être sûre que la Russie n’utilisera pas ces corridors (en mer) pour attaquer», a-t-il expliqué.

Lire l’article sur le site du Journal de Québec

https://www.journaldequebec.com/2022/06/16/cereales-les-etats-unis-appellent-la-russie-a-accepter-rapidement-louverture-des-ports-ukrainiens