En 2021, pour la première fois dans l’histoire, une crise énergétique a été provoquée par le gaz et non par le pétrole
Par Irène Inchauspé
Philippe Chalmin. Sipa Press
Les faits –
La demande européenne de gaz devrait diminuer cette année, son prix toujours élevé rendant le charbon plus compétitif pour la production d’électricité, a déclaré lundi l’Agence internationale de l’énergie (AIE).
Historien et économiste, Philippe Chalmin est un spécialiste des marchés des matières premières.
Comment s’est comporté le gaz en 2021 ?
On peut dire que 2021 a vraiment été l’année du gaz, car nous avons connu une crise énergétique qui, pour la première fois dans l’histoire, n’a pas été due au pétrole mais au gaz. Que ce soit en Europe ou en Asie, les prix du gaz ont quadruplé en moyenne, la hausse étant encore plus spectaculaire par rapport aux minima enregistrés en mai 2020 — de 1,50 dollar le mbtu [million de British thermal units], au plus bas, à 40 dollars au plus haut, soit des augmentations spectaculaires sur l’année (+397 % en Europe et +280 % en Asie pour le GNL [gaz naturel liquéfié]). Une évolution que personne n’avait prévue. Alors que le pétrole lui, est
seulement passé de 40 dollars le baril à 70 dollars le baril. Ceci montre bien que si traditionnellement le prix de gaz suivait le pétrole, ce n’est plus le cas aujourd’hui. D’ailleurs, le premier est deux fois plus cher que le second. Il faut noter également qu’entre 2015 et 2020, le
marché s’est modifié. La part des contrats à terme, indexés sur le pétrole, a fortement diminué par rapport au contrat spot. L’essentiel des transactions en Europe se fait au prix spot, et Vladimir Poutine a beau jeu de dire : « Vous vous plaignez, mais c’est vous qui vous êtes mis
dans cette situation. »
C’est le résultat d’une combinaison de facteurs climatiques, économiques et géopolitiques. Climatiques d’abord avec la sécheresse qui a touché la Chine affectant sa production hydroélectrique et provoquant un recours accru au charbon et la réouverture de mines. Mais aussi une hausse des importations de GNL qui ont fait monter les prix. Ensuite, il y a eu une panne de vent en Allemagne et en Europe du Nord. On s’est vraiment rendu compte alors que nos énergies renouvelables sont méchamment intermittentes ! Pas de vent, donc pas ou peu de production éolienne en Europe du Nord, nécessitant une consommation en forte hausse de GNL en été, ce qui est vraiment inhabituel. Le facteur économique est lié aux grandes compagnies gazières européennes qui sont en retard dans la reconstitution de leurs stocks, qui sont à des niveaux historiquement bas. Enfin, dans le domaine de la géopolitique, avant même la question de l’Ukraine, les tensions existaient déjà entre l’Europe et la Russie autour du gazoduc Nord Stream 2. Elles ont aussi contribué à la hausse des prix du gaz.
« Dans l’hypothèse où la situation politique ne se détériore pas, nous devrions assister à une détente des prix du gaz au printemps. Il ne retrouvera pas toutefois ses niveaux de 2020, en raison de la tension sur les stocks »
L’explosion des prix du gaz a entraîné dans son sillage un recours accru au charbon avec pour la Chine la recherche de nouveaux fournisseurs à la suite d’un embargo sur le charbon australien. L’Europe, elle, a augmenté de 12 % sa consommation de charbon en 2021. Les prix de
l’électricité en Europe ont aussi été impactés, puisqu’ils sont déterminés par les coûts de la dernière centrale appelée pour assurer l’équilibre entre l’offre et la demande, qui est une centrale au gaz. Les matières premières « électriques » comme le lithium et le cobalt ont également connu de fortes hausses des prix, tout comme on a connu flambée de ceux des engrais. Enfin, en raison de la hausse du coût de l’énergie, nous avons constaté une baisse de la production d’aluminium et de zinc.
Le conflit en Ukraine menace-t-il nos importations de gaz ?
Aujourd’hui, l’Europe occidentale dépend à 40 % pour ses approvisionnements de la Russie. Les autres grands fournisseurs sont la Norvège, l’Algérie, et des importations de gaz naturel liquéfié qui peuvent venir du Qatar, d’Australie et des Etats-Unis. Pour la France, le principal fournisseur de gaz est la Norvège (36 %), devant la Russie (17 %), l’Algérie (8 %), les Pays-Bas (8 %), le Nigeria (7 %) et le Qatar (2 %). Nous sommes moins dépendants de la Russie que le reste de l’Europe, en particulier l’Allemagne. Nous avons aussi l’avantage du nucléaire. Vladimir Poutine, quant à lui, utilise déjà l’arme du gaz vis-à-vis des « maillons faibles ». Par exemple, en Moldavie qui s’est dotée d’un gouvernement plutôt pro-européen, alors que la société gazière du
pays est une filiale de Gazprom ! Il a exercé des pressions identiques en Bulgarie et en Hongrie. Si nous avons un vrai conflit, qui nous amène à dire que l’on n’achète plus de gaz aux Russes ou que ceux-ci ne veulent plus nous le vendre, nous aurons un vrai problème d’approvisionnement
puisque les stocks de gaz naturel que nous détenons sont historiquement bas. Il faudrait alors trouver d’autres approvisionnements. La Russie devrait elle aussi trouver d’autres façons
d’écouler son stock, mais elle peut tenir un moment car elle a des débouchés en Chine.
Risque-t-on de faire face à une pénurie de gaz en Europe ?
Du gaz, on pourra toujours en trouver, on pourra toujours en acheter. On a des capacités aujourd’hui d’importations de gaz naturel liquéfié. Le seul problème qu’il faut rappeler, c’est se détériore pas, nous devrions assister à une détente des tarifs du gaz au printemps. Il ne retrouvera pas toutefois ses niveaux de 2020, en raison de la tension sur les stocks.
Retrouver l’article original sur le site de L’Opinion.
A health worker collects a swab sample from a traveler at a train station to test for COVID-19 before allowing her to enter the city, in Mumbai, India
India Inc has demonstrated resilience in the third wave of Covid-19, despite disruptions and challenges, and business should rebound by February-March, say CEOs and business leaders.
Larger markets such as Mumbai and Delhi have been able to deal with the third wave, without putting too much pressure on the healthcare infrastructure, and smaller cities too are expected to ride it out better than the previous ones, corporate leaders say. While employees having to take time off to recover from Covid infections did delay assignments and plans, relative mildness of Omicron, lower mortality levels compared with the second wave and large-scale vaccinations resulted in the absence of fear and stress among organisations.
Infosys founder NR Narayana Murthy said Indian industry has done a pretty good job at drdriving growth despite Covid.
Absence of Lockdowns Helped
He added that Indian businesses will remain resilient with appropriate Covid protocols, vaccinations and greater planning.
“The government has also done a great job on the vaccinations front. That has led to a drop in mortality and fear, and more confidence in running businesses and life,” Murthy said. “We have to learn to live with the virus with more planning and less panic. I think the Indian economy is fairly resilient today and will be on a strong wicket.”
Corporate chieftains say businesses have attempted to mitigate the risks arising from Covid over the last two years in terms of planning, sourcing and strategy. Investment in robust and diversified supply chains, automation of processes, and accelerated digitalisation on the customer-experience side, have helped companies manage the aftermath of Covid better. Also, the absence of lockdowns has ensured less disruption and less panic.
“Fear is absent and we are in a better place to deal with Covid in terms of medicines and health infrastructure. There have been blips in demand, but we see lesser anxiety, leading to more business confidence. Fortunately, there were no lockdowns and we are hopeful that the Omnicron wave ends by March this year,” said RPG Group chairman Harsh Goenka. The chairman of a top Indian conglomerate said that in the first wave there was tremendous business uncertainty, and in the second wave, the high levels of mortality caused a dent in business and consumer confidence. This time round, business is better prepared and illness caused by Omicron is temporary, without being life threatening in most cases. “Vaccines, improved line of treatment, and availability of better drugs will help cope with the pandemic. Businesses have to work around Covid,” he said.
CONSUMER SENTIMENT
Business leaders were of the view that consumer sentiment remained positive.
” Consumer sentiment is far better after vaccinations and boosters. Business rebound is expected to be faster than before,” said Indian Hotels Company Ltd managing director Puneet Chatwal. Businesses took six to nine months to bounce back after the first wave in 2020, three months to recover after the second wave, and six weeks in the third, he said.
Shoppers Stop MD Venu Nair said consumer sentiment continues to be positive. “We are already seeing a positive trend in sales, and we expect a faster rebound this time,” said Nair.
Asian Paints CEO Amit Syngle said while consumer sentiment has been subdued in the third wave, prior experience shows that a Covid wave is followed by the release of pent-up demand. “Covid leads to temporary suspension in demand owing to deferment of plans, but buoyancy will return fast,” he said. Companies selling discretionary products said compared to the first two waves, business remained largely on track in the third wave. Beauty unicorn Good Glamm group founder Darpan Sanghvi said during the second wave, there was a drop in consumer sentiment. “Consequently, we saw online click-through rates (CTRs) drop by 15- 20% and offline was badly impacted by over 40- 50%. During the Omicron wave, we have not seen consumer sentiment get hit. We see CTRs staying strong and online sales staying healthy,” he said. “Agility of supply chains, distributed manufacturing footprint together, omni-channel presence as well as accelerated digitalisation have enabled us to ensure continued and uninterrupted supply of our range of FMCG products,” said an ITC spokesperson.
Metro Cash & Carry MD Arvind Mediratta, too, said the impact of the third wave on business was much less severe compared to the earlier waves. “There has been a slowdown in sales over the last one month (around 10-15%) with the hospitality sector down by 25-30%. But we expect this to get over by mid-February as by then the third wave would have receded in all the big cities,” he said.
Read the original article on the site of the Economic Times
ByCarl Bildt, Aleksander Kwasniewski, Victor Pinchuk, Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Ukraine faces a grave threat on its border. Another Russian invasion seems quite possible. Given the size of the Russian forces currently concentrated close to the frontier and the determination of Ukrainians to defend their freedom, the result would be tragic.
United and resolute engagement by the West is essential if we are to avoid catastrophe. A recent survey has identified strong backing among the Western public for an assertive policy in support of Ukraine. We believe this is an important and timely message for Western leaders.
Today, Western leaders are trying to balance firmness with efforts to avoid escalation. Are they prepared to back up diplomacy not only with sanctions but also with military support in a worst-case scenario?
We felt it was important to systematically survey Western public opinion in order to gain a sense of how the public views the current crisis. What policies towards Ukraine do people in Western countries want to see? Will citizens support their leaders in a coherent and firm policy to defend Ukraine?
The six-country study commissioned by the Yalta European Strategy and the Victor Pinchuk Foundation included 600 interviews per country with representative samples of the general population in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland.
Across all countries surveyed, though of course with national variations on all issues, the study found that Western populations not only endorse strong diplomatic and economic measures, but also back military engagement to deter Russian aggression and protect Ukraine’s borders. If deterrence fails and Russia invades Ukraine again, Western populations are even more emphatic in their backing for military support from NATO member states.
Western citizens want to stand with Ukraine and believe that an assertive set of policies can successfully deter Russia. At the same time, they expect Ukraine and its leadership to commit fully to reforms and the elimination of corruption.
Here are some key results of the survey:
Western public support is based on broadly positive attitudes towards Ukraine, and to the idea of the country joining the EU and NATO.
Clear majorities or nearly half of all respondents believe that Ukraine and the West share the same values, including 61% in Poland, 57% in the UK, 56% in Canada, 54% in the US, 48% in Germany, and 47% in France. When asked the same question about Russia, the answer is a clear “no.”
On the question “If the EU/NATO would accept candidates in the next five to ten years, which country should be admitted?” Ukraine ranks top among eleven listed candidate countries. Across the West, majorities consider it important for their home country to support Ukraine, its freedom, and efforts to defend itself. Majorities also see support for Ukraine as important for European security.
Western populations oppose the idea of “sacrificing” Ukraine in order to improve relations with Russia. Only around 15% of respondents feel it is more important to improve relations with Russia than defend Ukraine, with the highest figure being 18% in Germany.
In terms of the present military crisis, majorities or nearly one-half in all six surveyed countries favor NATO allies making a commitment to defend Ukraine from Russian aggression including 66% in Poland, 61% in the US, 61% in Canada, 57% in France, 49% in Germany, and 47% in the UK.
Through unity and resolve, the West can help defend both Ukraine’s territorial integrity and democratic values. We believe the West has a moral obligation to do so. Western nations have always supported and encouraged Ukraine on its European and Euro-Atlantic path. The West now has a responsibility to stand with Ukraine during this moment of truth.
The recent survey shows that Western citizens will support their leaders if they do the right thing. At the same time, the Western public want their leaders to be tough not only in defending Ukraine, but also in demanding reforms from Ukraine.
There is a consistent belief held by 70% in the UK, 67% in Poland, 63% in the US, 60% in Germany, 55% in Canada, and 53% in France that Ukraine must first get its act together before more substantial long-term support can be given. Western populations sees Ukrainian civil society as the main partners in the pursuit of reforms.
In a moment of grave threat, Western populations are ready to support Ukraine’s right to defend itself and the country’s choice of a democratic future. As Western leaders face up to a great crisis, they have reason to feel their voters will back them up and not hold them back if they adopt principled positions in support of Ukraine.
Carl Bildt is a Member of the Board of Yalta European Strategy. Aleksander Kwasniewski is Head of the Board of Yalta European Strategy. Victor Pinchuk is the Founder and a Member of the Board of Yalta European Strategy. Anders Fogh Rasmussen is a Member of the Board of Yalta European Strategy.
Survey Methodology Statement: Schoen Cooperman Research completed 600 interviews per country in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland with representative samples of general population adults, as well as an additional 185 interviews with professionals with higher educations and middle-to-upper incomes in each country, on behalf of Yalta European Strategy and the Victor Pinchuk Foundation.
Respondents in the secondary sample are defined as professionals working in industries such as technology, business services/consulting, finance, healthcare, law, academia, government, or media & entertainment with post-secondary education or the equivalent in their home country and annual incomes in the upper one-quarter or one-third of the income distribution in their home country. All survey interviews were completed online.
Respondents were reached using random selection procedures and were required to pass a series of screening questions in order to ensure they are adults in the given home country. The margin of error for each general population sample is +/- 4% at the 95% confidence level and +/- 7% at the 95% confidence level for each sample of professionals with higher educations and middle-to-upper incomes.
People in Western democracies are losing trust in government, but that is hardly a surprise. Political mediocrity has caused leaders to make promises they cannot keep while shunning other points of view. Nothing less than freedom itself is at stake.
Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” Winston Churchill uttered these words in 1947, and today they remain as true as ever.
Since democracy is better than all of the other forms of government we have tried, one might expect that in Western democracies, trust in government and its institutions would be high. This is not the case. For many years, the Edelman Trust Barometer has measured the relationship between people and their governments. Citing the 2022 edition of the measure, Reuters pointed out that it had fallen to “new lows.” However, it also showed rising scores in autocratic states like China.
“The biggest losers of public trust over the last year,” the article continues, “were institutions in Germany, down 7 points to 46, Australia at 53 (-6), the Netherlands at 57 (-6), South Korea at 42 (-5) and the United States at 43 (-5). By contrast, public trust in institutions in China stood at 83 percent, up 11 points, 76 percent in the United Arab Emirates (+9) and 66 percent in Thailand (+5).” Businesses, however, “retained strong levels of trust globally,” due to their role in “developing vaccines and adapting workplace and retail practices.”
These are woeful scores for the “liberal democracies.” But what might be the underlying reason?
Misuse of democracy
Like many good things, democracy is susceptible to misuse. Many systems label themselves “democratic” though they have no democratic qualities whatsoever. The former German Democratic Republic or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea come to mind.
Other places may have leaderships that act in a rather autocratic manner but have nevertheless been selected in a democratic way – Singapore is one example. In yet other places, there are successful democracies based on wide decentralization and the principle of subsidiarity, coupled with a strong element of direct democracy, such as in Switzerland. Most Western countries have systems of representative democracies with different degrees of centralization and federalism.
However, democracy is under constant threat – as is freedom. Just as freedom is a precious public good and must continuously be defended, so must democracy. The challenge for democracy is less autocracy, but rather two other phenomena: populism on one side and excessive bureaucracy (sometimes called “technocracy”) on the other.
Political parties are tempted to battle for ‘market share’ instead of defending their convictions and the public interest.
The pillars of democracy that should distinguish it from other systems are a guarantee of individual freedom and an efficient (as opposed to oppressive and arbitrary) rule of law. Democracy requires freedom of speech and opinion, and thrives on healthy debate between opposing views.
Because political parties compete for votes, they are tempted to battle for “market share” instead of defending their convictions and the public interest. They tend to disguise their populist, unsustainable proposals as ones that would serve that public interest.
A close look at the writings and debates of the United States’ founders reveals a worry that populism can take democracy hostage. They therefore introduced an elaborate system of checks and balances to contain the excesses of the majority. They designed institutions such as the Senate, in which each state, regardless of population, is represented by two senators.
Switzerland’s thriving democracy is based on a high degree of subsidiarity, granting the cantons broad autonomy and giving the municipalities a key role to play. The country also has a robust system of referenda, allowing for direct democracy. Frequently, decentralized systems have more resilient democracies and a stronger defense of individual freedom than more centralized ones. Subsidiarity is crucial.
Populism and bureaucracy
Another challenge to individual freedom and democracy is the rise of technocracies and bureaucracies. This trend diminishes magistrates’ responsibility and reduces the efficiency of administrative and political systems. The result is a torrent of rules limiting freedom of choice and adding huge societal and economic costs. The tentacles of state administration extend further and further, yet according to the constitutional concept adopted by most Western democracies, it is the parliament’s duty to keep public expenses under control and ensure that the state and its institutions do not become a burden on citizens.
Unfortunately, in many European democracies, populism is increasing and the state’s role in society and the economy is rising fast. The proponents of these changes like to camouflage this rising state interventionism as “technocracy,” to make it seem like experts are running things. As they gain traction, the traditional European dedicated civil service is transforming into an ever more bloated bureaucracy.
In many European democracies, populism is increasing and the state’s role in society and the economy is rising fast.
There are different varieties of populism. On the periphery are the more extreme types – some are radical, while some simply challenge what has become the accepted norms of the so-called “center.” Yet the traditional parties have long been engaging in their own type of populism. As they try to increase their constituencies, they water down their own policies, abandoning their stated convictions and using muddled rhetoric.
This is the populism of mediocrity. It leads politicians to avoid making decisions that are unpopular but necessary, and it makes it harder to find and implement good solutions. Examples are everywhere. In Germany, the Christian Democrats have taken a sharp turn to the left over the last 16 years to obtain more votes. The move worked at first, but by the end of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s time in office, the party had lost a huge chunk of its electorate. Moreover, the strategy emboldened radical groups on both the extreme right and left. When “centrist” parties engage in cheap populism, it radicalizes the political spectrum.
Political comfort zone
Unfortunately, the parties themselves have become very bureaucratic. Being a member of parliament has become a profession. As politicians increasingly rely on reelection for their income, they are less independent – they must bow to the will of the party bureaucracy if they want to be nominated.
As they try to siphon off votes from each other, the mainstream parties – the Christian democrats/conservatives and social democrats – have all begun to occupy the same cozy, center-left territory on the political spectrum. Any deviation from this philosophical zone is denounced as “radical.” As they try to maintain this balancing act, politicians increasingly make misleading campaign promises or take refuge in empty statements or even outright lies.
The fact that so many successful politicians are such shameless liars is not only a reflection on them, it is also a reflection on us. When the people want the impossible, only liars can satisfy.
Thomas Sowell
But with mediocrity on one side and radicalization on the other, what has allowed the citizenry to become so misguided? Convenience is one cause. It often takes a lot of work to understand policies and their consequences. It is reassuring to remain in a political comfort zone that the center-left purports is morally driven, especially in elaborate welfare systems. For a while, it can even seem like things are going well.
However, the uniformity at the center can make others feel resentful and left out, compelled to take to the political periphery. Others simply fall back on indifference – a social cancer that has become widespread and is toxic for democracy.
Economic populism
Rising inflation will further eat away at trust in institutions. The Edelman Trust Barometer shows that in Western countries, people have enormous doubt about their economic future. For years, the socialist political mantra has been that overspending by the state is unproblematic and that central banks can issue money at nearly unlimited rates without any negative consequences. That dishonest narrative is beginning to backfire. Inflation is here to stay, and the dire situation is clearly a failure of the state, not the market.
Another characteristic of the worsening quality of politics is how leaders create panic while both amassing power and remaining indecisive when it comes to real problems. The alarm over climate change and the incompetence in fighting Covid-19 are just two of the most prominent examples. In these cases, the leaders are often well-meaning and engaged, but lack the necessary understanding to deal with these issues and have grandiose ambitions about saving the world. They pose an immense danger to liberty.
Mediocrity, often presented as stability, is a breeding ground for decline.
This type of populism adopted by most of the West’s mainstream political parties, in which they ignore fundamental realities and promise more than they can deliver, has brought terrible results. It can be seen in post-Merkel Germany, in President Emmanuel Macron’s France, and in many other countries around the world, including the U.S. It has all of the toxic ingredients necessary to snuff out democracy and freedom.
Flimsy politics and a dependence on printing money have embroiled the European Central Bank – ostensibly a politically independent institution – in everyday politics. Former ECB President Mario Draghi (now prime minister of Italy) had political ambitions, while current President Christine Lagarde is a career politician. They have betrayed the institution’s mandate to preserve the value of the euro. Because it currently finances many of the European Union’s governments, the ECB has become Europe’s power center. This recalls Thomas Jefferson’s remark: “The end of democracy and the defeat of the American Revolution will occur when government falls into the hands of lending institutions.”
Freedom and democracy must not be taken for granted. Like all important public goods, they are constantly threatened by those who would seize power – be it autocrats, technocrats or weak politicians. Mediocrity, often presented as stability, is a breeding ground for decline.
It is citizens’ responsibility to defend their rights. Voters hold the key to change.
Europe and the US wait anxiously to see if Russian president Vladimir Putin will give the order to invade Ukraine. For years, western statesmen and commentators have puzzled over what makes Putin tick.
After Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, then US secretary of state John Kerry complained: “You just don’t in the 21st century behave in the 19th-century fashion by invading another country on a completely trumped-up pretext.” Others have called Putin’s aggressive policies “inexplicable” and bound to lead to a “quagmire”. Yet, here we are in early 2022 waiting for Putin to call the shot.
I believe his actions, however deplorable, are understandable. Almost everything Putin does at home and abroad is rooted in the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which for him marked the collapse of the four-century-old Russian empire and Russia’s position as a great power.
Internally, the Soviet collapse and subsequent period of “reform” led to chaos, lawlessness, poverty and a dramatic weakening of the central government at the hands of both oligarchs and regional authorities. Since becoming president in 1999, Putin’s objectives have been straightforward: to restore and expand central government authority (not to mention enhancing his personal dominance and wealth), and to return Russia to its historical role as a major power. In short, authoritarianism at home and aggression abroad.
The restoration of Russia’s role as a great power began with a return to its historical policy of creating a buffer of subservient states on the periphery — the so-called near abroad. Putin’s embrace of this strategy of securing the near abroad is seen in his actions in Belarus, Moldova, Transnistria, Georgia, the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, Kazakhstan and, most dramatically, Ukraine.
He has no desire to recreate the Soviet Union — he does not want to be responsible for the problems of former Soviet republics. What Putin wants is subservience, and for those now-independent states to bend the knee to Moscow — and to be a bulwark against the west and democracy.
Former US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski observed that without Ukraine, there can be no Russian empire. Putin fears a Ukraine that is economically and politically orientated towards the west with an ever-closer security relationship with the US and other members of Nato — even if it is not a member of the alliance. He regards that as a critical security risk and, just as bad, an alternative economic and political model likely to be increasingly attractive to Russians — a dagger pointed at the heart of Russia.
Putin seems determined, therefore, to take whatever measures he deems necessary either to destabilise and bring down the current western-orientated government of Ukraine or to try to seize the country by military force.
Putin’s restoration of Russia as a great power has also involved significantly strengthening the country’s military capabilities, as well as pursuing an aggressive foreign policy, especially in the Middle East and Africa. He sees the US as the primary enemy and is determined to do whatever he can to exacerbate American tensions at home, disrupt relationships with our allies even as he interferes in their internal affairs, and weaken the US position internationally. In these endeavours, he has enjoyed an increasingly close partnership and commonality of purpose with the Chinese.
Because of Russia’s stunted economy, demographic challenges and other weaknesses at home, Putin has dealt himself a poor hand — but until now he has played it rather skilfully. He has received a great deal of unintended help from the US. Our domestic divisions and near-paralysis in Congress, our perceived withdrawal from the Middle East and, more broadly, from our six-decade-long global leadership role, and ignominious scuttling out of Afghanistan — together these have led many countries to hedge their bets and develop closer economic, political and security ties with both Russia and China.
Putin’s problem is that, as dictators are wont to do, he has overplayed his hand. His aggressive threats against Ukraine have galvanised Nato and reaffirmed its clarity of purpose. His menacing policies have made Ukrainians even more anti-Russian and driven the country further into the arms of the west. Any Russian military action will result in Ukrainian resistance as well as larger Nato military deployments on Russia’s western border, potential suspension of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and painful economic sanctions.
Moscow has deployed some 100,000 troops to the borders of Ukraine. What now? Putin finds himself in a situation where Russian success is defined as either a change of government in Kyiv (with the successor aligned with Moscow) or conquest of the country. The 18th-century French diplomat Talleyrand is meant to have said: “You can do anything you like with bayonets except sit on them.” Putin must use those troops soon or face the humiliation of withdrawing them without achieving anything except pushing Ukraine closer to the west. In either case, he has placed himself in a difficult position at home and abroad. The US and its allies must do what they can to exacerbate his difficulties.
Read the original article on the site of the Financial Times.
“There will be no peace in Europe if the States are reconstituted on the basis of national sovereignty.” This warning by Jean Monnet—the crux of his seminal reflection from Algiers, Algeria in the summer of 1943—sums up the crisis Europe is currently experiencing nearly eighty years later.
Europe today, as in the aforementioned period, does not have a decisive voice in the great geopolitical issues that will define its future.
Let’s go back to the Algiers of 1943. In June, the French Committee of National Liberation was formed, with Charles de Gaulle as co-chairman and Jean Monnet among the five original members. That summer, the Red Army of the Soviet Union on the Eastern front and the Allied landing in Sicily marked a turning point in relation to Nazi Germany’s Wehrmacht. The divide was drawn between the supremacy of the Soviet Union (along with the United States) and the weakness of Europe and of the United Kingdom.
Importantly, at that time, and in line with a deep-rooted, historical tradition, the United Kingdom was considered European only in a broad, fluctuating sense, which also may include Russia. And so, the disputed delineation of Europe’s frontiers (which still hangs over our heads and has paralyzed, to a great extent, coordinated action in the twenty-first century) was already clear in these first designs of the post-war European order. Present, too, was the dilemma (as artificial today as it was then) between Atlanticist affiliation—based on fear of the Soviet protectorate—and Continentalist allegiance—stemming from reticence to the Anglo-American (now, simply American) hegemony.
The idea of building Europe beyond sovereignties (a need as conspicuous today as it proved to be in Yalta) is part of the reflection of the different groups of resistance (Algiers, but Ventotene’s Spinelli as well). The voice of de Gaulle’s Free France, bypassing the Vichy government, took the lead in this quasi-clandestine debate, as the powers that be engaged in dialogue exclusively among themselves. We are now living a painfully similar situation: Russia only recognizes the United States as a direct interlocutor.
In the objectively unfavorable context in 1943, Monnet laid the groundwork for the rebirth of Europe. And his idea, which became history, confronts us today.
It is true that we are not at war; but Monnet’s intellectual scaffolding presumes a state of peace. And although Europe’s challenge is not “rebuilding,” we Europeans have to accept that our survival as a society—one that can determine its future and defend its principles and values, liberal democracy, the rule of law, and multilateralism—depends just as much on collating national sovereignties as it does on a balanced, proactive transatlantic relationship.
It is said that Monnet, in those days of 1943 (the quote is part of a set of meditations dated August 5) paced back and forth, studying a wall map of the “great” Europe, pondering the nature of the structure that could undo the Gordian Knot of “the German question” (with Otto von Bismarck’s unification in 1871, the weight of Germany—stemming from its wealth and population—became a permanent factor of instability). Monnet’s deliberations revolved around how to create a framework that both integrated and disciplined Germany: a “European entity” with an economic and political vocation that he called a “federation.” The equivalent of addressing “the German question” in our days is the search for a single European voice in the three areas which define the twenty-first century: engagement with China, the health of the transatlantic bond, and Russian revisionism.
Let’s start with Beijing, a paradigmatic case of the trademark ambiguity that afflicts us in Europe: Europe seeks, above all, to be “understanding” (is China a “partner,” a “competitor,” or a “rival”?). This ambiguity transcends semantics—it is pure vacillation. Although our discrepancies with China are basic, rooted in disparate ways of seeing the world—the primacy of freedom versus security, citizen versus collective subject—the dispersion of our national interests and policies defies understanding.
Nor are we clear about what we want with the United States. On one side, we have French President Emmanuel Macron with his “we will see” take on US President Joe Biden; on the other, the countries of Eastern Europe that cling to NATO (and, therefore, to the United States) as guarantor of their defense and territorial integrity. And yes, the transatlantic alliance is, as in 1943, of vital importance for Europe. But Europe needs to be clear: The United States does not have the same relevance or the same interests as it did eighty years ago.
Today, it is a fractured society, whose foreign policy “for the middle class” is impregnated with confrontation (because, unlike us Europeans, the United States is clear about what to call its relationship with China). Although in an extreme situation the transatlantic bond would withstand, Europe is low on the totem pole, as was proven by the unfortunate development of the AUKUS storyline.
The urgency, the drama, and the potential catharsis come from Europe’s eastern neighbor. There are many Europeans who, out of ignorance, indolence, or even conviction play into the Kremlin mantra of Russia as a historical victim of hostility—from the outside world in general, and from the West in particular. After a period of weakness caused by the dismantling of the Soviet Union, in this view, Moscow has managed to regain great-power status without any help, despite the incomprehension—if not sabotage—of Europe and the United States. Russian President Vladimir Putin triumphantly leads the patriotic feat of fighting off alleged aggression and threats to the country’s security on its western border, which the United States is accused of having plotted in the aftermath of the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” (the dissolution of the Soviet Union), in the words of the president. This is the philosophy behind his article published last July, which unexpectedly crystallized in Russia’s December 17 ultimatum.
Europe is once again absent from the key conversation surrounding a process that will undoubtedly impact its collective future. Putin has reneged on the Normandy Format and is only addressing the United States. NATO today, after years of European complacency and under-funding, is seen as little more than a multilateralist front for Washington. As for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe meeting, it is a sad fig leaf to (poorly) hide the shame of Europe’s belittlement. The US Deputy Secretary of State’s meeting with the EU High Representative was a consolatory (if appreciated) formal gesture.
Europeans don’t count—not through our institutions and not even through France and Germany, as in the Minsk Accords. Europeans cannot accept the situation. Europe has to participate as the European Union, coordinating the member states, particularly the large ones, not bundled up in the cloak of US power or waiting in the wings.
Europe has to react. Our reality is objectively no worse than the one facing Monnet in August 1943. But we have much to learn from the founding fathers of European integration: ambition of vision, strength of conviction, clarity of exposition, and self-confidence.
French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian last week made a subtle criticism of the US. He said there is no European security without Europeans, alluding to the bilateral US negotiations with Russia over the fate of Ukraine, which not only did not include Europeans but also did not have any Ukrainian representation, even though it is the subject of contention. One of Joe Biden’s key criticisms of Donald Trump’s foreign policy was that the former president acted in a unilateral manner, but isn’t Biden now behaving exactly the same as his predecessor?
When Biden was elected, Europe breathed a sigh of relief. Paris Mayor Anne Hidalgo tweeted, “Welcome back America.” She was welcoming Washington’s likely return to the way it used to deal with its allies: On an institutional and multilateral basis. Hidalgo was also welcoming the return of American engagement with Europe after a period of confrontation during the Trump administration. There was so much hope that Biden would undo the damage Trump’s policies caused to the transatlantic alliance. However, America’s European partners are getting increasingly frustrated, as they are now realizing that Biden is as unilateral in his approach to foreign policy as his predecessor, and this selfishness in international affairs is overshadowing the common good of the transatlantic alliance.
This unilateralism is a byproduct of short-sightedness and opportunism. Ultimately, the US has so much to lose by not involving its allies. America’s strength does not primarily stem from its formidable military machine, but from its ability to garner support across the globe. And its alliance with Europe has been the cornerstone of US power projection worldwide. In fact, since the Second World War, transatlantic relations have been at the heart of international politics. This does not seem to be the case anymore. The epicenter is moving to Eurasia, with a likely Russian-Chinese alliance. However, if this is the case, it is really bad news for the West and for the people who aspire to freedom and democracy. The main culprit behind the likelihood of this shift in power is definitely the US and not Europe.
While Trump campaigned on an “America first” platform, Biden said “America is back.” But America today is neither the first nor is it back. It is slowly losing its place on the world stage, driven by an obsessive isolationism that resulted in this unilateral approach. When you simply don’t care what is happening in the world and don’t want to lead, why would you care what your allies think? Actually, when you are not planning to be involved, why do you need allies in the first place?
The most flagrant symptom was last summer’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, which happened without any coordination with any of its allies. “The Americans just left,” one source told me. Washington left its allies to scramble to deal with the repercussions of its hasty decision. Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who fell short of directly criticizing the US, said that the withdrawal was an “extremely bitter development. Bitter, dramatic and terrifying.”
While the narrative of the Biden administration stresses democracy, human rights, institutional relations and multilateralism, the reality is totally different. The reality is different simply because the US no longer has a leading interest in world affairs and primacy on the world stage is no longer a goal on its own. The Biden administration is more focused on domestic issues. However, the US should remember that its robust economy and a large part of the prosperity the average American enjoys can be partly attributed to the country’s position on the world stage. For example, the oil concessions US companies benefited from in the Arab Gulf were awarded to “Uncle Sam” for a reason. In addition to the economic element, these countries’ alliances with the US played an important role.
The ideology of isolationism started with Barack Obama, who was catering to a popular mood after Americans grew tired of George W. Bush’s wars. It continued with Trump’s America first approach. However, it is now being taken to new heights by the Biden administration — and this isolationism is driving unilateralism.
US selfishness in international affairs is overshadowing the common good of the transatlantic alliance.
Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib
The underlying logic is “we do the minimum to secure our interests and the world needs to take care of itself.” Prior to entering any negotiations with the Russians on Ukraine, Biden made it clear that the military option was not a realistic one for the US. With Ukraine feeling threatened, the US said it would not be sending soldiers to defend its ally. When you have this attitude, how can your allies trust you? More importantly, when negotiating with the Russians, the US has not involved its ally that is under threat or its European partners. This unilateralism shakes the trust of allies and sends a sign of weakness to foes.
Russian leader Vladimir Putin seems very confident. He is facing the American threat of sanctions with his own threat of cutting relations with the US. Where is the respect America can impose on its foes? Today, as the US is also negotiating with Iran in Vienna, the Iranians are refusing to talk directly to Washington. How humiliating is that? You are negotiating with a party who refuses to talk to you.
For the US to regain its prestige on the world stage, it should start by showing a firm commitment to its allies and decisiveness when facing its foes. It should also demonstrate to its allies that its political narrative is not void and that it can be translated into action when needed. Unless the US does that, we will witness the waning of America as a world power, the decline of the West and a serious blow to liberal democracies around the world. If Washington does not want to reach this point, it should start reversing its unilateral approach and begin liaising with its allies on foreign policy matters.
In File Photo: Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) and President Duterte wave to the media following a welcome ceremony at Malacañang Palace on November 20, in Manila. Image credits: AP/Bullit Marquez
CHINA hopes the next Philippine president will continue President Duterte’s “independent foreign policy,” a senior ranking Chinese politician and retired diplomat said.
Madame Fu Ying, chairperson of the influential foreign affairs committee of the Chinese parliament, said China, the Philippines and the region benefited from Duterte’s pivot towards China when he assumed presidency in 2016.
“[Duterte’s] independent foreign policy has won him respect from countries in the region, including from China, and he is willing to face the difficult issues with China, and find proper solutions, and he was able to reach consensus with the Chinese leaders, and allowing the relationship to come out of a difficult time and gain vitality,” Fu Ying said during the recent virtual conference billed as the 5th Manila Forum for Philippine-China Relations.
“It’s not only good for the two countries, two peoples, but also good for the region. So I hope that in the future, whoever is succeeding him will be able to wisely, courageously, and responsibly carry out Philippine independent foreign policy,” Fu Ying added.
Fu Ying had served as the Chinese Ambassador to Manila for two years from 1998 to 2000, at the time when relations between Manila and Beijing were strained as a result of China’s increased occupation of the Panganiban Reef (international name: Mischief Reef) in the West Philippine Sea. She was also appointed as the Chinese ambassador to Australia and the United Kingdom, before being promoted as vice foreign minister of China. Now, she chairs the foreign affairs committee of the National People’s Congress, and US think tanks have described her as a “senior figure in a growing number of US-China interactions.”
China’s State Counsellor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi also noted that Duterte’s pivot to China was a “strategic decision to improve the relations” between Manila and Beijing.
“Rainbows appeared after the rainstorms,” Wang Yi said in a recorded speech played during the virtual forum.
Fu Ying said she has been watching the recent spat between the Philippines and China over the West Philippine Sea, referring to reports of Chinese Coast Guard firing water cannon on a Philippine boat that transported food to Filipino soldiers stationed at Ayungin Shoal (international name: Second Thomas Shoal) last November. Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. protested the incident in “strongest terms” to a point of mentioning the treaty alliance the Philippines has with the United States.
“I have been watching the recent occasional hyping up of the disputes caused by some incidents related to some shoals in China’s Nansha Islands [also known as the Spratly Islands] and feel a bit concerned, hoping the two sides would properly handle it and avoid rolling back the mutual trust that both sides have worked so hard to build in the past years,” Fu Ying said.
Fu Ying suggested that both sides “stay firmly on the positive side” of the relationship and put the Spratly Islands dispute “at an appropriate place and properly handled through dialogues.” The Chinese foreign minister went further, saying that both sides should prevent the Spratly island issue from affecting or “taking hostage” the overall bilateral relationship.
She warned that the West Philippine Sea dispute will be used as an election issue in the Philippines in the upcoming presidential elections in May this year.
“I am aware that the election season is unfolding in Manila. The past experience shows that during such time, some people tend to bring up the disputes with China or try to stand tough against China which appear to be ‘politically correct.’
“Some Filipino scholars are expressing concerns of such tendency, stating that the disputes should not become a defining issue for our relations.
“I agree with such views and hope those who have foresight and stand for China-Philippines friendship can speak up and provide positive influence and we should work together to keep our relations on the right track,” Fu Ying said.
Wang Yi reassured the Philippines that “China will absolutely not use its strength to bully smaller countries, and we never believe in a winner-takes-all approach.”
“We hope to work with the Philippines to find ways to properly manage and resolve the issue in the spirit of goodwill and pragmatism. We need to come up with the resolve as soon as possible to advance joint development without prejudice to either side’s rights and claims, so that we can turn the South China Sea issue from a challenge into an opportunity and a positive factor conducive to the development of the Philippines and the friendship between our two peoples,” Wang Yi added.
Si la France veut avoir une chance se réindustrialiser et de se doter d’un système productif efficace, elle n’a d’autre choix que de mettre les bouchées doubles dans les nouvelles technologies. Par Jacques Moulin, directeur général du think tank IDATE DigiWorld.
Jacques Moulin
Jacques Moulin, le directeur général de l’IDATE. (Crédits : DR)
Plus de 4,5 milliards d’individus ont été confinés : jamais dans l’histoire de l’humanité, une crise sanitaire n’avait eu un tel impact. La pandémie a agi comme révélateur des fragilités de nos économies et de nos sociétés. Mais les confinements à répétition ont constitué aussi un accélérateur de l’hyperdigitalisation de notre civilisation. A tous les sceptiques du « big data », de l’IOT, de la 5G, le maintien de l’activité économique, de l’enseignement, de la médecine, – et bien sûr la recherche pour le vaccin – mais aussi des loisirs et du lien social, en bref de notre survie, aura été la preuve irréfutable de l’utilité du digital.
Selon Churchill, « il ne faut jamais gaspiller une bonne crise », et nous vivons actuellement un momentum qui offre l’opportunité de bâtir de nouveaux modèles. Il n’y aura pas de retour en arrière. Si le futur sera résolument digital, tout ce qui est digital ne fait pas sens. Encore faut-il que les transformations soient régies par une logique de progrès, d’inclusion économique et sociétale. Il nous faut bien sûr penser Europe. Un projet industriel digital européen inclusif, durable et responsable est la condition sine qua non pour échapper au déterminisme de la bipolarisation de l’échiquier mondial. L’Europe se doit de construire une alternative, empreinte de ses valeurs et forte de ses capacités d’innovation, aux modèles chinois et américains.
Cette voie se co-construira avec les territoires. La centralisation à outrance, la fracture numérique ont démontré leur logique d’exclusion. Nous ne pouvons plus feindre d’ignorer la fragilité des populations qui, par géographie ou par éducation, sont exclues d’internet. L’inclusion repose sur une infrastructure robuste. Nous pouvons pousser un cocorico pour le plan « Très Haut Débit » : la France est dans les premiers pays au monde et le premier pays d’Europe, à fibrer son territoire. Il nous faut désormais accompagner une offre de solutions régionales enrichies.
Le numérique, gage d’une France souveraine
Puisque tout ce qui peut être digitalisé sera digitalisé, seuls résisteront les entreprises, Etats et territoires qui mettent en action leur feuille de route digitale. Cela suppose de penser long terme car les investissements ne peuvent s’insérer dans la dimension temporelle du mandat électif. L’élu post-covid sera nécessairement visionnaire. Clé de voute de la réindustrialisation 4.0, le numérique est le gage d’une France et d’une Europe souveraines et compétitives. Souveraineté ne signifie ni repli sur soi ni protectionnisme mais partenariats lucides et équilibrés pour ne pas perdre en rapidité de transformation.
La « 5G Factory » de Mercedes est éclairante : l’utilisation de la 5G couplée au big data, à la robotique entraîne un gain de productivité de 25% et, grâce à la maintenance prédictive, permet d’assembler avec plus de fiabilité, différents modèles de véhicules sur une même chaine. Dans le secteur de la santé, le numérique affirme un véritable saut « quantique » : la transmission à distance de radios avec la 5G permet de sauver des vies dans des services d’urgence. Le couple « numérique et santé » contribue aussi à lutter contre les déserts médicaux si nombreux en France.
Or, force est de constater qu’encore trop d’industriels français sont frileux face aux investissements nécessaires pour accompagner la révolution 5G et engager la transition 4.0. Or, à l’heure digitale, le plus rapide gagne. L’industrie allemande, convaincue sans tergiversation de l’avantage concurrentiel de la 5G, s’est mobilisée pour être admise à l’attribution des fréquences. La France doit accélérer sa mue : il en va de la crédibilité de ses objectifs déclarés de ré-industrialisation. Est-ce anecdotique si Tesla et Toyota avec leur véhicule green rafle la mise des flottes de taxis parisiens ?
Réformer le capital-risque
Certes, il nous faut aussi réformer le capital-risque français trop timoré : une startup bénéficie de 8,3 fois plus de capital aux Etats-Unis qu’en Europe. Pire encore : la France, terre de médaillés Field, est à la traîne pour l’enseignement des mathématiques. Investir dans l’éducation et la recherche est vitale pour rester dans la course. La majorité des métiers dans les 10 prochaines années n’existe pas encore. Il nous faut repenser les modes d’apprentissage car désormais une vie professionnelle sera composée de 10 parcours différents.
La pandémie a banalisé le recours au télétravail. L’aspiration à travailler autrement – ne parle-t’on pas de néo-ruralité ? – est une opportunité inédite pour les territoires qui veulent développer leur attractivité, accompagner la création d’écosystèmes créateurs d’emploi. Le rôle de l’élu, agrégateur de ces écosystèmes, est dès lors central. Le projet que nous prônons au sein de l’IDATE DigiWorld est inclusif, responsable et durable. Pour cela, il doit tout d’abord s’exercer dans un cadre régulé. Les Digital Market Act/Digital Service Act européens, en sont un premier pas.
Le numérique est aussi le levier pour bâtir une société plus « green » et responsable. Le « green by design » intégrant nativement les préoccupations environnementale et énergétique est un impératif. Ainsi, le digital est-il la clé pour opérer notre « saut de grenouille » et « être absolument moderne ».
Il est temps que la France accompagne sa mutation en accélérant la modernisation de son système productif, en se dotant des « Humanités du numérique » : former chaque citoyen à la compréhension des enjeux du numérique, à l’utilité de ses actes digitaux au quotidien et investir dans la préparation aux emplois de demain, tout en favorisant la R&D au travers de projets européens. Et bien courons maintenant !
Le chef de la diplomatie européenne, Josep Borrell. STEPHANE MAHE / REUTERS
Le chef de la diplomatie européenne Josep Borrell a déclaré lundi redouter une «intégration de fait» à la Russie des régions de l’Ukraine non contrôlées par Kiev. «Je suis de plus en plus préoccupé par la situation dans les régions non contrôlées par Kiev, car elles s’écartent de plus en plus de l’Ukraine et se rapprochent de plus en plus de la Russie», a-t-il expliqué lors d’une audition par la Commission des Affaires étrangères du Parlement européen.
La région du Donbass, dans l’est de l’Ukraine, pourrait notamment se voir progressivement intégrée «de fait» à la Russie, a expliqué Josep Borrell aux eurodéputés, réunis à Strasbourg pour une session plénière du Parlement. Depuis sept ans, cette zone est déchirée par une guerre entre Kiev et des séparatistes prorusses, et le règlement politique du conflit, prévu par les accords de Minsk de 2015, est dans l’impasse. «La concentration par la Russie de forces à la frontière de l’Ukraine est liée à cette intégration (…) Une attaque massive en Ukraine n’est pas le scénario le plus probable, mais il existe d’autres moyens d’attaquer, comme les cyberattaques», a commenté Josep Borrell.
L’Ukraine a justement été victime, dans la nuit de jeudi à vendredi, d’un vaste piratage informatique ciblant les sites internet de plusieurs ministères. Kiev a assuré dimanche avoir des «preuves» de l’implication de la Russie dans cette cyberattaque. «Nous travaillons sur au moins sept scénarios différents. Je ne pense pas que nous allons immédiatement passer au pire scénario, mais il y en a plusieurs dans lesquels la situation pourrait être suffisamment dangereuse pour nécessiter un état d’alerte permanent», a jugé Josep Borrell.
Les Européens espèrent encore convaincre le président russe Vladimir Poutine de renoncer à une invasion de l’Ukraine, mais ils ont commencé vendredi à préparer de «lourdes» sanctions pour l’en «dissuader», lors d’une réunion informelle jeudi et vendredi à Brest (ouest de la France). Souhaitant affirmer leur crédibilité vis-à-vis de l’allié américain, ils ont rappelé leur mise en garde contre les conséquences d’une nouvelle agression militaire russe contre l’Ukraine. «Elle aura des conséquences et un coût par le biais de sanctions», a souligné Josep Borrell. Ces dernières seront discutées lors d’une réunion des ministres européens des Affaires étrangères le 24 janvier à Bruxelles, a-t-il précisé.
Nuclearelectrica has managed to continue or to develop major investment projects in 2021 whilst increasing its perspectives on the capitals market.
“2021 was a good year for Nuclearelectrica: financially, operationally, investment, human resources wise and innovation wise. (…) Most of my efforts in 2021 were directed towards Nuclearelectrica’s investment projects within the context of decarbonization coupled with Romania’s need for a robust and safe energy system,” Cosmin Ghita, CEO Nuclearelectrica told The Diplomat-Bucharest.
COMMITMENT TO PERFORMANCE | Business Evolution, Projects, PERFORMANCE, Figures
How would you describe the evolution of your company in 2021?
“2021 was a good year for Nuclearelectrica: financially, operationally, investment, human resources wise and innovation wise. We have accomplished a lot in 2021, we have managed to continue or to develop major investment projects, to take the new human resource strategy to a new level, to digitalize significantly our company, to increase our position and perspectives on the capital market.
However most of my efforts in 2021 were directed towards Nuclearelectrica’s investment projects within the context of decarbonization coupled with Romania’s need for a robust and safe energy system. We continued the refurbishment of Unit 1, according to the schedule, and we are to complete the first stage of the project in early 2022, the feasibility study. The purpose is to have another 30 years of safe and clean operation after 2028, in a very efficient and cost-effective manner. Refurbishments of nuclear units are confirmed to have the lowest levelized cost of electricity of all energy sources, renewables included.
We also continued the Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant Units 3 and 4 Project. We reoperationalized EnergoNuclear, the project company, and already signed one major contract with CANDU Energy as part of the first stage of the project. We are doing our best to develop the project within the established timeframe and have Unit 3 connected to the grid in 2030 and Unit 4 in 2031, just at the right time for Romania to meet its decarbonization targets in a reliable manner whilst phasing out coal-based capacities. According to the PNIESC, Romania’s aim is to generate 55% clean energy by 2030 and nuclear, as many international studies support, is an essential part of this objective.
Also, an equally important project for Romania’s meeting its decarbonation targets and energy security are the small modular reactors deployment. We have worked this year to achieve this intention with NuScale technology, around 2028. We have teamed up with NuScale, the US based company which owns the most advanced and the only licensed SMR technology, in order to provide a stable and clean energy alternative to areas where coal will no longer be an option and, at the same time, allow these areas to continue to socio-economically develop. We are looking at a 6 module power plant, with an installed capacity of 462 MWe, able to generate 193 permanent power plant jobs, 1.500 construction jobs, 2.300 manufacturing jobs and help Romania avoid 4 tons of CO2 emissions per year.
In addition to these benefits, Romania, based on its 25 years of nuclear expertise, has a huge opportunity to be at the forefront of SMR development in the region by developing a strong domestic supply chain that could further expand regionally and by training specialists given the fact that Romania will be the first country in the region to own and operate a SMR full scope simulator.”
What were your company’s business achievements in 2021?
“I will briefly state a few as last year we have set ourselves quite a busy agenda for 2021, and looking back today I can proudly say that Nuclearelectrica team has managed to achieve most of our objectives, even though it was a difficult year:
Maintain excellence in operation and nuclear safety and our top position worldwide in terms of capacity factor which is rewarding as in 2021 we celebrated 25 years of operation of Unit 1.
Increase in our financial results as part of a solid sales strategy
Near Completion of stage 1 of the Refurbishment project of Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 according to the schedule, even if a major part of this stage unfolded throughout 2020 and 2021 difficult pandemic years
Continuation of Cernavoda NPP Units 3 and 4 Project and signing of the first contract with CANDU Energy
The teaming agreement with NuScale for the deployment of SMRs in 2028 and the $ 1,2 million grant from USTDA, in early 2021, to assess potential sites for SMR deployment
Implementation of the HR strategy, as we had an ambitious plan to hire 500 people by the end of 2021 and we succeeded in hiring more than 500. Besides this, we aim at growing a new generation of specialists and for this we offer as well scholarship programs, apprenticeship, internship, mentorship and dual learning systems.
The acquisition of a part of Feldioara’s assets, namely the processing line, which will allow us to develop our internal fuel processing and manufacturing capabilities and maintain Romania’s nuclear fuel integrated capabilities doubled by the diversification of the company’s raw material supply possibilities.
And of course, SNN’s positioning on the capital market with a constantly appreciating share price, market capitalization and increased interest from the investor community.
However, all of the above are the result of a great team of specialists to whom I would like to thank and acknowledge their professionalism every chance I get.”
STRATEGY & VISION | RETHINK STRATEGY & PRIORITIES
What challenges have you faced as a CEO/ leader during 2021?
“It was a very busy year, and somehow a tough continuation of 2020, so my first concern was the wellbeing of my colleagues, as they are the driving force of every project, idea, result of the company. Therefore, making sure that we stay safe and protected was a top priority and a challenge. Besides this, challenges are objectives and they are inherent to any significant endeavor that an organization goes through. Nonetheless, a significant factor that kept us moving forward at a rapid pace was an already build in resilience from previous years and people’s professionalism, their expertise, capability and adaptability to working in less than normal conditions.”
What priorities and business strategy focus do you have in 2022?
“Definitely the continuation of our strategic investment projects: refurbishment of Unit 1, Unit 3 and 4, small modular reactors and, in this context, training and growing our new nuclear generation. These 3 main projects are complementary: what large fleet reactors lack is added by SMRs, in terms of flexibility, remote access, backup for renewables. Our purpose is to become a regional trendsetter in nuclear – we will do this by showcasing nuclear energy clear benefits, the clean energy which is reliable, cost effective and stable, with outstanding socio-economic advantages; by develop Nuclearelectica, the Romanian supply chain; by exporting our expertise; by acting as a strategic supporter for decarbonization, energy security, consumer protection. By 2031, we aim to reach 66% contribution of clean nuclear energy in Romania’s energy mix. There’s no real, time and cost efficient decarbonization without nuclear energy.”
PEOPLE & COMMUNITY | FOCUS ON SAFETY, SOCIAL APPROACH, LEVERAGE THE POWER OF COMMUNITY
What initiatives & projects did the company run in 2021 in CSR and social projects?
“For 2021 we split our CSR budget into 2 major directions: half of it for the Cernavoda community as we are responsible for the wellbeing of the communities we activate in. We supported educational and medical programs, trying to provide the community with better educational tools and facilitate their access to reliable healthcare. Also, we offered as well as environmental support for the forestation of certain areas that needed such activities. The other half was directed for the rest of the country, proving financial support on educational, medical and environmental projects, since our CSR strategy for 2021 was tailored to include these three main areas based on an assessment of needs.”
KEEN ON GREEN | SUSTAINABLE, GREENER, COMMUNITY &ENVIRONMENTALLY FOCUS
“Nuclear energy is a big part of the decarbonization solution, therefore every project we develop has a definite clean environment and sustainability component. The reason nuclear is a solid decarbonization and friendly environmental solution is the lack of CO2 emissions, NOx emissions, NOx emissions. Actually, by operating two CANDU reactors we avoid the release of 10 million tons of CO2 per year and after 2031, with 4 CANDU reactors running, we will reach 20 millions tons of CO2 avoided each year, which will probably place us as the most important clean energy generator in Romania. If we add a 6 module SMR power plant, 4 million tons of CO2 avoided will be added every single year.
We are extremely responsible with our burnt fuel, which is stored onsite in a water pool for the first 6 years after its removal from the reactor and then for 50 years into a Fuel Storage which 24/7 monitored by AIEA. The environmental component is extremely regulated and our doses are way below the legal limits.
Furthermore, we are assessing and implementing every solution to enhance our environmental footprint and one of our investment project, the Tritium Removal Facility, a 190 million Euro Project is in full development process.
Corroborated, as mentioned, our CSR programs are very much in sync with our operational and investment projects since we are a keen supporter of clean air, hence our involvement in forestation.”
DIGITAL DNA | Grasping tech, digital innovation, customer -driven, building new bridges
“We started our digital innovation strategy in 2019, however the COVID19 pandemic forced us to accelerate the pace in 2020. Our purpose was to facilitate working processes, HR management, e-learning, procurement processes, uniformization of company processes, digitalization of certain production processes, internal infrastructure and provide cyber safety of the data and employees.
From 2019, throughout 2020 and 2021, we have managed to implement 12 digital innovation projects, we have 16 digital innovation projects under implementation process, so all together our strategy included 28 projects.
In future, very few companies will continue to work in the traditional manner. We are not looking towards digital innovation because this is a trend, but because our company needs are as such. Digital innovation protects employees, enables their work and time, protects company infrastructure and processes. The future is digital.”
Could cryptocurrencies one day bring down the banking system? These decentralized technologies have already shown the potential for disrupting finance, which craves a faster, cheaper, and freer system. If people choose control over their money and identities over security, the fears of financial authorities may be realized.
The crypto boom is threatening conventional finance
Covid-19 has revived discontent with financial authorities
Central banks and regulators will not stand idly by
Could cryptocurrencies bring down the banking system – and, with it, the authorities who oversee it? Two years ago, such a question would have made central bankers laugh.
It no longer does. During a September Eurofi conference in Ljubljana, seasoned European policymaker Benoit Coeure laid out an alarming scenario: “The financial system is shifting under our feet.” In a speech intended above all as a wake-up call for financial supervisors, the French economist insisted that “central banks have to act while the current system is still in place – and to act now.”
Unforeseen obsolescence
The centralized financial system as we know it could in fact disappear. Not in a tragic fight to the death, nor following a systemic collapse at a larger scale than the one that triggered the 2008 banking crisis. Rather, this time, the traditional banking system may be silently pushed to the margins after having become inadequate, irrelevant, and outdated – in other words, incapable of adapting to a drastically changing world.
What worries Mr. Coeure most is the crushing technological superiority of decentralized cryptocurrencies, which – after only a few years in existence – have proved they have the potential to disrupt finance.
The former European Central Bank (ECB) executive board member is no tech fearmonger. Since 2020, as the chair of the Innovation Hub at the Basel-based Bank of International Settlements (BIS), he has been on a mission to help policymakers and technocrats around the world develop central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).
The ex-central banker is convinced that CBDCs (i.e., digital versions of fiat currencies) are the only option central banks have today if they want to stay in the game – let alone to maintain their leading role in the financial system. The problem, Mr. Coeure recognizes, is that CBCDs will take years to be rolled out, while privately issued digital assets and stablecoins are already there.
Dangerous animals
Meanwhile, there are several thousand cryptocurrencies in existence; the top 20 make up about 90 percent of the market.
In spite of extreme price fluctuations of the top cryptocurrencies since their inception, more and more people are tempted to jump ahead. As of June 2021, there were already 221 million users worldwide, including 120 million using bitcoin alone. This boom has only just begun.
The pandemic played an important part in what appears to be a bandwagon effect. The hype surrounding crypto – or to be more precise, sugarcoated marketing playing down people’s legitimate fears and concerns – has fueled investors’ optimism bias: the overconfident belief, common to all gamblers, that they are going to win rather than lose big.
Despite their growing popularity, bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are still far from being a conventional way to invest money. Investors are often blind to the fact that bitcoin, after all, has no intrinsic (i.e., real) value. Normally, investments are made in view of future income. This is not the case for bitcoin; as one financial analyst put it, “one cannot invest in BTC, one can only speculate in BTC.”
It is no coincidence that the pandemic has revived markets’ discontent with monetary authorities.
Stablecoins, for their part, appear less volatile and therefore less exposed to the risk of a brutal price crash. In contrast to bitcoin, they are tied to the value of fiat money (usually the United States dollar) or any other asset with real value (such as gold, silver, oil). Still, it remains difficult for the inexperienced investor to learn his or her way through a seemingly opaque and chaotic market.
Fabio Panetta, the Italian economist who replaced Benoit Coeure at the ECB’s executive board in 2020, has used harsh words to describe what he even refuses to call “currencies.” “Crypto-assets are very dangerous animals,” he said.
He is not wrong; but does it make sense to think that such high-risk assets could be the future of money? Is it really conceivable that the banking system, central bank money and their powerful guarantors of last resort – states and central banks — could be swept away? Perhaps only if a problem emerged, shaking the markets’ perceptions of central bank money and policy.
Broken trust
Indeed, such a problem may have come to light in 2008. Bitcoin’s inception in 2009 is often viewed as an act of defiance against the centralized banking system. The global financial crisis revealed that misconduct had for long become the norm in the banking industry, and that much of the regulatory frameworks in place had been a failure.
To repair those frameworks, central banks were given new assignments. Not only did they become intransigent banking supervisors and regulators; they aspired to become a new kind of fiscal power, in command of steering the economies in times of crises and beyond.
The ECB is a case in point. It stretched to breaking point its original, narrowly defined mandate of maintaining price stability in the eurozone. Unlike other central banks, it had to face a sovereign debt crisis – which, in 2012, almost brought down the EU’s common currency. Even if markets’ trust in sovereign money could be restored (through then-President Mario Draghi’s famous commitment to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro), it never fully recovered.
It is no coincidence that the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and its host of authoritarian policy responses (previously unseen in democratic nations) revived markets’ discontent with monetary authorities. For instance, savers increasingly perceive the persistently low (or sometimes even negative) interest rates as an illegitimate tax on their deposits. For long, they meekly accepted the creeping expropriation as a necessary (and temporary) evil in times of crises. Their tolerance level is dropping as they suspect that central banks will monetize part of governments’ colossal Covid debt through inflation.
With inflation on the rise and no end to financial repression in sight, crypto attracts even low-risk-profile investors. Some adopt a devil-may-care attitude, weighing the probability of losing (but also gaining) money in a gambling game against the certainty of losing in the fiat system. In a way, they send a message to central banks: “you’ve gone too far.”
Freedom call
What the crypto rush reveals above all is that markets crave alternative finance. They want it to be faster, cheaper, more rewarding – and, above all, freer.
Safety is important too. But, as revealed by the ECB’s recent public consultation on a digital euro, privacy is valued very highly by customers these days. Maybe the stringent transparency requirements imposed by the current banking regulations – obsessed with money laundering, tax evasion and financing of terrorism – have simply become too intrusive for the taste of many citizens.
Crypto entrepreneurs have heard the message. As one prosperous start-up advertises its financial offering: “Our goal is to disrupt the financial industry, one happy user at a time, and introduce financial freedom through crypto.”
Unbank the world
Newcomers have recently challenged commercial banks’ business models by creating open-source protocols that replicate existing financial instruments within a decentralized architecture. Their blockchain- and smart contract-based services promise to revolutionize payments, savings, lending, trading, asset management, derivatives, and insurance.
The pioneers of decentralized finance (DeFi) share a common goal: knock off their pedestal the middlemen and gatekeepers that have domineered centralized finance so far. Today, DeFi is among the fastest-growing sectors in the crypto world. According to one of the players involved, its market size is already measured in the trillions.
Yet it may still only be in its infancy. For the moment, DeFi is a playground essentially for experienced investors, with knowledge barriers remaining high.
Technology might soon render possible a large-scale investor revolution. Once access to DeFi gets easier, retail bankers might have a real reason to worry. DeFi markets could attract virtually anyone who has a smartphone and an internet connection.
Moreover, 1.7 billion adults worldwide are excluded from the traditional banking sector. DeFi could provide microfinance solutions to those unbanked, usually low-income individuals, opening up new prospects. In the world of DeFi, no credit amount is too small to be granted. Financing opportunities might arise that so far would have been unthinkable.
One can only imagine the positive impact on developing countries – not to mention those where authoritarian or irresponsible governments destroy the value of national currencies and the wealth of citizens.
Bridge builders
So far, DeFi is largely unregulated. Permissionless and censorship-resistant ecosystems enable perfectly anonymous users to interact on peer-to-peer trading platforms – at their own risk. None of the compliance procedures or mandatory disclosure requirements at the heart of today’s banking system, such as Know Your Customer (KYC) or Anti-Money Laundering (AML), need to be applied in those settings.
This scares off many potential users, notably in Western countries, where regulation is highly valued. Some companies are currently exploring a new market niche by providing crypto-services to those who want to take a safer road, preferring to turn to “regulated” institutions that trade and store crypto-assets on their behalf.
Market leaders Celsius and BlockFi present themselves as “centralized” blockchain-based companies, which perform KYC and comply with AML. In a way, their platforms create a bank-like environment meant to give crypto-beginners a sense of security – albeit a distorted one, as the companies’ accounts have been hacked more than once.
In order to provide investors with more secure and easy access to cryptoassets, other DeFi platforms seek to bridge the gap between blockchain-based finance and traditional capital markets. For example, Defi Technologies Inc. offers so-called digital-asset-exchange-traded-products (ETPs), listed on regulated stock exchanges.
Central banks and regulators will not stand idly by while decentralized finance cuts the ground from under their feet.
“Crypto-banks” and digital asset investment firms currently have the wind in their sails. They are the ones that could precipitate society’s move to digital finance.
The question is, for how long? Sooner or later, big incumbent banks might challenge them, building blockchain infrastructures of their own. But only a few have so far been able to get a foot into crypto, let alone disrupt the disrupters.
A recent study revealed a widening of the gap between leading banking institutions and those lagging behind. It looks as though crypto is already sorting out winners from losers.
Scenarios
Central banks and regulators will not stand idly by while decentralized finance cuts the ground from under their feet. They will come up with new regulations.
Already, in September 2020, the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation of the “Markets in Crypto-Assets” (MiCA). The document was drafted largely in reaction to Facebook’s Libra announcement, perceived as a threat to national currencies. In the meantime, Libra (rebranded Diem) was watered down to a simple dollar-backed stablecoin and is nowhere close to being issued. DeFi, on the other hand, gained momentum precisely in 2020-2021 – and is at risk of becoming MiCA’s first collateral damage.
Fortunately or not, MiCA is expected to enter into force only in late 2024. By then, many of its provisions may be obsolete. Compared to regulators, crypto innovators move at lightspeed.
Policymakers are “increasingly worried about being left behind,” Benoit Coeure admitted during a conference in Geneva. Could CBDCs get them back into the race? Mr. Coeure seems skeptical: “The time has passed for central banks to get going,” he said in Ljubljana.
A 2021 BIS study confirmed that even though most central banks have a keen interest in CBDCs (and some already “experiment” with the technology), only a handful are actually running pilot programs.
The People’s Bank of China is a front-runner. The ECB is among those that still “investigate;” it recently stated it wanted to get “ready” to launch a digital euro, but will not necessarily do so.
A host of technical (notably security-related) issues remain unsolved. The potential disintermediation of banks is another tricky problem. For the banking sector, a retail CBDC – if not well managed – could become a threat far greater than DeFi.
Finally, there is the question of why consumers would prefer CBDCs to decentralized cryptocurrencies.
The likes of Mr. Coeure hope that if privacy and safety principles were to rule, central banks will come out on top. The precise opposite might happen: the fact that digital cash gives central banks the power to track end-users’ spending in real time may in fact have a deterrent effect. Citizens today may be used to a high level of surveillance, but CBDCs could become the straw that breaks the camel’s back.
At some point, people might want to regain control over their money and identities. Many will desert centralized finance and turn to privacy-protecting DeFi platforms. Self-sovereign identity at consumer scale could become a pillar of the future financial landscape.
Le chef de la diplomatie européenne, Josep Borrell, se rend en Ukraine pour soutenir Kiev face à l’agressivité de Moscou. Pour l’Union européenne, il s’agit d’un véritable test de crédibilité de son action extérieure.
Le chef de la diplomatie européenne, Josep Borrell, au dernier Sommet européen de décembre 2021, où il fut beaucoup question de la Russie. (Kenzo Tribouillard/Pool via REUTERS)
Publié le 4 janv. 2022 à 17:20
Pour son premier déplacement de 2022, Josep Borrell tient visiblement à faire passer un message aux Etats-Unis et à la Russie. En se rendant du 4 au 6 janvier en Ukraine, jusque sur la ligne de front où s’opposent les forces de Kiev aux séparatistes prorusses, le chef de la diplomatie européenne espère signaler à Moscou et à Washington qu’ils ne peuvent s’entretenir de l’avenir de cette région sans les Européens – des pourparlers entre responsables américains et russes sur l’Ukraine doivent avoir lieu les 9 et 10 janvier à Genève.
« Toute discussion sur la sécurité européenne doit se faire en coordination avec l’UE et avec sa participation», a déclaré le Haut Représentant de l’UE. «Nous ne voulons pas et ne devons pas être un spectateur non impliqué, avec des décisions prises au-dessus de nos têtes», a-t-il ajouté, un an après l’ humiliation diplomatique que lui avait infligée le ministre russe des Affaires étrangères. Lors d’une conférence de presse, Sergueï Lavrov avait fustigé l’arrogance des Européens, après avoir expulsé trois diplomates de l’Union sans en avertir son homologue.
Souveraineté
Accompagné du ministre ukrainien des Affaires étrangères, Josep Borrell compte visiter, lors de sa visite, la zone critique qui jouxte les territoires tenus par les séparatistes prorusses. Il ira ensuite à Kiev pour rencontrer d’autres responsables ukrainiens et, selon ses équipes, « souligner le soutien ferme de l’UE à la souveraineté et à l’intégrité territoriale de l’Ukraine à un moment où le pays est confronté au renforcement militaire et aux actions hybrides de la Russie ».
Sanctions
Depuis plusieurs semaines, les Occidentaux s’inquiètent sérieusement du déploiement de plus de 100.000 soldats russes à la frontière orientale de l’Ukraine et redoutent une nouvelle agression . En décembre dernier, les Vingt-Sept ont menacé Moscou de lourdes sanctions économiques si jamais il passait à l’acte. « Mais le Russes s’y sont préparés, ils ne craignent pas vraiment les armes économiques », estime Gustav Gressel, chercheur de l’ECFR. Le secrétaire général de l’Otan, Jens Stoltenberg, a prévu d’organiser le 12 janvier une réunion spéciale des pays alliés avec des responsables russes dans le but d’éviter un conflit ouvert.
Test de crédibilité
L’enjeu est très élevé. Selon Cyrille Bret, de l’Institut Jacques-Delors, « l’Ukraine à bien des égards est le laboratoire de l’action extérieure de l’UE, un vrai test de sa crédibilité ». Le chercheur reconnaît des mérites à l’Union, qui « affiche depuis l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014 une position forte et constante à l’égard de la région, confirmée régulièrement par le renforcement ou l’extension des sanctions infligées à certains citoyens russes ou ukrainiens ». D’après lui, « qu’Emmanuel Macron, Angela Merkel et Ursula von der Leyen aient réussi à maintenir les Vingt-Sept soudés autour de l’instrument des sanctions est déjà une énorme réussite. A cela s’ajoute un soutien budgétaire de l’UE, certes conditionné, à Kiev ». Reste que, bien évidemment, « cela ne forme pas une stratégie complète, puisqu’il manque un volet militaire que les Etats-Unis, eux, pourraient actionner ».
PM’s hogwash arguments against free rapid tests range from hypocritical to obscene
Wed 5 Jan 2022 05.26 GMT
‘At every stage of the pandemic, prime minister Scott Morrison has had to be dragged into action.’ Photograph: Lukas Coch/AAP
Scott Morrison’s bloody-minded refusal to fund rapid Covid-19 tests is misguided, expensive and dangerous. It is just one more example of the Liberal leader putting his own crude political interests ahead of public safety.
There are no silver bullets to end a pandemic. The public understand that. Vaccines are an important weapon. But only because they let us move from the blunt instrument of citywide lockdowns to a combination of other, more targeted and inter-locking public health measures.
This includes an effective regime of testing, tracing, isolation and quarantine. All these elements must work together.
Morrison’s dereliction of leadership responsibility for Australia’s testing regime, with queues snaking through city streets and rapid antigen tests being hawked online at extortionate prices, is one more addition to the many errors that have come before it.
At every stage of the pandemic, Morrison has had to be dragged into half-hearted action – with catastrophic consequences.
Morrison has been obsessed with picking political fights instead of his government’s core responsibilities like quarantine and aged care. Almost 1,000 Australians have now died in commonwealth-regulated aged care homes that were meant to keep them safe.
In this pivotal stage of the pandemic, it is in everyone’s interest to ensure every Australian, regardless of their income, has access to free at-home rapid antigen test kits. This is because every time a positive case is identified, it provides the chance to staunch a chain of infection and keep bending the curve so that our hospitals aren’t overrun.
Morrison’s myriad arguments against free rapid tests range from the hypocritical to the obscene.
First, Morrison insists the Treasury cannot afford it. This is patently ridiculous. Let’s not forget how Morrison wasted an eye-watering $40bn in JobKeeper payments to companies that didn’t need it – enough to buy every Australian household a dozen tests every month into 2024!
Morrison’s position on rapid tests is ultimately a false economy because mass-testing saves money in the long run. Public hospitals can easily spend more than $100,000 invasively ventilating an intensive care patient, or the chain of infection can be detected and halted weeks earlier using a cheap rapid test.
Second, Morrison points to conventional PCR laboratory tests as fully subsidised alternative. Apart from the mammoth queues to access a PCR test, these tests are much more expensive to taxpayers. For every PCR test conducted by a private laboratory, Medicare is charged $85; by comparison, rapid tests generally cost about $10 (even less when the government is buying millions of units in bulk). Put another way, for every rapid test that displaces a PCR test, taxpayers would save at least $70.
Third, Morrison draws a distinction between medicine, which he says should be funded, and tests, which he says shouldn’t. This is hogwash.
Since 1991, successive federal governments have funded free breast and cervical cancer screenings. John Howard expanded on these programs by including at-home bowel cancer tests. The fact that Morrison’s own government is conducting a feasibility study on free lung cancer screenings suggests he has no objection.
Australia’s world-leading response to HIV/Aids also hinged on providing vulnerable groups with free testing, treatment, condoms and clean needles.
Fourth, the government warns it cannot possibly meet Australians’ insatiable appetite for free tests – a statement that is grounded in a deeply elitist perspective on public health behaviours by lower income Australians.
Morrison might find this hard to imagine, but not every household has an extra $25 saved for a rapid test when they need it. This is a recipe for massive undetected spread among those Australians least able to pay.
Finally, Morrison says he won’t “undercut” businesses trying to make a buck out of these tests. This is a total abrogation of responsibility, leaving public health at the mercy of price-gouging companies who – unlike Morrison – listened to experts’ warnings of a looming spike in demand.
The fundamental principle of Medicare is that Australians deserve access to healthcare based on their needs, not their ability to fulfil the needs of the market.
If Morrison wants to ensure Australians can find rapid tests at their local shops, that’s good; he should involve those businesses in delivering publicly funded testing kits. But since Morrison’s stated motivation is to avoid “undercutting” their profits, it seems he’s forgotten who he works for.
One of the few things that unites most Australians is our revulsion at the hideous inequities of the American health system; Morrison’s apparent fondness for mingling business with healthcare suggests he doesn’t share that view.
Why then has Morrison taken this hypocritical and unsustainable position? I suspect three reasons.
Morrison may be trying to ease fears ahead of the election. Australians are watching rising case numbers with trepidation and soaring positive test rates – now more than 20% in most states – suggest there are many more cases lurking beneath the surface.
If Morrison cannot reduce the numbers in reality, he can reduce the numbers that are announced in the media each day. As Donald Trump once claimed, “if you don’t test, you won’t have any cases”.
Morrison also knows voters have now seen through the myth of Liberals being superior economic managers. Morrison is now the biggest-spending postwar prime minister with record debt and record deficit.
National debt is set to reach $1.3tn – more than seven-times the Labor government’s supposed “debt bomb” of $189bn in 2013 – equivalent to 55% of GDP, compared with 12% when we left office. Morrison’s performative austerity on rapid tests is a feeble attempt to regain some fiscal credibility.
Finally, Morrison now stakes this public position on a thread-bare ideology of “personal responsibility”. He’s borrowed this from his British counterpart, Boris Johnson, who thought he could politically skate through the latest UK debacle. But it’s also political code language for a Darwinian survival-of-the-fittest contest in which the weak, the poor and the vulnerable are cast aside.
Perhaps that’s what Morrison really meant when he said of rapid tests, “someone’s always going to pay for it, and it’s going to be you”. Once we had Medicare. Now we have MorrisonCare.
Managing Director at BNP Paribas, Middle East and Africa. He is Senior Banking Executive with a 20-year experience in leading coverage, structured finance and product platforms within top-tier international and regional Corporate and Investment Banks.
Ambassador of Côte d’Ivoire to Saudi Arabia. He previously served as Director of the Asia-Pacific Region at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Côte d’Ivoire.
Ambassador of France to the United Arab Emirates. He was posted to the French Permanent Representation to the United Nations as a negotiator on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. He served as Political Advisor at the French Embassy in London and as Diplomatic Advisor to the Minister for the Armed Forces.
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia and Engineer. He has held various positions in the Saudi government, including Minister of Agriculture, as well as Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the Netherlands and Turkey.
Dean of Academic Affairs at Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy. Before assuming his current role, he has worked as an associate lecturer of international law for diplomats at the Academy. He previously served as Head of the Faculty of Law, Economics and Management at Sorbonne University Abu Dhabi.
Head of Middle East and Africa of BNP Paribas Middle East & Africa for Corporate and Institutional Banking (CIB). He has worked for BNP Paribas for 32 years in a number of global roles, including leadership positions in Paris, New York & London. Prior to taking the position as Head of BNP Paribas Middle East & Africa, Amine was Senior Advisor to Global Markets. His previous roles also include Global Head of Sustainable Finance in Global Markets and Global Head of Research and Sustainable Investments within Corporate Institutional Banking. Amine also served as Global Head of Commodity Derivatives, and Head of Equity & Derivatives for the Americas. After studying at the Ecole Polytechnique in France, Amine joined BNP Paribas in 1987. He started his career as a precious metals options trader in 1990 in Paris and then New York, where he later headed up energy options trading (oil and natural gas). In 2005 Amine was named by Financial News among the 20 most influential Europeans in America. He is fluent in French, Arabic and English.
Chairman of Hedayah. Leading international expert on Extremism and Education, he is a member of the UAE Federal National Council for the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and Chairman of the Defense Affairs, Interior and Foreign Affairs Committee at the Council.
Former Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to France and Germany. Prior to that, he was Director of the European Affairs Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs looking after bilateral relations. Before joining the Ministry, he held major positions in the field of Media and Communications.
Flags waving in Shanghai, November 2021 Aly Song / Reuters
“Time and momentum are on our side,” declared Chinese President Xi Jinping in January. But developments this year have not borne out Xi’s confidence about China’s inexorable rise. A number of structural weaknesses have been dragging down China’s prospects: a rapidly aging population, climate change vulnerability, a heavy debt load, and an increasingly inward-looking political system. The United States’ power, by contrast, has grown by a more substantial margin in the past year than that of any other Indo-Pacific country.
In 2021, according to the Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index—a data-driven annual assessment that measures national resources and international influence to rank the relative power of the states in the Indo-Pacific—Beijing lost ground in half of the index’s measures of power, including diplomatic influence, cultural influence, economic capability, and future resources. In the same period, Washington registered its first annual gain in comprehensive power since the launch of the index in 2018.
The United States exerts greater, more multidimensional power—from military capabilities and defense networks to diplomatic and cultural influence—than any other country in the world. Just as significant, the United States has this year outranked China in the index’s measure of future resources, a combined assessment of the projected distribution of economic and military capabilities and demographic strength in the future. Whether the United States remains the top power in the Indo-Pacific for decades to come depends on how it plays its cards. Yet it is already clear that China will never be as dominant as the United States once was. A bipolar future beckons.
INDO-PACIFIC POWER BEGINS AT HOME
Much of the improvement in the United States’ performance in 2021 is the result of domestic renewal and successful coalition building. President Joe Biden has stressed that foreign policy success starts at home. The new administration has made significant progress on dealing with COVID-19, investing in infrastructure, and boosting the U.S. economy—the only major global economy now predicted to be larger in 2030 than was forecast prior to the pandemic.
The faster-than-expected U.S. economic recovery has coincided with growing headwinds in China. China’s economic growth is slowing, from eight percent annually a decade ago to a “new normal” of just over four percent annually predicted by the end of this decade. Even at that rate, China’s GDP at market exchange rates will still overtake that of the United States. But there are inherent limits on the speed at which China can continue to grow beyond 2030. Its workforce is projected to contract by almost 20 percent from current levels by midcentury, and there are few policy levers to turn around the decline in China’s working-age population. Productivity growth is slowing, and China’s investment-heavy approach for driving the economy will produce diminishing returns over time. What is more, by some estimates, Beijing spends more on projecting power inward, on domestic security, than outward, on military expenditure.
But domestic strength is only half the story. Just as important as what a superpower has is what it does with what it has. Washington has redoubled its emphasis on allies and partners as a force multiplier for U.S. power. The Biden administration has strengthened long-standing bilateral alliances, such as those with Japan and South Korea, and refreshed defense ties with the Philippines. New multilateral partnerships such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (with Australia, India, and Japan) and AUKUS (with Australia and the United Kingdom) offer Washington its best hope of upholding a military balance in its favor despite the declining margin of U.S. military superiority in the region.
The U.S. has the only major global economy predicted to be larger in 2030 than it was before the pandemic.
China may be building the world’s largest navy at a fearsome clip and investing in signature military capabilities, including an expanded nuclear deterrent. It has intimidated Taiwan, jostled with India, and pressed its claims aggressively in the East China and South China Seas. But rather than enhancing Beijing’s influence, such behavior undermines its ability to replace Washington as the regional security guarantor.
Washington has also seized the diplomatic initiative on issues from COVID-19 vaccines to development and infrastructure finance and climate action. By October 2021, the United States had donated and delivered more than 90 million vaccine doses to the Indo-Pacific region—twice as many as China, the next-largest donor in aggregate terms—and had been more generous on a per capita basis than any other donor in the Indo-Pacific. The net result has improved the United States’ diplomatic standing markedly. Biden is judged by regional experts to be the most effective Indo-Pacific leader, up ten places from President Donald Trump’s ranking in 2020.
Biden’s reputation was not significantly diminished by the chaotic withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in August 2021 nor by France’s anger at the AUKUS announcement. In fact, Washington’s push to end the forever war in Afghanistan and bolster Australia’s sovereign capabilities were taken as tangible signs in many Asian capitals that the United States is focusing on this region and betting on its allies.
ASIA IS NOT WAITING
If there is one factor that threatens the United States’ strong position it is the decline in its regional economic influence. Here, U.S. policymakers should be alarmed. The rate of deterioration points to the risk of growing American irrelevance in the political economy of Asia.
Beijing’s economic power in the region is built on a narrow but deep foundation. China is virtually on par with the United States in terms of overall economic capacity but is vastly ahead in terms of regional economic relationships. China’s ability to connect with and influence the choices of other countries in Asia through economic interdependencies underlies this power, just as U.S. defense partnerships are the mainstay of U.S. military power. Trade flows between China and the rest of Asia are now three times the size of those between the United States and the region. China has also become the primary foreign investor in as many countries in the Indo-Pacific as the United States and Japan, the next-largest investor, combined.
China is vastly ahead of the U.S. in regional economic relationships.
The disparity in regional economic relationships has been a chronic weakness for the United States for many years. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), signed between 12 Pacific countries in 2016, was a centerpiece of the Obama administration’s strategic pivot to Asia and was meant to redress this weakness, countering the growing influence of China’s state-capitalist model in the region. But the United States withdrew in 2018, and without Washington anchoring the successor agreement, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the grouping risks underachieving on the original goal of strengthening and deepening the “rules of the road” of the regional trading system. Yet there seems to be little hope of a president from either party joining the CPTPP or a similar agreement anytime soon. The anti-trade consensus in U.S. politics is preventing the formation of an effective multilateral hedge against China’s economic power. It remains to be seen whether the Biden administration’s forthcoming “economic framework for the Indo-Pacific” can overcome domestic U.S. opposition to free trade and offer the region anything of substance.
In the meantime, Asia is not waiting. Alternative models for a rules-based regional trade environment are well underway. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, for instance, led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, will enter into force next month. The RCEP, unlike the CPTPP, has few commitments on labor, the environment, intellectual property, and state-owned enterprises. But it will result in more trade, investment, and supply chain integration for its 15 Asian partners—first among them, China.
The limitations on U.S. economic leadership in the Indo-Pacific point to the deeper problem: just as the United States’ resurgence in the past year stems from events at home, so do the biggest threats to the sustainability of this resurgence. The U.S. position will be threatened without a new commitment to economic engagement with the region, which in turn depends on American domestic dynamics. The other big danger for the United States is the polarization of its domestic politics and the threat this poses to the stability of the United States’ democratic institutions—and ultimately, its reliability as an ally and partner. It may be that the biggest risk to U.S. power in Asia lies not in Beijing but in Washington.
MICHAEL FULLILOVE is Executive Director of the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia.
HERVÉ LEMAHIEU is Director of Research at the Lowy Institute.
#أبو ظبي– سابين عويسفيما يغرق اللبنانيون في يومياتهم البائسة بحثاً عن مقومات عيش كريم، من دون أي أفق واضح لمستقبل يكتنفه غموض حول ما تحمله المعادلات الجديدة التي ترتسم في المنطقة، كان مستقبل #الشرق الأوسط والدول الدائرة في فلكه محور جلسات نقاش استضافها مؤتمر السياسات العالمية “world Policy Conference ” في طبعته الرابعة عشرة التي انعقدت على مدى ثلاثة أيام في مدينة أبو ظبي الاماراتية، حيث اجتمعت اكثر من ٣٠٠ شخصية من عالم الاقتصاد الجيوسياسي ومراكز الابحاث والدراسات للبحث بأجندا محفوفة بالملفات الساخنة التي اقلقت وشغلت العالم على مدى العامين الماضيين.لم يكن الملف الصحي غداة جائحة كورونا التي شلت العالم، الهاجس الوحيد على طاولة قصر المؤتمرات، بقدر ما كانت مسألة التعاطي والخروج منها امراً أكثر اهمية في ضوء التداعيات السلبية للاقفال التي ترافقت مع متغيرات مهمة جداً في المشهد السياسي الاقليمي والدولي.لم يغب عن المجتمعين هاجس الصراع الاميركي الصيني الذي بدأ يتحول الى ما يشبه الحرب الباردة بين العملاقين على قيادة العالم. وليس خافياً ان التغير او ما سُمي هنا بالمزاجية الاميركية المتقلبة تجاه اولويات السياسة…
Anwar Gargash, the UAE’s presidential diplomatic adviser and former minister of state for foreign affairs, was speaking at the World Policy Conference in Abu Dhabi. (Screenshot) China has emerged as a powerful economic player in the region and is the Gulf’s biggest buyer of crude oil China offers lucrative partnerships to Gulf states…
General view of vehicles stuck in a traffic jam amidst street vendors in the central Attaba district of Egypt’s capital Cairo on This picture taken on Feb. 22, 2021. (File/AFP) (1/2)
Nabil Fahmy, Egypt’s former foreign minister, speaks on the fringes of the World Policy Conference in Abu Dhabi. (Supplied) (2/2)
Egypt is emerging from a decade of upheaval that began with the overthrow of Mubarak
From Libya to Arab-Israeli peace, Cairo is reasserting its authority on the regional stage
BOGOTA/ABU DHABI: Egypt has experienced a decade of upheaval since the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, contending with two revolutions, environmental pressures, and more recently the economic challenges of COVID-19.
And yet, this most populous of Arab countries, straddling the African and Asian continents, has emerged from the turbulence with a new sense of purpose and a desire for greater engagement with the region and the world.
It has been announced that Egypt is a nominee to host the COP27 UN climate conference for 2022 — a distinction that seemed unthinkable just a few years ago.
This October not only marks the 48th anniversary of the 1973 war with Israel; 40 years ago on October 6, President Anwar Sadat was assassinated by Islamist extremists during the annual victory parade in Cairo.
For many in the Middle East, Sadat’s positive legacy is a work in progress: The Egypt-Israel peace process, Egyptian economic development and political liberalization, the Palestinian peace process, and overcoming the challenge of violent extremism.
“What I have seen recently, in this last year in particular, is that Egypt is much more engaged in trying to determine movement on regional issues,” Nabil Fahmy, former Egyptian foreign minister, said during a discussion at the World Policy Conference held earlier in October in Abu Dhabi.
“Egypt faced a couple of hurdles. But (look at) the strength of its system. I doubt very few countries in the region, and some abroad, frankly, could have survived two revolutions in three years and come out standing.”
The latest economic forecasts show that Egypt is now entering the recovery phase following the blows of the COVID-19 pandemic. “There’s clear evidence of economic progress,” Fahmy said. “Even post-pandemic we’re looking at 4 to 5 percent growth this coming year, which is significant.”
His observations were echoed by Egyptian politician and academic Mona Makram-Ebeid at the same conference.
“Now there is a ray of hope emerging and it comes in the form of natural gas discovery, with a potential to boost Egypt’s limping economy and build a new commercial alliance with eastern Mediterranean countries and Israel.
“Egypt struck the jackpot in 2015 with the discovery of a giant reservoir known as Zohr, which has developed into one of the largest single gas fields in the Middle East.”
To date, Zohr is the biggest gas field discovered in the Mediterranean region, with nearly 30 trillion cubic feet of reserves. The field — which is operated by Italian Eni — started production in December 2017.
From all accounts, there has been marked progress in more than just the economic field. Egypt is also making strides in institutional reform, bolstering the rule of law and addressing international concerns over its rights record.
“Just three weeks ago, we issued a new human rights doctrine,” Fahmy said. “It’s not perfect. Human rights doctrines and applications anywhere in the world are not perfect. But it’s tremendous progress. And it’s a reflection that we want to move forward.
People shop from a stall selling Ramadan lanterns along a main street in the in the northern suburb of Shubra (home to a large Christian population) of Egypt’s capital Cairo on April 12, 2021, at the start of the Muslim holy fasting month of Ramadan. (Photo by Khaled DESOUKI / AFP)
“Short term, it’s going to be a challenge. Medium term, I’m much more confident. But, as Egyptians, given our weight, given the role we have to play, I also want us to be able to look long term and engage with our neighbors.”
Makram-Ebeid praised the new doctrine, saying that it would have a positive impact on several aspects of Egyptian life.
“It will give access to job opportunities, education, healthcare and religious freedoms,” she said.
Egypt’s latest decade of upheaval began on Jan. 25, 2011, when thousands of protesters spilled onto the streets of Cairo to demand change. Aggressive police tactics to quell the protests culminated in calls for Mubarak’s removal.
Egyptian demonstrators tear a portrait of President Hosni Mubarak during a protest against his rule in the northern port city of Alexandria on January 25, 2011. AFP PHOTO/STR (Photo by – / AFP)
When he was finally toppled from power, young Egyptians felt their moment had come to create a fairer society. In reality, it was only the beginning of a fresh period of discontent and uncertainty. The country was rocked by new economic calamities and the rise to power of Mohamed Morsi — an Islamist politician affiliated with the now-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.
The “second Egyptian revolution” came in 2013, a year after Morsi’s inauguration. The resumption of street protests that summer saw Morsi forced from office and the Muslim Brotherhood designated as a terrorist organization.
The following year, Morsi’s defense minister, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, won the presidential election and was sworn into office.
“The basic challenge between the Muslim Brotherhood and the rest of the Egyptian system was about our identity,” Fahmy told the WPC event.
“Are we Egyptians including some Muslim Brotherhood, or are we the Muslim Brotherhood that has some Egyptians? That’s an existential threat and that’s why the clash happened quickly. Not only political influencers, but also the middle class were actually against the form of government that was being formed by the Muslim Brotherhood when they came into power.”
Egypt’s deposed Islamist president Mohamed Morsi sists behind the defendants cage during a trial at the police academy court in Cairo on November 5, 2014. Morsi is on trial in several cases and faces a death sentence if convicted of espionage and terrorism related charges. AFP PHOTO / STR (Photo by STR / AFP)
The Brotherhood was founded in 1928 in Egypt by Hassan Al-Banna, and later spread throughout the Middle East into Sudan, Syria, Palestine and Lebanon and across North Africa, where its affiliates have had varying degrees of success.
“The Muslim Brotherhood was born in Egypt, so there will be some trends in Egypt. But the reality is, if you try to build for the future, then our youth want to be engaged in the world,” Fahmy said.
“A dogmatic ideology doesn’t fit Egypt. We need to engage with the world, and I think that ideology is a threat to modernity.
“The influence of the Brotherhood today in Egypt is highly diminished and the government, currently — whether one agrees or disagrees with some details of policy is irrelevant — is an activist government trying to respond to the basic, immediate needs of the people.”
Egypt’s greater emphasis on regional and global engagement has been evident in recent months. Besides recent talks with senior Iraqi and Syrian officials, Egypt has also made diplomatic headway with its rivals. “We have engaged in a dialogue with Turkey,” Fahmy said. “It’s slow, (so) don’t be overly optimistic.”
One diplomatic front where Egypt has made noteworthy progress in the last year is Libya, which in the past decade has become a haven for human smugglers and religious extremists.
During the same revolutionary wave that overthrew Mubarak, the Libyan people rose up against their long-time ruler Muammar Gaddafi. However, a decade on from his downfall, the oil-rich country remains mired in chaos and political gridlock.
Since the two countries share a porous desert border, the extremists based in Libya have, time and again, succeeded in carrying out attacks against Egyptian security forces and Christians.
In recent months, Egypt has engaged with Libya’s feuding parties to ensure that national elections are held in December as scheduled. Cairo believes a fair and transparent election will help put its war-torn neighbor on the path to stability and recovery.
Fahmy says there has been good progress on the Libya issue, but he doubts the elections scheduled for Dec. 24 by the country’s recently installed Government of National Unity will go ahead as planned. “I would love to be proven wrong,” he said.
Fahmy is well regarded after his years as a career diplomat and academic. He is the founding dean of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy and Distinguished University Professor of Practice in International Diplomacy at the American University in Cairo. He has dedicated many years of study to Arab-Israeli diplomacy, making him a leading authority on the peace process.
Last summer, the UAE became the first Arab country to sign the Abraham Accords, a series of US-brokered diplomatic agreements inked between Israel and Arab states. The Aug. 13, 2020 signing marked the first time an Arab country had publicly established relations with Israel since Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994.
Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat (L), Israeli Premier Menachem Begin (R) and US President Jimmy Carter (C) shake hands after a press conference in the East Room of the White House, on September 17, 1978. Egypt began peace initiatives with Israel in late 1977. A year later, with the help of Carter, terms of peace between Egypt and Israel were negotiated at Camp David. A formal treaty, signed 26 March 1979 in Washington, D.C., granted full recognition of Israel by Egypt, opened trade relations between the two counties, and limited Egyptian military buildup in the Sinai. Israel agreed to return to final portion of occupied Sinai to Egypt. (Photo by – / FILES-CONSOLIDATED NEWS PICTURES / AFP)
Although the agreements have shown potential, critics say they have done little to bring the Palestinians any closer to statehood. And while several governments have embraced the accords, the normalization of ties with Israel has been harder to sell to Arab publics.
“You can’t overemphasize that the Palestinian issue, per se, is a very emotional issue throughout the Arab world and therefore reactions to it tend to be very strong in either way,” Fahmy said.
“My point is the following — and I have said this to my Palestinian colleagues — I understand your concern, I understand your fear, but focus on building your case rather than on criticizing somebody. Because, in the case of those who signed the accords, even if we don’t agree with them, they have all committed to helping establish and support a Palestinian state.
“So, my recommendation to Arabs: Be a bit sensitive in the steps you take. You will have to face that this is sensitive, you will get some criticism.
“I would tell my Arab colleagues, I would tell the Palestinians, come up with ideas on how to move forward politically, and don’t let the political process die.”
Mona Makram Abed with President El-Sisi, Dec. 4 2016. (Facebook)
Given Egypt’s renewed assertiveness on the regional stage, Fahmy hopes other Arab countries will follow Egypt’s lead and come to the negotiating table to speak frankly about the way forward. “Arabs are lovely in their ability to agree. Our problem is our inability to disagree,” he said.
“Let me seize this occasion to call on Egypt and the Arab countries: We should all speak much more about our vision for the future, for the region, and what we want to see for the Middle East as a whole in concrete terms.
“We don’t have to agree, but we need to engage in a dialogue and let’s see how much agreement and how much disagreement we have. Because allowing others to set the agenda is very dangerous.”
本台(法廣)法語部的地緣政治欄目本月初做的一個題為“正在發生變化的全球化”節目中指出,世界已經變得複雜,難以破譯,而且比以往任何時候都更加相互關聯。面對不斷變化的全球化,在美中關係史無前例的分裂和推動下,人們越來越感到集體知識和合作的必要性。記者 Marie France Chatin 對世界政策會議的創始人和主席,同時也是法國智庫,法國國際關係研究(IFRI)的創始人和所長德蒙比亞(Thierry de Montbrial)以及法國費加羅報的高級記者和外交政策編輯雷諾吉拉爾德(Renaud Girard)進行了專訪,這次訪問的後半部分談到了中美關係以及台海局勢等主題,其中有些比較獨特的觀察點,在本次國際縱橫節目中與大家分享。
ABU DHABI, 3rd October 2021 (WAM) – A number of ministers and officials from the United Arab Emirates have participated in the World Policy Conference, hosted in Abu Dhabi, to share the geopolitical, cultural, and economic priorities of the country.
Founded in 2008 by Thierry de Montbrial, Chairman of the French Institute of International Relations, the World Policy Conference held its fourteenth edition from October 1-3, 2021 in the UAE for the first time. The World Policy Conference brings together top-level decision-makers, academics, and opinion leaders from over 40 countries to discuss solutions to contemporary global challenges and forge bonds between key international actors.
UAE officials participating in the World Policy Conference included Dr. Anwar Gargash, Diplomatic Advisor to President His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan and UAE officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; Sheikh Shakhbout bin Nahyan bin Mubarak Al Nahyan, Minister of State; Khalifa Shaheen Almarar, Minister of State; Reem bint Ibrahim Al Hashemy, Minister of State for International Cooperation; and Salem Mohammed Al Zaabi, Director of the International Security Cooperation Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.
Dr. Gargash participated in a discussion with Thierry de Montbrial on geopolitical issues on Saturday, October 2. During his participation, Gargash addressed regional and international challenges, noting “Confrontation is not the way forward. Rather, conversation is the way forward. The UAE is exerting all efforts to maintain dialogue between states. The Abraham Accords are emblematic of this: the Accords have been a success in breaking the psychological barrier to peace and strengthening the economic and people-to-people benefits that all can reap.”
“The UAE has historically played a significant role as a mediator and facilitator, and our priority is on maintaining the fabric of trust in the international community in order to encourage positive engagement between states,” Dr. Gargash added.
In his participation in a workshop on Africa held on Saturday, Sheikh Shakhbout Al Nahyan reviewed the UAE’s efforts to strengthen partnerships throughout the African continent, pointing to the ways in which the UAE has expanded economic and political relations with African states in recent years.
Sheikh Shakhbout remarked, “We are excited to enter a new era, post COVID-19, when we will be able to build stronger partnerships across Africa with the hopes of creating a better future for our countries and regions a future built on stability, security, and sustainability. We understand that the only way to achieve this is through dialogue, open channels of communication, the exchange of information and knowledge, and above all, the development of strategic partnerships that are mutually beneficial.”
Almarar, during a session entitled “Middle East and External Powers” held on Sunday, October 3, underscored the UAE’s commitment to reinforcing regional stability and security through a multilateral, rules-based approach in coordination with its international partners.
In his remarks, Almarar stated, “We have to acknowledge that there are legitimate concerns and legitimate interest among world powers in the development of the Middle East insofar as security and stability are concerned There is consensus among Arab countries that any malicious intervention in crises in the region can make a very complex situation more complex. Therefore, we feel it is necessary to promote stability, security, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.”
Al Hashemy attended virtually to highlight the UAE’s hosting of Expo 2020 Dubai, stating, “I am proud to share with you all that yesterday’s opening of Expo 2020 Dubai was one that exemplified the years of hard work and aspirations of the UAE and all participating countries and organizations. With 192 participating countries, Expo 2020 Dubai will act as a global platform dedicated to bringing people, nations, and communities together to build bridges, enable action, and inspire real-life solutions to real-world challenges for the first time since the beginning of the pandemic. It is also an opportunity for humanity to convene in the spirit of hope, optimism, and positive change for the future.”
Al Zaabi participated in a session on “Afghanistan and the Sahel” on Sunday. During his participation, Al Zaabi reviewed the UAE’s efforts to address the humanitarian and security situations in areas currently experiencing conflict, remarking, “The historic importance of Afghanistan cannot be understated, nor can its impact on the regional climate for security and stability.”