Jean de Kervasdoué – La fuite des cerveaux

Portrait de Jean de Kervasdoué. Crédit photo : Hannah Assouline/Opale/Leemage

Le Point – 05.04.2021

Par Jean de Kervasdoué

Pourquoi donc, en économie ou en sciences, nos plus grands talents partent-ils exercer ailleurs ? Notre chroniqueur nous livre quelques explications.

Àl’instar des milieux artistiques, le monde de la recherche est sans pitié, le classement y est permanent et l’élitisme, la culture commune. En France toutefois, si l’entrée dans la carrière est très sélective, car il n’y a, chaque année, qu’un ou deux postes dans une discipline donnée[1], la quête s’arrête là et la carrière devient du jour au lendemain toute tracée. Comme sous l’Ancien Régime, le jour où un chercheur du CNRS ou de l’Inserm est titularisé, il a acquis pour la vie un statut, une « charge ». Elle le protégera, mais ne lui donnera plus aucune stimulation financière ou symbolique […]

Retrouvez l’article complet sur le site du Point.

Renaud Girard: «Le défi migratoire de Joe Biden»

Par Renaud Girard

L’élection du 46e président des États-Unis a créé un immense appel d’air pour les migrants. Surtout pour ceux d’Amérique centrale fuyant la misère, les désastres naturels et la violence des gangs.

À la frontière entre le Mexique et les États-Unis, les trafiquants d’êtres humains se sont adaptés, avec le cynisme qui les caractérise, à la nouvelle donne administrative prévalant à Washington. Joe Biden a conservé la directive sanitaire – dite Title 42 – prise par son prédécesseur qui autorise les gardes-frontières américains à reconduire immédiatement les personnes ayant franchi illégalement la frontière. Mais il a fait une exception pour les mineurs non accompagnés. Alors, on a vu des trafiquants – filmés la nuit par une caméra de surveillance – jeter des enfants par-dessus un mur frontalier de 4,2 mètres de haut. Beaucoup se blessent en tombant, mais ils sont toujours, plus tard, soignés par les gardes-frontières.

L’élection de Joe Biden, candidat qui avait vertement critiqué l’inflexibilité de Trump en matière migratoire et dénigré son projet d’un mur courant tout le long de la frontière, a créé un immense appel d’air pour les migrants. Surtout pour ceux d’Amérique centrale fuyant […]

Retrouvez l’article complet sur le site du Figaro (réservé aux abonnés).

Samir Saran: Enough Sermons on Climate, It’s Time for ‘Just’ Action

ORF online – 31.03.2021

by Samir Saran

As Britain readies to host the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) in Glasgow in November this year, there is a concerted effort to push countries towards publicly endorsing and adopting ‘Net Zero’—a carbon neutral emission norm—as policy. This is a demand for an inflexible, near-impossible, time-bound agenda to achieve what is no doubt a noble goal. And, as is often the case with climate-related issues, the nobility of intent is at risk of being overwhelmed by sanctimonious hectoring that raises hackles instead of ensuring meaningful participation.

On 3rd March, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres took to Twitter to call on governments, private companies and local authorities to immediately initiate three measures to mitigate climate change: Cancel all coal projects in the pipeline; end coal plant financing and invest only in renewable energy; and, jumpstart a global effort to a ‘just transition’ from carbon to non-carbon energy sources.

On the face of it, this was an unexceptionable call from the high priest of the UN to the global laity to rise in support of an important cause. But if we were to scratch the surface of the Secretary-General’s words, we would see that his call was little more than virtue-signalling.

For, there is nothing ‘just’ about the transition that he has sought without delay. Implicit in his call is the immoral proposition to disregard poverty, despair and the yawning development deficit between nations as he places them all on the same plane. Inherent in this approach is the unedifying complicity of global institutions in foisting an arrangement founded in the belief that the poor in the developing world should underwrite the climate mitigation strategy of the developed world. The climate high priests need to realise that depriving the world’s poorest of their aspirations can never be ‘just’ climate action. It can be convenient and, hence, it has much appeal in many quarters.

The climate high priests need to realise that depriving the world’s poorest of their aspirations can never be ‘just’ climate action. It can be convenient and, hence, it has much appeal in many quarters

An Alternative Script

A waffle-free alternative script for those given to sermonising to the world would focus on three other aspects that may actually lead to faster transitions and more justice. First, an impassioned call to those who control capital—managers of pension, insurance and other funds—to ensure larger amounts of money leave the country of origin and flow to countries of deficit for building sustainable, climate resilient infrastructure of the future. The Climate Policy Initiative has calculated that less than a quarter of climate finance flows across national boundaries; in other words, the overwhelming majority of climate finance is raised for domestic projects. The states expected to disproportionately do more to battle climate change are located in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Yet, they are inadequately funded and financed and cost of capital in these places dampens the scope of action. It would be stressing the obvious to say that the frontline states cannot be expected to engage in this battle without adequate inflow of climate capital at the right price for climate action.

Second, the assessors of risk—the intractable credit rating agencies, the cash-rich central banks and the big boys of New York, London and Paris—who decide how much capital should flow in which direction, should be called upon to recalibrate their risk assessment mechanism. Let it be said, and said bluntly, that objective ‘climate risk’ outweighs subjective ‘political risk’ which prevents the flow of capital to key climate action geographies. Risk must be reassessed objectively. Till then, the highfalutin sermons of the Pontiffs of Climate would be mere lip service, which none among the Climate Laity would bother to take seriously.

Third, and, perhaps, the most ‘just’ proposition the Secretary-General could make, would be a moral directive to all Western nations to shut down coal plants and fossil fuel- based enterprises immediately and entirely abandon carbon-fuelled energy for any purpose. After all, green energy sources need room to grow and space to mature and the OECD nations must allow this at warp speed. It is farcical to deny coal plants to countries that are still struggling to claw their way up the development ladder and demand that they turn carbon neutral while thousands of units and homes belch and blow climate emissions every day in rich economies. What is good for the rich cannot be bad for the poor.

Rich countries have failed to reduce their share of fossil fuel emissions. CSEP’s Rahul Tongia has calculated that the top emitting countries in terms of per capita emissions (nations above the global average emissions) still account for about 80 per cent of global Fossil CO2.  He further explains that the absolute emissions of these countries are rising even when measured in 2019. The rich took more than their fair share historically, and are still doing so. Any ‘Just Transition’ must involve evicting the squatters occupying carbon space to the detriment of others. Buying this space from the poorer is not ‘just’; it is another perverse business model based on extraction and mercantilism of centuries past.

Any ‘Just Transition’ must involve evicting the squatters occupying carbon space to the detriment of others. Buying this space from the poorer is not ‘just’; it is another perverse business model based on extraction and mercantilism of centuries past

In the run-up to COP26 at Glasgow, we are witnessing a new passion play of countries making a dramatic show of embracing the idea of Net Zero economies in the coming decades. The script of this passion play draws on starkly evocative narratives that seek to catalyse action through theatrical terms such as ‘climate emergency’. From appropriating the voice of the powerless to acquire legitimacy and crafting compelling narratives through a new cohort of well-funded ambassadors to push the envelope on climate change policy approaches, we are seeing varied actors engaging with climate issues in different ways. These different efforts have a common design, the economic objective of socialising the cost of climate action and making the poor carry the can for the rich.

That said, some facts are irrefutable. The last decade has been the warmest in recorded human history and its effects are visible to all. In February this year, an iceberg larger than New York City broke off the frozen Antarctic  and my just be a prelude to what lies ahead. Indeed, the possibility of the Arctic turning into a benign waterway in the near future can no longer be ruled out. It would require extraordinary un-intelligence to argue that global warming and its fallout can be mitigated by business-as-usual decision-making. But even as there is trans-world consensus on climate change and its impact, many would and must disagree on the proposed burden-sharing and distribution of responsibilities as we respond as a collective.

The India Imperative

India will be significantly affected by climate change in the coming decades. It is already feeling the heat and is combatting challenges from its mountains to its coasts due to shifting weather cycles and changing climate. It needs clearheaded policies, backed by political will, on this single most important issue that will impact its growth, its stability and the very integrity of its geography comprising a multitude of topographies.

This is happening at a moment when India is poised to exit the low-income orbit and take off on a trajectory towards becoming a middle-income country. Its journey from a US $3 trillion economy to a US $10 trillion economy coincides with ongoing climate action, polarising climate debate and climate-impacted economics. India can neither isolate itself from this reality, nor can it be reticent or timid in making its choices known to the world. India cannot be a receiver of decisions made elsewhere; it has to be on the high table, co-authoring decisions implicating its future.

For India, the moment offers three opportunities in these challenging times. First, India has to prepare itself through its policies, politics and internal rearrangements to seize and realise the single biggest global opportunity of leading a global effort to mitigate emissions of the future. The IEA, in its India Energy Outlook 2021 Report, estimates that India’s emissions could rise as much as 50 percent by 2040—the largest of any country, in which case India would trail behind only China in terms carbon dioxide emissions. This need not happen and is an opportunity for India and the World.

India must grab this chance to lower its future emissions through the right investments, technologies and global partnerships. The developed world, too, must make a matching response: Just like the Marshall Plan invested billions to rebuild post-War Europe with Germany at its heart, a new age Climate Marshall Plan must see India at its core. India must prepare and offer itself as the single biggest climate mitigation opportunity for the world and the most important green investment destination.

The developed world, too, must make a matching response: Just like the Marshall Plan invested billions to rebuild post-War Europe with Germany at its heart, a new age Climate Marshall Plan must see India at its core

Second, neither the world nor India should forget the dictum that on climate, India solves for the world. The solutions that India experiments with and implements successfully will be fit to be repurposed for other developing countries with similar geo-topographical conditions and economic sensitivities. Many of them are frontline countries in the climate battle.

India can and must become the hub of climate action for this decade and beyond, offering services, technology and infrastructure through climate supply chains that span the developing world. The International Solar Alliance is just a modest beginning. The future holds multiple opportunities. The country must lead the charge through building financial institutions that will support and sustain green transitions and helping create green workforces fit for purpose for the coming decades, amongst others.

Third, as India celebrates 75 years of its independence in 2022 and leads the G20 in 2023, it has the chance to make its most significant identity shift. India moved from being a British colonial state to a free nation in 1947, and then moved from being perceived as a land of snake-charmers to becoming an internationally acknowledged technology hub at the turn of the century. This decade offers the chance for it to emerge first as aUS $5 trillion and then as aUS $10 trillion economy that will be green and low carbon in its evolution – the first large green economy of the fourth industrial revolution.

India’s expectations from Glasgow COP26 should be uncluttered—its single purpose must be to catalyse global flows and investments to India and other emerging economies. If India fails to attract investments, the markets will clearly have not signed on to the climate agenda. In this effort, India needs a leg-up from the Climate Pontiffs.

Perpetuation of global poverty and low incomes cannot be the rich world’s climate mitigation strategy. ‘Net Zero’ should not seek this end state. On the contrary, investing in the emerging world’s green transition is the only way to build a ‘just’ world. The UN Secretary-General could help ensure that the largest pool of new money flows to where the climate battle will be fought—in India and in the emerging world. That would be a just transition and an efficient one.

Read the original article on ORF online’s website.

Masood Ahmed: IMF’s spring meetings lack ambition for a world in crisis

Countries risk a ‘dangerous divergence’ in economic fortune unless more is done to help.
Mark Lowcock & Masood Ahmed – Financial Times – 5 April 2021
IMF managing director Kristalina Georgieva.
IMF managing director Kristalina Georgieva. The fund’s projections show a prolonged and stumbling recovery for developing countries © Samuel Corum/Getty

At the spring meetings of the IMF and World Bank this week, we can expect measures to support low- and middle-income countries’ pandemic recovery that are laudable but fall well short of what is required.  One likely outcome will be an allocation of up to $650bn in IMF special drawing rights, the fund’s reserve currency that is used to supplement members’ official reserves. An extended pause on debt service payments for the poorest countries and a commitment from wealthy nations to help finance the global distribution of Covid vaccines will probably also be agreed. All these measures will be welcome. But they will be only marginally helpful for countries where the end of the pandemic remains far off. They certainly will not prevent IMF managing director Kristalina Georgieva’s warning of a “dangerous divergence” between economies from becoming a reality.  The IMF’s projections show a prolonged and stumbling recovery for developing countries. Most are unlikely to vaccinate enough people to achieve herd immunity until 2023. Their financial buffers are near depleted, threatening the first rise in global poverty since 1990. Already 270m people face starvation.  It is not too late to raise the ambition for the spring meetings. They could be used to trigger immediate action and set the agenda in a way that recognises the long-term impact of this crisis and matches it in scale, scope and duration. The IMF and the World Bank increased their lending last year. They now need to publicly commit to at least sustain their flows at this elevated level for the next five years. This will require an agreement between the institutions and their shareholders on more creative use of their balance sheets combined with commitments for new shareholder financing as needed.  Second, a fundamental restructuring or writedown of debt is required for a significant number of developing countries. The common framework for debt treatments agreed by the G20 last November has potential but has achieved little so far. Shareholders should ask the IMF and World Bank to apply the framework and more actively address the debt issue, for instance by bringing recalcitrant private creditors to the table. Third, neither future pandemics nor climate change can be managed unless developing countries are engaged in the process. International financial institutions need to adapt their historical country-focused business model. Now is the time for shareholders to ask the leadership of the IFIs to produce ambitious proposals to address these global challenges.

Finally, international support for countries trapped in economic fragility and conflict remains fragmented and has yielded mixed results. The meetings should set out how IFIs and the UN can better co-ordinate on fragile states socially, politically and economically. During the pandemic there have been examples of solidarity and smart collaboration; the development of vaccines is perhaps the finest. As rich countries move from crisis management to shaping the recovery, it would be a mistake to think of the continuing crisis in the world’s poorest countries as someone else’s problem. Some will say these proposals extend the mandate of the IFIs. But maintaining the weak response we’ve seen so far would be a moral failure, and one lacking foresight. Aside from the obvious risk of leaving the virus free to circulate, it opens up the possibility of secondary crises — hunger, conflict and displacement — spilling over into the lives of everyone, everywhere. The spring meetings have the potential to determine whether this autumn is the beginning of the end of the pandemic, or the start of a more complex and dangerous phase for the world.

 

The writer is the UN under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs.

Masood Ahmed, president of the Center for Global Development, co-authored this article.

Ana Palacio appelle l’UE à jouer “un rôle de premier plan” dans la résolution du conflit autour du Sahara

Le360 (avec MAP) – 25/03/2021

L’Union européenne (UE) est appelée à jouer un “rôle de premier plan” dans la relance des pourparlers entre les parties pour le règlement définitif du conflit autour du Sahara, a affirmé l’ancienne ministre espagnole des Affaires étrangères, Ana Palacio.

Ana Palacio cover

Le statu quo au Sahara -et au Maghreb plus largement- ne peut pas durer, a relevé l’ancienne cheffe de la diplomatie espagnole, dans une chronique publiée récemment par l’organisation médiatique internationale “Project Syndicate”, basée à Prague, notant que “la guerre, si elle revenait, alimenterait l’instabilité dans toute la région”.

Revenant sur la reconnaissance par les Etats-Unis de la souveraineté pleine et entière du Maroc sur ses Provinces du Sud, elle a relevé que les “USA ne sont pas les seuls à soutenir le Maroc dans le différend du Sahara”.

“A la fin de 2020, 18 pays d’Afrique subsaharienne et du Golfe avaient ouvert, ou exprimé leur intention d’ouvrir, des consulats au Sahara, impliquant une reconnaissance tacite de la souveraineté marocaine”, a-t-elle expliqué. De l’autre côté, a-t-elle indiqué, le Polisario a récemment contesté, sans succès, la légalité des exportations agricoles et des accords de pêche entre le Maroc et l’UE devant la Cour européenne de justice.

Elle affirme que “les Sahraouis sont pris en otage par le Polisario afin de soutenir le discours selon lequel le Maroc est un occupant, un discours qui n’est pas confirmé par le droit international”, soutenant qu’aucune des 69 résolutions du Conseil de sécurité sur le Sahara “ne fait référence à une occupation”.

Ces résolutions, a-t-elle précisé, appellent plutôt les parties à négocier un règlement politique. A rappeler que le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies a, dans ses résolutions, notamment la dernière (2548), insisté sur la solution politique réaliste, pragmatique et durable qui repose sur le compromis, pour le règlement du conflit artificiel autour du Sahara. Il consacre de ce fait la prééminence de la proposition marocaine d’autonomie qui recueille le soutien de la communauté internationale et que l’administration américaine estime, à juste titre, comme étant la base de toute solution politique.

Retrouvez cet article sur le site du 360.

Les implications économiques potentielles d’une pandémie durable

Terranova – 16.03.2021

Par Jean Pisani-Ferry et Olivier Blanchard

SYNTHÈSE

Si le COVID-19 persiste et continue de menacer des vies, deux scénarios semblent possibles. Des vagues d’infection récurrentes qui conduisent les gouvernements à osciller entre l’imposition et la levée de mesures sanitaires en fonction des hauts et des bas de l’épidémie. Ou un scénario de « zéro COVID » dans lequel des politiques d’endiguement sévères et soutenues au début, suivies de mesures sanitaires plus douces associées à un traçage et à des tests systématiques, viseraient à atteindre et à maintenir un niveau d’infection très bas. Bien que l’expérience suggère que ce deuxième scénario entraînerait des coûts humains et économiques à long terme moins élevés, les réalités géographiques, humaines et politiques au sein des pays et entre eux le rendent moins probable, du moins dans le cas d’économies ouvertes, étroitement intégrées et densément peuplées comme celles de l’Europe. Le premier semble plus probable.
Les économistes Jean Pisani-Ferry et Olivier Blanchard voient trois principales implications économiques d’un scénario d’épidémies récurrentes, qu’ils détaillent pour Terra Nova. La première est la fermeture durable des frontières, les pays essayant de se protéger des infections survenant ailleurs. La deuxième est la probabilité de confinements répétés. La troisième concerne les effets durables sur la composition de l’offre et de la demande.

Cet essai fait partie d’une série du Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) sur Economic Policy for a Pandemic Age: How the World Must Prepare for a Lasting Threat.
Les auteurs remercient Michael Kister pour son excellente assistance à la recherche, Nicolas Woloszko pour ses conseils sur les données de l’OCDE et Laurence Boone, Philippe Martin, Guntram Wolff et leurs collègues du PIIE pour leurs commentaires et critiques sur une version antérieure.

Téléchargez la note sur le site de Terranova.

Philippe Chalmin : “Il y a une montée en puissance des tensions” entre Chinois et Occidentaux

  

Par 

La filière des batteries électriques, en Europe et aux Etats-Unis, est renforcée par la reprise de la production de l’Usine du Sud en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Mais le nickel illustre aussi les tensions entre chinois et occidentaux.

La ville d’Anchorage en Alaska, avec ses températures polaires, tournée vers le Pacifique, a servi de décor adapté au climat de guerre froide qui règne entre la Chine et les Etats-Unis. Les deux pays, ont conclu vendredi deux jours de discussions “dures” mais “constructives” qui ont donné lieu au déballage inédit de leurs profonds désaccords, à l’image des tensions militaires et de la confrontation commerciale sans merci entre les deux premières puissances mondiales.

Chine
Les délégations chinoises et américaines face à face à Anchorage en Alaska.  ©Fred J Brown AFP

Symbole de ces tensions, la mer de Chine où s’observent désormais quotidiennement navires de guerre chinois et occidentaux. Cette route maritime, voit se croiser les exportations chinoises d’acier ou de batteries électriques, et les importations de matières premières venues d’Australie, d’Indonésie ou de Nouvelle-Calédonie pour le nickel. Il y a une montée en puissance des tensions militaires dans la région qui s’ajoutent aux conflits commerciaux et ce sont les matières premières qui sont en première ligne” a estimé Philippe Chalmin, économiste et historien, fondateur du cercle Cyclope.

Taiwan
Chasseur F16 taïwanais escortant un bombardier à capacité nucléaire chinois H-6K dans le détroit de Formose.  ©AFP

Jeudi soir, après les durs échanges verbaux entre les délégations américaines et chinoises à Anchorage, les cours des matières premières avaient baissé par peur du risque ; ainsi pour le nickel qui était passé sous le seuil des 16.000 dollars la tonne.

Mais vendredi, oubliant le sommet américano-chinois de l’Alaska, les analystes londoniens prenaient connaissance, positivement, de l’information publiée par Nouvelle-Calédonie la 1ère annonçant la reprise progressive de l’activité de l’Usine du Sud (Goro Resources). Le nickel hydroxyde cake produit par le grand complexe industriel calédonien, l’un des plus importants au monde, est le principal composant utilisé dans l’industrie des batteries rechargeables, celle des véhicules électriques. La production serait principalement destinée aux constructeurs occidentaux. Elle n’irait pas en Chine…“L’Usine du Sud a produit 23.400 tonnes de nickel en 2019. Elle a la capacité de produire jusqu’à 60 000 tonnes par an de NHC” a rappelé Anna Stublum, stratégiste de Marex Spectron.

« Les opérations de lixiviation du nickel à l’acide, comme à Goro en Nouvelle-Calédonie, sont toujours bien meilleures pour l’environnement que la production de nickel par une filière de fonte ».

Lyle Trytten, expert canadien du nickel (Trytten Consulting Services)

Faut-il y voir un signe ? Les tensions qui opposent d’un côté les Etats-Unis et leurs alliés, et de l’autre la Chine, ne sont pas absentes non plus de la bataille qui se livre autour du nickel de la transition énergétique. Comme en réponse à la participation de l’Américain Tesla au renouveau de l’usine calédonienne, le conglomérat chinois Tsingshan a annoncé qu’il disposait d’une alternative pour fournir du nickel au marché des voitures électriques. Du nickel de qualité batterie à partir de Nickel Pig Iron, un processus métallurgique qui est critiqué pour son impact environnemental. “C’est cette information qui a entraîné la baisse substantielle du prix du nickel”, a rappelé le Metal Bulletin de Londres. Comme une illustration de la “compétition rude” qui oppose la Chine et les occidentaux, selon les termes utilisées par la délégation américaine à Anchorage.

Usine du Sud (nickel et cobalt) Vale Nouvelle-Calédonie
Usine du Sud (nickel et cobalt) Vale Nouvelle-Calédonie

Cours du nickel au LME de Londres 16.262 dollars/tonne +1,56 % (-17,24 % sur un mois)

Retrouvez l’article complet sur le site de La 1ère – France TV Info.

Bertrand Badré: Europe’s ESG Opportunity

Bertrand Badré at 2019 WPC Finance workshop

11.02.2021 – Project Syndicate

Olivia Grégoire & Bertrand Badré

Far from being a purely technical matter, assessing firms’ non-financial performance is a deeply political issue. Europe’s inclusive governance model may give it a competitive edge in shaping global environmental, social, and governance regulations for firms and investors.

PARIS – Finance is evolving in a more sustainable direction, and just in time. Pension funds, insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds have made multiple commitments on climate change, biodiversity, and economic inclusion. In each case, the aim is to treat finance as a tool, not an end in itself, and to adopt objectives that go well beyond financial returns.

Today, more than $40.5 trillion globally is invested according to environmental, social, and governance principles. But who defines what constitutes an ESG investment, and how far can we trust ESG statements issued by corporations? We need a set of  – and Europe can, and should, play a leading role in formulating and implementing them.

Far from being a purely technical matter, assessing firms’ non-financial performance is a deeply political issue. The first step is the choice of indicators to measure a company’s environmental or social performance. Then there is the question of establishing baseline ESG standards that Europe, the United States, or China will require from all firms that want to do business in their market, as well as a frame of reference that will directly influence financial and investment flows.

Designing such indicators is an invaluable instrument for building sovereignty. Europe, in many respects a global leader in the environmental and social domains, should therefore seize the opportunity, and advance the case for a different kind of sovereignty that serves as a launchpad for global initiatives.

Since French President Emmanuel Macron advocated building European sovereignty in a 2017 speech, the European Union’s view on the issue has evolved significantly. Nowadays, member states are far less ambivalent about defending European sovereignty, whether in response to emerging digital monopolies, the economic risks of Brexit, or the public-health threat posed by COVID-19.

To safeguard its model and values, Europe can no longer just respond to events, but needs to be proactive in identifying and initiating measures that will spread beyond its borders. Assessing corporations’ non-financial performance can form part of a more assertive sovereignty that also enables Europe to address equally urgent issues such as climate change, social problems, and shifting geopolitical alignments.

For example, the EU has set itself far-reaching environmental goals, starting with achieving carbon neutrality no later than 2050. To that end, it recently developed a so-called green taxonomy, a standardized classification that enables assessment of the sustainability of 70 economic activities that together account for 93% of the EU’s greenhouse-gas emissions.

On the social front, the EU established the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000, and in 2017 proclaimed the European Pillar of Social Rights – granting its citizens new and more effective means of ensuring equal access to the labor market, fair working conditions, and increased social protection. And in October 2020, the European Commission proposed an EU directive to ensure adequate minimum wages for workers in member states.

But here, too, Europe is trapping itself in a defensive situation. Although Europe is protecting its sovereignty by building such an environmental and social framework, it has no desire to introduce these ideas elsewhere. But in a global economy where each country is trying to shape standards to its own advantage, the key is not merely to defend a model, but to present it to the world as a basis for further discussion.

Since its inception, the EU has frequently been criticized for its sluggishness and bureaucratic red tape. But in a union of 27 sovereign states, every decision is necessarily the result of negotiation and compromise. Moreover, decisions about what constitutes good or bad behavior relative to a norm should not be made lightly. Ironically, therefore, Europe’s inclusive governance model may give it a competitive edge in shaping global ESG standards.

With its large and prosperous single market, high savings rate, and powerful financial sector, Europe can potentially influence these standards through what Zaki Laïdi calls “norms over force.” This is the exact opposite of traditional political and military power, or, as Laïdi puts it, the “ability to produce and set up a worldwide mechanism of norms able to structure the world, to curb unruly behavior from entering players, to offer those who abide by the rules, particularly the less powerful, ample opportunity to make the norms stand against all, including the powerful.”

Furthermore, because measuring non-financial performance goes well beyond simple accounting, the transition to a more ecologically and socially sustainable capitalism through participants’ transparency and shared responsibility may become the polestar of a new European identity.

At a time when Europe is seeking to outgrow its internal political divisions, the EU has an opportunity to reiterate its environmental and social values without requiring member states to support a particular economic model, but rather by simply sticking to a results-based approach. Despite their historical and cultural differences, member states have many shared values that enable them to agree on the basics on issues such as gender equality or environmental protection.

One of the founding fathers of European integration, Jean Monnet, believed that sovereignty declines when it is entrenched in old patterns. Having designed a sovereignty that differs fundamentally from previously tested governance models, the EU must now demonstrate its vitality by extending its power beyond its single market.

More than any other jurisdiction, the EU should embrace new norms, not fear them. By requiring an evaluation of a firm’s environmental and social impact before granting access to its market, the EU would have a unique opportunity to assert both the singularity and the extent of its sovereignty.

In doing so, Europe would contribute to a necessarily global debate regarding the transition toward a sustainable, resilient, and inclusive capitalist economic model. This goal was implicit in the Sustainable Development Goals and Paris climate agreement that the world adopted in 2015. We now have a duty to make it overt.

Read the article on Project Syndicate.

Quelles perspectives pour le Liban ? Analyse de la situation géopolitique par Renaud Girard

13.02.2021 – France Culture

Les Répliques, par Alain Finkielkraut

Quelles perspectives pour le Liban ? Plusieurs mois après les explosions sur le port de Beyrouth et alors que le pays connaît une grave crise financière, Renaud Girard et Karim Bitar analysent la situation géopolitique.

Le Liban, c’était la coexistence miraculeuse dans un même Etat de dix-huit communautés religieuses, allant des musulmans sunnites aux chrétiens maronites, en passant par les chiites, les druzes, les Arméniens catholiques, les Arméniens orthodoxes, les Melkites et quelques autres.

Ce vivre ensemble plusieurs fois mis à mal est-il encore possible à l’heure de la guerre civile qui dirige l’islam et du choc Orient-Occident ? Faut-il considérer la double explosion dans le port de Beyrouth, le 4 août 2020, qui a soufflé les quartiers alentours et qui a fait 204 morts et 6 500 blessés comme l’apocalypse terminale de cette exception politique dont le pacte national stipulait qu’elle devait se tenir à égale distance de l’Occident et du monde arabe ? Pour nous éclairer et nous guider avec des idées justes dans le Liban compliqué, j’ai convié ce matin Renaud Girard, chroniqueur international au Figaro et Karim Emile Bitar, directeur de l’Institut de sciences politiques à l’Université Saint-Joseph de Beyrouth.

Le Liban, tel que nous le connaissions, a définitivement disparu, il ne renaîtra pas. Les contours du nouveau Liban tardent à se définir et nous sommes dans ce clair-obscur où les monstres surgissent ; les monstres se sont bien évidemment les assassins de Lokman Slim. Karim Emile Bitar

L’un des gros problèmes du Liban, c’est l’absence de démocratie intra-communautaire. Il est extrêmement difficile de faire entendre une voix qui soit contraire à celle de la majorité de sa communauté. […] Aujourd’hui, nous sommes dans cette situation où une majorité a quelque peu embrigadé la communauté chiite. Le Hezbollah n’est que l’un des avatars de ces monstres qui surgissent sur la scène libanaise. Karim Emile Bitar

Enjeux internationaux

Karim Emile Bitar et Renaud Girard esquissent une géopolitique de la région, évoquent le communautarisme et la nécessité de faire triompher cette notion de citoyenneté.

La plupart des analystes estiment aujourd’hui que cette politique de pression maximale de Téhéran qu’a menée Donald Trump a plutôt été un échec, qu’elle est plutôt venue faire le jeu des ultra-conservateurs iraniens, qu’elle n’est pas véritablement venue affaiblir l’Iran. Mais au contraire, lui donner un certain nombre d’atouts. […] Près de 70 à 80% de la communauté chiite libanaise soutient le Hezbollah. Malgré toutes ces dérives idéologiques, même ceux qui ne partagent absolument pas son idéologie islamiste le suivent dans son opposition à Israël parce qu’ils estiment qu’il constitue une force de dissuasion et qu’ils ne souhaitent pas qu’Israël puisse à nouveau envahir le Liban comme par le passé. Karim Emile Bitar

Le général Gouraud, après avoir battu les armées arabes en Syrie lorsqu’il prononce la souveraineté du Grand Liban le 1 septembre 1920, envisage déjà un système de cantons suisses. Je pense que c’est sans doute la solution pour le Liban : le fédéralisme mais pas sur des lignes ethniques, sur des lignes régionales qui existent aujourd’hui. Renaud Girard

Ecoutez l’émission sur le site de France Culture.

Renaud Girard: «Soyons réalistes face à la Russie!»

L’Europe se trompe en voulant imposer des sanctions à la Russie après la condamnation de Navalny. Elles pénalisent le commerce alors que c’est ce qui devrait les rapprocher.

Le Conseil des affaires étrangères de l’Union européenne (UE), qui se tiendra le lundi 22 février 2021 à Bruxelles, sera dédié aux relations qu’elle doit construire avec la Russie. C’est dans cette enceinte que le haut représentant européen pour les Affaires étrangères rendra compte des résultats de son déplacement à Moscou du vendredi 5 février. L’Espagnol Josep Borrell y était allé notamment pour demander la libération de l’opposant Alexeï Navalny, qu’un tribunal moscovite vient de condamner à deux ans et huit mois de prison ferme, sans qu’il ait commis le moindre délit réel. Devant la presse, le ministre russe des Affaires étrangères avait fait la leçon au haut représentant. Sergueï Lavrov avait fustigé l’«exceptionnalisme» des Occidentaux qui, selon lui, s’arrogent le droit de s’ingérer, comme ils veulent et quand ils veulent, dans les affaires intérieures des autres pays. Le même jour, son ministère expulsait trois diplomates européens (un Allemand, un Polonais et un Suédois) ayant […]

Retrouvez la suite de la tribune de Renaud Girard sur le site du Figaro.

2020 Conference proceedings

09:00 – 09:30 | Opening

Global Governance and Public Health

Thierry de Montbrial

Founder and Chairman of Ifri and the WPC

We are living through the greatest of all shocks since the beginning of the WPC, COVID-19, which probably belongs to the highest category of conceivable shocks. As a result, we will have to introduce health as a fundamental subject in all the discussions and reflections about the future of global governance.

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Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus

Director-General of the WHO

The pandemic has shown us that international cooperation is the only solution to an international crisis. Working together might not always be easy, but it is essential. We must rethink and strengthen multilateralism to address the pressing challenges of our world in a coordinated and coherent way.

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09:30 – 11:30 | Session 1

The lessons of COVID-19

Michel Kazatchkine

Special Advisor to the Joint United Nations Program on AIDS in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Senior Fellow at the Global Health Centre of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies

Against a certain lack of interest in certain health issues that has prevailed in recent years, the world is now realizing how much among all global issues, it is health in the short-term that has the greatest potential for disruption in our globalized world.

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Antoine Flahault

Director of the Institute of Global Health at the University of Geneva

In a collaboration between the University of Geneva and the two engineering schools of Zürich and Lausanne (ETHZ and EPFL), we provide on a dashboard […] with daily updates of COVID-19 forecasts for 209 countries and territories.

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Debate 1

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Alexandre de Germay

Senior Vice President Global Head of Cardiovascular and Established Products at Sanofi

Overhauling healthcare systems is an onerous undertaking – and requires many actors engaging in concert behind common or complementary objectives. But the COVID-19 crisis has shown us that it is possible to effect wide and large-scale change […]

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Jean Kramarz

Head of Business Line Health at Axa Partners

The purpose of Insurance is to cover for unexpected events in a predictable, measurable environment. COVID-19 taught us in a hard way that the Health environment was less predictable and measurable than we all thought.

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Juliette Tuakli

Medical Director, Chief Executive Officer of Family, Child & Associates, Chair of the Board of Trustees of United Way Worldwide

Agile coherent leadership was noted in the most COVID-19 resilient African nations. Whilst there was some politicization of COVID-19 management, as in other parts of the world, Africa fared much better than feared.

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Elhadj As Sy

Co-chair of the WHO/World Bank Global Pandemic Preparedness Monitoring Board, Chair of the Kofi Annan Foundation Board

This time, we are being reminded that perhaps we should not go back to normal because normal has not worked.

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Debate 2

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11:30 – 13-30 | Session 2

Technology, Economics, Health Ethics

Introduction

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Jacques Biot

Board Member and Advisor to companies in the field of digital transformation and artificial intelligence, former President of the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris

Innovation in the field is still mostly science and technology driven, a favorable feature to provide disruptive remedies to some major health issues, but which allows for no reasonable marketplace to reconcile demand with supply and rationalize economic flows.

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Alexandra Prieux

President of Alcediag, Founder of SkillCell

The extensive use of technologies permanently changes medical practice as well as the role of the doctor who becomes more and more a technology user. Alongside with the progresses carried by technologies come new challenges that will need to be overcome.

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Debate 1

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Daniel Andler

Emeritus Professor at Sorbonne University, Member of the French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences

Over the last three decades health technologies have produced a steady flux of revolutionary inventions, disrupting established practices and common understandings of some basic ethical and anthropological notions. Hence the need for guidelines, which provide a legible representation of the ethical and legal issues which allows agents in the field to navigate the situations they encounter daily.

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Arthur Stril

Chief Business Officer and member of the Executive Committee of Cellectis

The 21st century will be the century of biology and medicine, fuelled by the rapid accumulation of biological engineering breakthroughs such as viral vectors, gene editing, and reproductive medicine, which are drastically reshaping human healthcare. But does the end justify such technological means?

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Debate 2

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Patrick Nicolet

Capgemini’s Group Chief Technology Officer

Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) form the backbone of our societies, but their usage so far has been centered on short-term convenience slowly taking a toll on the Earth finite resources. In this context, what if the most pressing healthcare challenge for mankind isn’t COVID-19 itself but a deeper transformation of our individual and collective practices and behaviors through planet-centric design.

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Carlos Moreira

Founder and Chief Executive Officer of WISeKey, former United Nations Expert on Cybersecurity and Trust Models

We must rethink the way the internet is built in order to unleash the potential of technology for healthcare as this sector is still mainly an analogue sector waiting to be digitally transformed.

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Conclusion

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14:30 – 16:00 | Session 3

Mental Health and Addiction

Introduction

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Michael van den Berg

Health Economist and Policy Analyst at the OECD

Slowly but surely, a paradigm shift is taking place in the way we think about healthcare, with a focus on the people who use it. Policymakers, academics, healthcare providers and patients are joining forces to make health systems more people-centered.

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Roberto Burioni

Professor of Microbiology and Virology at the Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan

Together with a pandemic caused by the new coronavirus, we must face a second pandemic, made of fake news that are widely circulated and believed by the general population.

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Jean-Pierre Lablanchy

Medical Doctor and Psychiatrist, member of the Supervisory Board of Edeis

Mental health issues that have emerged for some time in the public debate are not new, but COVID-19 contributed to exacerbate some of them.

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Debate

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Conclusion

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Antoine Flahault : « On pourrait rêver d’une sorte de week-end vaccinal en juin »

03.02.2021 – Le 1 hebdo

Entretien avec l’épidémiologiste Antoine Flahault

Qu’a-t-on appris des épidémies passées ?

Toutes les épidémies de maladies émergentes nous en apprennent beaucoup. L’épidémie de VIH a montré que trouver des traitements qui modifient radicalement le pronostic vital peut changer la donne. Changer le pronostic de la maladie, notamment chez les personnes âgées et à risque, pourrait avoir un effet similaire pour le Covid. L’épidémie de chikungunya nous a éclairés sur le rôle des mutations dans l’évolution de l’épidémie. On a aussi appris à mettre en place en France des vaccinodromes avec l’épidémie de H1N1 – un modèle qui réapparaît aujourd’hui, et que les Allemands appliquent depuis décembre et nous depuis janvier. En réalité, ceux qui ont le mieux tiré les leçons des épidémies passées sont les Asiatiques, les peuples proches de la Chine continentale : toutes les connaissances accumulées sur le SRAS pour mieux juguler le SARS-CoV-2, qui ressemble à s’y méprendre à son cousin éloigné le SARS-CoV, virus du SRAS.

Sait-on combien de temps encore pourrait durer l’épidémie ?

Nos outils prédictifs ont hélas très peu progressé. On sait davantage comment se comporte une pandémie de grippe, car la grippe saisonnière nous sert de guide dans nos modèles mathématiques. Mais une pandémie de coronavirus, ça ne s’est jamais vu dans l’histoire contemporaine. Il serait hasardeux de vouloir prédire quel scénario se réalisera. Même si nous avons espoir que la vaccination accélère sa disparition, nous ne sommes pas à l’abri d’un variant qui échapperait à l’immunité et nous ferait retomber dans une nouvelle forme de pandémie.

Ces variants nous exposent-ils à une pandémie sans fin ?

De nouveaux variants seront forcément découverts, car ces virus ARN sont connus pour beaucoup muter. On a plutôt de la chance, puisque ce coronavirus mute moins que le virus de la grippe. Le virus ARN du coronavirus a un grand génome. C’est le plus grand de tous les virus ARN connus, avec ses 30 000 bases. Ses mutations ne sont pas nécessairement alarmantes. Les inquiétude que suscite un nouveau variant concernent sa transmissibilité accrue, sa virulence – la sévérité des formes cliniques qu’il génère –, le fait qu’il puisse échapper au diagnostic PCR ou antigénique ou, enfin, à la protection conférée par les vaccins. S’agissant de sa transmissibilité, le consensus est que les variants actuels sont plus transmissibles. Il faut comprendre que le coronavirus a muté plusieurs milliers de fois depuis son apparition l’an dernier à Wuhan. Les variants britannique B 117, sud-africain ou brésilien comptent 15 à 25 mutations chacun, touchant des sites parfois stratégiques du virus, comme celui qui code pour la protéine Spike, celle-là même qui permet au virus de s’accrocher à nos cellules afin d’y pénétrer. C’est en quelque sorte le trousseau de clés dont se sert le virus pour infecter l’homme. Si vous changez des constituants de la protéine Spike, soit c’est bénéfique – par exemple, si la clé ne permet plus d’entrer aisément dans la cellule –, soit cela aggrave la situation – si la clé devient un passe-partout et permet au virus d’entrer encore plus facilement dans la cellule. Aujourd’hui, des arguments laissent à penser que ces trois mutants augmenteraient la transmissibilité du virus, peut-être aussi sa virulence, et on ne sait pas encore ce qu’il en est de la sensibilité au vaccin.

Que doit-on en conclure ?

Le fait que ces variants soient plus transmissibles n’est pas une bonne nouvelle. Y compris pour la mortalité. Dans la situation actuelle, il vaudrait mieux un virus 50 % plus mortel que 50 % plus transmissible. C’est contre-intuitif, mais un virus 50 % plus transmissible tuera proportionnellement davantage, car le pourcentage de morts ne sera pas augmenté, mais le pourcentage de cas le sera largement. Ce n’est donc une bonne nouvelle ni du point de vue du taux de saturation des hôpitaux ni de celui du risque de mortalité.

Où en sommes-nous de l’épidémie ? Ne fait-elle que commencer ou en voit-on le bout ?

Nous publions chaque jour une carte réactualisée du monde, qui nous permet de dire comment la situation évolue dans les 209 pays et territoires de la planète qui enregistrent des cas et des décès par Covid. En Europe, on a connu deux vagues, en mars puis en octobre. Cette deuxième vague n’est pas terminée. Si on regarde l’hémisphère sud, l’Australie, l’Afrique du Sud ou l’Argentine, on voit qu’une vague hivernale (entre mai et septembre chez eux) a déferlé de façon brutale et s’est prolongée jusqu’à la fin de l’hiver. Fin janvier, dans l’hémisphère nord, la deuxième vague n’était pas terminée. La pression du virus pendant toute la saison froide risque de rester importante pour les Européens. Ce qui n’est pas clair, c’est de savoir s’il y aura un rebond

[…]

A Global Pandemic Alarm Bell

Jean Pisani-Ferry

The appearance of mutant versions of the coronavirus in the United Kingdom, South Africa, and Brazil has given the world no choice but to design and implement a comprehensive global strategy. So, what’s stopping that from happening?

PARIS – Seen from Europe, Asia, or even North America, Manaus, the capital of the Brazilian state of Amazonas, is as remote as can be. Yet the 501Y.V3 variant of the coronavirus recently detected there has already been identified as a global threat, because its emergence in a city where two-thirds of the population was already infected in the spring of 2020 suggests that acquired immunity does not protect against it.

Scientists speculate whether 501Y.V3 may also thwart some of the existing vaccines. Even if the RNA-based vaccines can be quickly modified, the risk of ineffectiveness just when mass vaccination is being rolled out is extremely scary.

Viruses, of course, mutate all the time. While many mutations are innocuous, dangerous ones regularly appear. The larger the population that is infected at any time, the higher the probability that a hazardous variant, or possibly a new strain, will appear. Each person is a potential lab for these mutations. With some 600,000 new coronavirus infections identified daily, there are currently several million such labs in operation around the world. So it is a certainty that more mutations will occur.

This threat confronts the international community with a stark choice: either design and implement a comprehensive global strategy, or seal borders and let countries fight it out with the virus one by one. There is no effective middle way. The prevailing combination of vaccine nationalism and half-open borders is a losing strategy. In an open world where rich countries would attempt to protect their populations while poorer countries could not, contamination would repeatedly cross borders and defeat the most sophisticated health policies. Already, the South African and Manaus variants have been found in Germany.

On paper, the choice between acting globally and closing borders is a no-brainer. The total population of countries categorized by the World Bank as low-income and lower-middle income is about four billion. Assuming a $10 unit price, vaccinating 75% of this population would cost $30 billion, a mere two-hundredth of the crisis-induced fiscal loss already incurred by advanced economies. Even from a narrow economic standpoint, and even if ten times more expensive, investment by rich countries in curbing the pandemic in poor countries would be hugely profitable. The alternative of closing borders altogether to contain contamination would send a terrible signal and destroy prosperity on a massive scale.

Conscious of the challenge, rich countries actually support a program of this sort, though on a much smaller scale. The COVAX initiative, launched in April 2020 by the World Health Organization, the European Commission, and France, is meant to help participating states jointly negotiate procurement with vaccine producers, and to donate to poor countries enough free doses to vaccinate 20% of their population. Although this is insufficient to control the virus’s spread, it would be good enough to protect the elderly and health-care workers, and it would represent a significant stepping-stone to further action.

By the end of 2020, COVAX had raised $2.4 billion and pre-ordered enough doses to vaccinate a billion people in 2021, but it was still at pains to raise the additional $5 billion needed to finance its rather unambitious program. Under President Donald Trump, the US had refused to provide support. Moreover, vaccine manufacturers favor more profitable rich-country markets, where governments are willing to pay a premium to accelerate the supply of doses.

Not surprisingly, WHO Chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus recently warned that the world was “on the brink of a catastrophic moral failure.” But, alongside the moral failure, what is puzzling is the collective action failure this behavior represents. Self-interest, not just a sense of duty, dictates that rich countries should do more. Why aren’t they?

The first reason is short-sightedness. At home, too, governments are not doing enough. In Europe, investment in vaccine research and development has fallen short of the $18 billion the US has devoted to Operation Warp Speed. Oddly, the European Union’s €390 billion ($473 billion) in grant-making resources administered by the bloc’s Recovery and Resilience Facility does not include joint funding for vaccine research.

The second reason is the traditional temptation to free-ride on others’ efforts. Rich-country governments have strong incentives to protect their citizens, but support to poor states is vulnerable to free-riding, as each player’s interest is to let others pay for the common good. For example, Trump announced that he was withdrawing the US from the WHO at the very moment when joint action was urgently needed. Add to that China’s shirking of its global responsibilities, and international leadership has been dramatically absent since last spring.

The third reason is messy governance. The global health field is complex, scattered, and characterized by institutional overlap. Because the WHO is widely regarded as an ineffective and politicized institution, initiatives have developed on the side, with private donors such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, governments, and public agencies cooperating ad hoc to develop a flurry of initiatives. The resulting funding map defies imagination. This was fine as long as tackling emerging challenges required limited mobilization and resources, but the pandemic calls for acting on an entirely different scale.

Can the world change tack? Fortunately, US President Joe Biden’s administration has already announced its intention to join COVAX. Until recently, it was assumed that the repair of international trade and renewed engagement in climate action would be its first external priorities. Events may well turn the coordination of pandemic efforts into a litmus test of Biden’s global leadership. But if US commitment is clearly needed, much broader joint action is called for to prevent a moral, medical, and economic disaster.

Read the original article on Project Syndicate.

Promoting the diffusion of technology to boost productivity and well-being in Korea

Mathilde Pak, OECD Economist at the 2019 WPC

Korea is a top player in emerging digital technologies, with an outstanding digital infrastructure and a dynamic ICT sector. The COVID-19 outbreak highlighted the importance of digitalisation to contain the spread of the virus, by allowing quick testing and tracing of infected people, and spurred the development of the “untact economy”. Remote access both facilitated physical distancing and mitigated the economic impact of the crisis by enabling more people to continue working. Digital technologies offer opportunities to raise firms’ productivity and the population’s well-being. However, wide productivity gaps between large firms and SMEs and between manufacturing and services weigh on economy-wide productivity, which is far below the OECD average. A wide skills gap between youth and older generations prevents an increasing share of the population from taking part in and enjoying the benefits from a digitalised economy. This paper suggests ways to narrow the digital divide by enhancing the diffusion of digital technologies among firms and among individuals. Increased participation in quality ICT education and training for students, teachers, SME workers and older people is key to address the lack of adequate skills and awareness of digital benefits or dangers (online security, cyberbullying, addiction). Promoting innovation networks between SMEs, academia and large firms through vouchers or platforms can support SMEs’ R&D and commercialisation of innovative goods and services. Waiving stringent regulations through regulatory sandboxes can help identify and alter regulations that hinder the adoption and diffusion of digital technologies.

Click to access the PDF of the full OECD Economics Department Working Paper

Click to access the PDF from the OECD iLibrary 

Towards the Second Crusade?

Portrait de Thierry de Montbrial © Bahi

Editorial, January 26, 2021

Europeans first grew aware of a possible pandemic exactly one year ago. The wave is here. It has submerged the world, claiming many lives and causing tremendous collateral damage.

But a kind of miracle has occurred in this maelstrom: the development in record time of not one but several apparently effective vaccines. Two of them are based on technology that has long been gestating but are nevertheless revolutionary. Perhaps Donald Trump is not being showered with tributes, but at least he deserves credit for having believed in and funded these vaccines at the right time. Unfortunately, hopes of quickly beating the virus have been dashed for at least two reasons. First, vaccines cannot be produced and distributed with the snap of a finger. The rollout has hit various organizational snags, particularly logistical ones. We are on a war economy footing for which few countries were prepared. Vaccination is a public good in that every vaccinated person also protects others, but the operational translation of this fact piles difficulty upon difficulty, especially in developing countries. Second, and perhaps above all, the arrival of more contagious, if not more dangerous, variants has thrown cold water on hopes that the crisis would end soon. At present, no one expects a return to normal before 2022 at best. And even then, it would be a new normal.

In other words, at least the first quarter of Joe Biden’s presidency will be taken up with two crises, as intertwined now as they were in 2020: the virus and China. They are intertwined because China clearly won the first round of the fight against the pandemic from both a health and an economic standpoint, although the risk has not vanished. The United States still has a long way to go. Moreover, China quickly grasped the opportunity of the pandemic to undertake active health diplomacy everywhere, first with masks, then with medical devices and now with a vaccine. Beijing seeks to portray itself as the champion of openness and multilateralism at a time when, despite the new president’s outreach and soothing words, US allies and partners remain traumatized by his forerunner’s term and show little hurry to rally behind the star-spangled banner against the rising power. Biden’s desire to restore America’s “global leadership” is mere wishful thinking: during the Cold War, the United States was the only leader of the “free world”, as it was called then, and that was already a lot. Today, the People’s Republic of China has no intention of positioning itself as a “follower” of the US. When the 46th president speaks about restoring American leadership, it is to be understood that for him the system of alliances developed after the Second World War must now be reorganized, not only because Russia is still considered threatening, but also and above all because of China, accused of trampling on freedoms at home and wanting to impose its hegemony in its backyard by force, particularly by threatening Taiwan. Moreover, it is around Taiwan that everything will play out.

Do not expect 2021 to be decisive in this regard. The domestic problems facing the United States are too serious for the successor of Donald Trump—the first to denounce the Chinese menace out loud—to be able to immediately start a new Cold War. At least at first, he will try to carry out a strategy of competitive rivalry, in the words of famous Harvard professor Joseph Nye—a highly respected Democrat—while, without flexing America’s muscles too much, trying to keep Europeans and others from economically and technologically cooperating too closely with China. Still reeling from the Trump experience, Europeans have no intention of letting themselves be pushed around and are trying to widen their margin of maneuver. Hence the investment deal with Beijing, which the US surely wants to block. Even in Europe, the agreement does not have unanimous backing. It is criticized for giving too much away to German interests and turning a blind eye to human rights violations.

International relations do not take place in a world of teddy bears. As the new administration in Washington finds its footing, it will carry on its predecessors’ policy of promoting American economic and technological interests by any means, of which legal extraterritoriality is the most worrisome for its partners. In this regard, it will be interesting to see the conditions of their possible return to the nuclear deal with Iran (the JCPOA). But on the level of discourse or “narrative”, America’s material interests, while being defended tooth and nail, will remain more or less masked behind ideological pieties at both the White House and Congress. The new crusade on the horizon will be waged, like the first, in the name of liberty.

At the risk of repeating myself, I do not think things will be decided in 2021. Trump and the pandemic have spurred on Europe’s quest for technological, if not strategic, self-sufficiency, and America’s other major partners have also drawn their own lessons. Looking ahead to Biden’s term as a whole, the key issue is the evolution of China’s image and, therefore, its perception by the “free world”, understood as the free-market liberal democracies. Obviously, since the arrival of President Xi Jinping and the strengthening of his power, this image has deteriorated for reasons that are both objective and subjective. The objective one is China’s increasingly impressive rise and assertion of its “rights” over Hong Kong, the South China Sea and, especially, Taiwan. The subjective reason is that many outside of China’s cultural sphere perceive Beijing’s ambitions as boundless. In other words, China is frightening. That said, Beijing also projects a reassuring face, if only from the balance-of-power viewpoint, including the economic and social development angle. Objective interdependence means that neither China nor anyone else is ready for a violent clash with the United States.

In 2021, then, more or less serious skirmishes can be expected, but in a framework that remains still more cooperative than confrontational. Things will surely settle down in the next four years. Soon, but not right away, we will know if the second crusade is in sight. Much will depend on the Chinese. If it really does take place, it is highly likely that cultural reflexes will come into play: the Chinese world will not turn away from China, the European world will turn to America, and everybody else will go wherever they can. What will be the consequences? We are not there yet.

Thierry de Montbrial

Founder and Chairman of the WPC
Founder and Executive Chairman of Ifri

The Next Frontier of Responsible Business

Bertrand Badré at 2019 WPC Finance workshop

Europe in the World: for a Modest and Effective Reform

Portrait de Thierry de Montbrial © Bahi

Editorial, December 16, 2020

This sad year ends with a pandemic that continues in full swing over a large part of the planet, especially in the United States and Europe, with no other reassuring prospect than that of one or more vaccines, which is already a lot. But that’s not the subject I want to focus on in this eighth letter, the last one for 2020. Internationally, two other facts have dominated the scene in recent months.

The first is the major turning point of the West vis-à-vis China, in the wake of Donald Trump’s offensive against Xi Jinping. Even in 2019, Europeans weren’t thinking in terms of a “Chinese threat”, even if many were beginning to worry about Chinese groups taking over a growing number of technology companies on the old continent. The deterioration in perceptions became evident during the tour of Minister Wang Yi and State Councillor Yiang Jiechi at the end of the summer. Certainly, the emergence of a sense of fear vis-à-vis the Middle Kingdom is also due to the change in tone of the Chinese leadership since the accession of Xi Jinping and the consolidation of his power. China’s leadership no longer hesitates to assert its desire for power beyond a mollifying discourse on the virtues of multilateralism, at a time when the United States was becoming more and more unilateral.

The second fact is obviously the election of the Biden-Harris tandem as President/Vice-President of the United States (as in my last letter, I insist on this notion of tandem), of which we can expect a return to good manners in the United States’ conduct of its foreign policy, but certainly not a softening in the face of China. Some, like my illustrious friend Joe Nye, a great artisan of concepts among which soft power has gained wide acceptance among political scientists, want to believe in the possibility of competitive rivalry, without major conflict over time around issues, the main one being Taiwan. I fear this will be wishful thinking, at least if China’s technological and economic rise continues to the point where the United States will soon be relegated to the second most powerful world power. Already the technological decoupling between the two superpowers has started.

The prospect of a deepening new Cold War is not just a concern for Europeans. I was able to see directly, in recent high-level meetings (virtual, unfortunately) with mostly Asian participants, that many countries in East and South-East Asia do not want to be forced to choose between the United States and China. They expect the same attitude from Europe. The warning is clear, and under the circumstances it is directed primarily to Washington. Realists are also wary of the strong inclination among American Democrats, but not just them, to play with the idea of regime change under the pretext of defending human rights. In Europe, this inclination is arguably the most fundamental reason for the failure of reconciliation with Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union. Be that as it may, the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a vast free trade agreement – heavily supported by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries – including China, Japan and South Korea, is a strong signal. The absence of India also weakens the geopolitical concept of an Indo-Pacific entity to counterbalance the Chinese space.

But it is above all from the European point of view that I would like to place myself. It is quite clear that the members of the European Union remain committed to the Atlantic Alliance, even though its purpose has lost all clarity since the fall of the Soviet Union. Questioning North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is taboo in Germany, where they do not want to hear talk about “strategic autonomy”. Germany is wary of France’s rhetoric and notes its economic weakness, which has only worsened with the pandemic. A member state like Poland sees a threat only from the Russian side and for many members the Alliance’s raison d’être has not changed with the end of the Cold War. However, I do not yet know anyone among my European contacts who is not aware of the risk of seeing the Atlantic Alliance gradually transforming, under American pressure, into an anti-Chinese alliance. In other words, no more than the Asians, Europeans as a whole do not want to be forced to choose between the two rivals from the outset, even if they have good reasons to lean towards the American side.

Concretely, we do not want the United States to continue abusing the devastating practice of secondary sanctions. These sanctions aim to wring the very necks of their allies, if they do not fully align with the United States’ policies (e.g., vis-à-vis Iran).

European construction is a long-term endeavour, where everything canot be accomplished at once. At the moment, a big step forward is being taken with the concept of technological sovereignty, now recognised by Germany itself and which seems to me could replace the concept of strategic autonomy, whose connotations divide. European sovereignty will only truly take shape if it is supported by a discourse shared by all members of the Union, which cannot happen overnight. I am convinced – and here I am speaking as a French citizen – that the best that we can do now is to reconnect with the humble and practical spirit of our compatriots Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet in the post-war years. They wanted to lay the foundations for European construction, not by waxing lyrically with no follow through, but based on projects – at the time, the European Coal and Steel Community – aimed at fostering the emergence of the idea of ​​European interests, transcending the classic notion of national interest. Now, isn’t this exactly what the Commission chaired by Ursula von der Leyen is working on, by promoting the very concrete project of a technological Europe, to which Thierry Breton and others are committed? This is a well-defined task, which offends no one and is a prerequisite for any other ambition, albeit a long-term one. But its success is within our reach and will ultimately be our collective best chance to help restore a global balance that Europeans and others aspire to.

I would like to end on a note of optimism, by sending all of you my warmest wishes for 2021, for which we all expect a kind of rebirth.

Thierry de Montbrial

Founder and Chairman of the WPC
Founder and Executive Chairman of Ifri

The Biden-Harris election: a respite in view of what?

Portrait de Thierry de Montbrial © Bahi

Editorial, November 8, 2020

I am writing this seventh letter on Sunday, November 8. Yesterday, the world press proclaimed the victory of Joe Biden and Kamala Harris. However, Donald Trump has filed lawsuits in several states, which few people believe have any chance of succeeding. At this point, then, the present occupant of the White House can be said to have joined the narrow circle of one-term presidents. Other immediate observations come to mind. The Blue Wave heralded by the polls failed to materialize. Not only that, but Biden beat his opponent by a razor’s edge in the swing states, hence those lawsuits. The Democrats fell short of their goals in the Senate and the House of Representatives. There is more talk about the triumph of the Biden-Harris team than the success of one man, who led a lethargic campaign. This is a key point, for the new president looks frail and odds are that California’s former Attorney General will move into the White House in four years, if not before.

However, unlike his former opponent in the primaries, Ms. Harris psychologically belongs to the New World, far from Europe but close to Asia, where the competition for global supremacy between the United States and China is being played out. In that world, Europeans might be relegated to supporting roles. Because of his age and personal experience, the president-elect remains attached to the Atlantic Alliance, as do some of his advisors, such as Anthony Blinken, who is well known in France. But clear-headed observers are aware that, since at least the beginning of this century, Europe has steadily faded in the minds of American foreign policy-makers. I will add two more remarks before dipping into that topic. First, the November 3 election’s outcome does not by any stretch of the imagination mean that the rifts in American society have been healed. The 46th president of the United States is undeniably a man of good will but he is not a magician, far from it, and the reasons for America’s divisions, which I talked about in my last letters, run deep. Incidentally, the Democrats’ relative failure in the Senate and the House of Representatives could help the new president hew to the center, as Kamala Harris would not like him to do. The really important point is that Trumpism remains a force to be reckoned with in the US. Trump himself could continue to embody it in the next few years if he does not go off the rails in the next few weeks. In that regard—and this is my second remark—I am pleased to say that the outbreaks of violence predicted by many analysts in the election’s aftermath did not occur. True, that would not be in the outgoing president’s interests, if he is at least thinking of preserving his political capital, whose magnitude is undeniable.

Obviously, the Covid-19 pandemic and its multi-faceted consequences will overshadow the beginning of Biden’s first term. But foreign policy will not wait. There is no need to repeat here the dominant point of view among recognized experts on the subject, which could be caricaturized like this: a change in form (a return to classic diplomacy, the invocation of human rights and a minimalist interpretation of multilateralism) but continuity in the basic goal (“America First”) and the attitude towards partners (“you’re either with us or against us”). America’s culture of power, unlike Europe’s, weakened by two world wars, is based on strength. Rather than repeating commonplaces on these issues, let us summarize, in very broad strokes, three key points amply developed in my writings for three decades. Here I will limit myself to the European perspective.

  1. The most basic cause of the fall of the USSR, and therefore the end of the Cold War, was the information and communication technology revolution. This can be seen as the fruit of America’s genius for capitalism and a unique culture of mutual support between the State and companies when the national interest is at stake. That revolution has steadily gathered pace since the 1970s. Today it is symbolized by GAFA, which in a way can be considered the Trojan horse of American dominance.
  2. The liberal wave that submerged the world between the fall of the USSR and the financial crisis in the late 2000s, when Russia was sidelined or very weak and China still had a small economy (its GDP barely equaled that of France when it joined the WTO in 2001), first benefitted the United States, which was able to consolidate its domination over countries that cared little about national independence. That was the case of Europe, now subject to the extraterritoriality of American laws. But China also benefited. An extraordinary push in the education sector has allowed that country to skillfully use its position as a global reservoir of low-cost labor to achieve the massive technology transfers that have made its access to primacy in the 21st century a serious possibility.
  3. The basic reality of the next several decades will be Sino-American strategic competition, towards which the second-rank powers, like the European Union as a political unit, will have to position themselves. Trump wanted to pull out of NATO. Biden will undoubtedly want to strengthen it, i.e., in his mind, to politically and economically rally its members behind the star-spangled banner in the fight to contain China. For Europeans, who are hardly eager for a strategic rapprochement with China and who, unlike the main Asian powers, are lagging behind in the technological race, the temptation to put themselves under an American protectorate even more than they did during the Cold War could be irresistible. But with what term-long perspective and under what conditions with respect to their nearest neighbors in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa? That is the question.

For now, Europeans are relishing the election of a once-again empathetic American president who will warmly welcome them to the Oval Office and elsewhere. At a time when they are facing an invisible enemy that threatens them as well as Americans, they are not alone in yearning for a respite. May the Atlantic Alliance in the short term be the first alliance against the virus. For once in its history, do we not have an opportunity to reinterpret article five of the treaty and harness all of NATO’s resources to fight the pandemic together?

Thierry de Montbrial

Founder and Chairman of the WPC
Founder and Executive Chairman of Ifri

Joseph Nye: Can Joe Biden’s America Be Trusted?

Can Joe Biden’s America Be Trusted?

Project Syndicate – 04.12.2020

By Joseph S. Nye, JR.

America’s friends and allies have come to distrust it in the wake of Donald Trump’s presidency. Joe Biden will do all that he can to repair the damage, but the deeper problem is that many are asking whether Trump was merely a symptom of the decline of American democracy.

CAMBRIDGE – Friends and allies have come to distrust the United States. Trust is closely related to truth, and President Donald Trump is notoriously loose with the truth. All presidents have lied, but never on such a scale that it debases the currency of trust. International polls show that America’s soft power of attraction has declined sharply over Trump’s presidency.

Can President-elect Joe Biden restore that trust? In the short run, yes. A change of style and policy will improve America’s standing in most countries. Trump was an outlier among US presidents. The presidency was his first job in government, after spending his career in the zero-sum world of New York City real estate and reality television, where outrageous statements hold the media’s attention and help you control the agenda.

In contrast, Biden is a well-vetted politician with long experience in foreign policy derived from decades in the Senate and eight years as vice president. Since the election, his initial statements and appointments have had a profoundly reassuring effect on allies.

Trump’s problem with allies was not his slogan “America First.” As I argue in Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, presidents are entrusted with promoting the national interest. The important moral issue is how a president defines the national interest.

Trump chose narrow transactional definitions and, according to his former national security adviser, John Bolton, sometimes confused the national interest with his own personal, political, and financial interests. In contrast, many US presidents since Harry Truman have often taken a broad view of the national interest and did not confuse it with their own. Truman saw that helping others was in America’s national interest, and even forswore putting his name on the Marshall Plan for assistance to post-war reconstruction in Europe.

In contrast, Trump had disdain for alliances and multilateralism, which he readily displayed at meetings of the G7 or NATO. Even when he took useful actions in standing up to abusive Chinese trade practices, he failed to coordinate pressure on China, instead levying tariffs on US allies. Small wonder that many of them wondered if America’s (proper) opposition to the Chinese tech giant Huawei was motivated by commercial rather than security concerns.

And Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement and the World Health Organization sowed mistrust about American commitment to dealing with transnational global threats such as global warming and pandemics. Biden’s plan to rejoin both, and his reassurances about NATO, will have an immediate beneficial effect on US soft power.

But Biden will still face a deeper trust problem. Many allies are asking what is happening to American democracy. How can a country that produced as strange a political leader as Trump in 2016 be trusted not to produce another in 2024 or 2028? Is American democracy in decline, making the country untrustworthy?

The declining trust in government and other institutions that fueled Trump’s rise did not start with him. Low trust in government has been a US malady for a half-century. After success in World War II, three-quarters of Americans said they had a high degree of trust in government. This share fell to roughly one-quarter after the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal of the 1960s and 1970s. Fortunately, citizens’ behavior on issues like tax compliance was often much better than their replies to pollsters might suggest.

Perhaps the best demonstration of the underlying strength and resilience of American democratic culture was the 2020 election. Despite the worst pandemic in a century and dire predictions of chaotic voting conditions, a record number of voters turned out, and the thousands of local officials – Republicans, Democrats, and independents – who administered the election regarded the honest execution of their tasks as a civic duty.

In Georgia, which Trump narrowly lost, the Republican secretary of state, responsible for overseeing the election, defied baseless criticism from Trump and other Republicans, declaring, “I live by the motto that numbers don’t lie.” Trump’s lawsuits alleging massive fraud, lacking any evidence to support them, were thrown out in court after court, including by judges Trump had appointed. And Republicans in Michigan and Pennsylvania resisted his efforts to have state legislators overturn the election results. Contrary to the left’s predictions of doom and the right’s predictions of fraud, American democracy proved its strength and deep local roots.

But Americans, including Biden, will still face allies’ concerns about whether they can be trusted not to elect another Trump in 2024 or 2028. They note the polarization of the political parties, Trump’s refusal to accept his defeat, and the refusal of congressional Republican leaders to condemn his behavior or even explicitly recognize Biden’s victory.

Read the original article published on Project Syndicate.

Sally Eaves WPC – Health

Prof. Sally Eaves is a highly experienced Chief Technology Officer, Professor in Advanced Technologies and Global Strategic Advisor, Author and Speaker on Digital Transformation, Sustainability, HealthTech and Social Impact. She specializes in the application of AI, Cloud, CyberSecurity, Blockchain, IoT & 5G disciplines for both business and societal benefit at scale. Sally is Senior Policy Advisor for the Global Foundation of Cyber Studies & Research and has founded ‘edtech’ enterprise Aspirational Futures to enhance accessibility, inclusion and diversity in education, technology and beyond.

Sophie Turrettini – WPC Health

Sophie Turrettini

General Secretary of the Fondation Dr Henri Dubois-Ferrière Dinu Lipatti and board member of several charity foundations in Geneva. In charge of administration, accounting and human resources for several companies in various industries. Member of the board of the WPC Foundation since 2013.

Karim El Aynaoui WPC – Health

President of the Policy Center for the New South, and Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences and Executive Vice-President of the Mohammed VI Polytechnic University. From 2005 to 2012, he worked at the Central Bank of Morocco as the Director of Economics, Statistics and International Relations. Prior to this, he served as an economist at the World Bank. He holds scientific and advisory positions in various institutions, including the Malabo-Montpellier Panel, the Moroccan Capital Market Authority, and the French Institute of International Relations. He is also advisor to the CEO and Chairman of the OCP Group, and serves as a board member of the OCP Foundation and as a global member of the Trilateral Commission. He holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Bordeaux.

Nicolas de Germay WPC – Health

Vice Chairman of the WPC. He manages the organisation of the annual conference since its first edition in 2008. He is also chairman and founder of Alandia, a restructuring advisory firm which helped various States or Sovereign funds to regain control over their industrial investments (Middle East, Africa and West Asia). Former Vice chairman of the Franco Indian chamber of commerce, he was more especially in charge of agricultural investments. He seats, or seated, at several Advisory Boards such as British Telecom or PWC. He published a book on globalization in June 2010: Mondialisation, un autre regard and one on restructuring issues in France (2015).

Dominique David WPC – Health

Advisor to the Executive Chairman, Ifri, Editor of Politique étrangère and co-director of the annual report Ramses. He is also President of the Austro-French Centre for Rapprochement in Europe. Former Executive Vice-President of Ifri. Previously, he was in charge of the Security Studies department at Ifri. Before joining Ifri, he was Deputy Director of the Institut français de polémologie (French Institute of Polemology), and then Secretary General of the FEDN (Fondation pour les études de défense nationale). He also taught at the Military School of Saint-Cyr, at the Paris I University and at the Institut d’études politiques de Paris (IEP). His studies and publications deal with strategic issues, particularly with French strategy and European issues.

Vuk Jeremić WPC – Health

President of the Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development, a global public policy think-tank based in Belgrade, and Editor-in-Chief of the quarterly magazine Horizons – Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development. He is also the leader of Serbia’s opposition People’s Party. In 2016, he participated in the official election for UN Secretary-General and finished in second place. In 2012, he was elected President of the 67th session of the UN General Assembly. During his term in office he played a leading role in steering the UN towards the establishment of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. He served as Serbia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2007 to 2012.

François Nordmann WPC – Health

Former Ambassador of Switzerland to France (2002-2007). He joined the Foreign Service in 1971. He held several positions such as Ambassador to Guatemala and to other States of Central America, Head of the Swiss Delegation to UNESCO, Ambassador to the United Kingdom and Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the international organizations in Geneva. He contributes regularly to the Swiss newspaper Le Temps. He studied law and international relations at the University of Fribourg and the Graduate Institute for  International Studies in Geneva.

Gilles Guérin WPC – Health

Managing Director of Banque Bordier & Cie, Geneva. He is also a member of the Board and Treasurer of the WPC Foundation. His area of expertise is private asset management. He was formerly Managing Partner at EFG Bank in Geneva. He previously worked as a money market dealer at the Al Saudi bank in Paris, then as treasurer for Europe at the National Bank of Abu Dhabi in Paris. He received a degree in economics from the University of Neuchâtel and an advanced management degree from the École des Cadres de Lausanne.

Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus WPC – Health

Director-General of the World Health Organization since 2017. Prior to his election, he served as Ethiopia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2012 to 2016 and as Minister of Health from 2005 to 2012. He holds a PhD in Community Health from the University of Nottingham and a MSc in Immunology of Infectious Diseases from the University of London. He is globally recognised as a health scholar, researcher, and diplomat with first-hand experience in research, operations, and leadership in emergency responses to epidemics. Throughout his career Dr Tedros has published numerous articles in prominent scientific journals, and received awards and recognition from across the globe.