NATO headquarters in Brussels on Feb. 7. (Olivier Matthys/AP)
Are Finland and Sweden moving toward applying for membership in NATO after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression against Ukraine?
There is no clear answer yet. NATO membership would be a fundamental change for both countries and must be carefully considered. ”Not hesitating, but with care,” as Finnish President Sauli Niinisto has said. Public opinion in both countries has swung heavily in favor of applying for membership of NATO, and the situation in the respective parliaments seems to be moving in the same direction.
The question is tied to a lengthy history. For Finland, which came out of World War II under the heavy shadow of Stalin’s Soviet Union, NATO membership was never an option during the decades of the Cold War. Sweden, meanwhile, feared that a move into NATO would result in Stalin grabbing complete control of Finland.
But after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Sweden took the lead in applying for membership in the European Union. When I took over as Swedish prime minister after the 1991 election, seeking partnership with Finland in search of E.U. membership was a key objective, and soon thereafter Finland under then-Prime Minister Esko Aho followed.
Together, our two countries entered the European Union in 1995. The age of so-called neutrality — slightly superficial in the Swedish case and severely compromised in the Finnish case — came to an end.
Our countries subsequently entered NATO’s Partnership for Peace, along with Russia. With the three Baltic countries — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — regaining their independence, and Poland gradually moving toward membership of both E.U. and NATO, the situation in the entire region looked very different than during the Cold War.
It was only when Russia under Putin started to demonstrate that its threshold for using military force was lower than many had hoped — first with the war with Georgia in 2008 and then the invasions of Ukraine beginning in 2014 — that a debate on possible NATO membership started.
In both Finland and Sweden, governments set up independent assessments of NATO membership. These reports carefully noted the advantages that membership would bring for the security of the entire region. Both countries also took steps to upgrade their relationship with NATO to the maximum extent that was possible short of membership, and initiated far-reaching bilateral defense cooperation, later extended to NATO member Norway.
Now, Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has created a very new security situation. After initially hesitating, both Sweden and Finland decided on arms shipments to Ukraine, recognizing that the security of all of Europe is at stake. Of the at least 17,000 antitank weapons reportedly delivered to Ukraine, 5,000 are directly from Swedish army stocks. As a result, the relationship with the regime in Moscow will almost certainly be one of deep adversity as long as Putin remains in power.
There is no way back to a past of illusionary neutrality. The choice now is between remaining in a slightly uncertain in-between or recognizing a new reality and taking the step into full membership. It has not gone unnoticed that, in this crisis, the United States has drawn a firm line between the countries covered by NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense commitments and those that are not. Governments come and go, while treaty commitments endure.
It will boil down to politics and leadership. In Finland, the voice of President Niinisto will be decisive. In Sweden, the eyes are primarily on the Social Democrats ruling in a weak minority government. Having been firmly opposed to any NATO move only weeks ago, the party will now face a contest between an older generation and younger ones looking at the world with fresh eyes. That could well result in a U-turn of the sort that contributed to our E.U. membership nearly three decades ago.
There are separate processes in Finland and Sweden, but, in strategic as well as political terms, the countries firmly belong together.
Many factors have to be taken into account. NATO membership for Sweden and Finland would open up the potential of close defense integration with Norway and Denmark, with obvious benefits for all. Sweden and Denmark have declared their ambition to move toward a defense spending target of 2 percent target of GDP, and Norway and Finland are nearly there. This would create a more powerful deterrent against any revanchist Russian moves against the Baltic countries, thus making an important contribution to wider European and Atlantic security.
The long-term relationship with Russia must also be a key consideration. No Nordic country seeks to become a spearhead directed against Russia. In the years to come, we will probably see a Russia significantly weakened by the consequences of the insanity of the Putin aggression. But as long as Putin is in power, we will also see an increasingly despotic, desperate and accordingly dangerous regime.
E.U. defense options must also be on the table. These will take time to create and, with neither the United States nor Britain taking part, will involve limitations.
The road ahead must include strengthened European and Atlantic security structures, while also taking wider global challenges into consideration. A stronger European pillar within NATO, with an enhanced role for the E.U., is likely to emerge. For Finland and Sweden, the question over the next few months is how they will seek to contribute to the building of these new and necessary security arrangements.
There is no going back to how things were.
Read the original article on the site of The Washington Post.
MADRID – Russian President Vladimir Putin’s barbaric war on Ukraine seems to have awakened Germany from its post-Cold War slumber, with a dramatic shift in foreign and defense policy indicating a newfound recognition of Russia’s unreliability as a partner and the broader security challenges Europe faces. But can Germany’s tougher approach withstand a painful and protracted crisis, or will accommodationist voices regain traction, urging acceptance of the realities on the ground?
There is no doubting the resoluteness of Germany’s response to the Russian invasion. Beyond halting the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has announced a €100 billion ($109 billion) increase in defense spending this year and agreed to send weapons – not just helmets – to Ukrainian fighters.
Moreover, Germany has participated in the imposition of sweeping Western sanctions aimed at isolating Russia and inflicting maximum economic pain. More fundamentally, Germany seems finally to have abandoned its long-held belief that dialogue is the only way to deal with the Kremlin.
Germany’s newfound mettle, which has been welcomed across Europe, was by no means guaranteed. For decades, Germany’s approach to geopolitics had emphasized rapprochement and economic engagement, with its Russia policy representing a kind of misguided continuation of the Federal Republic’s Cold War-era Ostpolitik. This persisted through Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, its downing in 2014 of MH-17, a passenger flight passing over eastern Ukraine, and the Kremlin’s poisoning of political opponents like Alexei Navalny, who recovered from a nerve-agent attack in a German hospital.
Germany was not alone in taking a soft-handed approach to Russia. The United Kingdom has continually – and willingly – attracted Russian oligarchs’ dark money. In this sense, Britain’s sanctioning of oligarchs like Roman Abramovich also represents a notable shift.
But, historically, Germany has been at the center of Europe’s political tangles. This was often for the worse: Germany repeatedly disrupted Europe’s balance of power, leading to conflict and unparalleled bloodshed, culminating in World War II. But with the 1951 creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, which bound together Germany and France, the country’s role was transformed.
From Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s tenure in the 1950s and early 1960s through Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s in the 1980s and 1990s, it was said that Germany would find its interests in the interests of the European project. Integration was the only conceivable path to a sustainable and lasting European peace, and Germany was essential to achieving that goal.
After reunification in 1990, Germany leveraged its economic strength and prowess to assume a unique convening power in Europe, which enabled it to define the EU’s agenda – and, thus, trajectory – for decades.
But Germany’s leadership was always selective. It used its influence – enhanced by an EU presidency – to press for the completion of an EU-China investment agreement just a month ahead of US President Joe Biden’s inauguration last year. (That deal is now in limbo, unlikely to be ratified by the European Parliament any time soon.) Germany also pushed forward Nord Stream 2, despite its allies’ concerns.
However, in areas that drew less German interest, such as banking union, the EU was left largely directionless. This dynamic is what prompted former Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski to declare in 2011 that he feared Germany’s power less than its inactivity. In fact, Germany’s selective leadership prevented the EU from forging ahead strategically and left it reliant on former Chancellor Angela Merkel’s personal mediation, which ended when her 16-year tenure did.
In this sense, Putin has done the West a favor. By launching a brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and threatening the West with nuclear escalation, he has shaken the very foundations of the postwar order – and jolted Germany out of its dream of Wandel durch Handel (change through commerce). If recent policy changes are any indication, a more comprehensive and strategic form of German leadership could emerge.
But the Western countries imposing costs on Russia will also face high costs, from low growth to skyrocketing energy bills. The post-pandemic recovery could be all but wiped out in much of Europe. Over time, this – together with the existential dread generated by Putin’s wanton nuclear threats – could generate significant pressure on European leaders to pursue normalization of relations with Russia and even greater accommodation of it. Germany’s coalition government will be no exception.
Putin would view any such shift as yet another demonstration of Western weakness, all but inviting him to pursue ever-bolder gambits. That is why the West, with Germany as a central player, must stand firm in defending its values and opposing Russia’s illegal aggression, despite the costs. Otherwise, sooner or later, we will find ourselves once again living in a world where, as the Athenian historian Thucydides famously put it, “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”
Read the original article on the site of Project Syndicate.