Author: Sangpil Jin, University of Copenhagen
It has become increasingly evident that South Korea’s public perception of China has cooled considerably in recent years. There are several reasons behind this development, including bilateral cultural spats, the dispute over Seoul’s procurement of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, and China’s close ties with North Korea.
Despite the adverse circumstances, bilateral ties between China and South Korea have not reached the point of no return. Although China and South Korea have distinct political, social and cultural systems, neither Beijing nor Seoul can afford to ignore the potential geoeconomic and geopolitical value of a strong China–South Korea relationship. As well as being a major South Korean trading partner, China’s support is crucial for maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula.
China should be wary of the growing confidence among its increasingly nationalist populace about its international status. There are increasing signs that Chinese diplomatic circles have become concerned about the international reception of China’s foreign policy.
The commentary by former Chinese ambassador to Britain, Fu Ying, in the People’s Daily illustrates the belated recognition by Chinese policymakers that Beijing needs to rein in the so-called ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy increasingly adopted by Chinese diplomats. As a highly-experienced ex-diplomat, Fu recognises that the image of a country is judged in the court of international opinion.
Tsinghua University Professor Yan Xuetong similarly recognises the need to avoid the pitfalls of overconfidence, taking issue with ‘[China’s] strong sense of superiority and self-confidence’ — a phenomenon found among many young Chinese students. The President of International Studies at Peking University, Wang Jisi, likewise adopts a cautious tone, predicting a protracted ‘hot peace’ — rather than Cold War — between China and the United States.
These timely comments by prominent Chinese intellectuals lay bare the concerns that Chinese elites have about the deteriorating international perceptions of their country. Beijing cannot successfully implement major policies like the Belt and Road Initiative unless its leadership regains some form of international goodwill.
South Korean foreign policy traditionally relies on its military alliance with the United States. This is unlikely to change as long as the North Korea threat remains. But as the new world order shapes up, South Korea should strive for relatively more balanced diplomacy with both superpowers, helping to maintain at least some semblance of geopolitical balance in the Asia-Pacific.
Given the high-level of hostility among large sections of the South Korean public towards China, pursuing practical interest-based diplomacy with Beijing risks intense backlash. Still, decoupling economically from China is not a viable option for South Korea’s export-oriented economy. Despite having some success in diversifying its exports away from the highly coveted Chinese market towards the rapidly growing ASEAN market, China remains the most important market for South Korean goods in the foreseeable future.
Beijing has, from its perspective, repeatedly demonstrated the desire to improve bilateral ties with South Korea. The December 2021 talks between China’s Vice Foreign Minister, Le Yucheng, and his South Korean counterpart, Choi Jong-kun, are ostensibly evidence of China’s desire to enhance communication between the two countries.
Although a single meeting cannot be assigned too much importance, China’s deteriorating relations with Washington and its allies mean that such talks could enable Seoul to leverage its amicable ties with Beijing to advance mutual interests. Indeed, an advisor to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Jia Qingguo, coincidentally urged China to ‘make more friends and fewer enemies’ and improve its ties with major powers and neighbours.
Under these circumstances, Beijing would welcome a ‘reset’ between China and South Korea, lest the focus of the US-South Korea alliance is broadened beyond North Korea to China. While it might be unrealistic for Seoul to completely sever itself from Washington’s global geostrategy, Beijing and Seoul could still reach a modus vivendi on South Korea’s contribution to the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy and its future relationship with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
Seoul should also review the wisdom of embedding itself too firmly in the US alliance system. South Korea is a quintessential middle power, playing an important role in securing international trade and supplying high-tech goods like semiconductors. But it will only gain more autonomy in international relations when it learns to abandon its one-dimensional outlook on China and embrace a more multidimensional type of diplomacy.
Whether policymakers in South Korea can play a deft hand in maximising Seoul’s bargaining power in relations with both Beijing and Washington remains unclear. Keen to loosen Washington’s hegemonic grip over the Asia-Pacific, Beijing would most certainly welcome any South Korean actions that put a dent in the containment strategy led by the United States.
Read the original article on the site of the East Asia Forum.
MADRID – Russian President Vladimir Putin’s barbaric war on Ukraine seems to have awakened Germany from its post-Cold War slumber, with a dramatic shift in foreign and defense policy indicating a newfound recognition of Russia’s unreliability as a partner and the broader security challenges Europe faces. But can Germany’s tougher approach withstand a painful and protracted crisis, or will accommodationist voices regain traction, urging acceptance of the realities on the ground?
There is no doubting the resoluteness of Germany’s response to the Russian invasion. Beyond halting the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has announced a €100 billion ($109 billion) increase in defense spending this year and agreed to send weapons – not just helmets – to Ukrainian fighters.
Moreover, Germany has participated in the imposition of sweeping Western sanctions aimed at isolating Russia and inflicting maximum economic pain. More fundamentally, Germany seems finally to have abandoned its long-held belief that dialogue is the only way to deal with the Kremlin.
Germany’s newfound mettle, which has been welcomed across Europe, was by no means guaranteed. For decades, Germany’s approach to geopolitics had emphasized rapprochement and economic engagement, with its Russia policy representing a kind of misguided continuation of the Federal Republic’s Cold War-era Ostpolitik. This persisted through Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, its downing in 2014 of MH-17, a passenger flight passing over eastern Ukraine, and the Kremlin’s poisoning of political opponents like Alexei Navalny, who recovered from a nerve-agent attack in a German hospital.
Germany was not alone in taking a soft-handed approach to Russia. The United Kingdom has continually – and willingly – attracted Russian oligarchs’ dark money. In this sense, Britain’s sanctioning of oligarchs like Roman Abramovich also represents a notable shift.
But, historically, Germany has been at the center of Europe’s political tangles. This was often for the worse: Germany repeatedly disrupted Europe’s balance of power, leading to conflict and unparalleled bloodshed, culminating in World War II. But with the 1951 creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, which bound together Germany and France, the country’s role was transformed.
From Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s tenure in the 1950s and early 1960s through Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s in the 1980s and 1990s, it was said that Germany would find its interests in the interests of the European project. Integration was the only conceivable path to a sustainable and lasting European peace, and Germany was essential to achieving that goal.
After reunification in 1990, Germany leveraged its economic strength and prowess to assume a unique convening power in Europe, which enabled it to define the EU’s agenda – and, thus, trajectory – for decades.
But Germany’s leadership was always selective. It used its influence – enhanced by an EU presidency – to press for the completion of an EU-China investment agreement just a month ahead of US President Joe Biden’s inauguration last year. (That deal is now in limbo, unlikely to be ratified by the European Parliament any time soon.) Germany also pushed forward Nord Stream 2, despite its allies’ concerns.
However, in areas that drew less German interest, such as banking union, the EU was left largely directionless. This dynamic is what prompted former Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski to declare in 2011 that he feared Germany’s power less than its inactivity. In fact, Germany’s selective leadership prevented the EU from forging ahead strategically and left it reliant on former Chancellor Angela Merkel’s personal mediation, which ended when her 16-year tenure did.
In this sense, Putin has done the West a favor. By launching a brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and threatening the West with nuclear escalation, he has shaken the very foundations of the postwar order – and jolted Germany out of its dream of Wandel durch Handel (change through commerce). If recent policy changes are any indication, a more comprehensive and strategic form of German leadership could emerge.
But the Western countries imposing costs on Russia will also face high costs, from low growth to skyrocketing energy bills. The post-pandemic recovery could be all but wiped out in much of Europe. Over time, this – together with the existential dread generated by Putin’s wanton nuclear threats – could generate significant pressure on European leaders to pursue normalization of relations with Russia and even greater accommodation of it. Germany’s coalition government will be no exception.
Putin would view any such shift as yet another demonstration of Western weakness, all but inviting him to pursue ever-bolder gambits. That is why the West, with Germany as a central player, must stand firm in defending its values and opposing Russia’s illegal aggression, despite the costs. Otherwise, sooner or later, we will find ourselves once again living in a world where, as the Athenian historian Thucydides famously put it, “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”
Read the original article on the site of Project Syndicate.